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II. Implementing the Strategy
Into the 21st century, the United States must continue to adapt to changes brought by globalization such that we foster close cooperative relations with the world's most influential nations while preserving our ability to shape those nations capable of having an adverse effect upon our well-being and way of life. A stable, peaceful international security environment is the desired endstate -- one in which our nation, citizens and interests are not threatened. It is important that we work to enhance the health and safety of our citizens by promoting a cleaner global environment and effective strategies to combat infectious disease. We must work to ensure that the United States continues to prosper through increasingly open international markets and sustainable growth in the global economy, and that democratic values, respect for human rights, and the rule of law are increasingly accepted.
Chapter II describes how we intend to utilize the instruments at our disposal to implement our strategy for engagement and, in the process, achieve the goals of security, prosperity, and democracy -- our vision for ourselves and others in the 21st century.
Enhancing Security at Home and Abroad
Our strategy for enhancing U.S. security has three principal elements: shaping the international security environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future.
Shaping the International Environment
The United States seeks to shape the international environment through a variety of means, including diplomacy, economic cooperation, international assistance, arms control and nonproliferation efforts, military presence and engagement activities, and global health initiatives. These activities enhance U.S. security by promoting regional security; enhancing economic progress; supporting military activities abroad, international law enforcement cooperation, and environmental efforts; and preventing, reducing or deterring the diverse threats we face today. These measures adapt and strengthen alliances and friendships, maintain U.S. influence in key regions, and encourage adherence to international norms.
The U.S. intelligence community provides various Federal agencies with critical support for the full range of our involvement abroad. Comprehensive collection and analytic capabilities are needed to provide warning of threats to U.S. national security, give analytical support to the policy, law enforcement, and military communities, enable near-real time intelligence while retaining global perspective, identify opportunities for advancing our national interests, and maintain our information advantage in the international arena. We place the highest priority on monitoring the most serious threats to U.S. security. These include countries or other entities potentially hostile to the United States; proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery; other transnational threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, other international crime, and potential threats to our critical infrastructure such as computer network attack; potential regional conflicts that might affect U.S. national security interests; illegal economic or uncontrolled refugee migration; and threats to U.S. forces and citizens abroad.
Active diplomacy is critical to advancing our national security. The work of our missions and representatives around the world serves a number of shaping functions. Examples include adapting alliances, as the State and Defense Departments do when they work to ensure that NATO "candidate" militaries will be interoperable with those of current NATO members; deterring aggression, mediating disputes, and resolving conflicts as shown by our efforts to dampen the momentum to conflict in South Asia and the Middle East; promoting the trade and investment opportunities that increase U.S. economic prosperity; and confronting new threats.
While crisis management is an important foreign policy function, crisis prevention is far preferable. Throughout the 1990s, the United States has most frequently chosen a policy of preventive diplomacy to avert conflict as well as humanitarian and other emergencies. Bringing disputing parties to the table is less costly in lives and resources than separating warring parties; helping failing states is less burdensome than rebuilding failed states; and feeding the hungry is far more effective and easier than treating victims of diseases wrought by malnutrition.
Our diplomatic efforts are often multilateral. Consistent with our global leadership role, it is incumbent upon the United States to maintain its financial and political support for international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. We must continue to work to ensure we meet our financial obligations to international organizations.
Likewise, domestically, we must remain committed to supporting the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Peace Corps, and other vehicles of U.S. diplomacy. Our diplomatic infrastructure must be updated to meet critical productivity and information age requirements to effectively serve our diplomatic and consular efforts worldwide. Modernization of embassies, consulates, and our diplomatic telecommunications and information infrastructure is essential to advancing and protecting vital national interests overseas. Our embassies and consulates host critical elements of peacetime power: diplomatic personnel, commercial, defense, and legal attaches, and consular and security officers dedicated to protecting Americans at home and abroad. Our commitment in properly resourcing these modernization plans is essential if we are to have the future diplomatic infrastructure capable of supporting and enhancing our leadership role worldwide.
Such enhancements to our diplomatic infrastructure will also help attract a new generation of professionals whose skill, dedication, and creativity are at the heart of our ability to use diplomacy to protect American interests. To both attract and retain these individuals, we must take every measure to keep our personnel safe overseas. The State Department is therefore implementing a broad program of security enhancements in response to continued threats of terrorism directed at U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities overseas. The investment is warranted. The cost to sustain and protect the diplomatic components of our peacetime power is a tiny fraction of the price associated with the crises averted by their presence.
We have an obligation and opportunity to harness the tools of public diplomacy to advance U.S. leadership around the world by engaging international publics on U.S. principles and policies. The global advance of individual freedom and information technologies like the Internet has increased the ability of citizens and organizations to influence the policies of governments to an unprecedented extent. This makes our public diplomacy -- efforts to transmit information and messages to peoples around the world -- an increasingly vital component of our national security strategy. Our programs enhance our nation's ability to inform and influence foreign publics in support of our national interests, and broaden the dialogue between U.S. citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. Some even improve mutual understanding by reaching out to future leaders and inform the opinions of current leaders through academic, professional, and cultural exchanges. Successful diplomatic relations between the United States and other countries depend upon establishing trust and creating credible partnerships based on this trust.
Effective use of our nation's information capabilities to counter misinformation and incitement, mitigate inter-ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation helps advance U.S. interests abroad. International Public Information activities, as defined by Presidential Decision Directive 68 (PDD-68), are designed to improve our capability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs and other national security information-related efforts to ensure they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy making and execution.
The United States has a history of providing generous foreign assistance in an effort to promote global stability. From the Marshall Plan to the present, our foreign assistance has expanded free markets, promoted democracy and human rights, contained major health threats, encouraged sustainable global population growth, promoted environmental protection, and defused humanitarian crises.
Expanding debt relief is a key element of our international assistance agenda. In 1999, the G-8 agreed to a reduction in bilateral debt between member countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This effort encourages international financial institutions to link debt reduction to other efforts to alleviate poverty, promote economic development, and thereby create stronger partners around the world for trade and investment, security, and democracy. To show our commitment to this agreement we have stood firmly behind efforts to provide 100% debt relief in countries where the funds being used to service bilateral debt will finance the basic human needs of a population.
The United States intends that these nations not be left behind, instead joining in the positive economic prosperity made possible through participation in the international economic community. Our role in the World Bank and other multilateral development banks supports mutual goals to provide developing countries with the financial and technical assistance necessary to assimilate them into the global economy. Such efforts lift peoples out of poverty, and typically result in substantial growth of U.S. exports to the aided countries.
Finally, our philanthropic history is such that we routinely act to mitigate human suffering in the wake of both natural and man-made disasters. From the U.S. Agency for International Development's disaster assistance and food aid, to the State Department's refugee assistance, to grants to non-governmental relief organizations, to the Defense Department's Humanitarian Assistance Program, the United States has found multiple avenues to relieve the suffering of disaster victims worldwide with coordinated targeted relief efforts.
Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Arms control and nonproliferation initiatives are an essential element of our national security strategy of enhancing security at home and abroad. They closely complement and strengthen our efforts to defend our nation through our own military strength while seeking to make the world a less dangerous place. We pursue verifiable arms control and nonproliferation agreements that support our efforts to prevent the spread and use of NBC weapons, materials, expertise, and means of delivery; halt the use of conventional weapons that cause unnecessary suffering; and contribute to regional stability at lower levels of armaments. In addition, by increasing transparency in the size, structure and operations of military forces and building confidence in the intentions of other countries, arms control agreements and confidence-building measures constrain inventories of dangerous weapons, reduce incentives and opportunities to initiate an attack, reduce the mutual suspicions that arise from and spur on armaments competition, and help provide the assurance of security necessary to strengthen cooperative relationships and direct resources to safer, more productive endeavors.
Verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms and the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems remain essential to our strategy. The START I Treaty's entry into force in December 1994 charted the course for reductions in the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the former Soviet Union. The other countries of the former Soviet Union, besides Russia, that had nuclear weapons on their soil -- Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine -- have become non-nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). If the START II Treaty enters into force, the United States and Russia will each be limited to 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear weapons. START II also will prohibit land-based missiles from being deployed with more than one warhead and eliminate heavy land-based missiles entirely. On September 26, 1997, the United States and Russia signed a START II Protocol extending the end date for reductions to 2007, and exchanged letters on early deactivation by 2003 of those strategic nuclear delivery systems to be eliminated by 2007. The Senate approved the ratification of START II in January 1996; the Duma ratified the START II Treaty and the 1997 START II Protocol in April 2000.
At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to START III guidelines that, if adopted, will cap the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed in each country at 2,000 - 2,500 by the end of 2007 -- reducing both our arsenals by 80% from Cold War heights. They also agreed that, in order to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, a START III agreement will include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. In addition, the Presidents agreed to explore possible confidence-building and transparency measures relating to nuclear long-range, sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the United States is committed to continue efforts to enhance the Treaty's viability and effectiveness. On September 26, 1997, representatives of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed or initialed five agreements relating to the ABM Treaty. At the Cologne G-8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their determination to achieve earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements. The two presidents also reaffirmed at Cologne their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. They also agreed to begin discussions on the ABM Treaty in parallel with discussions on START Ill. The United States has proposed that the ABM Treaty be modified to accommodate possible deployment of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system that would counter new threats by states that threaten international peace and security while preserving strategic stability.
At the June 4, 2000, Moscow summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement of Principles on Strategic Stability. The Principles state that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, and that there is a need to address these threats. The Principles recalled the existing provisions of the ABM Treaty, to consider changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the provisions of the treaty, and, as appropriate, to consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. The Principles also record agreement to intensify discussions on both ABM issues and START III.
The United States has also made clear to Russia that we are prepared to engage in serious cooperation to address the emerging ballistic missile threat, and we have identified a number of specific ideas for discussion. At the same June 4, 2000, Moscow Summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed an agreement to establish a Joint Center for exchanging early warning data on ballistic missile launches. The agreement will significantly reduce the danger that ballistic missiles could be launched inadvertently on false warning of attack. It will also promote increased mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides. The Presidents also agreed to explore more far-reaching cooperation to address missile threats.
On July 21, 2000, in Okinawa, Presidents Clinton and Putin issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability, which identifies specific areas and projects for cooperation to control the spread of missiles, missile technology, and weapons of mass destruction. On September 6, 2000, in New York, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement on the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative and Implementation Plan, which provides further detail and an agreed timetable for pursuing cooperation in these areas, including the establishment of a ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other states would be invited to participate. Most recently, the United States and Russia signed a bilateral pre-launch notification agreement on December 16, 2000.
To be secure, we must not only have a strong military; we must also take the lead in building a safer, more responsible world. We have a fundamental responsibility to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. To this end, the United States remains committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force.
