

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE ENDS

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September 2001

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ISBN 1-58487-070-2

FOREWORD

Defense planners and strategists have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America's role in what many see as a dramatically different international situation. Most of those proposals, though, continue with a Cold War paradigm of trying to foresee what the next threat might be and how the United States might best prepare itself to respond to it. Consequently, the possibility of taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote *positive* ends—long-term peace, stability, and prosperity—has remained largely overlooked.

In this monograph, the authors, Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege and Lieutenant Colonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, make a case for a strategy aimed at achieving positive, rather than neutral or negative, ends. They first discuss the dynamic conditions of the new strategic environment, then explore the options the United States has available for dealing with those conditions. The options include (1) preventive defense, (2) neo-isolationism, and (3) a strategy that pursues positive ends. Only the last, the authors argue, deals with the new security environment in a proactive way. It enables the United States to define its vital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace, freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or nonstate actors. The basic approach of a strategy of positive ends would be to build and enlarge a circle of stakeholders committed to creating conditions for a profitable and enduring peace—thereby reducing the potential for crises—and to preparing response mechanisms for coping successfully when crises do occur.

As the authors show, a threat-based strategy has serious liabilities in an environment in which the next opponent or the next crisis is nearly impossible to predict. The United

States would do better, therefore, to pursue a strategy of positive ends, one that endeavors to maintain a dynamic and enduring peace.

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advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

SUMMARY

While defense planners have recently proposed a variety of alternatives for America's role in what many see as a *New World Coming*, few of those proposals go beyond the Cold War paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking. This paradigm focuses on deterring or defeating specific threats, rather than taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote long-term peace, stability, and prosperity.

America's challenge today is to foster peace and stability in a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partners and allies willing and able to share the costs just as surely as they reap the benefits. Hence, instead of a strategy oriented on prevention—a negative aim—the United States would do better to lead a 21st-century concert of nations toward creating *positive* conditions, those that promote long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. Such a strategy would, as a matter of course, preclude a number of threats—perhaps even the majority of them—from emerging in the first place and would better position the United States to cope with unexpected emergencies.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

The forces of globalization are creating something of a Janus-faced future for the international community. At one extreme, the future takes on the countenance of a stable world in which national interests merge into the general aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity. At the other extreme, the future assumes the face of a more dangerous and unpredictable world characterized by shifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-nots.

The face of the future that comes into view will undoubtedly have features representing both extremes. The extent to which the United States and other powers work in concert will make a difference in determining which aspect of Janus will become more prevalent. The United States can address the challenges of the new security environment through any one of three broad strategic approaches: preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aimed at positive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense aims at forestalling potential problems by deterring, containing, isolating, and defeating specific threats. Its success depends on developing the correct list of threats; and it generally seeks to preserve or restore the status quo. It provides for deterring—and defeating, if necessary—such potential aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kim Jong Il in North Korea. However, a strategy of preventive defense, even if successful in deterring or defeating designated threats, could fail if other threats emerge that military forces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. It also falls short of providing a rationale for taking control of events that might shape the future or of building a broad multinational basis for anticipating and addressing the type of problems commonly associated with today's strategic environment.

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes called strategic independence or anti-interventionism. Under this option, the evolution of the international security environment is left largely to itself. Neo-isolationism pursues a neutral end, since security interests are strictly defined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness at home. Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue strategic defenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize threats from abroad. The principal weakness of a neo-isolationist strategy is its lack of practicality. Isolation of any sort is becoming difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in today's global village. Ignoring the forces at work beyond U.S. borders is simply not an effective way of dealing with them.

A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of Positive Ends aims at building an international environment that promotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, economic stability, and the rule of law, and provides a multilateral basis for crisis response. It differs from the other strategic approaches discussed above in that it is oriented toward achieving a condition, rather than preparing to respond to specific threats. In other words, its ends are *positive*, rather than negative or neutral. The basic approach would be to build and enlarge a circle of *stakeholders* committed to reducing the potential for crises and to prepare response mechanisms for coping successfully when they do. The primary weakness of this strategy is that others can misconstrue its goals as a form of *Pax Americana*, particularly if American leadership appears aggressive and hegemonic. A second weakness is that positive aims generally require more energy and resources than do negative or neutral ones, which may mean that short-term costs of this policy may be greater than people would expect to pay, at least when compared to other strategies.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy built around positive ends permits the United States to define its vital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace, freedom, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or non-state actors.

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive ends must, of course, involve all elements of national power. The political and socio-cultural elements would help create conditions for long-term peace and stability by strengthening democratic institutions worldwide, by advancing human rights, and by responding to humanitarian crises. The economic element of national power would contribute to global prosperity by enhancing and guiding international financial institutions, by

promoting open trading systems and global business enterprises, and by providing for sustainable economic development worldwide. In broad terms, the military element of national power must have the capability to conduct sustained *peacetime engagement* activities as well as respond to two general types of crises (those with significant escalation potential and those without).

Peacetime engagement should lay the groundwork necessary to ensure such operations are not conducted off the cuff, but reflect adequate planning, preparation, and consensus building among allies and partners with regard to the desired strategic ends, ways, and means. Accordingly, the day-to-day work of military peacetime engagement should become a high-priority effort for the U.S. defense establishment. The need to respond to two types of crises makes the value of an established multilateral response mechanism clear, as well as the importance of a full-spectrum force, which can provide an array of response options. Indeed, the nature of tomorrow's opponents, the destructive power of their weapons, and the environment in which they are likely to operate all underscore the need for a balanced force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environment, the legacies of the Cold War continue to influence U.S. strategic thinking. The problems associated with the Strategy Review are evidence of that. The defense community continues to justify its strategic preferences with *threat*-based assessments, some of which are loosely labeled asymmetric. However, as has been shown, a threat-based strategy has serious liabilities in an environment in which the next opponent or the next crisis is nearly impossible to predict. Instead, the United States would do well to pursue a strategy focused on positive ends, one that endeavors to maintain a dynamic and enduring peace.

