CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

The Small Wars Manual, U. S. Marine Corps, 1940, is published in 15 chapters, as follows:

**Chapter I.** Introduction.
**II.** Organization.
**III.** Logistics.
**IV.** Training.
**V.** Initial Operations.
**VI.** Infantry Patrols.
**VII.** Mounted Detachments.
**VIII.** Convoys and Convoy Escorts.
**IX.** Aviation.
**X.** River Operations.
**XI.** Disarmament of Population.
**XII.** Armed Native Organizations.
**XIII.** Military Government.
**XIV.** Supervision of Elections.
**XV.** Withdrawal.
# SMALL WARS MANUAL

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section I. General Characteristics</th>
<th>Par.</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. Strategy</td>
<td>1–7 to 1–9</td>
<td>1–16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Psychology</td>
<td>1–10 to 1–17</td>
<td>17–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Relationship With State Depart-</td>
<td>1–18 to 1–20</td>
<td>33–34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Chain of Command—Navy</td>
<td>1–21 to 1–27</td>
<td>35–39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Military—Civil Relationship</td>
<td>1–28 to 1–31</td>
<td>41–47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(V)
SECTION I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Small wars defined ...................... 1-1 1
Classes of small wars .................. 1-2 2
Some legal aspects of small wars ...... 1-3 2
Function of headquarters Marine Corps 1-4 4
Phases of small wars .................. 1-5 5
Summary ................................ 1-6 8

1-1. Small wars defined.—a. The term "Small War" is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation. As herein used the term is understood in its most comprehensive sense, and all the successive steps taken in the development of a small war and the varying degrees of force applied under various situations are presented.

b. The assistance rendered in the affairs of another state may vary from a peaceful act such as the assignment of an administrative assistant, which is certainly nonmilitary and not placed under the classification of small wars, to the establishment of a complete military government supported by an active combat force. Between these extremes may be found an infinite number of forms of friendly assistance or intervention which it is almost impossible to classify under a limited number of individual types of operations.

c. Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war. They are not limited in their size, in the extent of their theater of operations nor their cost in property, money, or lives. The essence of a small war is its purpose and the circumstances surrounding its inception and conduct, the character of either one or all of the opposing forces, and the nature of the operations themselves.

d. The ordinary expedition of the Marine Corps which does not involve a major effort in regular warfare against a first-rate power
may be termed a small war. It is this type of routine active foreign

duty of the Marine Corps in which this manual is primarily inter-

ested. Small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of

the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine

Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts of the

world. The Marine Corps has landed troops 180 times in 37 coun-

tries from 1800 to 1934. Every year during the past 36 years since

the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps has been engaged in

active operations in the field. In 1929 the Marine Corps had two-

thirds of its personnel employed on expeditionary or other foreign

or sea duty outside of the continental limits of the United States.

1–2. Classes of small wars.—a. Most of the small wars of the

United States have resulted from the obligation of the Government

under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and have been undertaken

to suppress lawlessness or insurrection. Punitive expeditions may

be resorted to in some instances, but campaigns of conquest are con-

trary to the policy of the Government of the United States. It is

the duty of our statesmen to define a policy relative to international

relationships and provide the military and naval establishments with

the means to carry it into execution. With this basis, the military

and naval authorities may act intelligently in the preparation of

their war plans in close cooperation with the statesman. There is

mutual dependence and responsibility which calls for the highest,

qualities of statesmanship and military leadership. The initiative

devolves upon the statesmen.

b. The legal and military features of each small war present dis-

tinctive characteristics which make the segregation of all of them

into fixed classifications an extremely difficult problem. There are

so many combinations of conditions that a simple classification of

small wars is possible only when one is limited to specific features

in his study, i. e., according to their legal aspects, their military or

naval features, whether active combat was engaged in or not, and

many other considerations.

1–3. Some legal aspects of small wars.—a. According to inter-

national law, as recognized by the leading nations of the world, a

nation may protect, or demand protection for, its citizens and their

property wherever situated. The President of the United States as

the Chief Executive is, under the Constitution, primarily charged with

the conduct of foreign relations, including the protection of the lives

and property of United States citizens abroad, save insofar as the

Constitution expressly vests a part of these functions in some other

branch of the Government. (For example, the participation of the
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Senate in the making of treaties.) It has been an unbroken policy of the President of the United States so to interpret their powers, beginning with the time of President Jefferson down to the present with the exception of President Buchanan.

b. The following pertinent extracts from U. S. Navy Regulations are cited:

On occasion where injury to the United States or to citizens thereof is committted or threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty right, the Commander in Chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United States and take such steps as the gravity of the case demands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy all the facts. The responsibility for any action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly upon the commanding officer thereof.

The use of force against a foreign and friendly state, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to states as well as to individuals, and in the case of states it includes the protection of the state, its honor, and its possessions, and lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the state or its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the application of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform their duties in this respect with all possible care and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts already committed.

Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall become necessary to land an armed force in foreign territory on occasion of political disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life and property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved. Due to the ease with which the Navy Department can be communicated from all parts of the world, no commander in chief, flag officer, or commanding officer shall issue an ultimatum to the representative of any foreign government, or demand the performance of any service from any such representative that must be executed within a limited time, without first communicating with the Navy Department except in extreme cases where such action is necessary to save life. (U. S. Navy Regulations. NR. 722, 723, and 724.)

c. The use of the forces of the United States in foreign countries to protect the lives and property of American citizens resident in those countries does not necessarily constitute an act of war, and is, therefore, not equivalent to a declaration of war. The President, as chief executive of the nation, charged with the responsibility of the lives and property of United States citizens abroad, has the authority to use the forces of the United States to secure such protection in foreign countries.
The history of the United States shows that in spite of the varying trend of the foreign policy of succeeding administrations, this Government has interposed or intervened in the affairs of other states with remarkable regularity, and it may be anticipated that the same general procedure will be followed in the future. It is well that the United States may be prepared for any emergency which may occur whether it is the result of either financial or physical disaster, or social revolution at home or abroad. Insofar as these conditions can be predicted, and as these plans and preparations can be undertaken, the United States should be ready for either of these emergencies with strategical and tactical plans, preliminary preparations, organization, equipment, education, and training.

1–4. Functions of headquarters Marine Corps.—a. Small wars, generally being the execution of the responsibilities of the President in protecting American interests, life and property abroad, are therefore conducted in a manner different from major warfare. In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations. The very inception of small wars, as a rule, is an official act of the Chief Executive who personally gives instructions without action of Congress.

b. The President, who has been informed of a given situation in some foreign country through the usual agencies at his disposal, makes the decision concerning intervention. In appropriate cases this decision is communicated to the Secretary of the Navy. The senior naval officer present in the vicinity of the disturbance may then be directed to send his landing force ashore, or given authority to do so at his discretion; the Marine Corps may be ordered to have an expeditionary force ready to proceed overseas with the minimum delay. These instructions are communicated to the Marine Corps via the Secretary of the Navy or Assistant Secretary. Frequently a definite number of men is called for and not a military organization; for example, 500 men (not one battalion). It is desirable, however, that a definite military organization which approximates the required strength and characteristics for accomplishing the mission be specified, such as one infantry battalion; one infantry regiment (plus one motor transport platoon), etc. The word often comes very suddenly and calls for the immediate concentration of the forces, ready to take passage on a certain transport which will be made available at a given time and place. Generally there are no other instructions than that the force shall report to * * *, “the Commander Special Service Squad-
G E N E R A L  C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S

ron,” for example. Thereupon Headquarters Marine Corps designates the force, its personnel, organization, arms, and equipment; all necessary stores are provided and orders issued for the commanding officer of the force to report in person or by dispatch to the SOP or other authority in the disturbed area. With the present organized Fleet Marine Force ready for movement at a moment’s notice, the Marine Corps now has available a highly trained and well equipped expeditionary force for use in small wars, thus eliminating in a large measure the former practice of hastily organizing and equipping such a force when the emergency arose. Accompanying these simple organization and movement orders are the monograph, maps, and other pertinent intelligence data of the disturbed area, to the extent that such information is on file and can be prepared for delivery to the Force Commander within the time limit. Thereafter Headquarters confines itself to the administrative details of the personnel replacements and the necessary supply of the force in the field.

c. The operations of the Force are directed by the Office of the Naval Operations direct or through the local naval Commander if he is senior to the Force Commander.

1–5. Phases of small wars.—a. Small wars seldom develop in accordance with any stereotyped procedure. Certain phases of those listed below may be absent in one situation; in another they may be combined and undertaken simultaneously; in still others one may find that the sequence of events or phases may be altered.

The actual operations of small wars may be arbitrarily divided into five phases as follows:

Phase 1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.
Phase 2. The arrival of reinforcements and general military operations in the field.
Phase 3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.
Phase 4. Routine police functions.
Phase 5. Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations.

b. First phase.—Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard.