To date, 160 countries have signed -- and 68 have ratified -- the Treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions. The 68 include 31 of the 44 countries named in the Treaty whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. The CTBT will, in effect, constrain nuclear weapons development. The United States ended nuclear testing eight years ago; upon entry into force, the CTBT will require other state entities to also refrain from testing. We are confident in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent capability. However, if we find we cannot, we would have the option of using our supreme national interest withdrawal rights under the Treaty in order to conduct whatever nuclear testing is necessary.
The CTBT will put in place a worldwide network of sensors for detecting nuclear explosions. With over 300 stations around the globe -- including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East -- this international monitoring system will improve our ability to monitor nuclear explosions and catch cheaters. The United States already has dozens of monitoring stations of its own; the CTBT will allow us to take advantage of other countries' stations, while also creating new ones. The Treaty also will give us the right to request on-site inspections of sites in other countries where nuclear tests are suspected to have taken place.
As a matter of policy, the United States will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the CTBT, and we are encouraging all other states to do the same. We are also encouraging all states that have not signed and ratified the CTBT to do so. Despite the unfortunate rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate, we remain committed to obtaining Senate advice and consent for ratification of this treaty. United States ratification will encourage other states to ratify, enable the United States to lead the international effort to gain CTBT entry into force, and strengthen international norms against nuclear testing. Simply stated, the United States must be prepared to lead by example.
The NPT, the cornerstone of international nuclear nonproliferation regime, reinforces regional and global security by creating and sustaining confidence in the non-nuclear commitments of its parties. It was an indispensable precondition for the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and South Africa. We seek to ensure that the NPT remains a strong and vital element of global security by achieving universal adherence and full compliance by its parties with their Treaty obligations. A Review Conference held in May 2000, the first in fifteen years with a consensus document, strengthened the global nuclear nonproliferation norm and demonstrated that support for this critical Treaty is broad and deep. We won our case by vigorously promoting the value of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while continuing policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and to work for their ultimate elimination.
The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an essential component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We seek widespread adoption of the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system and to ensure that the IAEA has the resources necessary to fulfill its obligations. We are working to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ensure that its standards cover national activities as well as international transfers of nuclear material, which complements our effort to enhance IAEA safeguards. We also seek the immediate commencement of negotiations to achieve a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Halting production of fissile materials for nuclear explosions would cap the supply of nuclear materials available worldwide for weapons, a key step in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. A coordinated effort by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent, and deter illegal trafficking in fissile materials is essential to our counterproliferation efforts. So is the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, which enhances security for former Soviet nuclear materials and helps prevent them from ending up in the hands of terrorists or proliferant states. We also recognize that nuclear weapon free zone treaties and protocols that conform with long-standing U.S. criteria can also advance nuclear nonproliferation goals.
Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and other initiatives, we aim to strengthen controls over weapons-usable fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of NBC weapons and related material and technology from the former Soviet Union. The CTR Program has effectively supported enhanced safety, security, accounting, and centralized control measures for nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. It has assisted Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapons states and will continue to assist Russia in meeting its START obligations. The CTR Program is also supporting measures to eliminate and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological weapon-related capabilities, and it has supported many ongoing military reductions and reform measures in the former Soviet Union.
The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) is a sharply focused fund to permit rapid response to unanticipated, high priority requirements or opportunities to: 1) halt the spread of WMD, their delivery systems, and related technology; 2) limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and related technology; and 3) eliminate existing weapons. NDF activities in Central Europe and the NIS have included the elimination of SCUD and SS-23 missiles, the procurement of HEU, the development and deployment of automated systems to license and track sensitive technologies, and the acquisition of nuclear material detection equipment.
In 1999, the President launched the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This effort is designed to address the new security challenges in Russia and the other Newly Independent States (NIS) caused by that year's financial crisis, including preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons, reducing the threat posed by residual NBC weapons, and stabilizing the military. This initiative builds on the success of existing programs, such as the CTR program, the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, and the Science Centers. A new component of our nuclear security program will greatly enhance the security of fissile material by concentrating it at fewer, well-protected sites, and new programs will increase the security of facilities and experts formerly associated with the Soviet Union's biological weapons effort.
At the June 4, 2000, Clinton-Putin summit, the United States and Russia reached agreement on the management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. The agreement entered into force after Prime Minister Kasyanov and Vice President Gore signed it on September 1, 2000. Under the agreement, each government commits to irreversibly transform 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium to a form that will be unusable for weapons. The agreement establishes the goals, timelines, and conditions for ensuring that this plutonium can never again be used for weapons or any other military purposes.
Implementation of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement is contingent on sufficient international assistance for the Russian program. At the Okinawa G-8 Summit in July 2000, leaders took an additional step to this end. The final communiqué stated that their goal for the next summit is to develop an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to coordinate this cooperation. They also committed to expand cooperation to other interested countries beyond the G-8 in order to gain the widest possible international support, and to explore the potential for both public and private funding.
Over the past year, the United States Government provided leadership for the multilateral cooperation effort, particularly in the context of an informal G-8 working group, which coordinated with the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group. (NPEG). Preparations for the Genoa summit will be under the auspices of a formally established Plutonium Disposition Planning Group to be co-chaired by the United States and the Russian Federation. We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel. We are helping redirect dozens of former Soviet NBC facilities and tens of thousands of former NBC scientists in Eurasia from military activities to beneficial civilian research.
In support of U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of NBC expertise and materials in the NIS, Eastern Europe, and across borders, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and the FBI are engaging in programs that assist governments in developing effective export control systems and in developing capabilities to prevent, deter, or detect such proliferation. These programs provide training, equipment, advice, and services to law enforcement and border security agencies in these countries.
We seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with a new international regime to enhance compliance. We are also working hard to implement and enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States Congress underscored the importance of these efforts in October 1998 by passing implementing legislation. In late 1999, the Executive Order (EO 13128), Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-70), and two new regulations were completed, enabling the United States to submit commercial declarations and commence commercial facility inspections in the middle of 2000.
The Administration also seeks to prevent destabilizing buildups of conventional arms and to limit access to sensitive technical information, equipment, and technologies by strengthening international regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group (for chemical and biological weapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Zangger Committee (NSG and Zangger ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to nuclear exports). At the NATO 50thAnniversary Summit, Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO's ability to deal both politically and militarily with the proliferation of WMD and the means of their delivery. To this end, we have worked with our Alliance partners to establish the NATO WMD Center and to promote invigorated discussions of nonproliferation issues in the NATO Senior Political Military and Defense Groups on Proliferation.
Regional nonproliferation efforts are particularly important in three critical proliferation zones: the Korean Peninsula, Southwest Asia, and South Asia. On the Korean Peninsula, we are implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, which requires full compliance by North Korea to live up to its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. We also seek to convince North Korea to halt its indigenous missile program and exports of missile systems and technologies; something emphasized during a November 2000 visit to Pyongyang by the Secretary of State. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we encourage regional confidence-building measures and arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. We continue efforts to thwart and roll back both Iran's development of NBC weapons and long-range missiles, and also Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its NBC programs. In South Asia, we seek to persuade India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponizing or deploying nuclear weapons, testing or deploying missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. We also urge India and Pakistan to adhere fully to international nonproliferation standards and to sign and ratify the CTBT.
Over the past three years, the United States has worked to ensure that the landmark 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty remains a cornerstone of European peace, security and stability into the 21st century. On November 19, 1999, we joined the other 29 CFE States Parties in signing an Adaptation Agreement that eliminates obsolete bloc-to-bloc limits and replaces them with a system of national and territorial ceilings. It will also enhance transparency through more information and inspections, strengthen requirements for host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces, and open the treaty to accession by other European nations. The accompanying CFE Final Act reflects a number of important political commitments, including agreements on the complete withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Moldova and partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia.
The United States is a world leader in the effort to curb the harmful proliferation and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) such as automatic rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, light mortars and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles. Inexpensive, widely available, and easy to use, these weapons exacerbate regional conflicts, expand casualties, increase crime, and hinder economic development. They can jeopardize the safety of peacekeepers, potentially putting U.S. Forces at risk.
To reduce this threat, the United States is urging countries to adopt effective export controls, brokering regulations, permanent marking, anti-smuggling measures, and embargo enforcement. Global efforts focus on securing a Firearms Protocol to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention and seeking international agreement through the UN 2001 Conference on Illicit Trafficking in SA/LW. The United States also works with regional partners in the OSCE, NATO/EAPC, OAS, OAU, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and elsewhere. The United States provides some technical assistance to countries trying to prevent SA/LW trafficking and actively supports efforts to destroy excess stocks of SA/LW worldwide, often partnering with like-minded countries such as Norway.
The United States is also committed to ending the threat to innocent civilians from anti-personnel landmines (APLs). We have already taken major steps toward this goal while ensuring our ability to meet international obligations and provide for the safety and security of our men and women in uniform. President Clinton has directed the Defense Department to end the use of all APLs, including self-destructing APLs, outside Korea by 2003 and to pursue aggressively the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006. We are also aggressively pursuing alternatives to our mixed anti-tank systems that contain anti-personnel submunitions. We have made clear that the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if by then we have succeeded in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our self-destructing APLs and mixed anti-tank systems.
In May 1999, we gained Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. This agreement addresses the worldwide humanitarian problem caused by APLs by banning the use of non-detectable APLs and severely limiting the use of long-duration APLs to clearly marked and monitored fields that effectively keep out civilians. We have established a permanent ban on APL exports and are seeking to universalize an export ban through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We are supporting humanitarian demining programs worldwide through engagement with mine-afflicted nations and the international community. We have taken a lead role in establishing the International Test and Evaluation Program, through which nations will develop agreed standards and test procedures for various pieces of demining equipment and will then test against those standards. To date, the United States has provided over $400 million through the
U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program. The Demining 2010 Initiative, which is independent of the Humanitarian Demining Program, advocates increased efforts in the United States and abroad and develops public-private partnerships to support these programs.
The effectiveness of the panoply of arms control agreements described above, as well as that of our nonproliferation activities, rests on maintaining and enhancing our monitoring capabilities. We must keep ahead of potential attempts by others at denial and deception. To do so, we must maintain current monitoring assets and have a vigorous research and development program that will translate new technologies into enhanced capabilities. These efforts will increase our confidence in the viability of existing agreements and enable us to conclude new ones to further decrease the risks of armed conflicts.
The U.S. military is a very visible and critical pillar of our effort to shape the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests. It is not, however, a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and educational activities. We must always be mindful that the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened. Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities, such as defense cooperation, security assistance, regional centers for security studies, training, and exercises with allies and friends, our Armed Forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability, support the development of indigenous counterdrug law enforcement capabilities, and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known foes, military cooperation can serve as a positive means of building bridges between the military leaderships of different nations. These links enhance security relationships between the nations today and will contribute to improved relations tomorrow. At the same time, we also remain firmly committed to human rights and we will ensure our military forces do not knowingly train or assist units that have committed a gross violation of human rights.
