

TOWARD AN AIR AND SPACE FORCE:
CAN WE GET THERE FROM HERE?
NAVAL AVIATION AND
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SPACE POWER

BY

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Preface

Major Mark P. Jelonek began his Air Force career in 1985 as a student at the Air Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. He earned a Master's of Science in Engineering Physics in 1986 and a Doctorate of Philosophy in Physics in 1989. He was then assigned to the Starfire Optical Range of the Phillips Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, NM where he was the chief of the experiments section for atmospheric compensation experiments for the ground-based laser anti-satellite program from 1989 until 1992. He served as the chief of Standardization and Evaluation for the 12th Space Warning Squadron, Thule Air Base, Greenland from 1993 to 1994. From 1994 until 1996, he was assigned to the 11th Space Warning Squadron, Falcon Air Force Base, CO as the Operations Support Flight Commander. Major Jelonek graduated from the School of Advanced Airpower Studies in 1998 and is assigned to the Strategy, Concepts, and Doctrine Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington, DC.

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ABSTRACT

The Air Force and Air Force Space Command need an official implementation plan to integrate space into air operations or it might founder in this third attempt to transition to an air and space force. The historical precedent established during the integration of aviation into the U.S. Navy from 1921 to 1941 suggests five policy areas essential to successful integration. The Air Force has initiated several excellent programs to increase the knowledge and understanding of space operations in the flying community by incorporating space capabilities and products into air operations, Professional Military Education, and field exercises. Including space power in war games is also promoting understanding and creating an environment for innovation. The Air Force is on the verge of a bitter debate over the funding priorities between combat aircraft; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; and space systems. From this debate, the Air Force must establish priorities. While space operations officers have earned the highest ranks in the Air Force, but they are under-represented in command positions. Providing opportunities for space operators to experience air operations will cultivate air and space officers to employ the air and space force. The Air Force can benefit from this historical analogy by recognizing integration is more than the acquisition of weapons and combat capabilities. Integration relies on a powerful human component which will ultimately determine the success or failure of the endeavor.

Chapter 1

Introduction

“We are now transitioning from an *air* force into an *air and space* force on an evolutionary path to a *space and air* force.”¹ This latest Air Force vision, though rapidly becoming trite, is certainly plausible, but has the Air Force developed and implemented a plan to affect this transition or simply adopted a particularly appealing bumper sticker slogan? This research looks to the history of U.S. Naval Aviation to answer the question: Does the effort to integrate aviation into the U.S. Navy from 1921 to 1941 provide a suitable framework which the U.S. Air Force can emulate to integrate space into Air Force operations? The intent of this comparison is to measure the progress of space integration into the Air Force against this historical precedent, to identify areas suggested by the analogy that would benefit from increased attention, and to recommend improvements which could facilitate the integration of space power into the Air Force.

Global Engagement's call to integrate space into the Air Force is the third such initiative since 1989.² That the Air Force began such a course of action again in 1997 implies that it did not fully integrate space during the previous two attempts. Remarks

¹ Department of the Air Force, *Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force*, Washington, DC, 1997, 7.

² The Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation in 1989 and the Blue Ribbon Panel on Space chaired by Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr. in 1992 both made similar

from the most senior levels of the Air Force suggest the latest integration program is off to a slow start. General Michael E. Ryan, chief of staff of the Air Force, said the concept of becoming a space and air force is a “good road map, a good glide path for us. It’s now up to us to go out and execute it.”³ The commander of Air Force Space Command, General Howell M. Estes III, said, “ I would have to say that the Air Force still has a long way to go in becoming an air and space force, much less a space and air force, and that’s not a surprise to anybody.”⁴ Maj Gen William E. Jones, former 14th Air Force commander (the Air Force’s space component), has said that “virtually nothing has transpired which indicates that the Air Force is actually serious about moving out on transitioning to an Air and Space Force.”⁵ Based on these tepid endorsements, the Air Force might well benefit from an exploration of the past to help set a course for the future.

The U.S. Navy embarked on a similar voyage to integrate aviation into the fleet in the 1920s and 1930s. Naval aviation emerged from World War I with great promise and great expectations. Many thoughtful proponents of aviation within the Navy patiently wove airpower into the fabric of fleet operations. The triumph of naval airpower and of the aircraft carrier over the enemies of the United States in World War II is powerful evidence attesting to the success of the integration of aviation into the Navy. Few could argue against the notion that naval aviation and the aircraft carrier *are* sea power today.

recommendations for the integration of space into Air Force operations. These two plans are discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.

³ Quoted in John A. Tirpak, “The Chief Holds Course,” *Air Force Magazine* 81, no. 1 (January 1998): 38.

⁴ General Howell M. Estes III, transcript of interview by Bill Scott, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 4 December 1997.

If this inextricable connection between airpower and the fleet is the same objective the Air Force envisions for air and space, then a study of the integration of aviation into the U.S. Navy may well reveal the trail markers along the Air Force's evolutionary path to a space and air force.

The remaining five sections of this chapter bound the scope of this research project. The next section discusses the methodology used to identify integration programs, the evidentiary base from which the data was drawn, and the analysis used to categorize and interpret the data. Following that, the next two sections list and explain the major assumptions and limitations of the research. The fourth section is a biographical sketch of Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, a central figure in early naval aviation. The final section of this chapter outlines the contents of the rest of the thesis.

Methodology, Evidence, and Analysis

This research project relies on the use of historical analogy as a tool for providing insight and suggestions for dealing with the challenges of the present. The initial objective is to survey the wealth of historical monographs on naval aviation, the biographies of prominent personalities, the pertinent correspondence between these people, and some of their professional publications. From the historical data recurrent patterns of behavior, trains of thought, and official aviation integration policies will emerge. The patterns, thoughts, and policies are collected into ten categories and compared against a theory of military innovation to test their validity.⁶ From the

⁵ William E. Jones, "White Paper on Space in the USAF," to Maj Gen David W. McIlvoy, Headquarters USAF/XPX, Washington, DC, 22 December 1997, 19.

⁶ The theory of military innovation is that of Stephen Peter Rosen published in "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," *International Security* 13, no. 1

theoretical filtration, five major categories surface (one of which had three sub-categories) which appear critical to integrating aviation into the Navy. The other five influenced integration but were external to naval operations.

The naval aviation analogy serves as the model for assessing the state of integration of space into the Air Force. The data describing space integration comes from military and popular literature, speeches and articles by senior Air Force leaders, interviews with officers employed in Professional Military Education (PME), Air Force policy statements, and official Air Force studies. The data is grouped into the same five categories as those from the naval aviation case study, and the progress and completeness of the Air Force's space integration programs are evaluated against the historical example. Based on this subjective comparison, I develop a series of recommendations for Air Force space integration.

Assumptions

The arguments in this paper stand on four assumptions. The nature of the Air Force vision statement from *Global Engagement* admits of two. First, air and space are presently not sufficiently integrated into Air Force operations. Second, in the near term, space power will not evolve into an independent military service. The second two assumptions involve naval aviation and historical analogy. I will make no effort to prove the U.S. Navy did successfully integrate aviation into naval operations during the interwar years. The record of aviation during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and the character of the U.S. Fleet today provide their own proof. Finally, I also assume the

(Summer 1988) and *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1991.

historical precedent of integrating naval aviation is relevant to the integration of space power into the U.S. Air Force. Chapter 2 will attempt to persuade the reader the analogy is appropriate.

Limitations

Related to these assumptions are six limitations adopted to focus the research and argument of this project. I will not tackle the issue of deploying weapons in space. Whether in naval aviation or in space, a weapon is just one of several means of exerting power in warfare. Nor will I judge the merits of creating a separate space force. I purposely chose the naval aviation analogy because airpower in the Navy never evolved into an independent service. The time period for the naval case study spans from the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921 to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. The establishment of the Bureau of Aeronautics gave aviation legitimacy and an institutional permanence which was difficult to marginalize or abolish. Similarly, I concentrate on space power from 1991 to the present and include Operation Desert Storm, the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period when space power shifted from principally a strategic to a more operational focus. Personalities are important to any military endeavor, but I will not draw personality-based inferences or conclusions. I will, however, examine the intent and validity of the programs sponsored by charismatic people. Finally, I emphasize the role of officers in integration. While an enlisted corps is essential to the success of any military program, the real decision makers, the holders of power and influence, and the ones capable of shaping policy are the officers, especially those holding flag ranks.

Dramatis Personae: Rear Admiral William A. Moffett

Rear Admiral William Adger Moffett was *the* overwhelming personality who championed naval aviation from 1921 until his death in 1933. His particular combination of personality, political acumen, political connections, and leadership dragged the U.S. Navy into the age of airpower. No study of carrier aviation during the interwar years can ignore his contributions.

William A. Moffett was born in Charleston, SC in 1869, the son of a former captain in the South Carolina infantry.⁷ In 1886, Moffett competed for and won an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy and entered as a midshipman into the class of 1890. After graduation and a two-year apprenticeship at sea, Moffett earned his commission and served aboard the *U.S.S. Chicago* under the command of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1893.⁸ Ensign Moffett saw one-sided combat in the Philippines on the *U.S.S. Charleston* during the Spanish-American War in 1898.⁹ In 1914, Commander Moffett earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for his actions in the Battle of Vera Cruz, Mexico while skipper of the *U.S.S. Chester*.¹⁰ While commanding the Great Lakes Naval Training Center in Illinois, Moffett developed friendships with several prominent members of the Chicago business community which would serve him well in his later political struggles.¹¹ Captain Moffett commanded the *U.S.S. Mississippi* from 1918 to

⁷ Most of the biographical information is from William F. Trimble's *William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press), 1984, 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 59.

1920, and in 1921, President Warren G. Harding appointed him as the first chief of the newly created Bureau of Aeronautics with the accompanying rank of rear admiral.¹²

Admiral Moffett was not a complete stranger to naval aviation. He oversaw flight training and aircraft maintenance instruction during World War I while at the Great Lakes Naval Training Center and used aerial spotters with great success during gunnery exercises while commanding the *Mississippi*.¹³ Moffett was an outstanding naval officer, and he devoted those same considerable abilities to the cause of naval aviation. From 1921 until 1933, he conducted a sustained campaign against traditionalists to convince the naval establishment of the value of airpower. Moffett sent airpower to sea aboard battleships and cruisers. He pushed the development of fleet aircraft carriers, airships, and the flying-deck cruiser. He fought to protect the careers of aviators and instituted the aviation observer program to lure senior officers into the fold of aviation. To win public support, Moffett entered naval aviators into popular air races, sent aircraft and airships on cross-country tours, and conducted exhibitions with aircraft carriers to keep naval aviation in the public eye. Moffett leveraged his political connections to remain in his post as bureau chief for an unprecedented twelve years and to garner congressional support to expand the nascent aviation program during years of lean budgets.

Not everything Moffett touched turned to gold. The flying-deck cruiser never left the drawing board. Light carriers could not launch enough aircraft to generate the massed attacks necessary for fleet engagements. The rigid airship never developed into a credible combat platform and died a lingering death. Ironically, Admiral Moffett met his

¹² Ibid., 59, 80.

end aboard one of the airships he so staunchly defended. He was killed in a thunderstorm on 4 April 1933 when the airship *Akron* crashed at sea off the coast of New Jersey.¹⁴ Rear Admiral William A. Moffett earned the epitaph, the “Father of Naval Aviation.”¹⁵ The policies and construction programs begun under his leadership created the organization and infrastructure that battled to victory in World War II. In the words of his biographer, “Moffett at the time of his death had already done more than anyone before or since to secure the place of naval aviation in the military establishment.”¹⁶

Paper Overview

The heart of the paper begins in chapter 2 with a discussion of the propriety of historical analogy. I attempt to present a persuasive argument to justify using historical analogy to guide the Air Force’s space integration programs. To do so, I enumerate intriguing similarities and differences between the integration of aviation into the Navy during the interwar years and the current desire to integrate space into the Air Force. Chapter 3 is the discussion of the naval aviation integration process. I separate the policies which were peripheral to integration from those that were essential to the cause. I also hint at what the policies portend for space power integration. Chapter 4 compares space integration policies against the naval aviation template. I evaluate the progress of the programs which conform to the historical analogy and identify areas which might require increased emphasis. Chapter 5 summarizes the results of the study and includes

¹³ Clark G. Reynolds, “William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of Naval Tradition 1880-1930* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1990, 378.

¹⁴ Trimble, 266.

¹⁵ Reynolds, “William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” 374.

¹⁶ Trimble, 276.

recommendations to improve some of the initiatives for integrating space into the Air Force.

Chapter 2

Propriety of Historical Analogy

From the past, the future. The motto of the United States Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies implies that knowledge and understanding of yesterday's events will help influence the actions and policies for tomorrow. Indeed, if there is no utility to the study of history, then that expansive endeavor is nothing more than a hobby, an idle pastime. The intent of this chapter is to outline some justification for using historical analogies to guide policy. To fulfill this intent, the chapter has three objectives. The first is to study historical analogies. The second is to discuss the possible value and potential outcomes derived from historical comparison. The third is to persuade the reader that the similarities between naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s and space power in the 1990s are sufficiently compelling to make this comparison an appropriate and instructive historical analogy.

To accomplish these objectives, the chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examines the purpose of using historical analogies and offers tests for determining the propriety of a particular analogy. The second section applies the tests to the argument for comparing space power integration to the case of integrating aviation into the U.S. Navy in the interwar years.

Historical Analogies

The use of historical analogies in reinforcing an argument is an exercise in the art of persuasion. Analogies allow people to simplify, interpret, and comprehend complex situations by comparing them to better-understood and analyzed historical examples.¹⁷ into the unknown. Historical analogies provide maps, charted by previous explorers, which indicate possible courses of action and identify shoals along the way. Analogies help assess situations and provide policy prescriptions. They also aid in predicting the chances of success of alternative options and signal dangers associated with the options.¹⁸

Public officials often relied on historical analogies to guide policy making during the last half of the twentieth century. President Harry S Truman compared the Communist invasion of South Korea in 1950 to similar aggression by Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese in the 1930s. Robert Kennedy dissuaded the Executive Committee from endorsing a preemptive strike on Cuba during the Missile Crisis of 1962 by labeling such an attack as “a Pearl Harbor in reverse.”¹⁹ In an elegant and comprehensive study of decision-making in the Johnson Administration prior to U.S. entry into Vietnam, Yuen Foong Khong described how references to the Munich Crisis, the Philippine and Greek insurrections, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, and the Korean War influenced the perspectives of the cabinet members and essentially determined U.S. intervention policy.²⁰ There is at least one instance where historical analogy influenced Air Force

¹⁷ Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1992, 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁹ Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York: Basic Books), 1988, 6.

