

# Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: A Rational Decision?

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**A**s Lieutenant Colonel Joe “Gonzo” Gordon, U.S. Air Force was escorted through the Pentagon security system, he was struck at how far removed he was from the enjoyment of spending the past year as a student in beautiful Newport, Rhode Island attending the Naval War College. The Air Force considered Joe a “mover and shaker” and following school assigned him to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) working missile defense issues.

Upon checking in, Gonzo was sent to see his boss, Colonel Jake Connell. Colonel Connell was a no nonsense kind of guy and after a brief handshake, got straight to the point.

“Gonzo, for the past several years, United States policy makers had struggled with what to do about the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Here’s a copy of the speech that Bush gave to the National Defense University on 1 May 2001 when he said, “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world. To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the thirty-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future. It enshrines us in the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today’s threats, that prohibits us from pursuing promising technology to defend ourselves, our friends and our allies, is in our interests or in the interests of world peace.”<sup>1</sup>

“Since President Bush took office he has been adamant about getting rid of the ABM Treaty. He has obviously evaluated over time this treaty and came to the conclusion that it is a hindrance to our national security and the protection of our citizens. He is a realist with a focus on defining national interests in terms of the survival of our nation and he supports the power of our military in achieving its security. The president knows there are many technological challenges ahead but believes they can be solved through new technologies, aggressive testing and time. Look at the selection of people he brings to this administration. Don Rumsfeld, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, and Colin Powell who all had previous knowledge with other administrations in identifying rogue threats and the constraints in working from Russians on the ABM Treaty. It is obvious that he knows that the international community is not supportive of the withdrawal from this treaty but has decided we must move forward and deploy a missile defense system, regardless,” Colonel Connell emphasized.

“I’m sure you know on 13 December 2001 the president made the decision that the United States will withdraw from the Treaty in six months, the very first time in modern

history that the United States has renounced a major international accord.<sup>2</sup> As your first assignment at OSD, I want you to provide me a point paper on the President's decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Your emphasis should be on why the 13 December decision was made. This will give you an opportunity to learn about all the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty, missile deployment, future missile testing and meet some contacts over at the State Department, the Pentagon, and Congress working the missile defense issues. My secretary will give you some points of contact and I'd like to see your work in the next day or two. Good luck!"

Colonel Connell's secretary provided Gonzo three points of contact, a copy of the 1972 ABM Treaty, a couple news clippings and showed him to his cubicle. Gonzo had expected a different lifestyle than at Newport and, so far, events had certainly lived up to his expectations.

He figured he needed to get "up to speed" on the ABM Treaty before calling his points of contact, so he quickly took note of the treaty. The treaty was written during President Nixon's time in office when both the United States and Russia had thousands of inter-continental ballistic missiles pointing at one another. Gonzo highlighted one particular point of the treaty that allowed either signatory to withdraw with six months' notice. That would mean the Pentagon would be free to conduct aggressive testing of ground-based, sea-based, and space-based interceptors as well as begin construction of a future ABM site by mid-June 2002.

Well, Gonzo thought, "I guess by mid-2002 the Pentagon will be able to conduct whatever tests it wants since the treaty would be null and void."

One of the news clippings Gonzo read was a *New York Times* article dated November 16, 2001 when President Bush and President Putin ended their three-day summit meeting in Crawford, Texas. The article addressed the fact that the two men had a difference of opinion on the ABM Treaty but that President Putin commented that the abrogation of the treaty would "not threaten the interests of both countries and of the world."<sup>3</sup> The article went on to quote Dr. Rice, the national security adviser (NSA), as saying, "The president has made clear that one way or another the United States will have to get out of the constraints of the missile defense treaty."<sup>4</sup> Gonzo thought that the Russians should not have been too surprised with the 13 December announcement.

With an understanding of the ABM Treaty, Gonzo looked at his list of points of contact and decided to start with the Department of State's, Ms. Alice Worth. He called her office and she was free to see him in an hour.

After a brief introduction, Alice said that she had a tight schedule and suggested they get right to the issue at hand.

