I am much honoured by the invitation to address this distinguished gathering tonight, and my wife and I are deeply indebted to our hosts for their hospitality and for the opportunity to visit this beautiful and remarkable place. My topic tonight is one upon which much has already been said. It might reasonably be asked whether anything omitted from the distinguished writings of men like Samuel Huntington, Hanson Baldwin, Spanier, Clark, Legere, Coles, Ralston, Higgins to name only a few, as well of course as those very distinguished men, Theodore Ropp and Forrest C. Pogue, and my own good friend and countryman Michael Howard, who have also enjoyed your hospitality on similar occasions, has sufficient importance to justify a transatlantic journey to say it. But times and perspectives change. It is perhaps worthwhile to ask, from a point in time now well advanced in a century which has seen swifter change in human affairs than any since the world began, what the relationship between the military and the state looks like today, what changes have taken place in it in our time, and what factors are at work leading to further change. To try to be exhaustive would be to succeed only in exhausting patience. I propose therefore only to outline a basic position and suggest broadly how it has developed up to our own time, to point to some of the factors bearing in a novel way upon the relationship between the military and the state in the second half of our century and to ask what their effect might be, and finally to consider some ethical aspects of the relationship.

Until man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered application of force at the instance of a properly constituted authority. The very existence of any society depends in the last resort upon its capacity to defend itself by force.

"Covenants without swords are but words," said Thomas Hobbes three hundred years ago. This is no less true today. Government thus requires an effective military instrument bound to the service of the state in a firm obligation.

The obligation was at one time uniquely personal. Later it developed into an obligation to a person as the recognized head of a human group—a tribe, a clan, a sept, or a nation. The group develops in structure, acquires associations and attributes (including territoriality) in a process occurring in different ways at different times in different places. The polis emerges in ancient Greece. King John is found in Mediaeval England describing himself on his seal, the first of English kings to do so, as Rex Angliae, King of England, and no longer Rex Anglorum, King of the English. The state is born. In Western Europe statehood had by the mid-thirteenth century largely replaced the concept of an all-embracing Christendom as the basic political structure. Military service continued however to be rendered as an obligation to a person, to the single ruler, to the monarch, and the personal link has persisted in one form or another right up to today.

I leave the Middle Ages with reluctance, as I always do, in a world in which the book I have long been preparing on a topic in the twelfth century has so often been pushed aside by the preoccupations of the twentieth. As we leave the Middle Ages behind, the military profession emerges, clearly distinguished from other institutions. Continuous service, regular pay, uniforms, segregation in barracks, the revival and improvement of ancient military formations such as the Roman Legion, the development of tactics, the introduction of better materials and techniques and of firearms, more attention to logistics—these and other developments had by the early eighteenth century given to the
calling of the man-at-arms a clearly distinguishable profile as the lineal antecedent of the military profession we know today. The eighteenth century regularized this calling; the nineteenth professionalized it. From the late nineteenth century onwards, armed force was available to the governments of all advanced states through the medium of military institutions everywhere broadly similar in structure and essentially manned- and wholly managed- by professionals. The soldier and the statesman were by now no longer interchangeable and the subordination of military to civil was, in theory everywhere and in your country and mine in fact as well, complete.

The Napoleonic experience led not only to the complete professionalization of the military calling: by reducing to a system the basic concept of the French revolutionary armies, it opened up the era of the nation-in-arms and thus of total war. In the eighteenth century, wars were conducted by a relatively small sample of the nation's manpower applying a relatively small proportion of the nation's wealth. The nineteenth century led to the situation where the totality of a nation's resources in men and materials was applied to conflicts in which all other belligerents were similarly mobilized. In the eighteenth century, war and peace could to some extent coexist. England and France were at war when the writer Sterne received his passport to travel in France from the French ambassador in London himself, with the words, "A man who laughs is never dangerous." Odd vestiges of the coexistence of war and peace persisted even into the nineteenth century: George Washington's investment account was handled by Barings of London throughout the Revolutionary War; and Russia, seventy years later, helped to finance the Crimean War against France, Turkey, and Britain by means of loans raised in London. But by quite early in the twentieth century, war and peace had come to be mutually exclusive concepts and could coexist no longer.

