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Chapter 13— Protecting Cyberspace
Jacques S. Gansler
Information systems are the critical elements in the transformation of
both military operations and the functioning of society, and they will be
increasingly vital in the future. In the military area, the centrality of
these systems varies from growing dependence on the real-time linking of
distributed intelligence “sensors” and distributed “shooters” (through
complex networked command, control, communications, and computers [C4]
systems) to the rapid responsiveness provided by modern information-based
logistics support systems. On the civil side, it includes the
exponentially growing dependence on computer and communication networks
for everything from government operations to the full infrastructure of
the financial, medical, transportation, utilities, and other systems that
determine the effective operation of modern society. The problem, of
course, is that with this growing dependence on information systems, we
expose ourselves to a rapidly growing and increasingly dangerous spectrum
of information warfare (IW) operations. These might include direct
military information system attacks aimed at prevention, disruption,
intelligence gathering, or deception; cyberterrorism attacks on civil
infrastructures, such as banks, water and power systems, air traffic, and
hospitals; and even combined and simultaneous attacks on both military
systems and their supporting civil infrastructures.
This vulnerability of modern military and civil society to information
warfare must be addressed with appropriate defenses. Clearly, however, the
potential benefits of offensive information warfare are also likely to be
fully exploited by all sides. To better understand this cat-and-mouse game
of offensive and defensive information warfare operations, consider the
almost-ubiquitous Internet.
Origins of the Internet
The Internet has evolved from its roots 30 years ago as an academic
research tool to become a global resource serving millions of individuals
as well as providing critical connectivity for national security,
industrial, economic, and governmental functions. To understand the
current issues of Internet security, it is important to understand its
history and heritage. The Department of Defense (DOD) Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA), now DARPA, sponsored the initial research on
packet-switching technology, the enabling technology for the Internet, and
published a plan for a computer network called ARPANET in 1967. In October
1969, the first four nodes were established at the University of
California at Los Angeles, the Stanford Research Institute, the University
of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah.
The potential utility of computer networking was not lost on other
communities, and by the mid-1970s other computer networks began to spring
up at the Department of Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF, which funded
CS-NET), and throughout a variety of academic communities. These networks
were still largely incompatible until 1986, when ARPA and the NSF made
their networks interoperable using the ARPA- developed communication
protocol known as TCP/IP. The high-speed national links developed by the
National Science Foundation (NSFNET) became the national backbone for this
combined network, but it was still restricted to research and education;
commercial use was, in fact, prohibited. Security was not believed to be
an issue, since access was restricted to trusted users.
By 1990, the Internet had grown from 4 hosts to 300,000. The ARPANET
was formally shut down, and the NSF began to manage the Internet. In 1991,
liberalized restrictions on commercial use coupled with the growing
availability of personal computers fueled the explosive growth of the
Internet. In 1995, the Internet was privatized, and by January 2001, it
had grown almost twenty-fold to 109,574,429 hosts.1
Based on the nature of the Internet’s early evolution, however, security
was not a primary consideration in the design. Partly for that reason, the
Internet continues to provide many security challenges.
Increasing Public-Private Activity
In the near future, the Internet will be ubiquitous, transparent, and
integrated into everything we do. The benefits of this cheap, reliable
communication have been enormous. As the public and private sectors
continue to look for ways to take advantage of opportunities created by
the Internet, the interaction and activity between the two sectors will
continue to increase in ways that often obscure the ways in which we are
becoming dependent on it.
As a result of advances in information technologies, it is possible for
us to tie together infrastructure, data, and daily operations in ways not
possible before. Today, computer networks control the Nation’s powergrids,
natural gas pipelines, and transportation systems. Both Federal Express
and United Parcel Service, for example, depend upon computer networks to
get packages where they are going on time. U.S. industries design and
manufacture products on computer aided design/computer aided manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) systems (for example, Boeing designed the Boeing 777 in “virtual
space”). More than people realize, these systems and networks are all
interconnected on the Internet. The business sector, early on, recognized
the commercial potential of the information revolution and quickly made
the Internet a commercial medium. Although there have been some setbacks,
electronic commerce has a bright future; business-to-citizen revenues are
estimated at $96 billion in 2001, and business-to-business online revenues
at $448 billion, nearly double the previous year.
