

# Rwanda

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**T**he renewal of the Rwandan Civil War in April 1994, and the genocide that accompanied it, presented the Clinton administration with one of the most perplexing and difficult decision-making situations a United States president can be asked to deal with. Should the armed forces of the United States be committed to combat operations when United States values, but not United States interests, are at stake?<sup>1</sup>

The Clinton administration never answered this question directly, although a decision to deploy military forces to the region was reached in late July of 1994, after the civil war and genocide in Rwanda had ended. The administration's actions in regard to Rwanda continue to be hotly debated within the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academic and political communities. Given the continuing possibility of genocidal violence not only in the Great Lakes region of Africa, but also in other parts of the globe, a study of the events leading to the president's decision could be of unusual utility.

In order to understand the decision-making process involving Rwanda, it is first necessary to provide a brief historical background of the events leading up to and following April 1994.<sup>2</sup> Rwanda is a small state. Roughly half the size of Maryland, it was a German colonial possession from 1899 until 1916. The Belgians then became Rwanda's colonial rulers and remained in power until 1962.<sup>3</sup>

Two ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, dominate the Rwandan population. The Hutu comprise the numerically larger group. European colonists fostered a sense of superiority among the Tutsi and, in time, the Tutsi became the comprador class of Rwanda.<sup>4</sup> Devices such as the establishment of a national identity card system in 1933 solidified racial identities, despite a tradition of intermarriage, common language, diet, and cultural heritage.<sup>5</sup> In time assimilation and elevation became "next to impossible."<sup>6</sup>

In the late 1950s, as independence and national elections drew closer, the Belgians realized a rise in Hutu power was inevitable and as a result the Tutsis were essentially abandoned.<sup>7</sup> In 1959 rebellion broke out. The Belgians made no move to help their former allies and the result was a bloodbath (while casualty estimates would vary from 10,000 to 100,000, the savagery of the action would serve as an eerie precursor to the mayhem of 1994.)

In contrast to Rwanda, the Tutsi in Burundi remained in power following independence. In Burundi the population distribution was more equal and the Tutsi dominated the military. Ironically, the behaviors of the Hutu elite in Rwanda and the Tutsi elite in Burundi have been very similar.<sup>8</sup>

From 1959 on, Tutsis fled Rwanda. Two great waves of refugees entered Uganda. The first entered in 1959, the second in 1962.<sup>9</sup> The total numbers of refugees crossing the Uganda border may have reached as high as two-hundred thousand.

Life in Uganda under the Obote and Amin regimes was not easy. The suffering the Rwandan Tutsi Diaspora experienced, increased their prevalent determination to return to Rwanda. As the second generation of Tutsi ex-patriots came of age, enlisting in the revolutionary army of Yoweri Museveni provided them an accelerated opportunity to do just that.<sup>10</sup>

Museveni's army was, in comparison with other forces in the region, highly disciplined and professional. In the successful effort to overthrow Obote in 1986, its Rwandan soldiers gained both combat and leadership experience.<sup>11</sup> When the war was over the Tutsi fighters would leave Museveni's service and form the core combat cadres of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).<sup>12</sup>

While Tutsi refugees were settling in Uganda, the one-party state in Rwanda was becoming increasingly corrupt and ruled by patronage. Tutsi guerrilla raids brought fierce reprisals and pogroms were common. (Two massive purges occurred in 1963 and 1967.) In 1973 all Tutsis were purged from Rwandan universities as part of an overarching program to drive them from all educational institutions.<sup>13</sup>

Also in 1973 Rwandan military Chief of Staff Juvenal Habyarimana staged a coup under the pretext of restoring social order. Although presenting the appearance of positive social change, Habyarimana simply replaced a corrupt set of Hutu rulers with a new set of corrupt Hutu rulers. These were predominately his friends from the north of Rwanda, traditionally the most chauvinistic of all Hutu nationalists.<sup>14</sup> The new elite was known as the Akazu.<sup>15</sup>

Once in power, Habyarimana and his cronies set about draining the country's resources while continuing to blatantly discriminate against the Tutsis. The Tutsis also served as convenient scapegoats. When Hutu complaints were raised, the regime blamed the Tutsis.

But scapegoating had its limits. Eventually crops collapsed. Migration and social upheaval spread. Western donors who had been generous with aid, only to have it siphoned off in a variety of ways, began to demand more stringent accounting.<sup>16</sup> With funding drying up the Akazu found it increasingly difficult to buy the loyalty of the army and the civil service. Suggestions that Rwanda should democratize horrified the elites, as this would mean the end of their system of clients and patronage.<sup>17</sup>

By 1990 the RPF staged a significant offensive. As many as 7,000 RPF troops may have attacked into Rwanda.<sup>18</sup> The Habyarimana regime reacted by denouncing Tutsis as fifth columnists and blaming them for any and all government setbacks. Fear and hatred of Tutsis was actively fomented by the Rwandan government in order to direct the people's anger at frustration away from the government. These efforts produced what was to become the most virulent anti Tutsi propaganda in the history of Rwanda. A civilian militia was formed and attacks on Tutsis escalated, although this violence did not reach the level of genocide.<sup>19</sup>

However, the violence was not one-sided. Tutsi armed groups were also targeting some elements of the civilian population. Selective killings had, for all purposes, “become part of the common coinage of politics.”<sup>20</sup>

The Rwandan government’s initial response to RPF success was to dramatically expand the size of its army. Between 1990 and 1992 the Army of Rwanda grew from a force of 5,000 to one of 30,000. In addition, the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republic (CDR) was formed. The CDR, a violently Hutu extremist party was opposed to any dialogue with the RPF.<sup>21</sup>

However, the twin elements of RPF military success and growing international pressure for a peaceful resolution eventually forced Habyarimana to embrace compromise. On 26 October, with the aid of Belgium, a cease-fire was brokered between the Rwandan government and the RPF. Known as the Gbadolite agreement, it was short-lived.<sup>22</sup>

In 1991 further political concessions were forced from Habyarimana when he was forced to agree to the principle of multipart politics.<sup>23</sup> Several new political parties sprang into existence, including the Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MDR) a true Hutu challenger to the president.<sup>24</sup> Other parties, some socialist, some moderate, also emerged. Government and right-wing controlled radio stations and newspapers began an increasingly virulent hate campaign aimed against Tutsis.

On 12 July 1992 significant political progress was at last apparently achieved with the signing of the Arusha Accords. An associated cease-fire went into effect on 31 July. A buffer zone, in Rwanda, between the RPF and Rwandan Army front lines was established.<sup>25</sup> The Organization of African Unity (OAU) agreed to provide a “Neutral Military Observer Group” to monitor the zone.” The Accords also called for a Joint Political Commission to help implement the cease-fire and a pledge to reach a final peace agreement within twelve months. A transitional government would take over at this time until new elections could be held.<sup>26</sup>

The cease-fire held more or less until 8 February 1993 when a new outbreak of fighting occurred. The RPF rapidly seized several objectives in the buffer zone, alleging they were responding to human rights violations committed by the Rwandan government. The RPF closed on Kigali airport but were prevented from seizing it when French troops intervened. The French government, seeing Rwanda as part of Francophone Africa, and being partial to the Habyarimana government deployed forces to Kigali. Having prevented the RPF capture of Kigali, the French continued to maintain a sizeable military mission and detachment of officers in Rwanda.<sup>27</sup>