"I can give you a fairly accurate account from the State perspective on that decision. First, the decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, which we can legally do, came after Secretary Powell had visited Russia on 3 December. The secretary tried but was unable to fix the

differences with President Putin on how to deal with the arms control treaty that President Bush repeatedly called a “relic” of the cold war. At the time, Secretary Powell felt it was possible to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would allow the Pentagon to do its tests. Initially NSA Rice had been supportive of Secretary Powell in seeking greater compromise with the ABM Treaty testing limitations. Both Powell and Rice wanted ‘to do everything we need to do with testing and accomplish all the other objectives within the ABM Treaty constraints with Russia all at the same time.’<sup>5</sup>

“But since the 11 September terrorist attacks, she eventually sided with Secretary Rumsfeld on the need to pull out of the treaty. I heard from a friend in the National Security Council that she had been leaning towards doing away with the treaty once our war on terrorism was moving forward so smoothly. I guess you could surmise that the Russians were not agreeing with our issues of the treaty but cooperating in the war on terrorism—implication being no big cost for abrogation.”

Alice continued, “It should not surprise you that many see the president’s decision to abrogate the treaty as a major policy defeat for Secretary Powell who feels strongly that he should be the official spokesman for foreign policy matters and initiatives within the administration. But I’m here to tell you that Secretary Powell is a team player and the key point he has made is that an arms race between Russia and the United States is not taking place. In fact, he is encouraged by the discussions of significant levels of reduction in nuclear warheads between both countries.

“Additionally, the 11 September terrorist attacks have offered opportunities to President Putin and President Bush to battle a common enemy. President Putin’s strong support for American intervention in Central Asia allows President Bush to promote a greater role for Russia in Western security and a possible trade-off for abrogating the ABM Treaty. President Putin’s decision to align Russia with the fight against the Al Qaeda has been hailed as a significant turn in Russia’s post-cold-war policy toward the West. The Russian leader characterizes the Chechnya campaign as Moscow’s battle against terrorism, and since Putin has already agreed on the existence of the threat and on the desirability of defenses, the United States could argue that it had no choice but to abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to counter new missile threats. The State Department continues to work well with the Russians and we do not see the treaty abrogation as a problem.”

Alice went on, “Since President Bush entered office, the reactions of our allies in his statements to abrogate the ABM Treaty have been a concern of ours. In fact, a number of United States European allies have suggested that United States deployment of national missile defense (NMD) might lead to a “Fortress America” mentality among Americans.<sup>6</sup> Many of the citizens of Europe’s four largest countries disapprove of President Bush’s policy on a national missile defense. A poll was taken by the Pew Research Center, the *International Herald Tribune* and the Council on Foreign Relations found that Britons (49%), French (59%), Italians (46%) and Germans (65%) opposed Bush’s decision to develop a national missile defense system. Europeans have been largely critical of Bush since he came to office in January, accusing his administration of being “new unilateralist” and of a failure to

consult with United States allies in Europe on the missile defense issue.<sup>7</sup> It should come as no surprise if this retreat from the ABM Treaty had a negative impact on future efforts by the United States to obtain support from other nations in negotiating new multinational agreements.

“Here are some of the attitudes Europeans have expressed towards national missile defense:

- The U.S. government acted unilaterally by presenting its allies (and others) with essentially a *fait accompli* on NMD, without real concern for allied reactions.
- The very term “rogue state” that has been the foundation for the United States characterization of the new ballistic missile threat is evidence of an arrogance that is dismissive of other countries’ real strategic concerns.
- NMD is a technological response to what is essentially a political and diplomatic problem.
- The United States is in search of 100 percent security, an ideal that is unattainable.
- Underneath everything else, the U.S. drive for NMD is motivated by pressure from the U.S. defense industry and a desire to maintain a technological lead over the rest of the world.
- The United States is locked into an outdated model of international relations in which military power is the decisive element.
- The U.S. NMD program is a strategically and financially disproportionate response to an admittedly changing strategic situation.<sup>8</sup>

“The Europeans generally recognize that the decision to proceed with a deployment to protect United States territory against ballistic missile attack is a sovereign decision for the United States to take. But European governments believe that their interests will be affected by this decision and that it may have adverse effects on Alliance relations.”