²⁰ Khong, 133.

planning. Colonel John Warden's in operation in 1991 bluntly rejected a reprise of the failed R T campaign employed in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.²¹

Historical analogies offer policy prescriptions and help evaluate alternatives, but they are accompanied by risk. Inappropriate analogies fail to illuminate a situation. Poor analogies can also emphasize superficial or irrelevant similarities.²² Risk increases when policy makers neglect important differences between an analogy and the current situation. There is also a strong tendency to adhere to an appealing analogy despite contrary evidence which demonstrates an analogy to be inappropriate.²³ With these provisions, precedents, and warnings, the next task is to determine whether or not an analogy is suitable for a given set of circumstances.

There are no approved formulae, which conclusively determine the propriety of an historical analogy for a particular situation, but there are tests, which might uncover shortcomings, limitations, or dissimilarities. The most important step is to determine the nature and context of the problem or situation. The problem presented in chapter 1 is the integration of space power into Air Force operations. There are several potential historical analogies to compare to the integration of space power into the Air Force—the Army Air Corps in the U.S. Army, the Marine Corps in the U.S. Navy, helicopter aviation in the U.S. naval aviation in the interwar U.S. Navy. The most convincing step in the assessment process is to list likenesses and differences between the historical

²¹ Richard T. Reynolds, *Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press), January 1995, 29. Reynolds presents a detailed, if hagiographic, discussion of the development of the air campaign.

²² Khong, 12.

²³ *Ibid.*, 221, 223. Khong calls the adherence to inappropriate analogies perseverance.

analogy and the situation under examination.²⁴ Unfortunately, this process is only persuasive. It does not and cannot prove any particular analogy is more appropriate than another, but comparing likenesses and differences can reveal factual mistakes which might unravel potentially misleading analogies.²⁵ In the end, persuasion depends on the similarities substantially outweighing the differences.

Likenesses and Differences

There are striking similarities between the domestic and international political environments of the interwar years and the 1990s. In addition, there are similarities between the military structure, doctrine, and technologies for naval aviation and space power. The following ten similarities are intended to be persuasive and stimulating rather than exhaustive.

1. U.S. Naval aviation endured its first sustained combat test during World War I. Naval aircraft had participated in the Vera Cruz incident in 1914, but the two-day affair was little more than a demonstration for a handful of aircraft. Space in marked a fundamental change in the philosophy of space power. Elements of space power participated operations, but most space assets were designed to fight the Cold War. After the focus shifted from Cold War to the support of military operations.

2. All nations share the freedom to navigate the World's oceans outside territorial boundaries. President Dwight D. Eisenhower crafted policies to establish and maintain

²⁴ These steps in assessing the validity of historical analogies form only a few parts of Neustadt's and May's method for using history to assist in determining policy. Neustadt, 234, 235.

²⁵ Ibid., 41, 47, 235.

the freedom of space so unarmed military satellites could freely overfly any country.²⁶ The Vanguard program to place a civilian satellite in orbit to demonstrate the freedom of space, but the Soviet's launch of Sputnik I in October 1957 established the very legal precedent Eisenhower sought.²⁷ Eisenhower's refusal to deploy weapons in space and the idea of the freedom of space profoundly influence U.S. space policy today.

3. In its democratic, isolationist tradition, the United States government dramatically reduced military spending following World War I. Following the sudden end of the Cold War, space power, too had to compete for its share of the continually contracting defense budget.

4. Democracies generally distrust large standing military forces in peacetime. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, there was limited public enthusiasm for things military. The resounding victory in the Persian Gulf War, the end of the Cold War, an all-volunteer military force, and the ever-elusive promise of a "peace dividend" have all combined to drain public support from the military since the late 1990s.

With the defeat of the Kaiser's Germany in 1918, there was no imminent threat to U.S. security or its vital security interests. The imperfect peace with Germany and the rising sun of Japanese imperialism were distant menaces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the most prominent threat to the U.S. vanished. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China pose indirect threats to vital security interests.

6. In the 1920s, there was a limited commercial market for military aviation products, so the aviation industry depended on government orders for survival. Although

²⁶ Curtis Peebles, *High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force and the Military Space Program*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997, 8.

the market for space services is growing, current entry-level costs are exorbitant, and few organizations other than governments can afford to participate. Like aviation in the 1920s, however, the commercial space market appears to be on the verge of expansion.

7. In the early days of wood and fabric biplanes, naval aviation was principally an auxiliary to the fleet. Aircraft conducted scouting, aerial spotting, and reconnaissance missions in support of battleships. For political rather than technological reasons, space power is an auxiliary to the combat Air Force. Space missions include reconnaissance, warning, communications, and navigation. Neither naval aviation nor space power began as primary means for delivering destructive power to the enemy.

8. Senior naval officers trained and blooded in the battleship navy held nearly all leadership positions and controlled naval policy. Flying officers hold most of the senior leadership positions in the Air Force, and many saw combat in the air over Vietnam.

9. Aviation was an element of warfare completely alien to the traditional role of the sea service. Aircraft could influence the outcome of a surface battle before the opposing fleets ever-exchanged gunfire. The fundamental characteristics of warfare in the air, speed, range, flexibility, and elevation, are essentially the same as those of space, but the manner in which satellites exploit those characteristics is different from that of aircraft. Somewhat simplistically, satellites accelerate to slow down and do not when they turn. Warfare in space is as alien to airpower as aviation was to war at sea.

10. The last is possibly the most appealing similarity between the two cases. The U.S. Navy gradually integrated aviation fully into naval operation over the course of twenty years. Aviation became neither a separate corps within in the Navy nor a service

²⁷ Ibid., 10.

independent from the Navy. The Air Force's implicit position, supported by the *Global Engagement* vision statement, is that space will not evolve into either a separate corps or independent service in the near term. Several significant differences distinguish naval aviation in the interwar years from space power at the end of the century. The following discussion illustrates three.

1. The state of technological development of naval aviation in the 1920s was comparatively more immature than the state of development of space power in the 1990s. By 1921, man had been flying for less than eighteen years. Aircraft could barely haul a 1000-pound bomb aloft and certainly not from the deck of an aircraft carrier. Naval aircraft could competently perform the scouting, spotting, and reconnaissance missions, but communications between ship and aircraft were primitive. Pilots initially relied on homing pigeons to deliver scouting reports back to the fleet. Despite visionary claims, aircraft were incapable of replacing the battleship as the Navy's primary instrument of power projection. In contrast, space power in 1998 has existed for over forty years. An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can from half a world away with greater accuracy than a B-17 could drop a bomb from 20,000 feet over its during World War II. Satellites are complex, reliable, and extremely capable military platforms. Politics, not technology, prevents the military from delivering firepower from and through space.

2. During the early years of aviation, there was freedom for individual experimentation and innovation with aircraft and their roles in warfare. Captain Joseph Mason Reeves implemented flight operations on the *U.S.S. Langley* he had discovered in war games at the Naval War College. Jimmy Doolittle performed experiments in instrument flying, Carl Spaatz and Ira Eaker demonstrated aerial refueling, and Billy

Mitchell conducted the famous bombing tests of the *Ostfriesland*. Today, space platforms continuously perform their operational missions. They are precious, limited national assets under carefully managed control. Their remoteness inhibit experimentation except under meticulously-scrutinized, officially-sanctioned research programs. There is no provision to hop aboard a satellite and make a few test orbits.

3. The battleship admirals were skeptical if not completely critical of aviation, and the fliers fought a lengthy battle for legitimacy against service resistance eneral board in 1922, thought aircraft would interfere with battleship tactics.²⁸ The chief of the bureau of the budget, Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, believed aviation was not of paramount and cut its budget accordingly.²⁹ Rear Admirals William Shoemaker and Richard Leigh refused to consider aviators as any different than other line officers.³⁰ The space community faces no similar struggle for recognition. The reason might lie in the fact that space power does not yet challenge the flying establishment for preeminence in the Air Force.

It is prohibitive to present more than a handful of prominent likenesses and differences between naval aviation and space power and probably disingenuous to stack the deck in favor of similarities. Hopefully, the similarities are sufficiently compelling to overcome the differences presented as well as any others that may exist. Consequently, the reader is the ultimate judge of whether or not the analogy of naval aviation is even appropriate, and if so, whether or not the derived prescriptions apply to integrating space

²⁸ Gerald E. Wheeler, *Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor's Life*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1974, 202.

²⁹ . Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, *History of United States Naval Aviation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1949, 226.

power into the United States Air Force. Regardless, the policies and programs employed by the U.S. Navy between 1921 and 1941 to integrate aviation into naval operations constitute a compelling case.

³⁰ William F. Trimble, *Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press), 1994, 198.

Chapter 3

Naval Aviation Integration Policies

The United States Navy, as an institution, understood both the value and the potential of aviation in naval operations early in the development of powered flight. After the end of World War I, the Navy strongly resisted attempts by Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell and his followers to absorb naval aviation into a separate and independent air service. An extremely effective defense against such an assault would be to build a naval air service so tightly ingrained and integrated into the Navy that separating aviation would severely and perhaps fatally degrade the combat capabilities of the fleet. This chapter presents policies sifted from historical evidence which the Navy used to fully integrate aviation into fleet operations.

The sections of this chapter summarize evidence, which suggests that policies adopted by the U.S. Navy from 1921 until 1941 promoted the integration of aviation into the battle fleet. Based on ideas proposed by Stephen Rosen, the first section examines the process of integrating innovations into military institutions. The second section reviews several courses of action pursued by the Navy, which did not necessarily contribute, to the integration process. The third section presents the policies, which facilitated the integration of aviation into the Navy. Each section ends with a summary of

the implications the naval policies may have for integrating space power into the U.S. Air Force.

The Integration Process

To integrate means to incorporate as equals into an organization, to form or blend into a whole. In this study, integration means the evolutionary process by which a new technology (aviation in the U.S. Navy and space power in the U.S. Air Force) becomes an inseparable part of the military service. In his study of military innovation, Stephen Rosen defined innovation as a change that forces a primary combat arm of a service to alter its concepts of operation and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions.³¹ Integrating a “new way of war”³² is a logical, intermediate stage in Rosen’s innovation process, but the principal difference between innovation and integration is that the integration process does not necessarily result in replacing the traditional method of warfare. An integrated technology may help perform existing missions better rather than radically changing them.³³ Therefore, Rosen’s ideas on the innovation process can serve as a strawman for integrating new technologies.

Rosen determined that innovation usually proceeds downward from the top of military organizations.³⁴ Respected senior military officers formulate and implement a strategy for gaining political control over their service on behalf of the new way of war. Those senior officers champion a new theory of victory which predicts how future wars

³¹ Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” *International Security* 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 134. For further discussion on the innovation process, see Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press), 1991.

³² Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” 134.

³³ *Ibid.*, footnote 1.

will be won, and they translate the theory into concrete new tasks performed every day in peacetime and in war.³⁵ For the Navy in the 1920s and 1930s, aviation was the new way of war. Aerial spotting, reconnaissance, air superiority, and later, surface attack were the tasks by which the Navy measured an officer's effectiveness. As officers skilled in the new way of war ascend in rank and assume positions of command, the distribution of power shifts slowly away from those versed in the old methods (the battleship admirals) toward those proficient in the new technology (the aviators). Only senior military officers hold enough political power within the service to create career paths to senior ranks for officers to learn and practice the new way of war. The protected career path prevents young officers from being shunted into positions which disqualify them from flag rank³⁶ and therefore positions of influence from which to promote and perpetuate the new method of warfare.

The U.S. Navy instituted a number of policies which composed the integration process. For the purpose of this study, a policy is any course of action—whether official, intended, or accidental—followed by the Navy, which affected the integration of aviation into naval operations. Some of the policies are those identified by Rosen's innovation process. Others are a collection of recurring initiatives that coalesced into identifiable patterns. All are supported by an abundance of evidence.

Plausible Integration Policies

The Navy Department and the Bureau of Aeronautics pursued a variety of policies which, on the surface, appear as if they aided integrating aviation into the fleet. Upon

³⁴ Ibid., 143.

³⁵ Ibid., 142.

closer examination, those policies probably did not contribute in a vital way to the integration process. This section examines five of those policies and discusses why they did not further the cause of aviation within the Navy despite their *prima facie* appeal.

Rear Admiral William A. Moffett was a respected naval officer, was devoted to the cause of naval aviation, was the first Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and held the position for twelve years. *His well-earned sobriquet as the “Father of Naval Aviation”³⁷ suggests that Moffett himself was instrumental to integrating aviation into the Navy. Would aviation have floundered and failed without him?*

Naval aviation had existed since 1911 when Congress appropriated funds for the Navy to purchase its first aircraft.³⁸ By 1921, naval aviation had demonstrated its combat capabilities in World War I, and many more officers than Admiral Moffett recognized its utility. Rear Admiral William S. Sims, although in the sunset of his career, was an ardent supporter of aviation.³⁹ Rear Admiral William V. Pratt, newly promoted to flag rank in 1921 and member of the Navy’s General Board, was a convert to the cause of aviation.⁴⁰ Although too junior in 1921, Captain Ernest J. King, Captain Joseph Mason Reeves, and Commander John H. Towers all believed in the future of naval aviation. Any of these men could certainly have substituted for Moffett within the span of a few years. Finally,

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Clark G. Reynolds, “William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of American Naval Tradition 1880-1930* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1990, 374.

³⁸ Archibald D. Turnbull and Clifford L. Lord, *History of United States Naval Aviation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 1949, 15.

³⁹ David F. Trask, “William Sowden Sims: The Victory Ashore,” in James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of American Naval Tradition 1880-1930* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1990, 246.

⁴⁰ Gerald E. Wheeler, *Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U.S. Navy: A Sailor’s Life* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1974, 203.

naval aviation did not founder with Moffett's death in 1933. Moffett may have hauled aviation through its formative years, but he probably was not irreplaceable as the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.

President Warren G. Harding appointed a former battleship commander as its first chief of the new aviation bureau. *Did having a battleship skipper in charge of aeronautical development win members of the "Gun Club" to the cause of naval aviation?* By the time Moffett assumed his duties as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, he had thirty years of experience in ships and well understood the language of his brother flag officers.⁴¹ But part of the struggle of naval aviation was bureaucratic, and the new Bureau of Aeronautics siphoned manpower and resources away from the established Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair (55 percent of the new Aeronautics staff transferred from the Bureau of Construction and Repair).⁴² Moffett's attempts to manage aviation personnel directly challenged the prerogatives of the Navy's powerful Bureau of Navigation.⁴³ Fraternity among flag officers may have only served to make the turf battles cordial.

On the opposite side of the fraternity equation, Moffett earned the respect of naval aviators through loyalty and dedication to their cause, but that respect did not transfer to other converts to aviation. Younger pilots considered the officers who earned their observer or pilot wings in mid-career as opportunists.⁴⁴ Although Moffett defended these officers (Captains Ernest King and William F. Halsey, for example) as expedients to

⁴¹ Turnbull, 206.