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF POSITIVE ENDS

The emergence of a more dynamic and complex security environment since the end of the Cold War has prompted a comprehensive reevaluation of America's national security strategy. While defense planners have proposed a variety of alternatives for America's role in what many see as a *New World Coming*, few of those proposals go beyond the Cold War paradigm of threat-based strategic thinking. Although undeniably effective under certain conditions, this paradigm has the distinct disadvantage of yielding the initiative to outside forces. It focuses on deterring or defeating specific threats, rather than taking advantage of the intrinsic dynamism of the new security environment in order to create conditions that might promote long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. It has the additional disadvantage—as reflected in today's strategic dilemma—of placing defense planners in the position of having to make difficult resource choices in the absence of the underlying rationale that a clear threat would provide. In short, the logic of threat-based planning can lead to strategic paralysis, or—worse—a defense establishment organized for the wrong kind of threat.

America's challenge today is to foster peace and stability in a dynamic world and to do so with strategic partners and allies willing and able to share the costs just as surely as they reap the benefits. To be sure, deterring and defeating threats to U.S. security remain critical priorities. However, it is simply not possible to prepare for every contingency, especially since serious adversaries always try to strike where one is least prepared. Hence, instead of a strategy oriented on prevention—a negative aim—the United States would do better to lead a 21st century concert of nations toward creating *positive* conditions, those that promote long-term peace, stability, and prosperity. Such a strategy would, as a matter of course, preclude a number of

threats—perhaps even the majority of them—from emerging in the first place and would better position the United States to cope with unexpected emergencies. This monograph describes the primary advantages of a national security strategy oriented on positive ends.

New Global Challenges and Opportunities.

Most descriptions of the current and near-future national security environments indicate that the world is becoming a more dangerous place.¹ While changes in the contemporary security environment might appear random at first blush, closer analysis reveals that they reflect new global forces at work. Known collectively as globalization, these forces include the spread of information and information technologies, as well as the concomitant, ever-increasing propensity of the world's populations to participate in economic and political processes.²

Globalization has begun to transform every aspect of human affairs, from enhancing the real and virtual mobility of people and things to reforming the ways in which economic and political interests are defined. Interests that were once local or special in other ways can now cut across national boundaries to gain more publicity and support. For example, corporate interests mobilized via the World Economic Forum and the International Chamber of Commerce have influenced global policies that have expanded trade regimes, regulated markets, and partially redefined the roles of governments and international organizations, including the United Nations. Similarly, special interest groups, such as Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, have become powerful international forces in their own right. They have effectively promoted treaties to limit global warming, to establish an international criminal court, and to outlaw antipersonnel mines. Other transnational forces have challenged state sovereignty in the area of human rights. The internationalization of

justice, for example, recently brought about the arrest of Augusto Pinochet, the former Chilean dictator, for human rights violations committed decades earlier in his own country. This broad dispersion of the ability to influence political agendas and outcomes has been both observed and encouraged by a number of the world's leaders, including the secretary-general of the United Nations, the director-general of the World Trade Organization, and the managing director of the International Monetary Fund.³

Yet, all is not good news. While economic globalization has brought greater prosperity to some parts of the world, it has also contributed to the quick spread of an Asian economic flu to other regions. Even if this crisis has passed, recovery might take considerable time.⁴ Other evidence suggests that, despite (or perhaps because of) economic globalization, 70 percent of the world's wealth continues to travel back and forth among 28 percent of the world's population, thereby excluding developing and undeveloped countries and exacerbating the gap between *haves* and *have-nots*.⁵ Furthermore, growing prosperity does not preclude economic conflict, as developments in Europe and Asia seem to indicate.⁶ Moreover, despite a decade's worth of effort, a free market economy has failed to take hold in Russia owing to an ineffective government, a well-entrenched organized crime syndicate, and growing regional fragmentation, among other problems. Tensions in the Middle East, where democracy has precious few footholds, have risen recently, threatening to erupt in a broader military and political crisis. While democracy has made rapid strides in Central and South America, economic change has exacerbated social inequalities; and corruption and narco-trafficking remain stubborn problems. In Africa, economic growth has been uneven and intrastate violence has been extremely bloody.⁷

In other words, the forces of globalization are creating something of a Janus-faced future for the international community. At one extreme, the future takes on the countenance of a stable world in which national interests

merge into the general aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity. In this world, the rule of law and pluralistic political systems continue to spread, albeit with some degree of friction, and the number of free-market economies expands, distributing economic prosperity still further, if unevenly, due to the influence of state laws, institutions, and bureaucracies. Indeed, within the last decade alone, globalization contributed to increasing the number of democracies in the world by 14 percent. More than half of the world's population now lives under democratic rule.⁸ While the argument that democracies do not go to war against each other is based on a limited data base, it is fair to say that democracies with established civil societies—where strong traditions exist concerning the rule of law and citizens feel empowered to participate in the political process—tend to define security problems similarly.⁹ Historically, they have demonstrated a greater willingness to cooperate in addressing the challenges posed by arms proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, mass migrations, ethnic strife, and other security problems. Such inclinations suggest a greater opportunity for creating favorable conditions for continued peace and prosperity than one would find in a global environment dominated by autocratic regimes.