(1) One of the most common characteristics of the small wars of the United States is that its forces “dribble in” to the countries in which they intervene. This is quite natural in view of the national policy of the government. It is not at war with the neighboring state; it proposes no aggression or seizure of territory; its purpose is friendly and it wishes to accomplish its objectives with as little military display as possible with a view to gaining the lasting friendship of the inhabi-
tants of the country. Thus our Government is observed endeavoring
to accomplish its end with the minimum of troops, in fact, with nothing
more than a demonstration of force if that is all that is necessary and
reasonably sufficient. This policy is carried on throughout the cam-
paign and reinforcements are added by “driblets,” so many companies,
or a battalion, or a regiment at a time, until the force is large enough
to accomplish its mission or until its peacetime limitations in person-
nel have been reached. Even after landing, instructions probably will
be received not to exert any physical force unless it becomes absolutely
necessary, and then only to the minimum necessary to accomplish its
purpose. Thus orders may be received not to fire on irregulars unless
fired upon; instructions may be issued not to fire upon irregular groups
if women are present with them even though it is known that armed
women accompany the irregulars.

(2) During the initial phase small numbers of troops may be sent
ashore to assume the initiative, as a demonstration to indicate a deter-
mination to control the situation, and to prepare the way for any
troops to follow. This vanguard is generally composed of marine
detachments or mixed forces of marines and sailors from ships at the
critical points. Owing to its limited personnel the action of the
vanguard will often be restricted to an active defense after seizing a
critical area such as an important seaport or other city, the capital of
a country or disturbed areas of limited extent.

c. Second phase.—The arrival of reinforcements and general mili-
tary operations in the field.

During this period the theater of operations is divided into areas
and forces are assigned for each. Such forces should be sufficiently
strong to seize and hold the most important city in the area assigned
and to be able to send combat patrols in all directions. If certain
neutral zones have not been designated in the first phase, it may be
done at this time if deemed advisable. During this phase the organi-
zation of a native military and police force is undertaken. In order
to release ships’ personnel to their normal functions afloat, such per-
sonnel are returned to their ships as soon as they can be relieved by
troops of the expeditionary force.

d. Third phase.—Assumption of control of executive agencies, and
cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies.

If the measures in phase 2 do not bring decisive results, it may be
necessary to resort to more thorough measures. This may involve the
establishment of military government or martial law in varying de-
gree from minor authority to complete control of the principal agen-
cies of the native government; it will involve the further strengthening of our forces by reenforcements. More detachments will be sent out to take other important localities; more active and thorough patrolling will be undertaken; measures will be taken to intercept the vital supply and support channels of the opposing factions and to break the resistance to law and order by a combination of effort of physical and moral means. During this period the marines carry the burden of most of the patrolling. Native troops, supported by marines, are increasingly employed as early as practicable in order that these native agencies may assume their proper responsibility for restoring law and order in their own country as an agency of their government.

e. Fourth phase.—Routine police functions. (1) After continued pressure of the measures in phase three, it is presumed that sooner or later regular forces will subdue the lawless elements. Military police functions and judicial authority, to the extent that they have been assumed by our military forces, are gradually returned to the native agencies to which they properly belong.

(2) Our military forces must not assume any judicial responsibility over local inhabitants beyond that expressly provided by proper authority. The judicial powers of commanders of detached posts must be clearly defined in orders from superior authority. Furthermore, as long as the judicial authority rests squarely upon the shoulders of the civil authorities, the military forces should continually impress and indoctrinate them with their responsibility while educating the people in this respect. Each situation presents certain characteristics peculiar to itself; in one instance officers were clothed with almost unlimited military authority within the law and our treaty rights; in another, less authority was exercised over the population; and in the third instance the forces of occupation had absolutely no judicial authority. The absence of such authority is often a decided handicap to forces of occupation in the discharge of their responsibilities. If the local judicial system is weak, or broken down entirely, it is better to endow the military authorities with temporary and legal judicial powers in order to avoid embarrassing situations which may result from illegal assumption.

(3) During this phase the marines act as a reserve in support of the native forces and are actively employed only in grave emergencies. The marines are successively withdrawn to the larger centers, thus affording a better means for caring for the health, comfort, and recreation of the command.
f. Fifth phase.—Withdrawal from the theater of operations. Finally, when order is restored, or when the responsible native agencies are prepared to handle the situation without other support, the troops are withdrawn upon orders from higher authority. This process is progressive from the back country or interior outward, in the reverse order to the entry into the country. After evacuation of the forces of intervention, a Legation Guard, which assumes the usual functions of such a detachment, may be left in the capital.

1–6. Summary.—a. Since the World War there has been a flood of literature dealing with the old principles illustrated and the new technique developed in that war: but there always have been and ever will be other wars of an altogether different kind, undertaken in very different theaters of operations and requiring entirely different methods from those of the World War. Such are the small wars which are described in this manual.

b. There is a sad lack of authoritative texts on the methods employed in small wars. However, there is probably no military organization of the size of the U. S. Marine Corps in the world which has had as much practical experience in this kind of combat. This experience has been gained almost entirely in small wars against poorly organized and equipped native irregulars. With all the practical advantages we enjoyed in those wars, that experience must not lead to an underestimate of the modern irregular, supplied with modern arms and equipment. If marines have become accustomed to easy victories over irregulars in the past, they must now prepare themselves for the increased effort which will be necessary to insure victory in the future. The future opponent may be as well armed as they are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence, and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment.

c. Although small wars present a special problem requiring particular tactical and technical measures, the immutable principles of war remain the basis of these operations and require the greatest ingenuity in their application. As a regular war never takes exactly
the form of any of its predecessors, so, even to a greater degree is each
small war somewhat different from anything which has preceded it.
One must ever be on guard to prevent his views becoming fixed as to
procedure or methods. Small wars demand the highest type of leader-
ship directed by intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity. Small
wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted often with precarious
responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders
lacking specific instructions.

d. Formulation of foreign policy in our form of government is not a
function of the military. Relations of the United States with foreign
states are controlled by the executive and legislative branches of the
Government. These policies are of course binding upon the forces of
intervention, and in the absence of more specific instructions, the com-
mander in the field looks to them for guidance. For this reason all
officers should familiarize themselves with current policies. A knowl-
edge of the history of interventions, and the displays of force and
other measures short of war employed by our Government in the past,
are essential to thorough comprehension of our relations with foreign
states insofar as these matters are concerned.
1-7. The basis of the strategy.—a. The military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations. In the latter case, war is undertaken only as a last resort after all diplomatic means of adjusting differences have failed and the military commander’s objective ordinarily becomes the enemy’s armed forces.

b. Diplomatic agencies usually conduct negotiations with a view to arriving at a peaceful solution of the problem on a basis compatible with both national honor and treaty stipulations. Although the outcome of such negotiations often results in a friendly settlement, the military forces should be prepared for the possibility of an unfavorable termination of the proceedings. The mobilization of armed forces constitutes a highly effective weapon for forcing the opponent to accede to national demands without resort to war. When a time limit for peaceful settlement is prescribed by ultimatum the military-naval forces must be prepared to initiate operations upon expiration of the time limit.

c. In small wars, either diplomacy has not been exhausted or the party that opposes the settlement of the political question cannot be reached diplomatically. Small war situations are usually a phase of, or an operation taking place concurrently with, diplomatic effort. The political authorities do not relinquish active participation in the negotiations and they ordinarily continue to exert considerable influence on the military campaign. The military leader in such operations thus finds himself limited to certain lines of action as to the strategy and even as to the tactics of the campaign. This feature has been so marked in past operations, that marines have been referred to as State Department Troops in small wars. In certain cases of this kind the State Department has even dictated the size of the force to be sent to the theater of operations. The State Department materially influ-
STRATEGY

ences the strategy and tactics by orders and instructions which are promulgated through the Navy Department or through diplomatic representatives.

d. State Department officials represent the Government in foreign countries. The force generally nearest at hand to back up the authority of these agents is the Navy. In such operations the Navy is performing its normal function, and has, as a component part of its organization, the Fleet Marine Force, organized, equipped, and trained to perform duty of this nature. After the Force has landed, the commander afloat generally influences the operations only to the extent necessary to insure their control and direction in accordance with the policy of the instructions that he has received from higher authority. He supports and cooperates with the Force to the limit of his ability. In the latter stages of the operation the local naval commander may relinquish practically all control in order to carry out routine duties elsewhere. In such case the general operations plan is directed by, or through, the office of the Naval Operations in Washington.

e. Wars of intervention have two classifications; intervention in the internal, or intervention in the external affairs of another state. Intervention in the internal affairs of a state may be undertaken to restore order, to sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or to enforce the fulfilment of obligations binding between the two states. Intervention in the external affairs of a state may be the result of a treaty which authorizes one state to aid another as a matter of political expediency, to avoid more serious consequences when the interests of other states are involved, or to gain certain advantages not obtainable otherwise. It may be simply an intervention to enforce certain opinions or to propagate certain doctrines, principles, or standards. For example, in these days when pernicious propaganda is employed to spread revolutionary doctrines, it is conceivable that the United States might intervene to prevent the development of political disaffection which threatens the overthrow of a friendly state and indirectly influences our own security.

