"Force Planning for Ungoverned Regions and Failed States"

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

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Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on ways the Department of Defense can transform to improve its ability to execute stabilization and reconstruction operations successfully. I am joined by Dr. Stuart Johnson, Dr. Richard Kugler, and Lt. Col. (US Army, ret) Chuck Barry. My colleagues are analysts at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University and have studied in some depth the issues we will be addressing today. Dr. Kugler and Col. Barry have written testimony that we will leave with the committee on sizing and organizing for stabilization and reconstruction respectively. They will be available to answer any questions you might have.

We appear before you today speaking on our own behalf. These views are our own and do not represent those of the National Defense University or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

In the summer and fall of 2003 our Center conducted a detailed study of stabilization and reconstruction operations. We identified a serious gap in capabilities and proceeded to do a broad study on how to fill those gaps. Our conclusions were published in the Spring of 2004 in Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Since that time, the Center has worked with the armed services, especially the Army, to refine and update our findings. The Department of Defense has taken a number of very useful steps to ensure that the appropriate capabilities are resident in the forces for the next time we are called on to perform stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions, but more progress is needed.

Military operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq were characterized by the rapid collapse of enemy military forces, by the relatively small deployment of US forces, and by the very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure during the conflict. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the US military that manifested itself in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver in the battlespace.
The United States was not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the looting, lawlessness, and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure that followed the collapse of the Iraqi military. Our failure to do so set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a democratically chosen Iraqi government. Moreover, our failure to establish security immediately upon collapse of the enemy appears to have driven the enemy underground and emboldened them attack Coalition troops.

It is precisely the success of the US military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to take the next step: to proceed with a second transformation with regard to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process concurrently with the end of major combat. This can only be done if preparations for stabilization and reconstruction operations are integrated into planning for the conflict from the beginning. This is needed to ensure that the right skills are in theater in the right place to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of enemy forces.

Our suggestions would not turn the Army into a constabulary force or dilute its combat capability. On the contrary, it is the next logical and necessary step to secure the victory that our combat forces achieve in major combat operations.

This requires a change in how we organize both in peacetime and in time of conflict. It will be an uphill battle though the Army in particular recognizes the importance of the challenge and has taken some important steps to address it. Still, two key obstacles have to be overcome.

- First, the great bulk of the forces that specialize in the skills that are needed promptly are in the reserve component and, generally speaking, organized and trained in a manner that is sub-optimal to prompt deployment and effective operations.
- Second, planning is so dominated by combat operations both during peacetime and during the run up to war that stability operations receive secondary consideration at best.
A change in the way the US organizes and plans for stability operations will go a long way to overcome these obstacles and ensure that stability operations get the attention they need.

With this background, I’d like to address briefly seven critical issues:

- What does history have to teach us?
- What new strategic concepts do we need to develop?
- How should we size forces for stabilization and reconstruction?
- How should we organize our forces for stabilization and reconstruction?
- How can we broaden the military culture to accommodate stabilization and reconstruction skills?
- What emerging technologies should be encouraged to support the troop in this mission?
- How can the interagency process be strengthened to support stabilization and reconstruction operations?

Lessons from History

Our analysts did a systematic review of past stabilization and reconstruction operations since World War II to see what factors that we can control correlated with success. Two were common to successful operations.

1. A stabilization and reconstruction force of adequate size committed to the operation.
2. A deployment long enough to allow stability to take root.

This, of course characterizes post war stabilization and reconstruction of Japan and Germany after World War II. In the same manner, the extended NATO deployment in the Balkans is showing hopeful signs of stabilization and reconstruction succeeding there as well. A major long term commitment of resources does not guarantee success but it is generally necessary for success.

New Strategic Concepts
The US needs to approach the challenge of stabilization and reconstruction with a new set of strategic concepts that grant this mission the attention it deserves. In our book we developed ten, of which the most important were:

- A coherent war winning *and peace winning* strategy
- Unity of effort among military and civilian agencies in the S&R environment
- Full spectrum planning that integrates major combat and S&R missions
- Concurrency of operations that includes mobilization and deployment of S&R capabilities as major combat operations are unfolding
- Improve cultural intelligence
- Early demonstrable success in providing personal security, basic services, and job opportunities

While this list is not exhaustive, our research indicates that these six strategic concepts provide a compelling framework for planning the S&R component of military operations. Joint Forces Command has recognized the need to develop a more robust approach to S&R operations and had drafted a Joint Operating Concept for Stabilization Operations that includes these concepts.