At the other extreme, the future assumes the face of a more dangerous and unpredictable world characterized by shifting power relationships, ad hoc security arrangements, and an ever-widening gap between haves and have-nots. In this future, a number of the world's new democracies—lacking strong traditions for maintaining a balance of power—collapse after experiencing only transitory successes; and transnational threats, such as international crime syndicates, terrorist networks, and drug cartels, continue to grow in strength and influence, thriving among autocratic, weak, or so-called failed states. Hence, under these conditions, a greater number of autocratic regimes, perhaps allied with nefarious transnational actors, would likely emerge. Since perennial sources of friction—ethnic

rivalries, nationalism, religious-based antagonisms, and competition for scarce resources, including water—would go unresolved in such an environment, they would continue to provoke serious crises, especially as the world's population increases.

As the Vietnam conflict, the war in Afghanistan, and the Kosovo crisis have shown, a state need not be a peer competitor or even a major regional power to pose significant security problems. Such states could well employ what diplomats and policymakers have rather loosely called asymmetric strategies, which—despite the confusion created by recent rhetoric—amount to little more than the exploitation of an Achilles' heel.¹⁰ Even with more conventional means, small states can prove difficult contenders. The Kosovo crisis required the marshalling of considerable political and military resources from NATO, for example. Yet, if supported by a larger state or a network of transnational forces or armed with one or more weapons of mass destruction, a small state like Serbia would have presented much greater—perhaps even insuperable—challenges even for an alliance as large as NATO. Whether a manifestation of the *clash of civilizations* or the *coming anarchy*, therefore, this face of the future poses some novel and rather thorny challenges for the ends, ways, and means of future strategy.¹¹

The face of the future that comes into view will undoubtedly have features representing both extremes. The extent to which the United States and other powers work in concert will make a difference in determining which aspect of Janus will become more prevalent. The United States can address the challenges of the new security environment through any one of three broad strategic approaches: preventive defense, neo-isolationism, or a strategy aimed at positive ends.

Preventive Defense. Preventive Defense aims at forestalling potential problems by deterring, containing, isolating, and defeating specific threats.¹² This option

essentially amounts to little more than a complex version of the threat-based strategy that characterized the Cold War. It orients on the more dangerous and unpredictable face of Janus, pursuing a negative rather than a positive aim. Its success depends on developing the *correct* list of threats; it generally seeks to preserve or restore the status quo.

The major advantages of this approach are that it has the momentum of current practice behind it and that it is viewed as defensive as opposed to aggressive or hegemonic. It provides for deterring—and defeating, if necessary—such potential aggressors as Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Kim Jong Il in North Korea. It also recognizes the need to establish a regional balance of power in areas where the potential for trouble exists, but where the lines of conflict are less clearly drawn, as in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Formosa Strait. Some advocates of this approach argue in favor of shifting U.S. defense focus toward the Pacific Rim, improving the defenses of the homeland, and adjusting the current force-sizing metric to a redefined threat.

The principal weakness of this strategy, even if the metric is adjusted, is that it tends to focus too narrowly on an identifiable and predictable threat list. A purely threat-based metric, such as that associated with counter-aggression scenarios in Southwest and Northeast Asia, fails to account for the unique requirements of other kinds of interventions, such as those encountered in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Libya, Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere. While it is prudent not to disregard known threats, this approach depends too much on planning and justifying resources in terms of predictable threats and capabilities. It tends to assume that problems not included in the list are not dangerous, or will not expand or escalate into serious crises. Because the logic of the strategy is based on a consensus regarding specific threats, responses to unforeseen crises will generally be inefficient and in some cases wholly ineffective. New strategic problems will require considerable time and debate to build support for

action, which an adversary can use to its strategic advantage. In other words, a strategy of preventive defense, even if successful in deterring or defeating designated threats, could fail if other threats emerge that military forces are neither equipped nor trained to confront. In short, it could put the nation on the path toward fighting the wrong kind of war against the wrong type of foe.

A second weakness is that this strategic approach, and the threat-based metrics that underlie it, do not afford much in the way of strategic flexibility. The United States and its global security partners have participated in a growing number of low-visibility peace operations that facilitate agreements among states and quasi-states, such as Ecuador and Peru, Israel and Egypt, East Timor and Indonesia, and the Kosovar-Albanians and Kosovar-Serbs.¹³ They have also provided military support to long-standing arrangements with other national and international agencies to monitor arms control arrangements; counter the drug trade; control the spread of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, High-explosive/High-yield (CBRNE) weapons; monitor embargoes; and so on. They have responded to humanitarian crises, such as those in northern Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda, where military forces facilitated the work of national, international, private and other nongovernmental agencies. They have also had increasing occasion to facilitate the evacuation of American citizens and other noncombatants when hostilities break out unexpectedly. Finally, U.S. forces have been committed to exchanges and exercises that build a basis for cooperative action with regional friends and neighbors.

In essence, the logic underpinning the threat-based preventive defense approach wrongly assumes that forces committed to these activities are available for crisis response elsewhere. Hence, it tends to blur the distinction between forces assigned to the daily work of shaping the international environment and those designated as a hedge against strategic risk. Certain of these activities—such as peacekeeping missions based on treaty requirements—

must continue even during a crisis. Forces engaged in them cannot readily disengage. Any threat-based metric suffers from the same flawed logic.

In sum, preventive defense seeks to forestall potential problems by deterring, containing, isolating, and defeating specific threats to preserve or restore the status quo. However, it fails to provide a rationale for taking control of events that might shape the future. It also fails to build a broad multinational basis for responding to the type of problems commonly associated with today's strategic environment.

