HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF (HA/DR) OPERATIONS PLANNING

AUGUST 2005

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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Title: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations Planning

Originator: Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)

Purpose: The purpose of this tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) is to provide guidance to strike group commanders, squadron commanders, their staffs, and ships for planning and executing HA/DR operations.

This TACMEMO addresses issues specific to HA/DR operations. The intent is to guide a commander and staff in the thought process, planning, and course of action development needed to prepare for and conduct foreign disaster relief operations. It is not an all-encompassing guide, but does present actions and options to be considered. It does not prescribe activities which are better addressed in other publications.

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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1 PURPOSE
To assist Navy strike group staffs, squadron staffs and ships tasked with providing humanitarian assistance support in disaster relief operations.

1.2 SCOPE
The intent of this tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) is to guide a commander and staff in the thought process, planning, and course of action development needed to prepare for and conduct foreign disaster relief operations. Each disaster and associated response operation will be unique due to differences in scale, environmental factors, geography, host country (nation) relationships, etc. The basic planning considerations and thought processes, however, remain the same. While some considerations and resources discussed reflect a “worst case scenario” response to a major regional catastrophe, they should be considered for “scaled down” applicability in other cases. Similarly, many of the considerations in this TACMEMO may be applicable in domestic disaster relief operations.

1.3 ORGANIZATION
This TACMEMO incorporates lessons learned and observations during disaster relief operations, including those from the 2005 tsunami relief effort Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. The chapters immediately following contain general initial planning considerations and the operational commander’s principal concerns and decisions. Subsequent chapters and annexes provide more detail. It is not an all-inclusive checklist, but rather a guide of “things to think about” to assist a commander and staff in planning HA/DR operations.
CHAPTER 2
Initial Considerations in Operations Planning (Generic)

2.1 Review Superior Commander’s Guidance and Direction
- The following are intended to develop an understanding of what the superior commander (e.g., joint task force commander) has directed:
  - Identify the superior commander’s mission and intent.
    (1) Purpose of action and mission goals
    (2) Operational objectives
    (3) Desired results and end state
    (4) Concept of operations
    (5) Specified tasks
    (6) Follow-on tasks
- Determine the types/availability of assets and command relationships in theater.
  (1) National and theater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that can be assigned or tasked by higher headquarters
  (2) Joint functional organization
  (3) Logistics infrastructure

2.2 Conduct Mission Analysis
- The following are intended to develop an understanding of what the mission entails:
  - Determine specified and implied tasking.
    (1) Determine follow-on tasking and, based on desired end state, possible transition points.
  - Determine priority of effort.
  - Identify civil/political and, if applicable, religious limitations on activities.
    (1) National policy
    (2) Public affairs guidance
    (3) Legal restrictions
    (4) Religious climate and practices
  - Identify military limitations on activities.
    (1) Rules of engagement (ROE), if applicable (e.g., non-permissive environment or opposition/danger from rogue elements)
    (2) Military policies in effect (e.g., arming of personnel, billeting of foreign civilians in Navy ships, transportation of foreign civilians in Navy aircraft, etc.), noting differences if there are multiple host nations involved.
  - Identify environmental factors and physical limitations on activities.

Develop an understanding of where, by whom, and how aspects of the relief operation may be accomplished. See Section A.2 for examples of specific application in disaster relief operations.

  (1) Geographic/topographic
  (2) Command relations
  (3) Communication, detection, and intelligence systems
(4) Manning
(5) Expertise
- See Annex B for a draft list of essential tasks to accomplish the mission.
As discussed in NTTP 1-01, such lists allow a commander to quantify both the
level and scope of effort needed to achieve mission objectives.

2.3 Conduct Intelligence Preparation
- The following are intended to improve situational awareness:
  - Identify environmental conditions and other factors affecting command,
    control, and employment of forces assigned and communications capabilities in
    the area of operations. (Areas where forces can and may go, how to get
    supplies/material to the right places, and the environmental impacts to operations
    planning, e.g., flight schedules, air routes, where to put the sea base, water
    routes, etc.) See Section A.2 for examples of specific application to disaster
    relief operations.
  - International and intra-national environment (leaders, power and
    influence groups, factions, allies, or other entities, type of government and
    economy, laws/legal system, etc.).
  - Host nation restrictions (types of operations prohibited, forces or
    platforms that may not be used, force protection measures, etc.)
  - Conduct enemy (opposition) assessment (for non-permissive or lawless
    environment)
    (1) Potential enemy and/or regional centers of gravity or key
    nodes/sources of power, strength, and support
    (2) Relative combat power analysis
    (3) Force composition
    (4) Location and disposition
    (5) Reinforcements/reserves
    (6) Logistics
    (7) Time/space factors
    (8) Combat efficiency
    (9) Enemy courses of action analysis

2.4 Review Lessons Learned
- The following are intended to assist in learning from recent experience:
  - Review operational lessons/observations recorded in the Navy Lessons
    Learned System (NLLS) database and after action reports (AARs).
  - Review exercise lessons/observations recorded in the NLLS database
    and AARs.
- Review applicable lessons/observations from other Services, recorded in their lessons learned databases and AARs, and from other nations, if available.
- See Section A.4 for examples of lessons or observations contained in the NLLS or recent AARs.

2.5 Develop Battle Rhythm
- The following are intended to assist in organizing for success:
  - Identify key readiness factors.
  - Identify operational and training requirements.
  - Identify higher headquarters’ requirements for reports, meetings, video teleconferences (VTCs), etc.
  - Identify other recurring requirements for coordination with subordinates, the country team, host nation, and other agencies/organizations.
- See Sections 3.9 and 6.1.2.

Note: The above are initial planning considerations that are common to any operation. Amplification is provided in subsequent chapters and annexes.
CHAPTER 3
Commander’s Principal Concerns and Decisions

3.1 Mission Clarity, Command Relationships, and Policies
- From the outset, the commander must have a clear understanding of the mission and how the military, host nation, and other participants in the humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operation fit together and interact in accomplishing that mission.
- Determine mission requirements, policies in effect, and the operational command structure.
- A natural tension may occur between the commander on the scene and distant headquarters as warfighting command structure(s) adapt to meet unique requirements under non-warfighting crisis conditions.
  - Those at the scene have a great need for agility in addressing rapidly changing conditions and local working relationships that may not be apparent to those at the distant headquarters. For one thing, the headquarters is focused on other things than the commander on the scene, including moving the “bigger blocks” in the operation.
  - Additionally, it takes a considerable amount of time and information to stand up a headquarters, while those at the scene are likely fully tasked meeting daily HA/DR operational requirements.
- It is incumbent upon the local commander to assist the headquarters in developing its situational awareness and to speak emphatically, when necessary, to advise superiors when their decisions run contrary to what is needed on scene to accomplish the mission or when assets on scene are insufficient to meet the requirements levied by higher headquarters. See Section A.4 for illustration.
- Determine the command’s relationship with civilian and other military participants (e.g., U.S., host nation, coalition partners, non-government, and other international).
- Supported/supporting relationships may be more appropriate than shifting operational or tactical control of subordinate units. In some cases these units will require considerable logistical, planning, or operational support from their parent command and a supported/supporting relationship between commanders may be more effective. See joint doctrine publications JP 0-2 and JP 3-0 for a discussion on command relationships.
- Publicize the end state, including the intended scope and duration of military aid, to all participants early in order to avoid unreasonable expectations and mission growth.
- Maintain proper perspective. It is easy to get “too close to the problem.” There is a need to occasionally detach oneself from the situation and ask such questions as “Why are we here and what are our objectives?”

3.2 Situational Awareness
- Good situational awareness is critical to properly focusing the force’s efforts.
- Ensure sufficient forces are assigned and/or tasked to develop and maintain a robust awareness of the situation.
- Employ subject matter experts (SMEs), from recent operations or exercises, the combatant command (COCOM) country/region desks, or fleet headquarters, as part of the force’s extended network.
  - Request they be attached for duty in theater, if possible.
  - Additional sources of SMEs include the U.S. State Department, academic institutions, the retired joint flag officer community, UN sources, and industry. Fleet and COCOM staffs may be able to assist in accessing these groups.
- Determine safety concerns, including safety of navigation, air traffic control, and force protection issues.
- Determine other agency expectations.
  - Assist their situational awareness by communicating the military role and transition plan.
- Get as much information as possible, from as many sources as possible. See Sections 5.1 through 5.4 for additional suggestions.

3.3 Forces and Material
- It is important to get the “logistics train” moving as soon as possible. It does no good to arrive on station without the needed supplies, equipment, and skills, or the capacity to deliver or apply them. Similarly, the distribution element must be thought through. Again, it does no good to create a “mountain” of supplies and material on the beach, with associated protection and shelf life concerns, if you can’t deliver them where they are needed. Other participants, such as NGOs, may not give logistics matters due consideration and the military may be called upon to assist them.
- At the initial indication that assignment to HA/DR operations may be imminent, ensure required forces and material are on board or en route and available for tasking. Having the right forces in the right place at the right time is the challenge that the commander must meet.
- Manage the “demand signal” that the crisis generates in order to avoid excess capacity, as well as shortages. See Section 7.2 for more on this dynamic.
  - Forward recommendations on support, relief supplies, etc. up the chain of command as soon as possible and maintain a continuous dialog to effect changes as conditions evolve.
- Re-deploy U.S. military assets, or have their emergency deployments cancelled, as the host nation and civilian agencies get the situation under control. These forces may be needed elsewhere. Additionally, there are morale and logistic reasons for avoiding situations in which forces are underemployed.
- Preserve availability of air assets and flexibility in their tasking from the sea base. Short notice requirements for assessment or delivery are common in HA/DR operations.
- Aid prioritization should reflect host nation desires and emergent needs. One way to accomplish this is to establish a procedure in which the host nation
provides a daily list of requirements, which may be expanded to reflect situational awareness gained while meeting those requirements.
- Establish procedures for force protection and security of material. Depending on host nation sensitivities, such as size of footprint ashore and arming of personnel, this may entail significant risk.
- Commanders may decide to keep the footprint ashore small as a security measure. Whether such decision is made for that purpose, or due to another reason (e.g., host nation desire), there is an associated overhead or opportunity cost (i.e., a tradeoff in airlift and sealift used for this purpose, as opposed to delivering aid) in building and collapsing a presence ashore each day.
- Maintaining combat readiness can be difficult, particularly in extended operations or if deck space, policy, or host nation restrictions preclude certain activities. See section 7.4.2 for an example. Develop a plan to maintain/re-gain combat efficiency and advise higher headquarters of expected deficiencies.
- Extensive relief efforts may stress the physical, spiritual, and emotional capabilities of personnel. Establish a preventive program and monitor personnel for signs of stress.
- Identify and leverage special capabilities and skills that exist within the force. These can be force multipliers and gap fillers. See Section 9.4 for an example.

