

**SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST  
AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE:  
LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST**

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## FOREWORD

This monograph comes at a time when U.S. and other world political and military leaders are struggling with the “new” political-psychological aspects of unconventional conflict. Unfortunately, the strategic theory of unconventional political war has played little part in the discourse. Yet political-insurgency war is the most likely type of conflict to challenge the maintenance and enhancement of global and regional security over the near-to-long term. Contemporary political-insurgency war is a threat we can ill afford to ignore.

Through the analysis of the cases of Argentina (1969-79), Peru (1962-present) and Italy (1968-82), the author identifies the political-strategic challenges of modern unconventional conflict. He stresses the political complexity of insurgency and the broader implications for the promises of democracy, free market economies, and prosperity implicit in the mandates to civil-military forces that confront global and regional instability. These cases are significant because they address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. As a consequence, this examination is a logical point from which to begin to understand how governments and international organizations might ultimately control--or succumb to--the strategic challenges of political-insurgency war.

The author’s recommendations impose no easy set of tasks. Nevertheless, if the U.S. and other global leadership ignore the highly political aspects of modern unconventional conflict, the resultant instability and possible state failure will adversely shape the security environment in which all nations must struggle to survive. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this cogent monograph as a part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security.

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING, a retired U.S. Army colonel, joined the Strategic Studies Institute in September 2000. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including a previous appointment at the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Southern Command, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs. He is also the editor or co-editor of *El Salvador at War*; *Gray Area Phenomena*; *Confronting the New World Disorder*; *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success*; *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*; and *Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century*. Dr. Manwaring holds a B.S. in economics, a B.S. in political science, an M.A. in political science, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Illinois. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

## SUMMARY

This monograph begins with a short discussion of contemporary insurgency. It argues that in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed groups that are attempting to gain political control of a state. These organizations are engaged in a highly complex political act--political war. Given that this type of conflict is likely to challenge U.S. and other global leadership over the next several years, it is important to understand that the final results of insurgency or counterinsurgency are never determined by arms alone. Rather, the results depend on winning the political support of the people.

In these terms, it is helpful to examine some key harbinger case studies from which the first contemporary lessons of modern insurgency were learned. They stress: (1) insurgencies may be populist-nationalist as well as Marxist-Maoist oriented, (2) they may be urban as well as rural-based, and (3) they may be highly political-psychological as well as military conflicts. Additionally, this monograph emphasizes some broader lessons learned. Among other things, the Argentine case provides a basis from which to understand better the problem of current and future radical populism and urban insurgency. All three cases--but especially the Peruvian case--invoke the fundamental strategic political issue of state failure. The Italian case emphasizes the issue of military vs. political victory, and its implications for the future of the state.

This monograph concludes with the idea that the complex realities of contemporary political-insurgency wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve mutually agreed political-strategic ends. In this connection, at a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to deal effectively with unconventional conflict situations. They are: (1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable security and stability, (2) fundamental education and understanding requirements, and (3) the strategic application of U.S. military

power. The associated recommendations take us beyond doing “something” for something’s sake to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways, and means that directly support the achievement of a political end-game.

## SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

The lessons of the Persian Gulf War, the recent Iraqi War, and the hundreds of other conflicts that have taken place since the end of World War II are not being lost on state and nonstate powers emerging into the contemporary multipolar global security arena. Ironically, strategies being developed to protect or further the interests of a number of traditional and nontraditional political actors are inspired by the dual idea of evading and frustrating a superior conventional military or police force. The better a government has become at conventional maneuver warfare or law enforcement, the more likely potential opponents will turn to unconventional insurgency war that is often called asymmetric, insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist, or “knowledge-based” war.

Even though prudent governments must prepare for high-risk low-probability conventional state vs. state wars, the President and Congress of the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) will likely require high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) military-civil participation in small, unconventional, and intrastate conflicts well into the future. These unconventional low intensity conflicts, complex emergencies, ethnic wars, and small-scale contingencies threaten the security and stability of the global community, and are gravely complicated by various militant nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious fundamentalists, ideologues, demagogues, civil and military bureaucrats, organized criminals, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and rogue and criminal states working to achieve their own objectives. In this security environment, governments and their defense establishments have little choice but to rethink contemporary unconventional wars as they apply to global and national security and stability.

In an attempt to provide a better understanding of the current and future strategic security environment, we first examine unconventional asymmetric insurgency war as a very political form of warfare for the weak against the strong. As a corollary, we also seek to highlight insurgency and counterinsurgency as the most likely form of global, regional, and sub-national political-coercive

interaction for now and the future. The outcomes and second- and third-order effects of these wars will shape the security environment in which all nations and socio-political groups must struggle and survive.

## **POLITICAL WAR AND INSURGENCY: ILLUMINATING SOME SHADOWS FROM THE PAST**

The contemporary use of political-psychological efforts as the primary means—rather than just military means—to achieve the control or overthrow an existing government has been termed “political war.”<sup>1</sup> It may be combined with military violence, economic pressure, subversion, and diplomacy—but its chief aspect is the use of words, images, and ideas. It is also a natural means of expression and self-assertion for extremist political actors, terrorists, and insurgents. The more messianic the vision, the more likely the actor is to remain committed to the use of violent political-psychological measures to achieve his objectives.<sup>2</sup> But, let us begin this discussion at the beginning.

Rebellion has always existed. It is a simple, violent effort to force an incumbent government to redress grievances. For a rebellion to become an insurgency, a much stronger political component must be added to the equation. That is, the “authoritative allocation of values in a society;” or, essentially, “who gets what”—to include resources, rights, and privileges.<sup>3</sup> Thus, an insurgency is a political war in support of a goal in which the power to allocate is at stake. Even those revolutionary movements that are not explicitly political—such as radical Islam—ultimately must seize political power in order to implement the changes they demand. The insurgent political intent, then, would be to force a radical socio-economic-political restructuring of a nation state—and its governance.<sup>4</sup>

The difference, then, between rebellion and insurgency is that rebellion requires only redress of grievances, and insurgency requires the achievement of the control or overthrow of the incumbent government to bring about fundamental (revolutionary) change.<sup>5</sup> In this connection, the stakes in insurgency war are not limited. They are, in fact, total from the standpoint of both the eventual winners and losers. Ultimately, it is a question of survival. Failure in political war is not an option.

Thus, we come back to where we began—in studying terror war, guerrilla war, or any other common term for insurgency war, we find these expressions mischaracterize the activities of armed organizations attempting to gain political control of the state. Such organizations involved in that kind of effort are engaged in a highly complex political act—political war. To emphasize this fact, in this monograph we use “insurgency” and “political war” as synonymous or hyphenated terms.

U.S. and other world political and military leaders have been struggling with this “new” political aspect of unconventional war since the end of World War II—and especially since the ending of the Cold War. Yet, the nature of the unconventional war dilemma still is not understood. Unfortunately, the strategic theory of political war has played little part in the debate. Yet the type of conflict that is likely to challenge U.S. and global leadership over the near-to-long term must be informed by an understanding of insurgency as political war.

Understanding the nature of a given conflict, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is “the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.”<sup>6</sup> And, in that context, ample evidence indicates that the highly respected Brazilian theorist of insurgency war, Abraham Guillen, was right when he explained that “revolutionary war is never decided by arms, but rather by winning the political support of the people.”<sup>7</sup>

One can take an important step toward understanding the insurgencies in our midst by examining a few case studies. That may be done in abstract theoretical terms, or it may be accomplished by remembering some of the hard-learned—and sometimes unpopular—lessons of the past. Thus, this monograph examines three premier cases—Argentina, 1969-1979; Peru, 1962-date; and Italy, 1968-82.

## **AN OVERVIEW OF THE CASES**

What makes these political wars significant beyond their own domestic political context is that they are the cases from which the first contemporary lessons of urban and populist insurgency were learned. In these terms, these cases are harbingers of much of the political chaos emerging from the Cold War’s end. They stress:

(1) insurgencies may be populist-nationalist as well as Marxist-Maoist oriented, (2) they may be urban as well as rural-based, and (3) they may be highly political-psychological as well as military conflicts. These cases also are significant because they address counterinsurgency as much as they do insurgency. Thus, examining these cases is also a logical point from which to begin to understand how governments might ultimately control—or succumb to—the strategic challenges of political war.

### **Argentina, 1969-79.**

Argentina, with well over half the national population concentrated in the Buenos Aires area, was a good place to experiment with urban insurgency in a contemporary populist and nationalist context. And today, the world is urbanizing at a faster and faster rate. Latin America, and, of course, Europe, are already two of the most highly urbanized regions of the world. But, as fast as cities are growing, their slums and shantytowns are growing even faster. As a consequence, urban space is now “where the people are.” Moreover, rural migrants to the urban areas find conditions that surpass the isolation, squalor, and hopelessness they fled. They move into places known variously as *callampas* (“mushrooms” because of the way they suddenly appear), *favelas* (squatter towns) in Brazil, *villas miserias* (miserable villages) in Argentina, and *pueblos juvenes* (young towns) or *invasions* (invasions) in Peru. Security forces normally are unable to enter these so-called “lawless” areas—much less control them. As a consequence, this kind of urban space is theoretically as impregnable as rural forests, jungles, or mountains.<sup>8</sup>

The Argentine case is a prime example of a “new jungle” within which insurgents can find similar conditions as in rural space, and take the fight *directly* to the enemy. It also is a good example of a demagogic-populist insurgency that was designed to take down a regime and replace it with another envisioned by Juan Domingo Peron. At the same time, the Peronist Montonero insurgency and the Argentine governmental response to it are prime examples of how *not* to conduct an insurgency and how *not* to conduct a counterinsurgency.

In that connection, the Montonero insurgent leadership made a conscious decision to “militarize” the struggle and attack—directly—the Argentine armed forces. The political objectives that originally motivated the confrontation were sacrificed to military considerations. The groups that were supposed to bring national and social liberation to the country developed into mirror images of the Argentine armed forces, and legitimizing political-psychological efforts were considered unproductive niceties. The new Peronist Motherland, literally, would be created only out of the destruction of the traditional Argentine military establishment.<sup>9</sup>

The Argentine government counterinsurgency response came in the form of unprincipled societal repression and the “Dirty War.” Today, the country still does not exhibit the harmony and prosperity that might have been expected to come with peace. Rather, virtually all Argentines—regardless of which side they were on—personally bear the open wounds and festering scars of the insurgency period. There are recriminations 25-30 years after the fact, with “witch-hunts” and cynicism regarding the personal motives of the “political class.” Furthermore, the general Argentine society, economy, and polity still struggle with urban overcrowding, intense poverty, and rampant corruption. The Argentine example clearly demonstrates the importance and necessity of a legitimate political-psychological-military balance in insurgency—and in countering it.

