Joint intelligence doctrine focuses too much on traditional adversaries in combat situations and does not adequately address issues of foreign culture. Current doctrine does not adequately direct the joint force commander’s (JFC) intelligence establishment to prepare estimates on the characteristic features of foreign peoples that includes items such as their civilizations, beliefs, and social institutions. In order to better support the commander across the range of military operations, we must expand joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence.

To develop the best courses of action for mission success, the JFC must understand the cultures of the foreign groups with which he, his staff, and his forces will interact. In Iraq, U.S. leaders and forces must interact every day with all segments of the local population. Iraq is an obvious example, but operations in Afghanistan, Djibouti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, the Philippines, and Somalia highlight only a few of the many places where U.S. and U.S. led coalition forces have recently had troops, airmen, and sailors on the ground conducting operations. These operations included the local peoples in the joint operations area as well as foreign forces in coalitions.

Interactions that cause mistakes and delays may derail achieving an objective, cost precious time, thwart an initiative, or cause the force to miss important local information or intelligence. As the potential for low intensity conflict, MOOTW, and stabilization operations remains high, the need for good cultural intelligence remains high too. It would be a mistake to continue to marginalize cultural intelligence in joint intelligence doctrine.

**Cultural Intelligence**
Cultural intelligence can be defined as an analysis of social, political, economic, and other demographic information that provides understanding of a people or nation’s history, institutions, psychology, beliefs (such as religion), and behaviors. It helps provide understanding as to why a people act as they do and how they think. Cultural intelligence provides a baseline for designing successful strategies to interact with foreign peoples whether they are neutrals, people of an occupied territory, or enemies.
Cultural intelligence is more than demographic statistics. It provides understanding of not only how other groups act but why. It gives the commander as well as the soldier the knowledge to anticipate reactions to selected courses of action. Cultural intelligence provides operational and tactical forces knowledge to guide their actions when working with foreign nationals so they can better achieve objectives. Cultural intelligence products must be built early and ready for the commander and forces prior to the start of operations. Cultural intelligence should provide the foundation of knowledge for all types of operations in foreign lands and for all levels of war. It is especially relevant for the JFC because he must work with coalitions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), host nations, and other regional power brokers. If used properly it will enable U.S. forces to more successfully interact with foreigners and more successfully achieve mission objectives.

THE CASE FOR CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE

The need for cultural understanding to conduct successful operations has been stated and written many times. For almost one hundred years the U.S. Marine Corps has considered cultural issues in its MOOTW. It most recently captured these issues and other small contingency best practices in its Small Wars Manual last formally published in 1940. In this manual the need for true cultural understanding is emphasized for the Marines that will be operating in foreign countries. However, the lesson of including cultural intelligence in our joint intelligence effort and doctrine has not been learned. Historical feedback and recent lessons-learned confirm this. In a perceptive article on transforming doctrine with cultural intelligence, George Smith draws fascinating parallels between Napoleon’s campaign in Spain and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In each conflict, conventional military operations were quickly won, but stabilization operations encountered long and difficult problems due to a lack of proper planning for and understanding of the local populations in each country. Regarding OIF, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William S. Wallace, V Corps Commander in OIF, stated that the value of “cultural intelligence” was a lesson learned. He noted, “If we are going to insert Army formations in a culture that is different than our own, we’ve got to have a much better appreciation for what the impact of insertion of U.S. formations into that culture might have . . . we need to be a lot more sensitive to that.”

Analysis of other recent operations and wars also highlights the need for good cultural intelligence. Vietnam provided many examples, but operations in Somalia give even more applicable lessons to the varied MOOTW missions we continue to conduct. Reflecting on stabilization, humanitarian relief, and other MOOTW operations in Somalia, Marine
General Anthony Zinni, former commander of Operations *Restore Hope, Continue Hope*, and *United Shield* concludes that cultural intelligence is indispensable:

What we need is cultural intelligence. What makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?...What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you.\(^4\)

With so many lessons learned documented, why do we keep making the same mistakes? Undoubtedly part of the answer lies within our own military culture which is more geared to preparing for and fighting conventional military operations. That culture is clearly expressed in our doctrine.

