Return to Coercion Theory





Address by

Ambassador Paul D. Taylor (Ret.)


June 16, 1998





Don’t just stand there, do something! Few phrases better capture the American spirit of activism than "don’t just stand there, do something!" Doing something, in the realm of foreign affairs, frequently means imposing economic sanctions. Sanctions against 35 countries were instituted from 1993 to 1996 by 61 U.S. laws and executive orders. Sanctions have become the method of first resort in foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. As we meet, Congress has under consideration new legislation on sanctions specifically relating to religious persecution, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms sales and transfers, terrorism, narcotics, travel restrictions, workers’ rights, war crimes, torture and other aspects of human rights. Many of these congressional ventures into foreign policy will be paper tigers. They may give us the satisfaction of condemning objectionable behavior but no other results.

You may think that sanctions never work. We all know of cases that would support healthy skepticism about their efficacy. In fact, sanctions failed in more than four out of five cases in the 1970’s and 1980’s according to research at the Institute for International Economics in Washington. Worse yet, sanctions are costly. More recent research by the same prestigious institute found that U.S. sanctions in 1995 reduced our exports to 26 target countries by as much as $15 to $19 billion, representing more than 200,000 jobs in the export sector, where wages are relatively high.

As if the economic costs of sanctions were not enough, their cost in terms of our foreign relations can also be significant. When we try to coerce our allies as in the recent Helms-Burton Act, which threatens to punish third-country corporations doing business in Cuba, we jeopardize our relations with our partners in the OECD and even invite retaliation by those very partners against U.S. companies operating in their countries. Beyond annoying our friends, we tarnish our image as a leader in promoting a more open international trading and financial system when we act to interdict free economic flows in order to promote our national security agenda.

Allow me at this point to interject a personal note. During three decades as a diplomat, I worked in a number of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives by imposing economic sanctions and I, too, became a skeptic about their power. I had been Chief of Food Policy in the Department of State when we embargoed grain exports to the U.S.S.R. in order to induce the Soviets to conclude a long-term grain agreement. As a result, we received countless letters from farmers protesting that the measures had destroyed their prices and complaining that they did not wish to be pawns in Henry Kissinger’s chess game. Later, I participated in daily meetings in the White House Situation Room for several weeks to devise ways to tighten the economic screws on Panama in order to push Manuel Noriega out of office. In 1991, I participated from Santo Domingo in efforts to force the military junta in Haiti to allow President Aristide to return to office. In short, my service in the economic wars did not inspire confidence in the magic of economic coercion.

Six years ago, I had the good fortune to be assigned to the Naval War College as the International Affairs Advisor, more commonly known at the "State Department Advisor" to the President and as a teaching member of the faculty. What became apparent to me here, as I taught and read Carl von Clausewitz’ classic treatise On War, was that economic coercion could be designed and analyzed in strategic terms, just like other forms of force. Viewed that way, it was obvious that economic sanctions do work, in some situations and under the right circumstances. The key issue is to identify the factors that make the difference between success and failure.

A Simple Definition

To get at that issue, let us step back from the real world for a few minutes to examine a few simple theoretical concepts. First, economic sanctions can be defined simply as measures taken to alter or prevent economic activity that would otherwise occur. Sanctions employed to achieve a national security objective depend on an equally simple assumption: if we can inflict enough economic pain on an adversary we can induce it to behave as we would like in return for offering to end the pain.

We have more options now for interfering with economic interaction among countries than ever before. International commerce has expanded rapidly. U.S. trade with other countries, for example, grew fourfold from 1970 to 1996. Bear in mind, though, that if sanctions are to achieve the desired consequence, they must not only cause pain, but they must also influence behavior. To put the matter in the terms of Clausewitz, they must constitute "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." Viewed that way, economic sanctions are war, as defined by Clausewitz, and so we had better consider them as such. To think of sanctions as something other than war, even an alternative to war, is to engage in self-delusion. That way of thinking may explain why economic sanctions have sometimes been so ineffective.

Another theoretical contribution came from the distinguished scholar of international relations, Klaus Knorr. Knorr identified three factors that must be met for the successful employment of coercive economic influence:

1) Actor A must have a degree of control over the supply of something Actor B values.

2) Actor B’s need for this supply must be intensive.