Neo-isolationism. Neo-isolationism is sometimes called strategic independence or anti-interventionism. Under this option, the evolution of the international security environment is left largely to itself. In other words, this approach would attempt to isolate the United States from the effects of the dangerous Janus face. Neo-isolationism pursues a neutral end, since security interests are strictly defined in terms of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness at home. Resources spent on overseas engagement are reduced and greater risks are accepted in terms of crisis response. One rarely finds neo-isolationist strategies proposed under that name. Instead, the approach typically takes the form of arguments against U.S. military involvement abroad and for extensive defenses at home. U.S. military involvement abroad—usually called intervention—is seen as either ineffective or too expensive, or both.¹⁴ Neo-isolationists tend to overvalue strategic defenses of the homeland that promise to neutralize threats from abroad. They would, for example, favor establishing national missile defenses at the expense of active crisis response and overseas engagement forces, and at the risk of stability in external relations with key regional or global powers.

A *Fortress America* brand of this approach also exists, the true colors of which are sometimes partly obscured by vociferous calls for more military force structure and an

overall increase in defense spending. Nonetheless, the missions this larger military force would perform—large-scale conventional wars rather than smaller scale contingencies or operations other than war—reveal that the strategy's true aim is to limit U.S. military involvement to *the big one*, which in effect amounts to an overall strategic retreat since a large-scale conflict is unlikely in the near term. In short, this more extreme version amounts to building a large defense establishment and then taking refuge behind it.

The principal weakness of a neo-isolationist strategy is its lack of practicality.¹⁵ Isolation of any sort is becoming difficult, if not impossible, to maintain in today's global village. Ignoring the forces at work beyond U.S. borders is simply not an effective way of dealing with them. As the world becomes more economically interdependent, the penalties for withdrawing and allowing stability to erode may prove very costly, perhaps leading to a climate more conducive to state adventurism, transnational crime, and international terrorism. Certainly, efforts to counter arms proliferation and curb mass migrations, both of which require active measures, would suffer. The foundation for cooperative action in response to crises would also decay. Hence, responding to major crises might demand a larger expenditure of resources in the long run than preventive measures would have required, thereby effectively negating any dividend gained from a strategic retreat. Finally, as in the case of France in the 1930s, the decision to put resources into a fortress or Maginot-Line type of strategy ultimately means the foreclosure of certain strategic options, such as responding to Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the annexation of Czechoslovak territory in 1938, or the invasion of Poland in 1939.¹⁶ The strategic lesson from a far less complex time is that a great power ought to have broad offensive and defensive options, and that allies matter.

A Strategy of Positive Ends. A strategy of positive ends aims at building an international environment that

promotes global peace, prosperity, freedom, economic stability, and the rule of law, and provides a multilateral basis for crisis response.¹⁷ This approach seeks to harness the forces behind one Janus countenance to counter the complex and unpredictable forces associated with the other. It differs from the other strategic approaches discussed above in that it is oriented toward achieving a condition, rather than preparing to respond to specific threats. In other words, its ends are positive, rather than negative or neutral. The basic approach would be to build and enlarge a circle of *stakeholders* committed to reducing the potential for crises and to prepare response mechanisms for coping successfully when they do.

A strategy of positive ends would have two primary objectives. The first would include performing peacetime-engagement missions intended to prevent crises from emerging. When crises do occur, stakeholders would work proactively to minimize the need for forceful intervention. If intervention becomes necessary, the United States and other stakeholder nations would take advantage of the regional climate of support that peacetime activities had created to act rapidly and decisively to resolve the crisis. The regional balance of power that peacetime engagement would aim to create by enlarging the circle of stakeholders would also help prevent crises from escalating into major conflicts. In addition, it would contribute to creating a basis for a multilateral response, thereby easing the process of coalition building.

Second, when responding to a crisis, stakeholders would endeavor to create political, economic, and military conditions more stable than those of the status quo ante. For example, under a policy of positive ends, stakeholders would make a commitment to respond to humanitarian crises, to establish and maintain political and economic stability, to protect global infrastructures, to guarantee the safety of citizens, and to contain or channel the rise of so-called states of concern. However, the process of responding would also

include identifying the root causes of the problem and creating conditions that prevent the crisis from recurring.

Two ways exist to achieve the second aim. First, stakeholders can install a nonaggressive regime in place of the aggressive one, as was done in Germany and Japan after World War II. Or, if that is not possible because the aggressor can guarantee its survival by resorting to nuclear escalation, stakeholders can create a more stable regional balance of power by a combination of actions, such as building up and reinforcing regional allies, installing a verifiable arms control regime, and imposing various nonmilitary sanctions as was done with Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM. Admittedly, the latter course tends to add a long-term, day-to-day burden to the maintenance of the peace. Nonetheless, the new regional balance of power can serve to stabilize the area over the long term.

The primary weakness of this strategy is that others can misconstrue its goals as a form of Pax Americana, particularly if American leadership appears aggressive and hegemonic.¹⁸ Some parts of the world see the United States as the primary force behind the advancement of Western values. They see such values as repugnant and evil and, hence, resist them.¹⁹ Each region has its special problems, and the United States must build partnerships and the conditions for peace and prosperity on a region-by-region basis. The United States and other stakeholders must, therefore, become more aware of and sensitive to the details of regional affairs. Otherwise, the approach will become counterproductive, with other states either resisting its aims or stepping aside to allow the United States to take the lead and shoulder the burdens. Indeed, rather than creating a world of peace, stability, and economic prosperity, the United States could well find itself the target of one or more multinational alliances or coalitions set on curbing, if not undermining, its influence. When it comes to practical execution, therefore, U.S. representatives abroad would do well to follow the principal rule of the medical profession—

first, do no harm—and to emphasize consensus-building. This emphasis on consensus does not, however, mean that the United States should never take the lead in regional affairs. On the contrary, it can and should do so whenever such action is in its interest.