### **Peru, 1962-date.**

The Peruvian case demonstrates how a small number (about 180) of well-trained and organized militants can work together, organize internal support, terrorize, and take a nation of over 20 million people to a point of near collapse within 10 years. It also illustrates that the fortuitous capture of key insurgent leadership in 1992 did not end the insurgency. Successive Peruvian governments failed to address the political aspects of the problem adequately, and the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) insurgency is now in resurgence.<sup>10</sup>

The ongoing insurgency is an example of the blending of mass mobilization techniques of both rural and urban insurgencies. The strategic intent is to develop adequate support bases in rural areas and in urban *pueblos jóvenes* (i.e., slums) from which to break the

power of the foreign-dominated, non-Indian, and undemocratic governing oligarchy, and to form a new Peruvian, Indian, and democratic political entity. In this context, all past and present regimes are judged to be the equivalent of “occupying powers,” and the *Sendero Luminoso* insurgents are considered to be a kind of “resistance movement.”<sup>11</sup>

The operational intent of the movement not only includes a marriage of rural and urban bases from which to attack the enemy, but also the blending of both military and political-psychological elements to conduct a true “People’s War” to replace the illegitimate internal enemy. The tactics of “People’s War” would begin the mobilization the masses, create an alternative society, and carve out “liberated” rural and urban areas from which to launch a “final offensive.” Lastly, the “People’s War” and “final offensive” would inflict decisive punishment on the “occupying regime” and theoretically force it to leave Peru.<sup>12</sup>

The contemporary notion that *Sendero’s* regeneration and continued “People’s War” will eventually force the incumbent “occupying regime” to leave Peru has been generally dismissed as the disappointed rhetoric of its jailed leader, Abmael Guzman. That dismissive rhetoric may have some truth to it, but it should be remembered that the legitimizing socio-political basis of the insurgency did not die with the figurative “decapitation” of the insurgent political leadership. It must also be remembered that, over the past 42 years, *Sendero* has proved to be a patient and resilient organization. In the meantime, it is important to remember that terror is all that is left to the fanatical remnants of the leadership.

One observer poignantly warns us that the perceptions of repression, injustice, and inequity of a self-appointed insurgent elite—its *raison de etre*—cannot be disrupted or ended “for something as mundane as peace.”<sup>13</sup> Thus, in Peru since 1992, we see the logical aftermath of an unfinished insurgency—prolonged terror and destruction, and a slow but sure process that can lead to state failure.<sup>14</sup> How else to let the masses know that you are still there for them?

## **Italy, 1968-82.**

Somewhat like the Argentine and Peruvian cases, the Italian case illustrates a strategy aimed at the destruction of the state, and

replacing it with something else. Yet, Italian terrorism, through the 1970s, was not taken very seriously, and was allowed to fester and grow.<sup>15</sup> It was not until after the highly publicized 1978 kidnapping, “people’s trial,” and “execution” of five-time Prime Minister Aldo Moro, that the Italian government directly addressed the insurgency and its associated “terrorist” threat. That “terrorist incident” marked the first time in over 10 years of kidnappings, murders, maimings, and bombings that the Italian government decided that terrorism was, in fact, more than a complex law enforcement problem. The various insurgent organizations—through the use of “terrorism”—were challenging the integrity of the country’s political institutions and creating an unacceptable level of internal instability. Decisionmakers began to understand that insurgent violence was “an ideological substitute for conventional war.”<sup>16</sup> And, it began to be understood that the political objective of that unconventional war was to “destroy the political equilibrium of Italy and give impetus to the conquest of political power and the installation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.”<sup>17</sup> As a consequence, Italian terrorism was finally defined as a national security problem.

Interestingly and importantly, the planning and coordination of the response to insurgent “terrorism” essentially fell to the paramilitary Carabinieri. The mandate for those political, economic, informational, and security instruments of the state that would implement the counterinsurgency effort was two-fold. First, there would be no “Dirty War” in Italy. Second, there would be no strategic ambiguity—that is, the various political-security instruments of the Italian state would integrate all their actions under the direction of a Carabinieri General. Together, these unifying and legitimizing efforts would reestablish the kind of stability that was derived from popular Italian perceptions that the authority of the state was genuine and effective and that it used morally correct means for reasonable and fair purposes.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, the Italian case is an excellent point from which to examine the ways and means by which governments can combine military with political victory, and legitimately control or neutralize the strategic challenge of insurgent terrorism. In that context, the Italian experience demonstrates the effective political-military means through which to reverse the impetus toward failing or failed state status.

## Conclusions.

This brief examination of the Argentine, Peruvian, and Italian revolutionary urban insurgency cases provides instructive lessons regarding current and future unconventional war. The primary issues to be discussed in each case are the following:

- The General Situation,
- The Stated Objectives and Visions of the Insurgents,
- The Insurgent Organization,
- The Program for Gaining Power,
- The General Response to the Insurgent Program, and
- Key Points and Lessons.

### **ARGENTINE URBAN INSURGENCY, 1969-79: SOME STRATEGIC LESSONS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN LEARNED**

Despite what was at one time a popular cultural myth that an Argentine *coup d'état* is no more violent than a Mexican wedding party, that country's political history has, in fact, been marked by considerable violence. Violent conflict between those advocating a unitary state and those demanding a federal government prevailed in the early decades of Argentine nationhood. Military interventions and popular rebellions further contributed to considerable political instability in the early 20th century. Argentina experienced extreme political polarization and the rise of Peronism before, during, and after World War II. In the context of polarization, Peronism encouraged its followers to pursue a confrontational populist and nationalistic agenda in which the sovereign nation and socio-political justice were identified with the Argentine "people," and economic dependency and political imperialism with the "oligarchy."<sup>19</sup>

What followed the military coup that deposed Juan Peron in 1955 was political deadlock. Peronist resistance to the new government made sure that rule would be impossible without Peron. Peron's opponents in government and society did all they could to outlaw Peron and Peronism and prevent his return to power. Thus, the only way for either side to attempt any kind of political action was through either popular or state violence. In that connection, Argentina

experienced three failed attempts at rural guerrilla warfare between 1959 and 1969. At that point, the insurgents decided in favor of urban warfare. It seemed obvious that they would be safer and more relevant in crowded urban space than in isolated rural areas.

Nevertheless, one final attempt was made at generating a conventional rural-based insurgency. In 1974, Marxist admirers of Che Guevarra (the People's Revolutionary Army [ERP]) took control of the remote province of Tucuman and actually governed that part of the national territory. However, eventually, the Army was ordered to Tucuman to eradicate the insurgents and restore the province to the Argentine state. The Army did just that—swiftly and ruthlessly. And 1975 marked the end of any serious rural insurgency effort in Argentina.<sup>20</sup>

Over the period of time between the ouster of Peron in 1955 and his return from exile in 1973, a number of urban insurgent organizations emerged. Six major groups—two Marxist-Maoist-Guevarrist-oriented, and four populist-nationalist Peronist-oriented—eventually dispersed or joined either the ERP or the Peronist Montoneros. The Montoneros became the largest and most active of the two revolutionary movements, but maintained close ties with the ERP.<sup>21</sup>

The Montoneros illustrate some important points regarding contemporary insurgency. First, they demonstrate the efficiency of mobilizing a mass support base within urban space. Second, they show that insurgents—either urban or rural based—need not be Marxists or Maoists, or even religious fundamentalists. Populists and nationalists may also become major players on the insurgency stage. Third, the Montonero experience illustrates that once an insurgent movement achieves a certain momentum, its leadership is not likely to accept “peace” as a viable alternative to armed struggle. As a result, we concentrate on the Montoneros.

## **Montonero Objectives and Vision.**

In Argentina, Juan Domingo Peron is credited with beginning the country's national liberation. After taking power in 1946, he and his first wife, Eva, initiated the nationalization of the major means of production and distribution in the country, and gave political

voice and dignity to organized labor. This socialist transformation continued until a military coup restored the traditional Argentine oligarchy to power in 1955. During the subsequent 18 years of exile, Peron used the Montonero insurgents as a primary means of breaking the resultant political impasse. He also used them as a political bridge to a worker-based mass movement and as a bridge to rebellious youth movements. This strategy proved successful. The military was nudged out of government, and fair elections were allowed that put a Peronist, Hector Campora, into the presidency and paved the way for Peron to return to Argentina.<sup>22</sup>

During the period of exile—and shortly after Peron’s return to power—Montonero strategy focused on a political-psychological war to liberate Argentina from foreign economic domination and political dependency, and from the oligarchy who were acting in behalf of foreign interests. The focus began to change sometime during the period between Peron’s return to Argentina and his death. At that time, the insurgents began to argue that they were also liberating Argentina from the military and police who were acting in behalf of the oligarchy. In these terms, the Montonero vision of the “Peronist Motherland” could only be achieved by building an army capable of defeating the Argentine Army.<sup>23</sup> The final logic of the argument was straightforward—“Unarmed, the people inevitably suffer repression.” This was the lesson that was learned by generations of Argentines from independence through the advent, exile, and subsequent return of Juan Peron.<sup>24</sup>

## **Organization.**

The Peronist Montonero insurgent organization, as well as its militant allies, tended to follow a standard Leninist-Maoist organizational model. In that regard, cadres were built; political and logistical infrastructure was created; a military arm was recruited, trained and deployed; and, finally, political-military operations were conducted. The offensive strategic intent, clearly, was to “capture the controlling and governing institutions of the Argentine state.” Likewise, the various clandestine units in the military part of the organization tended to adopt a centralized and compartmentalized

cellular structure in which the individual only knew the members of his or her own cell, and one member of another cell who acted as a “connector.”<sup>25</sup>

A recruit would generally pass through a mass-front political youth group to become a *miliciano*, an *aspirante*, and, finally, an official Montonero. Once one became a Montonero, military rank was awarded, and he or she could progress through the ranks to sergeant, lieutenant, captain, commandant, etc. Thus, the general Montonero organization was described as a “double pyramid.” One of the pyramids included a number of political-logistical mass-front youth or labor organizations. The other pyramid included the official Montonero fighting units—commandos, detachments, and columns that eventually gave way to squadrons (squads), platoons, companies, and battalions. The “national leadership” set broad policy goals, and the relevant political-logistical support groups and individual fighting units implemented that guidance as they could.<sup>26</sup>

