Blue Horizon: United States-Japan-PRC Tripartite Relations
1. Richard N. Haass, Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, DC: A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994), 3.
2. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Consequences of the end of the Cold War for International Security," in New Dimension in International Security, Adeplhi Paper no. 265 (Winter 1991/1992: Part 1, 3.
3. For details, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin Books, 1992); and Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs (September-October 1993); and "If Not Civilization, what?" Foreign Affairs (November-December 1993). 4. United States Department of State, Current Policy Document, no. 1298.
5. See James Schlesinger, "New Instabilities - New Priorities", Foreign Policy (Fall 1991): 4.
6. The Economist, 5 September 1992.
7. For further elaboration of these points, see Haass, Intervention, 3-18, and Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost", Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 43-58.
8. The author likes to acknowledge that the following schema was adopted and modified from the two following works: D. Banerjee, "A New World Order: Trends For the Future," Strategic Analysis 17, no. 2 (May 1994), and Swaran Singh, "Post-Cold War World Order and India's National Security,"Strategic Analysis 18, no. 4, July 1995, 524-25.
9. Tommy T.B. Koh, The United States and East Asia: Conflict and Co-operation (Singapore: The Institute of Policy Studies and Times Academic Press, 1995), 1.
10. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 819-810.
11. Cited in Charles H. Stevenson, "US Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia: Implications for Current Regional Issues," Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 2 (September 1992): 105.
12. The Straits Times, 26 November 1994.
13. Koh, 12-16.
14. William T. Pendley, "U.S. Security Strategy in East Asia for the 1990s", Strategic Review VXX, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 7-8.
15. United States Security Strategy for the East Asian-Pacific Region, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense and Office of International Security Cooperation, February 1995), 3-4.
16. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994).
17. See Jose T. Almonte, "The Philippines and East Asia", Foreign Relations Journal 9, no. 4 (December 1994): 1-14; and Jose T. Almonte, "Pacific Security Into the Twenty-First CenturyCLikely Challenges and Possible Responses," paper presented at the Second Pacific Dialogue, 9 January 1996, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
18. See "Sasser: US-China Ties May Be World's Most Important," Wireless File, East Asia/Pacific, 18 January 1991, 9.
19. This has been argued on grounds that the treaty keeps Japan as a perpetual servant of the United States, that the continuation of the treaty will prevent Japan from emerging as a "normal" country, that the treaty's existence is symbolic of the continued distrust of Japan's ability to act as an ally, that the continued presence of American soldiers on Japanese soil will weaken Washington's bargaining power with Japan, that the treaty permits Japan to spend less on defense and thus "free ride" on the United States, and finally, that countries in the region are eager to see the end of the treaty and American soldiers leaving Japanese soil.
2. R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Plans Maneuvers Off Taiwan," Washington Post, February 5, 1996, A18; Julian Baum and Matt Forney, "Strait of Uncertainty," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 8, 1996, 20.
3. David Shambaugh of SOAS in London posits a far higher figure of U.S. $28-35 billion. Lecture, Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Affairs, Washington, DC, February 7, 1996.
4. Ron Montaperto, "China as a Military Power," Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum, December 1995, 3. There may also be an effort to cut back on nonmilitary projects that generate capital for the armed forces because they have been detrimental to discipline and morale.
5. Robert S. McNamara, et al., Sino-American Military Relations: Mutual Responsibilities in the Post-Cold War Era (New York: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, November 1994), 28.
6. Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," Orbis 38 (Spring 1994): 164-68. Shambaugh, in contrast, sees the navy as an essentially coastal force.
7. Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack. China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), xiii.
8. The Chinese claim to have 50 SU-27 aircraft serving in the 3rd Fighter Division of the Chinese Air Force. Hsiao Yu-sheng, "China's New-Generation Main Military Aircraft," Hong Kong Kuang Chiao Ching, November 16, 1995, FBIS-CHI-96-021, January 31, 1996, 30.
9. Allen, Krumel and Pollack, 186, 156-61.
10. John Caldwell and Paul Godwin, "China's Force Projection Potential: An Assessment of the PLA's Conventional Military Capabilities 1994-2005," Report of the fifth Annual American Enterprise Institute Conference on the PLA, Staunton Hill, VA., June 1994, 30-31.
11. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security 20 (Winter 1995/96): 76.
12. Okazaki Hisahiko, "China: Function of Japan-U.S. Alliance," Daily Yomiuri, August 28, 1995, 5.
13. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War, Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995): 79 and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20 (Summer 1995): 5-38. Note that even in the present crisis atmosphere the DPP launched a petition drive February 2, 1996 to declare that Taiwan is not part of China.
14. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "War or Peace in the Taiwan Straits?" Washington Quarterly 19 (Winter 1996): 171-87.