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE**

Joint doctrine defines intelligence as a “product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas,” and the “information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.”\(^5\) Examination in more detail of what intelligence is in joint doctrine shows that it centers on combat adversaries and the physical environment. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, states:

Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy to JFCs. Intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. Intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action.\(^6\)

Joint intelligence doctrine is almost exclusively focused on combat operations and getting the JFC information on combat adversaries and the battlespace.

Joint doctrine breaks operations into two categories: war and MOOTW. In war, intelligence is focused on support of combat operations. Tasks
include things such as defining objectives and centers of gravity, determining orders of battle, and targeting. Cultural issues are not emphasized.

In intelligence doctrine for MOOTW, intelligence is supposed to provide assessments that help the JFC decide which forces to deploy; when, how, and where to deploy them; and how to employ them in a manner that accomplishes the mission at the lowest human and political cost. MOOTW as a set of operations is considered in two categories: MOOTW involving the use or threat of force and MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force. Figure 1 shows how JP 2-0 breaks out the key intelligence requirements. In short, existing doctrine does not draw a major distinction between intelligence requirements for supporting MOOTW and the use of force “during war”—a dangerous assumption. This downplays the role the local populations play in achieving mission success. In the JP 2-0 construct then, it is intelligence during MOOTW not involving force, where one would then expect to find doctrine supporting the need for cultural intelligence. Unfortunately, as Figure 1 from JP 2-0 shows, it is clear that the requirements listed pertain to developing the conventional physical, threat and target-oriented aspects of the situation, not developing a true understanding of local peoples and their culture in the way that General Zinni espouses.

Providing cultural intelligence and insight on the local populations is not a doctrinal focus—but it needs to be in order to shape how we plan. The closest we get in joint intelligence doctrine are general requirements such as, “Intelligence develops knowledge of the environment in relation to the JFC’s questions concerning actual and potential threats...cultural characteristics, medical conditions, population, leadership, and many other issues concerning the operational area.” The direction to provide “cultural characteristics” will get the commander some demographic overlays showing data like tribal locations and a geographic chart showing a region’s religious breakdown by percentage. As the following excerpt

![Figure 1](image-url)

**Intelligence During MOOTW**

**MOOTW INVOLVING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE**
- Strikes and Raids, Peace Enforcement, Counterterrorism
  - Helps joint force commanders (JFCs) with force deployment and employment decisions
  - Supports force protection mission
  - Prepares for possible escalation to war

**MOOTW NOT INVOLVING THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE**
- Disaster Relief, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Counterdrug Operations, Security Assistance
  - Provides JFC with information about the operational area
  - Helps JFC determine which forces to employ
  - Assists JFC in estimating the duration of the operation
from JP 2-0 makes clear, doctrine assumes that the intelligence establishment can do things such as using imagery and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets to survey terrain and help in the deployment of forces to “combat” physical, terrain related problems:

Intelligence helps the JFC determine which forces to employ and assists in estimating the duration of the operation. During disaster relief operations, intelligence can play an important role in surveying the extent of damage and the level of suffering and can assist in planning for the deployment of relief forces.\(^\text{10}\)

Unfortunately, no other examples are given, and it is not implied that the intelligence officer (J-2) needs to provide cultural insights on the people and leaders—the very things that Generals Zinni and Wallace say we need:

JP 2-0 also addresses intelligence doctrine in times of peace: During peacetime, intelligence helps commanders project future adversary capabilities; make acquisition decisions; protect technological advances; define weapons systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems requirements; shape organizations; and design training to ready the joint force. Intelligence assets monitor foreign states and volatile regions to identify threats to U.S. interests in time for the National Command Authorities (NCA) to respond effectively.\(^\text{11}\)

Thus, in peacetime preparations, intelligence is focused on strategic acquisitions, indications and warning, and training—developing sound cultural intelligence is largely ignored.