Alice continued, “We can’t forget the reaction of our Asian allies either. What’s interesting to note is that the Asian reactions have not changed since the 11 September terrorists attack. The attitudes of Asian governments toward the NMD program and the ABM Treaty vary in direct relation to their ties with the United States. The closer the relations, the greater the support for missile defense and President Bush’ decision on the treaty. America’s friends—Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan—see NMD linked to their own theater missile defense (TMD) systems against potential adversaries they believe also concern the United States. Their TMDs could be integrated into United States NMD’s early warning and command and control satellites. Those countries identified as potential adversaries, principally North Korea and China, oppose United States-sponsored missile defense, whether labeled theater or national, and they see the connection between TMDs of America’s friends and NMD. In the middle are India and Pakistan. Both countries are neutral to United States NMD because of their own interests in nuclear programs.

“Ballistic missile defense has been less controversial in Japan than in Western Europe. The Japanese government generally shares Washington’s perspective about the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. North Korea’s August 1998 test of the Taepo Dong-I ballistic missile, which overflew Japan, made missile defense a vital Japanese security concern. Because the North Korean threat is perceived to be real and immediate, Japanese officials are not preoccupied with the implications of United States NMD for arms control or the ABM Treaty. Japanese officials remain supportive of arms control and improved relations with Russia, but they tend to view Japanese missile defense as an issue of vital national security. Japanese leaders are sensitive to the possibility that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might respond negatively to increased Japanese collaboration with the United States in creating missile defenses yet the threat posed by North Korean ballistic missiles and the fear that these could someday be armed with nuclear warheads overshadow the concern with the PRC reactions.”<sup>9</sup>

Alice noted, “As you have probably heard, NMD received harsh criticism from Pyongyang. North Korea does not like to be labeled as a rogue, a state sponsor of terrorism, or designated as a rationale for NMD. In addition, the closer that United States-South Korean military ties grow, the greater the confidence given to the southern government to push for reunification on its terms and under its leadership.”<sup>10</sup>

“The Chinese are not a signatory to the treaty and China’s arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons is very small but many fear that the president’s decision will prompt them to speed the modernization of their nuclear forces. China has previously responded to renewed United States interest in NMD by working to prevent any change to the status quo as embodied in the ABM Treaty. China and Russia co-sponsored a resolution of the 54<sup>th</sup> United Nations General Assembly on preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty, which China deemed a collective appeal by the international community to the United States.<sup>11</sup> Perhaps anticipating the abrogation of the ABM Treaty, China decided prior to the 13 December announcement to spend an additional \$9.7 billion to boost their second strike levels in an effort to overwhelm the United States NMD structure.”<sup>12</sup>

“The treaty announcement comes at a difficult moment for China’s leaders and the Communist Party. The prospect of a United States NMD system gives new influence to the hard-line elements in the policy process, especially those in the People’s Liberation Army and the defense industries, who favor an increase in military spending. A leadership troubled by these various challenges may look toward increase spending on nuclear forces and modernization of conventional forces. We’ll be watching this situation closely but the State Department’s view is that the argument that withdrawal may cause a new arms race is probably over stated because China is preoccupied with its economic development.”<sup>13</sup>

Alice glanced at her watch and continued, “As you know, the prospect of ballistic missile defenses in Taiwan is deeply unsettling to the Chinese. Operationally, Beijing appears fairly confident of its ability to overwhelm any defenses that Taipei may deploy at this time. The PRC allegedly is well on the way to deploying between 600 and 800 short-range missiles

across the strait from Taiwan by 2005. Beijing knows that if the United States is protected by NMD it will not have to worry about China and would defend Taiwan in times of crisis.<sup>14</sup>

“Of the seven states identified by the State Department as the principal sponsors of terrorism, five (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea) do have ballistic missile programs and are seeking longer-range weapons. States with nuclear capability may feel that they can get away with sponsoring terrorism. That’s one of the reasons that President Bush has concluded now is the time to abrogate the ABM Treaty.”