3.4 HA/DR and Joint Task Force (JTF) Infrastructure
- Naval forces are well suited to HA/DR operations and will often be the first to respond, possibly arriving prior to establishment of HA/DR and JTF infrastructure.
- Establish the sea base as close to the disaster relief site(s) as practical in order to speed delivery of supplies. Use the sea for maneuver space and leverage force mobility to focus efforts where they are needed most.
- Speed to execution is essential, not only to save lives and mitigate human suffering but to provide an effective supply bridge until others can take over the operation.
- Establish the command element at the most robust command and control node in the sea base. This will facilitate integration with the joint task force (JTF) and other agencies and command of the JTF, if a JTF is established.
- If arriving before joint or inter-agency command and control has been established, commence operations to minimize additional loss of life and keep superiors informed. Be prepared to take the lead in coordinating arriving U.S. forces. U.S. military assets may initially be the sole capability for delivery of relief supplies.
- Subsequent actions should focus on transition of command and control functions to the appropriate authority (e.g., joint task force commander), if a military organizational structure is established.
- Obtain host nation permission to operate watercraft and rotary wing aircraft at the earliest opportunity. These assets can access surviving population concentrations, requiring little infrastructure to deliver needed supplies in the austere environment resulting from the disaster.
3.5 Transition/Transfer Points and Strategy
- Military support in HA/DR operations is intended to be short duration (i.e., support during the crisis stage). Address the transition to civilian performance of tasks at the initial meeting(s) with other participants and keep the military-civilian team focused on this critical path. Update all concerned on the status of transition as often as possible.
- Once the situation has stabilized, the United Nations (UN), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and host nation should assume those functions the military initially performed. Civilian agencies should be required to contribute to the operation with all available assets as they arrive in theater, rather than being allowed to wait until all of their assets are on station and their normal support architecture is fully in place.
  - Non-NGO niche functions that must be provided by other means (e.g., air control) are critical to this transfer. Identify these early and ensure there is a plan to transfer them to the host nation or appropriate international organization.
  - Beware of mission creep (e.g., requests for assistance in reconstruction efforts). No new tasks should appear unless absolutely necessary and there should be an acceptable transition plan.
  - Other agencies’ readiness and willingness to assume humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) functions are key. Keep the chain of command informed in order to adjust resource allocation and deployment.
- Metrics are important in assessing progress toward transition/transfer of activities to another agency, or terminating those activities no longer necessary.

3.6 Lessons Learned Collection and Events Reconstruction
- It is essential that the Navy, as an enterprise, learn from its experience in order to continue to improve performance.
- Establish and follow a plan to collect data to meet specified and anticipated reporting requirements, reconstruct events, and provide lessons learned for those who will conduct this type of operation in the future.
- Dedicate personnel to collect this data. Consider using Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) analysts, if embarked, and requesting a Navy lessons learned (NLL) collection team for assistance in large operations.

3.7 Liaison Officer (LNO), Detachment (DET), and Team Deployment
- LNOs, DETs, and teams are force multipliers, facilitating access to key individuals and other agencies and promoting effective coordination.
- Designate and deploy LNOs as early as possible to get your “eyes on target” and coordinate efforts with other agencies. Consider stationing LNOs with other U.S. forces, U.S. government officials, and other Navy elements. Stationing a LNO with the U.S. embassy or country team base of operations is particularly important.
- Establish beach detachments to supervise flight operations and coordinate logistic matters, as required.
Deploy teams, as necessary, to coordinate with media, distinguished visitors (DVs), and other agencies, conduct assessments, make necessary infrastructure repairs to enable delivery of supplies, etc.

3.8 Communications
- Effective communications are essential to coordination. Minimum required capabilities include radios, telephones (preferably satellite), secure and non-secure Internet and video teleconferencing. The media will likely desire streaming video capability.
- Manage expectations of what communications support will be available or provided to the media by clearly articulating capabilities at first contact and as media personnel arrive.
- Determine the primary command and control medium. Consider using unclassified email to facilitate participation by all agencies.
- Establish ship to shore communications between the sea base and logistic sites (e.g., air heads and ports).

3.9 Battle Rhythm
- Events must be synchronized for effective coordination. Establish a battle rhythm, to include meetings, reports, key events, etc., to support higher headquarters' requirements and provide effective coordination between own force and other agencies. See Section 6.1.2 for additional discussion.
- Establishing and maintaining a battle rhythm pose a significant challenge, particularly in the earliest stages of an operation. Numerous entities, operating in widely different time zones and possibly opposite sides of the International Date Line, place demands on the commander and staff around the clock. Additionally, weekend and national or religious holiday routines can affect availability of key personnel in some of these organizations, posing coordination challenges or an impetus to accelerate or delay timelines. This can be especially challenging in Islamic countries, where there may not be anyone available because of religious proscriptions on holidays. The commander should be prepared to address what his staff can reasonably do to accommodate the requirements, desires, and battle rhythms of outside agencies.

3.10 Metrics and Terminology
- Commonality in measures and terms is essential to coordinating and assessing participant performance in an operation. Additionally, some terms can hamper coordination with the host nation(s) and NGOs or international organizations because of "baggage" they may carry. Develop a standard set of relevant metrics and appropriate terms and train personnel in their use. See Sections A.3 and 6.6 for more on metrics.

Note: The above are key considerations from the commander's perspective. Amplification is provided in subsequent chapters and annexes.
CHAPTER 4
External Relations

4.1 Military

4.1.1 Higher Authority
- Develop a means to keep higher authority informed of all of your activities. They will have a strong desire for information and this must be fulfilled as a matter of routine.

4.1.2 Other U.S. Navy, Services, and Joint Service
- Command and working relationships with other U.S. participants (e.g., functional component commands, area commanders, etc.) must be clearly understood in order to coordinate effectively (e.g., how to best coordinate activities in adjacent areas or within each other’s assigned areas).

4.1.3 International
- Key leaders, including those in the beach detachment, should seek out the local military and civilian leadership to gain their trust and approval to operate in the area, as well as their cooperation. Invite them to meetings and be sensitive to how they must be perceived by the local population. Share information within classification permitted. It is better for the host nation to be in control, providing information to the NGOs for coordination of participant efforts and ultimately transition to host nation performance of all functions.
- Other military participants will likely support the effort through their national channels. Determine communication paths to facilitate coordination.
- Combined force operations, especially those in which the U.S. is not a lead support element, will have unique relationships and procedures.

4.2 Civilian

4.2.1 U.S. Government
- The U.S. ambassador (O-10 rank equivalent) is charged by the U.S. President to manage all aspects of the U.S. relationship with the country he or she is posted to. The ambassador has veto power over all U.S. agencies and must be kept informed of plans and progress. The commander should meet, and develop communications paths to, the ambassador and country team as early as possible. If possible, station a liaison officer in the defense attaché office to assist.
- State department personnel are typically in charge of prioritizing U.S. efforts, coordinating with the JTF commander (when assigned) and other elements, and taking care to avoid internal conflict between competing host nation political, religious, or ethnic groups.

4.2.2 Host Nation
- The U.S. has no access rights in a foreign country, except those granted by the host nation. These rights are earned through the goodwill established by HA/DR participants and others who have interacted with the host nation in the past. - Host nation politics, culture, and local rules drive the conduct of a HA/DR operation. This can be particularly challenging when a country has not had a positive relationship with the U.S. for a significant period of time. In such cases, planners may have very limited data on infrastructure, the government, etc. and working relationships will have to be built. - Daily senior officer presence at meetings is essential to establishing and maintaining rapport with host nation officials. These officers should be empowered to make decisions or be able to communicate quickly with decision makers. Minimize personnel changes to avoid a potential necessity to rebuild established relationships.

4.2.3 Non-government
- There will likely be numerous NGOs involved in a HA/DR operation. For example, approximately three weeks after the 26 December, 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, there were over 109 NGOs operating in Indonesia, 84 in Sri Lanka, and 35 in Thailand. Coordination with NGOs poses a unique challenge. While grouped under one heading, these organizations vary widely on numerous dimensions (size, orientation, organization, funding sources, etc.) and it is difficult to get them to work together. Each will be primarily concerned with fulfilling its own purpose and desire visibility or recognition for its efforts. While this may not appear congruent with being an organization providing relief in a humanitarian crisis, it reflects the reality that NGOs have a charter and they must show results to their constituencies or their funding stream will suffer.
  - NGOs may have an organization-centric bias, in which they may be reluctant to accept assessments from other organizations as a basis for committing their assets. Developing a relationship as trusted agent can assist in developing efficiencies and synergies among the various participants. In the event this bias cannot be overcome, it must be factored into planning.
  - NGOs also tend to rely on ad hoc procedures and networks, including personal networks, as opposed to the formalized procedures and relationships military organizations favor. This, likewise, must be factored into planning.
  - NGOs may exaggerate conditions or inflate requirements in order to gain priority for distribution of their materials. If available, use additional sources to verify or validate their reports.
  - Attempt to determine a lead agency (e.g., UN) to act as single point of contact for matters related to NGOs and provide coordination between them and other participants. In some cases, the UN may activate a humanitarian operations center (HOC) for this purpose.
- The media are important in disseminating information, including the role the Navy is playing in the relief effort. They are also a key source of information in developing and maintaining situation awareness and facilitating perception management.
- The media will have unique requirements in fulfilling their role. Close coordination is required so that all parties understand both the media’s requirements and/or desires and the capabilities available to meet them.

4.3 General

4.3.1 Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)
- The JTF commander or military commanders at other echelons may establish a CMOC(s) to facilitate coordination of civilian and military activities. JP 3-57 contains a discussion on CMOCs and related interagency or international coordination centers.

4.3.2 Transition or Transfer of Responsibility
- The plan to transition functions from military to civilian performance must be decided early and addressed throughout the operation. There will likely be a tendency among other agencies to wait until all assets are available before accepting responsibility from the military. This is counter-productive. If necessary, request senior leadership assistance in convincing these agencies to join the operation as soon as their assets start to arrive. Their involvement in the operation will promote the necessary thought process to plan and execute transfer of functions as soon as the conditions can support it.
- Military forces are well suited to facilitate the necessary interaction among the various agencies in the operation. The sooner this occurs, the sooner transition will happen.

4.3.3 Requirements
- Failure to understand, or adhere to, the accepted process that drives requirements has caused operational and logistics problems in the past. Generally, it is the host nation that drives this process. Failing that, it is a UN, or other appropriate international organization’s, responsibility. For the U.S., the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead agency, supporting the U.S. ambassador, or the assistant secretary of state for the region in the case of countries where no U.S. ambassador is posted, through deployment of disaster assistance response teams (DART). JP 3-08 contains a discussion on the interagency process and foreign disaster relief.

4.3.4 Professional Contacts
- Professional relationships established during regional forums and exercises (e.g., medical conferences or exercises) may be leveraged to facilitate external relations. Similarly, relationships built by allies and partners may be helpful in this regard.

4.3.5 Seniority
Rank equivalency can be important in gaining and maintaining access to counterparts in other agencies. Where this is not possible, a senior officer of commensurate rank or position (e.g., a flag officer or commanding officer, as appropriate) may need to occasionally “open the door” for a more junior officer.
CHAPTER 5
Information and Situational Awareness

5.1 Intelligence, Media, Briefings and Reports

- Obtain as much information on the situation as possible, as early as possible. Consult the intelligence community (fleet/COCOM regional desk officers, Office of Naval Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, etc.) for photographs, news reports, analysis, etc. Review U.S. and foreign media reports.

  - COCOMs and other theater centers should be able to provide a list of popular foreign media for each country in the region. Monitoring these sources can provide valuable insight on local perception of U.S. activities.

  - The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) updates its ReliefWeb website (www.reliefweb.int) around the clock. Consult it for information (e.g., maps, policy and issue reference materials, organizations involved in each sector, contacts, etc.) on current and past humanitarian emergencies and disasters.

  - Determine which agencies or organizations are operating in-country and review their websites for background information.