By this stage of the conflict six-hundred thousand Rwandans had become displaced persons, prompting calls for help being made to the UN In response to requests from the governments of Rwanda and Uganda a UN observer mission (UNOMUR) was authorized to deploy along the countries’ mutual 150 kilometer-long border.<sup>28</sup> The mission was tasked with reporting and verifying any cross-border provision of assistance to the RPF from Uganda. The efficacy of this force was doubtful at best. Consisting of only fifty-five personnel, UNOMUR was not armed.<sup>29</sup> Lacking significant surveillance and transportation assets,

the UNOMUR forces never possessed the ability to adequately monitor the border.<sup>30</sup> Whether acting from a sense of obligation, or a desire to ensure the RPF fighters did not return, Uganda continued to provide arms and supplies to the RPF in Rwanda.<sup>31</sup>

On 24 September 1993 Kofi Annan presented an expanded peacekeeping proposal to the Security Council. The UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda, or UNAMIR, as the new peace operation would be called, would not only absorb UNOMUR, but would also bring in 2,458 additional military personnel in four, phased increments.<sup>32</sup> On 5 October the Security Council approved Annan's proposal, but instructed the secretary-general to "seek economies." The UN requested a Canadian general to command the operation.<sup>33</sup> The first troops landed in Rwanda on October. By December 1,260 were on the ground.<sup>34</sup> UNAMIR's mandate was to assist with the delivery of food supplies to the displaced and expatriated. Monitoring of the Ugandan border and the demilitarized zone (DMZ) would continue.<sup>35</sup> Cease-fire violations would be investigated and the activities of the gendarmerie and civilian police monitored. Other UNAMIR activities would include mine awareness training, assisting with resettlement initiatives and in the disengagement, disarming and demobilization efforts that would follow the end of the war.<sup>36</sup>

As UNAMIR was getting established, a military coup took over the government of Burundi. This set a refugee flow of more than 375,000 Hutu moving into Rwanda. As a result, UNAMIR extended its monitoring patrols into the south. By November, UNAMIR was already investigating reports of mass killings. The secretary-general realized that UNAMIR was going to require more troops and more time if it was going to carry out the assigned mandate. He asked for a six-month extension of the mandate and more peacekeepers.<sup>37</sup> On 6 January 1994 the Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 893, approving the request.

Although UNAMIR has been criticized in the wake of the genocide, the blue helmets were not inactive. Nor were they reluctant to gather and report and intelligence. As early as 11 January UNAMIR was reporting plots by the Interhamwe and the CDR to kill large numbers of Tutsis.<sup>38</sup> Guidance was requested from the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO). This communication has become known as the genocide telegram.

DPKO responded the same day. UNAMIR was to warn President Habyarimana that he should investigate the charges and prevent any killings. UNAMIR was informed that while it could "assist" in arms recovery operations, it was forbidden from "entering into a course of action which might lead to the use of force and to unanticipated repercussions."<sup>39</sup>

The next day the UN special representative saw Habyarimana. The ambassadors from the United States, France and Belgium were also briefed by both the special representative and the UNAMIR force commander. The ambassadors were asked to request their governments to encourage the Habyarimana administration to grant the UNAMIR/UN request to prevent killings and confiscate arms. In New York, the UN special advisor briefed the Security Council.<sup>40</sup>

The situation in Kigali continued to grow increasingly tense. On 3 February UNAMIR was authorized to engage in a deeper level of participation on arms recovery operations on a case-by-case basis. By the end of the month the UNAMIR commander had brought an additional two-hundred troops in the capitol from the northern demilitarized zone (DMZ).<sup>41</sup>

Violence continued to escalate. Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to pressure Habyarimana to get the transitional government in operation. The special representative continued to meet with the president on a regular basis.

Between 5–7 March additional peace talks were held in Dar Es Salaam. During the talks both sides agreed to continue the cease-fire. On 14 March the Belgian minister of foreign affairs warned Boutros Boutros-Ghali in writing of a predicted explosion of violence if the political deadlock continued. The truce had been renewed on 9 March and the Arusha talks continued on 15 March. It was expected that the talks would be complete by the first week in April.<sup>42</sup> The agreement called for the removal of all foreign forces, except those that would be deployed to Rwanda.<sup>43</sup>

Other actions forced upon the Rwandan president by the accords included political power sharing with the RPF, a reduction of presidential powers, and the integration of the RPF into the Rwandan Army. Under heavy international pressure Habyarimana signed what he thought was only a political agreement. It was actually also his death warrant.

By late March, UNAMIR had reached its peak manning level of 2,539 troops as a result of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 893.<sup>44</sup> There was also an additional component of 60 UN police personnel. Violence continued in Kigali. Despite UN protests, government forces mined the roads out of the capitol. The special representative reported that weapons were being distributed to Hutu civilians. All this information was then reported to the Security Council.<sup>45</sup> On 5 April 1994 the Security Council extended the duration of UNAMIR. The mission would now run to 29 July. The vote for extension was unanimous.

On 6 April 1994, Rwandan President Habyarimana, Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Rwandan Army Chief of Staff Deogratias Nsabimana were returning to Kigali from the latest round of the Arusha Accords. Their aircraft, a gift from the French, was on final approach to the landing field when it was struck by two surface-to-air missiles. All aboard were killed. Members of Habyarimana's presidential Guard most likely launched the missiles.<sup>46</sup> More recent reports have suggested that the RPF may have been responsible, but most scholars have discounted this idea.<sup>47</sup>

In the wake of the shootdown, Rwandan authorities acted with speed and well-planned precision. State radio immediately blamed the RPF for the downing of the presidential jet. Militia and Army units moved out of their barracks with lists of enemies and maps of their houses. Roadblocks were set up and manned by Interhamwe gunmen in some cases in less than half an hour.<sup>48</sup>

Thus began 100 days of genocidal fury and renewed civil war. In those one hundred days an estimated one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed, and burned to death. As might be expected the majority of this number was comprised of noncombatants.<sup>49</sup>

Within a few hours after the shutdown the RPF battalion in Kigali was fully engaged in combat. Within twenty-four hours the civil war had been renewed. The RPF, far more professional and disciplined than its Rwandan Army opponents, sought contact with enemy forces and strove to maintain it.

Among the hundreds of deaths in the first twenty-four hours, several were of extreme consequence. The leaders of three opposition parties were killed. The moderate prime minister, Ms. Agathe Uwilingiyimana and ten Belgian UN peacekeepers that were serving as her bodyguards were also assassinated.<sup>50</sup> Sensing a potential need for rapid UN action, General Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR had tried to create a "quick reaction force" from the soldiers he had been assigned. It was envisioned that this force would be able to respond to a variety of situations. Unfortunately, due to combination of training and equipment problems, the quick reaction force was not ready.<sup>51</sup> The Rwandan Army, their allies, and the Interhamwe essentially decapitated moderate Hutu opposition and dealt what would come to be seen as a deathblow to UNAMIR in the first twenty-four hours of the genocide.<sup>52</sup>

News of the violence traveled rapidly. On 7 April, President Clinton condemned the murder of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana. He also called for a return to the cease-fire.<sup>53</sup>

Any United States military operation mounted in Rwanda or neighboring countries would fall under the overall command of the United States European Command (EUCOM). EUCOM had been already paying attention to Rwanda and had even created a Rwanda Working Group prior to the shutdown.<sup>54</sup> EUCOM immediately asked the Joint Staff if Rwanda contingency plans should be made. The answer was an emphatic no for anything other than a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). EUCOM was to simply monitor the situation.<sup>55</sup> There would be no U.S. involvement. EUCOM followed orders, but expanded the Rwanda Working Group. It was a busy period for EUCOM. Five Joint Task Forces (JTFs) were already in operation in the theater.<sup>56</sup> Accordingly the apparent decision not to mount an operation in Rwanda was not unwelcome.