**Sizing the Stabilization and Reconstruction Force**

Chapter 3 of our study addressed the issue of how the United States should analyze its force requirements for S&R missions. We were endeavoring to determine S&R forces that could be needed to accompany combat forces in the difficult early stages of expeditionary operations: that is during the initial weeks and months when success is critical. Thus, we were not focusing on later requirements for troop rotations, which could arise after 6-12 months.

We employed the time-tested technique of assessing hypothetical scenarios for this purpose. Rather than rely upon a single scenario (e.g., a replay of Iraq), we examined a wide spectrum of twelve scenarios. All of these scenarios were selected because of their analytical contributions to force planning, not because any of them are likely to occur in the coming years. Nor did we specify the exact political reasons for each scenario. U.S. military interventions in them could occur for many different reasons: e.g., to topple a dictatorship seeking WMD and sponsoring terrorism, or to help a responsible government deal with a natural disaster, or to
stabilize a chaotic situation caused by a failed state. Our sole purpose was to offer technical insights on U.S. force requirements for S&R missions.

Our scenarios covered twelve countries in six turbulent regions: the Middle East, the Caucasus, South Asia, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These countries varied greatly in size. They ranged from very large counties (e.g. Indonesia with 216 million people and Pakistan with 162 million), to medium-sized countries similar to Iraq (e.g. North Korea, with 24 million), to small countries (e.g., Libya with 6 million). These countries also varied a great deal in their governments, societies, and economies, and therefore in the specific conditions that would confront U.S. force operations. Whereas some of them offered relatively easy conditions, others created very difficult conditions, including considerable violent opposition to U.S. forces.

Together, these scenarios created a wide range of potential S&R force requirements, stretching from small (e.g., 2,000 troops) to large (e.g., 20,000 troops). Because these scenarios were so diversified, we concluded that the United States should not rigidly size or design its S&R forces to meet the requirements of any single one of them. Instead, we determined that the United States should employ “capability-based planning” in order to create a flexible and modular S&R force that could be tailored to handle a wide spectrum of potential situations. We further concluded that the United States should field enough S&R forces to handle simultaneous contingencies: i.e. more than one scenario at a time. Our basic goal was to identify an S&R force that would leave the United States adequately insured against a plausible set of circumstances, not perfectly insured against all “worst cases”.

Our main recommendation was that an S&R force should be the equivalent of about two divisions in size. That does not mean the creation of two specialized divisions. But the S&R force should field about 30,000 troops, active and reserve component. Such a force would permit simultaneous S&R operations of moderate difficulty in two medium sized countries. Alternately, it would permit a single, bigger operation in a larger country such as Iran or Pakistan, or deployment of smaller, brigade-sized forces to several small counties. Our key point was that this S&R force would provide the U.S. military with multiple deployment options. Equally important, we concluded that the specific capabilities of the S&R forces mattered as much as
their size. As a result, we called for a balanced mix of forces in such critical areas as military police, engineers, and civil affairs.

I would like to emphasize that these units would be supplementing the combat troops that are in theater at the end of major combat operations. Only in very benign environments would we envision these S&R units equaling or outnumbering the combat units in theater. Moreover, I emphasize that the S&R posture envisioned here would meet needs only for the initial period of 6-12 months. If deployments last longer, rotational reinforcements would be needed, and these would have to be drawn from elsewhere in the Army posture.

**Organizing for Stabilization And Reconstruction Operations**

Our research has lead to two fundamental principles in organizing for S&R operations. First, the mission of early S&R should be given to a command not participating in or directly supporting combat operations. Combat places such demands on a commander and staff of any command that follow-on or secondary missions understandably must be either delegated to subordinates, or dealt with only when the primary mission of combat has been successful achieved. There is a basic difference in force posture and engagement restraint between S&R operations and combat operations. Notwithstanding the inherent flexibility of our leaders and forces, it is difficult to wheel mentally or organizationally from one mission to the other and back again and still bring the full resources of the command to each effort. The “Three Block War” notion championed by the Marines may work in a town but not country-wide. It is essential to invest in deploying a separate command for early S&R. The S&R command may have secondary missions, however none should be of equal or greater priority than S&R.