- A Naval Oceanographic Office fleet survey team generally conducts an assessment, including a hydrographic survey for such reasons as safety of navigation. Review their findings and disseminate them to other participants in the operation, after getting host nation permission for release of information that may be sensitive. As an example, a host nation in a HA/DR operation did not want certain coastal survey information released due to national security concerns.

  - Charts may be inadequate (e.g., inaccurate soundings, landmark/navigation aid features, etc.) or participants may be using different charts, navigation aids may be out of position, and new underwater obstructions may exist as a result of the disaster. The Naval Oceanographic Office may be able to assist with hydrographic ship services and/or a fleet survey team(s). These teams are rapidly deployable, small units with air-transportable equipment that may be embarked in a destroyer-sized ship. Request this assistance early, if needed, to avoid delays in delivery of supplies by ships or small craft.

- Work through the country team to obtain a host nation engineer assessment of the infrastructure, including utility systems. This is critical to planning and resourcing restoration to minimize mobility restrictions and dependence on externally provided utilities.

- Request access to daily briefings to the combatant commander and others on the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) in order to understand what is being presented and to maintain alignment with the commander’s intent. Submit any needed corrections to their data or tasking orders.

- Plan on submitting situation reports to higher headquarters every six hours, or as directed, to keep them apprised and minimize requests for additional information.

- Determine or establish a reliable source for numbers of displaced persons in the camps. International organization assessment teams tend to over estimate
these numbers. Additionally, NGOs tend to use their own assessment teams, rather than accept information provided by the UN and other international organizations.

Identify everything measurable (e.g., number of flights, flight hours, number/weight of pallets delivered, etc.), in convertible units of measure where possible, and keep such records from the start of the operation.

- VTCs are helpful in establishing and maintaining a common situational awareness. Maximizing the number of participants speeds the process and promotes general understanding of decisions and the decision process in use.

5.2 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, and Records
- Review applicable guidance in the Reference section of this publication.
- Search the lessons learned databases for relevant information (Navy, joint, other Services). Databases and points of contact for assistance are accessible through the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) websites (www.nwdc.navy.mil and www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil).
- Collect the lessons learned from this operation.
  - If the operation is of significant size, consider requesting an active collection team via the chain of command.
  - Assign someone to maintain a detailed diary of events, including flights conducted, where they went, what they carried, etc. This type of information will be requested at the end of the operation for historical documentation and it will be difficult to create without such a record. Strike group(s)’s embarked CNA analysts have been employed effectively in this capacity in past operations.

5.3 Imagery and Other Detailed Information
- Commercial imagery is generally of sufficient quality/granularity for use and it carries fewer restrictions, if any, on distribution. It is also useful as a broad survey tool that can assist in determining where national or tactical assets may be used to best effect.
- Request Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program (AIP)-equipped Maritime Patrol Air (MPA) assets to obtain updated, good quality imagery to help define and prioritize relief needs. The improved electro-optic capabilities of this aircraft are well suited to this type of mission. Unmanned sensor platforms, if available, may also be used for this purpose.
- Detailed information is needed on landing zones (LZs) in the relief area. Intelligence officers can assist in developing a library of LZ information by collecting photographs and other debriefing materials from returning aircrews and imagery from AIP MPA assets. It may also be helpful to send an interpreter on selected flights to assist aircrews in assessing current and future requirements in the area.
- Obtain detailed maps of existing infrastructure, critical facilities (e.g., hospitals, airfields, etc.), and utility systems, annotated to reflect the extent of known or suspected degradation, from host nation officials.
- Internet access restrictions may block receipt of imagery. Grant unrestricted access to key individuals.
5.4 Cultural Awareness

5.4.1 Culture
- Develop cultural awareness on the region in which you will be operating.
- If available, members of the U.S. ambassador's country team can help.
  Meet with the ambassador and his country team, if possible. Otherwise, Fleet or
  COCOM regional desk officers may provide assistance.
- If possible, request deployment of the desk officer(s) as advisors for the
duration of the operation, assign them to the liaison team(s), and have them brief
watch teams and other key personnel.
- Units, such as the U.S. Army 4TH Psychological Operations Battalion, can
assist in reviewing materials for religious, political, and other cultural
considerations prior to distribution to the local population.
- Unit chaplains may also assist in assessing the religious environment and the
impact of religion upon the local culture. Since many cultures hold religious
leaders in high esteem, chaplains may be perceived with inherent credibility and
serve particularly well as liaisons to indigenous religious leaders.
- See Section A.3 for examples of cultural issues.

5.4.2 Language
- The language skills provided by linguists are key to developing and maintaining
situational awareness. See Section 9.5 for further discussion.
- Information products should use pictures, color, and other graphics as the
primary means to communicate a message, where practical, to overcome
language and literacy obstacles.

5.5 Perception and Expectation Management.

5.5.1 Perceptions
- One key element of situational awareness is understanding how the Navy’s
actions, and those of the U.S. in general, are perceived by the host nation and
other participants. Leaders must be attuned to all sources (i.e., media, LNOs,
etc.), make necessary changes, and develop an information campaign, including
public affairs and LNO efforts, to promote and sustain trust.
- Look for opportunities to show good will (e.g., distribution of candy and cookies,
providing basic dental care, or elective surgery, etc.).

5.5.2 Expectations
- Host nations, international organizations and NGOs may have incorrect
understandings and unrealistic expectations regarding the military’s role in the
operation. Determine and communicate the military role, termination/transfer
criteria, and transition plan at the outset and continue to address expectations.
- Providing a contact relief for units and individuals participating in the operation,
until the functions have transferred to another agency, can assist in maintaining
the expectation that the host nation will not be abandoned, a key to maintaining trust.

5.6 Control or Management of Disseminated Information
- It is difficult to control or manage what happens to information after it has been provided to others. Pictures and reports may be used or altered to serve the purpose of a group or faction. Consider implications prior to release of information and minimize use of command logos or other identifying marks on potentially sensitive or exploitable material. Additionally, have public affairs officers (PAOs) review materials prior to release.
CHAPTER 6
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I)

6.1 Command and Control

6.1.1 Command Structure
- Service component or geographical command designation may be more appropriate than functional componenty in tailoring the command structure to the mission, reflecting the differences between HA/DR and warfighting.
- Seams, or disconnects, can occur as wartime command structures attempt to adapt to HA/DR operations. Staffs must identify and manage these seams.

6.1.2 Battle Rhythm
- Battle rhythm refers to events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis that facilitates setting conditions for success. Many factors help determine and establish a unit’s battle rhythm. Some of these are the unit’s state of training, battle rhythm of higher headquarters, and the current mission. Some missions require much more time than others to prepare for. The battle rhythm must remain flexible. Units must be able to react to changing conditions and targets of opportunity as they present themselves.
- Normal working hours for key staff will be determined by higher headquarters’ requirements for reports, meetings, visits, video teleconferences (VTCs), etc. These events will also drive the activities of the watch teams to a large extent.
- NWDC TACMEMO 3-32-03, concerning joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) planning and execution, contains an extensive discussion on battle rhythm and operational planning considerations.

6.1.3 Air Traffic Control
- Disaster relief operations entail the operation of numerous types of helicopters from disparate military and civilian organizations. Local and wide area air traffic control procedures are needed to provide guidance for safe routing of helicopter traffic within the relief area, including landing zones and fixed wing airports. These rules should additionally specify standard communication procedures and frequencies, checkpoints, altitude guidance, and air routes.
- Integrate helicopter operations and other military/relief agency flight operations into the existing air traffic control rules and routes in the affected area. Establish rules if none are in effect or the disaster rendered them ineffective.
- Conduct classes/training on these rules for helicopter pilots who will be using the airport and ensure local military/police and NGO pilots are included in the classes. It is important to gain the support of local senior leadership (e.g., host nation military or civil aviation authorities) in enforcing these rules. The complexity of air control/safety of flight issues will increase rapidly without compliance, particularly as the number of fixed wing flights increases.
- Depending on equipment capabilities at the airport, it may be necessary for a ship to close within territorial waters to assist HA/DR aircraft in collision avoidance and navigation in bad weather.

6.1.4 Air Tasking Order (ATO) and Assignment of Aircraft.
- The ATO provides necessary coordination among the various military and civilian entities involved in air delivery of material and passengers. Plan all aspects of air control early. As a show of good faith, assign highest priority to host nation requests and brief host nation representatives on the plan daily to get their “buy-in” for planned operations.
  - Tactical control (TACON) of organic rotary wing air assets should remain in the sea base, rather than with the joint force air component commander (JFACC), if a JFACC is established. This facilitates flexibility to deliver supplies as needed. Frequent, short notice changes are inherent in support to relief operations and may in fact be dictated by the host nation military. See Section A.4 for further discussion.
  - Ensure that sufficient maritime patrol aircraft are assigned to support the surveillance/reconnaissance needs of the theater. Those assets that are intended to be in direct support of the relief operation should be specifically assigned to avoid confusion in mission priorities.
  - Be careful that the number and types of aircraft provided do not exceed the capability to effectively employ them (e.g., consider air space control capability, airport/LZ capacity, etc.).

6.1.5 Crisis Action Team (CAT).
- A continuously manned CAT watch may serve as single point of contact for information, tasking, and coordination.

6.2 Communications

6.2.1 Communications Protocol
- Establish the communications protocol via record message traffic, Flash precedence, upon assuming command of the operation. This should include: guidance on message traffic and email, including designation of contact lists (e.g., message plain language address designations, email addresses, and INMARSAT and cellular phone numbers), computer chat groups to be monitored, designation of official Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) and SIPRNET web sites, and establishment of an unclassified web site for general dissemination of reports.
  - Email has proven preferable to message traffic in previous HA/DR operations, producing quicker response times. Accordingly, it may be advisable to use email as a vehicle for official tasking.
  - Some email systems delete incoming and outgoing emails containing large attachments, without advising the user. Consider increasing the allowed attachment size for selected users to avoid problems where messages are not sent or received due to size restrictions.
- Keep in mind that some people who need to know information discussed via email may not be on the distribution. The same applies to telephone calls, chat groups and meetings in general. Websites and daily summaries can assist in getting the word out to the wider audience.
- Use of unclassified email for command and control allows partners to rapidly gain situational awareness, facilitates their participation, and speeds transition of functions to other agencies. The master update authority for the message address directory may not accept non-traditional force structure entries as valid for entry into the directory database. Work with the local naval computer and telecommunications area master station (NCTAMS) to resolve difficulties.

6.2.2 Telecommunications and Teleconferencing
- Cellular telephones are critical elements of the communications network.
- Shipboard INMARSAT leases may not permit international telephone calls. Cellular telephones have been used for this purpose in past HA/DR operations. INMARSAT problems may be procedural (e.g., use of “leading zeroes” in the phone number). Train personnel in INMARSAT operating procedures.
- In the likely event of damage to the communications infrastructure, workarounds (e.g., satellite telephones, ship to shore radio, relay, etc.) will be necessary. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or manned aircraft (e.g., E2C HAWKEYE), if available and permitted, may be scheduled for communications relay during anticipated critical periods.
- Video teleconferences may be conducted a few times each day. Be prepared to travel to the nearest VTC location (afloat or ashore) if embarked in a ship that does not have this capability.