In the wake of the violence in Rwanda, UNAMIR was unable to conduct operations in accordance with the mandate. Instead the blue helmets concentrated on establishing safe havens for Rwandan noncombatants. Civilians flocked to the protection offered by the UN peacekeepers. Rwandan Army, Interhamwe, and RPF fighters did test UN resolve to defend these areas.<sup>57</sup>

The secretary-general has stated that he kept the Security Council apprised of all Rwanda developments he was aware of.<sup>58</sup> On 9 April, the assistant secretary-general for peace keeping operations provided an additional briefing on Rwanda to the Security Council.<sup>59</sup> The OAU also reported itself ready to fully cooperate with any efforts the UN might initiate.

International response was initially rapid. U.S. personnel (225 total) evacuated themselves from Rwanda via road convoy on 10 April. The ambassador and a number of embassy personnel remained on station. For a period of time the fighting effectively trapped the ambassador in his residence. On 11 April French and Belgian troops landed in Kigali to assist in the evacuation of their nationals.<sup>60</sup>

UNAMIR was also struggling to respond to the situation. UNAMIR troops deployed from the RPF-Rwandan DMZ to the capitol. The next day the Belgian minister for foreign affairs reported that the Belgians were leaving UNAMIR. On the 13<sup>th</sup>, Belgium recommended suspending UNAMIR. The secretary-general said UNAMIR would remain.<sup>61</sup> The national governments, with the exception of Ghana, made it clear to their UNAMIR contingents that self-protection was of the highest priority.<sup>62</sup> General Dallaire, commanding UNAMIR, sought to reverse the defensive orientation of the national contingents, obtain reinforcements, stop the genocide and bring the parties back to the negotiating table. It is doubtful whether the latter could have been accomplished under any conditions. Once back on the offensive, the RPF was not inclined to negotiations. Their leaders correctly sensed that they possessed a markedly superior fighting force than the Rwandan Army and that victory could be theirs.<sup>63</sup>

The United States response was in some ways surprisingly rapid. By 7 April representatives from the United States had clearly stated their opposition to shifting the authority for UNAMIR's mission from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the UN charter. This would have enabled the UNAMIR commander to take bolder and potentially more dangerous actions, including acts of combat to carry out the assignment. However, conducting Chapter VII operations would expose the blue helmets to potentially much higher personal risk and opened the possibility of full-blown combat with both RPF and Rwandan Army forces. During the same week National Security Advisor Anthony Lake became the first western political figure to demand a stop to the killing and to place the blame squarely on Hutu leaders.<sup>64</sup>

President Clinton spoke with reporters in Minneapolis on 8 April. He stated that he been involved with lengthy conversation about the Rwandan situation with Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, and National Security Advisor Lake. The subject of utmost concern was the safety of U.S. citizens in Rwanda.<sup>65</sup> Three days later, on 11 April, the president was able to report that 275 United States Marines had been flown to Bujumbura to assist with the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Rwanda. However, the Marines had not been required to cross into Rwandan territory. Ambassador Rawson was singled out for his efforts.<sup>66</sup> The Marines then returned to their ships in the Indian Ocean.

Within a short period of time, the Defense Department had established a Rwandan Task Force.<sup>67</sup> The task force collected and forwarded intelligence on the situation in Rwanda. Among the data collected was a daily estimate of those killed.<sup>68</sup> Under National Security Council (NSC) auspices, a Rwanda Interagency Working Group (IWG) was also established. In a short period of time, daily IWG conferences were being held. Some of these were conducted by Video Teleconference (VTC), but most were in the Situation Room in the White House.<sup>69</sup> Participants in the videoconferences included representatives from State, NSC,

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Defense, CIA, and the Office of the U.S. ambassador to the UN<sup>70</sup> The meeting held in person tended to involve only members whose agencies were located in Washington.<sup>71</sup> According to one participant, it was clear that there was no desire to become involved on the ground in Africa.<sup>72</sup> And while these meetings were supposed to focus on policy, on at least one question the issue of potential impacts on the 1994 elections was specifically raised.<sup>73</sup>

Although the IWG was drawn from a disparate group of agencies, the membership had, according to one participant, one thing in common. None were experts, or even essentially well versed in the politics of the Great Lakes region of Africa. None understood the historical and political context involving the French and the former colonial powers.<sup>74</sup> This lack was shared by the major cabinet level actors as well, specifically Secretary Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor (NSA) Tony Lake and Secretary of Defense William Perry.<sup>75</sup> As the IWG worked out their internal procedures, events continued to move at the UN

Interestingly, although Belgium had been the first state to favor a withdrawal from Rwanda, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes initially pressed for armed intervention by UN forces. He rapidly gave up this idea in the face of French and United States opposition.<sup>76</sup> Nor did he have unanimous support in Belgium.

On 11 April, the UNAMIR troops, that had been guarding a school where two-thousand refugees were being sheltered, were redeployed to Kigali airport. The refugees remained behind. Almost all were killed shortly thereafter. At this point, the UN had no doubts that widespread killing was going on in Rwanda and that there was a strong ethnic component to some of the shooting.<sup>77</sup>

Still, Dallaire's thought that UNAMIR could provide some stability clearly had merit. With only the UNAMIR troops in the capitol, he was providing security for thousands of displaced persons.<sup>78</sup> Had he received the five battalions and armored personnel carriers he requested, much more would have been possible.

At the Security Council, the subject of debate was whether UNAMIR should be continued. Now that initial concerns about the safety of their own citizens had been answered, the question was what to do with UNAMIR. Belgium, having abandoned any idea of intervention, pressed hard to withdraw the UN force.<sup>79</sup>

The Belgian argument was easy to follow. Events in Rwanda were developing rapidly and unpredictably. Although the Rwandan Army and the RPF had seemingly embraced a "hands off" policy toward UN safe havens, this had lasted slightly less than a week. On 18 April, displaced persons and UNAMIR forces within UNAMIR havens came under mortar attack. The next day Uganda requested that UNAMIR be retained and reinforced.<sup>80</sup> On 21 April, Bangladesh threatened to withdraw its forces and the Security Council unanimously voted to make the withdrawal of UNAMIR from Rwanda a reality.<sup>81</sup> However, as events unfolded UNAMIR was never completely removed from Rwanda, and 450 UN soldiers remained in Kigali throughout the crisis in order to secure the airport.<sup>82</sup> Despite their small numbers these troops also managed to provide sanctuary for as many as 20,000 displaced persons.<sup>83</sup>

Yet they could not cover all the people that UNAMIR had originally sheltered, and when UNAMIR forces left, death inevitably followed.<sup>84</sup>

In the years following the Rwanda crisis, the question, “Did the UN and the United States know genocide was being conducted in Rwanda?” was frequently asked. Obviously the answer is yes, although *when* that fact became known is a tougher question to answer. It was clear; almost at once, that widespread killing was going on, that civilians were being targeted and that the civil war was once again raging. Independent confirmation of these conditions came from evacuated civilians, UNAMIR soldiers, and NGOs such as the Red Cross that reported “tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of dead” by 21 April.<sup>85</sup> On 23 April, the killing campaign intensified, reaching into the countryside and rural areas that had previously been unaffected.