1–8. Nature of the operations.—a. Irregular troops may disregard, in part or entirely, International Law and the Rules of Land Warfare in their conduct of hostilities. Commanders in the field must be prepared to protect themselves against practices and methods of combat not sanctioned by the Rules of War.

b. Frequently irregulars kill and rob peaceful citizens in order to obtain supplies which are then secreted in remote strongholds. Seizure or destruction of such sources of supply is an important factor
in reducing their means of resistance. Such methods of operation must be studied and adapted to the psychological reaction they will produce upon the opponents. Interventions or occupations are usually peaceful and altruistic. Accordingly, the methods of procedure must rigidly conform to this purpose; but when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.

c. The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered. National policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high-moral plan. However, the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.

d. After a study has been made of the people who will oppose the intervention, the strategical plan is evolved. The military strategical plan should include those means which will accomplish the purpose in view quickly and completely. Strategy should attempt to gain psychological ascendancy over the outlaw or insurgent element prior to hostilities. Remembering the political mission which dictates the military strategy of small wars, one or more of the following basic modes of procedure may be decided upon, depending upon the situation:

1. Attempt to attain the aims of the intervention by a simple, clear, and forceful declaration of the position and intention of the occupying force, this without threat or promise.
2. By a demonstration of the power which could be employed to carry out these intentions.
3. The display of the naval or military force within the area involved.
4. The actual application of armed force. During the transitory stage or prior to active military operations, care should be taken to avoid the commission of any acts that might precipitate a breach. Once armed force is resorted to, it should be applied with determination and to the extent required by the situation. Situations may develop so rapidly that the transition from negotiations to the use of armed force gives the commander little or no time to exert his influence through the use of the methods mentioned in subparagraphs (2) and (3) above.

e. The strategy of this type of warfare will be strongly influenced by the probable nature of the contemplated operations. In regular
warfare the decision will be gained on known fronts and probably limited theaters of operations; but in small wars no defined battle front exists and the theater of the operations may be the whole length and breadth of the land. While operations are carried out in one area, other hostile elements may be causing serious havoc in another. The uncertainty of the situation may require the establishment of detached posts within small areas. Thus the regular forces may be widely dispersed and probably will be outnumbered in some areas by the hostile forces. This requires that the Force be organized with a view to mobility and flexibility, and that the troops be highly trained in the use of their special weapons as well as proper utilization of terrain.

6. Those who have participated in small wars agree that these operations find an appropriate place in the art of war. Irregular warfare between two well-armed and well-disciplined forces will open up a larger field for surprise, deception, ambuscades, etc., than is possible in regular warfare.

1–9. National war.—a. In small wars it can be expected that hostile forces in occupied territory will employ guerilla warfare as a means of gaining their end. Accounts of recent revolutionary movements, local or general, in various parts of the world indicate that young men of 18 or 20 years of age take active parts as organizers in these disturbances. Consequently, in campaigns of this nature the Force will be exposed to the action of this young and vigorous element. Rear installations and lines of communications will be threatened. Movements will be retarded by ambuscades and barred defiles, and every detachment presenting a tempting target will be harassed or attacked. In warfare of this kind, members of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits their fancy and convenience. In addition, the Force will be handicapped by partisans, who constantly and accurately inform native forces of their movements. The population will be honeycombed with hostile sympathizers, making it difficult to procure reliable information. Such difficulty will result either from the deceit used by hostile sympathizers and agents, or from the intimidation of friendly natives upon whom reliance might be placed to gain information.

b. In cases of levees en masse, the problem becomes particularly difficult. This is especially true when the people are supported by a nucleus of disciplined and trained professional soldiers. This combination of soldier and armed civilian presents serious opposition
to every move attempted by the Force; even the noncombatants conspire for the defeat of the Force.

c. Opposition becomes more formidable when the terrain is difficult, and the resistance increases as the Force moves inland from its bases. Every native is a potential clever opponent who knows the country, its trails, resources, and obstacles, and who has friends and sympathizers on every hand. The Force may be obliged to move cautiously. Operations are based on information which is at best unreliable, while the natives enjoy continuous and accurate information. The Force after long and fatiguing marches fails to gain contact and probably finds only a deserted camp, while their opponents, still enjoying the initiative, are able to withdraw or concentrate strong forces at advantageous places for the purpose of attacking lines of communication, convoys, depots, or outposts.

d. It will be difficult and hazardous to wage war successfully under such circumstances. Undoubtedly it will require time and adequate forces. The occupying force must be strong enough to hold all the strategical points of the country, protect its communications, and at the same time furnish an operating force sufficient to overcome the opposition wherever it appears. Again a simple display of force may be sufficient to overcome resistance. While curbing the passions of the people, courtesy, friendliness, justice, and firmness should be exhibited.

e. The difficulty is sometimes of an economical, political, or social nature and not a military problem in origin. In one recent campaign the situation was an internal political problem in origin, but it had developed to such a degree that foreign national interests were affected; simple orderly processes could no longer be applied when it had outgrown the local means of control. In another instance the problem was economic and social; great tracts of the richest land were controlled and owned by foreign interests; this upset the natural order of things; the admission of cheap foreign labor with lower standards of living created a social condition among the people which should have been remedied by orderly means before it reached a crisis.

f. The application of purely military measures may not, by itself restore peace and orderly government because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social. These conditions may have originated years ago and in many cases have been permitted to develop freely without any attempt to apply corrective measures. An acute situation finally develops when condi-
tions have reached a stage that is beyond control of the civil authorities and it is too late for diplomatic adjustment. The solution of such problems being basically a political adjustment, the military measures to be applied must be of secondary importance and should be applied only to such extent as to permit the continuation of peaceful corrective measures.

g. The initial problem is to restore peace. There may be many economic and social factors involved, pertaining to the administrative, executive, and judicial functions of the government. These are completely beyond military power as such unless some form of military government is included in the campaign plan. Peace and industry cannot be restored permanently without appropriate provisions for the economic welfare of the people. Moreover, productive industry cannot be fully restored until there is peace. Consequently, the remedy is found in emphasizing the corrective measures to be taken in order to permit the orderly return to normal conditions.

h. In general, the plan of action states the military measures to be applied, including the part the forces of occupation will play in the economic and social solution of the problem. The same consideration must be given to the part to be played by local government and the civil population. The efforts of the different agencies must be cooperative and coordinated to the attainment of the common end.

i. Preliminary estimates of the situation form the basis of plans to meet probable situations and should be prepared as far in advance as practicable. They should thereafter be modified and developed as new situations arise.
1–10. **Foreword.**—a. While it is improbable that a knowledge of psychology will make any change in the fundamentals of the conduct of small wars, it will, however, lead to a more intelligent application of the principles which we now follow more or less unconsciously through custom established by our predecessors.

b. Psychology has always played an important part in war. This knowledge was important in ancient wars of masses; it becomes more so on the modern battlefield, with widely dispersed forces and the complexity of many local operations by small groups, or even individuals, making up the sum total of the operation. In former times the mass of enemy troops, like our own, was visible to and under the immediate control of its leaders. Now troops are dispersed in battle and not readily visible, and we must understand the psychology of the individual, who operates beyond the direct control of his superiors.

c. This difficulty of immediate control and personal influence is even more pronounced and important in small wars, on account of the decentralized nature of these operations. This fact is further emphasized because in the small wars we are dealing not only with our own forces, but also with the civil population which frequently contains elements of doubtful or antagonistic sentiments. The very nature of our own policy and attitude toward the opposing forces and normal contacts with them enable the personnel of our Force to secure material advantages through the knowledge and application of psychological principles.

d. This knowledge does not come naturally to the average individual. A study of men and human nature supplemented by a thorough knowl-
edge of psychology should enable those faced with concrete situations of this type to avoid the ordinary mistakes. The application of the principles of psychology in small wars is quite different from their normal application in major warfare or even in troop leadership. The aim is not to develop a belligerent spirit in our men but rather one of caution and steadiness. Instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose by diplomacy. A Force Commander who gains his objective in a small war without firing a shot has attained far greater success than one who resorted to the use of arms. While endeavoring to avoid the infliction of physical harm to any native, there is always the necessity of preventing, as far as possible, any casualties among our own troops.

e. This is the policy with which our troops are indoctrinated; a policy which governs throughout the period of intervention and finds exception only in those situations where a resort to arms and the exercise of a belligerent spirit are necessary. This mixture of combined peaceful and warlike temperament, where adapted to any single operation, demands an application of psychology beyond the requirements of regular warfare. Our troops at the same time are dealing with a strange people whose racial origin, and whose social, political, physical and mental characteristics may be different from any before encountered.

f. The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for the existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any actions which may be contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured.

g. The great importance of psychology in small wars must be appreciated. It is a field of unlimited extent and possibilities, to which much time and study should be devoted. It cannot be stated in rules and learned like mathematics. Human reactions cannot be reduced to an exact science, but there are certain principles which should guide our conduct. These principles are deduced by studying the history of the people and are mastered only by experience in their practical application.
1–11. **Characteristics.**—The correct application of the principles of psychology to any given situation requires a knowledge of the traits peculiar to the persons with whom we are dealing. The individual characteristics as well as the national psychology are subjects for intensive study. This subject assumes increasing importance in minor operations. A failure to use tact when required or lack of firmness at a crucial moment might readily precipitate a situation that could have been avoided had the commander been familiar with the customs, religion, morals, and education of those with whom he was dealing.

1–12. **Fundamental considerations.**—The resistance to an intervention comes not only from those under arms but also from those furnishing material or moral support to the opposition. Sapping the strength of the actual or potential hostile ranks by the judicious application of psychological principles may be just as effective as battle casualties. The particular methods and extent of the application of this principle will vary widely with the situation. Some of the fundamental policies applicable to almost any situation are:

1. Social customs such as class distinctions, dress, and similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration.

