How many rogue states will the United States face in coming years? Moreover, how will their access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) affect their conduct? How will they affect regional stability? This chapter’s theme is that the combination of assertive rogue states and accelerating proliferation will result in major threats to U.S. national security.

Rogue states are proving more durable than anticipated. They also are likely to increase in number as more societies experience globalization’s negative effects. This greater number of rogues will be qualitatively more dangerous as the proliferation of WMD accelerates. The problem is aggravated by declining support from the core Western states for U.S. efforts to isolate rogue states and by increasing political and material support from transition states.

These trends will make protecting U.S. interests increasingly difficult. Rogues armed with WMD will aim to destabilize key regions and to constrain U.S. forces operating in areas like the Strait of Hormuz or on contaminated battlefields. The United States may find coalition building more difficult. Partners and allies may become reluctant to support the United States openly, as rogue states increasingly target vulnerable homelands and such threats become less attributable. The endurance of rogue states is also making it difficult to maintain international sanctions against them, especially when sanctions affect their societies more than their leaders. The greatest challenge may be the development of coalitions between rogue states and states that are disaffected with the Western democratic core. Such coalitions could provide rogue states with improved military capabilities while making it difficult to build international opposition against them.

The trend toward a growing number of rogues, with some of them acquiring WMD systems, poses an important challenge to U.S. policy and strategy. A variety of response options is available and will need to be pursued—for example, creating effective regional security strategies, mobilizing support from allies, and strengthening U.S. forces.

Key Trends

Previous Strategic Assessments have argued that the international system is divided into four groups of states: market democracies, transition states, rogues, and failing states. This framework assumed that the threat of rogue states was in decline because their conventional military capabilities had been diminished.
This assumption requires adjustment. Trends now suggest that the world is becoming a murkier and more dangerous place. They suggest the emergence of a greater number of rogue-threats, increased use of terrorism, breakdown of nonproliferation regimes, diminished support for isolating rogues, and an emerging group of stagnant states neither in the democratic core nor actively working against it.

Enduring Rogue States and the Growing Disaffected

Rogue states are not disappearing from the scene. Of those on the U.S. Department of State’s list of states sponsoring terrorism, the majority are ruled by long-standing leaders. Saddam Hussein has survived the Gulf War and 8 years of stringent UN sanctions. While signs of resistance occasionally appear, there are no indications that Hussein is in serious jeopardy. Kim Jong-il appears to have consolidated power in North Korea and received the military’s backing despite catastrophic poverty among the people. Libya’s Muammar Ghadafi may be more vulnerable, but there is little evidence of organized opposition or a more moderate leadership to follow. Syria and Iran are likely to remain rogues as long as their current leaders remain entrenched. Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo has been enough to provoke military action by NATO.

In addition to rogues not being displaced, globalization may be creating new rogue states and organizations. Although no major ideology challenges market-oriented democracy, globalization is dividing the world into camps of winners and losers. The less developed a state is, the less it seems to benefit from globalization. The winners are winning more and the losers are losing more. Consequently, the core of market democracies is managing globalization and becoming increasingly integrated, while less-developed states are disintegrating from the pressure of globalization. The growing chasm between the democratic core and the “have nots” portends a greater number of states and groups that see themselves excluded from the benefits of globalization. They have little stake in preserving international norms. Such states, as well as disenfranchised transnational organizations, are likely to join existing rogue states.

Rogue states have differing ideologies and specific aims, but what unites them is that they commonly have local and regional agendas aimed at altering the status quo by violence if necessary. Both Iraq and Iran aspire to control the Persian Gulf region. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula. Syria seeks to intimidate Israel and to control its sector of the Middle East. Serbia seeks ethnic domination of the Balkan region. Such aspirations typically lead rogues to threaten their neighbors, many of which are friends and allies of the United States, or to control local resources that are needed by the Western community.

Recent experience shows that rogues are often willing to behave assertively, especially against vulnerable neighbors, even when the United States and the Western community are aligned against them. They do not respond by tempering their ambitions and behavior when the normal array of political and economic pressures are applied. Their desire to alter the regional status quo leads them to be willing to pay high costs and accept major risks.

What constrains them is that they tend to be only medium-sized powers with poor economies, which limits their national power. Yet, except on the Korean peninsula, they often are larger and stronger than their immediate neighbors. In the past, they have relied upon conventional military power and offensive capabilities to intimidate their neighbors; Iraq and North Korea are good examples. If they acquire WMD systems, this will enhance their national power and coercive capabilities. Their main aim will likely be not to challenge the United States on the world stage, but to pursue their regional agendas against neighbors that will be even more intimidated than before, and to weaken Western resolve to oppose them. Access to WMD systems will not necessarily transform all rogues into fearless aggressors, nor does it make them undeterable. But all the same, this development spells trouble.