Part of the reason the United States was slow to recognize, and even slower to admit, that genocide was ongoing in Rwanda can be traced back to the U.S. experience in Somalia. A common perception among senior U.S. decision makers was that involvement in the Somalia civil war had led to the debacle of Mogadishu. This was especially true in the case of Warren Christopher.<sup>86</sup>

Michael Barnett, a member of the United States mission to the UN in 1994 has stated:

By mid to late April, people in the Security Council knew it was genocide, but refused to call it such because, ultimately, one understood that if you used the term genocide, then you might be forced to act. And when someone suggested that maybe they should call a genocide a genocide, they were quietly reminded that perhaps they should not use such language.<sup>87</sup>

Although other participants differ as to why the term genocide was not used, all agree that a decision was made to not call the widespread killing genocide.<sup>88</sup> The very fact this discussion was held indicates that there was general knowledge of mass killings going on inside Rwanda.

On 29 April, Boutros Boutros-Ghali went before the Security Council to ask for consideration of sending reinforcements to Rwanda.<sup>89</sup> Such a force, if approved, would have to be “well equipped, very mobile and able to protect itself.” The secretary-general admitted that he was not sure if even such a force would be able to bring about an end to the massacres.<sup>90</sup> On that very day, outgoing security council president, Colin Keating of New Zealand, took matters into his own hands and forced the council to approve a resolution. The council had been debating the issue for several days. Some members, such as China were opposed to any recommendation of strong action. Other members, such as the United States, did not want the term genocide used. Keating informed the council that unless they could reach agreement he would declare the meeting an open session.<sup>91</sup> This would have made the wording and positions of the opposing states public. The council rapidly passed a resolution recommending strong action, but refrained from the use of the word genocide.<sup>92</sup>

On 30 April President Clinton made a radio address. He spoke to the leaders of both the RPF and the Rwandan Army, urging them to stop the killing. The word genocide was not used, nor was there any intimation of U.S. or UN action.<sup>93</sup>

As the Rwanda IWG continued to attempt to craft policy options, it became apparent that no organization or senior decision maker wanted lead responsibility.<sup>94</sup> Rwanda was a very hot potato. Of all the organizations represented at the table, the Defense Department was the most reluctant to do anything that might lead to U.S. involvement.<sup>95</sup> But DoD's reluctance was in many ways indicative of the inability of decision makers to craft a policy that DoD could understand and support.<sup>96</sup>

Officials continued to use the word "chaos" to describe the killings in Rwanda. Some VTC participants saw Rwanda as a failed state; one that had failed from an excess of tribalism. Others thought the strife was of a permanent nature.<sup>97</sup>

Yet, over the course of the crisis, the option of committing United States forces either unilaterally or in conjunction with the OAU, or UN was continually raised. Later, when the French were launching Operation Tourquoise, there was even discussion of the United States militarily joining that effort.<sup>98</sup> The memory of the perceived failure of U.S. policy in Somalia hung heavy over these discussions, as indeed it did over most U.S. foreign policy deliberations.<sup>99</sup> Defense Department representatives were also affected by distant memories of Vietnam.<sup>100</sup>

Discussions among United States actors were not confined to the IWG level. Rwanda was a standard topic of discussions at informal luncheons of Defense Secretary Perry, Secretary of State Christopher and NSA Tony Lake. These gatherings were referred to as PCL or "pickle" meetings.<sup>101</sup> However, there were no NSC Principals meetings being held to discuss Rwanda during the first two months of the crisis.<sup>102</sup>

Whether at the IWG or at the "pickle" level, one component of the crisis stood out clearly. There was no major U.S. public support for involvement in Rwanda. The Congressional Black Caucus had not called for intervention. This fact was not lost on the president who specifically asked if the Congressional Black Caucus was showing a strong interest in the issue.<sup>103</sup> The *New York Times* twice ran editorials cautioning against providing more than logistic support and financial aid to Rwanda relief. The point was also made that the United States has no vital interests at stake in Rwanda. Both the *Washington Post* and the *Los Angeles Times* took similar positions.

On 3 May, President Clinton appeared on the Cable Network News (CNN) program "Global Forum with President Clinton." In the course of the show the president was asked what to do about Rwanda. He replied that he, like everyone, was shocked at the "slaughter," but hoped that the recognition of military and political dimensions would lead to avoiding the problems of Somalia. There was no discussion of intervention.<sup>104</sup>

Despite the president's appearance on the CNN news show, Rwanda was by no means the "hot" story of 1994 as far as the U.S. press was concerned.<sup>105</sup> Events in Haiti and Bosnia

dominated U.S. stories about the international scene as potential health care and crime bills did the domestic.<sup>106</sup> In part, this lack of coverage was due to a paucity of press assets in Central Africa and the difficulty in getting news crews and reporters into the country. However, reports, primarily in print media, did reach major news markets. In the United States, the *New York Times* gave the most play to stories about Rwanda, but the *Times*' coverage was not extensive, especially compared to Canadian papers. In part, the press' difficulty in getting at the Rwanda story was that neither the Rwandan Army nor the RPF wanted the scrutiny of the world press on their activities.

Congressional attention eventually touched on Rwanda. Secretary of State Albright testified on 5 May to the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. She briefly discussed Rwanda and also took the opportunity to brief the committee on Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which had but recently been signed into force. As Secretary Albright put it, PDD 25 was seen as a way to "make multilateral peace operations more selective and more effective."<sup>107</sup>

In reality PDD-25 was designed to make U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations a far more difficult mission into which to enter. The PDD established criteria concerning command and control, funding and the selection of which peacekeeping operations to support. Critics claimed that the president had effectively shut the United States out of the peacekeeping business. Many within government traced the origin of the PDD back to the battle of Mogadishu and the failure of the Clinton administration's Somalia policy. It was, in the words of one ambassador, "emblematic of the times."<sup>108</sup> But the PDD would also make it easier for government organizations opposed to intervention of any sort to advance their position.<sup>109</sup>

In discussing Rwanda, Ambassador Albright stated that the OAU had volunteered to contribute forces, but that funding for those forces would have to be provided. The UN did not have the money that was needed and was starting a voluntary fund for Rwanda. The UN secretary-general hoped the United States would pay a portion of that funding. The ambassador referred to the dilemma as a "chicken and egg situation."<sup>110</sup> When asked for specifics regarding the killings in Rwanda, Ambassador Albright answered that it was "hard" to get information out of Rwanda, but that while the exact numbers were unknown it seemed that the victims were mostly Tutsi and some moderate Hutus. The four hundred troops in Kigali were said to be "trying to help with negotiations, protect the UN negotiators there, and trying to provide some protection to Rwandans who sought protection under the UN force."<sup>111</sup> The prospect of putting more forces into Rwanda was complicated by the fact that the RPF did not want additional peacekeepers in the country. The ambassador also voiced doubt as to whether or not the Rwandan peace operation had "started out properly."<sup>112</sup>

These were public statements. Ambassador Albright has since stated that she did not agree with the orders she was receiving from Washington in regard to Rwanda. She claims to have "screamed about the instructions," feeling they were "wrong."<sup>113</sup> However, as an ambassador, she had to "follow" those instructions.<sup>114</sup> Her account has been substantiated by one IWG participant.<sup>115</sup>