⁴² William F. Trimble, *Admiral William A. Moffett: Architect of Naval Aviation* (Washington, DC, Smithsonian Institution Press), 1994, 83.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 7.

building support among the senior grades, the aviators looked to the promotion of career fliers like John Towers as signals for their own advancement. To them, King, Halsey, Arthur B. Cook, and others were “Johnnie-Come-Latelies.”⁴⁵ Apparently, credentials as battleship commanders garnered influence neither from the surface nor flying communities.

Admiral Moffett and the Bureau of Aeronautics expended a concerted effort to demonstrate the capabilities and to publicize the exploits of naval aviation. *Did these appeals for public support increase the acceptance of aviation within the line of the Navy?* Naval aviators sponsored by the Bureau of Aeronautics entered the all-Navy Curtiss Marine Trophy Race in 1922 and won both the Schneider Cup and Pulitzer Trophy Races in 1923.⁴⁶ During the summer of 1923, the *U.S.S. Langley* called on eight northeastern ports including New York City and Boston and participated in community celebrations by performing flying demonstrations.⁴⁷ Moffett sent the airship *Shenandoah* on similar promotional tours such as to the air races in St. Louis in 1923.⁴⁸ The near-disaster of the seaplane flights from California to Hawaii, the crash of the *Shenandoah*, the firestorm ignited by Billy Mitchell’s accusations of incompetence and negligence within the Navy, and the admonition from the Morrow Board about publicity flights, all in 1925, demonstrated the risk of pandering to the public. In 1924, Lt. Arthur W. Radford (who eventually rose to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Eisenhower) summarized the impact of Moffett’s publicity campaign. The

⁴⁴ Clark G. Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1991, 223.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 284.

⁴⁶ Trimble, 121. Turnbull, 211-212.

⁴⁷ Trimble, 106.

Bureau of Aeronautics had “sold aviation to the Public, but not to the Navy as a whole.” Flag officers, ship’s captains, and gunnery officers needed “tangible evidence” that showed aviation improved combat performance.⁴⁹ Publicity did not demonstrate the value of aviation to the Navy’s fighting officers.

Detractors tagged Admiral Moffett as a “political admiral” because of his political connections and his facility in exploiting them to achieve his objectives. *Did Moffett’s political maneuvering further integration of aviation into the Navy?* While assigned to the Great Lakes Naval Training station near Chicago, Moffett cultivated relationships with powerful businessmen such as J. Ogden Armour and William Wrigley, Jr. (famous for their meat packing and chewing gum industries, respectively).⁵⁰ Moffett appealed to these influential men to intercede on his behalf for his initial appointment to the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics as well as his reappointment for second and third terms.⁵¹ In a different tack, Moffett sent two of his pilots on a cross-country tour to visit senators and representatives in their hometowns to enlist their support for aviation funding. One result was an enthusiastic endorsement from Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington for a \$5 million aviation appropriation.⁵² Moffett’s deft political strategies secured government support for aviation and kept him in a position to capitalize on that support, but those political strategies did not penetrate into the daily operation of aviation with the fleet. The strategies were external to the integration process.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 127.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Turnbull, 239.

⁵⁰ Trimble, 55.

⁵¹ Ibid., 79, 150-151, 193.

⁵² J. J. Clark and Clark G. Reynolds, *Carrier Admiral* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.), 1967, 27.

The Naval Appropriations Act of 1921 established the Bureau of Aeronautics within the Department of the Navy, and the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926 created an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics.⁵³ *Was the Bureau of Aeronautics' federally mandated existence and civilian representation at the assistant secretary-level vital to integrating aviation into the Navy?* With bureau status, the Bureau of Aeronautics had authority over operational doctrine, aircraft development, and had influence over personnel assignments.⁵⁴ Because the bureau chiefs reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy, they had less to fear from a hostile Chief of Naval Operations.⁵⁵ Organization, though, had not led to successful integration in the case of engineering. Congress established the Engineering Corps in the Navy in 1842 and a Bureau of Steam Engineering in 1862,⁵⁶ but the rivalry between the line and the Engineering Corps increased until secretary of the navy John D. Long instituted dramatic reforms at the turn of the century. As for civilian representation, the office of the Assistant Secretary for Aeronautics was vacant from 1932 until 1941.⁵⁷ Neither bureau status nor an assistant secretary necessarily guaranteed aviation would be integrated into the fleet.

⁵³ Trimble, 177.

⁵⁴ Norman Friedman, *U.S. Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1983, 3.

⁵⁵ Clark G. Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy* (Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company), 1978, 15.

⁵⁶ John D. Long, *The New American Navy*, Vol. 1 (New York: The Outlook Company), 1903, 78, 105.

⁵⁷ Paolo E. Colletta, ed., *American Secretaries of the Navy, Vol 2. 1913-1972*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1980, 648-649. Turnbull and Lord state on page 312 that President Herbert Hoover abolished the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aeronautics as an economy measure. David S. Ingalls resigned from the position in 1932 to run for the governor of Ohio. President Hoover left the office vacant as an economy measure. President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Artemus L. Gates to the post in 1941.

If the effort expended in these five policy areas contributed little to integrating aviation into naval operations, then what legitimate purpose did they serve? All these measures ensured the continuing existence of naval aviation whose most serious and persistent threat came from outside the Navy. The political and public support nurtured by Moffett established a formidable bulwark from which to battle Mitchell over a separate air service.⁵⁸ Related to this, Moffett remained in his position as bureau chief at a time when naval aviation benefited from his political finesse and clout.⁵⁹ Protected from external assault, aviation could pursue the course which would make it indispensable to naval warfare.

Successful Integration Policies

The champions of naval aviation embarked upon essentially five major collections of policies and programs, which facilitated the integration of aviation into the Navy. The categories encompass (1) increasing the understanding of aviation within the Navy; (2) enhancing battleship performance rather than threatening the battleship's existence; (3) providing a career path for aviators to achieve senior rank; (4) maintaining the familiarity of aviators with surface operations; and (5) including aviation in naval war games. This section expands upon these policies.

The first, and arguably the most important, integration initiatives were those designed to increase the general knowledge and understanding among naval officers of the capabilities aviation brought to the battle line. In order to achieve this, Admiral

⁵⁸ Thomas C. Hone, "Navy Air Leadership: Rear Admiral William A. Moffett as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics," in Wayne Thompson, ed., *Air Leadership: Proceedings of a Conference at Bolling Air Force Base, April 12-14, 1984* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History), 1986.

Moffett and the Bureau of Aeronautics deployed aircraft with as many fleet units as possible. Moffett confided to Admiral Sims in 1921 that he found no opposition to aviation in the Navy “but considerable indifference and lack of knowledge on the subject” and was trying “to get aviation afloat by putting planes on everything from submarines to battleships.”⁶⁰

In 1922, Moffett submitted a tentative plan to the General Board to get as many airplanes as possible into operation with the fleet. The plan included equipping each battleship, each cruiser, and each destroyer division with scout and fighter aircraft and commissioning the aircraft carriers *Lexington* and *Saratoga* by the end of 1924.⁶¹ The General Board agreed with Moffett’s plan and proposed all battleships, modern cruisers, and destroyers be furnished with reconnaissance and fighter aircraft.⁶² By the end of 1922, the battleships *Maryland*, *Nevada*, and *Oklahoma* had aircraft catapults, and each *Omaha*-class cruiser and nine more battleships received catapults by mid-1925.⁶³ *Lexington* and *Saratoga* joined the fleet in 1927. Both ships possessed the power and speed to operate their seventy aircraft with the battleship fleet.⁶⁴ Moffett understood the Navy was the first line of offense. Aviation was its advanced guard and to act in the

⁵⁹ Reynolds, “William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” 381.

⁶⁰ William A. Moffett, Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, to Rear Admiral William S. Sims, President, Naval War College, Sims Papers, Box 74, Newport, RI, 31 October 1921.

⁶¹ Trimble, 100.

⁶² Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: I: The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism 1919-1929* (London: St. James’s Place, Collins), 1968, 485.

⁶³ Trimble, 107, 108.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 202, 203.

vanguard, it had “to go to sea on the back of the fleet.”⁶⁵ Equipping the fleet with aircraft was only one of several steps in the education process.

Beginning around 1919 and continuing through the 1920s and 1930s, flying units, and eventually, aircraft carriers participated in naval gunnery practice and full-scale fleet exercises. During interception exercises off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in January 1919, aircraft charted the position, course, and speed of the attacking fleet.⁶⁶ Moffett himself had benefited from aviation while captain of the battleship *Mississippi*. With the aid of aerial spotting in the 1920 gunnery exercises, the *Mississippi* achieved scores so high they nearly equaled those of all other battleships combined.⁶⁷

The *U.S.S. Langley* shouldered the burden of carrier-based airpower in fleet exercises until the *Lexington* and *Saratoga* joined the fleet in 1929. In Fleet Problem I of February 1923, the *Langley* demonstrated the vulnerability of the Panama Canal to air attack⁶⁸ and defended the scouting fleet from attacking bombers.⁶⁹ Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully, Jr., commander of the scouting forces of the U.S. Fleet in the Caribbean, commended *Langley's* performance in a letter to Moffett. McCully stated that the *Langley* had clearly demonstrated her value to the fleet and that her air operations had been “an eye opener for most people.”⁷⁰ By 1925, the role of aviation in Fleet Problem V expanded significantly. The fleet exercise in the Pacific included twenty-four aircraft from the *Langley*, sixty from battleships and cruisers, twenty-six seaplanes from the

⁶⁵ William A. Moffett, “Some Aviation Fundamentals,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 51, No. 10, (October 1925): 1877.

⁶⁶ Turnbull, 150.

⁶⁷ Reynolds, “William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution,” 378.

⁶⁸ Roskill, 542.

⁶⁹ Trimble, 107.

⁷⁰ Quoted in Trimble, 107.

scouting fleet, and fourteen from the Naval Air Station at Honolulu.⁷¹ Fleet Problem IX in 1929, with *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, finally tested the notions of carrier airpower that had long been hypotheses.⁷² A rather chaotic attack and defense of the Panama Canal showed the flexibility of carrier airpower, the importance of air superiority, and the inferiority of cruisers to aircraft in the scouting role. The exercise proved carriers occupied a definite place in plans for war at sea as the principal long-range strike element of the fleet.⁷³

Formal education complemented practical exposure. The curricula at the U.S. Naval Academy and the Naval War College included aviation courses and flying instruction to familiarize future and senior naval officers with the fundamentals of flight. In 1921, Admiral Sims added aviation studies to the course of instruction at the Naval War College where the Navy groomed its future admirals.⁷⁴ Moffett established aviation training at the Naval Academy⁷⁵ and the 1925 Eberle Board recommended adding a course in aeronautics which began in that same year.⁷⁶ The four hours of flight training required by the Academy grew to twelve hours by 1950.⁷⁷ By 1926, already half of the Academy's graduates received flying instruction.⁷⁸ Knowledge brought understanding and understanding brought appreciation and innovation.

⁷¹ Moffett, "Some Aviation Fundamentals," 1871.

⁷² Turnbull, 270.

⁷³ Turnbull, 272, Roskill 542.

⁷⁴ Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy*, 14.

⁷⁵ Reynolds, "William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution," 380.

⁷⁶ Hone, 97, Roskill, 399.

⁷⁷ Turnbull, 233, Dr. David Mets, a 1953 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, interviewed by the author, Maxwell AFB, AL, February 1998.

⁷⁸ Roskill, 299.

Each of these policies, intended to expose naval officers to the possibilities of aviation, provided tangible experience of how aviation improved the capabilities of individual ships and the battle fleet as a whole. Operating in the air was different from maneuvering at sea, and the differences were an impediment to understanding. In space operations, orbital mechanics is different from aerodynamics and creates a similar gulf in understanding between airpower and space power. Furthermore, space capabilities were long cloaked by the imperatives of national security. Programs analogous to those, which educated naval officers of the potential of naval aviation, will similarly expose space operations to the flying Air Force.

Early vocal aviation proponents advertised airpower as a new weapon which made armies and navies obsolete. These attacks threatened the *raison d' être* of a military establishment generally resistant to change. Naval aviators pursued a more subtle and ultimately more digestible course in the 1920s. *They promoted the capabilities and possibilities of airpower as enhancements to the battleship Navy rather than as rivals as the premier striking force of the fleet.* In reality, early airpower was technologically incapable of replacing the battleship. The aviators strategy was as wise as it was successful. The abundance of evidence supporting this assertion strongly suggests that Moffett and his aviators navigated this course as a considered strategy to integrate aviation into the Navy as well as into the hearts and minds of the Navy leaders. Moffett's strategy was comprised of both words and deeds.

Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, chairman of the navy's general board, asked Captain Henry C. Mustin, assistant chief of the bureau of aeronautics, "Do you contemplate making all naval warfare in support of the air attack?" Mustin, a pre-World

War I convert to aviation who had earned his captain's stripes on battleships during the war, clearly set the tone of aviation for Rodgers: "Our whole aviation program is laid out on the basis that the battleship is the dominant factor in naval warfare, provided it is properly supported by aircraft."⁷⁹ Admiral Moffett told the 1924 Eberle Board (chaired by the chief of naval operations, Admiral Edward W. Eberle) that it was foolish to think that airplanes would minimize the value of the battleship and render it obsolete. Aviation was and would remain an auxiliary arm of the fleet.⁸⁰ In testimony before the 1925 Morrow Board, Commander John H. Towers, naval aviator no. 3, stated, "I am firmly convinced that aviation must remain an integral part of the main fighting organization, and that is the line." Aviation did not cooperate with the Navy, it was the Navy. "In 10 years it may be one-third of it, and in 20 years it may be all of it."⁸¹

Moffett also captured the sentiment in writing. In a lecture prepared for the Naval War College, Moffett declared, "the most important Naval function that the aircraft has to perform today [1923] is that of observing gunfire for the main line of ships of the Fleet."⁸² In an article published in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Moffett proclaimed that "the fleet and naval aviation are one and inseparable."⁸³ Aviation belonged with the fleet, and the role of aviation at sea strengthened this conclusion.

⁷⁹ Quoted in Trimble, 101.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 142.

⁸¹ Quoted in Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy*, 189-190.

⁸² William A. Moffett, "Aircraft in the Navy--Their Use and Limitations," lecture read by LCDR B.L. Leighton, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 6 April 1923, at the Naval History Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, RG 4.

⁸³ Moffett, "Some Aviation Fundamentals," 1877.