Improving Rogue Arsenals

While nonproliferation regimes remain important, they appear to be breaking down in key regions. While not rogue states, India and Pakistan openly tested nuclear weapons and declared their intention to deploy nuclear systems despite the clear threat of severe political and economic sanctions by the United States.
Iraq seems impervious to international pressures to abandon its WMD programs. In September 1998, Saddam Hussein refused to permit continued inspections by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM). Moreover, French laboratories verified the presence of VX nerve gas on missile fragments from the Iraqi arsenal. Absent UN restrictions, Iraq would almost certainly reconstitute its ballistic missile program, as well as its nuclear, chemical, and biological programs.

North Korea’s August 1998 test of a three-stage Taepo Dong missile variant, in an attempt to put a satellite into orbit, and construction of hardened underground facilities suggest that it, too, continues to pursue better and longer range WMD. The Rumsfeld Commission assessed that North Korea could reach major U.S. cities in Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands with its current

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**Foreign Terrorist Organizations**

Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, October 8, 1997.

- Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
- Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
- Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
- Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
- Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Hawatmeh Faction (DFLP)
- HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
- Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA)
- Hizbollah (Party of God)
- Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
- Japanese Red Army (JRA)
- al-Jihad
- Kach
- Kahane Chai
- Khmer Rouge
- Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
- Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
- Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents (FPMR/D)
- Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO)
- National Liberation Army (ELN)
- Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
- Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP–GC)
- Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
- Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
- Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA)
- Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
- Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
An inventory of Taepo Dong missiles—and could modify existing platforms to reach the majority of the United States. Both the Taepo Dong and the medium-range No Dong missiles could reach Japan and South Korea. Additionally, North Korea maintains an active WMD program and has a record of proliferating technologies.

**Asymmetric Threats**

The possession of WMD by rogue states poses several risks. One risk is that they may use these weapons to coerce their neighbors. Another risk is that WMD may allow rogues to deter outside intervention. This would permit them to conduct conventional aggression against neighbors. This risk will increase if rogues achieve conventional force superiority over their neighbors.

Rogue states with WMD are less likely to directly challenge U.S. forces. U.S. nuclear forces and conventional strike capabilities are overpowering. Instead, rogue states may increasingly use asymmetric strategies to challenge U.S. military power in indirect but potentially effective ways. Such strategies may attempt to find a way to prevent U.S. forces from being used at all, or at least prevent them from being used effectively.

Asymmetric strategies encompass attacks on “soft” targets, such as U.S. civilians and nonmilitary facilities. Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam exemplify such a strategy. Terrorism is increasingly being incorporated into asymmetric strategies. President Clinton placed terrorism at the top of America’s security agenda. Secretary of Defense William Cohen characterizes terrorism as “the new global struggle,” replacing the confrontation with the Soviet Union.

While the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report indicates that the number of terrorist incidents has declined, the number of casualties has sharply increased. The number of international terrorist incidents fell from a peak of 666 in 1987 to a 25-year low of 304 in 1997. Two-thirds of these attacks were “minor acts of politically motivated violence against commercial targets which caused no deaths and few casualties.” Yet the deaths from terrorism climbed from 163 in 1995 to 311 in 1996, indicating a “trend toward more ruthless attacks on mass civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs.” Terrorist attacks are increasingly focused on the United

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**International Terrorist Incidents, 1978–97**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
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<td>97</td>
<td>304</td>
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Source: U.S. Department of State.

Despite Iran’s less aggressive rhetoric about harming Israel or the United States, renunciation of the fatwa death sentence against Salman Rushdie, cooperation with Saudi Arabia, and President Mohammad Khatami’s claims that Iran will no longer support terrorism, Iran continues to pursue a ballistic missile program. It has already tested the medium-range Shahab 3 missile and has the technical capability and resources to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile similar to the Taepo Dong 2. Iran’s capability will increase exponentially if it succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, as is likely in the coming few years.

As WMD technology becomes cheaper, it becomes more available. States and substate groups alike are gaining access to WMD, long-range delivery systems, and accurate guidance systems. Market mechanisms that allow easier movement of people, goods, and services than before also make tracking and preventing proliferation a more challenging task. Some WMD devices can be delivered by terrorists driving trucks or carrying briefcases.
States and symbols of its power, rather than commercial interests or the West in general.