3) Actor B’s cost of compliance with the demands of Actor A must be less than the cost of doing without the supply.

Notice that Knorr does not indicate here just how Actor A exercises control over the thing that Actor B wants. Military power may be necessary to prevent sanctions from being circumvented, even though many people often think of economic sanctions as peaceful measures,. To illustrate, once trade is embargoed, the target country, that is the country against which the sanctions are directed, will face new shortages. These shortages drive prices up and create incentives for smugglers to beat the embargo, whether they are acting on behalf of the target government or just serving their own pecuniary interests. Nothing may stop circumvention short of armed force.

Rather than considering sanctions a non-violent form of coercion as opposed to military action, I suggest that we will get further analytically if we recognize that the distinguishing feature of economic sanctions is that they target an enemy’s economy and not his armed forces or territory. As we emphasize that the distinguishing feature of economic sanctions is that they target an economy we can anticipate that sanctions may be implemented by whatever means necessary, be it diplomatic agreement, naval blockade or both. We can also recognize that sanctions may become but one important factor in a strategy in which all available coercive measures must be applied in concert to compel an enemy to do our will.

Three Categories of Objectives

Economic coercion has been called upon to serve distinct three types of national security objectives, and the differences among these objectives significantly color the nature of the intervention and its chance of success. First, we have used economic sanctions to punish a country for behaving badly, with the goal of deterring other countries from following suit. The economic actions employed against India and Pakistan in response to their nuclear tests provide a recent example. We hope that the threat of such retaliation will deter an adversary, just as in military strategy, even as we recognize that if the deterrence fails, executing the punishment may do little to redress the situation. Even if international sanctions succeed in damaging the Indian or Pakistani economies, for example, they still will not put the Indian or Pakistani nuclear genies back into the bottle. The punishment may deter other countries from conducting nuclear tests, unless of course they conclude that the pain inflicted by sanctions on India and Pakistan is an acceptable price to pay to be seen as nuclear powers. A homely example of this type of objective would be withholding candy from a three-year-old. That move might dissuade him from repeating objectionable behavior, but parents in the audience know that punishment does not always change behavior.

A second objective of our intervention in markets has been to prevent our adversaries from getting their hands on certain categories of goods. Export controls on strategic materials that would enhance an adversary’s ability to wage war are a classic use of this strategy. An example of this type of objective is international cooperation to prevent nuclear components from being acquired by non-nuclear countries. To apply the approach to our hypothetical child, if we can withhold candy, we can probably keep him from eating candy. There is always the chance that someone else will provide a supply, but that is an implementational problem, not a conceptual problem.

The third type of objective for which sanctions are often used is to induce another country to do something, for example, get its troops out of Kuwait in the case of Iraq or return President Aristide to office in the example of Haiti. This application is very common, and it is probably the most challenging. In essence, it seeks not just to affect an adversary’s capacity to fight but in fact to bend the will of another, that is, to achieve a psychological transformation. To return to the example of our three-year-old, this approach is analogous to saying there will be no candy until he picks up his toys. Whether it will work depends on how much he likes candy, whether he can get it from someone else and how much he dislikes picking up his toys. Professor Knorr would ask if the child’s costs of compliance are less than the cost to him of doing without the supply. In simple language, is it worth it to pick up in order to get some candy?

Strategic Criteria to Make Sanctions Work

Drawing on this cursory review of theory, and taking specific inspiration from Clausewitz, we can identify 6 essential criteria for a successful strategy of economic sanctions. These strategic criteria are:

1) Support in our own society for a strategy that hurts foreign civilians and often damages the commercial interests of U.S. citizens and taxpayers. Unlike the armed forces, which are a public asset controlled by the government, the front line players in a non-violent sanctions strategy are exporters, importers, investors and financiers. They are likely to see the costs they are called upon to absorb as an unfair tax imposed without due process and perhaps as a boon to their overseas competitors when they are required to suspend their business operations. They will often see sanctions as destroying costly investments built over time.

2) The degree to which an adversary is susceptible to this kind of pressure. Does the target country rely heavily on foreign trade or finance for things that it can hardly live without? If a country really operates in isolation, consciously practicing autarky, like Albania until it opted to join the world economy a few years ago, it offers no fulcrum for the lever of international sanctions. Do we understand enough about the psychology and the culture of the target population to gauge how much economic suffering they can tolerate and how they will respond to it?