Maintaining our overseas presence enhances our understanding of the military developments within various regions of the world. Relevant observations add to our larger geo-political understanding of potential areas for instability or threats to our national interests and help select our optimal avenue of response; diplomatic, economic, or military. It reassures our allies and promotes regional stability. It gives substance to our security commitments, helps prevent the development of power vacuums and instability, and contributes to deterrence by demonstrating our determination to defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests in critical regions. Having credible combat forces forward deployed in peacetime also better positions the United States to respond rapidly to crises, permitting them to be first on the scene. Equally essential is effective global power projection, which is key to the flexibility demanded of our forces and provides options for responding to potential crises and conflicts even when we have no permanent presence or a limited infrastructure in a region.
Just as U.S. engagement overall must be selective -- focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference -- so too must our use of the Armed Forces for engagement be equally discerning. Engagement activities must be carefully managed to prevent erosion of our military's current and long-term readiness for larger-scale contingencies. The Defense Department's theater engagement planning process, which was approved by the President in 1997, helps ensure that military engagement activities are prioritized within theaters, and balanced against available resources. In short, we must prioritize military engagement activities to ensure the readiness of our Armed Forces to carry out crisis response and warfighting missions, as well as to ensure that we can sustain an appropriate level of engagement activities over the long term.
Our ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime rests on several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. We have earned this reputation through both our declaratory policy, which clearly communicates costs to potential adversaries, and our credible warfighting capability across the full spectrum of conflict. This capability is embodied in four ways; ready forces and equipment strategically stationed or deployed forward, forces in the United States at the appropriate level of readiness to deploy when needed, our ability to maintain access to critical regions and infrastructure overseas, and our demonstrated ability to form and lead effective military coalitions.
We must continue to improve our program to combat terrorism in the areas of antiterrorism, counterterrorism, consequence management, and intelligence support to deter terrorism. We will deter terrorism through the increased antiterrorism readiness of our installations and forward forces, enhanced training and awareness of military personnel, and the development of comprehensive theater engagement plans. In counterterrorism, because terrorist organizations may not be deterred by traditional means, we must ensure a robust capability to accurately attribute the source of attacks against the United States or its citizens, and to respond effectively and decisively to protect our national interests. U.S. armed forces possess a tailored range of options to respond to terrorism directed at U.S. citizens, interests, and property. In the event of a terrorist incident, our consequence management ability to significantly mitigate injury and damage may likely deter future attacks. Finally, we will continue to improve the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence support to commanders, which will also enhance our ability to deter terrorism.
Our nuclear deterrent posture is one example of how U.S. military capabilities are used effectively to deter aggression and coercion against U.S. interests. Nuclear weapons serve as a guarantor of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own WMD capability. Those who threaten the United States or its allies with WMD should have no doubt that any such attack would meet an overwhelming and devastating response. Our military planning for the possible employment of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is focused on deterring a nuclear war and it emphasizes the survivability of our nuclear systems, infrastructure, and command, control, and communications systems necessary to endure a preemptive attack yet still deliver an overwhelming response. Another key element of the U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy is ensuring the National Command Authorities have a survivable and endurable command, control, and communications capability through which to execute the mission and direct nuclear forces during all phases of a nuclear war. The United States will continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any potential adversaries who may have or seek access to nuclear forces -- to convince them that seeking a nuclear advantage or resorting to nuclear weapons would be futile. In addition, some U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces are forward deployed in NATO to demonstrate the political commitment of the United States to the long-term viability of NATO and European security. We must also ensure the continued viability of the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces and weapons. The Stockpile Stewardship Program will provide high confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The Department of Defense's Counterproliferation Initiative provides another example of how U.S. military capabilities are used effectively to deter aggression and coercion against U.S. interests. Under this initiative, we are preparing our own forces and working with allies to ensure that we can prevail on the battlefield despite the threatened or actual use of NBC weapons by adversaries.
The United States is committed to preserving internationally recognized freedom of navigation on -- and overflight of -- the world's oceans, which are critical to the future strength of our nation and the maintenance of global stability. Freedom of navigation and overflight are essential to our economic security and for the worldwide movement and sustainment of U.S. military forces. These freedoms are codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which the President submitted to the Senate in 1994 for advice and consent to ratification. In addition to lending the certainty of the rule of law to an area critical to our national security, the Convention preserves our leadership in global ocean policy. Thus, the Law of the Sea Convention buttresses the strategic advantages that the United States gains from being a global power, and ratification of the Convention remains a high priority.
Quality people -- civilian and military -- are our most critical asset in implementing our defense activities. The quality of our men and women in uniform will be the deciding factor in future military operations where the operation and maintenance of information systems and advanced technology become ever more important. We must ensure that we remain the most fully prepared and best trained military force in the world. Accordingly, we will continue to place the highest priority and bear the costs associated with programs that support recruiting, retention, quality of life, training, equipping and educating our personnel.
International Law Enforcement Cooperation
Certain criminal threats to our national security are international in nature. Transnational threats include terrorism, drug and migrant smuggling, and other international crime. The rise in the frequency and intensity of these threats makes it incumbent upon U.S. and foreign law enforcement and judicial authorities to cooperate in an innovative manner. The President's International Crime Control Strategy prescribes the role of overseas law enforcement presence in establishing and sustaining working relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies; keeping crime away from our shores; enabling extradition; and solving serious U.S. crimes.
The Department of State and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies continue to assist law enforcement agencies in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia through cooperative centers established in Hungary and Thailand known as the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs). The ILEA initiative is a multinational effort organized by the United States, the host nations, and other international training partners to provide mutual assistance and law enforcement training.
Environmental and Health Initiatives
The President has said, "Our natural security must be seen as part of our national security." Decisions today regarding the environment and natural resources can affect our security for generations. Environmental threats do not heed national borders; environmental perils overseas and environmental crime pose long-term dangers to U.S. security and well being. Natural resource scarcities can trigger and exacerbate conflict, and phenomena such as climate change, toxic pollution, ocean dumping, and ozone depletion directly threaten the health and well-being of Americans and all other individuals on Earth.
Responding firmly to environmental threats remains a part of mainstream American foreign policy. America's leadership was essential for agreement on the Kyoto Protocol -- the first binding agreement among the world's industrialized nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. America also brokered key international agreements on toxic chemicals -- such as persistent organic pollutants, environmental aspects of biotechnology, the ozone layer, and endangered marine life. America's insistence on high environmental standards in its own trade agreements, in international financial institutions, and in bilateral export credit and development assistance programs similarly demonstrates to the rest of the international community that growing economies and clean environments do go hand-in-hand. America also provided leadership in the Global Environment Facility and in bilateral programs for clean energy development, as well as conservation of biological diversity and endangered ecosystems such as tropical forests.
With globalization, the free flow of people and goods across national borders continues to increase rapidly with each passing year. This interdependence has caused diseases and health risks around the world to become matters of both U.S. national and international security. The United States promotes international cooperation on health issues because it reduces the threat of diseases to Americans, and because global international economic development, democratization, and political stability are predicated in part on the health of populations worldwide.
Beyond these general concerns, a number of specific international health issues are critical for our national security. Because a growing proportion of our national food supply is coming from international sources, assuring the safety of the food we consume must be a priority. The Administration has announced new and stronger programs to ensure the safety of imported as well as domestic foods, to be overseen by the President's Council on Food Safety. New and emerging infections such as drug-resistant tuberculosis and the Ebola virus can move with the speed of jet travel. We are actively engaged with the international health community as well as the World Health Organization to stop the spread of these dangerous diseases.
Combating the global epidemic of HIV/AIDS has been a top international health priority in recent years. AIDS is now the number one cause of death on the continent of Africa. The United States led the United Nations Security Council in holding its first-ever session on AIDS in Africa and has committed to efforts to accelerate the development and delivery of vaccines for AIDS and other diseases that disproportionately affect the developing world. We also have promoted efforts by African national governments to provide AIDS awareness education to their military members who travel widely around the continent; and led the G-8's decision to link debt relief to HIV/AIDS prevention and other such programs.
Population issues have also been a health priority garnering renewed focus internationally. The Administration has re-established U.S. leadership on international population issues by expanding quality reproductive health care. This includes voluntary family planning services for women and men around the world; improving the political, economic, and social status of women; and enhancing educational opportunities for women and girls.
Responding to Threats and Crises
Because our efforts to shape the international environment alone cannot guarantee the security we seek, the United States must be able to respond at home and abroad to the full spectrum of threats and crises that may arise. Since our resources are finite, we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect our interests and engaging when and where we can have the greatest positive impact. We must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools -- diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures, law enforcement, intelligence, military operations, and others. We act in alliance or partnership when others share our interests, but will act unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand.
Efforts to deter an adversary -- be it an aggressor nation, terrorist group or criminal organization -- can become the leading edge of crisis response. In this sense, deterrence straddles the line between shaping the international environment and responding to crises. Deterrence in crisis generally involves demonstrating the United States' commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater. Our forward and rotationally deployed forces are the embodiment of our continuous commitment to our overseas partners and act as the first line of deterrence, providing the necessary inroads to access and influence to help defuse crisis situations.
Our ability to respond to the full spectrum of threats requires that we have the best-trained, best-equipped, most effective armed forces in the world. Our strategy requires that we have highly capable ground, air, naval, special operations, and space forces supported by a range of enabling capabilities including strategic mobility and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C41SR). Maintaining our superior forces requires developing superior technology, and exploiting it to the fullest extent.
Strategic mobility is critical to our ability to augment forces already present in the region with the projection of additional forces for both domestic and international crisis response. This agility in response is key to successful American leadership and engagement. Access to sufficient fleets of aircraft, ships, vehicles, and trains, as well as bases, ports, pre-positioned equipment, and other infrastructure will of course be an imperative if we are to deploy and sustain U.S. and multinational forces in regions of interest to us.
We are committed to maintaining U.S. preeminence in space. Unimpeded access to and use of space is a vital national interest -- essential for protecting U.S. national security, promoting our prosperity, and ensuring our well-being. Consistent with our international obligations, we will deter threats to our interests in space, counter hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space, and maintain the ability to counter space systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against our military forces, command and control systems, or other critical capabilities. We will maintain our technological superiority in space systems, and sustain a robust U.S. space industry and a strong, forward-looking research base. We also will continue efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space, and will continue to pursue global partnerships addressing space-related scientific, economic, environmental, and security issues.
We also are committed to maintaining information superiority -- the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Operational readiness, as well as the command and control of forces, relies increasingly on information systems and technology. We must keep pace with rapidly evolving information technology so that we can cultivate and harvest the promise of the knowledge that comes from this information superiority, sharing that knowledge among U.S. forces and coalition partners while exploiting the shortfalls in our adversaries' information capabilities.