**Assistance from Transition States**

Previous *Strategic Assessments* assumed that transition states were moving inexorably toward the Western democratic core. However, many states are likely to be neither market democracies nor clearly opposed to them. These states do not accept the Western assumption that democracy and vibrant economies are natural partners. Chinese and Singaporean leaders, for example, seem to be adopting free-market economies but rejecting democracy, claiming an “Asian values” model as their long-term stasis. Conversely, Russia appears to accept democracy without fully embracing the principles of a market-oriented economy.

As a result of this more complicated pattern of development, transition states are less likely to support the values of the Western core or identify with their interests. Many countries are actively proliferating technical expertise for commercial and political gains. The Russian Government claims to oppose nuclear and missile proliferation but either cannot or will not prevent Russian companies and individuals from doing so. China provided design and material assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Transition states are substantially contributing to the arsenals of rogues, and this is likely to increase over time.

Transition states also are helping defend the interests of rogue states in international arenas. Russia has long sought to prevent NATO military action against the Serbs in both Bosnia and Kosovo. China and Russia opposed U.S. military action against Iraq during the September 1998 crisis. Many transition states see their interests served by preventing what they perceive to be U.S. hegemony.

**Diminishing Support for Isolating Rogues**

Not only are transition states not supporting policies to isolate rogues, even America’s closest allies contest the policy of isolating rogues. European allies categorically reject extraterritorial U.S. action to punish companies doing business with Cuba, Libya, or Iran. France’s oil consortium openly challenged U.S. sanctions by investing in Iranian oil fields. Canadian companies invest in Cuba with regularity.

**U.S. Interests**

The increasing number of rogue states and accelerating proliferation are key reasons for the more dangerous international security environment than was envisioned in previous *Strategic Assessments*. The United States will likely be confronted with a greater number of states and organizations that pose threats to our interests. Those organizations will resort to terrorism and local coercion of neighbors rather than directly engaging U.S. conventional forces. The breakdown of nonproliferation regimes will enable these states to acquire a variety of WMD and long-range delivery systems. They are likely to receive support from transition states, and the core of democratic states may be less likely to support U.S. interests. These changes will further compound the problem of protecting and advancing U.S. interests.

**Protecting U.S. Territory and Citizens**

Protecting U.S. citizens and territory, while carrying out commitments to allies, remains the paramount U.S. security interest, but the United
States will need to adapt its policies and military forces to address the new threats. The increase in rogue states and organizations will make the security environment less predictable, which will require greater flexibility in policies and forces. The United States will also have a strong interest in preventing coalitions among rogues. Some rogues already share information and technology and conduct coordinated attacks. The United States needs to carefully monitor and, where possible, prevent such collaboration.

**Countering Terrorism**

Increased terrorism portends a serious challenge to protecting U.S. citizens and territory. The openness of U.S. society makes the problem all but unmanageable: four hundred million people travel to the United States each year; eight hundred thousand aircraft land at U.S. airports; and nine million cargo containers arrive by ship. Rogues are likely to exploit these vulnerabilities. The United States will be unable to effectively manage a defense against all possible threats absent a major redirection of funding for intelligence, monitoring immigration, controlling borders and coastal waters, and better coordination across agencies.

Protecting forward-deployed U.S. forces and ensuring their operational effectiveness will also be more difficult because of logistics support, and are likely to be within range of ballistic missiles, whose short flight times will make interception difficult.

**Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation**

The increasingly apparent breakdown of nonproliferation regimes does not negate U.S. interest in continuing existing regimes as long as possible and finding better ways to prevent proliferation. But more rogues armed with more accurate, long-range WMD argue strongly for better protection of U.S. citizens and territory than may have seemed necessary in the past. Protecting U.S. citizens and territory will also be an important element in preserving public willingness to remain engaged in the world and defending U.S. interests beyond U.S. borders.

In addition to defending against WMD attacks where possible, figuring out how to deter acquisition of WMD and their use against U.S. targets should be a top priority. It is unclear whether the same calculus that determined the behavior of nuclear weapons states in the past will motivate rogues. An important component of deterring WMD attacks will be demonstrating that WMD will not deter the United States itself from defending its interests. U.S. forces will need to have the capability to operate effectively in WMD polluted environments, and the American public will need to become inured to the prospect of the U.S. military fighting in these environments.