As Rosen observed, aviation in the Navy initially supported existing missions.⁸⁴ In 1919, the General Board informed the Secretary of the Navy that aviation was capable of scouting for the enemy fleet, spotting the fall of friendly gunfire, and engaging enemy aircraft in air-to-air fighting.⁸⁵ Aircraft allowed battle fleet commanders to detect the enemy at increased ranges.⁸⁶ Once within range, aerial spotting increased the distance at which the long-range guns could engage the enemy and dramatically improved their accuracy.⁸⁷ From this, the logic was inescapable. Aerial spotting increased the number of hits, and hits meant the destruction of the enemy fleet. The enemy should be denied their spotters and should not interfere with friendly spotters. Fighter aircraft protected friendly spotters by winning command of the air from enemy aircraft. Only aircraft carriers could provide sufficient fighter strength to win air control.⁸⁸ Initially, aircraft carriers operated close to the fleet to perform scouting, spotting, air control, and anti-submarine patrols. By 1931, as operational experience grew with the *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, the carriers operated as screening, raiding, and striking forces with the battle line or in independent fleet actions.⁸⁹ As late as 1941, carrier doctrine was flexible, but aircraft carriers were still a subordinate part of the battle line.⁹⁰

The patient insinuation of naval aviation into the fleet complemented rather than supplanted the surface forces. Aviation gained acceptance among naval officers because

⁸⁴ Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," 136.

⁸⁵ Charles M. Melhorn, *Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1974, 31.

⁸⁶ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 68.

⁸⁷ Battleships, even with untrained airborne observers, achieved miss errors of less than 64 yards, Melhorn, 37.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 37, 38.

⁸⁹ Friedman, 8, 9, 80.

⁹⁰ Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy*, 20.

it increased the performance of battleships and cruisers without threatening their supremacy. Aviation was a revolutionary weapon system in the 1920s, full of promise but alien to traditional naval equipment and thought. Understandably, it provoked an expected conservative reaction. Space power poses a similar threat to those who have proven themselves in traditional airpower missions. Integration is partly a human struggle, so space advocates could benefit by employing a strategy similar to that of the naval aviators in order to mitigate threats to airpower missions.

Senior officers dominated naval policy in the 1920s and 1930s (as they do today). Only by earning commensurate rank could aviators amass enough power and respect to influence naval aviation policy. *Aviators needed a viable career path which increased their aviation skills without prejudicing their opportunities for command and flag rank.*⁹¹ Like aviation itself, that career path had to be integral to that of other line officers to avoid any appearance that it was separate and distinct.

Within the living memory of naval officers in the 1920s, the Navy had recently overcome a divisive, internal conflict between the parallel careers of line officers and engineers. The animosity delayed the full integration of propulsion engineering into the line of the Navy by at least forty years.⁹² The ultimate goal of line officers was the command of a ship, but in 1842 when Congress created the staff engineer corps, engineers were removed from the promotion path that made them eligible to command

⁹¹ Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," 136.

⁹² Steam engineering had demonstrated its value in propulsion during the American Civil War in the early 1860s. The Navy did not progress significantly down the road to integrating engineering until the Naval Personnel Act of 1899. For further details, see Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York: The Free Press), 1991, 118.

ships.⁹³ In 1859, secretary of the navy Isaac Toucey ordered that the staff corps had no military command authority. Consequently, the engineers had no power to control and discipline their own men.⁹⁴ As further insult, Vice Admiral David D. Porter, a Civil War naval hero who sailed to victory on steam propulsion, downgraded the rank and status of steam engineering in 1869.⁹⁵

A captain was the most skilled sailor aboard his ship, but he depended on his chief engineer to propel and maneuver his ship in battle.⁹⁶ Engineers held neither Congressional commissions nor carried naval rank, but they challenged the line officers as the absolute masters of their ships.⁹⁷ Before the turn of the century, secretary of the navy John D. Long tackled this division. Naval officers were the masters of motive power during the age of sail, so it should be no different in the days of steam. Therefore, they needed to understand the practical application of steam engineering.⁹⁸ In 1899, Congress amalgamated engineering into the line. Line officers would learn the rudiments of engineering at the Naval Academy, and engineers were no longer second class officers forbidden to command ships.⁹⁹ Cadets were trained in both deck and engineering assignments, and line officers stood normal tours of duty in the engineering department

⁹³ Hagan, 117, Long, 78, Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 78.

⁹⁴ Long, 79.

⁹⁵ John D. Alden, *The American Steel Navy: A Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1972, 251.

⁹⁶ Hagan, 117-118.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 118.

⁹⁸ Long, 89, 64.

⁹⁹ Hagan, 232.

aboard ship.¹⁰⁰ With this lengthy, traumatic experience as prelude, the Navy was determined not to repeat the mistake with aviation personnel.

Naval aviators, like any other military officers, needed senior ranks and important commands as goals in order to motivate them to excel and to measure the success of their careers. The Naval Appropriation Act of 1921 that created the Bureau of Aeronautics established by law that 30 percent of commanders and above assigned to the bureau had to qualify as aviation observers within one year of assignment.¹⁰¹ Admiral Moffett understood there were too few senior officers qualified in aviation to fill senior billets, so he developed the naval observer's course at Pensacola Naval Air Station where commanders and captains could learn the fundamentals of flying. The course existed from 1921 to 1931 until qualified pilots attained sufficient seniority to fill aviation command positions.¹⁰² Some senior officers like Captain Ernest J. King (1927) and Captain William F. Halsey (1934) entered pilot training in order to command aircraft carriers and gave naval aviation much-needed rank in the higher Navy echelons.¹⁰³ Moffett balanced these "Johnnie-Come-Latelies" by appointing Commander Theodore G. (Spuds) Ellyson (naval aviator no. 1) as the head of the Plans Division of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Ellyson's assignment was a signal to aviators that Moffett was on their side and could uphold their interests.¹⁰⁴ These were expedient fixes to a problem that needed a long-term solution.

¹⁰⁰ Alden, 252.

¹⁰¹ Turnbull, 233.

¹⁰² Reynolds, "William A. Moffett: Steward of the Air Revolution," 381-382.

¹⁰³ Friedman, 7, Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy*, 16.

¹⁰⁴ Trimble, 85.

Moffett defended these personnel policies in testimony before the Morrow Board in 1925. Rather than rapidly promoted aviators, naval aviation observers would command aviation units. Younger airmen had to achieve senior rank by the normal selection process.¹⁰⁵ Only time in service could get the aviators what they desired. Nevertheless, the 1925 Eberle Board report recommended that the Navy Department establish a definite policy to govern the assignment of aviation personnel to aviation duty,¹⁰⁶ and as an undeniable incentive, the Morrow Board recommended only qualified commissioned pilots could command aviation shore establishments, seaplane tenders, and aircraft carriers.¹⁰⁷ In an ill-conceived attempt to protect some aviators from going to sea, Congress enacted an exception for Aeronautical-Engineering-Duty-Only in 1935.¹⁰⁸ There was already a pervasive uneasiness among aviators that duty involving flying decreased chances for promotion and command, so many preferred to remain in the line rather than go into aviation and sacrifice opportunities for becoming battleship commanders.¹⁰⁹ The personnel integration strategy was a slow process and the pace of success was linked to the pace of promotions.¹¹⁰ A junior aviator in 1921 would not be eligible for captain for about twenty years, so these fliers did not reach command grade until the midst of World War II.

Officers are measured by their leadership in command positions, and superior performance in command is usually a prerequisite for senior rank. The supreme test, whether appropriate or not, is an officer's ability to lead forces in combat. Aviators

¹⁰⁵ Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy*, 187.

¹⁰⁶ Roskill, 399.

¹⁰⁷ Turnbull, 256.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 293.

¹⁰⁹ Melhorn, 97, Turnbull, 293.

needed combat commands to prove themselves to their surface fleet peers, and the aviators had to earn these commands by the same rules and means as other line officers. Any appearance as a privileged, separate, or inferior class would degrade the aviators' legitimacy with the rest of the officer corps and impede their integration. Space operations officers are driven by the same needs for advancement, recognition, prestige, and career fulfillment as were the naval aviators in the 1920s. A viable career path to combat command and flag rank is as necessary for space officers as it was for the aviators.

To unite aviation with surface operations, naval aviators needed to proceed along a career path intimately connected with the ways of the sea. Aviators could best capitalize on their new weapon with a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and doctrine of the battle fleet. To understand the needs and functions of the fleet, naval aviators had to be naval officers first. *This meant, despite some resistance, that aviators had to perform the same sea duties normal for all naval line officers*

The Department of the Navy resolutely adhered to the policy that naval aviators be qualified as seamen first.¹¹⁰ The Eberle Board recommended in 1925 that Academy graduates could be assigned to aviator training only after two years of sea duty.¹¹² The Morrow Board supported this policy by concluding junior officers should perform adequate sea duty for advancement.¹¹³ The Bureau of Navigation, which controlled personnel assignments, strictly enforced this policy under Rear Admirals William R.

¹¹⁰ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 80.

¹¹¹ Turnbull, 228.

¹¹² Hone, 97.

¹¹³ Turnbull, 256.

Shoemaker and Richard H. Leigh.¹¹⁴ Shoemaker believed aviators were no more specialized than other officers and had to do their share of sea duty before receiving aviation assignments.¹¹⁵ The logic of this position is largely inarguable. Naval aviators had to be naval officers so they could understand how aviation should be used as an instrument of power projection in conjunction with the fleet.¹¹⁶ Aviation was only one component of a ship's fighting equipment, and aviators were no different than other officers.¹¹⁷ They had to be indoctrinated into the operations and methods of all naval craft as well as comprehend the language of the sea. Unless they were trained with the fleet, by the fleet, they could not properly understand the intentions of the commander-in-chief.¹¹⁸ Without obtaining sailing skills, aviators could never command aircraft carriers or become admirals in charge of fleets employing aircraft carriers.¹¹⁹

Moffett instituted a duty rotation to ensure aviators remained proficient in flying and developed the sea skills necessary to understand fleet operations. Annapolis graduates went to sea for two years, returned to Pensacola for flight training, performed a tour as a pilot, and then went back to sea duty.¹²⁰ Commander Towers told the Morrow Board that serving "general naval duty" at sea would better integrate aviators into the promotion system.¹²¹ While Captain Ernest King commanded the *Lexington*, he made aviators stand

¹¹⁴ Trimble, 133-134.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 140.

¹¹⁶ Rosen, "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation," 156.

¹¹⁷ Melhorn, 17.

¹¹⁸ Nearly identical sentiments were expressed by Moffett in "Some Aviation Fundamentals" and William S. Sims in Newport, RI to Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC, 1 February 1921, "United Air Service," in Archives, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

¹¹⁹ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 78.

¹²⁰ Hone, 98.

¹²¹ Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy*, 189.

bridge watch and practice navigation to emphasize they were naval officers first.¹²² Despite his often-irascible temperament and careerist ambitions, King understood the symbiotic relationship between aviators and seamen. Naval Aviation required more than mere flying. Years of training in navigation, gunnery, engineering, command, strategy, and tactics kept an aviator attuned to the naval profession. Only aviators so trained could fully appreciate the needs of the Navy. “Between the man on the bridge of a surface ship and the man at the controls of a naval airplane there is complete understanding and, therefore, complete cooperation.”¹²³

As a result of these policies and attitudes, all naval officers shared a common base of experiences, they encountered the same risks, and they spoke the same language. The naval aviators then understood the primary mission of the Navy, how each component supported the mission, and how aviation could make its maximum contribution to the mission. These basic lessons hold profound implications for the integration of air and space power. There is essentially no overlap in the skills required to fly and employ aircraft and those needed to operate space systems. Such disjunction necessarily impedes a space operator’s understanding of the Air Force flying mission and simultaneously makes integrating space power difficult yet critically important. Conversely, the dichotomy also implies space would benefit enormously from an influx of flying personnel. Without a common “language of the sea,” air and space power will continue to be perilously disconnected.

¹²² Thomas B. Buell, *Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company), 1980, 91.

¹²³ Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 1952, 250.

Early in the development of aviation, the U.S. Navy had neither aircraft carriers nor an experimental fleet air arm. Admiral Sims, president of the naval war college from 1919 to 1922, introduced aircraft and aircraft carriers into war games at the school to explore the possibilities of naval aviation in the conduct of sea warfare. *The war games opened the world of aviation to naval officers and created opportunities for officers to expand the role of aircraft in naval operations.*

The Naval War College developed the war game in the 1890s and it had become a regular part of the curriculum in 1894.¹²⁴ War games served as a tool for officers at the college to analyze and to test warship designs produced by the Navy's technical bureaus.¹²⁵ Results from the war games influenced procurement programs and fleet battle tactics. In the early 1900s, war games demonstrated the low cost-effectiveness of the armored cruiser, identified tactical defects in battleships, and were instrumental in introducing the all-big-gun battleship.¹²⁶ Later, war games decided the characteristics of the first purpose-built aircraft carrier *Ranger* and eliminated the proposed flying-deck cruiser. The president of the Naval War College was an advisor to the General Board, and the Board relied on the College to model and study new technologies through standardized games which permitted rapid technological progress without waiting for experimental ships.¹²⁷

In regard specifically to naval aviation, the war games produced several tactical innovations. In 1922, Captain Harris Laning, an instructor at the Naval War College,

¹²⁴ Ronald Spector, *Professors at War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press), 1977, 74, 78.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 117.

¹²⁶ Spector, 114, Friedman, 33.

¹²⁷ Friedman, 57.

reported to the General Board that aircraft did not dominate war game situations, but they exerted decisive influence in all stages of a campaign, especially the battle stage.¹²⁸ Laning noted that students initially showed no enthusiasm for aircraft. As the games progressed, the students displayed great interest in the possibilities of air attack and defense.¹²⁹ Commander Roscoe C. MacFall discovered the value of deploying screening ships in a circular formation around the major combatants. MacFall's classmate at the Naval War College, Chester W. Nimitz, introduced the now standard circular formation to the fleet in 1923 while serving under Admiral Samuel S. Robison, Commander in Chief, Battle Fleet.¹³⁰ The 1923 games demonstrated the necessity for massing aircraft for strikes.¹³¹ The 1925 war game convinced Captain Joseph M. Reeves that carriers had to carry more aircraft. While commanding the *Langley* in 1926, he tripled her aircraft complement.¹³²

There were serendipitous benefits to including aviation in the Naval War College games. The studies exposed the most senior commanders, those presumably destined for commands and admiral's stars, to the prospects of naval aviation. Those officers returned to the fleet with convincing arguments to convert any doubters, and that translated into progress for aviation.¹³³ Finally, the war games permitted great opportunities for innovation without the substantial cost outlays required for experimental programs. Space power is even more intangible and more remote to officers today than naval aviation was to officers during its early developmental years. Operational imperatives,

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹²⁹ Turnbull, 209.

¹³⁰ E.B. Potter, *Nimitz* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1976, 138, 139.

¹³¹ Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, 69.

¹³² Hone, 101.

inaccessibility, and high costs impair innovation with space systems. War games that realistically include components of space power would substantially increase the knowledge and understanding of space operations while fostering an fertile environment for experimentation and innovation.