A century and a half after Napoleon we seem to have reverted in some respects to the position evident before him. Total war is now unacceptable, total peace is apparently unobtainable. The world lives in a state between the two: war and peace again now coexist.

With the military institution professionalized, regularized, and seen to be subordinate to the civil power, what was its sphere of operation and to what or whom was it ultimately responsible? Clausewitz declared that war was the continuance of policy by other means. Military action in war must always be governed by political requirements.

But some who have accepted that the state is master have not always accepted that the statesmen are the masters or have done so with extreme reluctance. "I can't tell you how disgusted I am becoming with those wretched politicians," said Gen. George McClellan in October 1861 (2)- a sentiment which has possibly been echoed more than once since then. On at least one important occasion in recent years, hostility and distrust have erupted into something near open insubordination.

The principles formulated by Clausewitz have not been accepted as binding at all times everywhere. In Germany in World War I, the Army under the control of Hindenburg and Ludendorff became "a state within the state claiming the right to define what was or was not to the National interest." The supreme command reserved to itself the right of defining Germany's war aims. The history of the United States in our time has also afforded instances of tendencies to operate in a sense opposed to the concepts set out by Clausewitz. The case of Gen. MacArthur is important here and I shall return to it later. But in quite another respect the approach of the United States to military/civil relationships up to the middle of our century could be described as anti-Clausewitzian.

Let us look at the spring of the year 1945 as events drove swiftly on to military defeat of Germany. In spite of agreement between the Allies on postwar areas of occupation, "It was well understood by everyone," as Winston Churchill wrote, "that Berlin, Prague and Vienna could be taken by whoever got there first. "4 The Supreme Allied Commander, writes Forrest C. Pogue, "halted his troops short of Berlin and Prague for military reasons only." As Gen. Eisenhower himself said of this time, "Military plans, I believed, should be devised with the single aim of speeding victory."5

General Eisenhower recognized that Berlin was the political heart of Germany. Gen. Bradley, however, in opposing the British plan for an all-out offensive directed on the capital, described Berlin
as no more than "a prestige objective," though he frankly conceded later that: "As soldiers we looked
naively on the British inclination to complicate the war with political foresight and nonmilitary
objectives."6

Here lies the crucial difference between two philosophies. The one holds that war replaces politics
and must be conducted by purely military criteria towards purely military ends. When war has been
ended by the enemy's military defeat, political action can once more take over from the military.

The other maintains that war continues policy and is conducted only to a political end, that in grand
strategy purely military criteria and objectives do not exist, and that military action must at all times be
governed by political considerations arising out of clearly defined war aims. Under the first concept
the only war aim is to win the war and to do this as quickly as possible. Under the second the prime
aim in war is to win the peace. A policy of unconditional surrender is not a war aim at all but the
acknowledgment of the lack of one.

There were of course towards the end of World War II problems of national sensitivity within the
alliance which complicated issues. It would be wrong now to oversimplify them. Nevertheless,
whereas Churchill asked at the time whether the capture of Berlin by the Russians would not
"lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties for the future,"7 the U.S.
Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that such "psychological and political advantages as would result
from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military
consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed
forces." There is no evidence whatsoever that General Eisenhower at any time put American national
interests above those of the British. There is plenty of evidence that he acknowledged the complete
priority in importance of the general political interest over the military. "I am the first to admit," he
said, "that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should
decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I
would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation."8 The
Combined Chiefs gave him no other instructions on this critically important point than to make his
own dispositions. The new President of the United States, Harry S Truman, cabled Churchill on April
21, 1945, that "the tactical deployment of American troops is a military one."9

On May 2, 1945, with the Allied troops still halted according to their orders from SHAEF on or
about the Elbe, the Russians completed the capture of Berlin. On May 12, with the Allies halted on
orders from the same source to the north and west of Prague, the Russians entered Prague too. I do not
think I need dwell now on the consequences of these events or their effect upon the history of our own
time. Let me only add a warning against oversimplification. The record stands as quoted. The Yalta
agreement, however, is also on the record and it is not easy to see how the Allies could have stayed in
Berlin and Prague even if they had gotten there first.