6.2.3 Computers and Bandwidth
- NGOs will use the Internet to pass information. Unless dynamic, prioritized bandwidth software is in use, it may be helpful to disconnect all but a few computers from NIPRNET in order to preserve available bandwidth. Alternatively, it may be necessary to download data to a memory stick for transfer to/from NGO computers. If a local hotel or Internet café has high speed Internet access, it may be useful to station a detachment there. Similarly, Iridium satellite telephones can be used for this purpose.
- NGO use of “freeware” (software downloaded from the internet) poses a collaboration problem for military networks that require accredited software applications and protection from viruses inherent in “free” software. “Fly-away” kits of commercially-based communications systems and web-based collaboration tools may be available to facilitate this in the future. Establishment of an information clearinghouse and common web page to “push” information can help, if participants are willing to commit to using them for collaboration.
- Bandwidth will be a particular concern in transmission of imagery via the Internet. Transmission to the ship from an air operations center is preferable. SIPRNET bandwidth is less saturated than NIPRNET and may also be used for this purpose. Establish the protocol to transfer appropriate unclassified imagery
to the NIPRNET for further dissemination to users that don’t have SIPRNET access (e.g., NGOs). See Section A.4 for further discussion.

- Manage file size by compression techniques, minimizing use of graphics, etc.

6.2.4 Streaming Video
- Embedded media will likely desire streaming video capability. A non-material workaround is to break the media file into numerous smaller files (approximately 12) and email them to the studio for re-construction. Installation of fast file transfer software is also helpful.
- Maintain liaison with the media to ensure that their requirements/desires are known and that they understand the limitations of the capabilities available for their use to avoid unrealistic expectations.

6.2.5 Equipment Portability and Distribution
- Portability of communications equipment (i.e., radios, computers, etc.) is key to effective coordination in a dynamic, distributed environment. Additionally, personnel sent ashore may need to return to the sea base with their communications equipment at the end of their workday. Identify availability of portable communications assets within the force (e.g., in the explosive ordnance disposal detachment and Marine expeditionary unit) and place them where they are most needed in the detachments and with the LNOs.

6.3 Interim Support to Joint Task Force Commander
- If a JTF is established, determine the best command and control node in the force and offer it to the JTF commander as an interim location for key staff while a more permanent command center is being set up ashore. See Section A.4 for additional discussion.

6.4 Information Dissemination and Coordination
- Assign two officers to one or more UN/NGO coordination teams to serve as trusted agents and perform clearinghouse functions. This will also facilitate the transfer of duties to civilian organizations, as the credibility and trust they have established carries over to that phase. These personnel are particularly critical in the early stages of the operation, when the various agencies involved have not yet established an effective coordination mechanism with the host nation. They can reduce the number of duplicate requests for helicopter flights to assess the situation, freeing those assets for delivery of critical supplies. See Section A.4 for additional discussion.
- Maximize employment of PAOs to disseminate information consistently and accurately.

6.5 Point of Failure Node(s)
- Identify and mitigate single points of failure, developing multiple paths and redundancy in equipment where needed. This is particularly important with respect to communications with non-military agencies using commercial equipment.
6.6 Measures and Terminology
- Military personnel frequently use performance or achievement indicators (e.g., number of people treated, pounds of medical supplies delivered, quantity of utilities and resources provided, number of sorties conducted, etc.).

International organizations and NGOs use outcome indicators, such as mortality or morbidity numbers and infant mortality rates. While both types of measures are useful, the latter are often more relevant in assessing a situation.

- Some terms commonly used in military operations may carry “baggage” that can hamper coordination with the host nation(s), NGOs, and international organizations, particularly in cases of host nation sensitivity to foreign military presence or with individuals who have a distrust of civil-military organizations. Consider alternative terms. See Section A.3 for examples.

- Development of a common set of metrics and terms has obvious benefits in coordination. Develop and standardize appropriate measures and terminology and train personnel in their use.

6.7 Intelligence
- Clearly identify priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and essential elements of information (EEI).

- Determine foreign disclosure rules, particularly for P-3 AIP imagery and classified or sensitive navigational charts. In most cases, HA/DR operations will be conducted in a coalition environment. There may be classification markings from other countries or U.S. agencies that personnel are not familiar with, such as the U.S. State Department’s “sensitive, but unclassified.” Have embarked intelligence professionals anticipate the coalition composition and work the details on handling and disclosure guidelines with fleet and COCOM foreign disclosure offices.

- Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a valuable source of information in prioritization of relief efforts. All participants (air crews, beach detachments, etc.) should be trained in casual observation skills and briefed/debriefed prior to and after each mission. Medical personnel and chaplains have training in these skills that may easily be leveraged.

- See Sections 5.1 and 5.3 for additional discussion.
CHAPTER 7
Logistics

7.1 Disaster Relief Supplies
- Ask for deployment of survival packs to the area immediately. These should include empty water containers (collapsible ten gallon size, preferably), blankets (if low temperatures are expected), lumber and plastic sheeting (for shelters and palletizing supplies), food, water bladders or potable water pillow tanks (PWPTs), reverse osmosis water purification units (ROWPUs), pumps (for removal of contaminated well water), and whatever else is needed immediately, based on assessments from a review of intelligence, media reports, etc. Bottled water is a stopgap until a potable water production, storage, and distribution system is restored and capacity is sufficient to meet local needs.
- Replenish these supplies and add additional types of supplies as needs are defined.
- Be prepared to purchase these supplies in the region, if they cannot otherwise be delivered in time. CCOM funds may be available for this purpose and it may be possible to get a line of credit or permission to use operating target (OPTAR) funds until appropriate funding is received.
- Prioritize delivery based on host nation desires and situational awareness. These initial deliveries may mean the difference between life and death for many victims of the disaster.
- Water is the most critical of HA/DR supplies. It is more essential to survival than food or anything else. Accordingly, imaginative or innovative efforts may be required to distribute it to those in need. See Section A.4 for examples.
- Delivery of ROWPUs and water bladders may require heavy lift resources. Identify these requirements early.
- If possible, send an advance team to work with the local Navy regional contracting center (NRCC) to assist in filling requirements expeditiously.

7.2 “Demand Signal” Response
- Managing the “demand signal” is critical. Events unfold rapidly and the tendency will be for outside agencies to send more than is needed or can effectively be employed, in type and amount of assistance, and to send it as soon as possible. Conversely, some requirements may have been overlooked and it will take time to generate and deliver those forces or material items. Early and continuous dialog is needed to ensure the right type of support arrives in a timely fashion.
- As discussed in Section A.1, speed of deployment is particularly critical. Assets not arriving in the first three weeks will quickly become excess capacity as the host nation and other agencies ramp up their operations.

7.3 Surface Assets

7.3.1 Military Sealift Command (MSC)
- Maritime prepositioning ship squadron (MPSRON) ships require an additional Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorization in order to utilize their assets. Do not assume this second authorization has been granted because their deployment was approved by JCS. If necessary, check with higher headquarters on the status of this second authorization.

- Explosive safety quantity distance (ESQD) event waivers can also cause delays for MPSRON ships. Check with the U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) for the status on these waivers. The Atlantic or Pacific Fleet explosive safety officer can assist the USDAO with process steps and sample correspondence.

- MPSRON ships are not configured for selective offload. With the exception of bulk fuel or water provision, they require a port with dock space to re-configure to support this.

- Combat logistics force (CLF) ships are capable of selective offload. They require approximately 24 hours notice to re-configure material in the hold.

- MPSRON ships have the capability to purify water and transfer it ashore from anchorage. This can be a critical factor in the early aftermath of a disaster, where potable water demand exceeds damaged infrastructure capacity.

- Lack of a robust communications capability must be considered in plans for hospital ships and other MSC vessels.

7.3.2 Other Vessels
- Large capacity high speed vessels (HSVs) can transport large numbers of people and large amounts of material quickly.

- Landing craft, such as landing craft, utility (LCUs) and landing craft, air cushion (LCACs) also provide significant heavy lift capability from the sea base. LCACs and LCUs can deliver up to 72 and 180 tons of HA/DR supplies respectively.

- Large deck vessels can serve as receiving, assembly, and staging areas to break bulk shipments of HA/DR supplies and build them into deliverable (e.g., palletized) sets.

- Other ships, including non-U.S. vessels, have unique characteristics and procedures that must be factored into planning.

7.4 Air Assets

7.4.1 Helicopter
- Extensive dedicated helicopter support will likely be required. Schedulers must constantly work to maximize use of these assets and keep things moving.

- Consider maximizing deck landing spots for rotary wing operations. This may entail additional certifications (e.g., for aircraft elevators to be used as landing spots).

- Removal of selected mission equipment (e.g., sonobuoy launchers, magnetic anomaly detector, etc.) assists in maximizing capacity for material and personnel transfer, while minimizing the risk of collateral damage.

- Tasking for DV and media transport may increase dramatically as the operation progresses, particularly for large scale relief operations. Often an additional
aircraft will need to be maintained in backup status, further reducing availability of assets for HA/DR supply delivery.
- Helicopter crews that normally do not operate in unprepared LZs may require additional training in these procedures.

7.4.2 Fixed Wing
- Coordinate with the host nation(s) and military engineers (e.g., Seabees) on locations of runways, or temporary runways, and establish the scheduled theater airlift route (STAR) at the beginning of operations. This will facilitate planning for equipment and personnel transfers.
- Fixed wing flight operations (e.g., for carrier on board delivery or maintaining proficiency) may affect availability and scheduling of rotary wing assets and staging of supplies.
- Proficiency in tactical aircraft night operations and basic fighter maneuvering may suffer in extended operations. Consider flying selected aircraft and crews off to maintain some level of proficiency ashore and develop a plan to quickly regain full operational readiness status. Staging aircraft off ship can also assist in maximizing deck space available.

7.4.3 Fuel
- The lack of existing contracts, credit arrangements, or availability may make it difficult to buy fuel in some locations. Manage fuel to avoid the need to refuel in the host nation until adequate fuel supplies and payment processes are established.
- Position helicopter refueling assets to facilitate delivery to a wide area and support safety considerations in the event of a mechanical failure. It may be advisable to request stationing of some helicopter capable platforms within territorial waters to support helicopter operations/safety of flight. Due to the flexible nature of HA/DR operations, refueling support may require frequent adjustment.

7.5 Forward/Advance Team(s)
- A forward logistics team(s) should be stationed ashore, prior to the arrival of support from the sea base. Establishing such teams ashore, ready to receive support materials and prioritize delivery, supports speed to execution. The teams can assist in data collection while afloat assets are en route. Work with the area logistics group to deploy the team(s) in a timely manner.
- Develop a prioritization scheme for daily use by team loadmasters.
- Coordinate with the host nation to determine procedures for use of local distribution capabilities.

7.6 Arrival Prior to Establishment of HA/DR Infrastructure
- Commence operations upon arrival to minimize additional loss of life. Keep superiors informed.
- Subsequent actions should focus on transition of command and control functions to the appropriate authority (e.g., joint task force commander) and the
transfer of relief operations to the appropriate non-military agencies (e.g., host nation, UN, or NGOs).

7.7 Pre-positioning and Enabling Stocks
- Do not plan on availability of pre-positioned stocks. Contingency blocks are no longer maintained in theater.
- Identify sources of those items (e.g., pallets, tri-wall containers, packaging and banding materials, shrink wrap, cargo nets, etc.) that enable ship to shore movement of material.