Recapitulation

The historical survey shows how the U.S. Navy implemented a variety of policies that facilitated the integration of aviation into fleet operations. The Navy learned how to deal with personnel issues from its own past of integrating steam engineering. Despite some pockets of institutional resistance, the Navy fought on a unified front to retain aviation as part of the fleet. There were also many companion policies, which did not contribute materially to integration but fended off the zealots demanding a separate air service and ensured the continuing existence of naval aviation.

None of these integration policies is peculiar to the case of naval aviation, and there are many parallels between naval aviation in the 1920s and 1930s and space power in the 1990s. If these policies triumphed in the crusade to integrate aviation into the Navy, and there is nothing particularly unique to aviation in the interwar years, then there is compelling reason to believe that similar policies will be effective in the effort to integrate space power into the Air Force. The task remains to identify contemporary space integration policies and then to measure them against the framework developed from the naval aviation analogy.

¹³³ Turnbull, 209.

Chapter 4

Comparison of Space Integration Policies to the Naval Analogy

The policies and programs derived from the historical analogy of the integration of aviation into the U.S. Navy provide a template against which to measure the progress of the integration of space into the Air Force. The objective of this chapter is to compare contemporary space integration policies to the five major program areas implemented by the Navy in the 1920s and 1930s. The chapter begins by expanding the earlier discussion on the utility of historical analogy. The comparison is organized into the five policy areas developed in the previous chapter: (1) programs designed to increase the knowledge and understanding of space within the Air Force; (2) approaches to promoting space capabilities to the flying community; (3) potential for space operations officers to command and attain flag rank; (4) opportunities for space operations officers to gain knowledge and experience in flying operations; and (5) the manner in which space participates in war games. Within each section, the chapter will highlight the initiatives which are having notable impact on space integration and will identify which programs could benefit from stronger efforts.

On the Power of Historical Analogy

“There is a need to integrate all aspects of Air Force space operations into one coherent roadmap which clearly delineates objectives that are directly tied to the

warfighting requirements of operational commanders.”¹³⁴ Although this sentence would fit neatly into the current Air Force vision statement, it was written in 1989 by a Blue Ribbon Panel commissioned by Air Force Chief of Staff Larry D. Welch.¹³⁵ A second Blue Ribbon Panel in 1992 chaired by Lt Gen Thomas S. Moorman Jr. saw space as “an integral part of the Air Force mission.”¹³⁶ *Global Engagement* has not declared anything new, and this latest Air Force vision is neither original nor unique, but do any of the policies identified by these previous committees provide some keys to space integration in its most recent manifestation, and do they offer warnings of misdirected efforts?

The 1989 Blue Ribbon Panel recommended twenty-seven different tasks to integrate space operations into the Air Force. Four of the tasks addressed increasing the knowledge and understanding of space within the Air Force. Three tasks dealt with officer career progression and representation at senior levels by officers with space expertise. One task specifically directed a crossflow of officers between space and air operations assignments. The remaining nineteen tasks regarded administrative issues, internal and external organizational relationships, and the procurement or realignment of space systems.¹³⁷ The 1992 Moorman Panel suggested that the Air Force make

¹³⁴ Department of the Air Force, *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, February 1989, n.p., task 6.

¹³⁵ David N. Spires, *Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Leadership* (Peterson AFB, CO: Air Force Space Command), 1997, 234.

¹³⁶ Department of the Air Force, *Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force in Space in the 21st Century*, Executive Summary, c. 1993, 4.

¹³⁷ 1989 *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, n.p., Tasks 3, 16, 17, and 24 called for expanding the knowledge of national reconnaissance systems among Air Force officers, revising the Undergraduate Space Training program, and building a core space curriculum for education in officer Professional Military Education. Tasks 14, 18, and 22 recommended restructuring the space operations officer career field and increasing the number of officers with space expertise on Air Force review committees and on the Air Staff and in the Secretariat. Task 15 directed a centrally managed plan to provide a

integrated aerospace employment a fundamental principle in all training and education programs. It, too, advocated an officer crossflow between Air Force Space Command and the other operational commands. It recommended integrating space into Red, Blue, and Green Flag exercises and called for a stronger operational space presence at Air Force headquarters to make better policy, program, and operational space decisions.¹³⁸ These conclusions were nearly identical to those proposed in 1989. In a 1995 study prepared for the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, the RAND Corporation determined that trust and space literacy were fundamental to integrating space into military operations by gaining the confidence of the warfighters. Integration depended on increasing space awareness among users by encouraging their participation in training and exercises.¹³⁹ Except for the explicit identification of including space in war games, these three investigations described four of the five policy prescriptions drawn from the naval aviation analogy. Although these facts still do not conclusively prove the validity of the case study, they do present compelling evidence regarding the power of historical analogy as a planning and analysis tool. Other conclusions from these

balanced flow of officers between space and other operational commands. The administrative issues included writing space policy and doctrine. Organizational relationships addressed the interaction between the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the other military services. The procurement and realignment of space systems covered anti-satellite weapons, space-based radars, space battle management systems, and launch and satellite command and control.

¹³⁸ The 1992 Blue Ribbon Panel published eighteen recommendations (recommendation #15 had two parts). Recommendations #12 and #15a covered increasing the knowledge and understanding of space in the Air Force (p. 21-22, 24). Recommendation #15a also suggested including space in Air Force and joint exercises (p. 24). Recommendation #15b discussed the officer crossflow program (p. 24). Recommendation #16 suggested strengthening space expertise at Air Force headquarters (p. 25).

three reviews will emerge in the examination of the five categories of space integration programs.

Increasing the Knowledge and Understanding of Space Capabilities

Admiral William A. Moffett well understood that the best way to integrate aviation into the fleet was to have ships' captains demand the services provided by aviation. The best way to promote those services was to have aviators demonstrating the capabilities of airpower in the daily performance of naval operations. For identical reasons, the best way to promote space power is to incorporate space capabilities into as many aspects of air operations as possible. Since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Air Force and Air Force Space Command have exerted considerable efforts to increase the knowledge and understanding of space capabilities among members of the flying community. Beginning with the Gulf War, space power has penetrated the cockpit and air operations centers, has been absorbed into education curricula, and has participated in numerous field exercises.

Interaction between Air and Space Operations

Operation Desert Storm earned the moniker as the "first space war," but the Persian Gulf War was not the first conflict in which space power played a visible and significant role in air operations.¹⁴⁰ Beginning in 1965, the Defense Meteorological Satellite

¹³⁹ Dana J. Johnson, Katherine Poehlmann, and Richard Bueneke, *Space Roles, Missions, and Functions: The Challenge of Organizational Reform*, RAND Corporation, PM-382-CRMAF, August 1995, 79-80, 92.

¹⁴⁰ A number of authors called Desert Storm the "first space war." See for example, Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, "The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War," *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI) Journal* 135, no. 4 (Winter 1991): 45; William A. Dougherty, "Storm from Space," *U.S. Naval*

Program (DMSP) began supplying weather imagery to support the air war in Southeast Asia.¹⁴¹ Air strikes, air-refueling tracks, close air support, and rescue missions depended on satellite-derived weather predictions. In 1967, General William Momyer, commander of 7th Air Force and the air operations in Southeast Asia stated, “As far as I am concerned, this [satellite] weather picture is probably the greatest innovation of the war.”¹⁴² Satellites provided weather and communications for operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983 and operation El Dorado Canyon in Libya in 1986.¹⁴³ LANDSAT imagery provided terrain mapping for the Libyan air strike which proved critical to mission planning.¹⁴⁴ Ships and helicopters conducting mine sweeping operations during operation Earnest Will in the Persian Gulf in 1988 relied on the Global Position System (GPS) for accurate navigation.¹⁴⁵ For operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989, satellites again supplied weather support and long-haul communications.¹⁴⁶ None of these examples include the contributions from the guarded history of National Reconnaissance Office satellites. Nevertheless, fliers were not ignorant of space capabilities as they entered the Gulf War.

Institute Proceedings 118/8/1074 (August 1992): 48; Steven Lambakis, “The United States in Lilliput: The Tragedy of Fleeting Space Power,” *Strategic Review* 24, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 33; Curtis Peebles, *High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force and the Military Space Program* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997, 73; or Craig Covault, “Desert Storm Reinforces Military Space Direction,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology* (8 April 1991): 42.

¹⁴¹ Spires, 170.

¹⁴² Quoted in Peebles, 53. The mission impact of weather is described on p. 52.

¹⁴³ Spires, 244, Peebles, 55.

¹⁴⁴ LANDSAT is a commercially-owned, multi-spectral, environmental sensing satellite, Dougherty, 48.

¹⁴⁵ Spires, 244, Dougherty, 48.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

Even with these successful debuts, it was not until the Persian Gulf War that most space systems were widely integrated into the overall force structure.¹⁴⁷ The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) carried 1100 voice circuits to 115 ground stations. Satellite links carried 90% of the communications traffic into and out of the theater, provided tactical relays for radios limited by line-of-sight, tied deployed units with their home bases, transmitted the daily air tasking order, and connected the theater with U.S.-based intelligence analysts.¹⁴⁸ Although the constellation was incomplete, GPS permitted two-dimensional navigation 22-24 hours per day and three-dimensional coverage 16-19 hours per day to the 12,000 receivers with Coalition forces.¹⁴⁹ The revolutionary satellite system allowed precision navigation in the featureless desert.¹⁵⁰ Air control officers with GPS receivers determined accurate locations of ground targets for GPS-equipped F-16s, F-111s, and B-52s.¹⁵¹ GPS gave B-52s an all weather capability and F-16s used GPS to calculate the initial points of their bomb runs as well as to provide targeting information as forward air controllers.¹⁵² Defense Support Program (DSP) missile-warning satellites detected the infrared rocket plumes of Iraqi Scud missiles. Space Command relayed the missile trajectories to PATRIOT batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The advanced warning alerted soldiers and civilians in the impact areas to seek cover.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷ Dougherty, 48.

¹⁴⁸ Anson and Cummings, 46, Spires, 246, 256.

¹⁴⁹ Anson and Cummings, 50, Spires, 249. The two sources disagree over the exact numbers, but the hours of coverage are sufficient for descriptive purposes.

¹⁵⁰ Dougherty, 50.

¹⁵¹ Anson and Cummings, 50.

¹⁵² Spires, 257.

¹⁵³ Anson and Cummings, 51.

Space-based imagery and remote sensing capabilities impacted most air operations. Once again, cloud imagery and moisture data from DMSP enabled the planning and execution of the air campaign. Laser-guided bombs required relatively cloud-free weather for target designation, and the satellites furnished weather forecasts and determined environmental conditions.¹⁵⁴ LANDSAT collected wide-area surveillance of the battlefield not available from national systems. Air Force pilots practiced flying missions using computer-generated terrain maps constructed from the multi-spectral data. F-111 pilots used this capability to train for the air strike on the Mina al Ahmadi oil complex in Kuwait, which was dumping oil into the Persian Gulf.¹⁵⁵ National reconnaissance systems provided detailed intelligence and bomb damage assessment thereby reducing the need to send unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over heavily defended targets.¹⁵⁶ All these missions, some demonstrated for the first time in the war, continue today and are augmented by further exploitation of space systems in support of military operations.

After the impressive performance in virtually all combat operations during Desert Storm, space power has become a permanent and growing part of air operations. In 1992, the Moorman Blue Ribbon Panel recommended establishing a Space Warfare Center to rapidly develop and deliver new space capabilities to warfighters.¹⁵⁷ Air Force Space

¹⁵⁴ Anson and Cummings, 52, Spires, 251, 258.

¹⁵⁵ Spires, 252, 258, Dougherty, 51.

¹⁵⁶ Spires, 259.

¹⁵⁷ *Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force in Space in the 21st Century*, Recommendation #12, 21.

Command formed Forward Space Support Teams in 1993 to provide tailored space support to theater air component commanders.¹⁵⁸ These initiatives opened new aspects of space power to theater warfighters.

In 1994, the Talon Shield program transitioned the first Air Force Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) project to an operational squadron. The 11th Space Warning Squadron, whose mission was to detect and report short-range ballistic missiles to all theaters of operations, received the Attack and Launch early Reporting to Theater (ALERT) system. The ALERT system has improved the ballistic missile detection capabilities of Defense Support Program satellites and enabled the broadcast of warning data directly into air operations centers worldwide.¹⁵⁹ The Talon Hook program built the HOOK-112 survival radio which uses GPS to precisely locate downed airmen and transmits the information to search and rescue forces.¹⁶⁰ In 1995, Forward Space Support Teams deployed to Vincenza, Italy as part of operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. The Team wrote the space annex for the peacekeeping operations plans, supplied Space Warfare Center-generated imagery of air drop zones, and showed airlifter squadrons how to predict daily GPS accuracies to improve mission planning.¹⁶¹ The Space Warfare Center also instituted an Air Operations Center Applications Course in 1997 which teaches the combat air forces the capabilities and limitations of space

¹⁵⁸ Larry Gedemer, "Forward Space Support," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 1, Issue 1 (June 1994): 4; Robert J. Feldman, "FSST Training—It's Not Just for FSST Teams Anymore," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 1, Issue 1 (June 1994): 4.

¹⁵⁹ Sean D. McClung, "Talon Shield Declares Victory," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 2, Issue 1 (November 1994): 3.

¹⁶⁰ Jack Fry, "Progress Report—Getting 'Space' to Warfighters," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 3, Issue 2 (Spring 1996): 3.

¹⁶¹ Steven R. Serie and Mark Lester, "Air Force Space Support Team Keeping Peace as Part of JOINT ENDEAVOR," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 3, Issue 2 (Spring 1996): 9-10.

systems and how to incorporate space assets into air campaign planning.¹⁶² These documented cases represent a few of the projects intended to better deliver space power directly to the flying community.

Professional Military Education (PME)

Education planted the seeds of aviation in the minds of the young officers at the U.S. Naval Academy and exposure at the Naval War College cultivated the value of airpower in the Navy's senior leaders. Air Force PME is much more comprehensive than that of the Navy in the 1920s and 1930s, and space power is included in all curricula. The space education programs in the Air Force's three commissioning sources (Air Force Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Officers Training School) are modest, but that modest training is reinforced when the lieutenants attend the Air and Space Basic Course.

The Air Force Academy's space education program is the best of the three training courses. During their Military Arts and Sciences studies, Academy cadets receive three formal lessons on space doctrine, space missions, and space systems. The students learn about the space contribution to the Gulf War in a case study on operation Desert Storm. They also explicitly integrate space support into a theater campaign planning exercise. Courses on space policy and space law complement the space employment component of the curriculum. By the summer of 1999, the Academy will offer an elective in space operations which will provide hands-on experience with space systems.¹⁶³ The Officers Training School has a single, one-hour lecture on space missions, space organization, and

¹⁶² John Bystroff, "Space Warfare Center (SWC) Offers Course for Air Operations Centers," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 4, Issue 4 (Winter 1997/1998): 6.