The second fundamental principle is that S&R command’s forces should be integrated and formed together as teams prior to deployment. They should not meet on the battlefield, brought forward piecemeal, when and as needed. Instead, they should plan, train and exercise together just as combat forces do. We do not yet know enough about integration options to advise whether these commands should be permanently integrated in peacetime or whether they should be task organized on a mission basis. There are costs neither way. For now, we should
experiment with the least disruptive and most expeditious option, task organizing units for particular operations. The initial step should be to develop these forces via exercising and determine the optimal mix and command relationships.

The ideal solution for future operations would be to create two new joint headquarters that would be designed especially for the early S&R mission. These joint commands would provide the capabilities for one large or two medium size S&R contingencies and would be responsive to all of the Regional Combatant Commands. The S&R joint commands might be organized under Joint Forces Command or SOCOM as deployable commands. While the optimum solution, we recognize from our discourse with the Army and others that there are major affordability questions in standing up two new commands. In addition, doing so would take several years to accomplish.

Fortunately, there is an interim alternative capability that is both affordable and able to be accomplished in the near term for future contingencies. That concept is to designate a division level combat command of the Army or Marine Corps as the S&R command in each appropriate Operations Plan (OPLAN). This command would be additive to the combat commands required for successful combat operations under the OPLAN and it would be given no combat mission, or any other primary mission beside S&R. The designated division would be especially task organized for S&R, giving up most of its own combat brigades and taking on several integrated brigade-size S&R groups.

Today both the Army and the Marine Corps have taken steps to improve their S&R force levels in the active force. In particular the Army is converting up to 30 artillery battalions, mostly from the reserve component, many to specialties such as military police that will buttress Army S&R capacity. Also, the Army has approved plans to increase the number of Civil Affairs personnel in the Active force and re-organize the current battalion-size force as a more flexible Civil Affairs brigade. More Civil Affairs officers are now on the staffs of combat units. In spite of these important improvements, the concept of giving the S&R mission to the same commander who also has primary combat-related missions remains in place. In addition, the concept of adding S&R capabilities such as Civil Affairs units to combat units still occurs late in
the operation, on a just-in-time basis. We believe that the concepts of a separate command
designated for the S&R mission and of integrating basic S&R capabilities within a brigade level
S&R task force should be vetted in joint exercises and used as the foundation for building better
capabilities for the future

**Broadening the military culture to accommodate S&R skills?**

Despite a long history of involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations, the
U.S. military has during the past decades tended to view these activities as separate from, and
indeed distracting from, its primary warfighting mission. As a result, the full spectrum of skills
that our military leaders need to plan and execute S&R missions is typically not part of the core
training and education that our officers receive.

We reviewed an excellent analysis done by the US Institute of Peace that catalogued those
skills needed for peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction missions. Several areas deemed
critical to the success of S&R operations require greater emphasis. These include:

- Ability to interact with nonmilitary partners & build consensus
- Negotiating skills
- Understanding of historical/cultural contexts

A stronger focus on these areas in the Joint Professional Military Education curricula would go a
long way to prepare our future officers for the complex operating environment presented by S&R
missions.

**Emerging technologies to support the S&R mission**

The challenges presented by stability and reconstruction operations transcend
straightforward technological solutions although they can be mitigated by them. There is a
cluster of technologies that have reached, or are reaching, maturity that can assist our troops in
S&R operations. A number of these have been developed in the commercial sector but have
application in S&R operations as well. Others are in late stages of research or even prototyping
and could be brought to the field within a few years, or in some cases, months. The full list is
long and spelled out in the book *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* that I referred to at the beginning of my testimony.

The most troublesome problem in Iraq has been providing security to our troops and to the Iraqi people. Research and development on non-lethal weaponry has up to now been assigned a priority well below weapons systems for major combat operations. The have considerable potential for riot and crowd control in those particularly difficulty situations where combatants and civilians are intermingled. For example, directed energy systems that cause discomfort but do not result in permanent injury are promising, but more research is needed to enhance its reliability.

Our troops must also interact on a day to day basis with the Iraqi population (at roadblocks for example). There are not enough reliable translators to go around and a severely limited number of soldiers who speak Arabic. Mobil, real-time machine translation is within our grasp. Already, prototype machines exist that can provide translation of basic information that has to be exchanged at a road block or check point for example. We feel that research that targets machine translation capable of handling idiom, nuance, and voice inflection hold promise of multiplying the effectiveness of our troops in contact with the native population.