2. Political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed.

3. A respect for religious customs.

Indifference in all the above matters can only be regarded as a lack of tact.

1–13. **Revolutionary tendencies.**—a. In the past, most of our interventions have taken place when a revolution was in full force or when the spirit of revolution was rampant. In view of these conditions (which are so often encountered in small wars) it may be well to consider briefly some of the characteristics of revolutions.

b. The knowledge of the people at any given moment of history involves an understanding of their environment, and above all, their past. The influence of racial psychology on the destiny of a people appears plainly in the history of those subject to perpetual revolutions. When composed largely of mixed races—that is to say, of individuals whose diverse heredities have dissociated their ancestral characteristics—those populations present a special problem. This class is always difficult to govern, if not ungovernable, owing to the absence of a fixed character. On the other hand, sometimes a people who have been under a rigid form of government may affect the most violent revolutions. Not having succeeded in developing progressively, or in
adapting themselves to changes of environment, they are likely to react violently when such adaptation becomes inevitable.

c. Revolution is the term generally applied to sudden political changes, but the expression may be employed to denote any sudden transformation whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines. In most cases the basic causes are economic. Political revolutions ordinarily result from real or fancied grievances, existing in the minds of some few men, but many other causes may produce them. The word "discontent" sums them up. As soon as discontent becomes general a party is formed which often becomes strong enough to offer resistance to the government. The success of a revolution often depends on gaining the assistance or neutrality of the regular armed forces. However, it sometimes happens that the movement commences without the knowledge of the armed forces; but not infrequently it has its very inception within these forces. Revolutions may take place in the capital, and by contagion spread through the country. In other instances the general disaffection of the people takes concrete form in some place remote from the capital, and when it has gathered momentum moves on the capital.

d. The rapidity with which a revolution develops is made possible by modern communication facilities and publicity methods. Trivial attendant circumstances often play highly important roles in contributing to revolution and must be observed closely and given appropriate consideration. The fact is that beside the great events of which history treats there are the innumerable little facts of daily life which the casual observer may fail to see. These facts individually may be insignificant. Collectively, their volume and power may threaten the existence of the government. The study of the current history of unstable countries should include the proper evaluation of all human tendencies. Local newspapers and current periodicals are probably the most valuable sources for the study of present psychological trends of various nations. Current writings of many people of different classes comprise a history of what the people are doing and thinking and the motives for their acts. Thus, current periodicals, newspapers, etc., will more accurately portray a cross section of the character of the people. In studying the political and psychical trends of a country, one must ascertain whether or not all news organs are controlled by one political faction, in order to avoid developing an erroneous picture of the situation.

e. Governments often almost totally fail to sense the temper of their people. The inability of a government to comprehend existing condi-
tions, coupled with its blind confidence in its own strength, frequently results in remarkably weak resistance to attack from within.

f. The outward events of revolutions are always a consequence of changes, often unobserved, which have gone slowly forward in men's minds. Any profound understanding of a revolution necessitates a knowledge of the mental soil in which the ideas that direct its course have to germinate. Changes in mental attitude are slow and hardly perceptible; often they can be seen only by comparing the character of the people at the beginning and at the end of a given period.

g. A revolution is rarely the result of a widespread conspiracy among the people. Usually it is not a movement which embraces a very large number of people or which calls into play deep economic or social motives. Revolutionary armies seldom reach any great size; they rarely need to in order to succeed. On the other hand, the military force of the government is generally small, ill equipped, and poorly trained; not infrequently a part, if not all of it, proves to be disloyal in a political crisis.

h. The majority of the people, especially in the rural districts, dislike and fear revolutions, which often involve forced military service for themselves and destruction of their livestock and their farm produce. However, they may be so accustomed to misgovernment and exploitation that concerted effort to check disorderly tendencies of certain leaders never occurs to them. It is this mass ignorance and indifference rather than any disposition to turbulence in the nation as a whole, which has prevented the establishment of stable government in many cases.

i. Abuses by the officials in power and their oppression of followers of the party not in power, are often the seeds of revolution. The spirit which causes the revolution arouses little enthusiasm among the poor natives at large unless they are personally affected by such oppression. The revolution, once started, naturally attracts all of the malcontents and adventurous elements in the community. The revolution may include many followers, but its spirit emanates from a few leaders. These leaders furnish the spark without which there would be no explosion. Success depends upon the enthusiastic determination of those who inspire the movement. Under effective leadership the mass will be steeped in revolutionary principles, and imbued with a submission to the will of the leader and an enthusiastic energy to perform acts in support thereof. Finally, they feel that they are the crusaders for a new deal which will regenerate the whole country. In extremely remote, isolated, and illiterate sections an educated revolu-
tionary leader may easily lead the inhabitants to believe that they, in the act of taking up arms, are actually engaged in repelling invasion. Many such ruses are employed in the initial stages and recruiting is carried on in this manner for long periods and the inhabitants are in a state of ignorance of the actual situation.

j. How is this situation to be met? A knowledge of the laws relating to the psychology of crowds is indispensable to the interpretation of the elements of revolutionary movements, and to their conduct. Each individual of the crowd, based on the mere fact that he is one of many, senses an invincible power which at once nullifies the feeling of personal responsibility. This spirit of individual irresponsibility and loss of identity must be overcome by preventing the mobilization or concentration of revolutionary forces, and by close supervision of the actions of individuals.

k. Another element of mob sentiment is imitation. This is particularly true in people of a low order of education. Attempt should be made to prevent the development of a hero of the revolutionary movement, and no one should be permitted to become a martyr to the cause. Members of a crowd also display an exaggerated independence.

l. The method of approaching the problem should be to make revolutionary acts nonpaying or nonbeneficial and at the same time endeavor to remove or remedy the causes or conditions responsible for the revolution. One obstacle in dealing with a revolution lies in the difficulty of determining the real cause of the trouble. When found, it is often disclosed as a minor fault of the simplest nature. Then the remedies are also simple.

m. The opposing forces may employ modern weapons and technique adapted to regular organized units, but the character of the man who uses these weapons remains essentially the same as it always was. The acts of a man are determined by his character; and to understand or predict the action of a leader or a people their character must be understood. Their judgments or decisions are based upon their intelligence and experience. Unless a revolutionary leader can be discountenanced in the eyes of his followers, it may be best to admit such leadership. Through him a certain discipline may be exercised which will control the actions of a revolutionary army; for without discipline, people and armies become barbarian hordes.

n. In general, revolutionary forces are new levies, poorly trained, organized, and equipped. Yet they can often be imbued with an ardent enthusiasm and are capable of heroism to the extent of giving their lives unhesitatingly in support of their beliefs.
Psychology

1–14. Basic instincts.—a. It is perfectly natural that the instinct of self-preservation should be constantly at work. This powerful influence plays an important part in the attitude of the natives in small wars. It is not surprising that any indication of intervention or interposition will prompt his instinct of self-preservation to oppose this move. Every means should be employed to convince such people of the altruistic intention of our Government.

b. Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in man. Among primitive people not far removed from an oppressed or enslaved existence, it is easy to understand the people's fear of being again enslaved; fear of political subjugation causes violent opposition to any movement which apparently threatens political or personal liberty.

c. Another basic instinct of man is self-assertion. This is a desire to be considered worthy among his fellow beings. Life for the individual centers around himself. The individual values his contacts as good or bad according to how he presumes he has been treated and how much consideration has been given to his own merits. This instinct inspires personal resentment if his effort is not recognized. Pride, which is largely self-assertion, will not tolerate contradiction. Self-respect includes also the element of self-negation which enables one to judge his own qualities and profit by the example, precept, advice, encouragement, approval, or disapproval of others. It admits capacity to do wrong, since it accepts the obligation of social standards. In dealing with foreign peoples credit should be readily accorded where merited, and undue criticism avoided.

d. There are also peoples and individuals whose instinctive reaction in contact with external influence is that of self-submission. Here is found a people who, influenced by the great power of the United States, are too willing to shirk their individual responsibility and are too ready to let others shoulder the full responsibility for restoring and, still worse, maintaining order and normalcy. In this event, if the majority of the natives are thus inclined, the initial task is quite easy, but difficulty arises in attempting to return the responsibility to those to whom it rightfully belongs. As little local responsibility as possible to accomplish the mission should be assumed, while the local government is encouraged to carry its full capacity of responsibility. Any other procedure weakens the sovereign state, complicating the relationship with the military forces and prolonging the occupation.
e. States are naturally very proud of their sovereignty. National policy demands minimum interference with that sovereignty. On occasion there is clash of opinion between the military and local civil power in a given situation, and the greatest tact and diplomacy is required to bring the local political authorities to the military point of view. When the matter is important, final analysis may require resort to more vigorous methods. Before a compromise is attempted, it should be clearly understood that such action does not sacrifice all the advantages of both of the opposing opinions.

f. The natives are also proud individually. One should not award any humiliating punishments or issue orders which are unnecessarily hurtful to the pride of the inhabitants. In the all-important interest of discipline, the invention and infliction of such punishments no matter how trivial must be strictly prohibited in order to prevent the bitterness which would naturally ensue.