¹⁶³ This information was provided by Dr. James Smith, Assistant Course Director, Military Arts and Sciences Department, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, interviewed by the author, 17 March 1998.

satellite systems. The Reserve Officers Training Corps program is based on the same material as the Officers Training School, and the space studies are presented in two classes during a cadet's freshman and senior years.¹⁶⁴ After graduates receive their commissions, they attend the Air and Space Basic Course. The course is designed to teach all new officers the fundamentals of air and space power. Four classes totaling approximately seven hours of instruction are dedicated to teaching space history, space doctrine, space missions, and space operations. The curriculum also includes space in the planning and execution of the Blue Thunder capstone war game.¹⁶⁵

The 1989 Blue Ribbon Panel on Space called for a core space curriculum for Air Force education programs.¹⁶⁶ A 1991 Inspector General review of the implementation plan noted that Squadron Officers School allotted two hours for space instruction.¹⁶⁷ With the advent of the Air and Space Basic Course in 1998, the emphasis on space power in the captain-level Squadron Officers School shrank to one hour, although space is specifically included in their Atlantis tactical war game.¹⁶⁸ In 1991, the Air Command and Staff College implemented a forty-five hour space curriculum, but that aggressive

¹⁶⁴ This information was provided by Captain Rhonda Carey, Defense Studies Curriculum Area Manager for Officer Training School and Reserve Officers Training Corps, Maxwell AFB, AL, interviewed by the author, 23 March 1998. The Officer Training School Defense Studies block consists of twenty-seven hours. Reserve Officers Training Corps classes are spread out over four years of college.

¹⁶⁵ This information provided by Captain James "Buddy" Holley, Curriculum Area Manager for Operations and Doctrine, Air and Space Basic Course, Maxwell AFB, AL, interviewed by the author, 19 March 1998. The Air and Space Basic Course lasts for seven weeks.

¹⁶⁶ 1989 *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, n.p., Task 17.

¹⁶⁷ "Report on Special Management Review of Integration of Space Operations and Capabilities Throughout the Air Force," Part II, *TIG Report*, PN 91-600, The Inspector General of the United States Air Force, 24 October 1991, 37.

program retreated substantially by 1997 to a limited effort of four lessons specifically dedicated to space and others that incorporated aspects of space contributions to intelligence and command and control.¹⁶⁹ The Air War College jumped on the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendation in 1989 by requiring five hours of space systems lectures coupled with a four-hour space war plan case study.¹⁷⁰ By 1991, these classes grew to seventeen hours, and by 1997, the Air War College's space education curriculum contained eight hours on space force employment; twenty hours on orbital mechanics, space history, space organization, and space support; and three, thirty-hour electives on space issues, space policy, and space technology.¹⁷¹ Some anecdotal evidence suggests space education at the Air War College may have reached overkill.¹⁷²

Participation in Field Exercises

Naval Aviation demonstrated its role in surface operations during yearly fleet exercises. Like naval aviation, space systems advertise their abilities in air operations by participating in the numerous field exercises sponsored by the Air Force and theater commanders. General Howell M. Estes III, the present commander of Air Force and U.S.

¹⁶⁸ This information was provided by Captain Brent Barber, Operations Officer for Curriculum, Squadron Officers School, Maxwell AFB, AL, interviewed by the author, 18 March 1998.

¹⁶⁹ *TIG Report*, 37; "Final Report on the Operational Needs Analysis for Senior Service and Command and Staff College Space Education, performed under contract to U.S. Space Command by SY Technology, Inc., 22 January 1998, 34-35. The SY Technology, Inc. report further indicated that the military command and staff colleges across the services lacked a comprehensive and integrated space curriculum, 37.

¹⁷⁰ Col. Eric Sundberg, Air University Space Command Chair, memorandum to the Air War College Commander, subject: Development of Enhanced Core Space Curriculum, AU/CS Ltr, 5 October 1989.

¹⁷¹ *TIG Report*, 37; SY Technology, Inc., Final Report, 9, 16.

¹⁷² During lectures at the Air War College and conversations with several students, the author noted a moderate amount of groaning and complaining about the number of classes taught on space.

Space Command remarked, “If we don’t train with [a space system], we’re not going to actually use it when it goes to combat and it’ll stay as a stovepipe.”¹⁷³ In 1995, the Air Force Weapons School opened the Space Training Facility at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The facility merges ground, air, and space information into a coherent picture transmitted directly to fighter cockpits for Red Flag and Green Flag exercises.¹⁷⁴ Space participated in Ulchi Focus Lens in Korea, Cobra Gold in Pacific Command, the JTFEX-95 series and Unified Endeavor in Atlantic Command, Atlantic Resolve in European Command, and Roving Sands in Central Command, all in 1995.¹⁷⁵ Four times a year, the Battle Staff Training School at Hurlburt Field, FL holds Blue Flag exercises for numbered air force commanders and their battle staffs. The school injects space into the exercises with the National Wargaming System model, which simulates national reconnaissance assets and generates reports for player analysis.¹⁷⁶ A Space Support Team deployed to Blue Flag 95-4 to support the 8th Air Force commander. The Team provided simulated data for theater missile warning, Satellite Reconnaissance Avoidance

¹⁷³ General Howell M. Estes III, transcript of interview by Bill Scott, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 4 December 1997. A military “stovepipe” is a system or program whose products and functions are generally self-contained and available to a limited group of users. For example, before the Persian Gulf War, intelligence specialists received imagery from the national satellites. Pilots flying combat missions rarely saw the imagery from which their targets were identified.

¹⁷⁴ Chris Kinnan and Joanna Sobieski, “Space in the Air Operations Center: The Quest for Seamless Integration of Space in Warfighter Operations,” *Space Tactics Bulletin 2*, Issue 4 (Fall 1995): 5; Karen M. Giacalone, “Space Shooters: Space Systems Hit the Cockpit at the ‘Home of the Fighter Pilot’,” *Space Tactics Bulletin 2*, Issue 4 (Fall 1995): 18-19.

¹⁷⁵ Mark Davis, “Space Support to the Warfighting Community—From a Unified Action Officer Perspective,” *Space Tactics Bulletin 2*, Issue 3 (Summer 1995): 9-10; T. Robinson, “Joint Space Support Teams at Work Around the World,” *Space Tactics Bulletin 2*, Issue 4 (Fall 1995): 15.

Notification (SATRAN), and GPS accuracies for mission planning.¹⁷⁷ Another Team supported Keen Edge in Japan in 1996 by filling space positions in the combat plans and combat operations cells.¹⁷⁸ In 1996, the National Reconnaissance Office participated in about eighty exercises supporting users across the joint commands and services.¹⁷⁹

Whether in the daily interaction between air and space operations, in the curricula across the spectrum of PME, or in exercise participation, the Air Force has dedicated a substantial effort to increase the knowledge and understanding of space throughout the service. These policy areas are as thoroughly developed as those pursued by the Navy during the interwar years, and progress continues. This knowledge base establishes a solid foundation from which to champion space capabilities to Air Force fliers.

Promoting Space Capabilities to the Flying Community

Whatever the naval aviators believed privately, they were careful not to threaten prematurely the primacy of the battleship in what they professed publicly. Battleship admirals held the political power in the U.S. Navy in the 1920s and could have frustrated attempts to expand the fledgling aviation service out of self-preservation. To earn co-equal status as warriors, space must contribute credible combat capabilities that enhance air operations rather than threaten the airplane as the Air Force's premier striking arm. The tone of the public pronouncements of influential space advocates is one measure of

¹⁷⁶ USAF Battle Staff Training School Primary Blue Flag Exercise Models, n.p., on-line, Internet, 18 March 1998, available from <http://nova.agos.hurlburt.af.mil/Exercise/models.htm>.

¹⁷⁷ Duane R. Cozadd, "Air Force Space Support Teams," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 2, Issue 4 (Fall 1995): 16.

¹⁷⁸ Michael Stroud, "Keen Edge 96," *Space Tactics Bulletin* 3, Issue 2 (Spring 1999): 11.

¹⁷⁹ Brig Gen David Baker, interviewed by Pat Cooper, *Air Force Times*, no. 9, 30 September 1996, 29.

how the leadership promotes space power to the Air Force. An examination of space missions reveals potential areas of competition between air and space officers over roles and influence. In an era of declining budgets, the struggle over funding may decide the ultimate fate of air and space integration.

“The contribution of space systems is not likely to remain simply as additive enhancers [sic] to atmospheric systems but will ultimately compete with them to satisfy strategic, tactical, and mobility tasks.”¹⁸⁰ Even though space systems have not seriously challenged strategic, tactical, and mobility tasks during the preceding ten years, the philosophy statement from the 1989 Blue Ribbon Panel on Space hardly engenders a cooperative environment between air and space. Perhaps fortunately, the Persian Gulf War intervened, and afterwards, General Charles A. Horner, battle-tested during operation Desert Storm as the Joint Forces Air Component Commander, took the helm of Space Command and charted a less antagonistic course. In 1993, General Horner told *Air Force Magazine*, “We have to make space efficient and responsive to wartime needs. We have to provide space data directly to the forces who are fighting the war.”¹⁸¹ General Horner maintained this emphasis throughout his tenure as the commander of Air Force and U.S. Space Command. Only space-based systems could detect third-world missile systems and reduce warning time from minutes to seconds. The Command had to protect GPS navigation capabilities while preventing the enemy from either exploiting GPS

¹⁸⁰ 1989 *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, n.p., Philosophy Statement.

¹⁸¹ Quoted in James Canan, “Space Support for Shooting Wars,” *Air Force Magazine* 76, no. 4 (April 1993): 30.

themselves or degrading its effectiveness for U.S. forces. “We must keep our mission sharply in focus—make all space systems responsive to U.S. warfighters.”¹⁸²

The Space Command position has begun to swing back toward the 1989 philosophy. General Estes is circumspect when addressing force application from space. He believes the Air Force must develop force application *concepts* but

“envision[s] a day when space power will also represent the ultimate in rapid global mobility and global precision attack. Though these capabilities are obviously some time away, the vision is in place and the plans are being laid to provide our civilian leadership with credible options should the need arise.”¹⁸³

These visions are sufficiently distant and pose no immediate threat to the “shooter” Air Force. Space force enhancement missions (communications, weather, navigation, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and spacelift) do not compete against fighter, bomber, and airlift missions. In addition, conventional airpower is largely incapable of engaging satellites and destroying ballistic missiles. The looming battle for legitimacy between air and space forces may never be one of roles and missions; the nature of the *intraservice* conflict will more likely be over funding.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸² Charles A. Horner, “Space Systems Pivotal to Modern Warfare,” *Defense* 94, Issue 4 (1994): 22, 25, 27, 28.

¹⁸³ Howell M. Estes III, “Sustaining the Strategic Space Advantage,” *Defense Issues* 12, no. 13 (13 March 1997): 9; Howell M. Estes III, “National Security: The Space Dimension,” *Defense Issues* 12, no. 52 (14 November 1997): 6. General Estes’ public pronouncements are more notable for what they do not say. He rarely mentions space-based weapons, and when he does, the remarks are within the context of the political constraints. His near term visions are to continue to migrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to space. See also, Howell M. Estes III, “The Promise of Space Potential for the Future,” *Defense Issues* 12, no. 20 (3 April 1997); Howell M. Estes III, “Space and Joint Space Doctrine,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996-1997); and Jim Wolffe, “Toward the Air and Space Force,” *Air Force Times*, no. 40, 5 May 1997, 10.

¹⁸⁴ This idea was first brought to the author’s attention by Lt Col (S) Roy Houchin, faculty member at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, interviewed by the author, 19 March 1998.

Many space power thinkers have called for offensive and defensive weapons in space, but politics and money steer those arguments as much as technology.¹⁸⁵ Exorbitant costs have doomed many military space programs, and expensive space force enhancement systems are competing directly with equally expensive aircraft modernization programs.¹⁸⁶ The Air Force managed to sustain funding for the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), and the Milstar satellite communications system as well as the F-22, B-2, joint strike fighter, and the airborne laser for fiscal year 1998.¹⁸⁷ The F-22, the airborne laser, SBIRS, and the EELV are the top four “inseparable capabilities” rather than priorities.¹⁸⁸ Such platitudes may temporarily assuage concerns over protecting favorite programs, but what will the Air Force fund when there is no blood left in the budget turnip? Furthermore, where will space find allies if General Estes believes, “Space must expand and become a larger part of the Air Force budget every year.”¹⁸⁹ The stark fiscal reality is that some programs get cancelled so others may move forward.

Maj Gen William F. Jones, former commander of 14th Air Force, is refreshingly outspoken on this issue. What he calls the 707-based intelligence, surveillance, and

¹⁸⁵ See for example, Lambakis, 35, 38; James Hackett, “Space, the Critical Defense Frontier,” *Washington Times National Weekly Edition*, 22 March 1998, 34; or Peter Grier, “The Arena of Space,” *Air Force Magazine* 79, no. 9 (September 1996): 44-47. The Grier article is a summary of some of the recommendations from the New World Vistas study by the USAF Scientific Advisory Board.

¹⁸⁶ Cost sank the Dyna-Soar/X-20 program in 1963, the Manned Orbiting laboratory in 1969, and the Follow-on Early Warning System in 1993. Funding, politics, technology, and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 reduced the Strategic Defense Initiative to the much smaller Ballistic Missile Defense Office, Peebles, 21, 26, 68-69, 78.

¹⁸⁷ Estes, *Defense Issues* 12, no. 52 (14 November 1997): 4.

¹⁸⁸ F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, “Meeting Today’s Challenges: Flight Path to the 21st Century,” address to the Air Force Association Air Warfare Symposium, Orlando, FL, 27 February 1998.

¹⁸⁹ Estes, *Defense Issues* 12, no. 52 (14 November 1997): 3.

reconnaissance fleet (E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS], E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS], and RC-135 Rivet Joint) cost billions of dollars to build, maintain, and fly. These systems are essentially tied to the advance of the ground armies and characterize only about one hundred miles of battle space ahead of the front line. Moving these aircraft functions to space will extend the depth of surveillance to the range of airpower, essentially the entire theater of operations. Maj Gen Jones predicts AWACS, JSTARS, and Rivet Joint will “head to the boneyard” in order to capitalize on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity of space.¹⁹⁰ Money liberated from the retirement of these platforms combined with a decreased cost of space launch and satellites will fund the next generation of space systems. The imminent battle over budgets will need influential space advocates within the Air Force, and the advocacy must come from the ranks of senior officers.

Space Officer Career Progression

The Air Force activated Air Force Space Command in 1982 consolidating space missions that had been previously under the management of Strategic Air Command and Air Force Systems Command.¹⁹¹ In 1993, Space Command received the intercontinental ballistic missile mission from Air Combat Command. Consequently, Air Force Space Command should consist of a mixture of hybrid officers experienced in these technical career fields.