JP 2-01, *Joint and National Support to Military Operations*, focuses on the need for intelligence to quickly support the speed of command functions and the planning process. Obtaining efficiency in the process and effectiveness in support to the JFC is important. Intelligence products are placed in five categories: Indications and Warning (I&W), current intelligence, general military intelligence, targeting, and scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence. While “political, economic and social aspects of countries in a Joint Operations Area” are listed as a part of “General Military Intelligence,” as the title suggests, adversaries and militaries are
emphasized, and the key products are military capabilities assessments and course of action estimates.\textsuperscript{12}

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) doctrine in JP 2-01.3 is also primarily focused on traditional combat operations. This includes how to prepare products to support analyses of the battlespace, environment and determining enemy courses of action. It is geared “towards preparatory intelligence analysis for operational level force-on-force confrontations.”\textsuperscript{13} There is a short chapter on JIPB support to MOOTW. It provides a few useful starting points on how to apply elements of the normal process to various MOOTW operations. However, the discussion focuses too much on how to modify normal JIPB products for the MOOTW situation instead of putting real guidance into items that may help in non-combat, transition or MOOTW missions. “[T]he primary purpose of JIPB support to MOOTW is to heighten the JFC’s awareness of the battlespace and threat the joint force is most likely to encounter.”\textsuperscript{14} There is no provision here or elsewhere in joint doctrine to incorporate substantive cultural intelligence into JIPB.

**OPERATIONS DOCTRINE - MOOTW**

The best joint doctrinal requirements for cultural intelligence are found in joint operations doctrine for MOOTW (JP 3-07). The MOOTW focus is on operations deterring war and promoting peace. Cultural issues important in the planning considerations for the sixteen types of MOOTW missions are listed in JP 3-07.\textsuperscript{15} Each of these planning considerations requires some degree of cultural understanding in order to enable the mission to be planned and carried out effectively. According to JP 3-07:

> Intelligence collection in MOOTW...might require a focus on understanding the political, cultural, and economic factors that affect the situation. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW must often address unique and subtle problems not always encountered in war. It will require a depth of expertise in (and a mental and psychological integration with) all aspects of the operational environment’s peoples and their cultures, politics, religion, economics, and related factors; and any variances within affected groups of people. It is only through an understanding of the values by which people define themselves, that an intervener can establish for himself a perception of legitimacy . . . .\textsuperscript{16}

MOOTW doctrine takes for granted that the JFC will not have the necessary cultural understanding at the beginning of the operation. It asserts that human intelligence will probably be the best intelligence
source to help the commander gain the understanding he needs. The problem is that the JFC may be at a huge disadvantage if he has to wait until he is assigned the mission, and is quartered in the joint operations area, in order to start building the cultural understanding he needs.

It takes time to develop human intelligence sources. The national intelligence structure supporting the Department of Defense (DOD) may be able to provide some baseline intelligence assessments from a strategic level, but neither it nor the Combatant Commander’s Joint Intelligence Center are geared to provide in-depth operational intelligence support to many of the potential areas--areas for MOOTW for example--where we are likely to find our joint forces operating. The military theater augmentation teams and Joint Intelligence Support Elements (JISE) do not include, per doctrine, cultural experts. If the JFC is lucky, regional embassy teams, national intelligence support teams or allies can provide some insight. Essentially, operations doctrine in JP 3-07 leveres significant cultural intelligence requirements on joint intelligence that joint intelligence doctrine does not adequately mirror or fulfill.

**Recommendations**

Existing joint intelligence doctrine inadequately accounts for cultural intelligence. Specific problems are:

- Joint intelligence doctrine, especially the capstone intelligence document, JP 2-0, is overwhelmingly written for combat operations using combat terms.
- Cultural intelligence is not considered as an important intelligence area for product production, and the JP 2 and JP 3 series are not clearly aligned on cultural requirements.
- Current JIPB and other intelligence products lack the proper level of detail, thought and planning needed to guide J-2’s to successfully plan for and incorporate cultural intelligence into their intelligence estimates.
- Joint doctrine does not provide for augmenting combatant commanders or Joint Task Forces with cultural intelligence experts.