15. The most recent research on the Straits crises appears in articles such as He Di , "The Evolution of the People's Republic of China's Policy Toward the Offshore Islands," in The Great Powers in East Asia, eds. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990 ), 222-45.
16. See Orville Schell, "How to Talk to China," The Nation, February 19, 1996, 20-22; A.M. Rosenthal, "The Words Not Spoken," New York Times, February 2, 1996, A13; Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," Washington Quarterly 19 (Winter 1996): 129-39; "The United States and China into the
17. Steve Mufson, "China's Global Grain of Difference," Washington Post, February 9, 1996, A1.
18. This case is illustrative of the risks of a highly charged atmosphere. The reference to Los Angeles came from remarks by Chas Freeman made at a January 19, 1996, White House meeting according to New York Times reporter Patrick Tyler, "Chinese Let the U.S. Know They Are Deadly Serious About Taiwan," International Herald Tribune , January 25, 1996, 4. Although Ambassador Freeman maintains he did not attribute any such statement to the Chinese, the remarks circulated on Capitol Hill causing considerable anger and consternation there.
19. Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?" American Historical Review , December 1993, 1502-04.
2. Li, Peng, "Report on the Work of the Government," delivered at the third session of the Eighth National People's Congress, March 5, 1995, Beijing Review 38, no.3, XV-XVI.
3. Between December 1953 and April 1954, The Chinese Government Delegation and the Indian Government Delegation held negotiations in Beijing on the question of relations between the two countries concerning China's Tibet. The five principles were put forward by Premier Zhou Enlai in his talks with the Indian Government Delegation at the beginning of negotiations. Later the principles were formally written into the preface of the Agreement on Trade and Communications Between China's Tibet and India. The Joint Statement issued by Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in June 1954 adopted the formulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
4. Jiang Zemin, "Accelerating Reform and Opening-Up," report delivered at the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, October 12, 1992, Beijing Review 35, no. 43, 27.
5. Deng Xiaoping, speech at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, April 10, 1974, People's Daily, April 11, 1974, 2.
6. Jiang Zemin, "Accelerating Reform and Opening-Up," 27.
7. Karl W. Eikenberry, "Does China Threaten Asia-Pacific Regional Security?" Parameters (Spring 1995): 96.
8. Gao, Shangquan,"China's Economy Vital for Asia-Pacific." Beijing Review 38, no.3, 19.
9. See, for instance, Ross H. Munro, "Awakening DragonCThe Real Danger in Asia Is from China," Policy Review (Fall 1992): 12.
10. Qian Qichen, "China's Position on Asia-Pacific Security," speech at the First Meeting of the ARF, July 25, 1994, Beijing Review 37, no.32, 21.
11. Michael Richardson,"China Takes Softer Stand in Dispute on Spratly Isles," International Herald Tribune (Hong Kong), July 31, 1995, 1.
12. See, among others, Paul H.B. Godwin and Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., "Assessing China's Military Potential: The Importance of Transparency." The Atlantic Council Bulletin VI, no.4, and Eikenberry.
13. Beijing Review 38, no. 42, 23.
14. "China and India Paving Way for Peace," Beijing Review 36, no. 38, 6; "Sino-Vietnamese Joint Communique," Beijing Review 37, no. 49, 18-19.
15. Part of this section draws from, Xinbo Wu, "Comprehensive Security: the Conception of Security in the People's Republic of China," paper presented to the First Workshop on Asian Conception of Security held in East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, Aug. 21-25, 1995.
16. Lin Yinjia, et al., Deng Xiaoping's Military Philosophical Thoughts in the New Era. (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1991), 156.
17. Speech made by Jiang Zemin at the Symposium on Memorizing the 50th Anniversary of the Triumph of the Anti-Japanese War, August 25, 1995, Xinhua News Agency, Daily Telegraph, August 25, 1995.
2. See, for instance, Lu Ning "Flashpoint SPRATLYS!" (Singapore, Dolphin Books, 1995), 17.
3. See for instance, Sheng Lijun, "Beijing and the Spratlys, in Issues & Studies 31, no. 7 (July 1995): 40.
4. Lee Ning, 67-68.
5. Sheng Liyun, 28-29.
6. Amnon Varon, "The Spratly Islands Embroilment: A Test Case in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia," La Trobe Politics Working Paper Number 3 (July 1994), 11.
7. Mark J. Valencia, "China and The South China Sea Disputes", ADELPHI Paper 298, IISS (1995), 25-30. Also Lee Lai To, "Security Issues of the Post-Cambodian Era," Foreign Relations Journal, III, no. 1, 2-3.
8. The Military Balance 1995/96.
9. Lu Ning, 149-164, and Mark Valencia, 57-67, are some good examples.