g. In revolutions resort may be had to sabotage. Unless the circumstances demand otherwise, the repair of damage should be done by civilian or prison labor. This will have a more unfavorable psychological effect on the revolutionists than if the occupying forces were employed to repair the damage.

h. Inhabitants of countries with a high rate of illiteracy have many childlike characteristics. In the guidance of the destinies of such people, the more that one shows a fraternal spirit, the easier will be the task and the more effective the results. It is manifestly unjust to judge such people by our standards. In listening to peasants relate a story, whether under oath or not, or give a bit of information, it may appear that they are tricky liars trying to deceive or hide the truth, because they do not tell a coherent story. It should be understood that these illiterate and uneducated people live close to nature. The fact that they are simple and highly imaginative and that their background is based on some mystic form of religion gives rise to unusual kinds of testimony. It becomes a tedious responsibility to elicit the un tarnished truth. This requires patience beyond words. The same cannot be said for all the white-collar, scheming politicians of the city who are able to distinguish between right and wrong, but who flagrantly distort the truth.

i. The “underground” or “grapevine” method of communication is an effective means of transmitting information and rumors with unbelievable rapidity among the natives. When events happen in one locality which may bring objectionable repercussions in another upon receipt of this information, it is well to be prepared to expect the
PSYCHOLOGY

speedy transmission of that knowledge even in spite of every effort to keep it localized or confidential. The same means might be considered for use by intelligence units in disseminating propaganda and favorable publicity.

j. Often natives refuse to give any information and the uninitiated might immediately presume that they are members of the hostile forces or at least hostile sympathizers. While the peasant hopes for the restoration of peace and order, the constant menace and fear of guerrillas is so overpowering that he does not dare to place any confidence in an occasional visiting patrol of the occupying forces. When the patrol leader demands information, the peasant should not be misjudged for failure to comply with the request, when by so doing, he is signing his own death warrant.

k. Actual authority must not be exceeded in demanding information. A decided advantage of having military government or martial law is to give the military authorities the power to bring legal summary, and exemplary punishment to those who give false information. Another advantage of such government is the authority to require natives to carry identification cards on their persons constantly. It has been found that the average native is not only willing and anxious, but proud to carry some paper signed by a military authority to show that he is recognized. The satisfaction of this psychological peculiarity and, what is more important or practical, its exploitation to facilitate the identity of natives is a consideration of importance. This also avoids most of the humiliating and otherwise unproductive process often resorted to in attempting to identify natives or their possible relationship to the opposing forces.

l. There are people among whom the spirit of self-sacrifice does not exist to the extent found among more highly civilized peoples or among races with fanatical tendencies. This may account for the absence of the individual bravery in the attack or assault by natives even where their group has a great preponderance of numbers; among certain peoples there is not the individual combat, knifing, machete attacks by lone men which one encounters among others. This may be due to the lack of medical care provided, lack of religious fanaticism, lack of recognition for personal bravery, or lack of provision for care of dependents in case of injury or death. Psychological study of the people should take this matter into consideration and the organization, tactics, and security measures must be adapted accordingly.

m. It is customary for some people to attempt to place their officials under obligation to them by offering gifts, or gratuitous services of
different kinds. This is their custom and they will expect it to prevail among others. No matter how innocent acceptance may be, and in spite of the determination that it shall never influence subsequent actions or decisions, it is best not to be a party to any such petty bribery. Another common result of such transaction is that the native resorts to this practice among his own people to indicate that he is in official favor, and ignorant individuals on the other hand believe it. Needless to say, when it is embarrassing, or practically impossible to refuse to accept a gift or gratuity, such acceptance should not influence subsequent decisions. To prevent subsequent requests for favors the following is suggested: Accept the gift with the proper and expected delight; then, before the donor has an opportunity to see you and request a favor, send your servant with a few American articles obtainable in our commissaries and which are considered delicacies by the natives. The amount should be about equal in value, locally, to the gift accepted; and usually the native will feel that he has not placed you under an obligation.

n. Sometimes the hospitality of the natives must be accepted, and it is not intended to imply that this should not be done on appropriate occasions. On the contrary, this social intercourse is often fruitful of a better mutual understanding. Great care must be exercised that such contacts are not limited to the people of any social group or political party. This often leads to the most serious charges of discrimination and favoritism which, even though untrue, will diminish the respect, confidence, and support of all who feel that they are not among the favored. If opportunities are not presented, they should be created to demonstrate clearly to all, that contacts are not discriminatory and that opinions and actions are absolutely impartial.

1–15. Attitude and bearing.—a. A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of their language are great assets. Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it.

b. Lack of exact information is normal in these operations, as is true in all warfare. Lack of information does not justify withholding orders when needed, nor failing to take action when the situation demands it. The extent to which the intelligence service can obtain information depends largely on the attitude adopted toward the
loyal and neutral population. The natives must be made to realize the seriousness of withholding information, but at the same time they must be protected from terrorism.

C. From the very nature of the operation, it is apparent that military force cannot be applied at the stage that would be most advantageous from a tactical viewpoint. Usually turbulent situations become extremely critical before the Government feels justified in taking strong action. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to determine the exact moment when the decision of a commander should be applied. In a gradually developing situation the “when” is often the essence of the decision. Problems which illustrate the results of too hasty or tardy decisions will be of value in developing thought along these lines. The force commander should determine his mission and inform all subordinates accordingly. Commands should be kept fully informed of any modification of the mission. The decisions of subordinate commanders should be strictly in accordance with the desires of their commanders. For the subordinate commander, the decision may be to determine when he would be justified in opening fire. For example, the patrol leader makes contact with a known camp and at the last moment finds that women camp followers are present in the camp. Shall he fire into the group? Insofar as it is practicable, subordinate military leaders should be aided in making such decisions by previously announced policies and instructions.

d. Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness. Such indecision will encourage further disorder, and will eventually necessitate measures more severe than those which would have sufficed in the first instance. Drastic punitive measures to induce surrender, or action in the nature of reprisals, may awaken sympathy with the revolutionists. Reprisals and punitive measures may result in the destruction of lives and property of innocent people; such measures may have an adverse effect upon the discipline of our own troops. Good judgment in dealing with such problems calls for constant and careful surveillance. In extreme cases, a commanding officer may be forced to resort to some mild form of reprisal to keep men from taking more severe action on their own initiative. However, even this action is taken with the full knowledge of possible repercussions.

e. In dealing with the native population, only orders which are lawful, specific, and couched in clear, simple language should be
PSYCHOLOGY

issued. They should be firm and just, not impossible of execution nor calculated to work needless hardship upon the recipient. It is well to remember this latter injunction in formulating all orders dealing with the native population. They may be the first to sense that an order is working a needless hardship upon them, and instead of developing their support, friendship, and respect, the opposite effect may result.

f. An important consideration in dealing with the native population in small wars is the psychological approach. A study of the racial and social characteristics of the people is made to determine whether to approach them directly or indirectly, or employ both means simultaneously. Shall the approach be by means of decisions, orders, personal appeals, or admonitions, unconcealed effort, or administrative control, all of which are calculated to attain the desired end? Or shall indirect methods by subtle inspiration, propaganda through suggestion, or undermining the influential leaders of the opposition be attempted? Direct methods will naturally create some antagonism and encourage certain obstruction, but if these methods of approach are successful the result may be more speedily attained. Indirect approach, on the other hand, might require more time for accomplishment, but the result may be equally effective and probably with less regrettable bitterness.

g. Propaganda plays its part in approach to the people in small wars, since people usually will respond to indirect suggestion but may revolt against direct suggestion. The strength of suggestion is dependent upon the following factors:

(1) Last impression—that is, of several impressions, the last is most likely to be acted upon.

(2) Frequency—that is, repetitions, not one after another but intervals separated by other impressions.

(3) Repetition—this is distinguished from frequency by being repetitions, one after the other, without having other kinds of impressions interspersed.

h. The strongest suggestion is obtained by a combination of “frequency” and “last impressions.” Propaganda at home also plays its part in the public support of small wars. An ordinary characteristic of small wars is the antagonistic propaganda against the campaign or operations in the United States press or legislature. One cannot afford to ignore the possibilities of propaganda. Many authorities believe that the Marine Force should restrict publicity to a minimum in order to prevent the spread of unfavorable and antagonistic prop-
aganda at home. However, it is believed that when representatives of the press demand specific information, it should be given to them, if it is not of a confidential nature or such as will jeopardize the mission. Sometimes marines are pressed with the question: "Why are you here?" The best method to follow when a question of public policy is involved is to refer the individual to appropriate civil authorities.

There is an axiom in regular warfare to strike the hardest where the going is the easiest. In small wars also, it is well to strike most vigorously and relentlessly when the going is the easiest. When the opponents are on the run, give them no peace or rest, or time to make further plans. Try to avoid leaving a few straggling leaders in the field at the end, who with their increased mobility, easier means of evasion, and the determination to show strength, attempt to revive interest by bold strokes. At this time, public opinion shows little patience in the enterprise, and accepts with less patience any explanation for the delay necessary to bring the operation to a close.