Inadequate joint intelligence doctrine factored into the OIF transition phase. The U.S. forces on the ground were not ready to culturally engage the citizens for the range of operations related to stability and security. What emerged from the field, well after these operations commenced, where the briefs giving follow-on forces the lessons learned. The local commanders, to overcome pre-operational intelligence shortfalls, are created them. Doctrine should have guided the operational commander’s J-2 to develop more detailed cultural intelligence prior to
operations occurring in Iraq. Without cultural considerations adequately addressed in doctrine, the military mindset remains on combat operations and not on conducting the less glamorous but equally important MOOTW.

In what specific ways should joint doctrine be re-written in order to account for cultural intelligence? First, doctrinal language should reflect the reality that joint forces interact with more than just adversaries. Below is a recommendation for JP 2-0 to add improved wording for what intelligence provides to JFCs. This is an example, the spirit of which should be incorporated throughout the JP 2 series. This example provides a contrast with the description shown above from JP 2-0 [bold font indicates additions]:

Intelligence provides knowledge of the enemy, potential enemy and local foreign populations to JFCs. In combat situations intelligence tells JFCs what their adversaries or potential adversaries are doing, what they are capable of doing, and what they may do in the future. In combat, intelligence assists JFCs and their staffs in visualizing the battlespace and in achieving information superiority. Intelligence also contributes to information superiority by attempting to discern the adversary’s probable intent and future course of action. In peacetime operations, transition operations or other MOOTW, intelligence provides the JFC true cultural knowledge of local populations, their leaders and coalition partners. This knowledge will help the JFC and his staff design the best courses of action for the given mission.

Intelligence doctrine must stress that knowledge of all foreign peoples in a joint operations area is a fundamental of joint warfare; it is not limited to the "knowledge of the enemy."

Second, JP 2-0 and the other joint intelligence doctrine series publications should be updated to include cultural intelligence, as defined in this paper. Cultural intelligence should fall under the category of an intelligence product and requirement in JP 2-0 and be described as such in all joint intelligence doctrine. The joint publication series, especially Operations and Intelligence, should align all cultural requirements. This will allow the JFC and his staff to estimate, plan, and synchronize cultural intelligence needs within intelligence operations.
Third, joint intelligence doctrine and JIPB products need to incorporate more cultural intelligence guidance. Because existing doctrine is inadequate, JFCs and their J-2s begin many missions at a cultural disadvantage. Tactical forces are then forced to build cultural awareness, on the ground, after operations have started. Figure 2 shows how cultural considerations could be visibly depicted in doctrine focusing on both planning and manning as well as getting cultural intelligence to the forces and the decision maker or JFC. The individual services should be consulted for recommendations in order to find the best practices they have developed, and these should be considered as doctrinal analysis is conducted on the best cultural items to incorporate into JIPB doctrine.

Cultural intelligence must be factored into the JIPB process. A base reference should be kept updated for any area where there may be a good chance of operations. The combatant commander’s Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) may possess elements of the cultural intelligence needed, but it needs to be systematically revised and expanded. When a warning order is issued, the culturally infused JIPB could then be quickly adjusted to the operational level and flowed to the JTF. Figure 3
shows an example of factors to consider when preparing cultural estimates for the JIPB. The figure shows what might be looked at for the insurgency in Iraq. It serves as an example of the type of guidance and level of detail that is needed in doctrine. Factors analyzed will vary from culture to culture and operation to operation. Using cultural intelligence will improve the JFC’s operational analysis of space, and it will allow him to make better force decisions.

The theater commander and his J-2 will not be able to have experts in every country or region in his area of responsibility (AOR). There are many “out of the way” places in the world, and sometimes unexpected crises erupt. To this end, the J-2 must get intelligence outside of DOD and even the intelligence community. In today’s environment inputs can and must be gathered from many sources including traditional intelligence sources, other governmental agencies, academia, embassies, information from NGOs and IGOs, allies and elsewhere.