After 1973-74, the subordination of political work to military activity became more pronounced. For example, youth organizations would organize mass demonstrations and popular rallies. *Milicianos* would provide the oratory for a demonstration, and *aspirantes* would throw molotov cocktails at nearby cars or property to divert the attention of security forces. Then, with security forces engaged in crowd control, minor violence, and looking for organizers, fighting units would strike at designated “military targets.” Additionally, elite Montonero troops (Special Combat Groups [GEC]), distinct from the regular fighting units, could be called upon to operate anywhere and against any target in the country. By 1975, the Montoneros had over 5,000 combat troops operating throughout Argentina—primarily in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area. At the same time, the organization had over 8,000 political activists capable of mobilizing hundreds or thousands of demonstrators for any given mass event.<sup>27</sup>

Toward the end of the revolutionary period in 1979, two organizational factors came together to contribute to the state’s ability to destroy the Montoneros and their allies. First, the “National Leadership” began to expand itself from a simple and effective four-person directorate into five relatively large and bureaucratic

“National Secretaryships.” These hierarchies were involved in specific personnel, financial, technical, and communications functions. They slowed and diluted decisionmaking and support processes, and generally lowered the effectiveness of the organization. Moreover, as some bureaucracies have been known to do, they lost effective contact with the rest of the organization and isolated themselves in a self-serving and unrealistic world.<sup>28</sup>

Second, Montonero leadership tended to ignore the socio-political side of the conflict and primarily used the mass front groups overtly in support of military activities. As a consequence, these “noncombatant” political activists acquired considerable visibility and became easy prey for the Argentine security forces. As the “national leadership” increased the intensity of its unrealistic “war of attrition” against the much larger Argentine military forces, the security forces were killing and imprisoning suspected Peronist activists—literally—by the truckload. Over the last year of the insurgency, the Montonero leadership found that there was “no one and nothing” to lead.<sup>29</sup>

### **The Montonero Program for Gaining Total Power.**

Universal revolutionary hero Che Guavara taught idealistic and frustrated youth *not* to wait for a “revolutionary consciousness” to develop within the masses. He argued that small groups of revolutionaries could speed that development by initiating an armed struggle. And he taught that popular forces could defeat a professional army.<sup>30</sup> Harsh experience taught pragmatic Montoneros that these conditions would not come about spontaneously. They understood that a serious military force had to be organized, equipped, and trained for the task of confronting a regular army. Such a task would require significant human and financial resources.<sup>31</sup>

The human resources were readily available. Argentina’s youth had turned against their parents’ generation and blamed them and the oligarchy—and the military—for all that was wrong with the government, the society, and the economy. These radicalized young people happily and enthusiastically joined whatever insurgent organization their friends had joined. Financial resources were another matter. Although there is evidence that Cuba and the Soviet

Union provided limited asylum, training, equipment, and money, no evidence suggests that help was ever significant. The Argentine insurgents generated the necessary revenue for their “revolution” through two primary sources—“revolutionary taxes” on foreign and domestically owned businesses, and kidnapping. The ransoms received for kidnapped individuals kidnapped were lucrative beyond expectations, and provided more than enough cash to buy the uniforms, medical supplies, equipment, and weapons required.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, at the beginning of the revolutionary period, the insurgent program consisted of three general parts. First, all the various insurgent organizations were heavily engaged in kidnapping and tax collection. Second, other actions were predominantly acts of “armed propaganda”—hijacking food delivery vans to distribute food in shanty towns, bombing supposedly empty buildings and monuments to mark Peronist and Guevarist anniversaries, bombing elite country clubs and the residences of directors of foreign corporations, and brief commando style occupations of small towns outside Buenos Aires. Third, Montonero actions also included assassinations of “traitors”—primarily deserters and informers from their own ranks, and from labor union leadership.<sup>33</sup>

These components of the revolutionary program, by their nature, required careful and deliberate planning. Moreover, armed propaganda and kidnapping tended to be only as violent as absolutely necessary. The Argentine insurgents, at least at the outset, understood two things. First, they understood that propaganda is intended to inform, impress, co-opt, and coerce—not necessarily to kill. Objectives are primarily political and psychological—not military. Second, a live kidnapping victim was worth a good deal more than a dead body. Dead bodies tended to have a negative effect on popular “good will.” As a result, from 1969 through 1973, survey data indicated that nearly half the Argentine population considered the “armed struggle” to be justified.<sup>34</sup>

Thus the insurgents enjoyed strong popular support and a certain legitimacy. That, in turn, created an associated level of popular dissatisfaction with the military regime that stimulated a voluntary retreat to the barracks, and “The sight of the military retreating contributed to the perception that insurgent action was effective, even though the real causes of the regime’s crisis were more complex.”<sup>35</sup>

Under these circumstances, the political parties were forced to deal with the problem of popular unrest. The solution was to call for the elections in March 1973 that brought Peronist Hector Campora to the presidency, and, subsequently, Juan Peron from exile and back to power.

Peron had argued from his exile in Spain that insurgent violence in Argentina would disappear once the Peronist electoral victory had been secured. On his return to Argentina and to political power, a general political amnesty was proclaimed. Additionally, Peronist Montoneros were given important posts in the government and in the national universities. As a consequence, there was a major political opportunity to abandon the armed struggle and cooperate in a stable new government. Some Peronists claimed victory and took advantage of the situation. Others, however, never abandoned their vision of taking total control of the state. They conducted several covert operations and openly renewed hostilities in September 1974. The armed struggle did not end.<sup>36</sup>

The insurgents' "Robin Hood" image began to tarnish as they continued to take from the rich and began to give to "poor" arms merchants. The image was tarnished further as insurgent armed violence increased steadily and dramatically after Argentina's return to constitutional rule. As an example, it was estimated that revolutionary guerrilla groups staged 205 operations prior to the 1974 elections, and 807 and 723 in 1974 and 1975, respectively.<sup>37</sup> This move away from armed propaganda toward more direct conflict against the state was in response to at least two factors. First, the insurgent leadership was never convinced that the Argentine Army would not execute another coup against a Peronist government—and, thus, the Army still had to be defeated. Second, Peron argued that the insurgents had served their purpose and no longer had a legitimate basis on which to continue their violent activities. He thus authorized the creation of the clandestine Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (Triple A) "death squads"—whose mission was to eliminate regime opponents.<sup>38</sup>

Thereafter, a new phase of violence was marked by a greater proportion of assassinations of "traitors" and informants. In time, kidnappings and bombings became less discriminate, larger-scale,

and more likely to involve ordinary citizens. Vengeance killings in response to Triple A death squad activities became a major component of the insurgent program. At the same time, more daring, sophisticated, and spectacular operations were being conducted directly against the Argentine armed forces. The political objectives assigned to operations were gradually forgotten, as operations increasingly were designed only to show military strength.

Instead of remaining an asymmetrical political-psychological war, the changed strategy began to define a futile war of attrition in which the 5,000 Montonero combatants realistically could not hope to defeat the 60,000-member Argentine military establishment. Three demonstrations of Montonero military acumen during 1975 would include: (1) Montonero frogmen attacked and damaged the Navy's first modern missile-carrying frigate; (2) regular forces destroyed an Air Force transport aircraft carrying 45 anti-guerrilla personnel; and (3) elite forces hijacked an aircraft, took over a provincial airport, attacked a major army garrison, seized its cache of arms, and escaped in the hijacked aircraft.<sup>39</sup>

By 1976, the public mood had changed. The insurgents were no longer "the proletariat in arms." They were providing inconsequential conventional military responses to political situations, and they were bent on emulating the regular armed forces. The people who were supposed to bring national and social liberation to Argentina developed into an ideology-bound, bureaucratized, isolated, cynical, mirror image of the their "enemy." In a moment of belated revolutionary self-criticism, a former insurgent leader reflected that, "When you become like the enemy, you end up being the enemy . . . . The enemy has defeated you because he has managed to transform you into him."<sup>40</sup> As a consequence, in December 1976, the Peronist Montonero leadership quietly followed its erstwhile allies into exile but continued to direct operations in Argentina until the final "Popular Counter-Offensive" of 1979.<sup>41</sup>

### **The State Response: The Dirty War.**

After the death of Juan Peron in 1974 and the subsequent military coup in 1975 that deposed the government of his third wife, Isabel, state action against the Peronist and Marxist insurgents intensified

dramatically. The same people who deposed Peron in 1955, outlawed Peronism, excluded one-third to one-half of the Argentine population from the political process, and fought to keep Peron from returning from exile were now back in power. And those Rightists attacked insurgents, their supporters, and the society that had created them—with a vengeance. General Jorge Rafael Videla made it clear when he explained that, “A terrorist is not just someone with a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christian civilization.”<sup>42</sup>

One by one, the Marxist ERP, the Peronist Montoneros, and their allies had been outlawed. A penal code reform introduced by Peron in 1974 provided severe punishments for insurgent and subversive activities. Other measures were taken to deprive insurgents of their organizational publications, and to impose censorship on all publications. Additional legislation was promulgated that imposed prison sentences on leaders of strikes that were declared illegal. And provincial police forces were placed under military control.<sup>43</sup>

These legalities, however, were irrelevant. Captured insurgents and known or suspected “subversive delinquents”—or people who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time—were murdered or imprisoned without trial. Those captured and not killed in combat operations, and those detained as a result of various counterinsurgency operations, were interrogated and tortured without legal constraints or time limits. The victims either were placed in one of an estimated 340 secret detention camps, buried in mass graves, or “were disappeared.” The final societal insult in this cynical and unprincipled dirty war was a gray economy based on war booty. That booty was derived from stripping an apartment bare after “disappearing” its occupants and selling the furnishings and other property in specified shops. Additionally, babies born in the detention camps were sold to more “deserving parents.”<sup>44</sup>

Importantly, this kind of repression against insurgents, relatives, friends, acquaintances, and suspected supporters continued at a high level for at least a year after the insurgents had lost their operational capacity. This point reveals two conclusions regarding the state response to the insurgency. First, the Dirty War claimed roughly six times the number of noncombatants vs. combatants (5,000 combatants killed vs. 30,000 noncombatants killed). More to

the point, the military governments in power from 1975 to 1983 were not only at war with the insurgents, they were also at war with a large part of the Argentine society.

Second, given the various regimes' full and direct involvement in the Dirty War, it is accurate to say that the Argentine governmental response to insurgency was—simply—state terrorism.