In street fighting against mobs or rioters, the effect of fire is generally not due to the casualties but due to the fact that it demonstrates the determination of the authorities. Unless the use of fire is too long delayed, a single round often is all that is necessary to carry conviction. Naturally one attempts to accomplish his mission without firing but when at the critical moment all such means have failed, then one must fire. One should not make a threat without the intention to carry it out. Do not fire without giving specific warning. Fire without specific warning is only justified when the mob is actively endangering life or property. In disturbances or riots when a mob has been ordered to disperse, it must be feasible for the mob to disperse. Military interventions are actually police functions, although warlike operations often ensue. There is always the possibility of domestic disturbances getting beyond the control of local police. Hence the necessity of employing regular forces as a reserve or reenforcements for varying periods after the restoration of normal conditions.

The personal pride, uniform, and bearing of the marines, their dignity, courtesy, consideration, language, and personality will have an important effect on the civilian attitude toward the forces of occupation. In a country, for example, where the wearing of a coat, like wearing shoes, is the outward and unmistakable sign of a distinct social classification, it is quite unbecoming for officers who accept the hospitality of the native club for a dance, whether local ladies and
PSYCHOLOGY

gentlemen are in evening clothes or not, to appear in their khaki shirts. It appears that the United States and their representatives have lost a certain amount of prestige when they place themselves in the embarrassing position of receiving a courteous note from a people ordinarily considered backward, inviting attention to this impropriety. On the other hand, care should be exercised not to humiliate the natives. They are usually proud and humiliation will cause resentment which will have an unfavorable reaction. Nothing should be said or done which implies inferiority of the status or of the sovereignty of the native people. They should never be treated as a conquered people.

1. Often the military find themselves in the position of arbiters in differences between rival political factions. This is common in serving on electoral missions. The individual of any faction believes himself in possession of the truth and cannot refrain from affirming that anyone who does not agree with him is entirely in error. Each will attest to the dishonest intentions or stupidity of the other and will attempt by every possible means to carry his point of view irrespective of its merits. They are excitable beings and prone to express their feelings forcibly. They are influenced by personal partiality based upon family or political connections and friendship. Things go by favor. Though they may appear brusque at times they feel a slight keenly, and they know how to respect the susceptibilities of their fellows.

m. In some revolutions, particularly of economic origin, the followers may be men in want of food. A hungry man will not be inclined to listen to reason and will resort to measures more daring and desperate than under normal conditions. This should be given consideration, when tempted to burn or otherwise destroy private property or stores of the guerrillas.

n. In the interior there are natives who have never been 10 miles from their home, who seldom see strangers, and much less a white man or a foreigner. They judge the United States and the ideals and standards of its people by the conduct of its representatives. It may be no more than a passing patrol whose deportment or language is judged, or it may be fairness in the purchase of a bunch of bananas. The policy of the United States is to pay for value received, and prompt payment of a reasonable price for supplies or services rendered should be made in every instance. Although the natives of the capitals or towns may have a greater opportunity to see foreigners and the forces of occupation, the Marine Corps nevertheless represents the United States to them also, and it behooves every marine to conduct
himself accordingly. There is no service which calls for greater exercise of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, and rigid military justice than in small wars, and nowhere is more of the humane and sympathetic side of a military force demanded than in this type of operation.

1–16. Conduct of our troops.—a. In addition to the strictly military plans and preparations incident to the military occupation of a foreign country, there should be formulated a method or policy for deriving the greatest benefit from psychological practices in the field. To make this effective, personnel of the command must be indoctrinated with these principles. While it is true that the command will generally reflect the attitude of the commander, this will or desire of the supreme authority should be disseminated among the subordinates of all grades. The indoctrination of all ranks with respect to the proper attitude toward the civilian population may be accomplished readily by means of a series of brief and interesting lectures prepared under the direction of the military commander and furnished all units. These lectures may set forth our mission, the purpose of our efforts, our accomplishments to date in the betterment of conditions, our objectives of future accomplishment, etc.

b. Uncertainty of the situation and the future creates a certain psychological doubt or fear in the minds of the individual concerned; if the individual is entirely unaccustomed to it, and the situation seems decidedly grave, his conduct may be abnormal or even erratic. This situation of uncertainty exists, ordinarily to a pronounced degree in small wars, particularly in the initial phases of landing and occupation. The situation itself and the form of the orders and instructions which the marine commander will receive are often indefinite. In regular warfare, clear cut orders are given, or may be expected, defining situations, missions, objectives, instructions, and the like, in more or less detail; in small wars, the initial orders may be fragmentary and lack much of the ordinary detail. However unfortunate this may be, or how difficult it may make the task, this is probably the normal situation upon landing. In order to be prepared to overcome the usual psychological reaction resulting from such uncertainty, studies and instructions in small wars should be accompanied by practice in the issuance of orders.

c. The responsibility of officers engaged in small wars and the training necessary are of a very different order from their responsibilities and training in ordinary military duties. In the latter case, they simply strive to attain a method of producing the maximum
PSYCHOLOGY

physical effect with the force at their disposal. In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent minimum loss of life. This requires recourse to the principles of psychology, and is the reason why the study of psychology of the people is so important in preparation for small wars.

d. In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population. There is nothing in this principle which should make any officer or man hesitate to act with the necessary firmness within the limitation imposed by the principles which have been laid down, whenever there is contact with armed opposition.

1–17. Summary.—a. Psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of the country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, respect, and order. Small wars involve a wide range of activities including diplomacy, contacts with the civil population and warfare of the most difficult kind. The situation is often uncertain, the orders are sometimes indefinite, and although the authority of the military commander is at times in doubt, he usually assumes full responsibility. The military individual cannot afford to be intimidated by the responsibilities of his positions, or by the fear that his actions will not be supported. He will rarely fail to receive support if he has acted with caution and reasonable moderation, coupled with the necessary firmness. On the other hand inaction and refusal to accept responsibility are likely to shake confidence in him, even though he be not directly censured.

b. The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable. Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants’ minds the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty. In so doing, one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population. The practical application of psychology is largely a matter of common sense.
## RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT

| Importance of cooperation                      | 1–18 | 33 |
| Principles prescribed by Navy regulations      | 1–19 | 33 |
| Contact with State Department representatives  | 1–20 | 34 |

1–18. **Importance of cooperation.** — _a._ One of the principal obstacles with which the naval forces are confronted in small war situations is the one that has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.

 _b._ In a major war, "diplomatic relations" are summarily severed at the beginning of the struggle. During such a war, diplomatic intercourse proceeds through neutral channels in a manner usually not directly detrimental to the belligerents. There are numerous precedents in small wars which indicate that diplomacy does not relax its grip on the situation, except perhaps in certain of its more formal manifestations. The underlying reason for this condition is the desire to keep the war "small," to confine it within a strictly limited scope, and to deprive it, insofar as may be possible, of the more outstanding aspects of "war." The existence of this condition calls for the earnest cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval authorities.

 _c._ There are no defined principles of "Joint Action" between the State Department and the Navy Department by which the latter is to be restricted or guided, when its representatives become involved in situations calling for such cooperation. In the absence of a clearly defined directive, the naval service has for guidance only certain general principles that have been promulgated through Navy Regulations.

1–19. **Principles prescribed by Navy Regulations.** — _a._ The principles referred to as set forth in Navy Regulations, 1920, are, for ready reference, herein quoted:

718 (1) The Commander in Chief shall preserve, so far as possible, the most cordial relations with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States in foreign countries and extend to them the honors, salutes, and other official courtesies to which they are entitled by these regulations.
(2) He shall carefully and duly consider any request for service or other communication from any such representatives.

(3) Although due weight should be given to the opinions and advice of such representatives, a commanding officer is solely and entirely responsible to his own immediate superior for all official acts in the administration of his command.

719. The Commander in Chief shall, as a general rule, when in foreign ports, communicate with local civil officials and foreign diplomatic and consular authorities through the diplomatic or consular representative of the United States on the spot.

b. The attitude of the Navy Department towards the relationship that should exist between the naval forces and the diplomatic branch of the Government is clearly indicated by the foregoing quotations. Experience has shown that where naval and military authorities have followed the “spirit” of these articles in their intercourse with foreign countries, whether such intercourse is incident to extended nonhostile interposition by our forces or to minor controversies, the results attained have met with the approval of our Government and have tended towards closer cooperation with the naval and military forces on the part of our diplomats.

c. It should be borne in mind that the matter of working in cooperation with the State Department officials is not restricted entirely to higher officials. In many cases very junior subordinates of the State Department and the Marine Corps may have to solve problems that might involve the United States in serious difficulties.