3) Know who in the target country will be hurt by economic sanctions and whether they have enough political clout to make their government accept our demands. This is no time to think of another country as just a black box. We need to look inside the political structure of a target country and examine its dynamics to calculate how it will respond.

4) The willingness of other countries to cooperate with us to deny our adversary something he really has to have. Is another country or group standing by to offset the effect of the sanctions for political or commercial reasons?

5) The adequacy of the sanctions strategy to achieve the objective which is sought. We country boys know that a pebble from a slingshot can kill a sparrow but it might not even faze a hawk. In particular, it is important to know whether the sanctions are targeted on our adversary’s ability to wage war or on the more difficult challenge of altering his will to act in a certain way. As with our three-year-old, we can be more confident of our ability to deny some strategic good to our target than we can be certain that our adversary will change his willingness to defy us.

6) Whether we are willing to go to armed conflict to reach our objective if the sanctions fail. If not, can we stand to lose prestige by a strategic retreat?

The Case of Iraq

Now let us apply these strategic criteria to some real world examples.

In order to do so, first, let us examine the sanctions employed by the international community against Iraq in 1990 in an effort to induce it to withdraw from Kuwait without having to engage in armed conflict. This example satisfies the axiom that the surest lessons in strategy can be gleaned from failures, not from successes.

In 1990, the conditions for economic sanctions against Iraq seemed to many observers strongly to favor success. Serious experts in national security argued, in the spirited political debate about whether to commit U.S. forces to combat, that economic sanctions alone could get Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait if "given a chance." After all, Iraq was dependent on imports for two-thirds of its food supply. Petroleum accounted for 95 percent of its export earnings, and other suppliers were willing to make additional oil available when the world stopped buying from Iraq. All the major powers in the international economy and the vast majority of the secondary players were willing, with the Cold War behind them, to cooperate in the trade and financial embargoes. Moreover, the purpose of the effort was unusually clear. Security Council Resolution 661 called on member states to prevent trade with Iraq or Kuwait and to do so in support of Resolution 660, which had demanded "that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces [from Kuwait]."

Sanctions did work swiftly to constrict Iraqi trade. The closure of the pipelines in Turkey and Saudi Arabia and the effective naval blockade reduced Iraqi exports of petroleum from 2.7 million barrels a day to an estimated 100,000 barrels. Export earnings fell sharply, curtailing imports, and shortages quickly triggered acute inflation. Most ordinary Iraqis diverted their attention from other concerns, including politics, to devote increasing time to hunt for scarce goods.

The sanctions against Iraq have to be recognized as one of the most successful applications of sanctions in history if viewed in terms of how much they disrupted the international economic relations of the intended target country, Iraq. Why, then, did the sanctions not do more to induce Saddam Hussein’s government to comply with the demands of the international community? Turning again to Klaus Knorr, Knorr explained the relationship between economic sanctions and the demands they were designed to satisfy when he wrote in 1977 that "defiance will occur when the economic burden falls short of the costs of compliance." How, then, did the economic burden on Iraq fall short of exerting the influence we might have expected?

First, it was easy to underestimate the capacity of the Iraqi people to endure economic pain. They had effectively been "immunized" during the l980’s by their prolonged war with Iran. As their country suffered an estimated 400,000 casualties, their economy had experienced repeated cuts in civilian imports--50 percent in 1983 alone--as well as a massive shift of resources from civilian to military uses. During that war, many Iraqis had learned to adjust their diets to compensate for shortages of foodstuffs and to hoard hard currency and gold. Their government, for its part, moved to provide some equity in the distribution of food by restoring rationing, at subsidized prices, and provided new incentives to increase domestic food production.