7.8 Coordination
- Senior officer presence is important at scheduled daily meetings at the airfield or coordination site (e.g., airfield, CMOC, etc.). It is also important to have a representative available ashore to attend evening meetings.
- Consider establishing a logistics operations coordination center (LOCC) in the sea base, where principal U.S. Navy logistics personnel (i.e., supply, medical, dental, civil engineering, etc.) can meet to share information or go to access information on current activities.
- Maintain liaison with logistics personnel to ensure the material unit of issue supports transportability at the delivery site (e.g., 40 lb. sacks of rice are preferable to 200 lb. sacks).

7.9 Support to Other Agencies
- Plan on providing support to the host nation, other foreign government and military agencies and NGOs.
- In the earliest stages, NGOs, the host nation, and other foreign government and military agencies operating in the area may have materials but lack the means to deliver them. Offer your manpower and lift assets to assist during this critical period.
- Offer to assist the host nation in distributing supplies your forces have transported. This will allow you to see where and how the material is being used, and minimize delays slowing the flow of additional supplies en route.
- NGOs, media, and other agencies may request shipboard billeting. Consider support and security requirements and seek policy guidance from higher headquarters.

7.10 Security and Force Protection
- The host nation may need to provide security at LZs. Warning handbills may not be sufficient to warn uncontrolled crowds of the dangers of helicopter rotors, etc. The preferred location for LZs and temporary runways is within vehicle range, but beyond easy walking range, of devastated areas for security and crowd control purposes.
- For safety reasons, it may be necessary to deliver only to places where crowds are controlled.
- Determine if there is a necessity to arm personnel in the event the host nation cannot provide safe places for supply delivery. Consider the local perception of
the use of armed personnel. Use alternate, less convenient delivery locations to minimize crowd control issues, if required.
- Consider the potential risks associated with bringing personnel aboard for medical treatment or billeting (e.g., spread of contagious disease, intelligence gathering, etc.) and take appropriate measures.
- Consider minimizing the group of personnel sent ashore to reduce personnel exposure to risk. This could have morale implications, as people tend to want to contribute in emergencies.
- Fleet antiterrorism strike team (FAST) platoons and/or mobile security squadrons (MSS) are normally assigned by the numbered fleet commander to provide force protection for MSC assets.

7.11 Contracting
- Develop a means to write, approve and fund contracts expeditiously. Contracts will be required for material and services. The local NRCC or regional naval facilities (NAVFAC) facilities engineering center (FEC) can provide streamlined, single point contracting service. They also have a good working relationship with local merchants, as well as access to contingency construction capabilities (CONCAP) contract assets.

7.12 Legal Considerations
- There are numerous legal considerations associated with HA/DR operations (e.g., use of operating funds, foreign claims issues, status of forces agreements (SOFA), use of facilities, supplies, or equipment, licensing requirements for health care providers, etc). Consult a staff judge advocate (SJA) to ensure legal implications are considered.

7.13 Communications Support
- The communications infrastructure will likely be inadequate in the aftermath of the disaster. Purchase Iridium satellite telephones in sufficient quantity, based on the size and scope of the operation and other telecommunications assets available. In the event the host nation communications infrastructure is intact and adequate, purchase cellular telephones and wireless laptop computers that operate on the local system.
- Provide digital cameras for flight crew use in taking pictures for transmission to the ship and/or headquarters. These pictures help keep the chain of command and crew/staff informed. Digital camera cellular telephones, with e-mail or text messaging capability, are particularly well suited to this.
- Purchase memory sticks (“thumb drives”), to facilitate file transfer and sharing. UN and NGO personnel prefer this medium. Blank compact disks may also be useful if data is on a laptop computer that has a compact disk read-write (CDRW) drive.
- Embedded media will desire streaming video capability. Request this equipment (i.e., a fly away kit, if available) early and be prepared to purchase or develop a workaround, if the capability is not available.
7.14 Beach Detachment Support
- Ensure sufficient support for the beach detachment (e.g., lodging, meals, electric power, fuel, radios, personal protective equipment and supplies, etc.). Depending on the size of the group being sent ashore via helicopter, additional cranial helmets, life vests (float coats) and immunization stocks may be required.
- The beach detachment should also have mobile communications (i.e., cellular/satellite telephone or radio) and radio frequency identification (RFID) capability, such as the inventory tagging and interrogation devices provided in early entry deployable support kits (EEDSKs).
CHAPTER 8
Health Service Support (HSS)

8.1 Appropriate Level/Scope of Assistance
- Assist host nation and international medical personnel, keeping termination in mind. The principal purpose of military HSS in disaster or humanitarian emergencies is to alleviate deteriorating health conditions and avert epidemics. Secondarily, military HSS provides a strong, credible statement of U.S. humanitarian interests.
- Commanders should focus support in an interagency approach to restore essential health services in collaboration with the host nation and/or international organizations. The scope of HSS will vary with the type and scale of emergency, as well as the level of national or regional development. Generally, this will entail initial emergent care, basic primary care, and preventive medicine support. Dental support and minor surgery may also be provided as a gesture of goodwill. A clear focus must remain on transition to other medical support organizations (e.g., host nation or NGOs) from the outset, particularly if taking a lead role during the initial stages of the response.

8.2 Health Situation Analysis and Estimate
- Designate a medical officer to conduct an analysis of the health situation. This goes farther than examining reports gained through intelligence sources and into a realistic evaluation of time, force, and space factors in providing the right medical capability. The purpose of the health situation estimate is to:
  - Identify the level of development of the healthcare infrastructure.
  - Identify the health status of the population.
  - Identify critical health risk factors in the environment, in particular short term primary and emergent care.
  - Understand the magnitude of the disaster’s impact and potential health consequences for military forces and the population.
  - Determine the level of involvement of the other organizations.
- Required HSS capabilities in HA/DR emergencies can vary widely. Figure 8-1 provides a generic matrix that illustrates how USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and many NGOs estimate HSS requirements. Requirements depend on population health issues and the impact on indigenous health service capabilities. Because there are so many variables that affect the need for HSS, an up-front analysis of multiple sources of intelligence or information, including HUMINT gathered by trained medical personnel on scene (e.g., forward deployed preventive medical units), is required. Medical personnel need to evaluate the safety and vulnerability of local food and water sources and local medical capabilities, perform an epidemiological risk assessment and a vector-pest risk assessment, determine the adequacy of hygiene in local billeting and public facilities, and perform an environmental risk assessment (coordinated with any environmental surveys conducted by civil engineers) as early as possible.
- Usually, the same groups who are most vulnerable in normal times are at most risk during emergencies and disasters. They include people whose health is already compromised (e.g., people with pre-existing illness, serious chronic diseases, or malnutrition, children under five years old, adolescents, pregnant or lactating women, and the elderly). Common HA/DR health concerns include the following: traumatic injury, acute respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases such as cholera and dysentery, malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases, meningitis, malnutrition, and psychosocial impact.

- In situations where injuries are high, the elimination of on-scene health hazards along with search and rescue and emergent surgical services, may be the highest priority. This type of support is generally short in duration, due to patient survivability time limitations and the ability to rapidly build appropriate force levels for these tasks.

- Highest priority health services include the most appropriate and effective interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality (e.g., providing clean drinking water, vaccinations, malaria prophylaxis, wound cleaning, antibiotics, counseling, public health information, etc.), as determined by health situation analysis.

  - Standardize triage procedures and treatment timelines to guide health care providers on patient assessment, prioritization, basic resuscitation, and referral.

  - Standardize protocols for advanced care referral of injured patients (e.g., surgery) and make arrangements for suitable patient transportation to the referral facility.

- The level of development in the country or region affects the level of HSS needed. Developed areas require broader access to higher levels of care. Less developed areas require broad access to more basic health services, with an additional emphasis on preventive medicine. See NWP 4-02 for a discussion on levels of care.

  - Because of a lack of public health infrastructure, and therefore public health information, less developed areas and areas with large numbers of
displaced persons require more preventive medicine services (e.g., control of infectious or communicable diseases).

- Preventive medicine measures include ensuring water quality and sanitation, hygiene promotion, vector control, and secure food supplies. Additionally, health education messages are provided on how to prevent common communicable diseases and how to access relevant services. More specific prevention measures, such as a vaccination/immunization campaigns, are conducted to the extent practical.

- International SOS, a private medical assistance network operating in over 60 countries, may be able to provide information on nearest medical treatment facilities (MTFs) and airfields for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) planning. Consult their website (www.internationalsos.com) for points of contact.

8.3 Own Forces
- Initiate preventive medical treatments (e.g., vaccinations and malaria pills) for beach detachments and other personnel going ashore at the earliest opportunity. It takes 30 days to reach required therapy level for malaria prophylaxis.
- Ensure forces going ashore have access to proper personal protective equipment (e.g., insect repellents with DEET, permethrin spray, mosquito netting, battle dress utility uniforms, gloves, etc.) necessary to carry out the mission. Often these environments are contaminated and have high risk disease vectors present.
- Take necessary precautions for personnel involved in physical labor to prevent sun exposure and heat-related illnesses or excessive exposure in cold environments.
- Ensure proper sanitation measures (e.g., latrine construction and maintenance) and trash/medical waste disposal procedures are followed in facilities established ashore.
- Consider deployment of mental health teams to prepare personnel for the conditions they will likely be exposed to and to provide counseling afterwards.
- Send medical teams ashore to monitor personnel for signs of illness and stress.
- If personnel will be ashore for extended periods, consider rotating them to the sea base occasionally for morale purposes (e.g., rest, hot meal, shower, recreation, etc.).
- Consult the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)'s Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) website (www.afmic.detrick.army.mil) for specific force health protection measures for the area. The numbered fleet surgeon may also provide this information on the fleet website.

8.4 Deployment
- There is a particularly strong tendency for higher headquarters to push medical capabilities into theater. Communicate needs and capacity to employ medical capabilities (e.g., fleet surgical teams to staff operating rooms) early and update these requirements frequently to prioritize what is sent, avoid getting more than can be employed, and to free up lift for higher priority cargo, material, and personnel.
- Set up a mechanism to pull these capabilities as needed.
- Due to cultural considerations, female health care providers should be made available to female patients, especially in Muslim countries/cultures.
- See Sections 3.3, 7.2, and 9.1 for further discussion on deployment of forces.

8.5 Communications Capabilities and Information Management

- Communications capabilities and appropriate links to the command element are often overlooked or under-resourced in deployment of health assessment teams. Ensure an effective means (e.g., satellite telephones, email, etc.) is established for communication between these teams and the command element. Imagery from unclassified sources should be in convertible file formats to conform to bandwidth limitations.
- Medical information management is a difficult challenge that can impact the quality of care provided. Posting timely, relevant information to a website, or providing links to such information, can assist coordination among agencies and facilitate introduction of new forces and turnover efforts. The following types of information should be considered:
  - Disease threat summaries (infectious disease risk assessments, environmental health risk assessments, country health service assessments, etc.). These may be obtained from the AFMIC website.
  - Demographic and health surveys (DHS) carried out in many USAID-assisted countries can provide a readily available baseline of health status of the affected population. These are available at www.usaid.gov.
  - Analysis of reports and records from the local ministry of health or other health providers and health information systems.
  - World Health Organization (WHO) country summaries, reports, and research tools at the WHO website (www.who.int).
  - Recommendations, policies, messages of interest and standard operating procedures (e.g., WHO disaster recommendations, force health protection, common disease management protocols, cultural issues, remains handling and disposition, re-supply guidance, guidance on treating foreign nationals aboard Navy ships, etc.).
  - Medical concept of operations (CONOPS), or a description of the medical plan.
  - MEDEVAC policies, including those regarding U.S. citizens, U.S. and foreign military personnel, disaster victims, and NGO or international agency workers.
  - Medical facilities, including name, location (address, latitude and longitude), communications (telephone numbers and radio frequencies), access (road and/or helicopter), capabilities, and points of contact.
  - Medical re-supply guidance or availability.
  - Assessment forms (i.e., standard template).
  - Frequently asked questions (FAQs).
  - Additionally, medical, environmental, disease intelligence, and countermeasures information on compact disks may be obtained through AFMIC.
or regional Navy environmental and preventive medicine units (NEPMUs). These provide worldwide infectious disease and environmental health risks, hyperlinked to the joint Service-approved countermeasure recommendations, military and civilian health care delivery capabilities, operational information, disease vector ecology information, and reference data.

