

ENDNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. U.S.G. Sharp and W.C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 107-207.
2. The North Vietnamese Army included "Vietcong" Main Force Units formed from "Regroupees" who returned to the South after the defeat of the French and the failure to hold unifying elections. North Vietnamese control of Vietcong forces was firm in all areas, not only operationally but also including control of internal organization and policies within Vietcong Main Force units. Soldiers from the North were always present in Vietcong units and their numbers increased as the war continued.
3. Van Tien Dung, "On Experiences in Building the Revolutionary Armed Strength of Our Party." Taken from a paper presented at the American Political Science Association Convention in San Francisco, September 1975; "The Political Role and Development of the Peoples' Army of Vietnam," by William S. Turley, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Ill., 1975.
4. Wm. Darryl Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 119-35.
5. Ibid.
6. One of the few analysts to consider the "human element" in assessing the opposing forces in the Falklands war was William T. Taylor, Jr., in an article on the Falklands war, *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 June 1982, p. 1.
7. T.N. Dupuy, *Numbers, Predictions, and War* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1979). An interesting method of predicting war outcomes based on assigning numerical weights to various factors (offensive or defensive posture, logistics,

weather, terrain, communications, firepower, strength, equipment, morale and leadership, and others) determined to be significant factors through historical study. Although morale and leadership are considered to "probably have more influence on the outcome of a battle than any of the other qualitative variables of combat," no method of assessing or comparing these factors is offered other than indicating that the weighting process for these variables is highly suggestive.

8. John H. Johns et al., *Cohesion in the US Military* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 9.

9. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, pp. 3-18.

10. Mao Tse-tung, in *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* by Alexander George (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 25.

11. Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982). In a recent work that again demonstrates the significance of the small group, leadership, and military cohesion in combat, the author compares the internal personnel practices, policies, and leadership of the Wehrmacht and the US Army in World War II and concludes that the Wehrmacht was a far superior army in its human capabilities.

12. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948): 281.

13. Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," *The Study of Leadership* (West Point: USMA Printing Plant, 1972), p. 19-3.

14. S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p. 42.

15. Johns, *Cohesion in the US Military*, pp. 61-62.

16. Erich M. Remarque, *All Quiet on the Western Front* (New York: Fawcett-Crest, 1975), p. 186.

17. James Webb, *Fields of Fire* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 258.

18. Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle* (Boston: Kluwer, 1982), p. 97.

19. Morris Janowitz and Roger Little, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965).

20. Kellet, *Combat Motivation*, p. 333.

21. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*.

22. For a more detailed discussion of the concepts and sources outlined in chapter 3, see a review of the literature in the appendix.

23. For example, see Kellet, *Combat Motivation*. This work is based on a study of US, British, and Canadian Armed Forces.

CHAPTER II

1. John H. Johns et. al., *Cohesion in the US Military* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 9.
2. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.
3. Richard T. LaPiere, *A Theory of Social Control* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 130-188.
4. Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 61.

CHAPTER IV

1. Wm. Darryl Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 107-118.
2. US Embassy, Saigon, Document No. 1, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, "Diary of an Infiltrator," 1967, pp. 3-5.
3. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 117.
4. US Embassy, Saigon, Document No. 102, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, "Diary of an Infiltrator," 1967, pp. 43-44.
5. *Vietnam Interviews*, Interview "K-5" (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, K Series), pp. 32-33.
6. *Interviews*, "K-5," pp. 8-9 and "K-22," pp. 7-8.
7. Charles C. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Toronto, Canada, 24-28 August 1981, p. 13.
8. This observation is based upon personal experience as a battalion commander and upon similar observations by other battalion and company commanders.
9. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," pp. 5-6.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
11. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975), pp. 26-27.
12. Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 175.
13. Jeffrey Record, *Sizing Up the Soviet Army* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 17.
14. John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1979), pp. 110-11.
15. Andrew J. Rochells and Paul G. Patton, "Demographic Changes in the

