

War and Strategic Communications

“The Way Ahead”

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Key Points From the Conference

- **U.S. Must Improve Internal and External Communications**
 - Accurately Portray What Americans Stand For
 - Express Our National Interests Forthrightly
- **U.S. Needs to Better Understand Its Enemies**

How Might We Accomplish These Goals?

- Tell the Truth – No “Spin”
- Promote Discourse/Dialog
(Telling and Listening to Stories)
- Ensure Transparency
- Recognize We Confront a Global
Islamist Insurgency (Conceptually We
Do Not Understand Insurgencies)

Everything relates, or ought to
relate, to strategy.*

- Colin Gray

* Paraphrase

“. . . war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.”

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton university Press, 1976), p. 69.

“. . . war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise?

Ibid., p. 605

Elements of National Power

Diplomatic

Military

Informational

Economic

“War is war!”

- Professor Colin Gray
U.S. Army War College
13 April 2005

In war more than in any other subject we must begin by **looking at the nature of the whole**, for here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together.

- Carl von Clausewitz

High-intensity conflict
Major regional contingency
Major theater war
Major combat operation
Conventional war
Regular war
Traditional war
Low-intensity conflict
Lesser regional contingency
Small-scale contingency
Small War
Minor War
Insurgency
Unconventional war
Irregular war
Nontraditional war
Stability operations
Asymmetrical war
Network-centric war
Cyber war

“War is **more than a chameleon** that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.”

- Carl von Clausewitz


“We can thus only say that the aims a belligerent adopts, and the resources he employs . . . will also **conform to the spirit of the age** and to its general character.”

- Carl von Clausewitz

Nuclear War

“Classical” War

Insurgency



**Military
Innovation
in the
Interwar
Period**

**EDITED BY
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett**

Statement of the Problem

The U.S. military has mastered the art of combined-arms operations writ large—air, ground, and naval forces working together as a coherent team—in regular or conventional operations and has demonstrated that mastery in Operation Desert Storm and in the attack on Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The U.S military has been less successful when operating against enemies such as insurgents, guerrillas, militias, and terrorists.

The theory and nature of war are inexorably joined. Theory provides the basis upon which the nature of war can be determined. Theory is education and deliberation that forms a common understanding and a norm against which one can compare the situation at hand. Without a theory of war, there is no point of departure to begin understanding how and why wars are fought.

*Theory and Nature of War Course Outline for Academic Year
1991-92, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps
University, Quantico, VA, p. 7*

“To understand the phenomena of ‘war’ or ‘operations other than war,’ we must view them in the context of conflict. . . . A general theory of conflict would expedite communications and coordination between the diverse efforts of the many agencies of conflict. An outline of a general theory of conflict starts with conflict as the competition of contradictory ideas. The mechanism of conflict is two-fold: logic and violence.”

David A Fastabend, *A General Theory of Conflict: Bosnia, Strategy and the Future*, U.S. Army War College Fellowship Research Project, Hoover Institution, Stanford University (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, 1 May 1996) p. ii.

Informational Learning
(Simply Adds New Information)

Transformational Learning
(Creates New or Revised
Schema or Mental Model)

- Dr. Jack Mesriow

The Problem of Insurgency— Overview


Take three different perspectives on insurgency:

- **Actual** (ontological)
 - General Characteristics
 - Emerging Global Features
- **Systemic**
 - Insurgency as a Complex System
 - A Systemic Model of Insurgency (based on Clausewitz)
- **Metaphorical**
 - Insurgency as Epidemic

The Problem of Insurgency: Transcendent Logic

Insurgent elite
Ideology (Esoteric)

Cabal
Terrorist
Kook



Transcendent Logic

Insurgency

People(s)
Grievances/Interests (Pragmatic)


Rebellion

General Characteristics of Insurgency

- **Because insurgent generally lacks resources to meet a ruling power initially on equal terms, adopts what appear to be *irregular* violent *methods*, all of which emphasize tactical offensive:**
 - Guerrilla warfare
 - Terrorism—as a *method* vice a *logic*
 - Coup
 - Sabotage
 - Assassination
 - Hostage-taking
 - Intimidation/coercion
- **Political methods include:**
 - Recruitment
 - Organization
 - Taxation
 - Propaganda—possibly aimed toward several different audiences
 - Fund raising
 - Shadow governance
 - Provision of other services
- **Struggle tends to be protracted**
- **Insurgency tends both to feed and feed on instability**

A Systemic Model of Insurgency


- The distinction of insurgency from other forms of warfare is that the primary conflict is not *between* combatants but *over* control of the people, fought *through* the people
- Insurgency a socio-political problem first, a military problem second
 - Defeating the fighters a necessary *secondary* aim



- Intervening power must secure the support of its own people for the intervention policy for the duration of the policy


Metaphor: Insurgency as Epidemic

- **Growing insurgency can be likened to an outbreak of infectious or *communicable* disease**
 - Not in sense that both are a scourge, but in sense of organic dynamics both exhibit
- **Like a communicable disease, insurgent transcendent logic spreads through a population by *individual-to-individual* “contact” based on susceptibility “risk factors,” including importantly government behavior**
 - Some individuals more susceptible than others; some largely immune
- **Like disease, can fester at low level for extended periods (controllable by law enforcement), until right set of conditions allows it to grow past “tipping point” into outbreak**
 - Under right conditions, a small number of infectives can grow quickly to epidemic proportions
 - Outbreaks are highly nonlinear
- **Best hope is to catch the spread early**
- **Different strains carried by different vectors & exhibit different symptoms and outbreak patterns**



The Systemic Logic of the Controlling Idea

- Interdict the infection mechanism that causes individuals to side with the insurgency ...
- ... at the same time strengthening support for the government



- For supporting power: Counter insurgent efforts to weaken resolve of population, while actively fostering ongoing support for the intervention policy
- Single defeat mechanism, but requiring multiple actions in multiple dimensions

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