Most of the initial Internet-related efforts by Federal and state
governments were aimed at making information available to internal users
and to the citizens at large; the Federal Government, for example,
maintains approximately 100 million Web pages at 25,000 Federal sites. DOD
placed virtually all of its unclassified data online, including what was,
in hindsight, sensitive data, such as the floor plan of the home of the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the operational status of Air Force
wings; and unit personnel rosters. (DOD Web sites have since been
“sanitized” and are continuously monitored for sensitive data.)
Government has absorbed lessons from private industry (for example,
reengineering processes to reduce paperwork and delays can improve
performance and efficiency). As government use of the Internet has
broadened and become more sophisticated, so-called E-government is
booming. Both Federal and state agencies are actively migrating many
essential functions to the Internet. Agencies are now turning to the
Internet to provide interactive electronic public services. For example,
the Internal Revenue Service has a working presence online and is actively
encouraging taxpayers to get help and to file their returns online. In
2001, 28 percent of U.S. returns were filed electronically. Federal
employees are now able to access and manipulate their pension funds
online, and some can monitor and manage their pay online. In the near
future, we can expect that many other generally available services, such
as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, will be conducted primarily
online, offering citizens better service and improving agency
performance.
Additionally, agencies are turning increasingly to the Internet for
“paperless acquisition.” Since Federal, state, and local governments spend
approximately $550 billion annually on goods and services, there is
significant incentive for process improvements and savings. The Department
of Defense already has several mature electronic procurement sites,
including the DOD “E-MALL,” an initiative to provide a single entry-point
for DOD customers to find and acquire off-the-shelf goods and services,
such as information technology (IT) equipment, textiles, and training from
both the commercial marketplace and government sources. The E-MALL target
market is in excess of $4 billion annually. The Defense Medical Logistics
Standard Support (DMLSS) program is an integrated system to accommodate
the needs of the Armed Forces at the wholesale and retail levels for
medical logistics support. It relies on electronic commerce and Web-based
technology to speed delivery of pharmaceutical, medical, and surgical
items to customers, negating the need to stock large inventory at depots
and military treatment facilities. At the Great Lakes Naval Hospital, one
of the first sites online, inventory was cut from $3 million to $3,000
using DMLSS.
These examples illustrate the kinds of programs that the government is
migrating to the Internet to make available and integrate fully online as
many functions as possible with private citizens and private industry. Not
only as we expand our definition of national security interests,
particularly since September 11, to include financial security,
healthcare, education, and personal privacy but also as ownership of
critical IT infrastructures moves increasingly into private hands, it is
clear that the Internet will require a public-private partnership with a
high degree of collaboration to develop effective policy, goals,
objectives, and, especially, defenses against information warfare
attacks.
Growing Vulnerability
In the United States, we are blessed with wonderful geography
from a national security perspective; we have friendly countries to the
north and south and large oceans to the east and west. In the past, few
enemies have ever had the means to threaten our homeland seriously. So,
for most of our history, we have not had to worry about being attacked at
home. There was a 40-year period during the Cold War when Soviet bombers
and intercontinental ballistic missiles were poised to attack our cities,
but with the demise of the Soviet Union, the successes of strategic arms
reduction talks, and the warming of relations with Russia, we once again
felt safe. Recent terrorist attacks, however, have reminded us of our
physical vulnerability.
At the same time, we also are making the transition to the new
borderless geography in cyberspace. As we grow more dependent on the
Internet, its inherent vulnerabilities have put all of us—government,
military, industry, and citizens—at risk. The Internet was originally
designed to be open, based on the premise that users were known and
trustworthy. Security was not designed in from the beginning, so as the
Internet has evolved into the current global network of networks, we have
found it difficult to provide security for our data and transactions. The
rapid pace of technical innovation introduces unanticipated
vulnerabilities with every advance, and commercial software suppliers are
often more eager to get their new products out in the market than they are
anxious to assure their invulnerability.2
Our security planning, often based on the older models of mainframes or
well-defined networks within a single organization, have proved inadequate
for this new environment with its ever-increasing threat.