Fourth, perhaps the quickest way to help a JFC would be to alter the doctrine in JP 2-01 and thus the composition of intelligence support teams. The JISE, for example, should be amended to include theater augmentees for cultural intelligence. There should be an organizational box showing that such support is required. In the same vein, continuing to push for support from broader groups such as National Intelligence Support Teams (NIST) or the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) may be a way to tap the expertise currently in DOD and the intelligence community.

The DOD initiative to create Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) in each geographic theater as well as a backup at U.S. Joint Forces Command is a step in the right direction. Creating the SJFHQs will allow staff officers to anticipate and study potential crisis areas, thereby being better prepared to know the crisis area’s people and political circumstances. Gaining such insight, as well as knowing how to quickly act as a JTF, are two complementary advantages of the SJFHQs. However, the combatant commanders will still need several cultural experts, as there can be many crises in various areas in one combatant commander’s AOR. The SJFHQ cannot be expected to provide experts for a COCOM’s entire AOR. The SJFHQ will improve the crisis response and JTF set-up time for a single contingency, but ultimately it does not provide the amount of in-depth cultural expertise needed.

Combatant Commanders should levy requirements for increased and highly trained cultural experts to support reformed intelligence doctrine. They should link these requirements to dedicated staff and JIC billets for
both civilian and military personnel. Commanders need an operational and strategic foreign area officer cadre created expressly to support the Combatant Commander, the JIC and a JTF. Major General Robert Scales (Ret.) argues that the military would be much better off if it spent billions of dollars to build greater cultural awareness among military officers rather than on marginally increasing our immense technological advantages. His research and interviews with commanders that served on the ground in OIF lend credence to his argument: “Reflective senior officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan,” Scales observes, “are telling us that wars are won as much by creating alliances, leveraging nonmilitary advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and managing perceptions—all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation.”

Scales proposes large training and educational improvements so that the armed forces can build a cadre of officers who specialize in cultural intelligence. These specialists would be integrated into key planning, analysis, and operational jobs.

Critics of this approach to change joint intelligence doctrine may say that cultural intelligence does not need to be formally incorporated into joint intelligence doctrine—because non-combat or MOOTW situations are addressed in existing publications. The U.S. military is a combat organization and that must be the emphasis of doctrine. Furthermore, there is nothing in doctrine prohibiting JFCs and their J-2s from acquiring and developing cultural intelligence.

While operational intelligence to support combat operations must remain a top priority in joint intelligence doctrine, it is time that the issues of cultural intelligence get more and better doctrinal emphasis. We must include cultural intelligence into joint intelligence doctrine so it will be included in training and planning and factored into priority intelligence requirements. U.S. forces repeatedly find themselves in situations in which they must interact with foreign populations whether in transition from combat to stability operations, in non-combat MOOTW, or a combination of both. Furthermore, JFCs are military commanders trained in military arts not cultural issues—they cannot be expected to be trained anthropologists, historians, or political philosophers. This is where the J-2 can provide guidance and expertise in shaping culturally oriented, priority intelligence requirements for the social and political situations. The J-2 and the JFC should not think of foreign peoples simply as adversaries, and attempt to analyze them in combat support terms with intelligence products designed for combat. They should think of the foreign peoples in terms of being from distinct cultures that must be understood in order to design successful courses of action to achieve
mission success. An operation will more likely succeed if the cultural intelligence requirements are given a conspicuous place in doctrine and incorporated in plans from the start.

Making greater use of cultural intelligence does not mean that the JFC should shape a course of action based solely on such considerations. It simply means the commander would possess the fullest knowledge of the circumstances at hand so that he can more efficiently achieve his objectives. For example, when a JFC’s troops need to protect the logistics shipments and lines of approach from infiltrators or insurgents, they will need human intelligence from a cooperative local population. Without good cultural intelligence as a part of the JIPB, JFCs and their forces may unintentionally alienate local populations and thus hinder the success of the operation from the start.