A second weakness is that positive aims generally require more energy and resources than do negative or neutral ones, which may mean that short-term costs of this policy may be greater than people would expect to pay, at least when compared to other strategies. This could make national consensus more difficult to achieve in the short term. While the constructive use of those resources might well reduce the frequency and scale of international crises over the long run—and thus prove a worthwhile investment—the payoffs are not always readily apparent. It is difficult to prove that a particular strategic approach deterred or preempted a major conflict. Methods for measuring the effectiveness of peace operations, for example, are still evolving. An inherent risk, therefore, is that the strategy requires a willingness to make possibly large investments in the short term for results that might not manifest themselves until the long term.

These weaknesses notwithstanding, a strategy built around positive ends permits the United States to define its vital interests in terms of conditions—such as peace, freedom and democracy, rule of law, and economic prosperity—rather than as the containment or defeat of inimical state or non-state actors. This approach also accords well with the ongoing expansion of open market economies and pluralistic governments. A positive strategy also offers two intrinsic advantages. First, it tends to generate momentum and support as it succeeds. Second, it permits the United States to take the strategic initiative, allowing it not only to shape the peace, but to have a major hand in setting the terms for conflict resolution.

Put simply, if the United States wants a world closer to the first Janus face to materialize, it will have to become

more actively engaged in the international system. It will have to promote democratic principles, free-market economies, and human rights, and assume an appropriate leadership role in multinational defense arrangements. In short, it will have to pursue a strategy of positive ends.

A prerequisite, of course, is to build consensus at home and among key strategic allies and partners. Although major differences exist over the specific priorities of America's national strategy, most policymakers do agree that our strategic ends should be greater peace and prosperity and that the United States should remain a positive force in the world. A number of defense studies have stated that the United States will continue to play a significant part in "shaping the international security environment" and should actively embrace that role.²⁰ Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and foreign policy expert Robert B. Zoellick have stressed the need to develop "a long term strategy to promote peace, security, and liberty" and to "affect the shape of the world to come."²¹ Foreign policy experts from outside the administration have also come out in favor of a Global New Deal that supports the concept of Engagement, but they also imply that it should have gone further.²² Thus, Democrats and Republicans alike seem to agree on the general strategic ends that the United States should pursue. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that a determined effort could achieve consensus at home.

The next step would be to build consensus abroad and to widen the circle of stakeholders—those allies and reliable security partners who share basic values in terms of democratic principles, the rule of law, and free market economies. Currently, stakeholders include such states as Great Britain, Canada, Germany, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. The list should also include G-7 economic powers, European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement members, and most NATO allies. Broadening this circle would mean eventually including such states as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Africa, South

Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and others. In addition, every effort should be made to add Indonesia, India, China, and Russia to the list of stakeholders.²³

On Ways and Means.

A coherent national strategy based on positive ends must, of course, involve all elements of national power. The political and socio-cultural elements would help create conditions for long-term peace and stability by strengthening democratic institutions worldwide, by advancing human rights, and by responding to humanitarian crises. The economic element of national power would contribute to global prosperity by enhancing and guiding international financial institutions, by promoting open trading systems, and by providing for sustainable economic development worldwide. Arguably, these elements of national power would contribute the lion's share to building conditions of greater peace and stability.

Yet, this strategy will also require certain elements of military power important enough to address here. In broad terms, the military element of national power must have the capability to conduct sustained peacetime engagement activities as well as respond to two general types of crises (those with significant escalation potential and those without). Collectively, these missions more closely reflect the requirements of the new security environment than those of the Cold War.

Peacetime Engagement, which includes stability and support operations as well as coalition and alliance building, contributes to the creation, improvement, and maintenance of regional systems of collective response for (1) routinizing the methods and procedures addressing smaller strategic problems, and (2) dealing more effectively with Type I crises (negligible escalation potential) and Type II crises (significant escalation potential).

Maintaining and shaping the peace through peacetime engagement is a continuous strategic activity. It is also labor intensive. It requires regional street smarts and disciplined troops on the ground.²⁴ When a crisis erupts, it is generally not advisable or even practical to withdraw forces already carrying out peacetime engagement. For one thing, withdrawal may undermine the accomplishment of long-term regional objectives or treaty violations—the reasons troops were positioned there in the first place. Secondly, such forces may not have the physical capability to respond quickly, due to the need to disengage from their engagement duties. Even temporary substitution of U.S. forces in the region by allies or coalition partners will entail some delay. In short, fulfillment of the national security strategy will require the commitment of U.S. forces at strategic locations throughout the globe. Honoring commitments, in turn, will require leaving a certain number of those forces in place, making them unavailable for other missions, despite a reshuffling of priorities due to events elsewhere.

The following stability and support operations fall under peacetime engagement activities:²⁵

Stability Operations:

- *Show of Force*—long and short-term activities designed to reassure allies, deter known or potential threats, and gain increased influence.
- *Arms Control* – assisting in locating, seizing, and destroying weapons and otherwise supporting arms control regimes.
- *Peace Operations* – Peace Enforcement (PEO), Peacekeeping (PKO), and other operations supporting diplomatic efforts to establish peace settlements, treaties, and accords.
- *Noncombatant Evacuations* – relocating threatened civilian noncombatants.

- *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance* – planned assistance conducted in conjunction with military training.

- *Security Assistance* – providing defense articles, military training, and other services to foreign nations.

- *Support to Counter Drug Operations* – assisting in the detection, disruption, interdiction, and destruction of illicit drugs.

- *Combating Terrorism* – offensive and defensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

- *Foreign Internal Defense* – assisting legitimate governments in freeing and protecting their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

- *Support to Insurgencies* – logistical and training support to insurgencies that oppose regimes hostile to the United States.

Support Operations:

- *Domestic Support Operations* – supporting efforts of state and local government organizations in an emergency situation.

- *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* – supporting efforts of foreign governments in an emergency situation.