Gonzo interrupted, “What you’re telling me is that President Bush made the treaty decision without consulting his allies from Europe and Asia? I thought since the “9-11” attacks the Bush administration has put new emphasis on the importance of allies and coalitions. It seems to me that diplomatic relations with Russia, Pakistan, and even China were likely to improve because of their help with combating terrorism. Is that not true?”

Well, Alice said, “We did in fact consult our allies over quite a long period of time. President Bush visited several of our allies shortly after taking office and he made it clear the ABM Treaty was a relic of the Cold War that prevented our security as well as our allies.”

Alice continued, “The whole idea that the war is fought by a coalition is comical. What exactly has Egypt contributed? France sent troops into Mazar-e Sharif after the fighting had stopped. There is a coalition office somewhere in Islamabad, I think. The coalition consists of little more than United States aircraft, U.S. Special Forces, and Afghan friends-of-the-moment on the ground. Like the Gulf War, the Afghan war is unilateralism dressed up as multilateralism.”<sup>15</sup>

Gonzo thanked Alice for her time and insight into the international reactions to Bush’s decision and headed over to his meeting with Colonel Frank Trust at the Air Force Legislative Liaison Office. Frank had been in Legislative Liaison for over two years and worked missile defense issues on the Hill. As usual Frank’s hair was on fire and he had only thirty minutes to spend with Flash. They met in the Pentagon’s cafeteria and Frank quickly brought Gonzo up to speed on why he felt the 13 December decision was made.

Frank noted, “Congressional support of President Bush’s missile defense plan was strengthened after the 11 September terrorist attacks. Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND), chairman of the Budget Committee, said, “what we see here is that we are much more vulnerable to terrorism than to missiles. We’ve got to use our resources to defend against this sort of attack.”<sup>16</sup> And an aide to a House Democrat who opposes missile defense explained, “What happened Tuesday [11 September] was just so terrible that people are rallying round, saying we have to let the president lead us. So we’re going to give him a lot of leeway on national missile defense.”<sup>17</sup> What is interesting to note is that in reading major news media shortly after “9-11,” such as the *L.A. Times*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and others, were not overly supportive or non-supportive of the issue of missile defense. One reason may be the emphasis on finding the terrorists and establishing the Office of Homeland Security.”

Frank continued, “Before and after 11 September terrorist attacks, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Union of Concerned Scientists issued statements urging Congress not to fund missile defense because it will squander resources. FAS went even further when it wrote additional letters to Congress to act vigorously against the ABM Treaty withdrawal and to call on Russia, China, and other states to renew their commitment to multilateral arms controls and nonproliferation. It said that Bush’s decision to withdraw from the treaty is both unnecessary and unwise.<sup>18</sup> Greenpeace, the anti-war environmental group, was also among the groups publicly opposing NMD.<sup>19</sup>

“However, some groups supported the 13 December decision. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank that lobbies Congress, wrote a letter to Congress on 20 December 2001 stating, that under the treaty, we cannot test some of our most promising missile defense systems and that we’ll be safer without the ABM Treaty.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the Center for Security Policy report stated that there can be no longer any disputing the fact that the ABM Treaty impedes the development and testing, as well as the deployment, of effective missile defenses.”<sup>21</sup>

Frank paused for a moment and then continued, “Everyone on the Hill knew in December that the public was very supportive of the administration. The polls show that since 11 September, more Americans believe in the need for missile defense, even though the attacks used airplanes, not missiles. In the days following 11 September, the approval ratings for the president reached record highs and general trust in government achieved levels not seen since the 1960s. A poll conducted on 11 December gave President Bush an 87% approval for his handling on terrorism and an 86% approval to his overall job.<sup>22</sup> With these incredibly high marks for the president, I think the Bush administration was pretty shrewd to select the waning days of our highly successful Operation Enduring Freedom to pull out of the ABM Treaty.