Returning to the OIF example, Bruce Hoffman from RAND presents a compelling case about how a complete lack of planning for cultural issues in the transition to stability operations cost U.S. forces dearly, as many local Iraqis decided to fight the American forces that had just liberated them from Saddam Hussein. While intelligence did predict some insurgent activity, it did not inform operational commanders or policy makers about the scope of the insurgency or educate them as to what the Iraqi public would most desire—security. Intelligence did not give the commanders insight on how to act. Thus, the transition situation in Iraq was misread and commanders did not develop courses of action to guarantee security and manage local perceptions. When small-scale looting started in Iraq immediately following combat operations, many local institutions with no connection to the regime remained unguarded and were systematically pillaged. U.S. and coalition forces did nothing to stop the crime and could not stop the indiscriminate terrorizing of the local population. 21 To many Iraqis it appeared that the U.S. forces could not guarantee security, which they desired far more than democracy. 22 By the time U.S. commanders figured it out, it was too late. Hoffman notes that this “lesson learned” has had to be relearned many times. 23 If cultural intelligence is emphasized in intelligence doctrine, U.S. commanders might avoid making similar mistakes in the future.

Finally, a benefit of incorporating cultural intelligence into Joint intelligence doctrine is that the knowledge gained by the J-2 during normal study and analysis can help the JFC understand his ally—a member of his own coalition. This does not mean the J-2 organization would be collecting information on coalition members as if they were our adversaries. It simply means that commanders can use knowledge
possessed by the J-2 organization to help them more effectively form and lead a coalition.

**CONCLUSION**
To sum things up: joint intelligence doctrine must emphasize cultural intelligence if the JFC is to possess the best knowledge to make decisions and determine courses of action in his joint operations area. The JFC needs to understand the peoples and leaders in the area where he and his forces will operate—especially if the operation involves MOOTW or the possibility of transition from combat to MOOTW. A failure to incorporate cultural intelligence into the JIPB and other intelligence products means that the JFC and his forces will start operations at a disadvantage. Ultimately, changing joint intelligence doctrine to include cultural intelligence will require a cultural change within the military intelligence community. Doctrine must be changed, and the accompanying support and training must follow for the change to take root.
NOTES

1 This is my definition of cultural intelligence. In my research I found that various authors espoused a need for better cultural awareness, understanding and training. One group, the Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group, defined cultural intelligence in terms of incorporating cultural factors into the Marine Corps intelligence cycle. My goal was to create a “stand alone” definition of cultural intelligence. The cultural aspect hinges upon the definition of the word culture. According to Webster’s New Ideal Dictionary, G.& C. Merriam Co., 1978, it can be defined as, “the characteristic features of a civilization including its beliefs, its artistic and material products, and its social institutions.” The intelligence aspect relates not an intelligence discipline or source (such as human intelligence), but it is a product of analysis and evaluation of various information sources including single source intelligence.


5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02 DOD Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 12 April 2001).

6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 2–0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 9 March 2000), I-1.

7 Ibid, I-7.

8 Ibid., I-6.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


14 Ibid., V-3.

Smith, 29-30. Smith makes great recommendations on how the JIPB process needs to be expanded to include people particularly for the transition phase from combat to stability and security. These recommendations and the additional ones I list should be applied to all types of joint operations and conflict.

William Wunderle, “Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: Planning Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power,” (Unpublished PowerPoint Briefing, Santa Monica, CA: RAND: November 2004). This briefing inspired the creation of Figure 2.

Ben Connable, “Groups vs. Motivations 31,” (Unpublished PowerPoint Briefing, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps Cultural Awareness Working Group: January 2005). Figure 3 is from this brief. The working group provided several thought provoking briefings and papers that discuss the need for better cultural awareness within DOD.


Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 2004), 2-3, 11-12. Hoffman’s work draws on other recent OIF analysis from many authors including Anthony Cordesman and a long history of RAND publications on insurgency, terrorism, and nation-building. Its assertions on the poor stability operations in Iraq includes corroboration from many military officers serving there.


Hoffman, 6.