1–20. Contact with State Department representatives.—The State Department representative may be of great help to the military commander whose knowledge of the political machinery of the country may be of a general nature. It is therefore most desirable that he avail himself of the opportunity to confer immediately with the nearest State Department representative. Through the latter, the commander may become acquainted with the details of the political situation, the economic conditions, means of communication, and the strength and organization of the native military forces. He will be able to learn the names of the governmental functionaries and familiarize himself with the names of the leading officials and citizens in the area in which he is to operate. Through the diplomatic representative the military commander may readily contact the Chief Executive, become acquainted with the government’s leading officials and expeditiously accomplish many details incident to the occupation of the country.
1–21. Navy regulations.—a. Article 575, Navy Regulations, 1920 states: “When serving on shore in cooperation with vessels of the Navy, brigade commanders or the officer commanding the detachment of marines shall be subject to the orders of the Commander in Chief, or, in his absence, to the orders of the senior officer in command of vessels specially detailed by the Commander in Chief on such combined operations so long as such senior officer is senior in rank to the officer commanding the brigade or the detachment of marines. When the brigade commander or the officer commanding the detachment is senior to the senior officer in command of the vessels specially detailed by the Commander in Chief on such combined operations, or when, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, it is for any reason deemed inadvisable to intrust such combined command to the senior officer afloat, the Commander in Chief will constitute independent commands of the forces ashore and afloat, which forces will cooperate under the general orders of the Commander in Chief.”

b. In article 576, it is provided that: “The brigade commander or other senior line officer of the Marine Corps present shall command the whole force of marines in general analogy to the duties prescribed in the Navy Regulations for the senior naval officer present when two or more naval vessels are serving in company, but the commander of each regiment, separate battalion, or detachment shall exercise the functions of command over his regiment, battalion, or detachment in like general analogy to the duties of the commander of each naval vessel.”

1–22. Control of joint operations.—In a situation involving the utilization of a marine force in a small war campaign, the directive
for the marine force commander usually requires him to report to the senior officer present in the area of anticipated operations. The Major General Commandant exercises only administrative control over the marine force; its operations are controlled by the Chief of Naval Operations directly, or through the senior naval officer present, if he be senior to the marine force commander. Consequently, no operation plans or instructions with regard to the tactical employment of the marine force originate in the office of the Major General Commandant.

1–23. The directive.—a. In situations calling for the use of naval and marine forces in operations involving protection of life and property and the preservation of law and order in unstable countries, the burden of enforcing the policies of the State Department rests with the Navy. The decisions with regard to the forces to be used in any situation are made by the Secretary of the Navy as the direct representative of the President. Through the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy exercises control of these forces. The directive issued to the naval commander who is to represent the Navy Department in the theater of operations is usually very brief, but at the same time, clearly indicative of the general policies to be followed. The responsibility for errors committed by the naval commander in interpreting these policies and in carrying out the general orders of the Navy Department rests with such naval commander.

b. If, as is the usual situation, the naval commander is the senior officer present in the theater of operations, his sole directive may be in the form of a dispatch. A typical directive of this type is set forth as follows:

INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN (name of country) HAS REQUIRED SENDING OF FOLLOWING NAVAL FORCES (here follow list of forces) TO ( ) WATERS WITH ORDERS TO REPORT TO SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER FOR DUTY POLICY OF GOVERNMENT SET FORTH IN OPNAV DISPATCHES ( ) AND ( ) YOU WILL ASSUME COMMAND OF ALL NAVAL FORCES IN ( ) WATER AND AT ( ) AND IN FULLEST COOPERATION WITH AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND CONSULAR OFFICERS WILL CARRY OUT POLICY OF US GOVERNMENT SET FORTH IN REFERENCE DISPATCHES.

c. Under the provisions of the foregoing directive, a naval commander concerned would be placed in a position of great responsibility and in accomplishing his task, he would necessarily demand the highest degree of loyalty and cooperation of all those under his command. The usual procedure, adopted by the naval commander, would be first to make a careful estimate of the situation, then
arrive at a decision, draw up his plan based on this decision, and issue the necessary operation orders.

1–24. **Naval officer commanding ashore.**—If the force to be landed consists of naval and marine units and is placed under the direct command of a naval officer, matters with regard to the relationship between the forces ashore and the naval commander afloat will give rise to little or no concern. The naval officer afloat will, under such conditions, usually remain in the immediate vicinity of the land operations, maintain constant contact with all phases of the situation as it develops, and exercise such functions of command over both the forces ashore and those afloat as he considers conducive to the most efficient accomplishment of his task. Commanders of marine units of the landing force will bear the same relationship toward the naval officer in command of the troops ashore as it set down for subordinate units of a battalion, regiment, or brigade, as the case may be.

1–25. **Marine officer commanding ashore.**—a. When the force landed comprises a marine brigade or smaller organization under the command of a marine officer, and such forces become engaged in a type of operation that does not lend itself to the direct control by the naval commander afloat, many questions with regard to the relationship between the marine forces ashore and the naval forces afloat will present themselves. The marine force commander, in this situation, should not lose sight of, and should make every effort to indoctrinate those under his command with the idea that the task to be accomplished is a “Navy task”; that the responsibility for its accomplishment rests primarily with the immediate superior afloat; and that regardlesss of any apparent absence of direct supervision and control by such superior, the plans and policies of the naval commander afloat must be adhered to.

b. The vessels of the naval force may be withdrawn from the immediate theater of operations; the naval commander may assign certain vessels to routine patrol missions along the coast; while he, himself, may return to his normal station and maintain contact with the marine force and the vessels under his command by radio or other means of communication.

c. The directive issued to the marine force commander will usually provide that he keep in constant communication with the naval commander afloat in order that the latter may at all times be fully informed of the situation ashore. The extent to which the marine force commander will be required to furnish detailed information
to the naval commander will depend on the policy established by the latter. As a general rule, the naval commander will allow a great deal of latitude in the strictly internal administration of the marine force and the details of the tactical employment of the various units of that force. He should, however, be informed of all matters relative to the policy governing such operations. In case the naval commander does not, through the medium of routine visits, keep himself informed of the tactical disposition of the various units of the marine force, he should be furnished with sufficient information with regard thereto as to enable him to maintain a clear picture of the general situation.

d. Usually the naval commander will be required to submit to the Navy Department, periodically, a report embracing all the existing economic, political, and tactical phases of the situation. The naval commander will, in turn, call upon the marine force commander for any reports of those matters as are within the scope of the theater in which the force is operating.

e. Estimates of this sort carefully prepared will often preclude the necessity of submitting detailed and separate reports on the matters involved and will greatly assist the naval commander in his endeavor. through the coordination of the other information at his disposal, to render to the Navy Department a more comprehensive analysis of the situation confronting him.

f. When questions of major importance arise, either involving a considerable change in the tactical disposition and employment of the marine force, or the policies outlined by the naval commander, the latter should be informed thereof in sufficient time to allow him to participate in any discussion that might be had between the political, diplomatic, and military authorities with regard thereto. It should be remembered that in making decisions in matters of importance, whether or not these decisions are made upon the advice of our diplomatic representatives, the marine-force commander is responsible to his immediate superior afloat.

g. In addition to the principles that are necessarily adhered to incident to the “chain of command,” a marine-force commander on foreign shore habitually turns to the Navy for assistance in accomplishing the innumerable administrative tasks involved in the small-war situations. Matters with regard to water transportation for evacuation of personnel, matters concerning supply, matters involving intercourse with our diplomatic representatives in countries in the vicinity of the theater of operations, matters relating to assistance from the Army
in supply and transportation, and any number of other phases of an administrative nature can be more expeditiously and conveniently handled through the medium of the naval commander whose prerogatives and facilities are less restricted than those of the commander in the field.

1–26. Marine—Constabulary.—When there is a separate marine detachment engaged in the organization and training of an armed native organization, the commanding officer of this detachment occupies a dual position. Although he is under the supervision of the Chief Executive of the country in which he is operating, he is still a member of the naval service. In order that there may be some guide for the conduct of the relationship that is to exist between the marine-force commander and the marine officer in charge of the native organization, fundamental principles should be promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy.

1–27. Direct control by Navy Department.—If the naval vessels that participate in the initial phases of the operation withdraw entirely from the theater of operations, the command may be vested in the marine-force commander or in the senior naval officer ashore within the theater. In such case, the officer in command on shore would be responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations. His relationship with the Chief of Naval Operations would then involve a combination of those principles laid down for the relationship that exists between the forces on shore and the naval commander afloat, and the relationship that the latter bears to the Navy Department as its representative.
SECTION VI

MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Par.</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1–28</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with national government officials</td>
<td>1–29</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation with law enforcement agencies</td>
<td>1–30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with inhabitants</td>
<td>1–31</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1–28. **Importance.**—*a.* All officers of the naval establishment, whether serving with the force afloat, the forces ashore, or temporarily attached to the national forces of another country, are required by the Constitution and by Navy Regulations to observe and obey the laws of nations in their relations with foreign states and with the governments or agents thereof.

*b.* One of the dominating factors in the establishment of the mission in small war situations has been in the past, and will continue to be in the future, the civil contacts of the entire command. The satisfactory solution of problems involving civil authorities and civil population requires that all ranks be familiar with the language, the geography, and the political, social, and economic factors involved in the country in which they are operating. Poor judgment on the part of subordinates in the handling of situations involving the local civil authorities and the local inhabitants is certain to involve the commander of the force in unnecessary military difficulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests of the United States.

1–29. **Contact with national government officials.**—*a.* Upon the arrival of the United States forces at the main point of entry the commander thereof should endeavor, through the medium of the United States diplomatic representative, to confer with the Chief Executive of the government, or his authorized representative and impart such information as may be required by the directive he has received. Such conference will invariably lead to acquaintance with the government's leading officials with whom the military commander may be required to deal throughout the subsequent operation.