Shared Threat
Cyberspace tends to level the playing field between the entities in
that space and offers attackers many high-value, low-risk targets. The
threats can come from a hacker, an insider, a criminal, a terrorist, a
hostile nation-state, or even some combination of these. The motivations
can be equally diverse—mischief, theft, data collection, disruption of
operations, falsification of data. The threats, obviously, can be aimed
equally well against military or civilian targets. The weapons, with
innocuous-sounding names like worms, viruses, and even Trojan horses, are
themselves readily available on the Internet. Most important, the Internet
itself is a very attractive target.
Unlike physical break-ins, Internet attacks are easy. An attacker who
gets access to a Web site can roam around freely and from a safe distance.
Although in the past, a great deal of technical sophistication was
required to penetrate a computer network, attacks are now possible even by
much less well-informed adversaries; successful intruders share their
programs—often with “hacking for dummies” type scripts—enabling anyone to
duplicate their efforts.
Attackers can and do obfuscate who and where they are, making Internet
intrusions and attacks difficult to trace. Additionally, because the
Internet allows packets to flow easily across political, administrative,
and geographic boundaries, cooperation from many different entities, many
without a vested interest, may be required to trace an attack.
Consequently, attackers often operate (or appear to operate) from other
countries, and thus international cooperation is required to trace and
investigate attacks.
Internet attacks are low-risk: since the attackers do not need to be
physically present, the risk of identification is greatly reduced. Much of
the activity is often masked by legitimate or unrelated activity, and
because multiple jurisdictions may be involved, prosecution can be
difficult and sometimes impossible.
As a result of these factors, and in spite of increased awareness and
security measures, attempted penetrations of Internet sites are steadily
increasing. The number of incidents reported worldwide grew from
approximately 2,000 in 1997 to 21,756 in 2000. Fully 15,476 incidents had
been reported in the first half of 2001.3
Since this reporting is voluntary, these figures presumably understate the
actual number considerably and reflect merely the trends in the
numbers.
The Department of Defense
Hundreds, and more likely thousands, of attacks are attempted against
DOD systems and networks each week. DOD estimates that, in 2001 alone, it
was likely to face around 40,000 attempted attacks.4
Most of these are unsuccessful, but in 2000, 715 documented attacks were
reported that achieved varying degrees of success. Of course, many others
may have gone undetected.
ülthough the threat to and vulnerability of U.S. information systems
has been the focus of much discussion, DOD perception of the information
warfare threat has particularly been shaped by several real-world events.
In 1997, recognizing that the American information infrastructure was at
risk, DOD planned the first large-scale exercise to test Defense ability
to respond to a cyber attack on the national infrastructure, nicknamed
ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 97 (ER97).5
It was planned and executed by a team of National Security Agency (NSA)
computer specialists.6
Their role in the exercise was to play the adversary making a concerted
effort to hack into U.S. systems.7
The offensive team operated under many restrictions: they had to
conduct their attacks without violating any U.S. law; they could not take
advantage of any insider information or collateral intelligence; and they
could only use tools that could be claimed to be in an adversary’s hands
(all tools and techniques were based on unclassified, open-source data).