8.6 Measures
- Military and civilian agencies differ significantly in this regard. Military HSS measures of effectiveness focus on the restoration of basic and emergency health services, while the host nation and NGOs generally have a longer term orientation. See Section 6.6 for more on measures.
CHAPTER 9
Personnel, Skills and Capabilities

9.1 Augmentee Assignment and Tracking
- Tracking of individual augmentees can be difficult once they arrive in theater and are moved from one location to another. Develop a means to identify the skills provided by these people and track their location so they may be moved where needed most.
- Often forces are sent in anticipation of a need, or they are no longer needed due to changing conditions, and the number of personnel in the area may exceed the capacity to effectively employ them. Establish a means to determine if unneeded forces are en route and arrange to return or divert them.

9.2 Passports
- Even during disasters, some countries may insist upon passports for entry. Determine requirements and obtain no-fee, government passports for key personnel, if necessary, and develop alternatives if time constraints prevent this.

9.3 Training
- HA/DR is not a primary or frequently executed military mission. Most naval forces receive little training in this area. Assess own force training and expertise in the requirements of this non-traditional activity (e.g., helicopter unprepared or confined area training). It may be necessary to conduct remedial training using experienced personnel to mitigate risk. Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) do receive training in this area, which may be leveraged in preparing other elements of the force.

9.4 Specialized Capabilities and Skills
- Line officers may be unfamiliar with missions, capabilities, and limitations of medical and other staff forces available for tasking or assignment. Similarly, they may not be aware of organic assets that may be used, such as an EOD detachment’s skills and its portable radio equipment. Key planners and watchstanders should be briefed on such in order to optimize use of these assets.

9.5 Linguists
- Linguists provide a critical language and cultural awareness capability, particularly for liaison teams ashore. Request their deployment as early as possible.
- They must be available to liaison officers and detachments. Co-locate them where possible.
- Dialects pose an additional language challenge, particularly in remote areas. The host nation, or other participants from the region, may be able to help in this area.
- Draw on the language skills of personnel attached to the naval force, regardless of their normal jobs. Poll subordinate commands to determine availability of personnel with appropriate language skills early in the planning process.

9.6 Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)
- Participants from recent Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), COCOM, or Service-sponsored HA/DR exercises are valuable sources of information and they may facilitate coordination through experience and personal contacts. Request assignment and deployment of these individuals.
- Some personnel offered (or pushed forward) as SMEs, in a well-intended effort to help, may lack current or relevant experience. Insistence on a "pedigree check" on SME credentials, or asking to review such information (e.g., biography or resume) can help avoid this situation.

9.7 Engineers
- Construction battalion personnel (Seabees) can assist with infrastructure inspection, damage assessment, and repairs to facilities and utility systems. Seabees assess and repair runways, airfields, and supply routes, or develop expeditionary airfields to facilitate logistics mobility. Seabees can also operate and maintain public utility systems.
  - Underwater construction team (UCT) Seabees perform underwater and hydrographic inspections, repair port and pier facilities and utilities, and install offshore petroleum discharge systems (OPDSs).
  - Amphibious construction battalion (ACB) Seabees provide MPS in stream or pier side off-load support with their organic lighterage equipment, as well as establish expeditionary shore infrastructure (i.e., tent camps).
  - Navy Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officers provide contingency and real estate contracting services, as well as environmental service support.
  - Mobile utility support equipment (MUSE) units can provide temporary power generation equipment.
- Seabees and ship’s force/embarked Marine Corps engineers have been called upon in previous HA/DR operations to repair generators ashore, while host nation public utilities personnel worked to restore electrical grids.

9.8 Cargo Handlers
- A Navy Reserve cargo handling and port group (CHAPGRU) element can be activated to perform cargo handling operations to include beach detachments, logistics airheads, and port support.

9.9 Air Traffic Controllers
- The military will likely need to provide air traffic controllers at the airport(s) for some time. This is a significant safety issue in the initial stages and a critical niche that must be transferred to the host nation or another appropriate agency, as military support for the operation ends.
- Begin planning and phasing in the transition of air traffic control as early as possible.

9.10 Liaison Officers (LNO)
- Determine the major centers or participants in the operation and recognize the value of exchanging LNOs, as available. For a large scale operation, the following are recommended LNO assignments:
  - Two or three officers to one or more host nation/UN/NGO coordination teams. The nature of the operation should determine preferred background for these individuals (e.g., a medical planner might be appropriate in a medically intensive HA/DR effort).
  - Exchange one officer between the CSG and ESG, especially if the two staffs have not had an opportunity to work together previously.
  - Exchange one officer with select foreign navies, particularly if the other military is in a lead role and the U.S. is supporting them in that effort.
  - Exchange one officer with higher headquarters (e.g., JTF headquarters), even if connectivity and coordination via VTC and other means are effective.
  - One officer at the U.S. embassy, if needed to keep the ambassador informed and coordinate with the country team.

9.11 Beach Detachments.
- Beach detachments may be established for a variety of purposes, such as providing a manpower pool to prepare or improve landing zones, supervising flight operations and other logistics matters, and coordinating activities with the host nation and other agencies.
  - It may be useful to assign a PAO to the detachment to facilitate meeting a requirement for a PAO to accompany media on Navy helicopters.
  - Assigning a supply corps officer to the detachment may facilitate material tracking and movement, as well as assist in contracting matters.

9.12 Distinguished Visitor (DV) and Media Liaison Team
- Assigning a project officer (and escort, if appropriate) to coordinate scheduling and transportation for a DV or group of DVs can help ensure details are covered.
- Large numbers of media personnel can be expected in larger scale HA/DR operations and schedulers will need to plan for transport of large quantities of bulky equipment and other needs.
  - PAO staff augmentation is advisable. For larger operations, a PAO cell may be established.
  - Dedicating personnel to primary duty as members of a media liaison team can help ensure requirements are met effectively and efficiently. The number of personnel assigned to such duties depends on the size and scope of the operation and the number of Navy units participating.
  - Media interest will vary with the scope, location, and type of disaster. Be prepared to adjust support for the media to meet the demand.
  - Clearly articulate available capabilities and capacity to support the media to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.
9.13 Analysts
- Analysts can help determine measures of performance and measures of effectiveness and take the burden off operational watchstanders in compiling and reporting this data. Consider requesting specialists, such as those from the CNA deployed in previous HA/DR operations.
  - Carrier and expeditionary strike groups have deployed with a CNA analyst embarked in the past. Such operations research analysts, with their associated specialized software and reachback capabilities, can be of great assistance in assessing performance and forecasting requirements.

9.14 Public Health
- The Navy Environmental Health Center (NEHC)’s regional NEPMUs have extensive expertise in public health and can assist in assessment. See Chapter 8 for a discussion on assessment of the health situation.

9.15 Mass Fatality/Mortuary Assistance
- In cases where the number of fatalities overwhelms the host nation and other participants, U.S. military mortuary assistance may be requested. Forward such requirements for identification and processing of remains to higher headquarters as soon as possible, in order to assist the COCOM in submitting a timely request for forces.

9.16 Religious Ministry Teams
- Religious ministry teams, consisting of at least one chaplain and one religious program specialist, may assist the commander in strengthening the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of service members by providing counseling and presenting classes on stress management and other related matters. They may also assist in determining the impact of religion on local culture.
  - Working in proximity to relief workers, these teams are able to respond immediately to signs of stress, spiritual anxiety, and fatigue.
  - Commanders may also direct chaplains to serve as their representatives to foreign religious leaders and NGOs in order to assist in identifying disaster relief projects. In rare cases, when authorized and appropriate, chaplains may provide direct humanitarian and/or spiritual care to disaster victims.
  - See OPNAVINST 1730.1 for policy guidance for religious ministry and NWP 1-05 and JP 1-05 for doctrinal guidance.
ANNEX A
Amplifying Information

A.1 Speed to Execution and Advantages of Sea-based Support
- In one of the most complex relief operations ever attempted, the tsunami relief operation in South Asia from late December 2004 through early 2005 (Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE), U.S. military assistance was only needed for the first six weeks. Forces that arrived after three weeks were largely irrelevant or excess. HA/DR operations develop rapidly and civilian agencies ramp up to meet the requirements. Unique Navy capabilities are key to saving lives and reducing suffering in the early stages, providing a bridge until the host nation and civilian agencies organize.

- Naval forces were delivering critical, life sustaining supplies five days after the earthquake.
- Naval forces are ideally suited to cover the gap until others can take over the operation, by establishing a sea base as close to the operation as possible. Naval forces are able to arrive with critical mass quickly, commence relief support immediately, and sustain those operations indefinitely. Additionally, they:
  - Are not reliant on shore infrastructure, much of which is likely damaged or destroyed in the relief area.
  - Arrive with a robust command and control capability that does not need to be replicated ashore.
  - Alleviate host nation concerns that may be raised by a large footprint ashore.
  - Reduce force protection concerns by minimizing presence ashore.

A.2 Factors Affecting Employment of Forces
- The following are examples of factors affecting employment of forces and aspects of HA/DR operations they may affect:
  - Geography/topography (natural and man-made features, such as terrain, roads, ports, etc.) can affect how and where relief supplies can be brought ashore and distributed over land, and affect communications in mountainous regions.
  - Meteorology (climate, weather, atmospheric conditions, etc.) may impact sea base location, operating tempo (OPTEMPO), flight operations, and the ability to conduct reconnaissance to assess the situation.
  - Oceanography/hydrography (water depth, currents, etc.) may impact sea base location and water borne delivery of supplies. For example, in the 2005 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia, the characteristic heavy swells off Sumatra in early February (that make it a favorite destination for surfers every year) hindered delivery of supplies.
  - Culture (religious beliefs/taboos, political system, diet, language, etc.) may affect interaction with the population and other participants. For example, country of origin and color of body bags were issues in the 2005 tsunami relief effort in Southeast Asia. See Section A.3 for further discussion.
- Communications capabilities are an appropriate mix of compatible military and commercial systems, vital to coordination of own force and cooperative efforts with other participants.
- Host nation restrictions may affect the location of the sea base, routes to shore, and locations where relief supplies may be landed (e.g., the host nation may require that aircraft carriers remain outside territorial waters while conducting fixed wing flight operations).