Other voices were also heard in Congress on the subject of Rwanda. Kofi Annan, then the under secretary-general of the UN, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa on 2 May 1994. Annan focused on the extent of the crisis. He noted that the situation was so bad that Médecins Sans Frontières and the Red Cross had either suspended operations in Rwanda all together, or confined themselves to Kigali. He noted that Rwanda was “the most violent and virulent of all African challenges” and that the UN was “doing everything within its power to respond to the devastation which is occurring.” He set the casualty figures at 100,000 dead, and 2 million displaced, within fourteen days. Senator Simon (D-IL) asked what the United States could or should do. Annan replied that the United States had the required lift capability, military hardware and speed of action that was desperately needed. Furthermore, he added, even if the United States was unwilling to commit ground forces, it could “lead the international community in mobilizing resources.”<sup>116</sup> When Simon asked about the capability of the OAU to be of greater support in helping answer the Rwanda problem Annan replied, “At least they tried.”<sup>117</sup>

Although it took some time, pictures and video of the devastation and genocide that was sweeping Rwanda began to appear internationally.<sup>118</sup> In the United States, many congressional representatives reported themselves horrified at the images. However, while there was support for increased aid for NGOs and UN agencies in Rwanda, there were no calls to send U.S. troops.<sup>119</sup>

On 4 May George Moose, an assistant secretary of state, was before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. By now congressional representatives were using the terms “genocide,” and “holocaust” to describe the killings in Rwanda. Furthermore Representative Johnston (D-FL) made it clear that the genocide was being carried out by Interhamwe and elements of the Rwandan Army. He further noted that the killing has been carefully planned and deliberately executed. Moose explained the killings had begun in Kigali, then spread to the countryside. The victims were moderate Hutu opposition leaders and Tutsis of every type. Casualties were estimated at 100,000 dead and more than 300,000 refugees.<sup>120</sup> After running down a long list of actions, the United States was taking to address the situation, Moose noted “In the end only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country. No outside effort can succeed without commitment to peace by the combatants themselves. The influence of the international community on internal conflicts of this type is limited.”<sup>121</sup>

The committee was hard on Moose. One of the more telling points they raised was that although UNAMIR had been removed out of concern for the soldiers’ safety, the 400 troops in Kigali had been safe since the second day of the fighting. Moose admitted that this was so.<sup>122</sup> He also made it clear that U.S. and UN missions that were being dispatched to the region were not actually scheduled to enter Rwanda. Moose downplayed the chance of French or Belgian capabilities to “influence the current situation” due to “historical baggage.”<sup>123</sup>

However, despite the committee’s willingness to put Moose on the spot, only Alcee Hastings (D-FL) was willing to call for U.S. armed intervention.<sup>124</sup> Others, such as Representative Dan Burton (R-IN) were willing to support a multilateral intervention, as long as U.S. troops were not part of the operation.<sup>125</sup>

Other congressional personalities tried a more direct approach. Personally contacting General Dallaire, Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) were told “If I can get 5,000 to 8,000 troops here quickly we can stop the whole thing.” Accordingly the Senators both wrote President Clinton urging rapid action.<sup>126</sup>

In New York, the UN Security Council continued to wrestle with the problem of Rwanda. On 1 May, Tanzania formally protested the decision to draw down UNAMIR. This act, it was argued “demonstrated that the tragedy in Rwanda was of no concern to the international community, and stood in sharp contrast to the peacekeeping efforts of the organization elsewhere.”<sup>127</sup> Unnamed Clinton administration officials stated that they were considering helping organize and fund an African intervention in Rwanda, but that the idea of any direct U.S. intervention had been rejected.<sup>128</sup> Ambassador Madeline Albright reinforced this the next day during an interview on CNN.<sup>129</sup>

On 3 May, Kofi Annan blamed the lack of support for direct action in Rwanda on two major factors. One was fear of placing national forces at risk.<sup>130</sup> This fear was fueled by past events in Rwanda and current events in Bosnia. The other factor was the lack of a feeling of “kinship” by the populations of western states for the people of Rwanda.

On 4 May, Boutros Boutros-Ghali referred to the killing in Rwanda as genocide.<sup>131</sup> So too did David Breyer, director of the nongovernmental organization Oxfam. He reported that as many as 500,000 Rwandans might have been killed.<sup>132</sup>

On 13 May, the Security Council was prepared to vote on restoring UNAMIR strength in Rwanda. Ambassador Albright delayed the vote for four days.<sup>133</sup> On 17 May, the Council passed Resolution 918 authorizing UNAMIR II, an expanded UNAMIR. UNAMIR II would consist of 5,500 personnel. Its mandate was to provide protection to displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk while supporting relief efforts.<sup>134</sup>

Although UNAMIR II boasted an authorized strength of 5,500, the required soldiers could not be found. Ghana immediately volunteered to send in the first of four phased installments, but made it clear their troops would need Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). The UN requested the United States provide the vehicles on 19 May.<sup>135</sup> Two weeks later the United States publicly agreed to provide the APCs.<sup>136</sup>

Meanwhile the RPF was collecting an impressive string of military successes against the Rwandan Army. They were still not keen on a UN intervention and possible interruption of their campaign.<sup>137</sup> Despite the arms embargo, both forces were being resupplied throughout the campaign, but the greater war-fighting skill and discipline of the RPF was credited as the most important elements of their victories. However, RPF professionalism only extended so far behind the battle lines. They were “less than precise” when it came to the Geneva protocols invoking the noncombatant status of hospitals and so on.<sup>138</sup>

As the RPF steadily advanced, UNAMIR II continued to be plagued by trouble. The transfer of the APCs came to be seen as an essential component to a successful deployment.

The United States had the vehicles and had publicly agreed to transfer them. However, in reality U.S. actions would cast serious doubts on Washington's commitment to that agreement.

At the best of times, the bureaucratic processes of the UN are cumbersome. Things happen slowly. Paperwork is extensive. When faced with a crisis, this process can be speeded up, but only with the intervention and oversight of an interested, powerful party.<sup>139</sup> In the past the United States has played such a role. This time the United States did not.<sup>140</sup> Disagreements over the terms of the APC contract were frequent and often focused on such details as taillights and painting the vehicles white.<sup>141</sup> United States officials kept asking for clarifying details, slowing down the process.<sup>142</sup> At least one contemporary editorial accused the White House or the NSC as being responsible for the delay in turning over the APCs.<sup>143</sup> The end result of this slow and cumbersome process was that the APCs would never be transferred from U.S. custody until after an RPF victory was certain.<sup>144</sup> UNAMIR II would never become an effective force.

But the killing continued. By mid-May the International Red Cross estimated that 500,000 people had been killed in Rwanda. The RPF held half of Rwanda and were tightening their hold on the environs of Kigali. Hutu refugees were "streaming" from the capitol to areas still dominated by the Rwandan Army.<sup>145</sup> On 21 May the RPF gained control of the Kigali airport and refused to turn it over to UNAMIR.<sup>146</sup> Yet, within the zone controlled by the RPF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP) and the ICRC were active. These agencies were even able to provide what amounted to systemic humanitarian assistance.<sup>147</sup> This fact would appear to strengthen the argument that the RPF's aversion to an increased UNAMIR presence was fear of being forced to give up their offensive short of total victory, rather than a general reluctance to deal with the UN and other actors.