The decisions which led to the course of events I have outlined here were in general wholly
consistent with United States attitudes up to the mid-twentieth century. The national ethic was not
greatly in favour of the application of armed force to a political end. It is true that America had been
involved in limited wars (like the Spanish-American and that of 1812-14 with Britain) and in wars
against the Indians which could scarcely be justified on grounds either of absolute morality or of
national survival. But the nation has in general been reluctant to fight except when there was clear and
compelling danger of national overthrow or a violation of the moral code which the nation followed- a
violation so grave and flagrant as to demand correction. It has then suspended normal peacetime
procedures wherever the military imperative demanded, thrown its whole weight into the crushing of
opposing armed force as speedily as possible and, this accomplished, returned with relief to its own
way of life.

From this concept there developed a division of responsibility of which a classic exposition is
quoted by Morton from an Army War College statement of September 1915. "The work of the
statesman and the soldier are therefore co-ordinate. Where the first leaves off the other takes hold."10
The middle years of our century, however, have seen changes which have profoundly affected the
relations of military and civilians and have set up a new situation. Of developments in military
practice, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction is the most obvious. It is not the only one.
Improved and new techniques and materials abound and have been applied not only in all aspects of
weaponry but over the whole range of tools for war. Developments in metals, ceramics, plastics; new
sources of energy; new forms of propulsion; new techniques in the electric and electronic fields; laser
beams and infrared; the startling developments in solid state physics which have revolutionized
communications and control systems—these are only a few examples chosen pretty well at random
from a list any military professional could almost indefinitely extend. What has been happening in
space needs no emphasis nor does the dramatic rise in powers of surveillance. The flow of information
from all sources has vastly increased and the application of automatic processes to its handling has
opened a new dimension.

There are other developments than those in the hardware departments. International alignments
have changed. The United States has replaced Britain in important traditional roles; Russia has been
reborn; China has emerged as a major power. The Third World has grown up out of disintegrating
colonial empires—British, French, Belgian, Dutch—and stresses have developed in the international
community no less than at home as the rich are seen to get richer much more quickly than the poor do.
International relations have grown more complex with the demise of bipolarity. The Russians have
moved further from strict Marxism at home and developed a striking potential for armed action at a
distance abroad. The failure hitherto of yet another attempt to establish a world community of nations
in the United Nations has been accompanied by a growing impatience worldwide with warfare as a
means of settling social problems, while there has been no decline at all in the resort to warfare. There
has been a surge of interest everywhere in the study of defence problems, an interest which springs, in
my view, from a basic realization that what is at stake is nothing less than human survival. There has
been much striving towards international agreement to take account of a new situation, and some of it
not unpromising the Test Ban Treaty, for instance, and SALT. The American relationship with Europe
has changed and is changing further. Many other things have happened. These are only some of the
more important developments in the field of external relations.

Here in the States you have seen an increase of centralized authority and a closer scrutiny of the
decision-making process in relation to national security. The risks of the nuclear age and the
complexity of international issues have resulted in a day to day involvement of the executive in
external affairs, with all their military implications, far greater than in the past. The reasons for this, as
well as for the development of defence analysis into a considerable industry, lie in the imperatives of
nuclear weapon power. Armed forces cannot now be brought into being more or less at leisure after the
crisis breaks, as was formerly possible for America beyond the oceans, and for Britain, protected by
her navy, when Britain could afford to be content to lose every battle but the last. For in general and
unrestricted war the last battle is now the first, and we know that it cannot be won. Thus it is vital not
to let the war take place at all, and deterrence becomes the major element in defence. But Deterrence
demands an apparatus sufficient in size and performance, always up to date, always at a high state of
readiness, but never used and never even fully tested. It is therefore quite inevitable that the military
agency will be closely and continuously monitored by its civil masters.