During the exercise, NSA specialists scripted attacks that would have
resulted in a series of rolling electricity blackouts and an overload of
the 911 emergency telephone service in Washington, DC, and a handful of
other cities. The potential for attack on the powergrid was demonstrated
by simulated attacks on the computerized sensing and control devices that
are commonly used in operating electrical, oil, gas, transportation, and
water treatment systems.8
Even with restrictions and a tight 3-month schedule, the exercise
demonstrated many weaknesses.9
It was clear that a dedicated and moderately sophisticated adversary with
modest resources could inflict considerable damage unless the target
systems were more effectively protected.10
In 1998, the United States was involved in a serious weapons inspection
crisis with Iraq, which was refusing to permit United Nations (UN)
inspectors unrestricted access. The United States, in addition to being
involved in the UN negotiations with Iraq, was preparing for possible
military strikes.11
Several cyberattacks—unauthorized intrusions into approximately six
military networks around the country—were picked up in the U.S. Air
Force’s Information Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas.12
Five hundred domain name servers were compromised. The attacks used the
same technique to exploit a vulnerability in the Sun Solaris operating
system. The intrusions were initially tracked to Abu Dhabi in the United
Arab Emirates.13
Under the circumstances, there was considerable concern about a major
asymmetric attack by Iraq or its sympathizers on logistics, medical, or
resource systems during the crisis period.14
The newly established National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)
coordinated a multiagency investigation into the attacks (code-named SOLAR
SUNRISE) that determined within a few more days that they were not the
work of Iraqi agents operating from the Middle East but were in fact
orchestrated by two California teenagers with the help of an Israeli citizen.15
The Department of Defense was still evaluating the implications of ER97
and the SOLAR SUNRISE investigation when, in January 1999, DOD, the
Department of Energy, military contractors, and civilian university
computer systems were attacked in the largest assault yet.16
Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense John
Hamre, stated: “We are at war right now. We are in a cyberwar.” Weldon
characterized these attacks as being in a different class from the
approximately 400 probes picked up each week: “These attacks are
organized, very capable efforts that have very specific goals, based upon
what we’ve seen.”17
The attacks, which apparently originated in Russia, began at a low
level in January and reportedly gained “root access” to certain systems.
The penetrations were on unclassified but nonpublic systems; they
apparently achieved no access to classified data. Nevertheless, the damage
could be significant because these unclassified systems often contain
useful and sensitive information.18
After 3 years of investigations and thousands of files stolen, the
evidence still points to Russia. James Adams, a consultant who serves on
the NSA Advisory Board, wrote in May 2001:
the assault has continued unabated....Despite all the investigative
effort, the United States still does not know who is behind the attacks,
what additional information has been taken and why; to what extent the
public and private sectors have been penetrated; and what else has been
left behind that could still damage the vulnerable networks.19
A more recent example was a malicious denial-of-service attack that
took place on July 19, 2001. According to the NIPC, Code Red, an Internet
worm, infected more than 250,000 Internet systems in just 9 hours;
Computer Economics, Inc., estimated over 1,000,000 infections worldwide.20
Code Red damaged sites by defacing Web pages; it also denied access to
certain Internet addresses by sending massive amounts of data, which
effectively shut down the addresses. As a result of the attacks, DOD was
forced to shut down its Web sites; the White House was forced to change
its Internet address; the Department of the Treasury Financial Management
System was infected and had to be disconnected from the Web; users of the
Qwest high-speed Internet service experienced outages nationwide; and the
Federal Express package-tracking system was infected, causing delivery
delays. The initial economic cost was estimated at over $2.4 billion in
costs associated with cleaning, inspecting, and patching servers, as well
as damage to productivity.
Shared Responsibilities
Public and private sectors are increasingly dependent on the Internet,
even with its many systematic vulnerabilities to a broad range of threats.
There is no question that defending against information warfare and
assuring unhampered access to the Internet is a responsibility shared by
both public and private sectors. The government has a clear responsibility
in the protection of information systems, especially where national
security is at stake. One of the Federal Government’s fundamental
responsibilities is to protect the Nation from all threats, foreign and
domestic, and this, of course, includes protection from threats to the
collective information systems that comprise the Internet. There are,
additionally, law enforcement responsibilities for protecting these
systems against terrorist threats and criminal activity. While attacks to
date have not caused devastating disruption, the potential for
catastrophic damage is significant. As the events of September 11
demonstrated, sometimes even the unimaginable is possible. Cyberterrorism
is clearly a growing and very real probability.21
The private sector, on the other hand, owns most of the information
infrastructure and develops most of the technology and software that
enable it. As a result of these factors, the shared public-private
responsibility of providing security to our information systems suffers
from a misalignment of authority, responsibility, and capability: “those
with authority to act often lack the capability, while those with the
capability to act often do not have the responsibility.”22
Directions for Solutions
As the way in which we use information and information systems
continues to evolve, it may be some time before the public and private
elements are correctly aligned. In the interim, if we are to improve
our capability against cyberattacks, we must do a much better job of
sharing information between the public and private sectors. First, having
information on threats and on actual incidents experienced by others can
help an organization better understand the risks that it faces and
determine what preventive measures should be implemented. Today’s nuisance
incidents may in fact be tests or probes for future attacks. Information
attacks cannot be launched blindly but, like any other weapon, must be
tested. In addition, urgent real-time warnings can help an organization
take immediate steps to mitigate an imminent attack. Finally, information
sharing and coordination after an attack are critical to facilitate
criminal investigations, which may cross many jurisdictional boundaries.
After-the-fact coordiaation will be essential to speed the recovery from a
devastating attack, should one ever occur.
The government has recognized its central role in this
information-sharing function and has several developing efforts. At the
Federal level, for example, the National Infrastructure Protection Center,
located at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), was established to
serve as a focal point in the Federal Government for gathering information
on threats, as well as to facilitate and coordinate responses to incidents
affecting key infrastructures. It is also charged with issuing attack
warnings to private-sector and government entities, as well as alerts
about changes in threat conditions. The National Institute of Standards
and Technology is building a database containing detailed information on
computer attacks. The Federal Government also sponsors the Computer
Emergency Response Team Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon University,
which studies Internet security vulnerabilities, handles computer security
incidents, publishes security alerts, researches long-term changes in
networked systems, and develops information and training. Early in 2001,
the Department of Commerce sponsored the formation of a private-sector
nonprofit alliance, the Information Technology Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (IT-ISAC). Its mission is to exchange information on
potential and known threats and vulnerabilities for the information sector
and sharing that information with Federal law enforcement. (It joins
existing ISACs for the energy, financial services, transportation, and
telecommunications sectors.) IT-ISAC has 19 members so far, including
major corporations, such as AT&T, IBM, Cisco, and Microsoft. President
George W. Bush has appointed Richard Clarke as a special adviser to work
with Governor Tom Ridge in the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate
the protection of the Nation’s computer infrastructure.
One of the key elements to the success of information-sharing
partnerships is developing trusted relationships among the broad range of
stakeholders involved with providing information assurance, including the
public and Internet community at large, law enforcement, government
agencies, the intelligence community, providers of network and other key
infrastructure services, technology and security product developers,
incident response teams, and international standard-setting bodies.
Information sharing must be seen as equitable, and it must provide value
over and above the costs that it imposes. There are some real and
perceived industry concerns that range from antitrust issues of sharing
information with industry partners to subjecting information to Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) disclosures. Inadvertent releases of trade secrets
or proprietary information are a concern because they could damage
reputations, lower consumer confidence, and hurt competitiveness. Sharing
information with law enforcement could result in costly compliance with
strict rules for preserving the integrity of evidence. The government is
reluctant to share classified information, even though it could be of
value to the private sector in deterring or thwarting electronic
intrusions and information attacks. This is particularly the case with any
potential offensive tools and techniques, which are extremely sensitive
from a national security perspective but are, of course, necessary for
effective testing of defensive capabilities. The government clearly must
work with industry to develop mechanisms to overcome each of these
impediments.
Specific Recommendations
Some useful actions to decrease U.S. vulnerability to information
warfare include the following: First, we need to have meaningful
information sharing, and for this, we must develop standard definitions
and terminology for use throughout the government and industry. A clear
understanding of what is meant by an attack and how to categorize
an incident will be essential to enable faster and more efficient
reporting, responding, and remediation. Distinguishing between an incident
that is classified as criminal and one that is a national security threat
will help determine the type and timeframe of the response. We may, for
example, choose to let potential criminal activity proceed to gather
evidence but may need to react immediately to a national security
attack.
Second, we need to overcome information-sharing roadblocks. Information
sharing between the government and private sector remains a vitally
important yet elusive goal. Among the several Federal Government
initiatives, its primary focus is with the NIPC, which is housed within
the FBI and has a decided emphasis on criminal investigation. This creates
a problem within the government since it puts the FBI in a position to
decide what information other agencies need to see. Industry, to say
nothing of any international partners, will also naturally be reluctant to
report incidents to the FBI. Another source of private-sector
reluctance to share information with the government is the requirements
imposed on government by FOIA.23
To facilitate uninhibited information exchange and protect competitive
positions, sensitive industry data needs to be exempted from FOIA
requirements. Other models for collection and dissemination of
vulnerability and threat information—for example, a single nonprofit
information clearinghouse—should be explored and developed.
Finally, government needs to develop mechanisms to share sensitive and
perhaps even classified threat data about pending attacks with industry
partners, both domestic and international. This will help ensure that all
information is available to those entities that are best equipped to
mitigate the impact. Government must be willing to share all appropriate
information in response to industry concerns if it hopes to overcome the
hurdles to achieving a mutually beneficial partnership.
Although improving organizational information sharing can significantly
improve our ability to defend against an IW attack in the near term, there
are still many technical challenges to providing security and assurance
within a distributed information environment. Our goal should be to create
an Internet infrastructure that is highly automated, adaptive, and
resilient to all types of attacks. An obvious first step is to improve the
overall quality of software security. Identifying products with easily
exploitable vulnerabilities and preventing them from being widely used
will reduce the more pedestrian attacks. Incentives should be created for
firms to improve the attention and resources that they devote to enhancing
their software and system protections; this suggests a useful role for
government managers and buyers, and even more for senior industrial
managers and buyers.24
In addition, there are technologies that could, if properly developed,
be useful in resisting and responding to inevitable cyberattacks. Among
those that merit increased attention are some in the area of intelligence
gathering. We should be developing tools that allow us to take the
initiative to gain insight into the capabilities and intentions of
potential adversaries. For example, it would be quite useful to have an
active software agent, using secure mobile code, that could monitor and
collect information on hostile entities in order to provide early warning
of attack. We currently have difficulty identifying novel attack patterns,
especially against the Internet’s widely distributed network. Insiders
pose a particular threat to all information systems; therefore, developing
systems to automate the processes of detecting, identifying, and analyzing
novel attack patterns and anomalous behavior would improve our ability to
provide warnings and reduce false alarms.
Opportunities for disruption will only increase as the complexity of
the Internet networks increases. We need to continue research and
development to guard against unknown attacks and to protect against
systems with unknown flaws. We need to develop automated mechanisms to
detect and nullify malicious codes that may be left behind in an
undetected attack. We have designed many fault-tolerant systems to cope
with naturally occurring faults and failures, and we need to extend these
capabilities to develop networks that are resistant to insertion of
intentional faults and to denial-of-service attacks conducted by
adversaries. Present capabilities for detecting large-scale intrusions
against multiple systems are limited. We need to accelerate the
development of an advanced intrusion detection capability that can fuse
and correlate information from distributed sensors.
Even with an adequate warning system and good defenses, some attacks
will be successful. Thus, we need to have the technology in place to
address the consequences of these attacks. We need to be able to assess
systems quickly and answer important questions: Was something done to the
system? If so, what was done? Is the system okay? What is the reliability
of the data? When we understand the answers to these questions, we need to
be able to move quickly to restore user trust in the system. If a system
has been attacked successfully, we need to be able to recover quickly from
the attack, bring the system back to full performance, and take corrective
action so that it will not be susceptible to a similar attack.
This discussion has focused on information-sharing processes and
technology, but we should also recognize that one of the most critical
elements in any comprehensive defense against an information warfare
attack is the people who use and operate our systems. Whatever else we do,
we must develop a continuing program to promote understanding of security
policies and controls and of the risks that prompted their adoption.
Better understanding of the risks will allow executives to make more
informed decisions regarding the resources required to protect their
systems. The first line of defense is the system user, who must understand
the importance of complying with policies and controls.