In late May the secretary-general began an increasingly anguished cry for support in stopping what he was publicly calling genocide in Rwanda. While recognizing a "general fatigue on the part of the international community regarding peacekeeping," the growth of peacekeeping missions and the difficulties with past operations such as Somalia, Boutros Boutros-Ghali still labeled Rwanda "a failure of the entire international community."<sup>148</sup>

During the same time period, President Clinton addressed the topic of United States intervention while giving the keynote commencement speech at the United States Naval Academy. The president's remarks made it clear that it was unlikely sufficient national interests were at stake in Rwanda to warrant United States intervention.<sup>149</sup> The next day the president signed Executive Order 12918, embargoing arms sales and transfers to Rwanda.<sup>150</sup> President Clinton repeated this point about no United States military intervention to the French press on 7 June.<sup>151</sup> The United States was willing to help, but would not commit troops. The president pointed out that the United States already had forces committed to Korea, to Europe, and to the blockade of Haiti. Developments in Bosnia and Haiti could place additional demands on the armed forces of the United States. The United States would provide financial assistance and armored support. The president thought that only a modest force, fielded by several African states offered the best hope of success.<sup>152</sup>

On 8 June the Security Council passed Resolution 925, endorsing the immediate deployment of two battalions to Rwanda and also extended the UNAMIR mandate.<sup>153</sup> Troops for the battalions were not forth coming. The European Command (EUCOM) APCs had yet to be delivered and it was increasingly becoming apparent that no major deployment of UN forces was likely. On 20 June the Security Council voted to extend UNOMUR until 21 September.<sup>154</sup> The day before, 19 June, the secretary-general told the Security Council that the French had informed him of “their willingness to undertake with Council authorization, a French-commanded multinational operation to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda. The U.S.-led United Task Force in Somalia (UNI) was cited as a precedent.”<sup>155</sup>

On 20 June the French directly addressed their fellow members of the Security Council. France and Senegal were prepared to deploy troops into Rwanda. They were ready to move “without delay” and wanted Chapter VII authorization.<sup>156</sup> They also insisted that the mandate empower them to use “all means necessary” to carry out their mission.<sup>157</sup>

As the Security Council debated the French offer, the RPF continued to make headway against the Rwandan Army. As the RPF advanced the numbers of Hutu refugees continued to grow. UNAMIR’s troop strength in Rwanda had grown from 444 to 503. The Rwandan noncombatant casualty list continued to grow. Any doubts about the existence of genocide had long been dealt with at the IWG. The mood was one of “increasing urgency” and the French offer was appealing.<sup>158</sup> But the problem of a lack of knowledge continued to affect the decision-making process. In the words of one participant, “State assumed the French would stabilize the situation and separate the warring parties. It never occurred to them that the genocidaires would use this as an opportunity to rest, reconsolidate, and then escape across the border. It never occurred to them that the French would allow this, even though many the genocidaires were their former clients.”<sup>159</sup>

On 22 June 1994 France’s offer was accepted by the Security Council. Resolution 929 authorized the French to intervene in Rwanda under UN auspices. The operation was to conclude on 21 August.<sup>160</sup> This was only the sixth time that a UN operation had been approved under Chapter VII of the charter. The first elements of what would be known as “Operation Tourquoise” deployed into Uganda that very day. By early July more than 2,000 troops were on the ground.<sup>161</sup> On 27 June President Clinton addressed the members of the White House Conference on Africa.<sup>162</sup> United States financial, material and “statistical” support was being provided for the efforts in Rwanda, including more than \$100 million in humanitarian relief. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by “statistical” relief.<sup>163</sup> The president also expressed support for the French intervention and affirmed that the United States was committed to bringing genocidaires to justice.

The ever-growing numbers of Rwandan cross-border refugees resulted in a shift in the relative interest of the various agencies attempting to come to grips with the problem in Washington. From the beginning of the crisis, USAID, true to its charter, had been anxious to do whatever was possible to alleviate the suffering in Rwanda and in neighboring refugee camps. In fact, it was acknowledged by some participants that USAID was probably the most

“out in front” of all the United States foreign policy community.<sup>164</sup> But USAID had not been able to significantly advance its position with other members of the interagency working group (IWG). Tony Lake was sympathetic, but the president was not.<sup>165</sup>

As the numbers of Rwandan refugees crossing into Tanzania and Zaire increased, two major developments ensued. The first was that the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM) became progressively more involved in the situation.<sup>166</sup> As the refugees flooded across international borders and pooled in increasingly huge and unhealthy camps, NGOs rapidly found themselves overwhelmed.

The second major effect was that “the CNN effect” which had previously been muted, now became more pronounced.<sup>167</sup> Reporters who had previously found it difficult to enter Rwanda had no such problems in entering the camps.<sup>168</sup> The conditions, death, and suffering were the stuff of powerful news stories and media coverage increased dramatically.<sup>169</sup> This resulted in a further increase in the urgency felt by members of the IWG and a growing sense that some U.S. response was going to be required.<sup>170</sup> Despite State’s increased involvement, at the IWG meetings there was an increasing sense that the State Department, and Warren Christopher, were deferring more and more to the NSC and Tony Lake. Christopher was not an “Africa hand” and was having other diplomatic difficulties. Tony Lake, in contrast, was very interested in Africa.<sup>171</sup> Defense Department representatives were still extremely reluctant to support any initiatives that might require the use of military forces in the Great Lakes region. There was a general agreement that there were still no U.S. national interests at stake.<sup>172</sup> The military also had concerns with any deployment’s effect on readiness and budget, as well as potential combat risks to U.S. personnel.<sup>173</sup>

In Rwanda, the RPF continued its string of victories. RPF troops were closing in on Rwandan Army strongholds in both the southwest and north-central portion of Rwanda. Refugee flows in excess of two million people were in motion away from the fighting.<sup>174</sup> Fear of the RPF, fear of being caught up in the general conflict, and the urgings of Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines, all incited Hutus to flee.<sup>175</sup> Ostensibly in reaction to these developments the French felt compelled to establish a safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-Gikongoro triangle in southwestern Rwanda. French-led forces deployed into the zone on 9 July.<sup>176</sup> Five days later the RPF had taken full control of Kigali and captured Butare, Rwanda’s second largest city.<sup>177</sup> Neither the leaders of the RPF or the Rwandan government were interested in discussing a cease-fire agreement. In the United States, an RPF victory was being increasingly seen as the most likely way to stop the genocide.<sup>178</sup>

By 14 July, approximately 1.5 million Rwandans, mostly Hutu, had crossed the border into Zaire. This number included “virtually all the forces of the former Rwandan Governmental Army.” Zaire’s ability to deal with such a flow was nonexistent and the Security Council called on the international community to mobilize all available resources to provide urgently needed humanitarian assistance. As many as 850,000 refugees settled in the vicinity of Goma.<sup>179</sup> Another 350,000 stayed in camps in the South Kivu region. United States-based humanitarian NGOs also began to marshal their forces to deal with the situation.