From all these and other developments, the civil/military relationship now finds itself in a new
frame of reference. I select two important elements in this new environment for further comment.
First of all there is the enormous rise in the cost of warlike material since World War II and the
huge increase in the burden on national resource, in money, materials, and skilled manpower, which
preparation for war demands. President Eisenhower spoke of the growing significance of a
military/industrial complex. General MacArthur among others drew attention to the ruinous cost of
preparation for war, as distinct from the cost of its conduct. The demands of the military upon national
resource, in times when a world war is not being fought, can be so great that the whole orientation of
national policy, not only abroad but at home as well, can be determined by them. The danger of the formal supersession of civil authority by the military can today in our two democracies be dismissed as negligible. National resource, however, whatever its size, is limited. Money spent on space cannot be spent on slum clearance. Money spent on the containment of pollution cannot be used for an antiballistic-missile system. Even if the usurpation of civil government by the military is no longer to be feared, the orientation of policies, particularly at home, which might be forced upon the state by demands upon material resource and money and skilled industrial, technical, and other manpower, could place the military in a position of dominance in the state scarcely less decisive in the event than formal usurpation of powers of government. In a pamphlet published in Britain this month, J. K. Galbraith speaks of the growth of a huge bureaucratic organization of defence contractors and politicians acting with service advice. It began to grow, to use Galbraith's arresting phrase, before poverty was put on the national agenda. The danger that the military, through the demands upon resource of the military/industrial complex, would exercise too powerful an influence over the state was never high in postwar Britain. Professor Galbraith suggested to me last week in England that the British tradition of civil supremacy was probably too powerful to allow it. There are other, simpler reasons. The World Wars which greatly enriched the United States greatly impoverished the United Kingdom. Britain was made very sharply aware at the end of World War II that drastic reduction in national resource demanded a drastic review of spending priorities. Over the postwar years Britain has asserted and confirmed priorities in which social spending went ahead of expenditure on defence. In the past few years, for the first time ever, less has been spent in Britain on defence, for example, than on education.

In the United States, where resource was so much greater, the realization only came later on that resource, however great, was not unlimited. Hard priorities have had to be drawn and as the disagreeable task was faced, perhaps a little reluctantly, the demands of some other claimants on national resource have had to be heard too.

My own view is that the danger of unbalancing the relationship between military and state through inordinate demand upon national resource was never great in Britain; and now in the United States, as national priorities come under review, it is on the decline. There is here, however, an aspect of civil/military relations to which we are not yet, I think, wholly accommodated.

Of crucial importance in this relationship between armed forces and the state is atomic weapon power. It is a commonplace now that total war is no longer a rational act of policy. George Kennan saw this earlier than most when he wrote in 1954, "People have been accustomed to saying that the day of limited war is over. I would submit that the truth is exactly the opposite: that the day of total wars has passed, and that from now on limited military operations are the only ones that could conceivably serve any coherent purpose." The implications of this situation have not everywhere been fully accepted. The concept of the nation-in-arms is in major powers no longer viable and we have to think of national security in other terms. But in what terms?

The introduction of atomic weapons has thrown new light upon a hallowed principle of Clausewitz. 'As war . . .,' he wrote, "is dominated by the political object the order of that object determines the measure of the sacrifice by which it is to be purchased. As soon, therefore, as the expenditure in force becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value this object must be given up, and peace will be the result."12

Into an equation which Clausewitz saw in relative terms, atomic weapons have now introduced an absolute. Can any political object be secured by the opening of a nuclear war which devastates both sides? Hence, of course, derives the whole language of brinkmanship in a situation in which one object has come to be common to all parties. This is now survival. In the context of general war we have here a completely new situation.
In the closing stages of World War II President Roosevelt showed much reluctance to impose a policy upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His successor, President Harry S. Truman, was disinclined at a critical time in 1945, as we have seen, to instruct General Eisenhower to act in Europe on any other than purely military considerations. It was only five years later that this same presidential successor found himself roughly compelled to accept the logic of the new order and act in a diametrically opposite sense.