Nonetheless, by March 1991, the combined effects of the embargo and of Desert Storm had created unrest throughout the Kurdish north and the Shia south, posing the most serious threat to Saddam’s rule in 23 years. Revolts led by Shia Muslems flared in at least nine key southern cities, surpassing any unrest experienced during the war with Iran. The rebellion provided Saddam an excuse to institute a secondary embargo to divert the available supplies of electricity, food and other consumer goods to his supporters, primarily Sunni Moslems. He punished the Kurdish and Shia populations by denying them goods and services. Thus the ethnically-fractured nature of Iraqi society frustrated a sanctions strategy which had assumed that the enemy could be worn down but did not take account of how little some segments of the public could influence their government. Instead of replicating the familiar situation in Western democracies, where widespread deprivation could be expected to create significant political pressure, Saddam deftly exploited the situation to concentrate the suffering on his adversaries while he simultaneously protected his political base.

Another problem for the sanctions strategy was that Jordan’s support of the embargo was no better than half hearted. Jordan itself suffered from the sanctions as a neighbor and a major trading partner of Iraq, and Saddam’s attempt to curry favor with other Arabs by championing the cause of Palestinians found resonance in Jordan. Jordanian cooperation with Iraq played a major role in the success of Iraqi efforts to restore basic services, repair key military and civilian infrastructure and increase the supply of consumer goods even though the amount of Jordan’s trade with Iraq was modest by pre-embargo standards.

This result demonstrated that enlisting the right allies can be even more important to a strategy of economic sanctions than in a military conflict. Recall that economic sanctions are simply measures taken to interrupt the transactions that occur naturally in the absence of artificial barriers. Thus when a neighbor stays neutral or offers only tepid support for sanctions, the effect is not neutral but in fact becomes helpful to the target country. No one would argue that adding Jordan’s military forces to the coalition would have made much difference to the outcome of Desert Storm. By contrast, the effects of Jordan’s lackluster support--or even systematic undermining--of the embargo may have been decisive.

In retrospect, no one argues now that economic sanctions alone could have compelled Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, or at least to do so soon enough to avoid unacceptable suffering on the part of the victims of his aggression.

Looking at this case with the benefit of hindsight, we see that our strategic criteria could have predicted the failure of the sanctions strategy to achieve the difficult task for which the international community employed sanctions. The plus signs on the slide indicate that the situation was favorable in terms of a strategic criterion and, naturally, the negatives represent an unfavorable factor in terms of our criteria. On the plus side, public support for the sanctions was strong. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait was widely condemned, and in addition, our businesses suffered little from the sanctions, primarily because any shortages caused by restricting exports of oil from Iraq were offset by increased production in other countries.


On the negative side, we were attempting to change the enemy’s will. While he was vulnerable economically, the psychological vulnerability of the Iraqi population was lower than some might have predicted. The victims had little ability to make Saddam feel their pain. Jordan’s failure to cooperate effectively in the sanctions lessened their sting. The most serious weakness in the sanctions strategy was simply that it was asked to accomplish too much. Our paramount demand was that Saddam withdraw his troops from Kuwait. His first requirement was to survive politically, and he may have doubted whether he could hang on politically if he left Kuwait before he was evicted physically.

A Few Cases in History

Now let us look briefly at some famous and not-so-famous examples of the use of sanctions and see what our strategic criteria can tell us about why some attempts succeeded and others failed.

The Old Testament. We learn in II Kings that when the Moabites came to the camp of Israel, the Iraelites rose up and smote them and drove them out. Not content with a defensive victory, the Israelites pursued the Moabites into their own country. To quote, "They overthrew the cities, and on every good piece of land every man threw a stone, until it was covered, they stopped every spring of water, and felled all the good trees." The king of Moab tried with 700 swordsmen to counter attack militarily, but that failing, he decided he had no alternative but to offer his oldest son and designated successor as a burnt offering. The Israelite forces did not linger to enjoy their victory. We are told that in the midst of great indignation after having rendered the Moab economy uninhabitable, they withdrew to their own land.


We can see in this case that our strategic criteria were favorable in all respects to the strategy of the Israelites.

The Napoleonic Wars. Early in the last century, Napoleon sought to fight sea power with land power, to use his political control of the Continent to shut British goods and shipping out of European ports and thereby ruin the British economy. Reflecting Mercantilist thinking, he failed to understand that trade was a positive sum game that benefited not only exporters but also their customers. Europeans, even the French Army, continued to demand British goods, and they were able to create major leaks in the Continental System, which finally only engendered widespread antagonism toward the Napoleonic regime, according to R. R. Palmer and Joel Colton in their History of the Modern World. Our strategic criteria could have alerted Napoleon that without the support of his public and his allies he had meager chance to defeat the British by economic sanctions.