### **Key Points and Lessons.**

- The urban insurgency conducted in Argentina between 1969 and 1979 was a combined populist (Peronist) and nationalist effort dedicated to the violent overthrow of the authoritarian, foreign-dominated capitalist system. It relied on internal urban strategies from which to develop a mass support base, and to develop the capability to defeat the regular army.
- The primary urban insurgent group, the Peronist Montoneros, organized a vigorous military-oriented campaign to implement its vision of how to depose the military-supported oligarchy, and establish a "Peronist Motherland."
- The political objectives that originally rationalized the insurgent struggle against the regime and its security institutions were sacrificed to military considerations and were subsumed in the fight against the Argentine armed forces.
- The state response to the insurgency went far beyond neutralizing and eliminating the Montoneros and their revolutionary allies. The state also attacked the part of Argentine society that had nurtured and supported the populist-nationalist vision of the future.
- The state response to the insurgency was, thus, total. The "Dirty War" was also completely unprincipled and could accurately be described as state terrorism.

Probably the most serious consequence of any given insurgency is to provide a rationale for a government to take repressive measures and delay the broadening of a social and political base that alone can ultimately ensure socio-political stability and progress. The Argentine experience reminds us that there is a far superior and

opposite alternative to state terrorism. The wisdom of Sun Tzu makes the point that, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means, they make their governments invincible.”<sup>45</sup>

## **THE *SENDERO LUMINOSO* INSURGENCY IN PERU, 1962-PRESENT: WHERE THE SHINING PATH LEADS**

Peru is faced with two ongoing insurgencies. The first is that of the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) that has stirred the imagination of most observers of revolutionary conflict. The second, the *Tupac Amaru* Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), despite some spectacular actions, has generated much less concern. *Sendero*, generally, is the more successful and violent of the two organizations, and is considered the most serious security problem facing the Peruvian government. In that connection, ample evidence indicates the resurgence of *Sendero Luminoso*.<sup>46</sup> Thus, we will focus on that organization.

Dr. Abimael Guzman was the main leader of *Sendero* until his arrest in September 1992. With or without Guzman’s continued leadership, that insurgency movement continues to represent a militant, revolutionary commitment to a long-term and very disciplined approach to clean government, a sense of social purpose, and national (i.e., Indian) tradition. *Sendero* thus provides violent reformers, disillusioned revolutionaries, and submerged *nomenklaturas* all over the world with a relatively orthodox and very sophisticated Leninist-Maoist model for the organization and implementation of a successful “people’s war.” It also provides an illustration of the consequences of not pursuing a counterinsurgency to its neutralization—prolonged terrorist war and possible state failure.

### ***Sendero* Objectives and Vision.**

Abimael Guzman, also known as Comrade Gonzolo and as Dr. *Puka Inti* (Red Sun), identified the origins of the *Sendero Luminoso* insurgency in Peru, and defined the central strategic problem as the lack of legitimacy of all Peruvian governments since the Spanish conquest.<sup>47</sup> He further identified the primary objective of

the insurgency as power. Power is generated by an intelligent, well-motivated, and highly-disciplined organization with a vision and long-term program for gaining control of a state or a society. In that connection, the *Sendero Luminoso* resistance organization, through its governance function, would theoretically maintain the state as its military forces replace the illegal regime.<sup>48</sup> The objective is to destroy the old foreign-dominated political system in Peru, take power, and create a “nationalistic,” “Indian,” and “popular” democracy.<sup>49</sup>

This revolutionary vision will not be achieved through a conventional armed rebellion. The revolutionary challenge is rooted in the concept that the Peruvian governmental system is not doing what is right for the people and that *Sendero Luminoso's* political philosophy and leadership will. Thus, regime legitimacy is key to the conflict. A government counterinsurgency campaign that fails to understand this fact, and responds only to top *Sendero* leadership cadres and military forces, is programmed to fail.<sup>50</sup>

## **Organization.**

Guzman's first and continuing concern centers on organization. The preparatory activities to achieve his vision—or the resurgence of the movement—are to establish: (1) a dedicated cadre and the first rudiments of a revolutionary party, (2) an insurgent military force, and (3) a support mechanism for the entire organization. This long-term effort would lay the foundations for the group's subsequent struggle and ultimate victory. Organization, not operations, is the key to success.<sup>51</sup>

Generally, *Sendero* appears to be structured much like other Leninist-Maoist movements along rigid, close-knit, and secretive lines. At the top level is the *cupula*, which includes Guzman (in jail) and other (out of jail) leaders. The *cupula* also includes the Politburo and the Central Committee, along with the Permanent Committee, or Secretariat. These individuals oversee the entire party operation. The key, however, to organizational success is quality of individuals—not the number of members. Thus, the *cupula* and lower level leadership (*cuadros*) come from the political and intellectual elite of the rural areas and from the urban universities. Guzman's main concern was

and is to place men and women in leadership positions who have an understanding of the why and how of subversion, insurgency, and governance. Thus, this “vanguard of the proletariat” performs the traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing leadership, controlling mechanisms, and providing the means for replacing the old regime and taking power.<sup>52</sup>

### **The Program for Gaining Power.**

The *Sendero* program centers on a rigid five-stage long-term effort: (1) an organizational phase that lays the foundations for the subsequent struggle; (2) an offensive phase that begins by attacking symbols of the bourgeois state; (3) an expansion of violence and terror throughout the country to convince the masses that the government cannot and will not perform its basic security and other rudimentary governance functions—and to create vacuums in rural and urban space that will allow *Sendero* to become the *de facto* authority in areas uncontrolled or abandoned by the state; (4) the consolidation and expansion of political and logistical support bases throughout the country; and (5) the programmatic isolation of the “center” and bringing about the total collapse of the state. That is not scheduled until (a) the necessary rural and urban support bases are consolidated, (b) the major population centers are subverted psychologically to the point where a relatively small, but direct, military assault could bring about the desired result, and, importantly, (c) the leadership nucleus of the movement is sufficiently large and well-enough prepared to govern the state.<sup>53</sup>

By September 1992 and the time of Guzman’s arrest, the Peruvian government and the country itself appeared to be on the brink of collapse. An estimated 25,000 people had been killed in “terrorist” actions. Over 500 political figures had been “assassinated”; over 35 percent of all mayorships were vacant; and over 85 percent of voters *did not* vote in elections. At the same time, inflation had reached the staggering rate of 7,600 percent per year, and terrorism had destroyed an estimated equivalent of one-third to one-half of the gross national product (GNP). Businesses were preparing to close, and affluent people were leaving the country and taking their money. One observer commented that, “If *Sendero* had maintained

the pressure, the government would have been at their mercy.”<sup>54</sup> The pressure eased, however, with the capture of Guzman and several high-ranking aides. And, as a result, a prolongation of the fifth stage or the addition of a sixth stage of the revolution—“*preparation for* (rather than bringing about) the total collapse of the state”—was proclaimed from Guzman’s prison cell.<sup>55</sup>

This addition to the revolutionary program has generally been dismissed as the rhetoric of a disappointed old man. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that, while the government was able to capture *Sendero*’s key leader in 1992 and inhibit progress toward his final political objective, succeeding governments have not managed to neutralize *Sendero Luminoso*. It must also be remembered that *Sendero* has proven to be a patient and resilient organization. Thus, at the strategic level, *Sendero* appears to be increasing sabotage and terrorism, taking a relatively low military profile, and preparing for the time when the interior bases of support and the organizational leadership are well enough prepared to make feasible the final attack on the center. It will jab and probe, destroy infrastructure, and enforce its will against carefully selected targets, but its primary efforts will continue to focus on the basis of power—the lack of the moral right—an elitist, foreign-dominated, and non-Indian minority regime.

At the operational level, *Sendero* continues to develop cadres to man the resurgent political, military, and support components of the movement; and to consolidate its position in Peru’s rural space and in poor districts of urban areas. Tactically, *Sendero* operates in small units with political, psychological, and military objectives—in that order. The intent of these operational and tactical objectives is to demonstrate to the country that *Sendero Luminoso* is still working to provide the freedom of revolutionary movement in rural and urban areas that is necessary to take power.<sup>56</sup>

## **Response.**

Generally, Peru, the United States, and other countries that ultimately might be affected by the destabilizing “spillover” consequences of *Sendero Luminoso*’s attacks against Peru’s governmental legitimacy have tended to deal ad hoc with the

insurgency problem in a piecemeal fashion, or to ignore it. The fundamental causes of the conflict act as continuing stimulants to the revolutionary movement, and the *Sendero* organization remains intact and functioning. Thus, the causes and consequences of insurgency continue to threaten the stability, development, and peace of Peru—and, perhaps, that of the entire Andean region.

More specifically, from 1980 through 1993, the various Peruvian governments dealt with the insurgency ad hoc—without a plan, without adequate intelligence, and in an environment of enmity between the civil government and the armed forces and within the armed forces. Then, after nearly 15 years of suffering, billions of dollars worth of destruction, and thousands of deaths, President Alberto Fujimori announced a new, more comprehensive political-military strategy. This strategy was never implemented completely. Moreover, there is still no intelligence below the national level, little trust or unity of effort between civil administrators and the armed forces, and not a lot of trust or unity of effort within the armed forces. It appears that the principal Peruvian leaders understand the insurgency problem in the rhetorical sense, but the fortuitous capture of Guzman significantly reduced *Sendero's* activity—and the urgency of the situation. That rhetorical understanding has not been translated into a viable program to address the core problem of regime legitimacy.<sup>57</sup>

Over the years, the United States has tended to ignore the Peruvian insurgency problem and concentrate limited effort on the war on drugs. From a security perspective, the punitive supply-side counterdrug eradication and interdiction measures emphasized by the United States are perceived by most citizens to be largely cosmetic and directed more often at “little people” than at real power centers of the illegal drug trade. Making criminals of minor employees and farmers in the relatively inaccessible areas of Peru encourages territorial disintegration, provides a ready source of recruits for any organization violently threatening the Peruvian government, and causes further estrangement between people and government. As a consequence, even though the United States has not been involved to any extent in Peru's counterinsurgency effort, the second- and third-level effects of U.S. counterdrug activities in that country appear to have worked to *Sendero Luminoso's* advantage.<sup>58</sup>

## Key Points and Lessons.

- *Sendero Luminoso* is an insurgent organization dedicated to resisting and replacing a reputed Peruvian neo-colonial regime. It blends both rural and urban strategies in an effort to develop an adequate support base.
- *Sendero* advocates a long-term, disciplined, and rigorous set of stages through which to organize and implement people's war. It believes that political success will not be achieved as a result of conventional armed rebellion only.
- Rather, success will come as a result of the careful application of political, psychological, and military efforts—in that order of priority. This indirect attack on the occupying regime centers on undermining the moral legitimacy of the incumbent government.
- By September 1992, the Peruvian government had been brought to the brink of collapse, but the fortuitous capture of *Sendero* leader Dr. Abimael Guzman significantly reduced the insurgency's activities and effectiveness.
- The Peruvian government, however, failed to address the insurgency's political legitimacy, and *Sendero* is now in a process of resurgence. Terror (that is, armed propaganda) is its principal political-psychological-military tactic and strategy.