USSR: Implications for the Soviet Military" (Washington, DC: Student paper, The National Defense University, 1982), pp. 35-36.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Drew Middleton, "Racial Clashes Said to Hinder Soviet Forces," *New York Times*, 11 July 1982, p. 9. Andrew Cockburn, *The Threat Inside the Soviet Military Machine* (New York: Random House, 1953). This recent analysis of Soviet military strength appears to have as its primary purpose the discounting of the Soviet military threat to the United States and its allies. Instead of looking at Soviet military capabilities, it emphasizes the many problems and failures of the Soviet military establishment. In the area of the human element or the motivation of Soviet soldiers, the author offers little that is new. Relying on recent studies by Richard Gabriel and the Rand Corporation that used primarily political emigres and ex-soldiers from low priority units as sources, Cockburn presents the Soviet soldier as unreliable, unmotivated, and unthreatening.

19. Stephen Webbe, "A Soviet Soldier's Lot," *Christian Science Monitor*, Midwest Edition, 3 December 1981, pp. B-24-27, B-30.

20. Yitzhak Tarasulo, "The Daily Life of a Soldier in the Modern Soviet Army," Yale University, 1983, presented at the National Convention of the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 1983.

21. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 102.

22. S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1982), p. 39.

23. *Ibid.*

24. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is organized around one central staff with one Chief of Staff for the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

25. Samuel Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army* (Cranbury, N.J.: Thomas Yoseloff, 1970), p. 200.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 200.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

29. *Interviews*, "K-5," p. 24 and "K-4," pp. 7-8.

30. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 55.

31. Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," paper presented at the International Congress, Foundation Society and Armed Forces, The Hague, Netherlands, 9-12 May 1982, pp. 1-3.

32. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," pp. 12-13.

33. Wimbush and Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 13.

34. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 163–64.
35. Wimbush and Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 43.
36. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, pp. 161–62.
37. Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Israel: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: American University, 1979), p. 260.
38. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 215.
39. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, pp. 25–47.
40. Ibid.
41. *Interviews*, “K-20,” pp. 22–24 and “K-10,” p. 16.
42. Ibid., pp. 40–47.
43. *Interviews*, “K-27,” p. 18.
44. Wm. Darryl Henderson, “Can-Do NCOs—With Clout—Can Help Cohesion Problem,” *Army*, March 1982, p. 20.
45. Ibid., p. 22.
46. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 118.
47. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 21.
48. Ibid., pp. 151 and 182.
49. Ibid., p. 192.
50. Ibid., p. 193.
51. Ibid.
52. Wimbush and Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*, p. 40.
53. Ibid.
54. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 132.
55. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 107.
56. Ibid., p. 196.
57. Ibid., p. 214.
58. Nyrop, *Israel: A Country Study*, p. 267.
59. US Embassy, Saigon, Document No. 102, pp. 45–47 and *Interviews*, “K-21,” p. 7.
60. Moskos, “From Institution to Occupation.”
61. Moskos, “The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force.”
62. Henderson, “Can-Do NCOs,” p. 21.

63. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," pp. 17-18.
64. Robert L. Goldrich, "Recruiting, Retention, and Quality in the All-Volunteer Force" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1981), pp. 58-59.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
66. V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin, and K.K. Platonov, *Military Psychology: A Soviet View* (Moscow, 1972), translated and published by the US Air Force, p. 292.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
71. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 184.
72. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 125.
73. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 199-200.
74. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 160.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
76. Y. Harkabi, "Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse," *Orbis*, Fall 1967.
77. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 175.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
79. *Interviews*, "K-5," pp. 28-30.
80. Goldrich, "Recruiting, Retention, and Quality in the All-Volunteer Force," pp. 66-65.
81. Shelyag, Glotochkin, and Platonov, *Military Psychology*, p. 320.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
83. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 162.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
85. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 169.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
89. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 61.
90. Warren L. Young, *Minorities and the Military: A Cross-National Study in World Perspective* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 227.

91. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," p. 4.
92. Tom Weber, "Rewarding Things that Count" (Washington, DC: Ft. McNair, Research Directorate, National Defense University, 1982), p. 3-7.
93. Moskos, "The Sociology of the All-Volunteer Force," p. 5.
94. Pete Earley, "Army Urges Rise in Jobs for Women," *Washington Post*, 15 October 1983, p. A3.
95. There is evidence that the Soviets formed an all-Afghan unit comprised of Soviet citizens for deployment in Afghanistan but disbanded it after discipline and control problems arose.
96. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 147.
97. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 389.
98. "More Women Enlist for Soviet Army Duty," *Washington Times*, 28 October 1982, p. 8.
99. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 208.
100. Irving H. Breslaver, "Women in the Israeli Defense Force," *Retired Officer*, September 1982, pp. 16-19.
101. Nyrop, *Israel: A Country Study*, p. 261.

CHAPTER V

1. E.P. Hollander and R.G. Hunt, eds., *Current Perspectives in Social Psychology* (New York: Oxford Press, 1963), pp. 298-311.
2. John H. Johns et al., *Cohesion in the US Military* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 69.
3. Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," in *The Study of Leadership*, Vol. 11 (West Point: USMA Printing Plant, 1973), pp. 20-22-20-23.
4. John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz, *Modern Society* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 91-93.
5. This definition of nationalism and the accompanying criteria for measuring its potential are taken largely from a series of lectures delivered by Professor Richard Cottam at the University of Pittsburgh during the summer of 1969. In arriving at this definition Professor Cottam built on the ideas of Hans Kohn and Rupert Emerson. See Hans Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1965), and Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
6. George, "Primary Groups, Organization and Military Performance," *passim*.
7. Morris Janowitz, Letter, 22 February 1983.
8. Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: Some Observations on Its Israeli Version,"

Washington, DC, Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1983, pp. 12-14.

9. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam," *Journal of Social Issues* 31 (1975): 27.

CHAPTER VI

1. Roy Jumper and Marjorie Weiner Normand, "Vietnam: The Historical Background," in Marvin E. Gentleman, ed., *Vietnam: History, Documents and Opinion* (New York: Fawcett, 1965), pp. 10-28.

2. Ellen Hammer, *Vietnam, Yesterday and Today* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 220-221.

3. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong, The Organization and Techniques* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 374.

4. Hammer, *Vietnam*, p. 39.

5. Pike, *Viet Cong*, p. 2.

6. Ann Crawford, *Customs and Culture of Vietnam* (Tokyo: Tuttle, 1968), pp. 55-61.

7. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 53.

8. Hammer, *Vietnam*, p. 1.

9. Martin Patchen, *Black-White Contact in Schools: Its Social and Academic Effects* (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1982), p. 349.

10. Morris Janowitz, Letter, 22 February 1983.

11. Charles C. Moskos, "Civic Education and the All-Volunteer Force," paper presented at the IUS symposium on "Civic Education in the Military," 15-16 October 1981, p. 21. See also James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti, "U.S. Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdown of Consensus and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems," *World Politics* 35 (April 1983): 368-92.

12. Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), p. 405.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 425-26.

14. Andrew J. Rochells and Paul G. Patton, "Demographic Changes in the U.S.S.R.: Implications for the Soviet Military" (Washington, DC: Student paper, The National Defense University, 1982) p. 29.

15. *Ibid.*

16. John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger, eds., *Soviet Military Power and Performance* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1979), p. 146.

17. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 404.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

19. Rochells and Patton, "Demographic Changes in the U.S.S.R.," p. 20.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

21. Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia, The People and the Power* (Brattleboro, Vt.: Book Press, 1976), p. 83.
22. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 83.
23. Herbert E. Meyer, "The Coming Soviet Ethnic Crisis," *Fortune* 98 (4 August 1978): 169.
24. S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1982), p. xiii.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
27. Rochells and Patton, "Demographic Changes in the U.S.S.R.," pp. 34-35.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
29. Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Israel: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: American University, 1979), p. 305.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
31. Samuel Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army* (Cranbury, N.J.: Thomas Yoseloff, 1970), p. 228.
32. Nyrop, *Israel*, p. xx.
33. *Vietnam Interviews*, Interview "K-1" (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965-67), p. 28.
34. Michael C. Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam* (Washington, DC: Center for Research in Social Systems, American University, 1966), pp. 302-303.
35. The concept of "latent patriotism" is a useful concept in explaining why soldiers fight. See Charles C. Moskos, "The All-Volunteer Force," in *The Political Education of Soldiers*, Morris Janowitz and Stephen D. Wesbrook, eds. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 308.
36. Douglas Pike, *The Vietcong, the Organization and Techniques* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), p. 377.
37. Joseph J. Zasloff, *Political Motivation of the Vietcong: The Political Regroupees*, RM-4703/2-ISA/ARPA (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1968), p. 40.
38. Alexander George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 89.
39. Moskos, "Civic Education and the All-Volunteer Force," p. 3.
40. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man* (New York: Russell Sage, 1970), pp. 146-56.
41. Moskos, "Civic Education and the All-Volunteer Force," p. 7.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

44. Benjamin J. Stein, "The Cheerful Ignorance of the Young in LA," *Washington Post*, 3 October 1983, editorial page.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Moskos, "Civic Education and the All-Volunteer Force," p. 7.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
49. *Ibid.*
50. William E. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism* 25 (September-October 1976): 34-51.
51. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 427.
52. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 351.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
54. Odom, "The Militarization of Soviet Society," p. 50.
55. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1975), pp. 249-254.
56. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 386.
57. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, p. 103.
58. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 405.
59. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, pp. 101-102.
60. Smith, *The Russians*, p. 332.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 410.
63. V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin, and K.K. Platonov, *Military Psychology: A Soviet View* (Moscow: 1972), translated and published by the US Air Force, pp. 330-55.
64. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 162-163.
65. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 169.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

CHAPTER VII

1. Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 61.

2. Anthony Kellet, *Combat Motivation, The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle* (Boston: Kluwer, Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), p. 327.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
6. Wm. Darryl Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation and Control in a Modern Army in Combat* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 95-102.
7. Kellet, *Combat Motivation*, p. 327.
8. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, pp. 95-102.
9. Wm. Darryl Henderson, "Can-Do NCOs—With Clout—Can Help Cohesion Problems," *Army*, March 1982, pp. 18-22.
10. Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 72.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 69-74.
12. John H. Johns et al., *Cohesion in the US Military* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), p. 69.

Henderson, *Why the Vietcong Fought*, p. 73. Much contemporary writing on leadership involves a redefinition of the phenomenon and then a suggested framework for analysis. To move beyond this, analysts must begin to relate and synthesize knowledge from other disciplines. This study attempts to relate a particular view of leadership to a broad body of knowledge about cohesion and its sources among soldiers in several different armies.

Many leadership approaches focus on the sources of the leader's power within the group. The categories of power used here rely primarily upon J.R.P. French, Jr., and B. Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," *The Study of Leadership* (West Point: USMA Printing Plant, 1970), pp. 7-3-7-17.

CHAPTER VIII

1. David W. Elliot and Mai Elliot, *Documents of a VC Delta Unit*, part two (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1969), p. 169.
2. *Vietnam Interviews*, Interview "K-14" (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1965-67), p. 2.
3. *Interviews*, "K-15," p. 26.
4. Frank Denton, *Volunteers for the Vietcong* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1968), p. vi.
5. *Interviews*, "K-41," p. 14.
6. *Interviews*, "K-9," p. 33.
7. *Interviews*, "K-19," p. 23.
8. *Interviews*, "K-5," pp. 7-15.