Building Coalitions and Alliances, which also falls under peacetime engagement, includes collective security exercises and other activities that facilitate team building among strategic partners. In the new dynamic security environment, regional coalitions and alliances will likely increase in strategic value. Indeed, many of the challenges reflected in the new strategic environment are transnational in character and would, thus, require a multilateral approach for resolution. The United States may well participate in a greater number of alliances, but not necessarily as a leader or even as a dominant member. Alliances and coalitions can help lessen tensions, increase

communication of intentions and capabilities, and raise understanding among members. They can also contribute to distributing the benefits and costs of maintaining and shaping the peace. Even more important, they provide a valuable strategic mechanism for executing regional crisis response. Alliances, especially, can work toward establishing and expanding zones of security comprised of multiple collective-security arrangements and arms control agreements.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is an example of just such a collective security arrangement. Its members—some 54 states—share core values, institutions, and interests. The OSCE has fielded dozens of advisor teams on missions across Europe and Central Asia to monitor and promote respect for human rights and democratic processes, including free elections, free speech, and the rule of law. Similarly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in November 1990 by NATO and several members of the Warsaw Pact, is an example of an arms control agreement that spans (or spanned) opposing alliances.²⁶ Such collective security arrangements facilitate crisis response by providing a ready framework for intelligence sharing, operational planning, access to bases and airfields, and logistical support.²⁷

In addition, programs like the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative could serve as a model for future cooperative endeavors.²⁸ Such programs facilitate international cooperation by removing suspicions and by building a basis for future teamwork. In order to ensure that such teamwork is built on a foundation of jointness, each branch of the U.S. military would have to commit resources in proportion to the degree of integration required in wartime.

Accordingly, the day-to-day work of military peacetime engagement should become a high-priority effort for the U.S. defense establishment. While such operations do indeed take away time and other resources necessary for

preparing for war, they also build strategically valuable military skills and capabilities that can enable and assist the U.S. military's capacity to wage war. In other words, military forces must have the capability to be proactive during peacetime, not just the capability to react to crises. Any military response to a crisis must come from an understanding of the conditions and forces that were at work beforehand and those necessary to produce a more stable peace afterward. In particular, military actions aimed at defeating and removing adversarial regimes will require a balanced—full dimensional—force and the United States would likely contribute a significant share of that force. Consequently, the defense establishment will have to rethink what military forces can, or should, do in peacetime, as well as in war.

Crisis Response.

Even with successful peacetime engagement around the world, unexpected situations are bound to develop that will require some form of crisis response. Such response will require a flexible basis that accepts the unpredictability of crises and prepares to address them accordingly. In general terms, crisis response will fall under two categories. Type I crises require forceful intervention, but the circumstances are such that the risk of escalation to major war is not present. Since this category includes crises that are relatively isolated politically, they can be resolved with a sudden and overwhelming *coup de main* approach. Type I crises tend to permit the use of decisive force even in conjunction with the pursuit of limited political objectives. Political ends can thus be stated in terms of absolutes, such as "enforce . . .," "gain control of . . .," "defeat . . .," or "reinstate . . ." Operational details will, of course, vary according to political aims and other circumstances. If the purpose is punitive, a quick strike using long-range, precision engagement munitions may suffice. On the other hand, a more decisive aim will require full-dimensional, joint capabilities.

Ideally, peacetime engagement will have laid the groundwork necessary to ensure such operations are not conducted off the cuff, but reflect adequate planning, preparation, and consensus building among allies and partners with regard to the desired strategic ends, ways, and means. If so, the principles underlying a traditional *coup de main* might apply: a sudden, violent application of force that limits an adversary's opportunities to react. Type I crises typically include:

- Enforcing key elements of international law, especially critical arms control or environmental treaty obligations, international sanctions, or agreements with the weight of international law (e.g., Iraq, 1998).

- Gaining control of transnational terrorist or criminal organizations where circumstances are conducive to intervention (e.g., Afghanistan/Sudan, 1998; and Panama, 1989-90).

- Defeating regular/irregular forces of governments engaged in crimes against humanity (e.g., Cambodia, 1978; Rwanda, 1994; Serbia, 1999).

- Reinstating legitimate governments illegally deposed (e.g., Haiti).

Type II crises, by comparison, are those with an apparent potential for vertical or lateral escalation. Typically, these crises involve actions—such as treaty violations, major economic disruptions, or invasion of an ally or a strategic partner—that directly challenge the vital interests of the United States and its allies. Such actions will generally require a rapid military response, but will not necessarily include the removal of the belligerent regime, especially if that regime possesses the means to launch a retaliatory strike using nuclear weapons. As such, they pose special challenges that require concerted allied efforts and relatively large, well-balanced military forces from the start. In such cases, the value of an established multilateral response mechanism becomes clear, as does the importance

of a full-spectrum force, which can provide an array of response options.

Since Type II crises have the potential to escalate, political and military leaders will want to exert more control over the introduction of force, bringing it into the theater in stages and keeping the amount and type of force appropriately aligned with political and military objectives. Such an approach may lead to longer, more deliberate campaigns than those typical of Type I crises. Hence, to address Type II crises, the United States and its allies will need the capability to fight and win deliberate campaigns.

Although conventional wisdom considers the likelihood of such conflicts as low, it is irresponsible not to prepare for them, particularly as history shows that authoritarian regimes can generally change policies faster than democracies can respond. Military response in such cases is more akin to a strategic-level meeting engagement in which one side carefully gages its actions at each stage of the conflict to produce a specific effect and to avoid sudden escalation. In other words, the political aims and military options chosen would depend upon the circumstances of each situation.