Protecting the Homeland
Emerging threats to our homeland by both state and non-state actors may be more likely in the future as our potential adversaries strike against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States to avoid direct confrontation with our military forces. Such acts represent a new dimension of asymmetric threats to our national security. Easier access to the critical technical expertise and technologies enables both state and non-state actors to harness increasingly destructive power with greater ease. In response to such threats, the United States has embarked on a comprehensive strategy to prevent, deter, disrupt, and when necessary, effectively respond to the myriad of threats to our homeland that we will face.
National Missile Defense
The Clinton Administration is committed to the development of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to counter the emerging ballistic missile threat from states that threaten international peace and security. On September 1, 2000, the President announced that while the technology for NMD was promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven, and thus he was not prepared to proceed with the deployment of a limited NMD system. The President has instead asked the Secretary of Defense to continue a robust program of development and testing. The Administration recognizes the relationship among the ABM Treaty, strategic stability, and the START process, and is committed to working with Russia on any modifications to the ABM Treaty required to deploy a limited NMD. An NMD system, if deployed, would be part of a larger strategy to preserve and enhance peace and security.
In making this decision, the President considered the threat, cost, technical feasibility and impact overall on our national security of proceeding with NMD, including the impact on arms control and relations with Russia, China, and our allies. He considered a thorough technical review by the Department of Defense as well as the advice of his top national security advisors.
The Pentagon has made progress on developing a system that can address the emerging missile threat. But, at this time, we do not have sufficient information to conclude that it can work reliably under realistic conditions. Critical elements of the program, such as the booster rocket for the missile interceptor, have not been tested; and there are also questions to be resolved about the ability of the system to deal with countermeasures. The President made clear that we should not move forward until we have further confidence that the system will work and until we have made every reasonable diplomatic effort to minimize the international consequences. In the interim, the Pentagon will continue the development and testing of the NMD system. That effort is still at an early stage: three of the nineteen, planned intercept tests have been held so far. Additional ground tests and simulations will also take place.
The development of our NMD is part of the Administration's comprehensive national security strategy to prevent potential adversaries from acquiring and/or threatening the United States with such weapons. Arms control agreements with Russia are an important part of this strategy because they ensure stability and predictability between the United States and Russia, promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and help complete the transition from confrontation to cooperation with Russia. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limits anti-missile defenses according to the following principle: neither side should deploy defenses that would undermine the other's nuclear deterrent, and thus tempt the other to strike first in a crisis or take countermeasures that would make both our countries less secure. The President's decision not to deploy a limited NMD system will provide additional time to pursue with Russia the goal of adapting the ABM Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD that would not undermine strategic stability. The United States will also continue to consult with allies and hold dialogues with other states.
In August 1999, President Clinton decided that the initial NMD architecture would include: 100 ground-based interceptors deployed in Alaska, one ABM radar in Alaska, and five upgraded early warning radar. This approach is the fastest, most affordable, and most technologically mature approach to fielding an NMD system capable of protecting all 50 states against projected emerging threats.
On July 23, 1999, President Clinton signed H.R. 4, the "National Missile Defense Act of 1999," stating that it is the policy of the United States to deploy an effective NMD system as soon as technologically possible. The legislation includes two amendments supported by the Administration. The first makes clear that any NMD deployment must be subject to the authorization and appropriations process, and thus that no decision on deployment has been made. The second amendment states that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces, putting Congress on record as continuing to support negotiated reductions in strategic nuclear arms, reaffirming the Administration's position that missile defense policy must take into account important arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives.
Countering Foreign Intelligence Collection
The United States is a primary target of foreign intelligence services due to our military, scientific, technological and economic preeminence. Foreign intelligence services aggressively seek information about U.S. political and military intentions and capabilities. As the rapidity of global technological change accelerates and the gap with some nations has widened, these countries' foreign intelligence agencies are stepping up their efforts to collect classified or sensitive information on U.S. weapons systems, U.S. intelligence collection methods, emerging technologies with military applications, and related technical methods. Such information enables potential adversaries to counter U.S. political and military objectives, develop sophisticated weapons more quickly and efficiently, and develop countermeasures against U.S. weapons and related technical methods. Intelligence collection against U.S. economic, commercial, and proprietary information enables foreign states and corporations to obtain shortcuts to industrial development and improve their competitiveness against U.S. corporations in global markets. Although difficult to quantify, economic and industrial espionage results in the loss of millions of dollars and thousands of jobs annually.
To protect sensitive national security information, it is critical for us to effectively counter the collection efforts of foreign intelligence services and non-state actors through vigorous counterintelligence efforts and security programs. Over the last six years, we have created new counterintelligence mechanisms to address economic and industrial espionage and have implemented procedures to improve coordination among intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies. These measures have considerably strengthened our ability to counter the foreign intelligence collection threat. We will continue to refine and enhance our counterintelligence capabilities as we enter the 21st century.
Dramatic geopolitical changes that continue into the first decade of the 21 s' century increase rather than lessen the need to protect sensitive national security information. Some of this information is classified while some is unclassified but sensitive due to its relationship to, or impact upon, our critical infrastructure. Increased threats to our cyber security and the inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of sensitive information underscore the necessity for the National Security Community to have reliable, timely, and trusted information available to those who both need it and are authorized to have it. During the last five years we have established a set of security countermeasures policies, practices, procedures, and programs for a rational, fair, forward looking, and cost-effective security system. More needs to be done, however, and efforts will continue in providing a better synchronized, integrated and interoperable programs for personnel security, physical security, technical security, operational security, education and awareness, information assurance, classification management, industrial security, and counterintelligence.
The United States has mounted an aggressive response to terrorism. Our strategy pressures terrorists, deters attacks, and responds forcefully to terrorist acts. It combines enhanced law enforcement and intelligence efforts; vigorous diplomacy and economic sanctions; and, when necessary, military force. Domestically, we seek to stop terrorists before they act, and eliminate their support networks and financing. Overseas, we seek to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries; counter state and non-governmental support for terrorism; help other governments improve their physical and political counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and consequence management efforts; tighten embassy and military facility security; and protect U.S. citizens living and traveling abroad. Whether at home or abroad, we will respond to terrorism through defensive readiness of our facilities and personnel, and the ability of our terrorism consequence management efforts to mitigate injury and damage.
Our strategy requires us to both prevent and, if necessary, respond to terrorism. Prevention -- which includes intelligence collection, breaking up cells, and limiting the movement, planning, and organization of terrorists -- entails more unknowns and its effectiveness will never be fully proven or appreciated, but it is certainly the preferable path. For example, as a result of the quiet cooperation with some of our allies and among federal authorities, agencies, and local law enforcement, planned terrorist attacks within the United States and against U.S. interests abroad during the millennium celebration were thwarted. A major aspect of our prevention efforts is bolstering the political will and security capabilities of those states that are on the front lines to terrorist threats and that are disproportionately impacted by the expanding threat. This coalition of nations is imperative to the international effort to contain and fight the terrorism that threatens American interests.
Avenues of international trade provide a highway for the tools and weapons of international terrorists. The same sophisticated transportation network that can efficiently, safely, and reliably move people and goods is also equally attractive to those whose motives may be hostile, dangerous, or criminal. Systems that promote efficiency, volume and speed, fueling economic prosperity, create new challenges in the balance between policing and facilitating the transnational movements of people and goods. Globalization and electronic commerce transcend conventional borders, fast rendering traditional border security measures at air, land, and sea ports of entry ineffective or obsolete. Despite the challenges, we are developing tools to close off this avenue for terrorists. In this new environment, prudent, reasonable, and affordable security measures will require an approach transcending any particular transportation node or sector. The International Trade Data System (ITDS), already in initial implementation pilot testing, was created to foster an integrated system to electronically collect, use, and disseminate international trade and transportation data. By transcending transportation nodes and sectors, efforts like the ITDS project will foreclose opportunities terrorists may believe are emerging with globalization.
When terrorism occurs, despite our best efforts, we can neither forget the crime nor ever give up on bringing its perpetrators to justice. We make no concessions to terrorists. Since 1993, a dozen terrorist fugitives have been apprehended overseas and rendered, formally or informally, to the United States to answer for their crimes. These include the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing, the attack outside CIA headquarters, and an attack on a Pan Am flight more than 18 years ago. In 1998, the U.S. Armed Forces carried out strikes against a chemical weapons target and an active terrorist base operated by Usama bin Ladin, whose terror network had carried out bombings of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and planned still other attacks against Americans. We will likewise pursue the criminals responsible for the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen.
Whenever possible, we use law enforcement, diplomatic, and economic tools to wage the fight against terrorism. But there have been, and will be, times when those tools are not enough. As long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, we reserve the right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist, or actively support them, as we have done over the years in different countries.
Fighting terrorism requires a substantial commitment of financial, human, and political resources. Since 1993, both the FBI's counterterrorism budget and the number of FBI agents assigned to counterterrorism have more than doubled. The President has also created and filled the post of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism. Three presidential directives now coordinate the efforts of senior counterterrorism personnel from various government agencies in dealing with WMD and other threats at home. The FBI and the State Department, respectively, operate Rapid Deployment Teams and interagency Foreign Emergency Support Teams to deploy quickly to scenes of terrorist incidents worldwide.
However, it is not only the response capabilities that need significant resources. It is our preventive efforts, such as active diplomatic and military engagement, political pressure, economic sanctions, and bolstering allies' political and security capabilities, that also require strong financial support in order to squeeze terrorists before they act. Providing political support and economic assistance to front line states and other allies impacted by this threat expands the circle of nations fighting against threats to the United States. These preventive measures are an important partner to our counterterrorism response efforts.
We must continue to devote the necessary resources for America's strategy to combat terrorism, which integrates preventive and responsive measures and encompasses a graduated scale of enhanced law enforcement and intelligence gathering, vigorous diplomacy, and, where needed, military action.
Domestic Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Defending the United States against weapons of mass destruction is a top national security priority. In October 1998, the President signed into law legislation criminalizing the unjustified accumulation of dangerous chemicals, thereby enhancing the ability of law enforcement to prevent potentially catastrophic terrorist acts by allowing enforcement action before the chemicals are weaponized. Additionally, concerted efforts have been undertaken to mitigate the consequences of a WMD attack.
The Federal Government, in coordination with state and local authorities, will respond rapidly and decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States involving WMD. Increased preparedness at home is critical to defending against, and responding to, such unconventional threats. The Administration developed a Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to address these issues.
Established in 1998, a standing Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Interagency Working Group, chaired by the National Coordinator, addresses current and future requirements of local, state, and federal authorities that are directly responsible for the WMD crisis and consequence management efforts. In coordinating the interagency process and cooperation between these three levels of government, several initiatives are now in place to better prepare the United States against a WMD incident. These initiatives include equipping and training first responders in the 157 largest metropolitan areas across the nation to prepare for, and defend against, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons of mass destruction attacks; renovating the public health surveillance system; and establishing civilian medical stockpiles of vaccines and antibiotics.
Critical Infrastructure Protection
An extraordinarily sophisticated information technology (IT) infrastructure fuels America's economy and national security. Critical infrastructures, including telecommunications, energy, finance, transportation, water, and emergency services, form a bedrock upon which the success of all our endeavors -- economic, social, and military -- depend. These infrastructures are highly interconnected, both physically and by the manner in which they rely upon information technology and the national information infrastructure. This trend toward increasing interdependence has accelerated in recent years with the advent of the Information Age.
At the same time that the IT revolution has led to substantially more interconnected infrastructures with generally greater centralized control, the advent of "just in time" business practices has reduced margins for error for infrastructure owners and operators. In addition, the trend toward deregulation and growth of competition in key infrastructures has understandably eroded the willingness of owners and operators to pay for spare capacity that traditionally served a useful "shock absorber' role in cushioning key infrastructures from failures. Finally, the increase in the number of mergers among infrastructure providers has increased the pressure for further reductions in spare capacity as managers seek to reduce overhead and wring "excess" costs out of merged companies.
As with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, ongoing hostile hacker attacks, and cyber conflicts between China and Taiwan have shown, asymmetric warfare against the United States will likely grow. We must understand the vulnerabilities and interdependencies of our infrastructures, accept that such attacks know no international boundaries, and work to mitigate potential problems.
In January 2000, the President launched the National Plan for Information Systems Protection and announced new budget proposals for critical infrastructure protection. Specific new proposals included the Federal Cyber Systems Training and Education program to offer IT education in exchange for federal service; an intrusion detection network for the Department of Defense and for federal civilian agencies; and the Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection, an innovative public/private partnership to fill key gaps in critical infrastructure protection R&D. The Institute represented part of a 32% increase that were proposed for computer security research and development efforts for the FY 2001 budget.
Implementing the proposals of the National Plan, as well as other future projects, will contribute to our economic competitiveness, military strength, and general public health and safety. These proposals will also protect the ability of state and local governments to maintain order and deliver minimum essential public services while also working with the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of vital services.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), founded in 1998 under Presidential Decision Directive 63, is the national focal point for warning, analysis, and response regarding threats to the infrastructures. Over the past two years it has provided warnings to the private sector, federal, state, and local governments regarding infrastructure threats. It has also coordinated numerous investigations of destructive computer viruses, computer intrusions against United States Government and private IT systems, and denial of service attacks both in the United States and overseas.
Some aspects of our critical infrastructure, such as the various transportation systems, are not commonly associated with the trends of globalization and technological change, but nonetheless are being dramatically affected by them. For example, the Marine Transportation System, which consists of waterways, ports, and their intermodal connections, vessels, vehicles and system users, provides American businesses with critical competitive access to suppliers and markets that will be key to maintaining our nation's role as a global power. Threats to this and other transportation systems will drive new security imperatives that we must continue to balance with the need for speed and efficiency. In any case, ensuring the long-term health of these traditional aspects of our critical infrastructure must remain a priority even as we look to new technologies to improve other aspects of our infrastructures and provide other competitive advantages.
Most importantly, the Federal Government cannot protect critical infrastructures alone. The private sector owns and operates the vast majority of these infrastructures. Protecting critical infrastructure, therefore, requires the Federal Government to build partnerships with the private sector in all areas -- from business and higher education, to law enforcement, to R&D. The Secretary of Commerce and industry leaders -- mostly from Fortune 500 companies -- are leading the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security. The Attorney General has teamed up with the Information Technology Association of America to promote industry-government cooperation against cyber crime through the Cyber Citizen project. The NIPC, meanwhile, is establishing cooperative relationships between industry and law enforcement through its InfraGard initiative.
Some segments of our critical infrastructures have not historically devoted significant resources to protection from threats other than those caused by natural means. As a result, we are building a strong foundation for continued protection of our critical infrastructures. The public and private sectors must work together to conduct R&D in infrastructure protection and interdependencies, increase investment in training and educating cyber-security practitioners (to include building an adequate base of researchers in this new discipline), and find innovative technical, policy, and legal solutions that protect our infrastructures and preserve our civil rights.
National Security Emergency Preparedness
U.S. Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations programs remain a top national security priority into the 21st century. They preserve the capability to govern, lead, and perform essential functions and services to meet essential defense and civilian needs. Together with other security, critical infrastructure protection, and counterterrorism programs, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations programs remain an important hedge against current and emerging threats, and future uncertainties.
We will do all we can to deter and prevent destructive and threatening forces such as terrorism, NBC weapons use, disruption of our critical infrastructures, and regional or state-centered threats from endangering our citizens. But if an emergency occurs, we must be prepared to respond effectively at home and abroad to protect lives and property, mobilize the personnel, resources, and capabilities necessary to effectively handle the emergency, and ensure the survival of our institutions and infrastructures. To this end, comprehensive, all-hazard emergency planning by Federal departments, agencies and the military, as well as a strong and responsive industrial and technology base, will be maintained as crucial national security emergency preparedness requirements.
Fighting Drug Trafficking and Other International Crime
Broad ranges of criminal activities that originate overseas threaten the safety and well being of the American people.
Drug Trafficking.Drug use and its damaging consequences cost our society over $110 billion per year and poison the schools and neighborhoods where our youth learn and play. Aggressive law enforcement is dramatically weakening the domestic perpetrators of organized crime who have controlled America's drug trade for much of the past century. Today, international drug syndicates based abroad challenge us. The criminals who run the international drug trade continue to diversify and seek new markets in the United States -- moving beyond large cities into smaller communities and even rural towns. All Americans, regardless of economic, geographic, or other position in society, feel the effects of drug use.
The National Drug Control Strategy, both at home and abroad, integrates prevention and treatment with law enforcement and interdiction efforts. We aim to cut illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 50% by 2007, and reduce the health and social consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25% over the same period.
Domestically, we have engaged in a wide range of treatment and prevention efforts. We seek to educate and enable our youth to reject illegal drugs, increase the safety of U.S. citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence; reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use; reduce domestic cultivation of cannabis and production of methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs; and shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.
The Drug-Free Community Support program and the Drug-Free Schools and Communities program promote citizen participation in anti-drug efforts and help to provide drug-free learning environments for our children. The Office of National Drug Control Policy is leading the implementation of a $2 billion, multi-year, science-based, national media campaign on the consequences of youth drug use. In the law enforcement arena, we have assisted communities in their law enforcement efforts; are committed to stemming the flow of drugs into our country; and have enhanced coordination among Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to arrest and prosecute drug traffickers and abusers. Concerted efforts by the public, all levels of government, and the private sector, together with other governments, private groups, and international organizations will be required for our strategy to succeed.
Internationally, our strategy recognizes that the most effective counterdrug operations are mounted at the source where illegal drugs are grown and produced. Our efforts therefore center on supply reduction in major drug exporting countries. In these "source nations," we act to bolster the capabilities of governments to help them reduce cultivation by eradicating drug crops, develop alternative crops, destroy drug labs, and control chemicals used in illegal drug production. As a second line of defense, in the transit zone between source regions and the U.S. border, we detect, monitor, and communicate with partner nations on the movement of suspicious surface, sea, and air traffic outside the United States. We support interdiction programs to halt the shipment of illicit drugs. In concert with allies abroad, we pursue prosecution of major drug traffickers, dismantling drug trafficking organizations, prevention of money laundering, and elimination of criminal financial support networks.
In an example of such cooperative effort, the United States is providing $1.3 billion in support for Plan Colombia, President Andres Pastrana's effort to fight Colombian drug trafficking and strengthen democracy, as well as promote legitimate economic endeavors in Colombia. Since Colombian drug traffickers supply approximately 90% of the cocaine used in the United States, U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia's interdiction, eradication, and alternative crop development efforts will be necessary if we are to stem this deadly drug's flow into the United States. As an additional measure, we continue to strongly support interdiction programs to halt the flow of drugs across the U.S. border either by independent means or exploiting the U.S. transportation system.
Other International Crime. Economic globalization increasingly makes all nations and peoples vulnerable to various unlawful activities that impede rational business decisions and fair competition in a market economy. Such activities include, but are not limited to, extortion, corruption, migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, money laundering, counterfeiting, credit card and other financial fraud, and intellectual property theft. Many of these activities tend to impede or disrupt the safe and secure international movement of passengers and goods across international lines. They also attack the integrity and reliability of international financial systems. Corruption and extortion activities by organized crime groups can even undermine the integrity of government and imperil fragile democracies. And, the failure of governments to effectively control international crime rings within their borders or their willingness to harbor international criminals endangers global stability. There must be no safe haven where criminals can roam free, beyond the reach of our extradition and legal assistance treaties.
Open markets must be preserved, laws and regulations governing financial institutions must be standardized, and international law enforcement cooperation in the financial sector must be improved for the benefits of economic globalization to be preserved.
The United States is implementing a number of initiatives and strategies tailored to combat various forms of international crime. For example, we launched the National Money Laundering Strategy, under which the Departments of Treasury and Justice work to disrupt illegal profit flows to organized crime groups. The Presidential Decision Directive on International Organized Crime directs close coordination among Federal agencies to identify, target, and disrupt the activities of criminal groups, and the President's International Crime Control Strategy establishes the broad goals and implementing objectives for this effort. Finally, in December 2000, the United States published its first-ever comprehensive International Crime Threat Assessment detailing criminal activities around the globe that impact our national security.
The United States is pursuing efforts to combat international crimes that are economic in origin, but the effects of which transcend economics. They include crimes that result in the contamination of the environment, such as the illegal international movement of chloro-fluorocarbons (CFCs) that attack the ozone layer, thereby endangering all life on earth. They also include crimes that threaten the world's diversity through illegal trafficking in endangered and threatened species of flora and fauna. The United States continues to work with nations around the world to counter these crimes.
Smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including peacekeeping operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, neutralizing NBC weapons facilities, supporting counterdrug operations, protecting freedom of navigation in international waters, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coping with mass migration, and engaging in information operations. These challenging operations are likely to arise frequently and require significant commitments of human and fiscal resources over time. These operations also put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other United States Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners.
In general, SSC operations are aimed at checking aggression and addressing local and regional crises before they escalate or spread. Thus, while SSCs may involve other than "vital" national security interests, resolving SSCs gives us the chance to prevent greater and costlier conflicts that might well threaten U.S. vital interests.
The United States need not take on sole responsibility for operations and expenditures in SSCs. In fact, we have encouraged and supported friends and allies' assumption of both participatory and leadership roles in regional conflicts. Such encouragement, in theory, constitutes a fruitful middle ground between inaction and conflict. In practice, the United States has recently played a role in a number of successful coalition operations. These include participating in NATO-led Bosnia and Kosovo operations with predominantly European troop participation; providing logistical, intelligence, and other support to operations in East Timor; and supporting the United Nations' and Economic Community of West African States' leadership roles in seeking peace for Sierra Leone.