**Reducing the Potential for Rogue States**

Integrating states into the global economy and the democratic core will be important to managing the threat of rogues and WMD. The Clinton administration’s national security strategy of enlarging the core of market-oriented democracies may not produce states willing to support U.S. security interests, but it will likely reduce the number that could later become rogue states. It will also give them more incentives to uphold international norms and fewer incentives to support rogue regimes.

**Increasing Cooperation Among Friends and Allies**

The disengagement of America’s allies from the problems of rogue states and WMD proliferation is already straining alliance relations and
Consequences for U.S. Policy

The major policy choice confronting the United States is whether to attempt to contain rogues or engage them and thereby modify their behavior. The current policy of isolating rogue states is morally appealing. It castigates behavior that is contrary to U.S. interests. When the United States has formed international coalitions to isolate rogues, the policy has limited their threats. However, even with international support for such isolation, the United States has not succeeded in removing rogue regimes or changing their behavior. International support for isolating rogues may diminish as their numbers increase and they pose greater risks for allies and partners.

Theoretically, engagement avoids these drawbacks. It does not punish societies living under already oppressive authoritarian regimes. Building coalitions based on engagement is easier than those attempting containment. However, engaging rogues also has its drawbacks, as difficulties implementing the Framework Agreement with North Korea make clear. Engagement can be seen as legitimizing the behavior of rogue states. In many cases, engaging rogues may not change their behavior, but may simply reduce the penalties they pay for it. In the worst case, engagement may actually facilitate rogue behavior.

In practice, a mixed approach will likely be preferred. Broad sanctions and other actions that punish whole societies are unlikely to garner support, especially if rogues continue to survive. Allies also are unlikely to support commercial embargoes over the longer term. Yet, simply engaging rogues would probably not be supported by the U.S. Congress or public, or succeed in many cases. Finding narrowly targeted ways to prevent threats from spreading and to penalize rogue leaders while minimizing the affects on their societies should be a priority in policy development.

Managing Proliferation and Promoting Stability

Maintaining existing nonproliferation regimes and creating more restrictive ones are desirable. Such regimes seek to limit commercial traffic in key components, monitor potential suppliers, and conduct inspections. Theoretically, nonproliferation regimes could separate the problems of WMD from rogue states. However,
there are compelling reasons why sole reliance on nonproliferation regimes is not practical. At most, the United States will be able to extend the length of time it takes rogues to acquire WMD. Nonproliferation makes acquisition of WMD more difficult and time consuming; as such, it is a management tool, not a solution to the problem of rogues and WMD. The best policies are those that restrict sensitive technologies, reward states that choose not to proliferate, and penalize violators.

As more states possess WMD with long-range delivery systems, the United States must develop a clear evaluation of which states threaten U.S. interests and develop a graduated spectrum of corresponding policies. Broad sanctions against any WMD possessor state are too blunt an instrument to always serve U.S. interests. Sanctions should remain one of our instruments, but the United States needs to punish rogue leaders and stabilize regional security affairs once proliferation occurs.

Maintaining Effectiveness as Support Diminishes

The increasing threat of rogues armed with WMD will likely decrease the open support provided by America’s partners. U.S. power projection depends on host nation support from many regional partners. Maintaining allied support will require careful statecraft and coordination of policies. Reliance on host nation support can also be minimized by reducing the operating footprint for U.S. forces, as envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. Finding other ways of meeting the operational needs of U.S. forces when expected support is not forthcoming should be a priority in U.S. planning.

The Department of Defense currently views the Quadrennial Defense Review’s “prepare function” primarily in terms of equipment modernization. However, preparing for the more hostile and less predictable international environment requires a more expansive set of tasks. Military operations in an environment with more and better armed rogue states will entail preparation in several areas:

- Enhancing protection of the U.S. homeland
- Increasing protection of partner countries and forward deployed U.S. forces
- Realizing Joint Vision 2010’s focused logistics concept to reduce the operating footprint of U.S. forces
- Ensuring effective operations in a WMD environment with less support from allies and partners
- Developing public acceptance of military operations in a WMD environment
- Maintaining military forces capable of conducting major theater wars in two regions nearly simultaneously.

Redirecting Defense Efforts and Resources

The United States spent $268 billion on defense last year and only $6.7 billion on countering terrorism. As terrorism increases, Congress likely will question why the U.S. defense establishment is not doing more in this area. A marginal shift in emphasis is needed to counter terrorism, proliferation, and new types of regional conflicts. Countering an increasing number of rogue states and accelerating proliferation is as important to U.S. interests as fighting and winning major theater wars. And, the United States so dominates the battlefield that major theater wars are arguably the least challenge of full-spectrum dominance. Moreover, weapons of mass destruction are not separate from regional wars; they may well be used to fight regional wars.