A.3 Cultural Awareness
- Numerous unexpected culture-related issues are likely to arise in a HADR operation. Past examples have included color of human remains pouches (body bags) and food product country of origin. Some countries would not accept the standard issue olive or black pouches, preferring white or clear, and some would not accept rice grown in a certain country. Country team, or other area expert involvement, can help minimize such difficulties.
- Some terms commonly used in military operations may carry “baggage” that can offend host nation sensitivities or individuals in international organizations and NGOs who distrust civil-military or military organizations. Examine the intended employment of the organization or forces and potential negative implications of terms. Examples include:
  - “Joint task force” is a single nation warfighting organization. Similarly, “coalition” has a warfighting connotation and “civil-military operations center” may carry negative connotations for some participants in this type of operation. Consider “combined support force” and “combined coordination center.”
  - “Disengagement” implies withdrawal of assistance, while “transition” implies a hand off to another agency or the host nation.
  - “Special operations” may arouse suspicions of an ulterior motive.
Introduction of special forces should be coordinated with the country team and host nation and accompanied by appropriate communications (public affairs).

A.4 Examples from Recent HA/DR Operations
- The Navy lessons learned database, distributed to the fleet on classified and unclassified compact disks semi-annually and available at the classified NWDC web site [www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil) (and soon at [www.nwdc.navy.mil](http://www.nwdc.navy.mil) for unclassified lessons) contains operator-identified problem areas, issues, or requirements that have not been adequately addressed in material (e.g., equipment, facilities, etc.) or non-material (e.g., doctrine, training, etc.) solutions. Consult this database, and the linked joint/other Service databases, for current and historical (i.e., archived) information on how others have accomplished similar missions. Examples of fleet observations/lessons are provided below.
- Establishment of a distant JTF organization, distant JFACC (called CFACC, or combined force air component commander, to reflect the combined nature of the operation), and multiple headquarters (one for each country) presented a complex management structure and complicated command and control for forward forces executing the HA/DR mission. These functions could have been performed more efficiently from the sea base.
- The capabilities inherent in a strike group make it a “JTF enabler.” This capacity could have been used better had the JTF been established in the sea base, until the infrastructure ashore was ready to accept the function.

- An example of the natural tension between those on scene and at a distant higher headquarters was reflected in a naval commander’s refusal to relinquish tactical control of helicopters to the CFAAC. As the commander on scene, the naval commander understood that control from a distant headquarters in Hawaii would not allow the necessary responsiveness.

- Similarly, higher headquarters and the naval commander had differences on how to deal with NGOs and host nations. The commander on the scene could not take the more collegial approach with NGOs that higher headquarters desired and he was in the better position to know what was acceptable to the host nation.

- NGOs desired their own dedicated flights and imagery in the initial assessment surveys, which would have diverted helicopters used for delivery of aid to conduct redundant surveys. The naval commander had to develop a workable solution, in which both needs could be met. Essentially, his decision was to establish a process in which the lead agency (i.e., host nation military), lift providers (e.g., U.S. Navy), and those agencies desiring helicopter assets (e.g., NGOs) came together every evening to determine the next day’s requirements and priorities. The NGOs were not satisfied, since their desires were not fully met, and some objected to the host nation military lead for a variety of reasons (e.g., NGO charter restrictions or organizational bias/preferences), but they had to accept the established process if they wanted access to military lift.

- Initial imagery from MPA AIP assets was transmitted to the CSG and ESG via SIPRNET. When the MPA assets were shifted to JFACC control, imagery was placed on a NIPR website in order to facilitate distribution to the host nation, UN, and NGOs. This created problems for afloat users due to bandwidth limitations, severely degrading their ability to get imagery. Transmission via multiple paths, as appropriate considering security classification, would have met the needs of both groups.

- The establishment of a coordination team, called a “SPARK team” by a naval commander, to act as a clearinghouse for information available to the host nation, UN and NGOs, not only assisted in information sharing and reducing redundant requests for military support, but helped to overcome collaboration difficulties posed by differences in hardware, software, and bandwidth capabilities between military and civilian participants.

- Shipboard personnel were pro-active and resourceful in delivery and distribution of essential supplies, such as water. In at least two cases, they designed and constructed a manifold to quickly fill water bottles. In another, they contacted a commercial source for water bladders, explained the dire need, and received the material free of charge.

- Host nation sensitivities that foreign militaries would be seen by the population as invading and occupying forces was reflected in prohibitions on fixed wing, tactical aircraft flights, impacting operations and readiness.
ANNEX B
Joint/Navy Mission-Essential Task List (Generic)

The list below contains the joint operational (OP) and Navy tactical tasks (NTAs) that may be applicable to HA/DR operations. The appropriate Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) tasks (OP, NTA, etc.) can be used to develop a joint/Navy mission-essential task list (J/NMETL) to identify mission requirements, assist in planning, training, and assessment, as well as in readiness reporting as these missions are added into the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and other appropriate readiness reporting systems. Task definitions and references used to transform the list of tasks into a J/NMETL (e.g., sample conditions and standards under and to which the tasks are performed) are contained in the Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04 (series) and the Universal Naval Task List, OPNAVINST 3500.38 (series), as well as the Navy Training Information Management System (NTIMS).

This list contains tasks that might be contained in the HA/DR commander’s J/NMETL, but also includes tasks accomplished by others at the same command level or by subordinate elements of the force, and command-linked tasks (i.e., required events or actions that are accomplished outside the HA/DR commander’s chain of command). Supporting and command-linked tasks would be included in a supporting commander’s METL.

OP 5.5 Establish, Organize, and Operate a Joint Force Headquarters
OP 5.7 Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support
NTA 1.1.2.2 Move Embarked Forces.
NTA 1.1.2.3 Move Units.
NTA 1.1.2.3.1 Conduct Qualification.
NTA 1.1.2.3.6 Conduct Flight Operations.
NTA 1.2.1.2 Establish Air Space Management and Control Procedures.
NTA 1.2.1.5 Determine Command Relationships for the Force.
NTA 1.2.5 Conduct Terrain Analysis.
NTA 1.2.6 Conduct Climatological and Meteorological Analyses.
NTA 1.2.8 Conduct Airborne Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
NTA 1.5.1.1 Maneuver Naval Forces.
NTA 1.5.5.6.2 Conduct Linkup with Other Tactical Forces.
NTA 1.5.5.8.5 Provide Refugee and Straggler Control.
NTA 1.5.8 Conduct Information Superiority Operations.
NTA 2.1.1 Determine and Prioritize Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).
NTA 2.1.2 Determine and Prioritize Intelligence Requirements (IR).
NTA 2.2.3 Perform Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
NTA 2.4.4 Analyze and Synthesize Information.
NTA 2.4.5.3 Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) of Threat.
NTA 2.4.5.4 Provide Intelligence Support to Force Protection.
NTA 4.4.1.4 Perform Casualty Operations and Mortuary Affairs Management.
NTA 4.4.2.4 Provide Billeting to Non-combatant Evacuees.
NTA 4.4.5.2 Provide Religious Spiritual, Moral and Morale Support
NTA 4.5.1 Load/Offload, Transport, and Store Material.
NTA 4.6.1 Provide General Supply Support.
NTA 4.7 Perform Civil Military Engineering Support.
NTA 4.7.1 Perform Construction Engineer Services.
NTA 4.7.10 Provide Environmental Remediation (Hazardous Waste Cleanup).
NTA 4.7.3 Perform Rear Area Restoration.
NTA 4.7.6 Supply Electric Power.
NTA 4.7.7 Provide Water.
NTA 4.7.8 Provide Humanitarian Support.
NTA 4.7.9 Provide Environmental Disaster Relief Support.
NTA 4.8 Conduct Civil Affairs in Area.
NTA 4.8.3 Provide Interagency Coordination.
NTA 4.8.4 Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations.
NTA 4.9.4 Provide/Execute Training for U.S. and Other Nation Units and Individuals.
NTA 4.10.2 Manage Contracts and Contract Personnel.
NTA 4.11 Provide Operational Legal Advice.
NTA 4.11.4 Process Claims.
NTA 4.11.5 Provide Legal Assistance.
NTA 4.11.6 Interpret International/Operational Law.
NTA 4.12 Provide Health Services.
NTA 4.12.10 Provide Health Services in Support of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.
NTA 4.12.1 Acquire, Process, Communicate Information and Maintain Status.
NTA 5.1.3.1 Maintain and Display Tactical Picture.
NTA 5.2.1 Analyze Mission and Current Situation.
NTA 5.2.1.2 Review and Evaluate Mission Guidance.
NTA 5.2.1.5 Determine and Prioritize Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).
NTA 5.3.1 Develop Concept of Operations.
NTA 5.3.1.3 Develop Requirements and Priorities
NTA 5.3.6 Prioritize Subordinate Commander Requirements.
NTA 5.3.7 Establish Force Command and Control Policy.
NTA 5.3.8 Issue Tactical Commander’s Estimate.
NTA 5.3.9.2 Develop Contingent Responses.
NTA 5.4.1.2 Exercise Tactical Command and Control.
NTA 5.4.4 Establish Liaisons.
NTA 5.4.5 Report and Analyze Mission Readiness.
NTA 5.7.1 Develop a Force Command and Control Structure.
NTA 5.7.2 Deploy Force Headquarters Advance Element.
NTA 5.8 Provide Public Affairs Services.
NTA 6.1.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems.
NTA 6.1.1.2 Remove Hazards.
NTA 6.1.2.1 Employ Operations Security (OPSEC).
NTA 6.3.1.3 Provide Harbor Defense and Port Security.
NTA 6.3.1.5 Establish and Enforce Protection Perimeter.
NTA 6.5 Perform Consequence Management.
NTA 6.5.1 Provide Disaster Relief.
NTA 6.5.3 Provide Emergency Assistance.
NTA 6.6 Provide for Operational Safety of Personnel and Equipment.
ANNEX C

References

AAP 6, “NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions”
AAP 15, “NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications”
AJP 3, “Allied Joint Operations”
AJP 3-1, “Allied Joint Maritime Operations”
AJP 9, “NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) doctrine”
AMedP 15, “Military Medical Support in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief”
APP 2(F), “Helicopter Operations from Ships Other Than Aircraft Carriers (HOSTAC)”
ATP 1(D), “Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures”
EXTAC 1011, “Naval Humanitarian Assistance Missions”
JP 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”
JP 1-05, “Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations”
JP 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations”
JP 3-07, “Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)”
JP 3-07.6, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance”
JP 3-08 Volumes I&II, “Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations”
JP 3-16, “Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations”
JP 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations”
JP 4-02, “Joint Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations”
JP 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations”
Interim JP 3-90, “Civil Military Co-operation”
“Seabasing,” Joint Integrating Concept Version 1.0, Pre-decisional draft
NAVAIR 00-80T-122, Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air Capable Ships
NATOPS Manual
NDP 1, “Naval Warfare”
NDP 2, “Naval Intelligence”
NDP 4, “Naval Logistics”
NDP 5, “Naval Planning”
NDP 6, “Naval Command and Control”
NWP 1-02, “Naval Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms”
NWP 1-05, “Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy”
NWP 3-02.3M, “Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations”
NWP 3-04.1M, “Helicopter Operating Procedures for Air-Capable Ships”
NWP 3-07, “Naval Doctrine for Military Operations Other-Than-War”
NWP 4-02, “Operational Health Service Support”
NWP 4-02.1, “Naval Health Service Support Logistics”
NWP 4-04, “Naval Civil Engineering Operations”
NWP 4-04.1, “Seabee Operations in the MAGTF”
NWP 4-04.2, “Navy Civil Engineer Operations for Component Commanders”
NWP 5-01 (Rev A), “Naval Operational Planning”
NTTP1-01, “The Navy Warfare Library”
TM 3-32-03 (NWDC), “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) Planning and Execution”
TM 5-00.1-03 (NWDC), “Multiple-Carrier Strike Group (CSG) Operations Planning and Employment Guidance”
CJCSM 3500.04C, “Universal Joint Task List”
OPNAVINST 3500.38A/USCGCOMDTINST M3500.1A, “Universal Navy Task List”
OPNAVINST 1730.1, “Religious Ministry in the U.S. Navy”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 93-140, October 1993, “Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-151, April 1996, “Planning for Humanitarian Assistance Operations”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-152, April 1996, “Logistics and Engineering Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-165.10, April 1996, “Command and Coordination in Humanitarian Assistance Operations”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 95-166.10, April 1996, “Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations”
Center for Naval Analyses CRM 98-176, February 1999, “Peacemaking, Complex Emergencies, and Disaster Response: What Happens, How Do You Respond?”
USAID Primer: “What We Do and How We Do It”

