Tailored Responses

**Informational**
- Place sanctions on C4I tech transfers
- Protect friendly C4I assets
- Maintain open dialogue with press
- Heighten public awareness

**Diplomatic**
- Show international resolve
- Reduce diplomatic ties
- Win support of allies and friends
- Evacuate American citizens (NEO)

**Flexible Deterrent Options**
**Small Discriminate Response Options**

**Military**
- Increase reconnaissance collection
- Activate procedures to begin reserve callup
- Initiate show of force actions
- Exercise pre-positioned equipment
- Deploy CVBG or SAG to the region

**Economic**
- Discontinue assistance programs
- Freeze international assets
- Enact trade sanctions
- Restrict corporate transactions
- Seize real property in the US

*Figure 4-14*
(a) **Case 1 Forces (FDOs).** Case 1 forces are primarily in-place and augmentation forces from the Active Component appropriate for an array of FDOs the CINC might develop for use during a period of ambiguous warning. Augmentation forces are rapidly deployable and relatively small, as previously described. The augmentation force may contain subunits of a larger force from Case 2.

(b) **Case 2 Forces (Early Deployers for Deploy-Decisive-Force).** Built on Case 1 forces, the Case 2 forces include Active and that portion of the Reserve forces needed to move and sustain a major force deployment from CONUS. They give the CINC a significant level of force that would be used in the early stages of a Deploy-Decisive-Force option.

(c) **Case 3 Forces (Deploy-Decisive-Force).** Built on Case 1 and Case 2 forces, the Case 3 forces are apportioned based on unambiguous warning in which the enemy initially may not have completed preparation for war. They include Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) and partial mobilization reinforcements, and are the forces available to the CINC during CONPLAN development.

(d) **Case 4 Forces (Counterattack/Decisive Force).** The Case 4 forces build on Case 1, 2, and 3 forces and comprise additional Active units and Reserve forces required and made available under partial mobilization. Case 4 forces are phased into the
CONPLAN to support the concept with the decisive force needed to quickly end a regional conflict on terms favorable to the United States.

(e) **Concurrent Contingencies.** The purpose of dividing MTW force apportionment into the four cases is to deconflict planned employment of forces apportioned to more than one CINC for planning in anticipation of concurrent contingencies. If an MTW is the first of two sequentially developing contingencies, not all of its Case 4 forces, even though phased into the CONPLAN, may be available at execution, as those units could be allocated to a second contingency. In the case of the second of two sequentially developing contingencies where significant forces have been committed to the first, in-place Case 1 forces may be the only forces available for planning an initial response. Other later deploying (Case 4) forces are apportioned for the purpose of counteroffensive operations should deterrence fail. CINC’s receive tasks in the JSCP to produce plans that outline how they will deal with such eventualities. It must be remembered that

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**Examples of Military Flexible Deterrent Options**

- Employ ready in-place units
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase strategic reconnaissance
- Increase collection efforts
- Initiate or increase show-of-force actions
- Employ electronic measures
- Conduct aircraft flyovers
- Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
- Increase military exchanges and staff visits to the area
- Pre-stage or deploy contingency ready brigades
- Pre-stage airlift
- Pre-stage airlift support assets
- Institute provisions of existing host-nation agreements
- Emplace logistics infrastructure where possible
- Impose restrictions on military personnel retirements, separations, and leaves; establish curfews
- Open pre-positioned storage facilities
- Deploy SAG/MAG to the region
- Deploy CVBG to the region
- Move MEB to the region
- Raise units’ deployment status
- Begin moving forces to air and sea ports of embarkation
- Increase mobile training teams
- Deploy tactical fighter squadrons
- Move forward-deployed ARG/MEU(SOC) to the region
- Activate procedures to begin reserve callup
- Increase naval port calls or air squadron visits to the area
- Deploy AWACS to the region
- Move MPS/AWR to the region
- Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
- Open and secure sea and air lines of communication
- Pre-stage sealift and airlift reception
- Assets to air and seaports of embarkation
- Increase informational efforts
  - PSYOP
  - Measures directed at the military forces of the opponent
  - Mission awareness

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Figure 4-16
### Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Promote democratic elections
- Reduce national embassy personnel
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
- Alter existing meetings, programs or schedules
- Take actions to win support of allies and friends
- Identify the national leader who may be able to solve the problem
- Use the UN or other international institutions
- Work within an existing coalition or alliance (seek to avoid unilateral actions whenever possible)
- Increase cultural group pressure
- Restrict activities of diplomats
- Show international resolve
- Clearly identify the steps to a peaceful resolution
- Prepare to withdraw U.S. embassy personnel
- Pursue measures to increase regional support
- Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
- Initiate actions to start the development of a coalition of nations
  - Heighten informational efforts directed at:
  - the international community
  - the people within the nation
  - the allies of the opponent
  - the coalition formed to overcome the crisis

### Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze monetary assets in the U.S.
- Seize real property in the U.S.
- Enact trade sanctions
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Sponsor trade sanctions/embargo actions in UN and/or other international organizations
- Reduce security assistance program
- Embargo goods and services
- Cancel U.S.-funded programs
- Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
- Heighten international efforts directed at:
  - financial institutions, questioning the soundness of continuing actions with the opponent’s businesses
  - reducing or eliminating corporate transactions