Increased spending in four areas is needed to better manage the problem of rogues and WMD proliferation.

- Intelligence Collection and Assessment. The U.S. must be able to identify and penetrate emergent rogue states and organizations, monitor their connections, assess likely actions, and prevent, wherever possible, proliferation or terrorist acts.
- Procuring Standoff Weapons. The United States has displayed a tendency in recent engagements to employ standoff weapons as the instrument of choice in retaliating against rogues, in order to limit the exposure of U.S. service members. More rogues resorting to asymmetric strategies argues for further reducing reliance on manned systems and spending much more on unmanned vehicles and penetrating weapons.
- Targeting Regimes. The capability to attack ruling regimes raises the stakes for rogue states. Holding the leadership at risk requires timely, actionable intelligence and accurate attack capabilities. Limiting collateral damage and achieving the intended result without weapons of mass destruction will make targeting rogues more acceptable to U.S. public and world opinion.
Ballistic Missile and Other Defenses. Accelerating proliferation and more rogues make defense of the U.S. homeland ever more pressing. Greater attention should be focused on resolving the problems associated with ballistic missile defenses. Defenses against cruise missiles and other long-range delivery systems are also needed.

Focusing on Threatening State Actions

Rogue states will vary in the degree of threat to U.S. interests. The challenge will be to determine which pose the most serious threats to U.S. interests and to discriminate among them. This will require a sophisticated set of U.S. policies. Focusing on rogue state actions rather than their values is a first step and offers several advantages. This policy characterizes the behavior of states rather than their nature. It also makes it likely that changes in state behavior will be detected. Additionally, it encourages states to adopt preferred norms of behavior. It avoids stigmatizing states that do not share our values, reducing the likelihood of a clash of civilizations. Finally, this policy broadens the basis for diplomatic and military coalitions by not excluding those states that may share U.S. interests but not necessarily our values.

Preparing Domestic Agencies for WMD Threats

The U.S. homeland is unprepared for terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Defense has initiated a program using National Guard units to train civil authorities in major U.S. cities. More programs are needed, even though some might blur the distinction between domestic and foreign operations. A public information campaign to educate Americans about the risks and how the government plans to manage them is necessary. Stockpiling chemical and biological antidotes would also facilitate crisis response.

Responding to such asymmetric attacks on U.S. interests will require closer cooperation between the U.S. military and other government agencies. Traditional barriers between internal
and external security and intelligence gathering will need to be overcome. Lack of coordination between domestic and foreign responsibilities will be a major vulnerability. In May 1997, the Clinton administration took a major step to address this problem by issuing Presidential Decision Directive 56, Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations. If this policy is implemented by the affected departments and agencies, cooperation will be vastly improved and government will be moved significantly toward unity of effort.

Building Consensus on Allied Approach to Threats

For nearly a decade, the United States has sought greater allied support in containing rogue states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with little effect. Unless allies begin to participate soon, the United States will develop institutional avenues, military practices, intelligence networks, and military systems that render allies unable to join in combined operations. Acting unilaterally not only reduces the international legitimacy of using military force, it also reduces U.S. leverage against rogue actions. Consequently, the United States should develop a concerted strategic effort drawing on all the instruments of national power and premised on the full cooperation of allies and friends.

Discarding the concept of rogue states, or at least not demonizing them, could help build a consensus approach. However, the United States should not hesitate to confront allies regarding the need to address threats to shared interests. The continued presence of U.S. forces and alliance participation might become contingent on meaningful allied contributions to combating the rogue and WMD threat.

The United States has an interest in improving surveillance of potential threats and intelligence gathering cooperation with other states’ intelligence organizations. Several states maintain intelligence operations in countries and other organizations that are more difficult for the United States to penetrate. Cooperation with other states’ intelligence efforts is mutually beneficial because it ensures more equitable burden sharing. The United States might also share information and communications technologies to facilitate allied participation in counterterrorist and counterproliferation operations.

Net Assessment

In contrast to the optimistic projections of past Strategic Assessments, the international environment is seemingly more dangerous with respect to rogue states and proliferation. The number of states or movements hostile to U.S. interests is likely to increase. States unable to benefit from globalization will grow disenfranchised. Technological improvements and deteriorating nonproliferation regimes are providing these groups with accurate, long-range WMD. Unable to succeed by directly challenging U.S. military forces, rogue states and organizations are likely to resort increasingly to terrorism. Together rogue states and proliferation will be a central threat to U.S. security interests.