The Peruvian insurgency has been ongoing from 1962 to date. In that time, violence and destruction have varied from acute to tolerable. However, just because a situation improves to the point of being tolerable does not mean that the problem has gone away, or should be ignored. Sun Tzu reminds us that, "For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited."<sup>59</sup>

## THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL-INSURGENCY WAR IN ITALY, 1968-1982: POLITICAL VS. MILITARY VICTORY

From 1968-82, Italy was subjected to a number of insurgencies with unique bases of power, separate ideologies, and differing levels of effectiveness. In that context, literally 297 "leftist" groups along

with several militant rightist, separatist, and pacifist organizations were supported by outside forces and dedicated to the overthrow of the Italian state. Moreover, the Red Brigades proved to be the most practical, calculating, and cynical of all the Italian insurgent organizations at conducting political war. As a result, we focus on the Red Brigades as the most important political phenomenon in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s.<sup>60</sup>

The basic problem in the Italian case was that, although similar political violence emerged in other Western democracies in the same period (including the United States), only in Italy did it reach such intensity and persistence as to be considered a serious threat to the state. The assassination of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 at the hands of the Red Brigades, however, was the catalyst that finally forced the Italian government into a direct confrontation with political-insurgency war and its associated terrorism. In that connection, the Red Brigades considered the large-scale killing and maiming of high-level officials as well as ordinary citizens to be “a social duty imposed by the laws of class warfare.”<sup>61</sup> These highly ideological insurgents, along with most of the others—both left and right—thus provide an example of extremist ideology as the justification for the use of terrorism as strategy and tactics.

### **Objectives and Vision of the Red Brigades.**

Generally, insurgent terrorism and its associated asymmetry emerge when fragments of a marginalized, self-appointed elite are frustrated to the point of violence by what they perceive as injustice, repression, and/or inequity. It must be remembered that it is individual men and women—so-called terrorists—who react violently when a government or another symbol of power is perceived to be unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a given injustice. And, as the means of causing mass destruction become less expensive and more available, the angry, the frustrated, and the weak rely on inventive forms of mass destruction to impose their vision of justice on peoples, countries, and the global community.<sup>62</sup>

More specifically, Italian insurgency emerged from the prolonged protest cycle of the late 1960s. During those years, demands for political, economic, and social reforms were widespread and

included elements of the entire society. Extreme left-wing fringe elements, ranging from white-collar workers to industrial workers to university students organized and became a political force when workers' and students' grievances expressed themselves in mass demonstrations that often were confronted violently by police. Thus, the Red Brigades evolved from demonstrators favoring socio-economic reforms into militants defending themselves against state repression. As time moved on, the violence of the Red Brigades changed from self-protection to aggressive actions. And those actions increasingly shifted from demonstrations, sit-ins, and propaganda to direct violence against individuals. All these efforts were considered to be war against the state because "the State, its juristic ideology, and its law are nothing other than instruments through which the bourgeoisie exercises its dictatorship over the proletariat."<sup>63</sup>

For the Red Brigadists, these political crimes quickly became acts of justice. At first, they were acts of retribution and vengeance against perceived attackers. For example, Aldo Moro had to be eliminated because he embodied "all that was the most intelligent and the most dangerous in the [governing] regime."<sup>64</sup> Then, progressively, more ordinary individuals were singled out—depending on the "bureaucratic need." As another example: "You make a political analysis, but then you need a victim. When you have singled out your victim . . . he is the one to be blamed for everything. In that moment, there is already the logic of a trial in which you have already decided that he is guilty; you only have to decide about his punishment . . . you punish him not only for what he has done but also for all the rest."<sup>65</sup> From that point, together with adventure, action became a reward in itself. In that context, "revolutionary violence [becomes] the highest possible good in overthrowing a moribund capitalist order."<sup>66</sup> The logical conclusion to this type of political war was articulated by Red Brigades leader Alberto Franceschini: "All of us in the BR (*Brigate Rosse*) were drug addicts of a particular type—of ideology. A murderous drug, worse than heroine."<sup>67</sup>

### **Basic Organization of the Red Brigades.**

The Red Brigades were founded in Milan by members of a militant leftist group called the Metropolitan Political Collective (CPM). Some

of the organizers came from Marxist-Leninist backgrounds and others from the more traditional Italian left. The CPM quickly spread to Turin, where workers of that industrial city increasingly became more violently involved with police. Subsequent organizational splintering, reorganization, ideology, and actions were adapted to the needs of the organizers' militant orientation.

Only people who were able to pass a rigorous vetting process were accepted into the ranks of the Red Brigades. That process carefully evaluated an individual's military courage and group loyalty. Successful recruits were divided into regular and irregular forces. Regulars were the only individuals who were allowed into the vertical command structure and were required to go "underground" and work for the organization full-time. Irregulars kept their jobs and lived with their families. Their primary tasks were to recruit sympathizers and to help generate support for the revolutionary movement. And irregulars were never allowed into the clandestine vertical hierarchy. At the same time, Marxist-Leninist-type rules on centralization and vertical hierarchy were enforced strictly, and disagreements with authoritative decisions were not tolerated.<sup>68</sup>

The organizational structure of the so-called Red Brigades included a strategic directorate, an executive committee, several "columns," and a number of "fronts." The column was the basic self-sustaining unit of the movement. It was composed of regulars and was given a specific geographic area of responsibility, such as Genoa, or certain neighborhoods of Milan, Turin, or Rome. The columns controlled subordinate brigades, which were termed logistical or mass, depending on the mission. The logistical brigades provided support, and the mass brigades were responsible for intelligence and operations. Thus, the primary orientation of all recruits was military or support for the military actions of the group. Because of that political culture, the Red Brigades attracted those individual men and women who understood discipline and were also prone to violence.<sup>69</sup>

### **The Program to Overthrow the "Moribund Italian Capitalist Order."**

At the height of Italian insurgency in the late 1970s when people were asked about the program of the Red Brigades, most citizens

probably would have described Red Brigade terrorism as ad hoc and arbitrary. Arbitrary perhaps, but ad hoc it was not. Political war in that instance was not a simple revolutionary need but, rather, the “exalted instrument” of liberation. As a result, Red Brigades’ leadership saw itself as the vanguard of the proletariat, stressed Leninist military discipline, and opposed spontaneity. Thus, actions of the Red Brigades were carefully planned, organized, and implemented.<sup>70</sup>

The insurgent terrorist strategy, however, could not have been implemented without the support provided by a sufficiently large and politically active internal support base. That support was provided by the logistical brigades responsible for procurement, falsification, communications, codes, medical assistance, billeting, and other internal support functions. Likewise, the mass brigades could not have carried out the actions that they did without significant international support. For example, the Soviet Union provided political-diplomatic and logistical-financial support; Bulgaria provided weapons, training, and money; and Palestinians provided “Energia bombs.”<sup>71</sup>

Typical human targets for the mass brigades included representatives of the capitalist system of production, political figures, and members of the judiciary and security agencies. Typical material targets included property in any way related to the classes of individuals noted above. Attacks on property either were complementary to attacks on persons or served as training and testing of recruits. Targeting tactics involved close, long-term observation of targets and the use of explosives, individual weapons, and ambush, raid, or abduction—depending on the difficulty of attacking a specific target and his prescribed punishment.<sup>72</sup>

Major attacks included: (1) the wounding of Gavino Manca in Milan, an executive at Pirelli, and the murder of Pietro Coggiola in Turin, an executive with Lancia; (2) the abduction and murder of President of the Christian Democratic Party and former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in Rome; (3) the murder of Supreme Court Judge Ricardo Palma in Rome; and (4) the murder of Assistant Deputy Police Commissioner Antonio Esposito in Genoa. For some clarification, it should be noted that the murder of the five escorts accompanying Aldo Moro at the time of his abduction was not considered a major incident. The ratio of woundings to murders

generally was consistent over the late 1970s and early 1980s at about 2:1. And the ratio of abductions/kidnappings to murders over the same period was about 3-4:1.<sup>73</sup>

In sum, the program of the Red Brigades was straightforward, transparent, and unchanged from the organizations' beginnings in 1969 through the early 1980s. In general terms, this urban insurgency—stressing terrorist strategy and tactics—would challenge the integrity of Italy's political and socio-economic institutions and create an unacceptable level of instability. In turn, the resultant instability would erode the basic public trust that must underlie the legitimate functioning of the state. In more specific terms:

The city must become a treacherous terrain for the enemy, for the men who exercise today an ever-increasing hostile power extraneous to the interest of the masses. All their gestures must be observed, all abuses must be denounced, all collusion between the economic and political power must be uncovered . . . The long revolutionary march in the metropolis . . . must begin here today.<sup>74</sup>

And from another source:

The only language that the servants of imperialism have demonstrated to understand is the language of arms . . . No objective, no matter how militarily protected, is unattackable by a guerrilla force . . . Proletarian power must be affirmed even through the concretization of its own justice, through the capability of trying, passing judgment on, [and] convicting enemies of the proletariat.<sup>75</sup>

It must be remembered that the organization of the Red Brigades was derived out of violence, and that its primary objective was to destroy the political equilibrium of Italy and enable the dictatorship of the proletariat.

### **Response to the Revolutionary Program.**

Over the 10-year period from 1968 to 1978, the Italian government considered revolutionary violence to be only a little more serious than normal violent criminal behavior. Thus, revolutionary insurgency was not a national security issue. Nevertheless, after the murder of Aldo Moro—and 2,497 other terrorist incidents in 1978—it was

generally agreed that Italy indeed was involved in an unconventional political-insurgency war for survival. The revolutionary assault on the Italian state was dividing, corrupting, destabilizing, and destroying Italian society—and the government was finding it more and more difficult to conduct the business of governance and to perform its legitimizing functions. As a consequence, the concept of national security was expanded to allow the Italian government to confront the nontraditional threat of insurgency to national stability and security—and meaningful sovereignty.<sup>76</sup>

This challenge required rethinking the problem of revolutionary insurgency, terrorist tactics, and unconventional war. In these terms, it was generally agreed that the unconventional threat comes in many forms, both direct and indirect. The most visible form of the direct threat to the state came in the form of public violence (terrorism) against leading officials who were considered symbols of something the insurgent leadership defined as “bad” or some form of “threat” to their movement.