Among the many other examples we cite in our report, I would like to highlight the challenge of neutralizing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Department of Defense has formed a task force that is working with great urgency to address this challenge and it is an effort that deserves ongoing support.

**Role of the Interagency and Allies**

Most future overseas military deployments will at some point require major civilian contributions and coalition partner participation. The changing nature of conflict as well as the nature of overseas operations will mean that deployments will not involve the military alone, especially over longer periods of time. Ultimate military success will often depend in large part on how well these partners perform. Maintaining and winning the peace is as important as
winning the war. The Department of Defense needs fully capable civilian and international partners, and must do what it can to bolster the capacities of both.

Senators Lugar and Biden, who introduced the “Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2005,” focused much needed attention on the role of civilians in S&R operations. This bill, which has not yet passed the full Senate, would establish as a core mission of the Department of State and USAID a civilian response capability to carry out reconstruction and stabilization activities. As a result of the bill, State has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which is the core around which to build any new civilian capacity. Strengthening S/CRS is critical to the organization of civilian assets for S&R operations.

Other agencies’ capabilities must also be strengthened and the NSC must play a stronger role in coordinating the interagency effort. This stronger NSC role would not be operational. For example, CSIS calls for an NSC Senior Director and an office for Complex Contingency Planning to lead the development of integrated interagency plans for complex operations. CSIS further advocates the creation of a planning office in each of the key civilian agencies (in State, this would be S/CRS) to participate in the interagency planning process. This would also require a strong NSPD or EO similar to PDD 56 to assign authorities and responsibilities and also create planning and operational mechanisms, oversight and accountability.

Coordinated planning is an important component of interagency cooperation. It did not work well in Iraq, but steps are being taken to correct this. The Defense Science Board, S/CRS and Joint Forces Command have each done significant work to enhance planning capabilities. Interagency planning must be conducted at three levels: strategic, contingency, and operational. First, more needs to be done at the strategic level to implement the National Security Strategy. Second, with regard to contingency planning, the Defense Science Board study of 2004 proposes the creation of cross-government, country specific, contingency planning task forces. Third, a process similar to PDD 56 needs to be developed for interagency operational planning that holds specific agencies responsible for parts of the plan and that rehearses the plan in detail before it is taken to the field.
Any end game strategy will involve effective international partners who are familiar with the geography, language, and culture of an area. The most successful example of this is Bosnia, where we conducted military operations with NATO and recently handed off the post-conflict phase to the EU. A successful international partnership requires two things: getting our diplomacy right and improving the institutional capacity of our allies. If we address the issue of political will early on and support efforts for more robust capabilities, we will have a powerful tool. We should support development of a new NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability, including deployable European constabulary forces. The African Union can perform peacekeeping missions but it does not have the combat forces necessary for humanitarian interventions to stop genocide. We need to help provide that capability. While there is some skepticism toward UNDPKO operations, a recent RAND study demonstrates that they are very often successful. DoD should take the lead in strengthening planning, military, and technical links in order to reform the UNDPKO. Each operation undertaken by the EU or AU or UN will lighten the burden on our combat forces.

I should also mention that the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Control Export Act are outdated. Many restrictions were added to both pieces of legislation during the Cold War that reflect the realities of a different time. Congress and the Executive Branch should work together to review both laws and make necessary adjustments.

Summary

I’ve shared with you a number of key findings that grew out of our study and are captured in the book that you have a copy of. I’d like to close with a few highlights from that book.

First, we have examined the gap that exists between the challenge of S&R operations and the capabilities our military has to meet those operations. The Department of Defense has recognized this gap. An example of its response is the draft DoD Directive 3000 that outlines responsibilities the services and agencies of the department are to assume to address this gap.
Moreover, the Army in particular has taken a number of steps to strengthen its capabilities for S&R.

But more still needs to be done. The Department of Defense requires forces with the skills needed for S&R operations that are organized and trained for these operations and able to deploy to the theater concurrently with the combat forces. Moreover, a Stabilization and Reconstruction command is needed to ensure that during peacetime units critical to stabilization and reconstruction are monitored for quality and readiness; that close attention is given to their training and exercising to ensure that when the different units get to theater the synergy of their skills can be put in practice; and that doctrine is developed as we learn lessons from our forces’ experiences, partner militaries’ experiences, and the results of experimentation.

Again, I would like to thank you for your invitation to testify to you today. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions.