

Marketing Terror: Effects of Anti-Messaging on GSPC Recruitment

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Introduction

Following the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. policymakers have become concerned with America's image throughout the Muslim world. A large part of that image is affected by the messages delivered through media or other means of communication. Some speculation has been made that the perception of U.S. policy around the world has contributed to the rise and fall of different terrorist organizations. Groups such as *al-Qaeda*, the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad and *Jema'at Islami* have drawn on anti-American rhetoric in order to reinforce their members' commitment to the cause. Many U.S. scholars and policy strategists have reinforced the importance of delivering a message that welcomes tolerance and shuns extremism whereby creating a more favorable view of the United States throughout the Islamic world.

One particular terror organization that has come under scrutiny more recently has been the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), an Algerian-based Islamist guerrilla group that has been fighting to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state. Some experts have opined that by reaching out to *al-Qaeda*, the group is attempting to siphon resources such as money and membership from bin Laden's group in order to sustain its growth in Algeria. Another important source of potential recruits has been the Maghrebian Diaspora throughout Europe.

Terrorist recruitment has come under intense scrutiny by counter-terrorism experts throughout the world. Recruitment is conducted in numerous ways, but for this project we were primarily concerned with those that effect a given population in Algeria or among the North African immigrant Diaspora in France. Our agent-based model focused on levels of perceived government legitimacy and the effect of narratives and counter-narratives on the potential recruit. Countering recruitment efforts benefits the counter-terrorist by reducing the pool of potential members which can populate the terror group and help to promulgate violence. It may not be a silver bullet for ending violent extremism, but is an invaluable tool in the fight against terror.

Messages can be delivered to a target in a variety of ways: media (television, radio, print, movies), personal (familial, friend, or social networks), religious (spiritual advisors/students, prayer groups, newsletters or proselytizing), and through education (textbooks, curricula, student/teacher

relationships). Logic states that if a message can impact or possibly increase membership in an organization, anti-messaging (for example, delivering a message counter to that which is being communicated) may also impact and decrease membership in an organization. One area of study that records the effect of positive or negative messaging on a population has been advertising and marketing strategy. American advertisers have been using framing strategies, narratives, symbols and behavior-influencing messages throughout the history of marketing and have created a public battle space in which companies fight a war of words seeking to credit their own product while simultaneously discrediting others. The same psychology of marketing products can be applied to terrorist marketing strategies. Both business advertisers and terrorist group recruiters seek to gain more individuals who are willing to buy their "product," and more importantly who would be willing to market that product on their behalf. The goal: more customers, more committed and motivated buyers of the product which translates for the businessman to more capital, and for the terrorist, more "believers" from which to choose from for operations.

One way terrorist groups recruit members is to provide the opportunity for the person to belong to an affinity group who gives the member a sense of common identity and purpose.^[1] To entice the member to their group they must craft and deliver an effective message. The message must be packaged (framed) in a way that will be acceptable to the audience, which will resonate significantly with their target population and deliver the results they are looking for. Advertising takes money and a savvy message architect. Terror recruitment strategies are no different. In order to bring a recruit from sympathetic-uncommitted to dedicated-committed takes a breadth and depth of knowledge in message manipulation and persuasive strategies. Advertisers want their audience to feel that if they buy their product, they will have immediate gratification. Similarly, terrorist recruiters sell the idea that by acting on behalf of their group, members will receive immediate satisfaction that something is being done to relieve their frustration. There are many parallels between advertising strategy and terrorist recruitment. Terrorism is a business in itself; some groups are highly organized, hierarchical, with a stated mission and values. They advertise using media and relationships and seek to transmit their message to those willing to buy the product they offer, belonging to an organization with higher goals and purposes that they could not achieve on their own.

This project is important because it examines one strategy to counteract terror recruitment efforts for the GSPC. To prevent the group from reaching the growth stage, U.S. counter-terror organizations will be able to fight a battle within a media or social battle space and without resorting to any physical violence. With U.S. troops committed to a war in Iraq, it is even more difficult to apply kinetic anti-terror efforts on a large scale. A strong counter-messaging campaign can be waged successfully with the results being a significantly smaller pool of potential recruits for the GSPC and a blow to the credibility of the organization. The GSPC may be on the decline, but that trend can be reversed if they are able to sell their vision to a group of disaffected youth that are searching for a path that allows them to reclaim their pride and commit to a cause worthy of their time and energy.^[2]

More attention has been paid to the European Muslim immigrant population after a series of riots were conducted in and around Paris. The protests occurred after two Muslim boys were electrocuted attempting to outrun police who were investigating a break in. The North African communities near Seine Saint Denis and Hauts-de-Seine became scenes of desperation after violence erupted and cars were burned resulting in the arrest of 258 people.^[3] Terror recruiters have an advantage within the Diaspora. The GSPC has a cultural bye when it comes to the immigrant population. The different pockets of Maghrebian immigrants have formed identity "hubs" where those North African immigrants that feel displaced can congregate and feel welcomed and more "at home." Between the GSPC and al-Qaeda is the danger of diffusion or the movement of ideas, practices and frames from one country to another, in this case, from North Africa to Europe. Another danger in the groups' alliance is the possibility of transnational collective action, "a coordinated international campaign against international actors, other states or international institutions."^[4] If GSPC and al-Qaeda become partners in more than name-only,

GSPC will be able to expand their field of vision for recruits and help to produce transnational identities.[5]

There are four primary questions we sought answers to with this project. First, using social mobilization theory, specifically framing strategies and narrative exploitation, we explore trends of message resonance among potential GSPC recruits in Algeria and among the Maghrebian Diaspora in France. We wanted to find out what reaction (positive, negative or neutral) the message receivers had after being subjected to the GSPC's recruitment efforts. We observed how long it will take for the message to be effective (effective being defined as joining rates for GSPC) and to discover if there is a point at which the message creates a saturation effect and repels potential recruits. In a similar vein, we investigated counter-narrative (anti-messaging) strategies and their impact on preventing potential recruits from joining the group. Finally, we questioned whether using effective advertising and marketing strategies would affect the recruitment rate of the group.

This paper is organized into five parts. First, we present social mobilization theory (framing strategies in particular), the psychology of advertising and marketing and terrorist recruitment. Second, we explore the GSPC organization in particular and discuss the recruitment strategies and targeting analysis used by the group in order to acquire committed joiners. Third, we present and explore our agent based model creating a pseudo-environment that applies inputs representing messages and anti-messages on an artificial population programmed with certain levels of receptivity based on perceptions of legitimacy for the given government (Algeria and France respectively) and the impact of messaging by GSPC recruiters and anti-messaging by the two governments. Next we discuss the results of the model and present a carefully constructed argument from the outcome that will contain recommendations for future policies and strategies in countering recruitment efforts by the group. These recommendations may be applicable to other anti-terrorism efforts for different terror groups around the world. Finally, we make other research recommendations and conclude our paper.

Part I: Framing, Narratives, Symbols and Advertising Strategy

In order to explore the question of framing strategies employed by the GSPC, it is important to review the concept of framing using symbols, emotions and narratives, and explore the implications on the success or failure of a terrorist group's recruitment methods. Framing is a vital component of the recruiting equation. It allows for the recruiter to use culturally familiar words, symbols or narratives (stories) targeting the potential recruit which resonates and incites an emotional reaction that subsequently opens the door for a future relationship based on common opinions, ideologies and eventually trust. Frames, similar to metaphors delineate different ways of thinking about political issues.[6] Social movement scholars David Snow and Robert Benford define a frame as, "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment." [7] The two scholars cite three types of framing as necessary for successful recruitment: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. Diagnostic framing aims to persuade potential recruits that a problem exists and need to be addressed, prognostic framing presents strategies, tactics and targets and motivational framing convinces them to take action.[8]

Framing can include narratives (stories, myths), symbols (religious, political, personal) or slogans (bumper stickers, jingles, songs). The narratives used in framing are very important to examine. "Narrative fidelity" has been a concept applied to cultural resonance of the stories, myths, folk tales that are part of the sender or receiver's heritage and serve to create a lens through which current events and activities can create meaning in the present.[9] Frames serve to prove or refute claims made by the opposition and can be manipulated to distort messages and stir emotion. Framing allows the bridging between individuals who construct meaning and socio-

cultural process that present meaning that are often contested.[10] Framing becomes a connection between cognition and culture.[11]

For our research project, it is fundamentally important to understand the narratives that buttress the *salafi* cause and which are transmitted to each potential foot soldier and member of the organization. The problem is not in the transmission of the message *per se*, but in the acceptance and identification with that message by the recipient. The authors suggest that by understanding the stories the terrorists tell, countering the terrorist group's genesis, growth, maturation and transformation will become easier to undermine and eventually disrupt or defeat them.[12] Weaving together myths and incorporating them into the recruitment strategy of GSPC will allow for a wider reach and greater probability for success in order to secure membership for their organization.

Why Frame?

The purpose of framing is ultimately to foster and grow support for a cause or movement. In the case of the GSPC, or other *salafi* group, framing is a strategy used to entice new members into the group and to keep them there. The concept of strategic framing of grievances is linked hand in glove with susceptibility to movement participation and even more intimately with efforts to keep participants committed during the group's growth, maturation and eventual transformation.[13] Social movement scholar Jorge Cadena-Roa opines that framing concepts allow us to empirically examine the process through which a given objective situation is defined and experienced.[14]

The other half to the framing strategy is the level of resonance that the frame has with its audience. Cultural resonance is defined as, "understanding how a movement frame is shaped by and in turn shapes the cultural environment." [15] A perfectly good frame can be completely useless if it has no effect on the audience. Therefore, resonance is extremely important in framing strategies. Snow and Benford presented three conditions for frame resonance: empirical credibility, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity, in other words, "the fit between the frames and previous beliefs, life experiences, or cultural narratives." [16] If the researcher understands what resonates and what does not, they can understand how message receivers process movement frames (and anticipate reactions to frame alignments). This fact also applies to the use of symbols, emotions and narratives. Symbols provide meaning to an interaction with different actors. The recruiter must ensure that his message is received by his target audience and that positive action results (membership in the organization rises). If one frame is not successful, a movement may undergo what is termed a "frame alignment process." These processes allow movement activists to produce and shape the motivations and rationale for mobilization and to adjust the frames to counter those offered by an opposition. [17] A narrative, story or myth has a cultural resonance that carries familiarity and some sense of shared meaning and value.

Charles Tilly, a renowned social movement theorist, opined that social movements choose certain strategies and tactics based on a "repertoire" of collective action. [18] Repertoire is the broad cultural interpretation of when and why people choose certain methods of resistance (protest, violence, picketing etc). It is the, "'toolkit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action.'" [19] The repertoire can constrain certain actions of a group, but it can also contain ideological and cultural expressions including rhetorics and symbols. [20] The right repertoire can create a sense of legitimacy for the movement and allow for limited participation in politics. The meanings and interpretations for certain symbols or cue words can change over time. What resonated twenty, thirty or even fifty years ago may not resonate today.

The concept of "culture" is contested among social scientists. For this project, we will refer to the definition of culture provided by Ann Swidler of Stanford University, "...culture consists of such

symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as language, gossip, stories and rituals of daily life.”[21] Conglomerations of culture can mesh with themes of collective identity, an individual’s “cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation which may be imagined rather than experienced directly.”[22] Collective identities are expressed in cultural mores such as narratives, symbols, rituals, clothing and speaking styles and reflect positive feelings among members of the group.[23] If we apply this to the situation in Algeria, a dominant secular government has limited political access to Islamist groups such as the GSPC which has created an alternative collective identity that has become opposition to the current government in power. Islamic identity is transcribed to most members of the GSPC as a commitment to stricter tenets of the faith, particular Islamic dress and a more streamlined identity as one of the “faithful.” Similarly, in France, a large portion of the Maghrebian immigrant Diaspora has been treated as an “other” (with respect to the indigenous French population) so has strengthened its collective identity in order to face the discrimination and repression of the French government. Political hot-button issues such as the French public school banning of the *hijab*, an optional head covering worn by Muslim women have become powerful rhetoric and narratives among the Islamist groups in Europe and abroad. Certain Islamist groups have seen this as a threat to their unalienable religious rights and have crafted innovative messaging strategies to present the issue as an affront to Muslims everywhere. In this case, the debate over the *hijab* has ceased becoming one over an individual female’s right to choose modesty into a global battle over religious expression. Circles of collective identity have expanded even further into the political and social spheres and have created fodder for terror organizations to justify targeting French or European political institutions. It is important to understand issues of collective identity as they relate to frames because some frames overlap and spill into collective identities that may be larger than a local group or gender.

Symbols

Symbols provide another useful tool in the framing toolkit. Symbols represent something that has broader meaning. The use of a symbol requires familiarity with the target culture in order to gain maximum output from its use. Terror groups will often fashion flags, patches or other identification badges which contain symbols. Some have religious meaning, others a more war-like schema and some a slogan or motto. Each symbol has a particular meaning to the group and provides a label for which the group’s identity can perpetuate group solidarity.[24] As humans grow, they form complex concepts out of their experiences which are carried as patterns of ideas and feelings which are aroused when the “real” thing is met or referred to.[25] Symbols can be something as simple as a shape, animal, clothing or alphabetical. The important part of this concept is that they ignite a particular meaning for a particular person.

Some activities can become symbols for action. For example, in Mexico, the athletic event of wrestling represents a broader meaning of suffering, defeat and justice.[26] The clothing, masks, shaved hair and struggle between “good and evil” play out on the wrestling mat. Rebecca Klatch, a social movement scholar, describes two categories of symbols: the meaning and the master. The meaning is the positive role that symbols play in society and the master is the use of symbols in manipulation.[27] Klatch asserts that symbols’ effectiveness is not inherent in their existence, *per se*, but is important because of the action they inspire and act as glue to bind the group together.

Symbols are primarily meaningful for those who are part of the in-group (those members who align behind symbols and are recognized and accepted among membership). Meaning, in itself can only be ascribed by those who recognize the cultural validity and internal resonance of the symbol. It is an “internal experience, not open to external observation.”[28] This is where the counter-terrorist who stands outside of the in-group and who desires to affect the happenings of the in-group has the most difficulty. It would follow that symbols are the prerogative of the in-

group and are more of use as an interpretive tool rather than a kinetic method to incite change of a target group.

Contesting Frames and Countering Narratives

Mayer N. Zald, a well-known scholar on social movements, asserts that framing can be a strategic activity.^[29] Frames are continually opposed and contested by competing groups and governments. Competing frames are used to counter messages and frames imposed by opposition groups. Slogans, symbols and messages are manipulated, twisted and projected onto an audience in hopes that they will do more than just bounce off. Frames are used to get in between the cracks of a culture and seep into the minds of potential followers. Within framing competitions, groups battle to gain the loyalty and commitment of a particular group. One by-product of the framing process is the intention to vindicate the righteousness of a cause.^[30] Groups do not only have to contest with governments or other, external organizations, but can also compete within their own faction. For example, during the split of the GIA and GSPC, the GSPC opposed the killing of civilians and in order to entice GIA's loyalists, they enhanced the religious obligations of not killing innocent people. Some level of competition had to occur between the two groups in order to segregate followers into those who supported the GIA and those that supported the GSPC. Different movements have different goals. There are often numerous actors pursuing different strategies simultaneously. The terror organization which can communicate its goals in such a way as to inspire action will be more visible and gain more credibility which it can translate into framing capital. The use of "collective action frames" describes people as "potential agents of their own history," and gives them the opportunity to make a difference.^[31]

Just as opposing groups use contesting frames in order to usurp the influence of the other, the use of counter narratives also provides a possible arrow in the counter-terrorist's quiver. In order to use counter narratives a grasp on cultural norms, stories, myths and folktales are required. To counter the *salafi* narrative, one must become fluent in the writings and tales of those who are considered experts and mentors in the field.^[32] Writers such as: Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Ibn Tamiya, and Sayyid Mawdudi have influenced *salafi* groups and helped to shape ideologies that guide terror groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jama'at Islami and al-Qaeda. It is important to be aware of the messages and narratives that are coming into the terror group in order to develop an effective counter-strategy.

According to Eric Hoffer in his book *The True Believer*, mass movements inspire a readiness to die in their adherents and an opportunity for united action while simultaneously demanding blind faith and single-hearted allegiance.^[33] Mass movements are encouraged by a desire for change. Enthusiasm is generated through societal forces such as religion, revolutionary or nationalist movements. Hoffer sees a fallacy in the effectiveness of propaganda on a mass movement. On its own, propaganda cannot force itself on the unwilling recipient, cannot create something fundamentally new and maintaining committed believers.^[34] To create counter-narratives and counter-framing strategies, one must be intimately familiar with the culture and symbols of a particular target group as well as fluent in the movement structure and motivational buttressing created by movement leaders. The counter-terror agent must become adept at manipulating and transmitting messages which resonate among a population.

Advertising and Marketing Strategy

The goal in both advertising and recruiting is to collectively motivate a target to buy or participate in the supply and demand process. Advertising and recruiting revolve around the delivery of a message or promotion of an idea, good or service. Edward L. Brink and William T. Kelley define promotion as, "the coordination of all seller-initiated efforts to set up channels of information and persuasion to facilitate the sale of a good or service, or the acceptance of an idea."^[35] A

marketing plan is created and implemented in order to mold demand in an advantageous manner to the firm or agency within the economic context and anticipated actions and reactions of competitors (or anti-terrorism agents).[36] The primary challenge to both the marketer and the terror recruiter becomes how to reinforce behavior that facilitates buying a product or joining a group and steering the buyer or recruit away from competitors or government authority figures.

The consumer (recruit) is faced with the options of buying (joining) decisions and must rely on brand names as a “shorthand expression of perceived values-values which often reflect the attitudes of the social group to which the buyer belongs or aspires.”[37] Applying this to the multitude of terror organizations which exist in the world today, the potential recruit is faced with joining possibilities to numerous organizations; they will most often choose to join the group which reflects the values of the social group to which they belong. This brings in the earlier personal network concept and reiterates the importance of gaining a foothold within the close-knit social network that shapes the value system of the recruit.

The importance of advertising in a particular cultural setting impacts the buying behavior of a given population in society. Irving S. White, an advertising strategy scholar asserted that, “advertising is only one of the several sources of stimulation that a product contains for the individual in society. The influences of culture and of private sensations modify and intermingle with the stimuli of advertising to achieve the final pattern of relationship between the seller’s product (or ideas and services) and the consumer.”[38] Products and ideas possess their own cultural contexts and they vary between one culture and another. Ideas generated and processed within one culture may not sell well outside of that given culture. The cultural contexts provide a set of meanings and the consumer begins labeling products and ideas with good, bad or neutral expectations based on these meanings.[39] Terror recruiters sell the image of their organization just as an advertiser sells the reputation of his brand. The image of the brand lends predictability and stability to the consumer’s relationship with the product which allows him to experience the aspects of the product that he values.[40] Branding allows for a consumer or recruit to buy the perceived values or meanings of the brand (organization) as well as the obvious benefits of owning a product or being a member of a group. The choice to buy or join comes down to a customer’s or recruit’s decision not about notions people have about a brand or what a group is “really” like, but contributes to them determining whether or not the brand is the one, “for me.”[41]

The Audience

The type of audience has an effect on the way a product is promoted and influences choices made by recruiters or advertisers on approach methods. The immense number of potential buyers or joiners to a terror organization requires access to large-scale communication systems such as mass media. Communication is key to marketing. Lessons of communication in the advertising (and recruiting) process are important for anti-terrorist agencies to heed. The communication process consists of a source, a message and a receiver. The process begins when the source decides he wants to get an idea or message “across” into a form for transmittal. He must encode that message into symbols such as words, gestures or pictures that his audience will understand. This works the same for terror organizations.[42] The communication process includes both encoding and decoding. Encoding is primarily accomplished by the message giver and decoding by the message receiver. The outcome of the message delivery depends on the ability of the receiver to decode the message. The outcome is also termed feedback. The communication process is successful only if four steps are accomplished, “getting the attention of the receiver, employing symbols which the receiver can understand in a sufficiently unambiguous manner, arousing needs in the receiver, and suggesting a solution which is compatible with the situation in which the receiver finds himself.”[43]

Communication can be conducted through various means as we discussed earlier. Face-to-face communication is more personal and can create a more reliable feedback process. “Communication is the essence of promotion and exists only to the extent that the sender and the

receiver of the message are in tune with each other.”[44] The success of a message often hinges on its ability to reinforce predispositions of an audience, his attitudes, values and goals.[45] An audience does not consist of passive receptors, but adjust their attitudes and availability schedule based on information they want or don't want.[46] One aspect of marketing to an audience consists of targeting or market segmentation. Market segmentation is the process by which a market is divided into groups of people who will react to marketing efforts in reasonably similar manners.[47] Segmentation is made based off demographics or predicted success or failure in a particular aspect of the market. Geographical speculation is not a successful segmentation strategy on its own, but combined with social class can narrow down target audiences.[48]

Cultural groupings are important to advertisers and recruiters. Different societies have different cultural patterns. One particular challenge for the counter-terrorist from a different culture is balancing cultural similarity and cultural diversity, both powerful forces that lend stability and tension to a society. “The ‘in group’ fosters feelings of security in belonging, in knowing the ‘right’ things to do and how to do them. The ‘out group’ is threatening since it is hard to understand and might try to destroy ones’ own ways. Its meanings can be misinterpreted.”[49] The way an audience perceives itself will predict the resonance of a particular message. The “self definition” of the audience will allow the audience to screen messages and determine if they are suitable for them.[50] Market segments are active, seeking, screening, assessing and initiating.[51]

Group membership will influence the receptivity of a message. An individual's behavior is an intersection of sets of behavior found in subject groups. Members of the group share certain features, some formal, some informal. Understanding the similarities found within a group gives clues to the nature of the members and what they get out of participating in the group.[52] These clues are important to the advertiser or counter-terrorist in order to understand what motivates potential recruits to join a terror organization and what need or desire that it fulfills. Understanding the complex set of cognitive reasons for joining can allow the counter-terrorist to unravel the cues that allow him to influence or prevent the recruit from joining in the first place. Being cognizant of peer-to-peer relationships and associations are important as well.

The Source

Although consumers choose to buy products based on individual product performance, some buying choices are affected by the reputation of the marketer (source). The more credibility retained by a source, the more persuasion is facilitated.[53] The same idea holds true for levels of perceived government legitimacy and the impact of government-sponsored messages. A highly credible source can be a powerful force in changing opinion. Those sources thought of as highly credible are often perceived as “fair” and “justified” in their conclusions rather than low-credibility sources.[54] This conclusion can change, however, when over time, audiences begin to dissociate source and message content.[55]

Counter-terrorist agents often want to know the best way to influence or alter the perceptions, opinions or actions of a target. Ideally, the absorption of the anti-terror message includes the adoption of opinions similar to the counter-terrorist. The adoption process contains five stages: awareness, interest, evaluation, trial and adoption.[56] The awareness stage is when the individual is aware of the new opinion but is not motivated to seek out any additional information about it. The interest stage is when the individual is sufficiently interested in the new idea and want to seek out further information about it. During the evaluation stage an individual decides whether or not to try the idea out. It is here he decides whether or not the product or idea is “for me.” The trial stage is where the individual tries the product or idea on a small scale in order to decide whether it meets his need and to determine whether or not they want to move to full adoption. Finally, the adoption stage is when the individual makes the decision to completely adopt the idea or use the product. Of the four sources of transmitting messages, the impersonal networks (using the mass media) are the most important in creating awareness but personal (face-to-face) sources are the most important during the evaluative stage.[57]

The Message

A message is defined as, “any sign or signal that can be interpreted in a meaningful way, or the summation of signs relating to the communication of one or more ideas; a printed ad, a television commercial, or a sales presentation.”^[58] Recall that a message must be encoded before it can be sent. Senders encode, or frame, a message in a way that can be decoded or interpreted by an audience in a manner that will inspire action. Both the sender and receiver can only encode and decode in terms of the experience each has had.^[59]

Messages are framed strategically to impact a particular audience. The frame can be adjusted according to the make-up of the audience. Advertisers strategically market messages to particular audiences by making assumptions about their audience before they start. Terror recruiters make the same assumptions. To gauge an audience, advertisers or recruiters must understand four factors.^[60] First, they must identify the specific groups to be addressed. Narrowing down a target audience helps to determine the trajectory of the message. This may not be an easy decision to make because the advertiser or recruiter naturally wants to get as many buyers or recruits as possible and subsequently wants to target the largest number of audience members as possible. Second, they must understand the characteristics of the audience which includes an evaluation of relevant needs and goals. Third, they should have a grasp on the present state of knowledge in the desired audience. For religious terror recruiters this means that using grand religious rhetoric may not resonate with a population that has not been immersed in a religious upbringing. If the audience does not understand the frame, it won't resonate. Finally, advertisers and recruiters must recognize the audience's position relative to the product. They must have a strategy to depict their group or product as something new, better and more improved than other alternatives. The message sender must be aware of how much knowledge their audience already has about their product or group.

Messages must be specific enough to communicate a clear message. If they are too ambiguous, the receiver will interpret the message based on their own personal cultural wiring and could create expectations or stereotypes based on previous life experiences. This is why, for the counter-terror agent, it is very important to keep a message specific and focused; the more ambiguous a message, the more wiggle-room for the audience to misinterpret it.

The credibility of the messenger is an intervening variable in the delivery of the message to the audience. Consumers like to feel the salesman is someone like themselves.^[61] If the advertiser or recruiter is too different, they will have a difficult time projecting a message to a customer or recruit. Clark Leavitt, an advertising theorist listed three critical responses to advertising; first, the initial discovery of a message (stopping power), the continuing perusal of the message (holding power) and finally the comprehension of the message (sending power).^[62] These three responses are applicable to terror recruiters' framing strategies. They must get the recruit to pay attention to the message (which can come in the form of a shock and awe video, narrative, speech or the recruit may come to the message on his own as a response to a traumatic personal experience), they must also hold the recruit's attention or commitment long enough to use them operationally in order to facilitate the maturation of the group, and finally, they must get the recruit to internalize the message to a level in which they themselves can become recruiters and perpetuate the cycle. Another commonly used model in advertising and marketing is AIDA, Attention, Interest, Desire, and Action.^[63]

Fear, Intimidation, and the Use of Negative Campaigning

Fear, coercion and intimidation are common methods used to ignite action in a terror organization. The recruitment process is often the seduction process whereby a potential recruit is enticed into the organization before he is induced to step beyond previously demarcated psychological boundaries. Some recruiters may be able to talk a recruit into committing a violent act using non-

coercive means, but there may be instances where threats, intimidation and force are also used to initiate an operation. The problem with using fear in an advertising campaign (and possibly an anti-terror campaign) is that there is no guarantee that it will be effective. Carl Hovland, Irving Janis and Harold Kelley hypothesized that when communication does not relieve the fear it arouses, the audience will ignore or minimize the threat.[64] If an advertising campaign presents a problem and then a solution (the company's product), it must overcome fear it aroused in its audience.

Using fear in an advertising or anti-terror campaign may raise the question of even including a solution in the message. The message that stresses need arousal is apt to be more effective than that of just offering solutions because an audience must be motivated before it pays attention to the message or take time to understand its concepts.[65] Propaganda on its own is not effective in keeping a target committed to a cause. In order to maintain and perpetuate a movement, recruiters and group members must be reinspired or forced to believe. What initially took just strategically framed words takes even more kinetic methods to keep members active in the group. Those recruits that are being converted by force need to have a fervent conviction that the idea they are being forced to accept is the only true one.[66]

Coercion and force can create fanaticism which can spark violence.[67] The reverse is also true. A new recruit, just like a new convert to a religion is usually more fanatical than those born into the religion. The challenge to terror recruiters is not in keeping new recruits motivated, it is in keeping veteran group members committed to the cause. For example, in the GSPC, terror recruiters can be enticed out of the organization by amnesty programs or jailed which places the members in the position of reorganizing priorities and deciding if membership is still "worth it." The information minister of the GSPC recently turned himself into Algerian authorities leaving the organization with a "brain drain," and without a major public affairs or recruiting representative.[68] These veteran members have been loyal to their product, but may hit a tipping point where they no longer get personal satisfaction out of membership and want to defect. These defectors can be important weapons in the counter-narrative campaign. There will be some amount of blowback for becoming a "traitor" to the rest of the members committed to the organization, however, they may reach a few doubters in the organization and provide valuable intelligence about the organization to counter-terror agents.

Methods of Promotion

There are four major types of promotion methods available: media (television, radio, magazines, newspapers, billboards and direct mail), face-to-face (salesmen), publicity (news releases), and word-of-mouth which occur via personal or social channels.[69] The terror recruiter has the same options available to him. Audiences will gravitate towards those communications which favor their predispositions. Multiple channels of promotion are available when an audience is disposed to listen to a particular subject. "Since audience attention is self-selective, exposure to communications in different media tends to be supplementary, not complementary; that is, those who read about a topic also tend to listen, and those who pay attention at one time also tend to pay attention at another." [70] Therefore, it would behoove the terror group to pick multiple methods of promotion to get their message out and to reach potential recruits. This can work just as effectively for the counter-terror agent.

Levels of education can influence the source of media promotion that an audience favors; for example, the higher the level of education, the greater the reliance on print and the lower the education the greater reliance on television and radio.[71] Studies have also shown that interpersonal communication and personal appeal is the most effective channel of promotion.[72] For counter-terror agents, this means more use of human intelligence and source networks. Getting ideas, information and disinformation to targets will be most effective through personal networks rather than mass media. This does not necessarily mean that mass media is out of the question. Interpersonal communication can impact the effectiveness of mass media.[73] Paul F.

Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel in their work, "Mass Media and Personal Influence," documented the relationship between mass media and interpersonal communication,

"People are somewhat more likely than the mass media to reach people who are as yet undecided. Personal influence about an issue is often exerted unexpectedly as a sideline or marginal topic in a casual conversation. It therefore is more likely to "get through" to the undecided or the opposed; mass media messages, by contrast, are more often approached with an awareness of their purposefulness. Face-to-face contact is also more flexible and provides immediate response to raise issues and arguments of immediate personal relevance to the listener. And finally, when someone yields to personal influence in making a decision the reward in terms of approval is immediate and personal."^[74]

Therefore, targets of mass media should be educated and influential community leaders who can transmit the message through informal interaction with those audience members who want to raise questions and want reassurance from someone who is respected and valued within their personal circle. This is a valuable lesson for counter-terror agents. Instead of targeting the individual recruit with mass media persuasion, it may be more effective to target the educated elite with certain political and social messages that will trickle down to the masses.

Repetitiveness of a message is valuable to advertisers and recruiters alike. The strength of the stimulus message effects the resonance and "staying power" of a message. One study cited the use of an intensive bombardment of a particular ad over the period of a year. The results showed that a message was most effective when it was shown in thirteen weekly exposures rather than a four-week exposure interval where the objective was to maximize the number of people who temporarily remembered the message.^[75] Messaging is most effective when it is spaced at even intervals over a broader length of time rather than in short bursts over shorter time periods.

Part II: Islamic Activism in Algeria and Maghrebian Diaspora

An examination of the socio-political environment in Algeria is important to understand the conditions and framing strategies that were present when GSPC split from the GIA. Islamism developed in the 19th and 20th centuries across North Africa, Central Asia and countries in the Middle East. Some scholars assert Islamism was a response to colonialism by the west. As a result of al-Qaeda's popularity, it is often debated whether or not Islamism, specifically the Wahabbi or *Salafist*-type has created a transnational Islamist movement. Although not every Islamist group is *Salafi* and groups in Algeria have ranged from apolitical social reformers to violent ideologues and extremists.^[76]

The armed resistance of the FIS was led by Madani Maezraq who framed the resistance to the repressive government as, "fighting for the sake of regaining the rights of the oppressed [mustadh'afeen]."^[77] He pointed out that the violence used was only a response in kind to the failure of political efforts made earlier on behalf of the FIS.

In 1992, an armed insurgency began in Algeria, led by the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA). The movement began as a disorganized band of militants, but over time, grew into organized factions. The GIA used antisystem frames that justified its *jihād* as a fight against apostates, infidels and tyrants.^[78] They rejected the political process and fought against democracy. The group also used religious and systemic framing, labeling the conflict as an "apostate" Islam versus the "true" Islam. According to this extremist interpretation and framing strategy, the frame of apostate or infidel created the image of an opposition who was not right in the mind of God, therefore, their removal from the earth would be sanctioned by holy law.

The GIA's use of violence began to create blowback against the organization. The Algerian public reacted harshly against the indiscriminate attacks against all whom the Islamists labeled as

unfaithful. Some passive supporters began to fall away and the movement weakened significantly. The GIA became so restrictive people were barely able to breathe for fear the organization would say they were performing a function opposite of what their extremist interpretation called for. Internal leadership began to point the fingers of judgment at each other and soon the organization began to fall apart. The important lesson to take away from the GIA and their framing processes is that although the frames resonated among a portion of the population, the religious framing contest became so tiresome and restrictive; the people lost their willingness to support the organization. Life became limited on an individual basis which became too much for most of the population. This is an example of a group imploding from a failure to grow the organization and self-sabotage. However, the GIA does lend important clues for understanding what the GSPC's framing strategies are and how the group may suffer the same fate as the GIA, primarily because of its "hereditary" framing strategies.

The Danger of the Diaspora

The North African Diaspora represents a social structure and a, "place of tensions, of continuous re-adjustments, a space of fragmentations and of unifying processes, symbolically as well as on the level of social practices."^[79] Members of the Diaspora reshape their relations in both time and space.^[80] Over time and through social interaction, the immigrant population creates an alternate social identity separate from that which exists in the "home space." This perceived separateness can facilitate the creation and evolution of a new collective memory rooted in a dislocated space and anchored in an awareness of being located somewhere away from the home space. Chantal Saint-Blancat a social science scholar has argued that the Algerians and their descendents in France constitute a Diaspora.^[81] She contends that the Algerian Diaspora exists primarily through the construction of a Muslim Diaspora consciousness developed from personal and common socio-cultural experiences.

One important factor to consider when examining the Algerian Diaspora is its relation to other ethnic enclaves within the larger European Diaspora. Each sub-group of displaced Muslims has their own spectrum of belief along the religious scale, conflicting with traditional and cultural norms that dictate different behaviors than perhaps practiced by a separate ethnic enclave. There is difficulty, therefore, in labeling all European Muslims as one collective group. There is a desire to be visible within the public space of European society which leads to a "desire to negotiate the status of Muslims collectively, removed from the current silent modalities of individual integration, which is often completed successfully but at the price of secularization."^[82]

Framing within the Diaspora becomes a strategy of linking religious, social and personal narratives generated by the collective memories created over time. Religious leaders serving their followers must meet spiritual needs and create a welcoming and inclusive environment for those that already feel displaced. This creates a "target-rich environment" for GSPC or al-Qaeda recruiters. Preying on the struggling and frustrated youth, they provide an opportunity to take part in something important and bigger than themselves. Their messaging becomes based on shared narratives linked to the Diaspora's collective memories. Recruiters can also be approached by disaffected youth looking for an alternative to lagging job opportunities and a way out of the Diaspora.

Recruitment in a Diaspora is not uncommon according to Marc Sageman, author of *Understanding Terror Networks*. Of the 165 *mujahideen* he researched, 115 (70 percent) joined the resistance in a country where they had not grown up. Most were expatriots, workers, and refugees living away from their families. 14 percent were second generation in France, Britain in the United States where Sageman opines, "they might have felt a strong pull for the country of their parents and not been completely embedded in their host society. In France, they were part of an "excluded" generation."^[83] He goes on to assert that in an expatriate community or hostile non-western Muslim country, lonely people will look for companionship with Muslims of a similar background. In France, Maghreb Arabs would go to the mosque to make friends to "gain a sense

of spiritual calling, and promote their values.”[84] Unemployment in the Diaspora contributed to the anger of the *mujahideen*. Maghreb Arabs were students or unemployed, many were involved in petty crime or living on welfare (70 percent).[85] Employment not only provides the fundamentals of living within a society, but also a sense of contributing and integration into social networks within the environment. Unemployment lends credence to the relative deprivation theory and more so among the Maghrebian Diaspora. Combine feelings of frustration and alienation with the lack of income and terror recruiters have a pool of disgruntled recruits ready to make a change to choose from. Sageman also asserts that the Maghreb Arabs in his study of *mujahideen*, either first or second-generation in France, grew up feeling excluded from French society and were not religious as young people. Discrimination and underemployment contributed to their psychological readiness to join an organization that lent pride, cohesion and camaraderie to their lives.

Counter-narratives and anti-messaging strategies can be applied in this environment, but perceived government legitimacy would be low (except among second and third generation immigrants who feel a sense of ownership to European countries and claim the government as their own). Our model accounted for levels of perceived governmental legitimacy and the effect of counter-narratives on a population’s decisions to join a terror group.

The next section introduces our agent based model. We wanted to explore the effects of a message or counter-messaging campaign on a population of agents who held either high or low levels of perceived legitimacy of the government. We understand that counter-narrative campaigns cannot on their own defeat the terror recruiter, but it is a powerful peripheral tool that can enhance the counter-terror agent’s fight against the power of persuasion.

Part IV: The Model

Modeling the effect on recruitment into GSPC based on the framing, strategy, and delivery of a message simplification becomes necessary. Additionally, the information we have on GSPC’s recruitment efforts and strategies is very limited. In order to gain insight into GSPC’s recruitment we will be using an adaptation of Joshua Epstein’s agent based model of “Generalized Rebellion Against Central Authority.”[86] In order to create our model we utilized NetLogo v3.1 an agent-based modeling software program.[87] When writing our program we utilized the code from the ‘Rebellion’ model included with NetLogo v3.1 as an example and guide in our programming efforts. The ‘Rebellion’ model is also based on Joshua Epstein’s work in this same area of research.[88]

Our Model

This model contains four different actors: agents, preachers, cops, and spies. Each of these actors has a vision term that defines a neighborhood where each of these actors can see from their current location. In our model vision is set to two. This defines the neighborhood to determine where each actor can move in successive rounds when the model is running. It is also used to define the area for counting other actors in calculations for estimated arrest probability for agents and preachers and for determining the cumulative effect of preacher and spy messages. This term is also used by cops to determine area where they can arrest an active agent or preacher.

When setting up the model we have to define some additional quantities. The first of these is *government legitimacy* (GL act) in a scale of 0-1 in increments of 0.01 and describes the actual legitimacy the population views its government. We determine this value using an empirical formula as defined below:

$$GL \text{ act} = (GDP \text{ 2005} / GDP \text{ 1996}) * (1 - U \text{ 2005}) * (1 - DF \text{ 2005})$$

Where (GDP) is the *per capita GDP* normalized to 1996, the 1996 level was chosen because GSPC was founded in that year (U) is the *unemployment rate* for the specified year, and (DF) is a *democracy factor* for the specified country using an average of the Freedom House civil liberties and political rights measures for the specified year. The next quantities are the effect of the *preachers message* (P m) and the effect of the *spy message* (S m) in a scale of 0-1 in increments of 0.01.

The main actor in the model are 'agents' who represent the general population that can either become a member of GSPC or remain a citizen satisfied with their current situation to prevent them from joining GSPC or any other terrorist organization. Each agent is assigned a random variable between 0-1 in increments of 0.01 for *risk aversion* (R a) and *perceived hardship* (H a). When the model is started each agent calculates their perceived government legitimacy (GL per)

$$GL\ per = GL\ act + [N\ active-preachers-in-neighborhood * (P\ m) + N\ spies-in-neighborhood * (S\ m)]$$

The result is then modified to ensure it remains in the 0-1 range by use of logic statements. For example, if the result is less than zero it is assigned a value of zero and a value of one if it is greater than one. Next, each agent calculates their *estimated arrest probability* (EAP)

$$EAP = 1 - \exp[-k * (N\ cops / (1 + N\ active-agents-in-neighborhood + N\ active-agents-in-neighborhood))]$$

Letting the term $(N\ cops / (1 + N\ active-agents-in-neighborhood + N\ active-agents-in-neighborhood)) = F$ in the above equation we can understand this function better. The greater the number of active agents and preachers in an agents vision the lower 'F' will be and hence the greater the probability they will also become a GSPC member.^[89] Once (EAP) is calculated that quantity is used to calculate their net risk (NR a)

$$NR\ a = R\ a * EAP$$

Now we have to calculate the grievance for each agent (G a) given their current location in the world and surroundings

$$G\ a = H\ a * (1 - GL\ per)$$

Finally, since we have calculated G a and NR a we can now determine if an agent will become a member of GSPC or remain a non-GSPC member.

$$G\ a - NR\ a > T$$

The agent will become a member of GSPC is this value exceeds a certain threshold (T) which we chose to be 0.1.