Notes:
1. **Bold type** indicates most helpful references on humanitarian disaster/disaster relief operations.
2. USAID publications are available through the USAID website www.usaid.gov.
4. CNA studies and reports can be accessed through the search function on the CNA website at www.cna.org, or requested through the contact information provided there.
### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>after action report; after action review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td>amphibious construction battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFMIC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIP</td>
<td>Anti-surface warfare Improvement Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>afloat prepositioning shipping</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>air tasking order</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control and communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAT</td>
<td>crisis action team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRW</td>
<td>compact disk read-write</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFACC</td>
<td>combined force air component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>Center for Naval Analyses</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMC</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONCAP</td>
<td>construction capabilities</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>combat logistics force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSG</td>
<td>carrier strike group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DART</td>
<td>disaster assistance response team</td>
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<tr>
<td>DET</td>
<td>detachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>demographic and health survey</td>
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<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRRS</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Reporting System</td>
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<td>DV</td>
<td>distinguished visitor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEDSK</td>
<td>early entry deployable support kit</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential elements of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESG</td>
<td>expeditionary strike group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESQD</td>
<td>explosive safety quantity distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAQs</td>
<td>frequently asked questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAST</td>
<td>fleet antiterrorism strike team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>facilities engineering center</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLOT</td>
<td>forward line of own troops</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance/disaster relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOC</td>
<td>humanitarian operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
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<td>HSV</td>
<td>high speed vessel</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>I&amp;W</td>
<td>indications and warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>intermediate maintenance activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>intelligence requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JF MCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMETL</td>
<td>joint mission-essential task list</td>
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<tr>
<td>J/NM ET L</td>
<td>joint/Navy (or naval) mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMFU</td>
<td>joint meteorological and oceanographic forecast unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LC AC</td>
<td>landing craft, air cushion</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCU</td>
<td>landing craft, utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOCC</td>
<td>logistics operations coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>landing zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>maritime patrol air</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTF</td>
<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>maritime prepositioning force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPSRON</td>
<td>maritime prepositioning ship squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>mobile security squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSE</td>
<td>mobile utility support equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAV FAC</td>
<td>naval facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAV FOR</td>
<td>naval force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTAMS</td>
<td>naval computer and telecommunications area master station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE HC</td>
<td>Navy Environmental Health Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPMU</td>
<td>Navy environmental and preventive medicine unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLL</td>
<td>Navy lesson learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLL S</td>
<td>Navy Lessons Learned System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIP R NET</td>
<td>Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NM ET L</td>
<td>Navy (or naval) mission-essential task list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR CC</td>
<td>Navy regional contracting center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTA</td>
<td>Navy (or naval) tactical task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTT L</td>
<td>Navy (or Naval) Tactical Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NT IMS</td>
<td>Navy Training Information Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW DC</td>
<td>Navy Warfare Development Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>O CHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OF DA</td>
<td>Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>joint operational task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPC ON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP DS</td>
<td>offshore petroleum discharge system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP SEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTAR</td>
<td>operating target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operating tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>preparation for overseas movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWPT</td>
<td>potable water pillow tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFID</td>
<td>radio frequency identification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROWPU</td>
<td>reverse osmosis water purification unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>staff judge advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status of forces agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>scheduled theater airlift route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACMEMO</td>
<td>tactical memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>underwater construction team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAIO</td>
<td>U.S. Defense Attaché Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>video teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Glossary

air tasking order - A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities, and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP 3-30)

battle rhythm - Those events that a unit conducts on a recurring basis that facilitates setting conditions for success.

carrier strike group - (To be defined.)

cargo handling and port group - A rapid deployment expeditionary combat logistics support unit with the mission of providing technical and related individual training for all Navy cargo handling force personnel and other Department of Defense units on an as available basis.

civil-military operations center - An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernment organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 3-57)

combatant command - A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. Also called COCOM. (JP 5-0)

command-linked tasks - Discrete events or actions designated by a joint force commander that must be performed by commands and agencies outside the command authority of the joint force, if the joint force is to successfully perform its missions. Command-linked tasks are designated by the supported joint force commander, but are normally scheduled for training, evaluated, and assessed by the organization providing the support. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

conditions - Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate that may affect performance. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

contingency construction capabilities contract - A contracting vehicle that provides a large civilian contractor at the ready to respond to contingencies or natural disasters. Also called CONCAP.
country team - The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 3-07.4)

crisis action team - A headquarters watch stood up during crises to act as a commander’s point of contact for information, tasking and coordination. Also called CAT.

criterion - The minimum acceptable level of performance associated with a particular measure of task performance. It is often expressed as hours, days, percent, occurrences, minutes, miles, or some other command-slated measure. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

demand signal - An impetus, driving force, or stimulus for activity in a system.

detachment - 1. A part of a unit separated from its main organization for duty elsewhere. 2. A temporary military or naval unit formed from other units or parts of units. Also called DET. (JP 1-02)

disaster assistance response team - United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A disaster assistance response team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called DART. (JP 3-08)

disaster relief - See foreign disaster relief.

essential task - Tasks based on mission analysis and approved by the commander that are absolutely necessary, indispensable, or critical to success of a mission. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

expeditionary strike group - (To be defined.)

foreign disaster - An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is, or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization. (JP 3-08)

foreign disaster relief - Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical material and medical
and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. See also foreign disaster. JP 3-07.6

foreign humanitarian assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 3-07.6)

functional component command - A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 0-2)

health service support - All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include but are not limited to the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services. Also called HSS. (JP 4-02)

host country (nation) - A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation and/or international agreement. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance - See foreign humanitarian assistance.

human intelligence - A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT.

humanitarian operations center - An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations, or a United States Government agency during a United States unilateral operation. The humanitarian operations center should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint
force, the United Nations, nongovernmental and international organizations, and other major players in the operation. Also called HOC. (JP 3-57)

**INMARSAT** - An international telecommunications company that operates a fleet of nine geosynchronous telecommunications satellites, providing service to government and commercial customers. Also called **Inmarsat** and used to refer to the communications capabilities provided by that company.

**interagency operations** - Operations in which government or nongovernment agencies interact with the armed forces of the United States. These agencies may include the National Security Council, headquarters of the operating elements of the Departments of State and Transportation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Adjutants General of the 50 states and four territories; other U.S. Government agencies; agencies of partner nations; nongovernmental organizations; regional and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations; and the agencies of the host country. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

**Iridium** - An international telecommunications company, utilizing a constellation of 66 low-earth orbiting, cross-linked satellites to provide service to government and commercial customers.

**joint force air component commander** - The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations for the proper employment of assigned, attached and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFACC**. (JP 3-0)

**joint force maritime component commander** - The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called **JFMCC**. (JP 3-0)

**joint mission-essential task** - A mission task selected by a joint force commander deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the Universal Joint Task List in terms of a task, condition, and standard. Also called **JMET**. (JP 1-02)
**joint mission-essential task list** - A list of JMETs selected by a commander to accomplish an assigned or anticipated mission. It includes associated tasks, conditions, and standards and requires the identification of command-linked and supporting tasks. Also called JMETL. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

**joint task force** - A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 0-2)

**liaison officer** - A member of the command staff responsible for coordinating with cooperating or assisting agencies. Also called LNO.

**master update authority** - The single point for message directory database updates, currently Navy Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station (NCTAMS) Pacific. The Atlantic NCTAMS serves as backup.

**measure** - Provides the basis for describing varying levels of performance. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

**medical treatment facility** - A facility established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or dental care to eligible individuals. Also called MTF. (JP 1-02)

**mission** - 1. The task, taken together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual; a task. 3. An assignment with a purpose that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 1-02)

**Navy Lessons Learned System** - The Navy's process for the collection and dissemination of all significant lessons learned, summary reports, and port visit reports from maritime operations. This feedback includes lessons that identify problem areas, issues, or requirements, and, if known, suggested corrections to those deficiencies. Lessons may contain pertinent information concerning doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP), and systems, or comment on a general document or process. Lessons may address the creation, update, or cancellation of existing doctrine, policy, organization, training, education, equipment or systems. Also called NLLS. (OPNAVINST 3500.37C)

**Navy (or naval) mission-essential task list** - A list of those tasks considered essential to accomplish and support missions assigned by a naval or joint force commander. Also called NMETL. (NMETL Development Handbook)

**nongovernmental organization** - Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational business, or simply groups with a
common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). Also called NGO. (JP 3-31)

**Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network** - Worldwide unclassified level packet switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. Also called NIPRNET.

**Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance** - Part of USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response. Office responsible for the coordination of all U.S. government assistance to foreign countries after a natural or manmade disaster. (USAID FOG V3.0)

**operating tempo** - Level of operations and training over time. Common measurements include fleet hours, track hours, ship steaming days, and rounds of ammunition. Also called OPTEMPO. (NWP 1-02)

**operation** - 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

**operational control** - Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational command should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 0-2)

**rules of engagement** - Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
sea base - An inherently maneuverable, scalable aggregation of distributed, networked platforms that enable the global power projection of offensive and defensive forces from the sea, and includes the ability to assemble, equip, project, support, and sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the joint operations area. (Seabasing JIC, V1.0, Draft)

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network - Worldwide SECRET level packet switch network that uses high-speed Internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defense Information Systems Network circuitry. Also called SIPRNET. (JP 2-01)

specified task - A task explicitly stated and assigned. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

standard - The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a task. For mission-essential tasks of joint forces, each task standard is defined by the joint force commander and consists of a measure and criterion. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

status of forces agreement - An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status visiting military forces may be unilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of that force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 3-07.2)

support - 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 0-2)

supported commander - 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 3-0)
supporting commander - 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 3-0)

supporting forces - Forces stationed in or to be deployed to an operational area to provide support for the execution of an operation order. Combatant command (command authority) of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

supporting task - Specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of a joint mission-essential task. Supporting tasks associated with a command’s or agency’s mission-essential task list are accomplished by the joint staff or subordinate commands or agencies. (CJCSM 3500.04C)

tactical control - Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 0-2)

tactical memorandum - Developmental tactics published for evaluation. They are issued for a specific period of time (normally 24 months), and incorporated into applicable doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), or reference publications when validated. Also called TACMEMO. (NTTP 1-01)

Universal Joint Task List - A menu of capabilities (mission-derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander to accomplish the assigned mission. Once identified as essential to mission accomplishment, the tasks are reflected within the command joint mission-essential task list. Also called UJTL. (JP 3-33)
**U.S. Agency for International Development** - The official U.S. government agency for international assistance and development. (FOG V3.0)
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