*b.* Meetings with these officials frequently require considerable tact. These officials are the duly elected or appointed officials of the government, and the military commander in his association with them, represents the President of the United States. These meetings or conferences usually result in minimizing the number of officials to be
MILITARY—CIVIL RELATIONSHIP

dealt with, and the way is thereby speeded to the early formulation of plans of action by the military commander. When the mission is one of rendering assistance to the recognized government, the relationship between its officials and the military commander should be amicable. However, if animosity should be shown or cooperation be denied or withdrawn, the military commander cannot compel the foreign government officials to act according to his wishes. Ordinarily an appeal to the Chief Executive of the country concerned will effect the desired cooperation by subordinate officials. Should the military commander’s appeal be unproductive, the matter should be promptly referred to the naval superior afloat or other designated superior, who will in turn transmit the information to the Navy Department and/or the State Department as the case may be.

c. In most of the theaters of operations, it will be found that the Chief Executive maintains a close grip on all phases of the national government. The executive power is vested in this official and is administered through his cabinet and various other presidential appointees. Some of these appointed officials exercise considerable power within their respective jurisdictions, both over the people and the minor local officials. Some of them exercise judicial as well as executive functions, and are directly responsible to the President as head of the National Government.

d. It follows, therefore, that in the type of situation which involves the mission of assisting a foreign government, the military commander and his subordinates, in their associations with national governmental officials, as a rule will be dealing with individuals who are adherent to the political party in power. This situation has its advantages in that it tends to generate cooperation by government officials, provided of course, the Chief Executive, himself, reflects the spirit of cooperation. At the same time, it may have the disadvantage of creating a feeling of antagonism toward our forces by the opposite political party, unless the military commander instills in all members of his command the necessity for maintaining an absolute nonpartisan attitude in all their activities.

e. Political affiliation in most countries is a paramount element in the lives of all citizens of the country. Political ties are taken very seriously and serve to influence the attitude and action of the individual in all his dealings.

f. When subordinate military commanders are assigned independent missions which bring them into contact with local and national governmental officials, they should make every effort to acquaint them—
selves with the political structure of the locality in which they are to be stationed. The principal guide for the conduct of their associations with the civil officials will be, of course, the regulation previously referred to which governs the relations between members of the naval service and the agents of foreign governments. The amenities of official intercourse should be observed and the conventions of society, when and where applicable, should be respected. When assuming command within a district or department, an officer should promptly pay his respects to the supreme political authority in the area, endeavor to obtain from him the desired information with regard to the economic situation in that locality and indicate by his conduct and attitude that he is desirous of cooperating to the extent of his authority with those responsible for the administration of the foreign government's affairs.

\(g\). In giving the fullest cooperation to the civil authorities, the military commander should insist on reciprocal action on their part toward the military forces. Interference with the performance of the functions of civil officials should be avoided, while noninterference on the part of those authorities with the administration of the military forces should be demanded. In brief, a feeling of mutual respect and cooperation between members of the military forces and civil officials on a basis of mutual independence of each other should be cultivated.

1–30. Cooperation with law-enforcement agencies.—\(a\). United States forces, other than those attached to the military establishment of the foreign country in which they are operating will not, as a rule, participate in matters concerning police and other civil functions. The military forces usually constitute a reserve which is to be made available only in extreme emergency to assist the native constabulary in the performance of its purely police mission.

\(b\). The mission of our forces usually involves the training of native officers and men in the art of war, assisting in offensive operations against organized banditry and in such defensive measures against threatened raids of large organized bandit groups as are essential to the protection of lives and property. When the civil police functions are vested in the native military forces of the country, these forces are charged with the performance of two definite tasks—a military task involving the matters outlined above and a police task involving in general the enforcement of the civil and criminal laws. The native military forces control the traffic of arms and ammunition; they see that the police, traffic, and sanitary regulations are observed; they assume the control and administration of government prisons; and they per-
form numerous other duties that, by their nature, may obviously, directly or indirectly, play an important part in the accomplishment of the military mission.

C. It follows, therefore, that by cooperating to the fullest extent of his authority with the native forces in the performance of civil police functions, the military commander will, without actually participating in this phase of the picture, be rendering valuable assistance towards the accomplishment of the ultimate mission assigned to the combined military forces. Due to the fact that in most cases the individuals occupying the important positions in those native organizations performing police duties, are United States officers and enlisted men, questions arising with regard to cooperation and assistance are easy of solution. Adherence, on the part of our personnel, to the dictates of the local laws and regulations, and a thorough knowledge of the scope of authority vested in the native police force is essential to the end that we do not hamper this force in the performance of its duty, and to the end that we maintain the respect and confidence of the community as a whole.

D. With regard to the contact that is had with those connected with the judicial branch of the government, very little need be said. The magistrates and judges of the various courts are usually political appointees, or are elected to the office by the national congress. Consequently, they are affiliated politically with the party in power, national and/or local. In most situations, the civil courts will continue to function. Although this procedure is not always conducive to the best interests of the military forces, it is a situation that normally exists and must be accepted. The manner in which the judiciary performs its functions may have a profound effect on the conduct of a small war campaign. In the first place, the apprehension and delivery of criminals, including guerrillas, by the armed forces to the courts will serve no useful purpose if these courts are not in sympathy with the military authorities; and in the second place, a lack of cooperation on the part of the courts, insofar as the punishment of outlaws is concerned, may have a tendency to place the local inhabitants in fear of assisting the military forces. In view of this situation, every endeavor should be made to generate a friendly attitude on the part of these law-enforcement officials in order that their cooperation may be had.

1-31. Contact with inhabitants.—A. Whether a military commander be stationed at a headquarters in a metropolis or assigned to the smallest outpost, he must necessarily come into contact with
the civilian population. By “contact” in this case is implied intercourse in daily life. The transaction of daily routine involves the association with the civilian element, even in the most tranquil territory. The purchase of fresh provisions, fuel, and other necessities of camp life involve the relationships with merchants, bankers, those in charge of public utilities, and many others. In relations with these persons, whether they be business or social, a superiority complex on the part of the military commander is unproductive of cooperation. The inhabitants are usually mindful of the fact that we are there to assist them, to cooperate with them in so doing, and while dignity in such relationship should always obtain, the conduct of the military authority should not be such as to indicate an attitude of superiority.

b. Association with civilians may be other than business or social. The same daily occurrences that take place in the United States between members of the naval forces and our own police and civilian population frequently take place on foreign soil. Damage to private property by the military forces is frequently the cause of complaints by members of the civilian population. Dealings with civilians making claims for damages incurred through the conduct of our personnel should be as equitable as the facts warrant. Even where the responsibility rests with the United States, the settlement of such claims is necessarily protracted by the required reference to the Navy Department, and the lack of facilities through which to afford prompt redress is oftentimes the cause of bad feelings. If the military commander were supplied with a fund to be used for the prompt adjustment of limited claims, the foregoing condition might be materially improved. However, under existing laws and regulations the amicable adjustment of matters involving injury and damage to the civilian population and their property calls for the highest degree of tact and sound judgment.

c. Cordial relationship between our forces and the civilian population is best maintained by engendering the spirit of good will. As previously stated, a mutual feeling of dislike and aversion to association may exist between members of rival political parties. Conservatives and liberals, or by whatever label they may be known, are frequently prone to remain “die hards” when their political candidate is unsuccessful at the polls. It is, therefore, highly important for a military commander to ascertain the party affiliation of the persons with whom he comes into contact. The homely advice: “Don’t dabble in politics” is wise, and military authorities should scrupulously avoid discussing the subject.
d. Akin to politics is the subject of religion. The people of many countries take their religion as seriously as their politics. Consequently members of the United States forces should avoid any attitude that tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the religious beliefs and practices observed by the native inhabitants.

e. Relations between our military forces and the civilians might easily be disturbed if the former were to get into altercations with the public press. Freedom of speech is another liberty of which the inhabitants of many countries are not only proud, but jealous. Editors of the local newspapers are not always averse to criticizing the actions of troops other than their own. Nothing can be gained by the marine commander in jumping into print and replying to such newspaper articles, other than possibly starting a controversy which may make his further retention in that locality undesirable. When a matter is so published and it is considered detrimental, the subordinate marine commander should bring it to the attention of his immediate superior for necessary action by higher authority.

f. Every endeavor should be made to assure the civilian population of the friendliness of our forces. No effort should be spared to demonstrate the advantage of law and order and to secure their friendly cooperation. All ranks should be kept mindful of the mission to be accomplished, the necessity for adhering to the policy of the United States and of observing the law of nations.

g. Foreign nationals are often the underlying cause of intervention; almost invariably they are present in the country during the occupation. Generally their concern is for the security of their lives and property; sometimes they have an exaggerated opinion of their importance and influence. Generally the condition of political unrest does not react directly against foreigners, and it often happens that the foreign resident does not consider himself in any danger until he reads of it in a foreign newspaper, whereupon his imagination becomes active. Foreign cooperation may at times be a greater obstacle to success than the foreign mercenaries in a revolutionary party, when, for equally unworthy purposes, they render aid openly or secretly to the revolutionists in order to assure themselves of the protection or favor of any new government. Any discontented faction of natives can usually secure the sympathy or support from some group of investors or speculators who think they can further their own interests or secure valuable concessions by promoting a revolution. In any event, in dealing with these corporations and in
receiving reports from them, it may often be wise to scrutinize their actions carefully to determine if they have any ulterior motives. In interventions, the United States accords equal attention to the security of life and property of all foreign residents.