Preachers are our next breed in our model and are similar to agents. Similar to agents they are assigned random variables between 0-1 in increments of 0.01 for risk aversion (R p) and *perceived hardship* (H p). Each preacher calculates an *estimated arrest probability* (EAP) and *net risk* (NR p) using the same equations as agents. We then calculate the grievance for each preacher (G p) with (GL per = 0) and find that G p = H p. Again like agents we calculate if a preacher will spread the GSPC message or not with the following equation

$$H\ p - NR\ p > T$$

The preacher will then become one who spreads the GSPC message to recruit new members if the value exceeds the threshold (T) chosen to be 0.1. Preachers are also counted by agents when agents looking in their neighborhood and are multiplied by the value their effect of passing the pro-GSPC message.

The next actor in the model are 'cops' who represent the state police force.

Cops enforce laws and are restricted to arresting only one active agent who is a GSPC member or a preacher who is passing the GSPC message during each round in the model in their vision defined by their neighborhood. When a cop arrests an actor the agent or preachers is automatically reset so they are either no longer a GSPC member or passing a GSPC message. Additionally, they are assigned a random jail term with a maximum of 30 rounds.

Spies are the simplest actor in our model. Spies do not have any direct interaction with other actors in the model. Their primary function is to be counted by agents when agents looking in their neighborhood and are multiplied by the value their effect of passing the anti-GSPC message.

Model Assumptions

- There are no consequences to agents if they leave GSPC and return to the non-GSPC group.
- The effect of the messaging, its framing, and method of delivery for the GSPC cause are all contained in the preacher and spy effect terms.
- Max possible jail term has no effect on deterring agents or preacher behavior.
- The effect of an agent or preacher within their vision is negated when the jail term is greater than zero.
- For preachers we use $GL_{per} = 0$ so that the preachers have a high probability of spreading the GSPC's message to gain new members.
- Preachers and spies don't necessarily represent actual people, but represent the message they are passing whether for or against GSPC.
- The model was only run through 100 time periods since a relative equilibrium was reached in the model after about 30 time periods. Data used for analysis was taken from time 30-100.

Modeling Behavior in Algeria

When modeling the ability to recruit new members we setup our model using the following settings for our baseline run to describe the current number of GSPC members in Algeria.

- Agent Density = 75%
- Preacher Density = 20%
- Cop Density = 20%
- Spy Density = 40%
- $GL_{act} = 0.22$ [\[90\]](#)
- Preacher Message Effect = 0.50
- Spy Message Effect = 0.50

In order to determine the effect of messaging on the membership in GSPC we varied the Spy Message Effect while holding all other variables constant. Our first case for Algeria we call the

'Good Message - Algeria.' Here we assume that we put out a message with an appropriate frame that resonates with the agents so they will be less likely to join GSPC. In order to accomplish this in the model we set:

- Spy Message Effect = 0.75

Our second case for Algeria we call the 'Bad Message - Algeria.' In this case we assume that we put out a message with an inappropriate frame that has an anti-resonance effect on agents that reduces the effectiveness of other messages or makes agents more likely to join GSPC. In order to accomplish this we set:

- Spy Message Effect = -0.20

Result of model runs:

	Algeria Baseline Run		Algeria –Good Message		Algeria – Bad Message	
	Result	Std. Dev.	Result	Std. Dev.	Result	Std. Dev.
GSPC Member	41	0.972	27	0.521	72	3.020
Non-GSPC Member	789	3.013	945	2.470	467	3.793

When running the model we ran each setup 100 times and determined the average number of GSPC members for each time period (see Figure 1) then when a relative equilibrium was reached (time periods 30-100) we determined our steady state GSPC membership and Non-GSPC members. In each run of the model there were 1261 agents. The amount of agents not accounted for as GSPC members or Non-GSPC members are those jailed for recent GSPC activity.

Modeling Behavior in France (Diaspora)

When modeling the ability to recruit new members we setup our model using the following settings for our baseline run to describe the current number of GSPC members in France.

- Agent Density = 75%
- Preacher Density = 5%
- Cop Density = 5%
- Spy Density = 15%
- GL act = 0.63[91]
- Preacher Message Effect = 0.70
- Spy Message Effect = 0.20

In order to determine the effect of messaging on the membership in GSPC we varied the Spy Message Effect while holding all other variables constant. Our first case for the Diaspora in France we call the 'Good Message - France.' Again we assume that we put out a message with an appropriate frame that resonates with the agents so they will be less likely to join GSPC. In order to accomplish this in the model we set:

- Spy Message Effect = 0.75

Our second case for the Diaspora in France we call the 'Bad Message - France.' In this case we assume that we put out a message with an inappropriate frame that has a repelling effect on agents which reduces the effectiveness of other messages or makes agents more likely to join GSPC. In order to accomplish this we set:

- Spy Message Effect = -0.20

	Diaspora Baseline Run		Diaspora – Good Message		Diaspora – Bad Message	
	Result	Std. Dev.	Result	Std. Dev.	Result	Std. Dev.
GSPC Member	200	1.887	182	1.620	292	3.099
Non-GSPC Member	500	15.413	768	2.063	276	1.591

When running the model we ran each setup 100 times and determined the average number of GSPC members for each time period (see [Figure 2](#)) then when a relative equilibrium was reached (time periods 30-100) we determined our steady state GSPC membership and Non-GSPC members. In each run of the model there were 1261 agents. The amount of agents not accounted for as GSPC members or Non-GSPC members are those jailed for recent GSPC activity.

Model Run Summary

After examining the data on GSPC membership we find that the framing of the message and how it resonates with the population matters from the perspective of affecting the perceived legitimacy of the respective governments and alter GSPC membership. In both the cases of Algeria and the Diaspora in France we find that the better we are at developing a message that resonates with our target population in the desired direction the lower the number of people who will be active members of GSPC.