"The Korean War," says Samuel Huntington, "was the first war in American history (except for the Indian struggles) which was not a crusade." I cannot quite accept this, but it certainly was for the United States a war of unusual aspect. It was a war conducted according to the main concept supported by Clausewitz and not at all according to the practice of Ludendorff. That is to say, the object from the beginning was clearly defined in political terms, and limited. There were variations from time to time in the war aim. After MacArthur's brilliantly successful amphibious operation at Inchon, the aim shifted from the simple re-establishment of the status quo in South Korea to the effecting of a permanent change in the whole Korean Peninsula. The chance was seen to reunite this at a time when China was thought to be too preoccupied with the danger from the old enemy Russia to be inclined to intervene by force of arms. But China did intervene and the Administration reverted to its former aim, whose achievement would in its view run small risk of furnishing the USSR with excuse and opportunity for the opening of World War III before Europe was strong enough to resist.

General MacArthur could not accept this position in terms either of the limitation of means or of the restriction of ends. He challenged the Administration on both counts. In criticizing the Administration's desire to prevent the war from spreading, he declared that this seemed to him to introduce a new concept into military operations. He called it the "concept of appeasement…the concept that when you use force you can limit that force." He was not consistent here. He did not, in fact, advocate the use of every available means against China. He was strongly against the use of American ground forces in any strength on the mainland, for example, and advocated in preference air bombardment and sea blockade with the possibility of enlarging Nationalist forces on the mainland out of Formosa. He did not, in my view, either convincingly or even with total conviction argue against the acceptance of limitations on hostilities. What he did insist on was that the limitations accepted should be those of his, the military commander's, choice and not those settled upon by his political superiors. But given the acceptance of limitation in principle, the identification of those areas in which specific limitations must be accepted is a clear matter of policy. Is that for soldiers to determine? MacArthur challenged the Administration on this issue and appealed to the legislature and the American people over the Administration's head. He lost. Perhaps he underestimated the character of the President and the degree to which experience had helped him to develop since the spring of 1945. Perhaps he overestimated the support that he could expect in the Joint Chiefs. The position taken by the Joint Chiefs, however, supported that of the President. It conveyed quite clearly that the instrumental nature of the military, as an agency in the service of the state, was not going to be forgotten. In the seven years between 1945 and 1952 there probably lies a watershed in civil/military relations in the United States, which future historians will see as of prime importance.

But another question arises, and this too was raised by the case of MacArthur, as it arose in the matter of the Curragh incident in Ireland in 1914 and with Gen. de Gaulle in 1940. Where or by what is the allegiance of the military professional engaged? Personal service to an absolute monarch is unequivocal. But in a constitutional monarchy, or a republic, precisely where does the loyalty of the fighting man lie?

In Ireland just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a distinct possibility that opponents of the British Government's policy for the introduction of Home Rule in Ireland would take up arms to assert their right to remain united with England under the Crown. But if the British Army were ordered
to coerce the Ulster Unionists, would it obey? Doubts upon this score were widespread and they steadily increased. In the event, there was no mutiny, though the Curragh incident has sometimes been erroneously described as such. The officers in a cavalry brigade standing by on the Curragh ready to move into the North of Ireland all followed their brigade commander's example in offering their resignations from the service. This in peacetime was perfectly permissible. The Curragh episode, all the same, formed a more than usually dramatic element in an intrusion by the military into politics which seriously weakened the British Government of the day and forced a change in its policy. As a successful manipulation of government by the military on a political issue, it has had no parallel in Britain in modern times. But is also raised the question of where personal allegiance lay and raised it more sharply than at any time since 1641, when the hard choice between allegiance to the King and adherence to Parliament, in the days of Thomas Hobbes, split the country in the English Civil War.