It is also important to point out that—regardless of the type of mission—the operational environment in which U.S. forces must operate is changing. The U.S. military is more likely to encounter conventional and unconventional forces working in an integrated fashion. The proliferation of CBRNE in combination with the tools and effects of the global age will likely make the latter, especially, much more dangerous than hitherto. In addition, since the already rapid pace of urbanization is expected to increase, the number of crisis response operations that take place in urban environments will probably multiply. Indeed, in an era in which even small powers might possess the capability to project certain kinds of power globally, especially CBRNE, the terms smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs) and major theater wars (MTWs) are no longer useful. Size and

intensity have become misleading metrics. For example, the Kosovo conflict (1999), which was officially classified as a SSC, required as many aerospace assets as a typical MTW.²⁹ It is equally unhelpful to use the terms conventional and unconventional when referring to military conflict. The proliferation of CBRNE, the permeability of national borders, the increasing speed of physical travel, and the ubiquity of internet communications will extend the reach of so-called unconventional forces. This extension, in turn, will probably make unconventional forces and forms of conflict more frequent, thereby making the unconventional more conventional. In other words, future conflicts will likely involve a greater integration of conventional and unconventional forces and approaches.

Indeed, the nature of tomorrow's opponents, the destructive power of their weapons, and the environment in which they are likely to operate all underscore the need for a balanced force. To be sure, allies and coalition partners could well contribute a large portion of the required land power with the United States supplying the bulk of air, sea, space, and information systems. Yet, the U.S. military will probably still have to contribute operationally significant land-power formations in order to provide technological overmatch, to demonstrate resolve, and to exert influence over the pursuit of political aims. Operational significance varies according to circumstances, but, in general, it means assuming an appreciable share of the risk and committing a force large enough to make a difference in the battlespace. Indeed, the continued proliferation of integrated surveillance, missile, and cannon technologies will likely multiply the advantages of the defense, requiring U.S. forces to possess a significant numerical and technological overmatch to prevail even against modest adversaries.

It is beyond the scope of this monograph to specify exact numbers and types of forces needed for peacetime engagement or response to Type I or Type II crises. In general terms, however, the U.S. Army's regional commitment to a strategy of positive ends should consist of a

baseline force comprised of a theater army, Army special operations forces, a forward-presence corps, and a corps equivalent of reserve component forces for rotational employment. This baseline force would include active and reserve component forces. Active components, rounded out with reserve component elements, would conduct the daily work of peacetime engagement. Concurrently, a corps equivalent of reserve component forces would conduct long-range planning for full integration into the recurring work of peacetime engagement. As a rule of thumb, then, reserve forces would be allocated against the more predictable requirements of the future, and active forces against initial commitments and those most likely to change. The defense community should also use a combination of historical data, regional political-military projections, and wargaming analyses to help quantify force requirements. Budget decisions and the risks the political leadership is willing to accept will, of course, further define the dimensions of the future force.

Despite the emergence of a new strategic environment, the legacies of the Cold War continue to influence U.S. strategic thinking. The problems associated with the Strategy Review are evidence of that. The defense community continues to justify its strategic preferences with threat-based assessments, some of which are loosely labeled asymmetric. However, as has been shown, a threat-based strategy has serious liabilities in an environment in which the next opponent or the next crisis is nearly impossible to predict.

Instead, the United States would do well to pursue a strategy focused on positive ends, one that endeavors to maintain a dynamic peace. Under such a strategy, the United States and its strategic partners and allies would concentrate on coping with the many small problems that arise daily and attempt to defuse them before they become larger crises. At the same time, they would actively build the necessary mechanisms to facilitate a decisive outcome to a larger crisis by maximizing the number of states

interested in maintaining peace and stability. While the United States should not cease tracking and preparing for specific threats, it can certainly do more to create and maintain conditions that promote long-term peace and prosperity.

ENDNOTES

1. For a representative sample, see National Defense University, *Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1999; *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century: Supporting Research & Analysis*, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999; Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, *Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era*, Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1999; Sam J. Tangredi, *All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View of the Future Security Environment, 2001-2025*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2000; and *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future*, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/globaltrends> 2015.

2. Perhaps the most popular definition of globalization is that of Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Anchor, 2000, p. 9; see also the IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, *National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World*, Final Report, p. 19, where he defines globalization as the dispersion and “democratization” of technology, information, and finance. The genuine extent and implications of globalization have sparked a great deal of debate. See *Global Transformation and the Third World*, Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schutz, and Steven R. Dorr, eds., Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993; *Global Transformation: Challenges to the State System*, Yoshikazu Sakamoto, ed., Tokyo, New York, Paris: United Nations University Press, 1994; and *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance*, James H. Mittelman, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

3. Richard Faulk and Andrew Strauss, “Toward Global Parliament,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 212-220; as a counterpoint, Robert M. Dunn Jr., “Has the U.S. Economy Really Been Globalized?” *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 2001, pp. 53-64, argues that the U.S. economy has remained largely independent. Bruce R. Scott, “Measuring Globalization,” *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2001, pp. 56-65, points out the difficulty of measuring globalization at all.

4. Stephen J. Blank, *East Asia in Crisis: The Security Implications of the Collapse of Economic Institutions*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999; but Hilton R. Root, "Asia's Bad Old Ways: Reforming Business by Reforming its Environment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 9-15, offers a more optimistic forecast of Asian recovery and further development.

5. Stephen J. Flanagan, Ellen L. Frost, and Richard L. Kugler, *Challenges of the Global Century: Report of the Project on Globalization and National Security*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2001, p. 9.

6. Bruce R. Scott, "The Great Divide in the Global Village," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 160-177; and C. Fred Bergsten, "America's Two-Front Economic Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 2, March/April 2001, pp. 16-27.