The indirect threat came in the form of the progressive discrediting of public institutions that eroded their ability to perform their functions for society—and eroded the basic public trust that government could and would provide individual and collective security, along with other legitimizing duties prescribed in the social contract. But, because of the continuing absence of a homogeneous and solid parliamentary majority, accompanied by endemic governmental instability, the Italian government could not micro-manage the problem and was limited to the promulgation of foundational measures that would facilitate an adequate response to the political war at the legislative, police, and intelligence levels.<sup>77</sup>

First, at the legislative level, it was agreed that the moral legitimacy of the republic that emerged out of World War II was strong enough to allow the planning, public dissemination, and implementation of a coordinated and legitimized counterinsurgent/terrorist policy. State legitimacy also was strong enough to allow the promulgation of a modern criminal code and “hard law” legislation directed specifically against the insurgents. This legislation brought the pre-World War II Criminal Code of 1930 up to date, and specifically addressed conspiracy and actions taken for the purposes of terrorism and subversion of the democratic order.<sup>78</sup>

Second, at the national security level, it was generally understood that political-insurgency war is, in fact, a series of “wars” within a general war against the state. These wars represent the major strategic dimensions that determine the outcome of the general war and take into account the so-called “forgotten” political-psychological-socio-economic-moral dimensions of conflict that make the difference between winning the battles—or winning the war itself. Both Carl von Clausewitz and Niccolo Michiavelli covered these dimensions in their treatises on conducting war, and both philosophers taught that war was not a strictly military effort.<sup>79</sup> Michiavelli, for example, argues that good laws and good arms allow the leader with *virtu* to master *fortuna* to take—or maintain—effective control of a state. Superior *virtu* consists of six related elements: (1) a well-disciplined and trained security force; (2) careful planning for the application of that force before and after power is achieved; (3) the skillful use of spies (intelligence); (4) isolation of the enemy from his sources of support; (5) *unison* (unity) of political-military effort; and (6) perceived moral rectitude (self-restraint and justice).<sup>80</sup> Italian strategic leaders also understood that this particular conflict was an internal affair. It was Italian vs. Italian. As a result, there was no way this confrontation could be allowed to degenerate into a simple military or “Dirty War.” This war would have to be fought with *prudenza* (prudence) so as to avoid, as much as possible, any damage to the future state of peace, prosperity, stability, and security of the country.<sup>81</sup>

Thus, third, the conduct of the diverse wars within the general war could not be left to the discordant elements of the state bureaucracy working separately and with their own agendas. There would also have to be (1) a strong attempt to achieve a certain level of “unity of effort” (*unison*, in Michiavelli’s terms) that would be made effective by (2) a unified intelligence capability. As a consequence, the Italian government created a temporary Counter-Terrorism Task Force. That organization was given the primary responsibility for intelligence collection and counterterrorist operations, and placed under the control of late Carabinieri general Carlo Alberto della Chiesa.<sup>82</sup> The para-military Carabinieri understand how to plan and coordinate action, and have the full police power throughout the entire Italian national territory. Thus, intelligence, operational planning, and multiorganizational coordination, to the extent that it was achieved,

essentially fell to that organization. As a result, the regular Italian armed forces generally took over routine, inconspicuous, and unobtrusive police functions to allow the State Police, other police forces, and the national Carabinieri freedom to concentrate on the counterinsurgency mission. Under Carabinieri leadership, long-term and short-term mutually supportive objectives were determined and pursued, and the war was discreetly brought under control as early as 1981-82.<sup>83</sup>

Additionally, two other extremely important factors were at work in the process of response to the revolutionary program. The first had to do with the intelligence component of the conflict. The second factor that influenced heavily the outcome of the counterinsurgency effort and the type of internal peace that was ultimately achieved was the use of power.

*Intelligence.* The legitimacy of the various disunited insurgent organizations was questioned from the outset. Even though 259 of the 297 leftist groups claiming responsibility for diverse terrorist acts were classified as communist, the legal parliamentary Communist Party of Italy (PCI) denied responsibility for taking a violent approach to achieving control of the state. Throughout 1968-82, the PCI “wrapped itself in the flag of the Italian republic,” insisted on its commitment to a pluralist society, and withheld its support from the combatant communists.<sup>84</sup> In that context, it was probably the role of the PCI that was decisive in bringing the insurgency under control within a relatively short period. That is to say, the PCI role in providing intelligence to the state security apparatus was key. The PCI’s capillary structure—strengthened by a large number of efficient ancillary organizations—was able to identify and locate specific terrorist organizations, leaders, and members. The PCI furnished a great deal of this human intelligence to the Counter-Terrorist Task Force and made it appear to be much more efficient and effective than it would have otherwise been. In any case, timely and accurate human intelligence provided by the PCI considerably enhanced Italian government efforts to find, discredit, and neutralize revolutionary insurgent organizations and leadership.<sup>85</sup>

*Power.* In an urban insurgency situation, there are normally no identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy and no specific geographical territory to take and hold. Moreover, the enemy

is living and mingling together with ordinary citizens, and there is no obvious way to determine which Italian is or is not a member of a revolutionary movement. Under these conditions, the enemy must be very carefully discerned and isolated from the rest of the population. This is crucial because, in the words of General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, (Retired), "The resulting burden on the military institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed adversary while attempting to provide security to the civilian population, it also must avoid inadvertently furthering the insurgents' cause. If, for example, the military's actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause 200 previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent cause, the use of force will have been counterproductive."<sup>86</sup>

Thus power must be considered as multilayered and combining "hard" and "soft" elements—political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal, military, police, and civil bureaucratic activities—that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of violence.<sup>87</sup> In Michaevevelli's terms, exceptional prudence (*prudenza*) is required in applying power in any internal—and external—situation, depending on the desired outcome.<sup>88</sup> The blunt hard power exercised by conventional military organizations supported by tanks, artillery, and aircraft in urban space is likely to be counterproductive—or irrelevant, at best. In a large number of cases, the more subtle use of soft power supported by relevant information warfare, careful intelligence work, and surgical precision in removing specific individual men and women insurgents from the general populace has proven effective—and imperative.<sup>89</sup>

For example, the Italian Carabinieri replaced the smart bomb aimed at an apartment in downtown Milan with a discrete knock on the apartment door. In doing that, they were able to destroy an enemy cell and *not* destroy an apartment building and displace the residents in the process. The Carabinieri gained the approval and admiration of the community—and contributed directly to the enhancement of the popular perception that governmental authority was genuine and effective, and used for reasonable and fair (that is, legitimate) purposes.<sup>90</sup>

Response to the revolutionary program on the part of external powers, such as the United States and other Western countries,

proved to be relatively ineffective. If credit is given where it is due, the Italian state deserves most—but not all—of the credit for effectively bringing the insurgency under control. It is important to remember that governmental success was at least partially based on a certain level of failure and isolation on the part of the insurgent organizations.<sup>91</sup>

### **Key Points and Lessons.**

- The Italian urban insurgency included a large group of diverse organizations motivated to the violent replacement of a “moribund” capitalist system. It relied on internal urban strategies from which to develop a support base and to act as an ideological substitute for conventional war.
- The primary insurgent organization, the Red Brigades, utilized a vigorous, wide-spread, and violent set of terrorist tactics to implement its objective of bringing down the Italian state.
- The Red Brigades were organized into logistical and mass brigades. The logistical brigades operated overtly to provide support to the mass brigades. The mass brigades operated covertly, and were responsible for intelligence and operations.
- The Red Brigades were derived out of political-social violence, and their primary objective was to destroy the political equilibrium of Italy to enable the dictatorship of the proletariat.
- The Italian government—once it made the political decision to treat the 10-year-old insurgency as a national security problem rather than an increasingly irritating law enforcement issue—planned, organized, and implemented a soft multilayered political-paramilitary response. Not unexpectedly, that strategy generated political stability and the viable possibility of a sustainable peace within a relatively short time.
- As a corollary, it was recognized that the unwillingness or inability of a government to develop a long-term, multidimensional, and morally acceptable strategy to confront an

insurgency and its associated terrorism is a threat to the stability and sovereignty of the state itself. In these terms, the state has the clear responsibility to take legitimizing measures to confront insurgency and avoid possible state failure.

These hard-won lessons, learned from the Italian experience with urban insurgency, and its associated terrorism, are all too relevant to the “new” political wars of the 21st century. Sun Tzu argues that “those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations.”<sup>92</sup>

## **OUT OF THE SHADOWS OF THE PAST: IMAGES OF THE FUTURE**

Victory in any kind of war—including insurgency war—is not simply the sum of the battles won or lost over the course of a conflict. Rather, it is the product of connecting and weighting the various political, economic, informational, and security elements of national power in support of a unifying political goal. Lessons from over a half-century of bitter experience suffered by governments involved in dealing with destabilizing internal conflicts show that a given response to a given threat often ends—or continues—short of achieving the desired peace. Too often, this is because too much time, treasure, and blood are dedicated to tactical and operational concerns as opposed to defining and implementing the strategic political end-game.

Moreover, it would be a terrible mistake to assume that there is nothing to be learned from past insurgency wars. On the contrary, in the “savage wars of peace” of the current and future eras, the lessons learned from earlier experience are all too relevant. Thus, this monograph emphasizes some strategic-level lessons learned over the past several years. The most salient points and lessons are seen—to one degree or another—in the Argentine, Peruvian, and Italian insurgency/terrorism cases outlined above. Among other things, the Argentine case provides a basis from which to examine the problem of current and future populism and urban insurgency. All three cases—but especially the Peruvian case—invoke the fundamental

strategic political issue of state failure, and why it matters. The Italian case illustrates good governmental decisionmaking regarding the question of military vs. political victory in internal conflict and has its implications for the future of the state.