One of the most effective ways for both the private and public sector
to assure secure systems is to conduct frequent red team attacks on their
own systems. Skilled attackers can test the vulnerabilities of systems and
fix them before someone else finds them. While many in the private and
public sector have a reluctance to test their own systems, the return on
investment here is extremely worthwhile.
Conclusion
While this discussion has focused on the illustrative case of the
Internet, its expansion to other systems—both military and civilian—is
obvious. Today, we know that 20 foreign nations are developing information
warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities for use against U.S. military
and private sector networks; numerous terrorist networks have similarly
recognized the potential of these “weapons of mass disruption” and have
begun to exploit them. Of course, the United States can also take full
advantage of the offensive military potential of information warfare to
broaden its military options and capabilities. However, as a military
force and as a civil society, the United States is already the world’s
most dependent on information systems, and we are moving more and more in
that direction. As we transform our forces and our society in the
information age, we become ever more vulnerable. Thus, we have a very real
requirement to address our information systems vulnerabilities before it
is too late.
Notes
- 1. Based on data
from the Internet Software Consortium. A host denotes a single
machine on the Internet. However, the definition has changed in recent
years due to “virtual hosting,” in which a single machine acts like
multiple systems (and has multiple domain names and IP addresses).
Ideally, a virtual host will act and look exactly like a regular host,
so they are counted equally. For the research above, and in many other
areas of this chapter, the author is deeply indebted to the assistance
of William Lucyshyn. [BACK]
- 2. Moreover,
to lower costs, many software firms now go offshore for their
programming, further raising the chance of vulnerability. [BACK]
-
- 3. Statistics are
from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center at
Carnegie Mellon University. [BACK]
-
- 4. D.A. Fulghum and R.
Wall, Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 5, 2001, 26.
[BACK]
5. John J. Hamre,
Congressional testimony, February 23, 1998. [BACK]
6. Bradley Graham,
“Hackers, Simulation, Expose Vulnerability,” The Washington
Post, May 24, 1998, A1. [BACK]
7. Stephen Green, “Pentagon Giving
Cyberwarfare High Priority,” Copley News Service, December 21, 1999. [BACK]
8. Graham. [BACK]
9. Goss. [BACK]
10. Kenneth Minihan,
Statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing on
Vulnerabilities of the National Information Infrastructure, June 24,
1998. [BACK]
11. “Prospect against
Iraq Prompts Demonstrations,” The Washington Post, February 15,
1998, A31. [BACK]
12. Graham. [BACK]
13. Gregory L. Vistica
and Evan Thomas, “The Secret Hacker Wars,” Newsweek, June 1,
1998, 60. [BACK]
14. Protecting the
Homeland, 2. [BACK]
15. Michael A. Vatis,
Statement for the Record on the National Infrastructure Protection
Center before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Subcommittee on
Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 1, 2000. [BACK]
16. Gregory L. Vistica,
“We’re in the Middle of a Cyberwar,” Newsweek, September 20,
1999, 52. [BACK]
17. John Donnelly and
Vince Crawley, “Hamre to Hill: ‘We’re in a Cyberwar,’” Defense
Week, March 1, 1999. [BACK]
18. Vistica. [BACK]
19. James Adams,
“Virtual Defense,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 3 (May-June 2001), 98.
[BACK]
20. A worm is an
attack that propagates itself through networks without any user
intervention or interaction. [BACK]
21. See Mike Toner,
“Cyberterrorism Danger Lurking,” The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, November 4, 2001, A4. [BACK]
22. Arnaud de
Borchgrave, Frank J. Cillufo, Sharon L. Cardash, and Michele M.
Ledgerwood, Cyber Threats and Information Security: Meeting the
21st Century Challenge, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 2000, 4. [BACK]
23. The Freedom of
Information Act guarantees that the public has a right of access to
Federal records and that these records must be made available to the
public, unless specifically exempt from public release. [BACK]
24. In early 2002, the
U.S. Air Force explicitly began to address this issue with suppliers.
See Byron Acohido, “Air Force Seeks Better Security from Microsoft,”
USA Today, March 11, 2002, 3B. [BACK]
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