The U.S. Civil War. In our own Civil War, the naval blockade of ports in the South reduced the Confederacy’s seaborne trade to less than a third of normal levels at a time when its need for goods of all kinds was much greater than in peacetime. Limiting the export of cotton to Europe and restricting the supply of critical manufactured goods, the embargo was also one of the causes of the ruinous inflation that reduced the Confederate dollar to one percent of it original value by the end of the war. James McPherson, in his classic history of the Civil War, Battle Cry of Freedom, concludes that "although naval personnel constituted only 5 percent of the Union armed forces, their contribution to the outcome of the war was much larger." Our strategic criteria help explain why.

Japan. In this century, the Roosevelt Administration responded to Japanese ambitions in Indo-China in 1940 by restricting the export of aviation fuel and iron and steel to Japan. Then in July, 1941, the United States froze Japanese assets and imposed a licensing requirement for all trade with Japan. On December 1, 1941, General Tojo told the Japanese Privy Council that the United States would not modify its position. A day later, the Japanese Ambassador explained to Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles that "the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a more effective weapon of war than military measures; that . . . they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure." We know what happened at Pearl Harbor later that week. In this instance, we may conclude that sanctions were indeed effective but produced a perverse consequence. By raising the stakes significantly, they helped precipitate the conflict they were designed to deter.

To apply our strategic criteria again, the cost to the Japanese of compliance with our demands was simply out of proportion to the burden of the sanctions, especially when it was not obvious that we were willing to resort to arms if the sanctions failed.

Cuba. The sanctions imposed against the Castro regime in the 1960’s were intended first to discourage Cuban insurgent activity against other countries in Latin America and later to force internal reforms in Cuba. Their main effect, initially, was to cement Havana’s ties to Moscow, which during the Cold War provided massive economic support to Cuba. The sanctions strategy was not supported by other major industrialized countries, so what Cuba could have bought from or sold to the United States could be traded in other markets. In other words, the economic effect of our policy has been negligible. That point has been largely overlooked. An unhappy result of the sanctions has been to provide Fidel Castro a plausible external explanation for the shortcomings of his disastrously managed Socialist economy. If that were not bad enough, they have opened us to criticism that we are injuring innocents, such as was heard from Pope John Paul II during his recent visit to Cuba.

Applying our strategic criteria, we see that our strategy of sanctions against Cuba has had little going for it beyond domestic support. The strongest argument against the sanctions, in my view, is that they actually help Castro by making him appear the victim, rather the cause, of a wounded economy.

South Africa. In a quite different case, the U.S. Congress, in an effort to end the apartheid policy of racial segregation, formalized South Africa’s isolation by passing strict curbs on the ability of U.S. companies to do business there. These measures, along with others taken by other countries against South Africa hit the South African business elite. Combined with a package of non-economic international measures, such as exclusion of segregated athletic teams from international competitions, the sanctions were credited with contributing to the election of a majority, black-led government.

The key to this success, in terms of our strategic criteria, was that the international community was able to cooperate in pressing key South Africans who had political influence and to do so using a variety of measures together.

Soviet Union. In 1981, the U.S. embargoed grain shipments to the Soviet Union to press it to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. Other nations broke ranks and sold grain to the Soviet Union while American farmers grumbled about the loss of their markets. When the embargo proved ineffective, President Reagan lifted it. The eventual Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan had nothing to do with our embargo.

Here our strategic criteria highlight the weakness of a strategy that lacked critical support at home and from other countries. Given those handicaps, it should not surprise us that an embargo on one product did not move the Soviets to undertake a major shift in their international program.

Panama. In the late 1980’s, the sanctions imposed by the United States to induce Manuel Noriega to resign his presidency seriously wounded the Panamanian economy, which was integrated with ours and especially vulnerable to pressure from us. Nonetheless, our policy had little chance to achieve its objective inasmuch as the people who suffered from our actions had no appreciable influence over an authoritarian Noriega. Our own government assured the policy’s failure when the Justice Department obtained an indictment of Noriega and thus put him on notice that if he left Panama, as we had been insisting, he was likely to end up in an American prison. Needless to say, the national security community did not clear that indictment, but the indictment had the effect of narrowing our choices essentially to two options: abandon our declared objective or go after Noriega militarily.