### **Populism and Urban Insurgency.**

A map of the 21st century security situation shows 79 low-intensity conflicts, 32 complex emergencies, and 18 ethnic wars, overlapping with 175 small-scale contingencies ongoing throughout the world.<sup>93</sup> Nationalist and separatist discontent, often accompanied by populist militancy, appears to provide fuel for most of these conflicts. In this connection, weak, corrupt, incompetent, misguided, and/or insensitive governments cannot or will not satisfy the legitimate expectations of their peoples—and add more fuel to the conflict syndrome. As a consequence, armed nonstate insurgent groups all over the world are challenging democratic as well as undemocratic governments' physical and moral right to govern.<sup>94</sup>

Latin America is only one example of this political turmoil. Since 1945, internal conflict in the region has been a series of confrontations between populist reform movements—sometimes radical, sometimes moderate, and occasionally (as in Peronist Argentina) quasi-fascist. But, the main line of internal conflict in Latin America, and elsewhere in the world, has been between the various populist forces and those of the existing oligarchic social and economic structures. The basic problem is that the transition to democracy is not satisfying the socio-economic expectations of the populace. Likewise, the transition to free market economies is not satisfying expectations.<sup>95</sup>

Ambitious populist leaders such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and others exploit these popular grievances to catapult themselves into political power—and stay there. Their success stems from solemn promises—made directly to the urban masses—to solve national and individual problems without regard to slow, obstructive, and corrupted democratic processes. Thus, through mass mobilization and supporting demonstrations, demagogic populist leaders are in a position to claim a mandate to place themselves above elections, political parties, legislatures, and courts—and govern as they see fit.<sup>96</sup>

In testimony before the U.S. Congress on March 24, 2004, General James T. Hill, U.S. Army, commander of the U.S. Southern Command, stated that, "Traditional threats [in Latin America] are now complicated by an emerging threat best described as radical populism . . . . That threat emerges when populism becomes radicalized by a leader who increasingly uses his position . . . to infringe gradually upon the rights of all citizens."<sup>97</sup> The threat becomes serious when a populist leader relies on the increasing use of repressive violence as an effective deterrent against any and all opponents. Under these conditions, can an insurgency be far behind?

In considering urban insurgency as a likely contemporary strategic approach to political war, this monograph goes against the conventional wisdom and the Leninist-Maoist tradition of rural-based insurgency. Ironically, we emphasize the urban approach for the same fundamental reasons Lenin reluctantly took his party cadre into rural Russia, and Mao happily concentrated his organizational efforts in the rural space of China. Simply put, that is where the people are. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that, as important as populism, its associated instability, and probable insurgency might be in a given threat environment, it is only a symptom—not necessarily a threat in itself. Rather, the ultimate threat is state failure.

### **The Issue of State Failure.**

State failure is an evolutionary process, not an outcome. This state of affairs is often brought on by poor, irresponsible, and insensitive governance, and leads to at least one other very fundamental reason why states fail. That is, state failure can be a process that is exacerbated by nonstate (insurgent) groups that, for whatever reason, want to take down or exercise illicit control over a given government. In Latin America, Colombia is, Peru has been, and both continue to be good examples of this. The narco-insurgent/terrorist nexus in those countries represents an unconventional, asymmetric threat to the authority of the central governments. Through murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, destruction of infrastructure, and other means of coercion and persuasion, these violent, internal, nonstate actors compromise the exercise of state authority. The

government and its institutions become progressively less and less capable of performing the tasks of governance, including exercising their fundamental personal security functions to protect citizens. As a result, the narco-insurgents become increasingly wealthy and powerful, and affected countries deteriorate further and further toward failed state status.<sup>98</sup>

Peru's *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating in that country and throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their specific objectives, *Sendero's* and other violent nonstate actors' armed propaganda and business incentives are aimed at lessening a regime's credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. This debilitating and destabilizing activity generates the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today.<sup>99</sup>

More specifically, failing or failed states in Latin America, Africa, the Middle-East, and Asia are breeding grounds for instability, insurgency, and terrorism. A breakdown in institutional governance can breed or exacerbate humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. Such states can host networks of all kinds, including criminal business enterprises and/or some form of ideological, religious, or populist crusade. They also spawn a variety of pernicious and lethal activities and outcomes, including torture and murder; poverty, starvation, and disease; the recruitment and use of child soldiers; trafficking in women and human organs for transplants; trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and weapons of mass destruction; genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism; and criminal anarchy and insurgency. At the same time, these networks and activities normally are unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of destabilization and conflict.<sup>100</sup>

Additionally, failing and failed states simply do not go away. Ample evidence demonstrates that failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people's democracies. Moreover, failing and failed states tend not to

(1) buy U.S. and other exporting nations' products, (2) be interested in developing democratic and free market institutions and human rights, or (3) cooperate on shared problems such as illegal drugs, illicit arms flows, debilitating refugee flows, and potentially dangerous environmental problems. In short, the longer they persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.<sup>101</sup>

### **Military vs. Political Victory.**

The global security arena may be characterized as a game of chess. In it, protagonists move pieces silently and subtly all over the game board. Under the players' studied direction, each piece represents a different type of devastating power, and may simultaneously conduct its lethal attacks from differing directions. Similarly, each piece shows no mercy against its foe, and is prepared to sacrifice itself to allow another piece the opportunity to destroy a more important adversary—or checkmate the king. Likewise, every player in the global security arena from proverbial pawns to bishops to the queen must attack the adversary and simultaneously cope defensively with several potentially grave types of threats.

In the real game of global politics, and at a lower level on the likelihood ladder of warfare as a whole, conventional military attack retains certain credibility. Nevertheless, this challenge is frequently complicated by threats and menaces at a higher level of likelihood emanating from rogue states, nonstate and transnational terrorists, insurgents, illegal drug traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, militant fundamentalists, ethnic cleansers, and 1,000 other "snakes" with a cause—and the will to conduct asymmetrical warfare to achieve their own political objectives.<sup>102</sup> Logic would, thus, dictate that military organization, training, and equipment must adopt two parallel tracks: the first aimed at direct conventional interstate war, and the second aimed at unconventional nonstate and intrastate political war. But, as in the game of chess, General Sir Frank Kitson, United Kingdom, (Retired), argues that these tracks should not be considered as independent forms of contemporary conflict. They are parts within the concept of total war.<sup>103</sup>

In connection with the idea of total war, or warfare as a whole, the military role goes beyond traditional warfighting to unconventional conflict and to consolidating success by providing security and support to partners, other government and international agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in the aftermath. Under these conditions, security forces provide the capabilities needed to consolidate battlefield success and turn it into strategic political victory. Thus, as shown in the Italian case, strategic victory requires not only the defeat of an enemy military or insurgent force, but also the protection of the state's socio-political foundations to ensure a durable and prosperous peace.

In the contemporary global security environment, international organizations and willing national powers are increasingly called on to respond to conflicts generated by all kinds of instabilities and destabilizers. Furthermore, the international community increasingly is expected to provide the leverage to ensure that legitimate governance is given to responsible, incorrupt, and competent leadership that can and will address the political, economic, and social root causes that underlie a given traditional or unconventional conflict. This legitimate governance concept has serious implications in terms of failing and failed states. As demonstrated in the Italian, Peruvian, and Argentine cases, the conscious positive or negative choices that a government makes about how to conduct national security and stability efforts will define the future of the state—through the processes of national reform, regeneration, and protection of citizens' well-being and by extension, global security. Thus, the capability to attain strategic political victory—rather than just military victory—is much more important now and for the future than it has been in the past.<sup>104</sup>

## **Summary.**

In sum, instability, violence, and the use of terrorist tactics and strategies in political wars are pervasive in the world today. It is important, then, for the United States and the West—as primary recipients of most of the benefits of global stability and economic integration—to do their utmost to protect and enhance the global order. And that must be done before even more territory, infrastructure,

and stability are quietly and slowly destroyed, and more thousands of innocents die.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRATEGIC LEADERS**

The study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the cornerstone for understanding conventional war.<sup>105</sup> It is no less relevant to nontraditional conflict. In the past, some wars tended to be unrealistically viewed as generally amenable to military attrition solutions—the Vietnam War and the two relatively recent Iraq Wars being good examples. In the 21st century, the complex realities of contemporary wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion, to achieve common, workable, and reasonable political-strategic ends.

Given today's realities, failure to prepare adequately for present and future political-insurgency war contingencies is unconscionable. Experience clearly demonstrates that the tradition of simply training and equipping troops has proven to be an inadequate tactical-operational reaction to the types of problems that pertain to modern political war. At a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to deal effectively with contemporary global conflict situations: (1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable security and stability; (2) fundamental education and understanding requirements; and the (3) strategic application of U.S. military power.

### **Dialogue on Security and Stability.**

At the highest levels, a beginning point from which to work toward viable security and stability would be to:

- Help advance a nation's or region's understanding of the conventional and unconventional security concerns and threats facing it,
- Develop permanent civil-military mechanisms for addressing these concerns and threats,
- Obtain consensus on common principles and concepts of security and stability to address real threats stemming from general concerns, and

- Foster expanded political-military dialogue and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect for sovereignty and understanding diverse points of view.

## **Education and Understanding.**

At base, however, education and understanding are key to success in dealing with political war. Thus, the political issue in conflict dominates threat and response at two related levels: (1) leader development and (2) development of strategic clarity.

*Leader Development.* The ambiguous multidimensional political-psychological nature of contemporary political conflict situations forces the redefinition of long-used terms. In this connection, civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn that:

- The enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity or an industrial capability to make traditional war. The enemy is also the individual political actor that plans and implements illegal violence, and exploits the causes of violence for his own self-determined purposes. In these terms, another very real enemy is recognized now to exist in the form of poverty, disease, and other nonhuman destabilizers that must be dealt with early and aggressively.
- Power is no longer confined to combat firepower directed at a uniformed enemy military formation or industrial complex. Power is multilevel, consisting of coordinated political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, and police activity that can be brought to bear discretely on the causes as well as the perpetrators of illegal violence.
- Victory or success is not an unconditional surrender marked by a formally signed document terminating a conflict. In the absence of an easily identifiable human foe to attack and destroy, there is no specific territory to take and hold, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending authorities will be honored, and no specific rules to guide leadership in a given civil-military engagement process.

Victory, perhaps with an international impetus, is now more and more defined as the achievement of a sustainable peace. Those who would declare victory and go home before achieving the foundations for a sustainable peace must be prepared to return and deal with the problem again—and again.

- Conflict is not a military-to-military war of attrition. Conflict now involves entire populations. It involves a large number of national civilian and military agencies, external national civilian organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizational and subnational indigenous actors, all dealing one way or another with myriad threats to global, regional, and national security, peace, and well-being. Thus, conflict is not only multidimensional, but also multiorganizational.
- Finally, at this level, contemporary conflict situations are not limited—they are total. Conflict is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the development or disruption of collective or individual well-being. As long as nonhuman destabilizers such as poverty and disease exist that can lead to the destruction of a people, a society, and/or a government—there is conflict. These are the root causes that human destabilizers exploit to implement their programs to take down violently a government, destroy a society, or cause great harm to a society.