“President Bush has also certainly worked hard to fulfill his campaign promise to defend the American people against ballistic-missile attack as soon as possible—even if it meant withdrawing from the Treaty.<sup>23</sup> I think he learned a great deal from his father’s presidency when promises had been made to American public that were perceived to have not been kept. There’s one thing you can say about Bush, he does not plan to make the same mistake.”

Frank continued, “Also, I heard from some of the House staffers saying one reason that the decision was made in December was that Congress’ winter recess was fast approaching and the president felt that those opponents of NMD would not be as vocal in denouncing his decision to withdraw. You have to remember that winter recess was fast approaching. However, the timing of the president’s ABM announcement did not go over too well with many of the Democrats because they were not consulted. Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) criticized by stating, “Shutting Congress out of the decision-making process involving agreements among nations is a dangerous and corrosive course of action. It effectively undermines the intent of the framers of our Constitution.”<sup>24</sup> Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del), and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented shortly after the decision was announced that the president, “has not offered any convincing

rationale for why any missile defense test it may need to conduct would require walking away from a treaty that has helped keep the peace for the last thirty years. A year ago, it was widely reported that our intelligence community had concluded that pulling out of the ABM would prompt the Chinese to increase their nuclear arsenal tenfold, and when they build up, so will the Indians, and when the Indians do, so will the Pakistanis. And for what? A system no one is convinced will work. Senator Biden was pretty worked up since he learned of the decision by reading it in a newspaper.”<sup>25</sup>

But as you are aware, Frank continued, “Republicans have long supported missile defense. Senator John W. Warner (R-VA), and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee said immediately after the 11 September attacks, I think the recent attack on New York and Northern Virginia has strengthened the argument in favor of a missile defense and this will require us to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The treaty has outlived its purposes and a new framework should be put in place.”<sup>26</sup> Additionally, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) said after the President’s remarks at NDU on 1 May 2001, “I greatly admire President Bush for his commitment to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack.”<sup>27</sup>

Frank continued, “But I think despite opposition from Democrats and some arms control groups, the White House’s decision will not be challenged openly—in part because patriotism is still running very high. The Washington Post-ABC News poll conducted on 18-19 December 2001, indicated that 86% of those interviewed either strongly approved (64%) or somewhat approved (22%) of the way President Bush is handling his job as our president.”<sup>28</sup> I talked with the arms control guys in both OSD and the Joint Staff and their reaction to Bush’s announcement was basically a large yawn. They said the groundwork had been laid months before and it was just a matter of time for the abrogation to take place.

“A few of the interest groups, such as Greenpeace and the Federation of American Scientists, are trying to influence members of Congress right now on the Bush decision but as long as the missile testing results are favorable, the groups should keep quiet.”<sup>29</sup> However, if the tests fail then criticism will likely increase since the price tag is estimated to be \$60 billion.”

Gonzo thanked Colonel Trust for his time.

His next stop was to see Mr. Jim Claus in the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) to find out about the Pentagon role in the decision to abrogate from the treaty.

After a quick handshake, Jim invited Gonzo into his cubicle and explained his thoughts on why the president made the decision in December.

“Let me tell you that we were pushing the secretary of defense hard to get the president beyond that ABM Treaty. But it was an easy sell. As you probably know, back in 1998 a blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission reported that a significant danger of devastating attacks via long-range missile could emerge at any time and with little warning. Well, the study was

chaired by Secretary Rumsfeld. We're lucky to have him as secretary since he knows the capability of rogue states and terrorists as well as anyone else in the administration.