7. United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, "Peacekeeping in Africa," February 13, 2001.

8. *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, The White House, December 2000, p. 2.

9. One of the most consistent proponents for the view that "established democracies do not go to war with other democracies" because they lack "adequate reasons" to fight one another is Donald M. Snow, *World Politics in a New Century: The Shape of the Future*, 3rd ed., New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999, p. 34. However, only a small number of the world's democracies fit the description of "established"; and there is the danger that, without considerable support, newer ones could go the way of Weimar's Germany or Kerensky's Russia. Moreover, the destructiveness and aftermath of the American Civil War demonstrate that even established democracies can employ violent means in ways that might directly or indirectly affect other societies.

10. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR*, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000, shows that tomorrow's adversaries could develop such strategies to undermine the national will through information warfare, even of a low-tech variety, and acts of terrorism, including attacks against the homeland. Vincent J. Goulding, Jr., "Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare," *Parameters*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, pp. 21-30, reminds us that such approaches have long been a part of how international competitors have dealt with each other. Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle, PA:

Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, discuss various categories of asymmetries and what America's political and military leadership should do about them.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996; and Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War World*, New York: Random House, 2000. Huntington is balanced by Richard E. Rubenstein, "Challenging Huntington," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, 1994, pp. 113-128. For more detail on transnational threats, see Carolyn W. Pumphrey, ed., *Transnational Threats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.

12. For an example, see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999.

13. The increase in U.N. peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War has been significant. By comparison, in 1990, the U.N. had 5 peacekeeping operations involving about 10,000 troops, not counting Korea. In 1993, it had 24 such operations involving over 75,000 troops. Peacekeeping costs skyrocketed from \$800 million to \$4 billion during the same period. Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey, "Military Support for Peacekeeping Operations," in *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions*, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 241.

14. A brand of this argument accepts that a certain amount of political and economic engagement is inevitable, or even desirable, but draws the line at intervention, particularly military intervention, maintaining that military force is often not the most effective, efficient, or ethical means for protecting or advancing national interests. See Ted Galen Carpenter, "The Case for U.S. Strategic Independence," *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 16, January 16, 1992; Ivan Eland, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism? The Historical Record," *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 50, December 17, 1998; and Earl C. Ravenal, "'Isolationism' as the Denial of Intervention: What Foreign Policy Is and Isn't," *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing*, No. 57, April 27, 2000, at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/foreignbriefs.html>. While this view can provide a necessary corrective to a tendency to rely too heavily on the military element of national power, it can go too far in the other direction, failing to integrate military power into a balanced national strategy.

15. Michèle A. Flournoy, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, November 2000, p. 25, dismisses neo-isolationism as an implausible alternative for the future. That, however, does not preclude its adoption as a form of "very selective" engagement, a policy that might enjoy considerable support since it has the potential to address the current mismatch in strategic ends and resources by scaling down the ends.

16. Numerous works have attempted to explain France's defeat in 1940. Like Alistair Horne, *To Lose a Battle: France 1940*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, especially pp. 51-52, 70-73, 121-125, most point to a failure in strategy; some to faulty doctrine. In another interpretation, Eugenia C. Kiesling, *Arming against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning*, Lawrenceville, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996, maintains that France's defeat was due less to flaws in strategy and doctrine than to poor training and leadership, and lack of unit cohesion. Collectively, then, the answer seems to lie in the absence of any congruence in France's ends, ways, and means.

17. This approach differs from the previous administration's policy of Engagement in that it calls for proactive involvement and seizing the initiative in global security affairs.

18. A number of sources point out that this perception is already strong. See Peter W. Rodman, *Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance*, Washington, DC: Nixon Center, 2000.

19. For example, Ming Zhang, "Public Images of the United States," *In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World*, Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, pp. 141-158, points out that a survey of China's educated population shows that most Chinese believe that the U.S. national goal is not global democracy and universal human rights, but a USA federal empire uniting the world. When U.S. officials use the term "leadership," the Chinese people read "hegemony." For other examples, see the special section "How the World Views America," in the *Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 2001, pp. 45-80.

20. See Part I, *New World Coming*, p. 3; Part II, *Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom*, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15, 2000, pp. 11-12; and Part III, *Building for Peace*, briefing delivered January 26, 2001; and <http://www.nssg.gov>. See also *America's National Interests: A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests, 2000*, Washington, DC: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2001.

21. Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest" and Robert B. Zoellick, "A Republican Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62, and 63-78; here 45 and 70, respectively.

22. W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero, and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "New World, New Deal," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2000, pp. 80-98, here 98.

23. A state and its people have to desire to become stakeholders. When they do, they will become committed. States that do not, may cooperate when it suits them, and may complicate matters when it does not.

24. Colonel George F. Oliver, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, "Doing the Dirty Work—Peace Enforcement," unpublished paper, details the requirements for peace enforcement, one aspect of peacetime engagement, through an analysis of lessons learned from Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor.

25. See also Field Manual (FM)-3, DRAFT, *The Army and the Role of Land Power*, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, pp. 1-15, 1-16.

26. The CFE establishes equal East-West limits on five key categories of conventional armaments—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the CFE now has 30 treaty parties. Department of Defense, *Strengthening Transatlantic Security: A U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, December 2000, pp. 40-41.

27. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kruger, Martin Lubicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs*, Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999, warns that the U.S. military's rapid pursuit of a revolution in military affairs is contributing to a dangerous (and growing) technological gap between the United States and its NATO allies.

28. Introduced in January 1994 in order to expand and intensify political and military cooperation among NATO and partner countries, PfP promotes civilian control of military forces, enables combined operations in NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and opens communications among PfP countries; www.nato.int/pfp/partners.htm, updated December 7, 2000.

29. IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000, *National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World*, Final Report, p. 94 .

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