*Educational Solutions for Strategic Clarity.* At a minimum, there are seven educational and cultural imperatives to modify traditional war and ethno-centric mindsets, and to develop the leader judgment needed to deal more effectively with complex, politically dominated, multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural contingencies:

- Strategic civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency, with particular reference to the way in which military and nonmilitary and lethal and nonlethal force can be employed

to achieve political ends; and the way in which political considerations affect the use of force. Additionally, leaders need to understand the strategic and political-psychological implications of operational and tactical actions.

- Strategic leaders must understand that the number of battlefield victories or the number of enemies arrested or killed has meaning only to extent that such actions contribute directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state.
- Civilian and military personnel must be able to operate effectively and collegially in coalitions or multinational contingents. They must also acquire the ability to deal collegially with civilian populations and local and global media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness—such as civilian and military exchange programs, language training programs, and combined (multinational) exercises—must be revitalized and expanded.
- Strategic leaders must learn how to cooperatively and collegially plan and implement an operation employing a full complex of diverse organizations—internal agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and coalition/partnership civil-military organizations.
- Strategic leaders must learn that an intelligence capability several steps beyond the usual is required for small political-insurgency wars. This capability involves active utilization of intelligence operations as a dominant element of both strategy and tactics. Thus, commanders and leaders at all levels must be responsible for collecting and exploiting timely intelligence. The lowest military echelon where adequate intelligence assets generally have been concentrated is at the division or brigade level. Yet, military operations in most contemporary conflicts are normally conducted by battalion and smaller units.
- Strategic civilian and military leaders must understand that nonstate political actors in any kind of intrastate conflict are likely to have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional and unconventional weaponry. Political wars

have and will continue to place military forces and civilian support contingents into harm's way. Thus, leadership must be prepared to deal effectively and decisively with that kind of threat.

- Finally, leadership at all levels must understand that generating a more complete unity of effort and concomitant strategic clarity is imperative in contemporary political war. Strategic leaders must establish the appropriate political-organizational mechanisms to achieve effective national and coalitional unity of effort. They must ensure that the application of the various national and international civilian and military instruments of power contributes directly to the achievement of a mutually agreed—or mandated—end-state.

*The Strategic Application of U.S. Military Power.* At the outset, it should be noted that the ultimate responsibility for stability and security lies with governments directly involved in political war. Yet, the United States and other Western countries as interested outside actors, have indispensable experience, resources, and political influence that can adapt military efficacy to a given strategic threat. This task, with those outlined above, extends to professional multilateral civil-military education and leader development:

Primary Recommendations. At the least, a carefully designed and relatively modest assistance program could increase vastly the speed at which civil-military institutions professionalize and modernize themselves. A short list of the most important areas for improvement would include:

- Development of strategy,
- Development of end-state planning capabilities,
- Training and doctrine for joint and combined operations,
- Improvement in the collection, fusion, evaluation, and dissemination of usable and timely intelligence,
- Development of quick-reaction capabilities, and
- Improvement in transport capability and lift.

Some More Advanced Recommendations. A short list of additional areas for improvement would include:

- Help define and implement nontraditional national interests centering on national “well-being” and effective sovereignty (control of territory and the body politic),
- Help implement the application of all the instruments of national and international power—including the full integration of legitimate civilian partners—as a part of a synergistic security/stability process,
- Help teach and apply the notion of indirect engagement versus direct involvement,
- Help teach and apply the notion of multiple centers of gravity, and how to defend one’s own centers of gravity as well as attack those of an opponent,
- Help teach and apply the power of information and public diplomacy and an understanding of the penalties that are paid when these instruments of power are not used, channeled, or harnessed,
- Help indigenous leadership understand that governmental inaction can be as much of a threat to stability and security as any other destabilizer, and
- Ensure that direct and indirect military aid to a given government makes a specific contribution to its strategic objectives of promoting democracy, human rights, economic development, social justice, personal and collective security, and creating an environment for sustainable peace.

### **A Cautionary Concluding Note.**

The above outline of fundamental strategic recommendations takes us back to where we began. This list of recommendations provides the basis for the understanding and judgment that civilian and military leaders must have to be clear on what the situation *is* and what it *is not*. The hard evidence over time underscores the

wisdom of Clausewitz's dictum, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."<sup>106</sup>

These recommendations take us beyond doing "something" for something's sake. They take us beyond developing budgets, force structure, and equipment packages for a given crisis situation. They take us beyond asking, "What are we going to do?" "Who is going to command and control the effort?" "How is it to be done?" These imperatives take us to the development of a mutually agreed-upon strategic vision (that is, the political end-game). In turn, these imperatives take us to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways and means that directly support the achievement of the political end-game.<sup>107</sup>

There is very little glamour, only a few sound bites, and not many career enhancement possibilities inherent in much of the work outlined above, but it does have great potential for directing progress toward democracy, stability, and sustainable peace.

## ENDNOTES

1. Paul E. Smith, *On Political War*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989, p. 3. This encompasses what B. H. Liddell Hart, drawing from Sun Tzu, calls the indirect approach to war. "The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting. . . . Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations." B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2d revised edition, New York: Signet, 1967, p. 324; and Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B., Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 79.

2. See Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence*, Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983; and Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Continuum, 2003.

3. This concept was formulated and elaborated in David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

4. For a good discussion of this set of points, see Thomas A. Marks, "Ideology of Insurgency: New Ethnic Focus or Old Cold War Distortions?" *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Spring 2004, pp. 107-109.

5. Field Manual 90-8, *Counter guerrilla Operations*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1986.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88.
7. See Donald C. Hodges, ed., *Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen*, New York: William Morrow, 1973, p. 250.
8. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison Taw, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center/RAND, 1994, p. ix.
9. From 1955 through 1958, the author was in a position from which to observe personally the political-military situation in Argentina. Over the period 1955 through 2004, the author has continuously interviewed civilian and military officials regarding political-military affairs and insurgency in that country and others—including, specifically, Italy and Peru. Thus, this and subsequent assertions made in this monograph are consensus statements based on observation and interviews. The intent is to allow anonymity for those who object to their names being made public. In subsequent notes, these statements are cited as Author Interviews.
10. See, for example, Juan Chamorro, “Sendero prepara nueva estrategia de resurgimiento,” *La Republica*, November 16, 2002.
11. Abimael Guzman, “El Discurso del Dr. Guzman,” in *Los partidos politicos en el Peru*, Rogger U. Mercado, ed., Lima: Ediciones Latinamericanos, 1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Peru, *Desarrollar la Guerra popular sirviendo a la revolucion mundial*, Lima: Comité Central de Partido Comunista del Peru, 1986, pp. 82-88.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1996, p. 54.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
15. Author Interviews.
16. Testimony of Red Brigadist Antonio Savasta quoted in Richard Drake, *The Aldo Moro Murder Case*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 50.
17. Declaration of Red Brigades sent to L’Espresso and published as “Le due anime delle Br,” March 1, 1987.
18. Author interviews.
19. Richard Gillespie, “Political Violence in Argentina: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and *Carapintadas*,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 215. Also see Maria Jose Moyano, *Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969-1979*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

20. *Ibid.*; and Author Interviews.
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*; and Gillespie, pp. 218-223.
23. Author Interviews.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*; and Gillespie and Moyano.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. The original formulation of the “foco theory” can be found in Ernest Guevara, *Obras Completas*, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cepe, 1973, Vol. III.
31. Author Interviews.
32. *Ibid.*; and Montoyo, p. 59.
33. *Ibid.*; and Gillespie, p. 224-225.
34. *Ibid.*; and Moyano, p. 172.
35. *Ibid.*; and Gillespie, pp. 222-223.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*; and Moyano, p. 36.
38. *Ibid.*, and pp. 38-41, 82-83.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57; and Gillespie, p. 236.
40. *Ibid.*, and p. 238.
41. *Ibid.*; and Moyano, p. 155.
42. Reported in *The Times*, London, January 4, 1978.
43. Gillespie, pp. 239-240.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 244; Moyano, p. 164; and Author Interviews.
45. Sun Tzu, p. 88.
46. Chamorro.
47. Guzman.
48. Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, *Bases de discusión*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 1987; and “El documento oficial de Sendero,” in Mercado.
49. *Ibid.* Also see Communist Party of Peru Central Committee, *Interview with Chairman Gonzolo*, San Francisco: Red Banner Editorial House, 1988.

50. Guzman.
51. Author Interviews.
52. *Ibid.*
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55. Simon Strong, *Shining Path: Terror and Revolution in Peru*, New York: Random House, 1992, pp. 225-231.
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57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. Sun Tzu, p. 73.
60. Author Interviews. Also see Donatella della Porta, "Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, p. 105.
61. Testimony of Red Brigadist Robert Buzzatti, quoted in Richard Drake, p. 143.
62. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics*, July 1981, pp. 379-399.
63. This passage was extracted from Red Brigades documents quoted in Vittorfranco S. Pisano, *The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy*, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987, p. 39.
64. Testimony of Red Brigadist Antonio Savasta, quoted in Richard Drake, p. 51.
65. Testimony of Antonio Savasta, 45, quoted in Donatella dela Porta, p. 150.
66. Antonio Savasta in Richard Drake, p. 50.
67. Alberto Franceschini, *Mara, Renato, e io: storia dei fondatori delle BR*, Milan: Mondadori, 1988, p. 204.
68. Author Interviews.
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*
71. An energia bomb is a more powerful bomb than one made with TNT. *Ibid.*; and Pisano, pp. 119-143.
72. *Ibid.*; and these data may also be found in della Porta, p. 130.
73. *Ibid.*; and these data may also be found in Pisano, pp. 157-167.
74. Romano Cantore, Carlo Rossella, and Chiara Valentini, *Dall'Interno della Guerriglia*, Milan: Mondadori, 1978, p. 24.

75. Quote taken from Pisano, p. 40, that was taken from a document entitled "Red Brigades," No. 6, March 1979, *Spring Campaign: Seizure, Trial, Execution of Christian Democratic President Aldo Moro*.

76. Author Interviews.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Ibid.* Also see Pisano, pp. 144-151; and della Porta, pp. 118-119.

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86. General John R. Galvin, "Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm," *Parameters*, December 1986, pp. 2-8.

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91. *Ibid.*

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93. See the "World Conflict and Human Rights Map," prepared by Berto Jongman with the support of the Goals for Americans Foundation, St. Louis, 2002; *The State of the World Atlas*, 1997; and website for *Genocide Watch.com*, Dr. Greg Stanton, among other sources.

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