Among the more active of these groups was the Capitol Hill Hunger Consortium. In addition to serving as a lobbying group for humanitarian programs, the Consortium also provided consulting services to several NGOs and UN agencies.<sup>180</sup> Eugene Dewey directed the Consortium. Mr. Dewey was a former senior official in both the UN and the State Department and he was well connected on Capitol Hill. On 14 July, he phoned contacts on the NSC staff, stressing the need for United States leadership. He did not stop with entreaties. Mr. Dewey also drafted an action plan, which he provided to his contacts on the NSC and certain influential congressmen, such as Tony Hall (D-OH).<sup>181</sup> Dewey claims that his proposals were actually presented to the NSC.<sup>182</sup> In the wake of this lobbying effort there were increased numbers of letters from the Congressional Black Caucus to the president requesting increased aid to Rwanda. Black Caucus chairman Donald Payne (D-NJ) penned the strongest of these letters. Sources within the NSC have confirmed that the Dewey proposal was among several plans made available to NSA Lake and other key figures. However, it was just one of several action plans under consideration.<sup>183</sup>

On 15 July President Clinton dispatched USAID's Brian Atwood to Goma in order to assess the severity of the humanitarian crisis. While there, Atwood met with General Dellaire and Charles Petrie, deputy director, United Nations Mission Rwanda Emergency Office. At the meeting Petrie "begged" for additional UNAMIR forces. According to Petrie, "It was fascinating to see how much support, compassion and willingness to help give there was at the time."<sup>184</sup> Shortly after Atwood returned, he personally briefed the president.<sup>185</sup> For what appears to be the first time in the crisis, the possibility that United States was likely to send military forces into the African Great Lakes region became public knowledge. In EUCOM the initial indicator, at the action officer level, that something more than "monitoring" was needed came in the form of White House press release.<sup>186</sup>

On 18 July the RPF reached the Zairian frontier and declared a unilateral cease-fire. With the exception of the French "humanitarian zone," the entire country of Rwanda was under RPF control.<sup>187</sup> The RPF formed a "government of national unity."<sup>188</sup> Representatives of all parties named in the Arusha Peace Accords were represented with the exception of the more extreme, Hutu-dominated parties.

On the next day, cholera appeared in the refugee camps of Goma. This was rapidly followed by an outbreak of dysentery.<sup>189</sup> The UNHCR urgently appealed for assistance as stockpiled relief supplies for half a million people had run out.<sup>190</sup> The very nature of the disease placed additional burdens upon the United States decision making apparatus. Cholera is extremely virulent and dangerous. It had broken out in the camps as a result of contaminated water supplies and a lack of sanitation facilities. Water purification equipment and associated hygienic items were needed immediately. Only the United States had the unquestioned ability to lift the required materials into the theater in a timely fashion.<sup>191</sup> On 21 July Brian Atwood personally briefed the president on the situation.<sup>192</sup>

The end of the civil war dramatically changed the relative influence among the members of the IWG. Defense Department representatives had lost one of their most compelling arguments against the deployment of United States forces into the region. With the shooting

at an end, United States personnel would be at little or no risk from combat. The Somalia analogy no longer seemed as applicable.<sup>193</sup>

Given the new situation on the ground however, “clear objectives and endpoints” could be identified.<sup>194</sup> This would satisfy at least one condition laid down by PDD-25, although the issue of national interest remained problematic. Furthermore, the diminished risk to United States forces also meant there was less political risk in mounting an operation.<sup>195</sup>

On 22 July, President Clinton announced a major increase in United States aid and directed the Department of Defense to commit troops to the relief effort.<sup>196</sup> He noted that prior to making this decision he had met with Brian Atwood to get Atwood’s report on the situation in the refugee camps. The threat of cholera was said to have been an important element in the decision. Interestingly, NSA Lake, Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch, USAID Director Atwood, and General Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, were charged with conducting the operation.<sup>197</sup> The decision was unilateral, but consistent with calls for international action made by the UN

Once the decision was made, United States response was rapid. Initial airdrops of food from Special Operations C-130 aircraft were being conducted within twelve hours.<sup>198</sup> Led by General John Nix, of European Command, United States troops were on the ground and conducting operations within forty-eight hours.<sup>199</sup> In less than twenty-four hours, following the arrival of United States forces, purified water was being provided to the refugees.<sup>200</sup>

From late July until early October more than thirty-five hundred United States personnel participated in Operation Support Hope. In addition to water purification, United States forces were involved with aid distribution projects, establishing and maintaining airfield operations, and providing logistic support to UN forces.<sup>201</sup> The total cost of the operation was evaluated to be \$123.9 million.<sup>202</sup> And while Rwanda would continue to attract United States observation and concern for years, the immediate crisis was over.

## Notes

1. Interview with Dr. Anthony Lake, former assistant to the president for national security affairs, 18 October 1999.
2. There are numerous publications dealing with the history of Rwanda. Some of the better ones include: For a very good condensed overview, see Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda* (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1996), 59–70. Also see Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999) for a comprehensive report of the events from April 1994 to November 1997.
3. James F. Miskel and Richard J. Norton, eds., “Going to Goma, the Rwanda Deployment,” *National Security, vol. II, Case Studies in US Contingency Operations* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1996), 223.
4. Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey* (New York: Viking, 1995), 16.
5. *Ibid.*, 17.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, 18–19.
8. Keane, 19.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, 19–20.
11. Indeed, many of Army’s senior leaders were Tutsi.

12. Keane, 19–20.
13. Ibid., 21.
14. Ibid.
15. Akazu translates to “Little Hut.”
16. Keane, 23.
17. Ibid.
18. United Nations Department of Information, “*The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*,” (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 12.
19. Keane, 23.
20. Glynne Evans, *Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes* (Trowbridge, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23.
21. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 12.
22. Ibid., 14.
23. Keane, 22.
24. Ibid., 22–24.
25. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 15.
26. Ibid.
27. Keane, 26. Negotiations between the RPF and the government of Rwanda continued. As part of the Arusha accords, Tutsi representatives in Kigali were supported by a battalion of fully armed RPF soldiers.
28. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 24.
29. Ibid.
30. Keane, 36.
31. Ibid.
32. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27.
33. Romeo Dallaire and Bruce Pullin, “Rwanda: From Peace Agreement to Genocide,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 3, spring 1995, 7.
34. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 27–28.
35. Ibid., 24.
36. Dallaire and Pullin, 8.
37. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29–30.
38. Ibid., 31.
39. Ibid., 32.
40. Ibid., 32.
41. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 33.
42. Ibid., 37.
43. Ibid.
44. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 36.
45. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 35. The specific national contributions to UNAMIR were: Austria, 15 soldiers, Bangladesh, 942 soldiers, Belgium, 440 soldiers, Botswana, 9 soldiers, Brazil, 13 soldiers, Canada, 2 soldiers, Congo, 26 soldiers, Egypt, 10 soldiers, Fiji, 1 soldier, Ghana, 843 soldiers, Hungary, 4 soldiers, Malawi, 5 soldiers, Netherlands, 9 soldiers, Nigeria, 15 soldiers, Poland, 5 soldiers, Romania, 5 soldiers, The Russian Federation, 1 soldier, Senegal, 35 soldiers, Slovakia, 5 soldiers, Togo, 15 soldiers, Tunisia, 61 soldiers, Uruguay, 25 soldiers, and Zimbabwe, 29 soldiers.
46. Keane, 27; Prunier 221
47. Discussion with Professor Howard Adleman, University of Toronto,
48. Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia Press, 1995), 221–224.
49. Keane, 29.
50. Prunier, 230–231.
51. Assemble Nationale, Mission d’information commune, *Enquete sur la tragedie rwandaise 1900–1994* (Brussels: Assemble Nationale, 1998), 138–139.
52. The Interahamwe were lightly armed and largely ill disciplined militia units established by the Rwandan government. At the commencement of the genocide they were called to service and carried out a great deal of the killing.
53. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 14, 737.
54. Interview 6 July 2000 with CDR. Douglas Hancher, former EUCOM J-5 Action Officer and EUCOM Crisis Action Team watch stander, 1994–1996.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. Most of the five involved Bosnia-related operations.

57. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 38.
58. *Ibid.*, 39.
59. John A Berry and Carol Pot Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1999), xxii.
60. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 40.
61. Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 3.
62. Prunier, 270–271.
63. Lake Interview, 18 October 1999; *Assemblée Nationale*, 532.
64. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 15, 752.
65. *Ibid.*, 771 - 72.
66. Yael S. Aronoff, “An Apology Is Not Enough: What will happen in the next case of genocide?”, *Washington Post*, 9 April, 1998, A25.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Interview with Mr. Richard McCall, former USAID Chief of Staff and USAID representative to the Rwanda IWG, 11 July 2000.
69. Miskel and Norton, 227.
70. McCall interview.
71. Nightline, 19. The member was identified as Tony Marley, U.S State Department Military Advisor, 1992–1995.); McCall interview.
72. Alison Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 624.
73. McCall Interview.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Des Forges, 605.
76. *Ibid.*, 623.
77. Feil, 8.
78. ABC News *Dateline* Transcript #1710, “The Triumph of Evil,” air date 26 January 1999. This statement was confirmed by Karel Korvanda of the Czech Republic on the same show.
79. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 41.
80. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 43–44.
81. Feil, 30.
82. Dallaire and Pullin, 9.
83. Feil., 16.
84. Feil, 15.
85. McCall Interview.
86. *Nightline*, 17.
87. Lake interview, Interview with Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Special Assistant to the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative and former ambassador to Somalia, 6 June 2000; Interview with Mr. George Taft, Attorney, U.S. Department of State, Office of Legal Affairs/Africa, 5 April 2000.
88. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 45.
89. *Ibid.*
90. Des Forges, 639.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, No. 18, 984.
93. McCall interview.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 984.
97. McCall interview.
98. Bogosian interview.
99. McCall interview.
100. Miskel and Norton, 227.
101. Aronoff, A25; McCall interview.
102. Des Forges, 624–625.
103. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 974.
104. Adelman and Suhrke, 211.
105. A review of stories in major newspapers for the period January through August reveals that Bosnia and Haiti stories outnumbered stories on Rwanda by nearly two to one. When only United States papers are examined the ratio is even higher.
106. Ambassador Albright testimony, 5 May 1994, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations for 1995, Part 4: Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives One Hundred Third Congress Second Session,”

- (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994) 547–622.
107. Bogosian interview.
108. Des Forges, 625.
109. Albright testimony,
110. *Ibid.*,
111. *Ibid.*
112. ABC News “This Week,” trans., air date: 10 July 2000, 4-5.
113. *Ibid.*
114. McCall interview.
115. Federal News Service Transcript, “Briefing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” May 2, 1994, 3.
116. *Ibid.*
117. Adelmand and Suhrke, 218.
118. Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 30, Nr. 18, 978.
119. “The Crisis in Rwanda: Hearing Before the Subcommittee In Africa Of The Committee On Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, May 4, 1994” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 1.
120. *Ibid.*, 4.
121. *Ibid.*, 12.
122. *Ibid.*
123. “Crisis In Rwanda,” 44.
124. *Ibid.*, 50–54.
125. Testimony of Senator Paul Simon, *Congressional Record*, 103<sup>rd</sup> Congress 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, 140 Con Rec S10941, Vol. 140, Nr. 8, S10941, 8 August 1994.
126. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 46.
127. Paul Lewis, “U.S. Examines Way To Assist Rwanda Without Troops,” *New York Times*, 1 May 1994, 1.
128. Ralph Bogleiter, “Albright Says U.S. Action Possible in Haiti,” *Cable Network News*, 2 May 1994, Transcript #600-3,
129. “Many countries ‘reluctant’ to send peacekeepers,” *The Vancouver Sun*, 3 May 1994, A4.
130. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 51.
131. “Aid group on Rwanda: It’s ‘genocide’ on a horrific scale; Kigali battered by heavy shelling as fighting surges,” *The Gazette* (Montreal), 4 May 1994, A10.
132. *Frontline* transcript, 4.
133. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 29.
134. *Frontline* transcript, 8-9.
135. *Ibid.*
136. Paul Lewis, “UN Chief Seeks and African Peace Force for Rwanda,” *New York Times*, 2 May 2000, A3.
137. Keane, 123–124.
138. Bogosian interview; interview with Dr. Ronald Senykoff, Country (Rwanda) Program Officer, Office of Food for Peace, U.S. Agency for International Development, 5 July 2000.
139. Aronoff, A25.
140. *Ibid.*; Keane, 124; Prunier 275.
141. McCall interview. McCall pointed out that such questions were not unique, but rather common when dealing with the United States military. “It’s been my experience that when you work with the military you have to be very precise about what is you want or they will keep coming back to you with questions.”
142. “Shameful Dawdling on Rwanda,” *New York Times*, 15 June 1994, A24.
143. Hancher interview. There were other aspects of the APC transfer that escaped the attention of the press. The requirement for transfer essentially required the APCs to be delivered “as is.” No spare parts, support packages or training were to be provided with the vehicles. Perhaps not surprising, less than half the APCs were reported to remain functional within three months of delivery and none within two years.
144. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 48.
145. *Ibid.*, 120.
146. *Ibid.*, 49.
147. *Ibid.* 50.
148. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, Nr. 20, 1161.
149. *Ibid.*, No. 21, 1171.
150. *Ibid.*, No.23, 1252.
151. *Ibid.*

152. U.N., 52.
153. *Ibid.*, 53.
154. *Ibid.*
155. *Ibid.*
156. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54.
157. McCall interview.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 54. Ten Council members voted for the action, none voted against. Brazil, China, New Zealand, Pakistan and Nigeria abstained.
160. *Ibid.*
161. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, No. 26, 1365.
162. To date, the author has been unable to discover just what the president meant by “statistical” relief.
163. McCall interview
164. *Ibid.*; Lake interview. McCall stated that the decision to not intervene more directly was made by the president. Lake has only said that he wanted to “do something.”
165. McCall interview.
166. *Ibid.*; Adelman and Suhrke, 221–227.
167. Hancher interview, 6 July 2000.
168. Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, “Soldiers To The Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons Learned from Rwanda,” (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996), 15, 111; Hancher interview. In EUCOM, it was only half-jokingly said that the appearance of CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour usually presaged an impending operation. Informally referred to as “the Death Angel” Amanpour always seemed to be where the most compelling stories were to be found.
169. McCall interview.
170. Lake interview
171. *Ibid.*
172. *Ibid.*; Bogosian interview.
173. Des Forges, 170.
174. *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996*, 55.
175. Initially Operation Tourquoise was carried out by French and Senegalese troops. Forces from Chad, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Niger later joined them. Minear and Guillot, 96.
176. *Ibid.*, 56.
177. Des Forges, 670.
178. *Ibid.*
179. Miskel and Norton, 226.
180. *Ibid.*
181. *Ibid.*, 228.
182. *Ibid.*
183. Berry and Berry, eds., 151.
184. McCall interview. Although there was a sense that a United States deployment of troops was inevitable the Atwood meeting “clinched” the decision. As a result of this meeting, the president would increasingly look upon Atwood as a personal “asset.”
185. Hancher interview.
186. U.N., 57.
187. *Ibid.*, 121.
188. *Ibid.*, 74.
189. *Ibid.*, 120.
190. McCall interview; interview with Admiral David Jeremiah, former vice-chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
191. *Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 30, No. 29, 1533.
192. *Ibid.*, 229.
193. Jeremiah interview.
194. *Ibid.*
195. *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, No. 29, 1533.
196. *Ibid.*, 1535.
197. Hancher interview.
198. McCall interview.
199. Minear and Guillot, 112.
200. *Ibid.*
201. *Ibid.*
202. *Ibid.*