As with the Navy, the senior officers within the Air Force hold the political power that enables them to implement policies which promote the new ways of war. Admiral Moffett created an aviation observer program to prime the senior command pump with

¹⁹⁰ Maj Gen William E. Jones (USAF, ret.), lecture, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 25 March 1998.

¹⁹¹ See Spires, Appendix 6-1 for a list of space systems transferred from Strategic Air Command to Air Force Space Command in 1982 and 1983, 296-297. Air Force Space Command did not gain complete control of satellite command and control and space launch until 1993, Spires, 274.

ersatz aviators until career aviators could advance through the ranks and qualify for senior commands themselves. There are a couple methods by which to measure the progress of space operations officers within the Air Force. The first is to examine the experience of general officers to determine whether or not space operators have achieved the highest ranks. The second is to study the backgrounds of officers commanding operation space units.

A snapshot of general officers clearly shows that officers with substantial space operations experience have earned all flag ranks, but there are notable anomalies within the senior command structure. To date, only one space operations officer has earned the rank of four-star general. General Thomas S. Moorman Jr. served as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force from 1994 until his retirement in 1997, but he spent less than half of his career in the space operations field.¹⁹² The current commander of Air Force Materiel Command's Space and Missile Center, Lt Gen Roger G. Dekok, is probably as close to a career space general as there is in the Air Force. He spent more than 80 percent of his career in space operations and staff positions. Maj Gen Robert S. Dickman, the Department of Defense Space Architect, and several current and retired brigadier generals followed space-related careers to the flag officer level.¹⁹³ While the space career

¹⁹² The biographies of all current and some recently retired Air Force general officers are available through the Internet on the USAF Home Page at on-line, Internet, 17 March 1998, available from <http://www.af.mil/cgi-bin/multigate/retrieve?u=z3950r://dtics11:1024>. To determine the percentage of officer's experience in particular career fields, the author used the same method developed by D. Tom Clark, "The Transition to a Space and Air Force: Proposed Solutions to the Dilemma," Research Report no. 97-04 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College), April 1997, 23. Lt Col Clark counted the years spent in operational units, commands, and staff positions directly related to a specific mission area as experience in a career field.

¹⁹³ Maj Gen Dickman spent about 50 percent of his career in space operations and another 40 percent in space acquisition and engineering. Brig Gen Thomas J. Scanlan Jr.,

field does lead to general officer ranks, there has not yet been enough time to breed many pure space operations officers. So who is filling the senior positions?

Despite success in promotions, no senior officer with predominately space experience currently holds any of the most senior leadership and command positions in Air Force Space Command. The present commander of Air Force Space Command is a career fighter pilot and currently filling his first space assignment.¹⁹⁴ The Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command is a career missile officer, and his predecessor was a career tanker pilot.¹⁹⁵ Within the Air Force Space Command Staff, the Director of Operations and the commander of the Space Warfare Center are both pilots. The Director of Plans has evenly split his career between missiles and space.¹⁹⁶ The trend continues at the numbered air forces and space wings, but the level of space experience increases perceptibly. Maj Gen Gerald F. Perryman Jr., 14th Air Force commander, spent more than half of his career as a missile launch officer. His last three assignments were

a former Director of Operations for U.S. Space Command (now retired) and Brig Gen Robert E. Larned, Director of Imagery Systems, Acquisition, and operations for the National Reconnaissance Office also spent most of their careers in space operations and space systems acquisition.

¹⁹⁴ Gen Estes is an F-4 pilot. His two immediate predecessors, Gen Joseph W. Ashy (1994-1996) and Gen Charles A. Horner (1992-1994) were also career pilots holding their only space assignments as commanders of U.S. and Air Force Space Command.

¹⁹⁵ For the purpose of this discussion, career missile officers are not considered space operations officers.

Lt Gen Lance W. Lord spent approximately 80 percent of his assignments in missiles and 17 percent in space. Lt Gen Patrick P. Caruana held two space assignments as Vice Commander of Air Force Space Command and commander of 14th Air Force.

¹⁹⁶ Brig Gen Robert C. Hinson, Air Force Space Command Director of Operations, is a B-52 pilot. Brig Gen Glen W. Moorehead III at the Space Warfare Center is a fighter pilot. Brig Gen John S. Boone, Air Force Space Command Director of Plans spent his first thirteen years in missiles and his last fifteen in space.

in space operations.¹⁹⁷ Three of the four wing commanders in 14th Air Force are career missile officers with 10-20 percent of their experience in space; the fourth is a helicopter and airlifter pilot.¹⁹⁸

In his already dated but relevant study, Tom Clark compared the career experience of flag officers in Air Force Space Command with those of Air Mobility Command as of 31 December 1996. His results showed that flag officers in Space Command had spent only 14 percent of their careers in space assignments (39 percent if he included missile assignments) compared to 90 percent in flying assignments for generals in Air Mobility Command. The amalgamated nature of Space Command explains why some general officers in the space career field have experience in a variety of technical career fields, but it does not explain why none of them had experience in operational space units other than as commanders. By contrast, all of the generals in Air Mobility Command filled assignments as flying crew members during their careers.¹⁹⁹ In 1996 and in 1998, Space Command was and is led by generals with little space experience.

General officers are a fairly fungible resource. These officers can successfully lead organizations well outside the boundaries of their professional experience based on the

¹⁹⁷ Maj Gen Perryman has been commander of the 21st Space Wing (1995-1996), Director of Operations for Air Force Space Command (1996-1997), and commander of 14th Air Force (1997-present). His predecessors at 14th Air Force, Lt Gen David L. Vesely (1995-1997) also commanded the Space Warfare Center (1994-1995) but is a career pilot, and Maj Gen Jones (1994-1995) filled assignments in air control, ground-launched cruise missiles, and space. Although not treated explicitly in this study, the 20th Air Force commander, Maj Gen Donald G. Cook and in command of the ICBM forces, spent 80 percent of his career as a B-52 pilot, about 10 percent in space, and 5 percent in missiles.

¹⁹⁸ 21st Space Wing, Brig Gen Franklin J. Blaisdell, 30th Space Wing, Col. C. Robert Kehler, and 50th Space Wing, Col. Elwood C. Tircuit are missile officers. The commander of the 45th Space Wing, Brig Gen F. Randall Starbuck, is a pilot.

¹⁹⁹ D. Tom Clark, 21, 24-25.

breadth of their assignments. A more detailed measure of the career progression of space operations officers is an examination of the backgrounds of operational group and squadron commanders.²⁰⁰ Data from five of the six group commanders within 14th Air Force showed a mixture of careers between space, missile, and engineering officers.²⁰¹ From a flier's perspective, these are all technical career fields. From a space operator's perspective, there are differences between space operators, missileers, and engineers.

Data was available for twenty-seven of the thirty-one operations squadrons under the six groups.²⁰² Of these, nine commanders are principally career space operations officers. Ten are career missile officers. Four are career navigators or weapon system officers, and four hold mixed backgrounds in space, engineering and acquisition. From the squadron to the major command, space operators are minority shareholders in the space business. Looking back, the Johnny-Come-Latelies led the naval air war during World War II. Is their reason to believe Space Command is experiencing a similar phenomenon?

²⁰⁰ This information is available from the Internet home pages of each of the space wings. 21st Space Wing at on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.spacecom.af.mil/21sw/21og.htm> 30th Space Wing at on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.vafb.af.mil/orgs/30swcc.htm>; 45th Space Wing at on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.pafb.af.mil/people>; 50th Space Wing at on-line, Internet, available from <http://www.fafb.af.mil/biographies>, 17 March 1998.

²⁰¹ 21st Operations Group, 50% space, 50% engineering; 821st Space Group, 76% space, 24% missile; 45th Operations Group, 95% missiles, 5% space; 50th Operations Group, 68% space, 23% missiles; and 750th Operations Group, 19% engineering, 68% space. The 30th Operations Group data was unavailable.

²⁰² 21st Space Wing: 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th Space Warning Squadrons; 3rd Satellite Communications Squadron; 3rd, 4th, 18th, and 20th Space Surveillance Squadrons; and 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Command and Control Squadrons. The 5th Space Surveillance Squadron was unavailable.

30th Space wing: 2nd and 4th Space Launch Squadrons were unavailable.

45th Space Wing: 1st, 3rd, and 5th Space Launch Squadrons.

There are several interpretations of this data. The first and least plausible is that this particular temporal sample is a statistical anomaly and does not represent the normal distribution of commander's experiences. That may be tenable in regard to squadron commanders, but the fact that there are few general officers with substantial space experience explains why generals from other fields hold senior command positions in Air Force Space Command. It does not explain why none of the space generals hold those command positions. A second interpretation is that space operations officers are generally less prepared and less qualified for command than missile and flying officers. A third is that the high number of missile officers in space operations commands is merely a reflection of the successful integration of the space and missile missions. Alternatively, Admiral Moffett and Stephen Rosen may have previously identified the key. The missile career field has existed as a single entity for forty years whereas the space operations field was fractured until 1982. As a result, Space Command has simply not had enough time to cultivate space officers to command and general officer levels.²⁰³ The career missile officers may be the equivalent of Moffett's aviation observers to give Space Command rank and advocacy in the senior positions. Regardless of the correct explanation, space operations officers would benefit from an understanding of Air Force flying missions to broaden their perspective on air operations.

50th Space wing: 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Space Operations Squadrons. The 5th Space Operations Squadron was unavailable.

²⁰³ Rosen said success in the integration of aviation in the Navy was linked to the pace of promotions. *Winning the Next War*, 80. Review page 27 in chapter 3 of this paper for further discussion.

Increasing Space Operations Officers' Experience in Air Operations

The Navy knew it was critical that all aviators understood naval surface operations before entering flight training and that the aviators maintain and expand that knowledge throughout their careers. As long as the U.S. Air Force remains predominantly an *air* force, space operators should understand the air power mission in order to maximize the space contribution. With only a few tightly focused programs available, space operators have meager opportunities to learn, understand, and experience the airpower mission.

The 1989 Blue Ribbon Panel on Space recommended that the Air Force implement a centrally managed officer crossflow program to assign space operations officers to air operations commands and to assign fliers to space operations units.²⁰⁴ The program was already struggling by 1991. The commands had not established formal goals, so the eighteen space officers assigned to eight commands were unsure of their duties and felt abandoned by Space Command.²⁰⁵ The 1992 Moorman Panel made the same recommendation.²⁰⁶ In 1993, General Horner said space personnel need to be on the staffs of warfighting commands “to bring an awareness of space to the guys who drop bombs.”²⁰⁷ General Joseph W. Ashy said it again in 1996, “That’s why we are integrating [at the Air Force Weapons School], so [space operators] can be exposed to our fighter forces, airlift forces, bomber disciplines...We are teams within teams.”²⁰⁸ Maj Gen Jones echoed the same idea in different words in 1997. “Rotation and integration of Air Force space qualified people must now be viewed as an essential

²⁰⁴ 1989 *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, n.p. task 15.

²⁰⁵ *TIG Report*, 33.

²⁰⁶ *Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force on Space in the 21st Century*, Recommendation #15b, 24.

²⁰⁷ Canan, 34.

element of Air Force personnel management.”²⁰⁹ Despite these repeated and persistent recommendations and the realization that space operators must understand the airpower experience, the Air Force has instituted precious few avenues through which space operators are exposed to air operations.

All officers receive measured doses of airpower during PME from commissioning through War College. Theoretically, every officer should understand airpower. The nation’s premier airpower strategy school, the School of Advanced Airpower Studies includes at least one space operator each year. Education, however, does not equate to experience.

The Space Division at the Air Force Weapons School trains approximately sixteen space operators per year through a rigorous curriculum heavily laden with airpower studies and flying missions.²¹⁰ Space graduates from the Weapons School work in the combat planning and combat operations cells in air operations centers, and Air Force Space Support Teams deploy from Space Command to augment the Weapons School

²⁰⁸ Joseph W. Ashy, “Putting Space in the USAF Weapons School,” speech to the graduates of the Space Tactics School printed in *USAF Weapons Review* 44, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 4.

²⁰⁹ William E. Jones, “White Paper on Space in the USAF,” to Maj Gen David W. McIlvoy, Headquarters USAF/XPX, Washington, DC, 22 December 1997, 17.

²¹⁰ The Space Warfare Center started a Space Tactics School in 1994 which migrated to the Air Force Weapons School in 1996. Approximately 20% of the 560 hours of academics during the six-month course is dedicated to airpower. Students are required to fly three missions and shadow other students during mission planning. The space officers can also ride on any airplane that has an open seat. Lt Col Gregory Billman, USAF Weapons School Space Division Commander, letter to the author, 18 March 1998; Lt Col Gregory Billman, USAF Weapons School Space Division Commander, letter to the author, 19 March 1998; USAF Weapons Instructor Course Syllabus for Space, USAF Weapons School, Nellis AFB, NV, January 1997, 16-31.

experts during contingencies.²¹¹ So far, feedback from the program has been positive. The numbered air force commanders are requesting more space graduates from the Weapons School to work under their commands.²¹²

Assigning Weapons School graduates and deploying Space Support Teams to air operations centers involves a handful of space officers. The initiative satisfies the letter of the crossflow programs, but it is far too limited to fulfill the spirit. The U.S. Navy *required* all aviators to perform sea duty, not an elite, highly-trained few. If the Navy model truly has instructive and predictive power, then the Air Force must greatly expand the opportunities for space officers to gain experience in air operations.

Space Participation in War Games

In the 1920s, the Navy relied on war games at the Naval War College to educate senior officers about aviation and to test airpower concepts before committing scarce resources. The game environment permitted a variety of officers to freely innovate and test ideas which they might eventually implement in the fleet. In the modern Air Force, war gaming is more pervasive, but games provide similar opportunities to Air Force officers as they did to earlier naval officers.

This chapter already mentioned several war games included within the PME process. The Air War College first incorporated space into its war gaming in 1990.²¹³ In 1998, the Air War College and Air Command and Staff College joined to participate in a

²¹¹ Michael Perales, "Integrating Space into the Fight," *USAF Weapons Review* 4, no. 44 (Winter 1996): 20-21.

²¹² Billman, 18 March 1998.

²¹³ Theodore C. Hailes, Chairman, Department of Regional and Warfare Studies, Air War College, to Air University XPO, letter, subject: Final Report: Special Management

combined war game which included operational- and strategic-level decision making. A single space cell supported ten simultaneous, independent war games.²¹⁴

The Air Force Wargaming Institute at Maxwell AFB, AL is the Air Force focal point for PME war games as well as interservice and senior officer-level war gaming. At the Institute, space in war games is an education process for conceptual understanding of the role of space in military operations. The Wargaming Institute is incorporating computer-generated visualization tools so participants can view the behavior of satellite constellations and to tie weather, imagery, and intelligence into the air campaign planning process.²¹⁵ The Air Force Wargaming Institute conducts the Joint Land Aerospace and Sea Simulation (JLASS) for the six senior service schools.²¹⁶ The Institute will use a Blue Force space cell connected directly to the Space Operations Center at 14th Air Force for realistic space participation.²¹⁷ In 1997, the Wargaming Institute conducted Global Engagement '97, a joint, general-officer war game in strategic decision making. The scenario took place in 2012 and included laser anti-satellite weapons and satellite jamming.²¹⁸

Review (SMR) about Integration of Space Operations and Capabilities Throughout the Air Force, 9 December 1991.