Conclusion

After conducting the agent based model runs, we concluded that message construction and resonance effect do impact the recruiting successes and failures of GSPC. More importantly, we summarized that if counter-terror agents are going to construct a persuasive campaign with goals of reducing terror recruiting efforts, the message should be positive (good) and must resonate with the audience. Resonance factors include geographic and ethnic targeting, cultural resonance evaluations, and well-constructed behavior-oriented messages. Advertising strategies provide lessons in gaining attention and persuading audiences to consider risks, and benefits to joining a terror organization. Our agent-based model showed that in comparison to a baseline model, successful framing strategies combined with effective law enforcement methods will have a declining effect on GSPC recruiting efforts. Algeria is currently conducting an aggressive anti-terrorist program and has been successful inducing GSPC members to turn themselves in and provide valuable intelligence to police. If our agent-based model is correct and Algeria continues these law enforcement efforts but combines them with an aggressive good-messaging campaign, GSPC recruiting should go down. Effective framing strategies (as part of a wider and more inclusive advertising strategy constructed to “sell” the state in a manner conducive to the resonance impact on the audience) are not a silver bullet. Counter-terror agents must combine these messaging strategies with effective and aggressive law enforcement efforts. In section one of our paper, we discussed the impact of counter-narratives on recruiting efforts. Our results show that as long as the counter-narratives provide a positive (good) message to an audience, who holds relatively high legitimacy for the government, they can be an effective terror-fighting tactic.

One surprising aspect of our model was that the outcome for the Diaspora did not differ significantly from the results for the Algeria model. We held some element of doubt that an immigrant population which felt alienated, discriminated against and who withdrew into identity enclaves would respond positively to a good message from the government. The effect of a well-framed (good) message on the Diaspora population in France was similar to the population in Algeria; recruiting success for GSPC was reduced.

There were some problems we encountered during the model experience. First, initial measurements were more heuristic than empirical. The numbers representing perceived government legitimacy for both Algeria and the French Diaspora were based on outside research and a figure was chosen to represent perceived legitimacy. It is difficult to measure perceptions and there was no data available to confirm our assumptions of perceived legitimacy. Measuring attitudes is very difficult. Attitudes are unstable and fluid, they can change simply during the process of thinking.^[92] Counter-terror agents cannot expect to change or create new attitudes, that is a process which is conducted internally and is inaccessible (at least in the long term) by outside forces. Agents should focus more on changing behavior by using scientific methods and persuasion theory.

We recommend that if a persuasion campaign is going to be utilized, local (to the country being targeted) advertisers and behavioral scientists should be incorporated into the operation. Cultural intelligence is an invaluable part of a persuasion campaign and must be a priority for the counter-terror agent. The local advertiser or scientist should be made into a stakeholder by contracting their efforts or providing an incentive for their cooperation so they place just as much emphasis on a positive outcome as the counter-terror agent.

Persuasion campaigns are just one part of a comprehensive policy strategy that can target terror recruiting among Maghrebians whether they are in Algeria or France. Counter-messaging is not a fool-proof strategy and must be complimented by other law enforcement and intelligence efforts. Individual grievances, government legitimacy and credentialed cultural messaging campaigns are all areas that must be considered when planning future policies to combat recruitment by terror organizations. The GSPC may be on the decline, but aggressive efforts to counter recruiting strategies must continue as part of an overall anti-terror policy. The United States can share persuasion strategies with the Algerian and French governments in order to address the GSPC as a multi-lateral effort. Policy development should be a coalition effort between all nations. There are several advantages to this strategy. First, cultural experts, police and intelligence collectors are indigenous to the country and the United States will not have to grapple for area experts including culturally fluent message architects. Second, the United States is not burdened with kinetic enforcement responsibility and can assume a supporting and advising role. There are numerous Information Operations and Psychological Operations specialists who can advise their equivalents in both Algeria and France on lessons learned from campaigns conducted in the past to streamline efforts and enhance message delivery. Third, by using indigenous cultural messaging experts, the United States does not have to conceal involvement or influence with the operation, but can monitor the outcome of the campaign from within the controlled information circle.

The GSPC represents a threat to French and Algerian interests. Their alliance with al-Qaeda makes them an indirect, yet important organization for U.S. counter-terror agents to be aware of. The demands of Iraq and Afghanistan have committed numerous counterintelligence and military assets, which is why multinational efforts are so important to combat terror groups in the Sahel and European Diaspora.

Future Research Recommendations

Our project could not encompass all aspects of the battle GSPC recruiters. We emphasize that anti-messaging tactics are only one part of the entire counter-terror process and should be applied in tandem with other efforts. We would recommend collecting empirical data through personal surveys using a structured and scientifically sound system to measure actual legitimacy among both Algerian and French Maghrebian Diaspora Arabs. Using these numbers, the model can be re-run and results should be compared to the results we came up with in our project. Different aspects of the recruitment process should be researched, for example, partitioning the project by demographics (age, gender, and religious center preference) would provide more focused and applicable data for the counter-terror agent. We believe through this project, we've provided a useful start for addressing the GSPC and their recruitment strategies through strategic messaging efforts and multinational alliances.

Table 1: GSPC Membership in Algeria—Message Variations





Table 2: GSPC Membership in France—Message Variations



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87. NetLogo v3.1 is available for free on the internet at:
<http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/download.shtml>.
88. An explanation of the 'Rebellion' model included with NetLogo v3.1 is available at:
<http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models/Rebellion>.
89. Joshua Epstein, *Op. Cit.*

90. [Government Legitimacy for France](#) was calculated using the following values: GDP of Algeria in 1996 = \$47600000000, GDP of Algeria in 2005 = \$72400000000; and Population of Algeria in 1996 = 28092972 by doing a lineal extrapolation between 1990 and 2000, [Population of Algeria in 2005](#) = 32532000. These values were used to determine the per capita GDP in 1996 = \$1694 and per capita GDP in 2005 = \$2226. [The democracy factor](#) (DF) was calculating by taking the average of political rights = 6 and civil liberties = 5 scores, and then normalizing the average to make the 1-7 scale for these values equate to 1 for an average score of 1 and 0 for an average score of 7. [Unemployment \(U\) in Algeria](#) = 22.5%.

91. Government Legitimacy for France was calculated using the following values: [GDP of France](#) in 1996 = \$1159090000000, GDP of France in 2005 = \$1407380000000, and [Population of France](#) in 1996 = 58388408 by doing a lineal extrapolation between 1990 and 2000, Population of France in 2005 = 60656178. These values were used to determine the per capita GDP in 1996 = \$19851 and per capita GDP in 2005 = \$23202 for an average Frenchman, but since we are concerned with the Diaspora in France we assume they make 75% of an average Frenchman so we equate their per capita GDP = \$17402 (all in 2000 dollars). [The democracy factor](#) (DF) was calculating by taking the average of political rights = 1 and civil liberties = 1 scores, and then normalizing the average to make the 1-7 scale for these values equate to 1 for an average score of 1 and 0 for an average score of 7. Since there was no good data on the [unemployment](#) among the Diaspora in France we used unemployment of immigrants in 1998 of 31.4% and 11.0% among French citizens to create a ratio where the immigrants were about 2.85 times more likely to be unemployed than a French citizen to determine an [unemployment](#) among the Diaspora in France in 2005 = 27.6% since the French unemployment in 2005 was 9.7%.

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