Coalition efforts in SSCs raise the critical question of command and control. Under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his constitutional command authority over U.S. forces. However, there may be times in the future, just as in the past, when it is in our interest to place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of a competent allied or United Nations commander.
There is an important role for the United Nations as a tool in managing conflict. UN peacekeeping operations can be a very effective alternative to direct intervention by the United States. The Brahimi report on peacekeeping reform offers many good recommendations that, if implemented, can make this tool even more effective as an instrument of policy.
As in regional conflict, conducting smaller-scale contingencies means confronting new threats such as terrorism, information attack, computer network operations, and the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. United States forces must also remain prepared to withdraw from contingency operations if they are needed in the event of a major theater war. Accordingly, we must continue to train, equip, and organize U.S. forces to be capable of performing multiple missions at any given time.
Major Theater Warfare
Fighting and winning major theater wars is the ultimate test of our Armed Forces -- a test at which they must always succeed. For the foreseeable future, the United States, preferably in concert with allies, must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. Maintaining a two major theater war capability reassures our friends and allies and makes coalition relationships with the United States more attractive. It deters opportunism elsewhere when we are heavily involved in deterring or defeating aggression in one theater, or while conducting multiple smaller-scale contingencies and engagement activities in other theaters. It also provides a hedge against the possibility that we might encounter threats larger or more difficult than expected. A strategy for deterring and defeating aggression in two theaters ensures that we maintain the capability and flexibility to meet unknown future threats, while continued global engagement helps preclude such threats from developing.
Fighting and winning major theater wars entails three challenging requirements. First, we must maintain the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of the enemy's objectives in two theaters, in close succession. We must maintain this ability to ensure that we can seize the initiative, minimize territory lost before an invasion is halted, and ensure the integrity of our warfighting coalitions. Failure to defeat initial enemy advances rapidly would make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory more difficult, lengthy and costly, and could undermine U.S. credibility and increase the risk of conflict elsewhere.
Second, the United States must be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means against us -- unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities. Because of our conventional military dominance, adversaries are likely to use asymmetric means, such as NBC weapons, information operations, attacks on our critical infrastructure, or terrorism. Such asymmetric attacks could be used to disrupt the critical logistics pipeline -- from its origins in the United States, along sea and air routes, at in-transit refueling and staging bases, to its termination at airfields, seaports, and supply depots in theater -- as well as our forces deployed in the field. The threat of NBC attacks against U.S. forces in theater or U.S. territory could be used in an attempt to deter U.S. military action in defense of its allies and other security interests.
We are enhancing the preparedness of our Armed Forces to effectively conduct sustained operations despite the presence, threat, or use of NBC weapons. These efforts include development, procurement, and deployment of theater missile defense systems to protect forward-deployed military personnel, as well as enhanced passive defenses against chemical and biological weapons, improved intelligence collection and counterforce capabilities, heightened security awareness and force protection measures worldwide. We are also enhancing our ability to defend against hostile information operations, which could, in the future, take the form of a full-scale, strategic information attack against our critical national infrastructures, government, and economy -- as well as attacks directed against our military forces.
Third, our military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement -- from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations. Withdrawing from such operations would pose significant political and operational challenges. Options available to the National Command Authorities (NCA) may include backfilling those forces withdrawn from contingency operations or substituting for forces committed to such operations. Ultimately, however, the United States must accept a degree of risk associated with withdrawing from contingency operations and engagement activities in order to reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to major theater wars.
The Decision to Employ Military Forces
The decision whether to use force is dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.
In situations posing a threat to important national interests, military forces should only be used if they are likely to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other non-military means are incapable of achieving our objectives. Such uses of military forces should be selective and limited, reflecting the importance of the interests at stake. We act in concert with the international community whenever possible, but do not hesitate to act unilaterally when necessary.
The decision to employ military forces to support our humanitarian and other interests focuses on the unique capabilities and resources the military can bring to bear, rather than on its combat power. Generally, the military is not the best tool for humanitarian concerns, but under certain conditions use of our Armed Forces may be appropriate. Those conditions exist when the scale of a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond, when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to provide an immediate response, when the military is needed to establish the preconditions necessary for effective application of other instruments of national power, when a humanitarian crisis could affect U.S. combat operations, or when a response otherwise requires unique military resources. Such efforts by the United States, preferably in conjunction with other members of the international community, will be limited in duration, have a clearly defined mission and end state, entail minimal risk to U.S. lives, and be designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.
In all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be commensurate with the interests at stake. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. Our involvement will be more circumscribed when regional states or organizations are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged with appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military tools.
In every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: have we explored or exhausted non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of achieving our goals? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the threat environment and what risks will our forces face? What level of effort will be needed to achieve our goals? What is the potential cost -- human and financial -- of the operation? What is the opportunity cost in terms of maintaining our capability to respond to higher-priority contingencies? Do we have milestones and a desired end state to guide a decision on terminating the mission? Is there an interagency or multinational political-military plan to ensure that hard-won achievements are sustained and continued in the mission area after the withdrawal of U.S. forces?
Having decided that use of military forces is appropriate, the decision on how they will be employed is based on two guidelines. First, our forces will have a clear mission and the means to achieve their objectives decisively. Second, as much as possible, we will seek the support and participation of our allies, friends, and relevant international institutions. When our vital interests are at stake, we are prepared to act alone. But in most situations, working with other nations increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions and lessens everyone's burden.
Sustaining our engagement abroad over the long term will require the support of the American people and the Congress to bear the costs of defending U.S. interests -- including the risk of losing U.S. lives. Some decisions to engage abroad with our military forces could well face popular opposition, but must ultimately be judged by whether they advance the interests of our nation in the long run. When we judge it to be in our interest to intervene, we must remain clear in our purposes and resolute in our actions. We must also ensure that protection of that force is a critical priority and that our protection efforts visibly dissuade potential adversaries.
Preparing for an Uncertain Future
We must prepare for an uncertain future, even as we address today's security problems. We need to look closely at our national security apparatus to ensure its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet new challenges. This means we must transform our capabilities and organizations -- diplomatic, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic -- to act swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats in today's continually evolving, highly complex international security environment. We must also have a strong, competitive, technologically superior, innovative, and responsive industrial and research and development base and a national transportation system with the resources and capacity to support disaster response and recovery efforts if national mobilization is required.
Strategically, our transformation within the military requires integrating activities in six areas: service concept development and experimentation; joint concept development and experimentation; robust processes to implement changes in the Services and joint community; focused science and technology efforts; international transformation activities; and new approaches to personnel development that foster a culture of bold innovation and dynamic leadership.
The military's transformation requires striking a balance among three critical funding priorities: maintaining the ability of our forces to shape and respond today; modernizing to protect the long-term readiness of the force; and exploiting the revolution in military affairs to ensure we maintain our unparalleled capabilities to shape and respond effectively in the future. Transformation also means taking prudent steps to position us to effectively counter unlikely but significant future threats -- particularly asymmetric threats.
Investment in research and development is an essential element of our transformation effort. It permits us to do what we do best: innovate, not copy. Revolutionary, not evolutionary, leaps will happen in an economy where new ideas can be pursued and quickly translated from vision to reality. It is a competitive advantage that leverages our technological breakthroughs into sustained military superiority. This requires support not only for bringing promising technologies out of the labs for insertion in weapons platforms, but also for fundamental research that will produce the as-yet-unknown technologies that will give the United States the revolutionary advantages we will need in the future. Ultimately, our development efforts must be practical and founded in war-fighting objectives tested through aggressive experimentation.
At the same time we push technological frontiers and transform our military, we also must address future interoperability with multinational partners. Since they will have varying levels of technology, a tailored approach to interoperability that accommodates a wide range of needs and capabilities is necessary. We must encourage our more technically advanced friends and allies to build the capabilities that are particularly important for interoperability, including the command, control, and communication capabilities that form the backbone of combined operations. We must help them bridge technological gaps, supporting international defense cooperation and multinational ventures where they enhance our mutual support and interoperability.
In May 2000, the United States spearheaded a Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI); a package of 17 measures designed to enhance allied interoperability and coalition warfighting capabilities by facilitating the transfer of critical U.S.-origin defense items to our allies. At the same time, DTSI promotes a strong and robust allied transnational defense industrial base that can provide innovative and affordable products needed to meet allied warfighting requirements for the 21st century.
Transformation extends well beyond the acquisition of new military systems -- we seek to leverage advanced technological, doctrinal, operational and organizational innovations both within government and in the commercial sector to give U.S. forces greater capabilities and flexibility. Joint Forces Command and the Armed Services are pursuing an aggressive, wide-ranging innovation and experimentation program to achieve that transformation. The Service programs focus on their core competencies and are organized to explore capability improvements in the near-, mid-, and far-term. The Joint Forces Command program ensures a strong joint perspective while also complementing efforts by the Services. A multilateral program has also been developed. NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative now includes both a NATO-centered and nation-centered concept development and experimentation program, which Joint Forces Command complements with a joint experimentation program to include allies, coalition partners and friends. A recently inaugurated interagency process on Contingency Planning offers the promise of improving the coordination among government agencies well before a crisis is at hand.
The on-going integration of the Active and Reserve components into a Total Force is another important element of the transformation. Despite the rapid pace of technological innovation, the human dimension of warfare remains timeless. In this era of multinational operations and complex threats involving ethnic, religious, and cultural strife, regional expertise, language proficiency, and cross-cultural communications skills have never been more important to the U.S. military. We will continue to transform and modernize our forces by recruiting, training, and retaining quality people at all levels of the military and among its civilian personnel who bring broad skills, an innovative spirit, and good judgement to lead dynamic change into the 21st century.
To support the readiness, modernization and transformation of our military forces, we will work with the Congress to enact legislation to implement the Defense Reform Initiative, which will free up resources through a revolution in business affairs. This effort includes competitive sourcing, acquisition reform, transformation of logistics, and elimination of excess infrastructure through two additional rounds of base realignment and closure. The Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will continue to ensure that we maintain the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led military force in the world for the 21st century.
In the area of law enforcement, the United States is already facing criminal threats that are much broader in scope and much more sophisticated than those we have confronted in the past. We must prepare for the law enforcement challenges arising from emerging technology, globalization of trade and finance, and other international dynamics. Our strategy for the future calls for the development of new investigative tools and approaches as well as increased integration of effort among law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, both in the United States and abroad.
We will continue efforts to construct appropriate 21st century national security programs and structures government-wide. We will continue to foster innovative approaches and organizational structures to better protect American lives, property and interests at home and abroad.
Globalization, which has drawn our economic and security interests closely together, is an inexorable trend in the post-Cold War international system. It is logical, then, for the United States to capture its positive energy and to limit its negative outcomes, where they exist. In doing both we will be able to promote shared prosperity, the second core objective of our national security strategy.
Strengthening Financial Coordination
As a result of economic globalization, prosperity for the United States and others is inextricably linked to foreign economic developments. Interdependence of this degree makes it incumbent upon the United States to be a cooperative leader and partner in the global financial system. This means doing our part to provide economic and political support to international financial institutions; working to reform them; equipping them with the tools necessary to react to future financial crises; and expanding them to embrace sustainable development efforts in emerging market economies.
Our objective is to build a stable, resilient global financial system that promotes strong global economic growth while providing broad benefits in all countries. Throughout the past seven years, Congress and the President have worked together to enhance funding for international economic institutions and programs. Promoting our prosperity requires us to sustain these commitments in the years and decades ahead.
Drawing on the lessons of the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and the Asian crises in 1997 and 1998, the United States took the lead in advocating steps to strengthen the architecture of the international financial system so that it more effectively promotes stronger policies in emerging market economies, works to prevent crises, and is better equipped to handle crises when they do occur. As part of a proactive effort to retool the system, the United States proposed creation of the Contingent Credit Line in the IMF to encourage countries to avoid crises. In addition to providing external incentives, it assists these countries to also improve their own debt management. The United States has also taken the initiative in 1999 and 2000, once financial stability was restored, to advocate a series of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These include restructuring lending instruments, introducing greater transparency and accountability into their operations, increasing efforts to reduce vulnerability in advance of crisis, and involving private sector creditors in crisis resolution.
Some developing countries face particularly difficult challenges in their efforts to achieve sustainable development. The HIPC Initiative, as both an international assistance and development tool, provides multilateral debt reduction to countries facing unmanageable debt burdens. In addition to providing $1 billion in support to the HIPC, the United States has led the IMF, World Bank, and other financial institutions to focus attention and resources on the health, education, environment, and poverty issues that surround sustainable development.
Promoting an Open Trading System
In a world where over 96% of the world's consumers live outside the United States, the Nation's domestic economic growth is predicated on our success in expanding trade with other nations.
Since 1993, the President has negotiated over 300 distinct trade agreements. Prominent among these have been the following, which have resulted in declining unemployment, rising standards of living, and robust economic growth in the United States:
• The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which institutionalized our trading relationship with Mexico and Canada. NAFTA created the world's largest free trade zone, expanded trade among its three signatories by over 85%, and generated increased U.S. exports to both Mexico and Canada. Mexico and Canada now take nearly 40% of U.S. exports.
• The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which created the WTO and created, or substantially expanded, multilateral trade rules and commitments to cover agriculture, services, and intellectual property rights. The WTO has been instrumental in assisting transition economies to progress from centrally planned to market economies and promoting growth and development in poor countries. The United States continuously leads accession negotiations with countries who are seeking WTO membership and who are willing to meet its high standards of market access and rules-based trading.
• Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, which will provide American farmers, businesses, and industries with market access to the world's most populous nation.
We have consistently advocated trade liberalization with our values in mind, ensuring that increased trade advances, rather than weakens, the rights of workers and the health of the environment.
NAFTA was historic because it mandated environmental and labor protections; it was the first trade agreement to explicitly create the link between trade liberalization and the protection of labor rights and the environment. History was again made this year when the United States entered into a Free Trade Agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Language in the agreement ensures that liberalization of trade between both nations, the protection of labor rights, and safeguarding the environment are mutually supportive.
The United States ensured that the WTO preamble established environmental protection as an overall objective of the parties to the agreement. In November of 1999, the President issued an executive order on Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements, an order requiring careful environmental analysis of major new trade agreements. The Office of the United States Trade Representative and the Council on Environmental Quality oversee the implementation of the order, ensuring that promoting trade and protecting the environment go hand-in-hand.
Numerous regional economic partnerships also facilitate global trade. In addition to NAFTA, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), the President's trade and investment initiative in Africa, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership, and negotiations to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005 promote open trade in other economic trading regions critical to our national security. With the enactment of the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act of 2000 and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, the United States set out to deepen and widen its regional economic relationships.
A Congressional grant of "fast track" authority to the President would enhance his ability to break down foreign trade barriers in a timely manner. "Fast track" promotes American prosperity, just as it expedites domestic job creation and economic growth.
Enhancing American Competitiveness
Gaining the full benefit of more open markets requires an integrated strategy that maintains our technological advantages, promotes American exports abroad, and ensures that export controls intended to protect our national security do not unnecessarily make U.S. high technology companies less competitive globally.
We will continue to support a vigorous science and technology base that promotes economic growth, creates high-wage jobs, sustains a healthy, educated citizenry, and provides the basis for our future military systems. We will continue to foster the open interchange of people and ideas that underpins our scientific and technological enterprise. We will invest in education and training to develop a workplace capable of participating in our rapidly changing economy. And, we will invest in world-class transportation, information, and space infrastructures for the 21st century.
The Administration created America's first national export strategy, working with the private sector to reform the way government and business cooperate to expand exports. The Trade Promotion Coordination Committee has been instrumental in improving export promotion efforts, coordinating our export financing, implementing a government-wide advocacy initiative, and updating market information systems and product standards education.
This export strategy is working, and the United States has regained its position as the world's largest exporter. While our strong export performance has supported millions of new, export-related jobs, we must export more in the years ahead if we are to further strengthen our trade balance position and raise living standards with high-wage jobs.
Enhanced Export Control
The United States is a world leader in high technology exports, including satellites, cellular phones, computers, information security, and commercial aircraft. Some of this technology has direct or indirect military applications, or may otherwise be used by states or transnational organizations to threaten our national security. For that reason, the United States Government carefully controls high technology exports by placing appropriate restrictions on the sale of goods and technologies that could impair our security. Imposing these controls recognizes that, in an increasingly competitive global economy, where there are many non-U.S. suppliers, excessive restrictions will not limit the availability of high technology goods. Rather, they serve only to make U.S. high technology companies less competitive globally, thus losing market share and becoming less able to produce cutting-edge products for the U.S. military and our allies.
Our current export control policy recognizes that we must balance a variety of factors. On the one hand, our policies must promote and encourage the sale of our most competitive goods abroad, while on the other, they must ensure that technologies that facilitate proliferation of F do not end up in the wrong hands. Our policies therefore promote high technology exports by making dual-use license decisions more transparent, predictable, and timely through a rigorous licensing process administered by the Department of Commerce at the same time that we ensure a thorough review of dual-use applications by the Departments of Defense, State, and Energy. Any agency that disagrees with a proposed export can enter the issue into a dispute resolution process that, if necessary, may ultimately rise to the President for adjudication. As a result, reviews of dual-use licenses are today more thorough than ever before. In the case of munitions exports, we are committed to a policy of responsible restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and technologies. A key goal in the years ahead is to strengthen worldwide controls in this area, while facilitating exports of items that we wish to go to our allies and coalition partners. The DTSI, which we look to enhance our future interoperability with our friends and allies, is one such effort that will streamline U.S. munitions export control processes while also devoting additional resources to increasing the security scrutiny applied to munitions exports. The President's decision to seek agreements with close allies that would permit extension of Canada-like exemptions to the ITAR for low risk exports will significantly enhance U.S. competitiveness while also enhancing export controls.
Encryption is an example of a specific technology that requires careful balance. Export controls on encryption must be a part of an overall policy that balances several important national interests, including promoting secure electronic commerce, protecting privacy rights, supporting public safety and national security interests, and maintaining U.S. industry leadership. After reviewing its encryption policy and consulting with industry, privacy and civil liberties groups, the Administration implemented significant updates to encryption export controls in January 2000 and concluded a second update in October 2000. The new policy continues a balanced approach by streamlining export controls while protecting critical national security interests. U.S. companies now have new opportunities to sell their software and hardware products containing encryption, without limits on key length, to global businesses, commercial organizations and individuals. Most U.S. mass-market software products, previously limited to 56 and 64 bit keys, are approved for export to any end user.
In October 2000, the Administration finished another review of its policy to ensure that it maintains balance while taking into account advances in technology and changes in foreign and domestic markets. The most significant change is that the U.S. encryption industry may now export encryption items and technology license-free to the European Union and among several countries (including major trading partners outside of Western Europe). The update is consistent with recent regulations adopted by the European Union; thus assuring continued competitiveness of U.S. industry in international markets. Other policy provisions implemented to facilitate technological development include streamlined export provisions for beta test software, products that implement short-range wireless encryption technologies, products that enable non-U.S.-sourced products to operate together, and technology for standards development. Post-export reporting is also streamlined to increase the relief to U.S. companies of these requirements. Reporting will no longer be required for products exported by U.S.-owned subsidiaries overseas, or for generally available software pre-loaded on computers or handheld devices. These initiatives will assure the continuing competitiveness of U.S. companies in international markets, consistent with the national interest in areas such as electronic commerce, national security, and support to law enforcement.
Similarly, computer technology is an area where the application of export controls must balance our national security concerns with efforts to promote and strengthen America's competitiveness. It is likely we will continue to face extraordinarily rapid technological changes that demand a regular review of export controls. Maintaining outdated controls on commodity-level computers would hurt U.S. companies without benefiting our national security. For these reasons, in February 2000, the Administration announced reforms to computer export controls; the reforms permit sales of higher-level computer technology to countries friendly to the United States. Export control agencies will also review advances in computer technology on an ongoing basis and provide the President with recommendations for updating computer export controls every six months.
U.S. efforts to stem proliferation cannot be effective without the cooperation of other countries. We have strengthened cooperation through a host of international WMD nonproliferation regimes, and we will continue to actively seek greater transparency in conventional arms transfers. These efforts enlist the world community in the battle against the proliferation of WMD, advanced conventional weapons and sensitive technologies, while at the same time producing a level playing field for U.S. business by ensuring that our competitors face corresponding export controls.
Providing for Energy Security
The United States depends on oil for about 40% of its primary energy needs, and roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports. And although we import less than 15% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, our allies in Europe and Asia account for about 80% of those exports. For some years, the United States has been undergoing a fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East oil. Venezuela is consistently one of our top foreign suppliers, and Africa now supplies 15% of our imported oil. Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela combined supply almost twice as much oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC countries. The Caspian Basin, with potential oil reserves of 160 billion barrels, also promises to play an increasingly important role in meeting rising world energy demand in coming decades.
Conservation measures and research leading to greater energy efficiency and alternative fuels are a critical element of the U.S. strategy for energy security. Our research must continue to focus on developing highly energy-efficient buildings, appliances, and transportation and industrial systems, shifting them where possible to alternative or renewable fuels, such as hydrogen, fuel cell technology, ethanol, or methanol from biomass.