Our strategic criteria could have predicted that squeezing a people who had no political power offered scant hope of forcing their President to submit to an unconditional political surrender.

Haiti. In this decade, when President Aristide of Haiti was forced from office in a military coup, the U.S. rapidly organized an international trade embargo. Despite some leakage in the embargo, the sanctions succeeded in crippling what had already been the poorest economy in this hemisphere. The effects within Haiti proved counterproductive, though, because military personnel were able to profit from their ability to control the scarce supplies that remained available while the principal victims of the restrictions were not only the poorest elements of Haitian society, but also Aristide’s most enthusiastic supporters. By raising the matter to a high profile when it imposed sanctions, the U.S. Government created the conditions which pushed it later to have to employ military action to restore Aristide to office.

As in the case of Panama, the sanctions hurt people who had no political influence. Our strategic criteria could also have warned us that the task we were asking sanctions to perform was simply excessive.

Guatemala. In a little remembered event in 1993, President Jorge Serrano dismissed the Guatemalan Congress and sought to consolidate all legislative powers in the presidency. His action ran counter to the strong U.S. emphasis on democratic governance in this hemisphere and stimulated an immediate threat of a trade embargo. This threat hit commercial leaders in Guatemala who feared a reversal of recent successes in their country’s export-led growth strategy. They had the political muscle to protect their interest and they quickly persuaded Serrano to retreat from his power grab.

In terms of our strategic criteria, the economic sanctions that were threatened proved adequate to do the job because they targeted a politically important group who were able to convince their government to undertake a relatively modest change of course.

Economic Sanctions Like Some Other Instruments of Warfare

Now that we have examined some of the history of economic sanctions, let us compare them with two other strategies unequivocably associated with warfare: strategic bombing and submarine campaigns against an enemy’s commerce. The three approaches target the same objective, i.e. the enemy’s economy. Each approach is essentially a standoff technique, carried out with minimal exposure of friendly forces. Each is likely to injure non-combatants and that factor makes it difficult to predict either how it will affect an enemy’s will to resist or how long the country applying the pressure can sustain a political consensus to do so. Eliot Cohen wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1994, "Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength, in part because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment." He could have been discussing sanctions.

One is hard pressed to find an example of a major strategic objective being achieved by economic sanctions, strategic bombing or submarine warfare alone. If any of these approaches is applied in concert with other types of force, though, the result can be decisive. The advantages of combined arms have become accepted as axiomatic in military warfare. Joint operations involving a rich mix of infantry, armor, air power and sea power rapidly achieved the strategic objectives of Desert Storm. Strategists should consider economic sanctions as one more weapon to be included in the concept of combined arms. Similarly, those contemplating the application of economic sanctions or assessing their results would be well advised to learn to think in terms of the strategy of conflict.

As we look into the future, we ought to consider that the track record is not very good on convincing countries to give up by attacking their social and economic infrastructure.


We have seen that if we plan and execute economic sanctions strategically, they need not be useless but neither are they an all-purpose weapon. They may be effective if our objectives are proportional to the weight of our measures and if the right conditions are present, especially in the target country and with our potential allies. When sanctions are the only pressure we are applying, our demands may have to be relatively modest if we are to have any hope of success, as in the Guatemalan case. We should also think twice about the costs to our own economy and what our next steps should be if sanctions fail. We must particularly avoid using sanctions as an easy way out when no other course of action appears attractive. We would benefit as a country if we learned to think about all the consequences of going to war before we fire even an economic shot. In the worst case, a casual decision to impose sanctions can condemn us to an unhappy choice between surrender and military action.

So to conclude, don’t just stand there! Think strategically!



Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).

The Bible, Revised Standard Version, American Bible Society, 1973.

Eliot Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," Foreign Affairs, January/February, 1994.

Klaus Knorr, "International Economic Leverage and its Uses," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager eds., Economic Issues and National Security, (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977).

James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988)

R. R. Palmer and Joel Cohen, A History of the Modern World, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

Robin Renwick, Economic Sanctions, Harvard Studies in International Affairs, Number 45, (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981).

Paul D. Taylor, "Clausewitz on Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq," Strategic Review, Summer 1995.