Jim further responded, "You have to admit that Secretary Rumsfeld's stock has hit an all-time high with the military's success in the war on terrorism, the latest successful missile defense test, and with having the national security advisor supposedly in his camp on the ABM Treaty issue. Just look at the latest *Gallup Poll* conducted from 6-9 December 2001 and the public shows the secretary with an 82% approval rating of his handling of the war on terrorism."<sup>30</sup>

"One of the reasons we needed the decision to pull out of the treaty right now was for us to begin spending the \$273 million for construction and breaking ground for a missile defense command center at Fort Greely, Alaska in late April or early May. You can imagine the weather conditions for construction up there and we only have three to four months of spring thaw to begin this massive effort. Secondly, we have some multiple test launches planned in 2002 and the treaty does not allow many of these tests. You may know that after the 13 November 2001 summit in Crawford, Texas, it appeared the Russians were inclined to allow us to conduct some antimissile tests despite the treaty restrictions. But the Russians wanted the right to approve each and every test of the system. Do you have any idea how long that approval process would have taken? We just could not live with those constraints and were concerned that the Russians would have us curtail, or maybe even terminate our developmental tests thereby significantly slowing down our progress.

"Our latest test occurred on 3 December 2001, was the second successful intercept of a dummy warhead for a ground-based system. We know the importance of each of these tests to our program and soon we plan on using sea-based and air-based platforms for intercept."<sup>31</sup> Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), made comment that the successful test on 3 December increased our confidence in the missile defense system and underscores the importance of the \$8.3 billion for such programs.<sup>32</sup> Defense contractors from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, TRW, Raytheon, General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. They have sent numerous white papers to Congress explaining that this is an engineering issue, that we are getting our arms around it. If the ABM Treaty had not been abrogated, we would seriously jeopardize the deployment of our missile defense system."

Gonzo pulled out a press release dated 4 December 2001 and said to Jim, "According to this article from the Council for a Livable World, I see the test conducted on 3 December resulted in a successful intercept but this press release says to remain cautious because the conditions for the test were not realistic. The fact is that this test does not show that hit-to-kill technology works in the real world today."<sup>33</sup>

Gonzo asked Jim, "Is it not true that when we know such things as when the target missile is launched, where it is coming from, and where it is going to, we should be able to intercept each time? How feasible is this technology?"

Jim went on to explain, "Well, Lieutenant General Kadall, director of BMDO, has said these are tests where we continue to learn and not tests to be judged as pass-fail."<sup>34</sup>

Jim continued, “You are correct that we have many technological challenges, but we, in BMDO, believe we are progressing well. Now that we have pulled out of the treaty, we need to press forward with good test results and deploy a missile defense system.”

Gonzo thanked Jim for his time.

Gonzo certainly collected a lot of information and now needed to sort out and put on paper his rationale for why the president announced on 13 December 2001 to abrogate the ABM Treaty. It was time to start putting pen to paper for Colonel Connell’s tasker.

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## **1972 ABM TREATY CHRONOLOGY**

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| <p>1972 ABM Treaty signed</p> <p>United States and Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear weapons and each feared retaliation of a launch would result in the destruction of the other’s country (the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)). This rationale was clearly reflected in the ratification surrounding the ABM Treaty and the language of Article I of the Treaty was explicit, committing each side “not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of its territory.”</p> | <p>1993 Clinton administration reversed course on NMD and the renegotiation of the ABM Treaty.</p> <p>National missile defense programs were downgraded in priority, and funding was significantly reduced. The ABM Treaty was seen as “the heart of its arms control policy”.</p>   |
| <p>1983 President Reagan announces the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)</p> <p>Proposes a long-term goal for development of a national missile defense to render “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Saw ABM Treaty as an obstacle to effective missile defenses because it inhibited research, development, testing, and deployment.</p>   | <p>1997 Congress established a bipartisan commission to assess the emerging missile threat.</p> <p>Headed by Donald Rumsfeld, the Commission estimated that countries such as North Korea and Iran could threaten the United States within five years after deciding to acquire long-range ballistic missiles.</p>   |
| <p>1991 Bush administration announces to deploy GPALS—Global Protection Against Limited Strikes</p> <p>End of Cold War and demise of Soviet Union brought in new era in security policy. Sought renegotiation of the ABM Treaty on both sensors and the right to deploy additional ABM interceptor missiles beyond the one site allowed by the Treaty.</p>   | <p>1999 National Missile Defense Act</p> <p>“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.”</p> |
|  | <p>2001 George W. Bush abrogates ABM Treaty on 13 December 2001.</p>   |

## Notes

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