9. US Embassy, Saigon, Document No. 72, *Vietnam Documents and Research Notes*, 1967.
10. *Interviews*, "K-5," p. 10.
11. *Interviews*, "K-9," p. 6.
12. *Interviews*, "K-12," p. 9.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Document No. 22, *Vietnam Documents*, p. 41.
15. *Interviews*, "K-5," pp. 8-9.
16. *Interviews*, "K-12," p. 7.
17. *Interviews*, "K-22," pp. 7-8, 85.
18. *Interviews*, "K-4," pp. 5-6.
19. Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," paper presented at the International Congress, Foundation Society and Armed Forces, The Hague, Netherlands, 9-12 May 1982, p. 10.
20. While a recent court ruling regarding off-post drug offenses has taken a small step back towards emphasizing unit discipline over individual rights, overall impact on decisions of the past two decades is insignificant.
21. Allen J. Bergstrom, "Ivan is Only About 5'8"," *Air Force*, March 1982, p. 76.
22. V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotchkin, and K.K. Platonov, *Military Psychology: A Soviet View* (Moscow: 1972), translated and published by the US Air Force, p. 303.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
24. C. Donnelly, "The Soviet Attitude to Stress in Battle," *Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps* 128 (1982): 72-73.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.
26. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1975).
27. Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1981), p. 381.
28. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 154.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 255.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
33. *Ibid.*

34. V.V. Shelyag et al., *Military Psychology*, p. 328.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
37. Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*, p. 380.
38. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 178.
39. Scott and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union*, p. 381.
40. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 179-80.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
42. V.V. Shelyag et al., *Military Psychology*, p. 326.
43. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 200-201.
44. V.V. Shelyag et al., *Military Psychology*, p. 303.
45. Suworov, *Inside the Soviet Army*, p. 236.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
47. Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, pp. 200-201.
48. Samuel Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1970), p. 175.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 86-87.
51. Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: Some Observations on Its Israeli Version," Washington, DC, Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuro-psychiatry, Walter Reed Institute of Research, 1983, pp. 8-11.
52. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 161.
53. Richard F. Nyrop, ed. *Israel, A Country Study* (Washington, DC: The American University, 1978), p. 267.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
55. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 196.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
59. Yigal Allon, *The Making of Israel's Army* (New York: Universe Books, 1970), p. 131.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 131-132.
61. Rolbant, *The Israeli Soldier*, p. 79.

62. Richard A. Gabriel, "Stress in Battle: Coping on the Spot," *Army*, December 1982, pp. 36-42.

63. Y. Harkabi, "Basic Factors in the Arab Collapse," *Orbis*, Fall 1967.

This is illustrated by a recent observation of officer-soldier relationships in an Arab army. An officer visiting an Arab unit on maneuvers was puzzled by a line of Arab soldiers standing in formation along the side of the officers' briefing and mess tent. The side of the tent was rolled up and the visiting officer could see these soldiers standing there indefinitely. It was not until the direction of the wind shifted and the soldiers were marched around the tent that he realized these soldiers, standing for hours in the sun, were acting as a wind break for the officers' tent.

CHAPTER IX

1. James N. Rosenau and Ole R. Holsti, "US Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdown of Consensus and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems," *World Politics*, vol. 35, no. 3 (April 1983), pp. 368-392.

2. For a more extensive discussion on the shift to an "occupational model" for the Armed Forces, the following readings are recommended: Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1. (1977), pp. 41-50 and "Social Considerations of the All-Volunteer Force," in Brent Scowcroft, ed. *Military Service in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), pp. 129-150.

APPENDIX

1. Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908), introduction.

2. Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948): 281.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 284.

4. Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organizations and Military Performance," *The Study of Leadership* (West Point: USMA Printing Plant, 1972), p. 19-3. For a broader discussion of combat motivation linking primary-group processes to individual self-concern and shared beliefs among soldiers, see Charles Moskos, "Surviving the War in Vietnam," Charles R. Figley and Seymour Leventman, *Strangers at Home: The Vietnam Veteran Since the War* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 71-85.

5. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p. 42.

6. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," p. 284.

7. Morris Janowitz and R. Little, *Sociology and the Military Establishment* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1965), p. 78.

8. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," p. 287.
9. Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 163-164.
10. Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: Some Observations on Its Israeli Version," Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington, DC, 1983.