Conservation and energy research notwithstanding, the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil sources. We must continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability and security in key producing areas, as well as our ability to use our naval power, if necessary, to ensure our access to, and the free flow of, these resources.
Promoting Sustainable Development
True and lasting social and economic progress must occur in a sustainable fashion, that meets the human and environmental needs for enduring growth. Common but reparable impediments to sustainable development include:
• Lack of education, which shuts people out from participation in technological advance.
• Disease and malnutrition, which stifle productivity.
• Pollution, environmental degradation, and unsustained population growth, the remediation of which is much more costly than pre-emptive action.
• Uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources (e.g., overhunting or overfishing of species for food, overcutting of timber for firewood, overgrazing of grasslands by cattle), which can be serious impediments to sustainable development.
• Unsustainable foreign debt obligations, which encourage currency devaluations and capital flight, and can absorb a substantial share of small economies' resources.
Efforts by the United States to foster sustainable development include:
• Promoting sound development policies that help build the economic and social framework needed to encourage economic growth and poverty reduction and facilitate the effective use of external assistance.
• Debt relief to free up developing countries' resources for meeting the basic needs of their people. The United States led the G-7 in adopting the Cologne Debt Initiative for reducing debts owed them by those of the world's poorest countries committed to sound policies that promote economic growth and poverty reduction. The resulting plan is embodied in the HIPC Initiative.
• Public health assistance consisting of grants, loans, and tax incentives for the prevention and treatment of epidemics such as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, as well as the training of individuals to continue providing public health services.
• Human capacity development assistance for basic education and literacy programs, job skills training, and other programs specifically designed to protect women's health, provide educational opportunity, and promote women's empowerment.
• Leadership in the G-8 and OECD to raise environmental standards for export credit agencies and international financial institutions.
In consonance with our values, when a nation that embraces globalization gets left behind, the United States and other proponents of globalization should reach out a hand. Doing so in a manner that promotes not just development, but sustainable development, enhances regional stability, steadily expands the economic growth on which demand for our exports depends, and honors our values, which encourage us to share our wealth with others and inspire growth for more than just ourselves.
Promoting Democracy and Human Rights
The third goal of our national security strategy is to promote democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law. Since the founding of the republic, our actions as a Nation have always been guided by our belief that individuals should control their own destinies: economically, politically, and spiritually. Our core values -- political and economic freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law -- support this belief, guiding the conduct of our government at home as well as in its dealings with others outside our borders. Much as John Winthrop set a standard for early colonists that we "be as a city upon a hill," nearly four centuries later we still seek to demonstrate the power of our democratic ideals and values by our example. This does not make us turn inward or isolationist, nor should it be interpreted as a bid for hegemony. Rather, in keeping with our values, we have lent our encouragement, support, and assistance to those nations and peoples that freely desire to achieve the same benefits of liberty. The extraordinary movement of nations away from repressive governance and toward democratic and publicly accountable institutions over the last decade reflects how these ideals, when allowed to be freely shared, can spread widely and rapidly, enhancing the security of all nations. Despite some minor setbacks for a few of the newer democracies in the last several years, the trend continues. Since the success of many of those changes is by no means assured, our strategy must focus on strengthening the commitment and capacity of nations to implement democratic reforms, protect human rights, fight corruption and increase transparency in government. For this reason, we join with other nations in creating the community of democracies. In June 2000, 106 countries meeting in Warsaw, Poland endorsed the Warsaw Declaration laying out criteria for democracy and pledging to help each other remain on the democratic path.
The United States works to strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in all countries, particularly those making the transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic. Our security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries and threaten the stability of entire regions.
The sometimes difficult road for new democracies in the 1990's demonstrates that free elections are not enough. Genuine, lasting democracy also requires respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; a robust civil society and strong Non-governmental Organization (NGO) structures; the rule of law and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; full respect for women's and workers' rights; and civilian control of the military.
The United States is helping consolidate democratic and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Integrating new democracies in Europe into European political, economic and security organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress these nations have made in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms. Consolidating advances in democracy and free markets in our own hemisphere remains a high priority. In the Asia Pacific region, economic dynamism is increasingly associated with political modernization, democratic evolution, and the widening of the rule of law. Indonesia's October 1999 election was a significant step toward democracy and we will do our part to help Indonesia continue on that path. In Africa, we are particularly attentive to states, such as South Africa and Nigeria, whose entry into the community of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region.
The methods for assisting emerging democracies are as varied as the nations involved. Our public diplomacy programs are designed to share our democratic experience in both government and civil society with the publics in emerging democracies. We must continue leading efforts to mobilize international economic and political resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine, and other countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and with Southeast Europe. We must take firm action to help counter attempts to reverse democracy, as has happened in Fiji, Haiti, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Peru.
We must help democratizing nations strengthen the pillars of civil society by supporting administration of justice and rule of law programs; promoting the principle of civilian control of the military; and training foreign police and security forces to solve crimes and maintain order without violating the basic human rights of their citizens. And we must seek to improve their market and educational institutions, fight corruption and political discontent by encouraging good governance practices, and encourage a free and independent local media that may promote these principles without fear of reprisal.
Adherence to Universal Human Rights and Democratic Principles
We must sustain our efforts to press for adherence to democratic principles, and respect for basic human rights and the rule of law worldwide, including in countries that continue to defy democratic advances. Working bilaterally and through international institutions, the United States promotes universal adherence to democratic principles and international standards of human rights. Our efforts in the United Nations, the Community of Democracies, and other organizations continue to make these principles the governing standards for acceptable international behavior.
Ethnic conflict represents a great challenge to our values and our security. When it erupts in ethnic cleansing or genocide, ethnic conflict becomes a grave violation of universal human rights. We find it clearly opposed to our national belief that innocent civilians should never be subject to forcible relocation or slaughter because of their religious, ethnic, racial, or tribal heritage. Ethnic conflict can also threaten regional stability and may well give rise to potentially serious national security concerns. When this occurs, the intersection of our values and national interests make it imperative that we take action to prevent -- and whenever possible stop -- outbreaks of mass killing and displacement.
At other times the imperative for action will be much less clear. The United States and other nations cannot respond to every humanitarian crisis in the world. But when the world community has the power to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing, we will work with our allies and partners, and with the United Nations, to mobilize against such violence -- as we did in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Our response will not be the same in every case. Sometimes concerted economic and political pressure, combined with diplomacy, is the best answer. At other times, collective military action is appropriate, feasible, and necessary. The way the international community responds will depend upon the capacity of countries to act, and on their perception of their national interests.
Events in the Bosnia conflict and preceding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda demonstrate the pernicious power of inaccurate and malicious information in conflict-prone situations. This made apparent our need to effectively use our information capabilities to counter misinformation and incitement, prevent and mitigate ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation. As a result, in the spring of 1999, the President directed that all public diplomacy and international information efforts be coordinated and integrated into our foreign and national security policy-making process.
We will also continue to work -- bilaterally and with international institutions -- to ensure that international human rights principles protect the most vulnerable or traditionally oppressed groups in the world -- women, children, indigenous people, workers, refugees, and other persecuted persons. To this end, we will seek to strengthen international mechanisms that promote human rights and address violations of international humanitarian law, such as the LIN Commission on Human Rights and the international war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. We strongly support wide ratification of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. We also aim to implement fully those international human rights treaties to which we are a party.
It is our aim to ensure protection for persons fleeing situations of armed conflict or generalized human rights abuses by encouraging governments not to return refugees to countries where they face persecution or torture. We also seek to focus additional attention on the more vulnerable or traditionally oppressed people by spearheading new international initiatives to combat the sexual exploitation of minors, child labor, use of child soldiers, and homelessness among children.
Violence against, and trafficking in, women and children are international problems with national implications. We have seen cases of trafficking in the United States for purposes of forced prostitution, sweatshop labor, and domestic servitude. Our efforts have expanded to combat this problem, both nationally and internationally, by increasing awareness, focusing on prevention, providing victim assistance and protection, and enhancing law enforcement. The President continues to call upon the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which will enhance our efforts to combat violence against women, reform unfair inheritance and property rights, and strengthen women's access to fair employment and economic opportunity.
Promotion of religious freedom is one of the highest concerns in our foreign policy. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a bedrock issue for the American people. To that end, the President signed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which provides the flexibility needed to advance religious freedom and to counter religious persecution. In September 1999, we completed the first phase outlined in the Act with publication of the first annual report on the status of religious freedom worldwide, a 1,100 page document covering the status of religious freedom in 194 countries. In October, we designated and sanctioned the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, and the Milosevic regime in Serbia as "countries of particular concern" for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The United States is active throughout the world assisting those who are persecuted because of their religion and promoting freedom of religious belief and practice. We will continue to work with individual nations and with international institutions to combat religious persecution and promote religious freedom.
The United States will continue to speak out against human rights abuses and it will continue to carry on human rights dialogues with countries willing to engage us constructively. Because police and internal security services can be a source of human rights violations, we use training and contacts between U.S. law enforcement and their foreign counterparts to help address these problems. We do not provide training to police or military units implicated in human rights abuses. When appropriate, we are prepared to take strong measures against human rights violators. These include economic sanctions, visa restrictions, and restricting sales of arms and police equipment that may be used to commit human rights abuses. The Administration proposed legislation to prevent the United States from becoming a safe haven for human rights violators. Both the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are coordinating investigative efforts on cases involving allegations of human rights abuse to pursue criminal prosecution or administrative removal proceedings in appropriate instances.
In the 1990s, the United States took the lead in seeking compensation for Holocaust survivors, many of whom are impoverished. Over a million individuals are eligible to apply for benefits under agreements concluded with Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. We must now be certain that these agreements are carried out in a fair and equitable manner, and that steps are taken to complete the work we have commenced in the areas of Holocaust education, the payment of Holocaust era insurance policies, and the restitution of art and other property.
Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering, address resource and economic crises that could have global implications, and pursue appropriate strategies for economic development.
We also must seek to promote reconciliation in states experiencing civil conflict and to address migration and refugee crises. To this end, the United States will provide appropriate financial support and work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. We also will assist efforts to protect the rights of refugees and displaced persons and to address the economic and social root causes of internal displacement and international flight.
Private firms and NGOs that principally address human rights issues or democratic principles often become natural allies in assisting in the relief of humanitarian crises. We frequently find we have natural partners in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, and chambers of commerce in providing international humanitarian assistance. In providing this often life saving assistance, these private and non-governmental groups visibly demonstrate another aspect of, and complement to, our democratic values -- one of helping others in need. All of these values are thus seen by the individuals and governments helped by these organizations, and they underscore why our support of the humanitarian assistance efforts of private and non-governmental groups is in keeping with our values and objective of promoting democracy and human rights.
Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic, long-term effort focused on both values and institutions. Our goal is a broadening of the community of free-market democracies, and stronger institutions and international non-governmental movements committed to human rights and democratization.