²¹⁴ Captain Michael L. Lakos, Exercise Wargame Director, Air Force Wargaming Institute, Maxwell AFB, AL, interviewed by the author, 19 March 1998.

²¹⁵ Two commercial satellite visualization computer programs the Air Force Wargaming Institute is testing are Satellite Tool Kit and Satellite Missile Analysis Tool. Lakos interview.

²¹⁶ James C. Hyde and Michael W. Everett, "Educating Future leaders in Strategic and Operational Art," *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 12 (Summer 1996): 29.

²¹⁷ The 14th Air Force Space Operations Center at Vandenburg AFB, CA is the 24-hour support center that manages all requests relating to USAF space systems. Lakos interview.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

These formal war games encourage innovation, but there are few possibilities for officers to return to their operational units and implement their ideas. The Space Battlelab at the Space Warfare Center in Colorado Springs provides a conduit to translate ideas into operational tests and successful tests into operational capabilities. Air Force Space Command activated the Space Battlelab in mid-1997. Its charter is to develop concepts for space-related Air Force operations based on ideas submitted from across the Air Force. The Battlelab is supposed to facilitate ideas in order to recreate the kind of innovation that led to many of the Air Force's historical successes.²¹⁹ Institutionalized innovation seems contradictory, but the Battlelab does attempt to connect ideas with inaccessible space systems.

Review and Analysis

At least three times in the last ten years, the Air Force decided to integrate space into an air and space force. The third iteration implies that the previous two attempts were not completely successful—if not outright failures. Some analysis of the cause of those failures is necessary.

Six of the twenty-seven tasks of the 1989 Blue Ribbon Panel Space Implementation Plan directing or relating to major expenditures of funds and to purchases of new weapons systems never made it past the fiscal chopping block.²²⁰ The three funding-

²¹⁹ Cliff D. Ozmun, "Air Force Space Command Establishes First Space Battlelab," *Program Manager* 26, no. 5 (September-October 1997): 82.

²²⁰ Task 5: anti-satellite weapons and battle management; task 7: common-user on-orbit support; task 8: space-based wide-area surveillance; task 9: cost-sharing in satellite communications; task 10: battle management for strategic defense; and task 24: expanding Air Force TENCAP all lost funding by 1991. *TIG Report*, 13, 17, 19, 22, 24, 47.

based recommendations from the 1992 Moorman Panel have not yet neared fruition.²²¹ Even the purely administrative tasks of updating policy and doctrine never gained approval.²²² One possible explanation, reinforced by the naval aviation analogy, was that the bulk of the implementation plan was wrong. Integration is not driven by weapons systems, capabilities, or declarative documents; it is accomplished by people, by leaders, by officers who hold positions of power and influence. There were fewer space generals in 1989 and 1992 and younger space operations officers than today. Perhaps with the passage of time and the accumulation of senior space officers with political power, the Air Force will succeed in integrating space in this third and latest attempt.

When measured against the template constructed from the historical analogy of naval aviation integration in the 1920s and 1930s, the Air Force appears to have a 70% solution, but some space proponents are still enamoured with technology and not focusing on human relationships. The service has made great strides in educating officers about space and incorporating space capabilities into air operations. Field exercises and war games repeatedly expose the vastness of space to the warfighting community. Leadership is the cornerstone to integration and requires more than excellence in a single area of expertise. Space operations officers need opportunities to experience flying operations, and only senior leaders can sponsor, protect, and promote officers filling assignments outside their primary career fields. The Air Force is transitioning to an air

²²¹ *Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force on Space in the 21st Century*. Recommendation # 6, develop a new spacelift system, 16; recommendation #8, develop anti-satellite capabilities, 18; and recommendation #9, expand the Air Force role in ballistic missile defense, 19.

²²² Task 1: prepare Air Force Space Policy letter; task 2: revise space doctrinal publications; task 6: update the Air Force Space Plan; and task 11: integrate space-based weapons into Air Force doctrine, *TIG Report*, 3, 7, 15, 25.

and space force, but there are roots and stones in the evolutionary path. Exploiting a few suggestions from history (from naval aviation and from the Air Force) might clear those obstacles and make the third time a charm.

Chapter 5

Summary and Recommendation

This chapter will consolidate the ideas of this paper into a condensed assessment of the Air Force's progress toward space integration and add general recommendations for improving those policies. The format of the chapter will deviate from the five-policy structure used to explain and compare integration policies in the two previous chapters. During the preceding analysis, the ideas and initiatives from three policy areas began to coalesce into an interrelated component of the space integration program, so the discussion will treat career progression, education, and experience in air operations as a single entity.

The chapter begins with a brief synopsis of the fundamental argument of the research project. Following that, the second section will discuss the Air Force's space integration plan. The third section reviews the efforts to increase knowledge and understanding of space within the Air Force. The fourth section tackles the presentation of space capabilities to the flying community and the pending battle for funding. The fifth section attempts to bring order to the relationship between the careers of space officers, their Professional Military Education (PME), and their opportunities for experiencing the wider Air Force. Finally, the paper will answer the research question posed in chapter 1.

Synopsis

This research used the historical analogy of the integration of aviation into the U.S. Navy in the 1920s and 1930s to develop a framework against which to measure the progress of integrating space into the Air Force with a view to creating an air and space force. From the case study, I identified ten policy areas that contributed to the integration of aviation into the fleet and culled from those ten the five most essential to the integration process. Those five were: (1) increasing the understanding of aviation within the Navy through exposure to aviation capabilities, inclusion in Professional Military Education, and participation in fleet exercises; (2) promoting aviation as an enhancement rather than as a threat to battleship performance; (3) providing a career path for aviators to achieve senior rank and command; (4) maintaining the familiarity of aviators with surface operations; and (5) including aviation in naval war games. I then compared current space integration policies to the contemporary equivalent of these five areas. Some of the Air Force programs matching the five policy areas are robust, but others are weak or require redirection. The next section reviews those assessments.

Official Integration Policy

The most startling conclusion of this research does not come from what was present but from something that was conspicuously absent. The Air Force and Air Force Space Command have no articulated, documented space integration plan. In 1989 and 1992, the Air Force built implementation plans to integrate space into air operations. The plans approached integration as a series of loosely related, discrete tasks, but they were

officially-sanctioned plans nonetheless.²²³ A vision statement does not constitute a roadmap. If the Air Force is going to prevail in integrating space, it should formulate a plan for the service to follow.

Increasing the Knowledge and Understanding of Space

The most successful segment of the space integration effort is the incorporation of space capabilities and products into air operations. Just as in the early days of naval aviation, association and exposure is awakening the knowledge and understanding of space within the warfighting community. The Space Warfare Center is making space more accessible to users. Downgrading classification is moving systems and capabilities into the light. Space's participation in field exercises is demonstrating the capabilities space brings to the fight. The Air Force Wargaming Institute is fostering an environment where students and senior officers can watch space perform in combat operations and understand its role in warfare. These initiatives are effective and growing. Warfighters in the field demanding and pulling space into their operations is a healthy indication of the progress of space integration.

Promoting Space Capabilities to the Flying Community

The most contentious fight and the most acrimonious debate between the fliers and the space operators will not be over roles and missions; it will be a contest over funding. Space power does not presently threaten the big three air weapons: fighters, bombers, and airlifters. Space is, however, in direct competition with the airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and the battle will commence with the

²²³ Both the 1989 and 1992 Blue Ribbon Panels were commissioned by the Chief of Staff

migration of those missions to space. There is not enough money to purchase F-22s, airborne lasers, joint strike fighters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), expendable launch vehicles, and space-based warning systems as well as fund expensive fleets of AWACS, JSTARS, and RC-135s. The Air Force has to answer the question about the future of these 707-based platforms, UAVs, and space-based ISR. The Air Force leadership must then develop a real list of priorities and not revert to timid attempts to avoid the responsibility of tough decisions. The senior leadership bears that responsibility, and the decisions will required hard choices by courageous leaders.

Space Officer Career Progression, Professional Military Education, and Experience

The most difficult problem the Air Force faces in integrating space is how to create an air and space officer to employ an air and space force. Twice before, Blue Ribbon Panels recommended developing a comprehensive approach to teach fliers about space and space operators about airpower. Twice before, the Panels recommended a crossflow of officers between air operations and space operations assignments. Twice before, the Panels recommended assigning officers with space expertise to the most senior levels of the Air Force.²²⁴ The programs foundered because the Air Force failed to devote sufficient leadership capital into making them work. Career, education, and experience are interrelated because they involve people, and solving the people equation will lead the way to the air and space force.

of the Air Force.

²²⁴ 1989 *Blue Ribbon Panel on Space Implementation Plan*, tasks, 3, 15, 17, 18, and 22. *Blue Ribbon Panel of the Air Force on Space in the 21st Century*, recommendations #15a, 15b, and 16 (p. 24, 25).

The Navy once required all officers to serve aboard ship to inculcate into them the meaning of sea power before they entered aviation. Today's Navy no longer maintains that requirement, but all aviators do serve tours aboard ship as seamen "haze gray and underway" early in their careers.²²⁵ The modification of requirements may reflect the success of integrating aviation into the fleet. The competition for flying slots is fierce, and the path to power and influence in the Navy goes from the flight deck to the bridges of aircraft carriers. Naval aviation and sea power have become synonymous.

Every Marine officer spends five months at the Basic School learning to be a Marine infantry rifleman. All officers learn to be platoon leaders and how to employ Marines in combined arms warfare from the platoon leader's perspective. After this mandatory training, the officers select their specialties, but no matter which they choose, they all exist for the sole purpose of supporting the infantry in combat: aviation, artillery, intelligence, logistics, *etc.* Every Marine is first and always, a rifleman.²²⁶

Until 1983, the U.S. Army required officers to earn qualification in a branch (infantry, armor, artillery) before entering aviation. Aviation is now a primary branch itself, but the Army PME process uses a building block approach to training that is fundamental to all branches: the command of progressively larger units in battle as part of the combined arms team. The Officer Basic and Advanced Courses teach lieutenants and captains how to lead and employ platoons and companies. The Army Command and

²²⁵ Naval officers generally attend flight school right after commissioning, but some officers go to sea to await an opening. After flight school, the aviators go to sea on carriers for three to four years, return to shore duty for two to three years, and then perform their tour "on the boat." This information was provided by Commander Richard Bohner, U.S. Navy, Naval Aviator, interviewed by the author, Maxwell AFB, AL, 30 March 1998.

General Staff College trains majors and lieutenant colonels to employ battalions and function on planning staffs. The Army War College teaches colonels and generals how to develop campaign strategies for brigades, divisions, and corps.²²⁷ Army officers learn how their specialty operates as part of the combined arms package.

The maturation process for Air Force officers is different still from these three, but distilling several ingredients from the other service programs might improve the Air Force's process. The Air Force does not require any air operations experience of its officers before they become space operators, yet the Air Force is telling them that fliers are their primary customer. The Air Force attempts to teach most of its officers about air warfare through academics in PME and not through first-hand experience. To understand and embrace airpower, space officers need intimate experience with air operations, but those opportunities are only available to an elite few. An entire generation of space officers is ignorant of airpower, but the air and space force calls for a new breed of renaissance officers. The pilot supply is too tight to fill more than a handful of space officer billets, but the Air Force could certainly select space operators from officers completing tours in air operations fields-AWACS, JSTARS, command and control, airborne intelligence, aircraft maintenance, command posts, or even navigators as their career field shrinks. Drawing space operators from this common foundation of experience would accomplish what the Air and Space Basic Course is attempting to do academically.

²²⁶ This information was provided by Lt Col David H. "Cow" Gurney, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Aviator, interviewed by the author, Maxwell AFB, AL, 30 March 1998.

²²⁷ This information was provided by Maj Clifton L. Dickey, U.S. Army, Army Aviator, 82nd Airborne Division, interviewed by the author, Maxwell AFB, AL, 30 March 1998.

Education is artificial experience. The intent of the Air and Space Basic Course is to mold air and space officers, but the Air Force is trying to do with books and computers what the Marines are doing with muscle and sweat. Marines become Marines by training and living like Marines. The Air Force has made a conscious effort to produce air and space officers, so it should dedicate the necessary resources to do the job right. Get the lieutenants on the flight line and into aircraft. Get them into air and space operations centers. Let them smell jet exhaust, plan a strike mission, deliver bombs on target, and maneuver a satellite. The physical experience would be worth much more than seven weeks of lectures and exercises.

PME should collimate and expand officer experiences at the appropriate points during career development. Squadron Officers School should concentrate on the tactical capabilities and employment of air and space weapon systems. The Air Command and Staff College should teach planning and integrating air and space operations into the theater campaign. The Air War College should weave air and space into campaigns and strategies. In my opinion, only the Air War College space curriculum fulfills these objectives, but is it too much and too late?

Space officers with broader career experiences and greater understanding of air and space power should fare better in the competition for leadership positions. Assignment opportunities in air operations, excellence in space operations, and timely doses of education should cultivate air and space power leaders. The passage of time may permit more space operations officers to achieve senior rank, but as long as the Air Force remains primarily an *air* force, senior space officers with minimal knowledge and experience in air operations will never hold the most influential leadership positions and

combat commands. Implementing these suggestions will require a massive overhaul of the Air Force personnel and education process. Blue Ribbon Panels and Air Force leaders demanded this no less than five times in the past. When will the Air Force heed its own advice?

The Research Question

Does the effort to integrate aviation into the U.S. Navy from 1921 to 1941 provide a suitable framework which the U.S. Air Force can emulate to integrate space power into Air Force operations? The policy challenges of integrating space power into the Air Force are not identical to those faced by the Navy in integrating aviation in the 1920s and 1930s. The similarities are compelling, but that does not mean the historical analogy presents a perfect template for emulation. Science builds on the work, the ideas, the innovations, and the discoveries of the past. That is called progress. Can we not build on history to construct the future of military science? History does not provide prescriptions for success, but it does offer a rich harvest of ideas and guidance. The naval aviation precedent even offers specific recommendations for space integration. More importantly, the naval aviation analogy strongly suggests that the integration process involves more than the acquisition of weapons and combat power. Integration is a social process among people with institutional identities and loyalties. An Air Force enamored by technological prowess neglected the human component in two earlier attempts to integrate space into air operations. Without a current plan, the Air Force has done well to integrate space capabilities and products but has not done as well with people. Integration also must be a human enterprise. Integration is an attitude.

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