Essentially the same question was raised by MacArthur. For he not only challenged the Administration on the fundamentals of policy- upon political ends, that is, as well as upon choice of military means. He also claimed that he was not bound, even as a serving officer, by a duty to the executive if he perceived a duty to the state with which his duty to the Administration conflicted. His words to the Massachusetts legislature are worth quoting:

I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept, that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of the Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous.16

There is here a deep and serious fallacy. I do not refer to the possible violation of the President's constitutional position as Commander in Chief. I have more in mind a principle basic to the whole concept of parliamentary democracy as it is applied, with differences in detail but in essential identity of intention, in our two countries. It is that the will of the people is sovereign and no refusal to accept its expression through the institutions specifically established by it- whether in the determination of policies or in the interpretation of the constitution- can be legitimate. MacArthur's insistence upon his right as an individual to determine for himself the legitimacy of the executive's position, no less than his claim of the right as a military commander to modify national policies, can never be seen in any other way than as completely out of order. It is ironic that MacArthur, who himself might perhaps have been brought to trial for insubordination, should at one time have sat in judgment on another general officer for that very offence. Gen. Mitchell, though possibly wide open to charges of impropriety in the methods he used, was challenging the correctness of the Administration's policy decisions. MacArthur's act was the far graver one of challenging his orders in war and of appealing to the legislature and people over the Commander in Chief's head.

It is worthy of note that in the wave of criticism of General MacArthur from non-American sources, some of it violent at times, the voice of General de Gaulle in France was almost alone amongst those of comparable importance which was raised in MacArthur's defence. De Gaulle himself, of course, had been there too. He had declined to accept the wholly legitimate capitulation to a national enemy in war of a properly constituted French government. This is something for which France will always remain deeply in his debt. There is no doubt, however, of the correctness of the position taken by officers of the so-called Vichy French Forces after the fall of France. We fought them in Syria on account of it. The Troupes françaises du Levant had orders to defend French possessions in mandated territories against all comers and this they did. I was myself wounded for the first time in the last war, in that campaign, commanding a small force in an untidy little battle on the Damascus road which we won. After the armistice in Syria and the Lebanon, walking around Beirut with an arm in plaster, I met a French officer who was another cavalryman and a contemporary whom I had known before the war as a friend. He had the other arm in plaster and, I discovered, had been in this little battle the
commander on the Vichy French side. We dined together in the St. Georges Hotel while he explained to me with impeccable logic how professionally incompetent the command had been on our side. The fact that we had won was at best irrelevant and at worst aesthetically repugnant. But I do not recall that in the whole of our discussion either of us doubted the correctness of his action in fighting against the Allies and his old friends.

There is sometimes a purely military justification for disobedience. Britain's greatest sailor, Lord Nelson, exploited it. After Jutland, Adm. Lord Fisher said of Adm. Jellicoe that he had all Nelson's qualities but one: he had not learned to disobey. What I describe as military justification rests in the opinion of the officer on the spot that he can best meet the military requirement of his superiors if he acts in some way other than that prescribed by them. This is a matter of professional judgment, and of courage, for failure can prejudice a career. It is not a matter of morals. But there are also circumstances in which men or women find themselves under a moral compulsion to refrain from doing what is lawfully ordered of them. If they are under sufficiently powerful moral pressure and are strong enough and courageous enough to face the predictable consequences of their action, they will then sometimes disobey. This, I know, is terribly difficult ground. "My country right or wrong" is not an easy principle to reconcile with an absolute morality, even if we accept a Hegelian view that the state represents the highest consummation of human society. Early in World War I a brave English nurse called Edith Cavell, who had said that "Patriotism is not enough," was shot by her country's enemies for relieving human suffering where she found it, among people held by the enemy to be francs tireurs or partisans. Nurse Edith Cavell's statue stands in London off Trafalgar Square, around the corner from the National Gallery, and it is worth a look in passing. It bears the inscription I have quoted: "Patriotism is not enough."

In the half century since that time doubt has grown further, not only on the ultimate moral authority of the nation state but also upon its permanence as a social structure. The nation state could at some time in the future develop into something else. States have before now been united into bigger groupings, and supra-national entities are not impossible.

I do not see the nation state disappearing for a long time yet, but already we have much experience of international political structures under which groups of national military forces are employed. The United States in the last third of a century, it has been said, has learnt more about the operation of coalitions than ever before. Conflicts of loyalty are always possible where forces are assigned to an allied command. I have been a NATO commander in Europe, and as such I had on my staff an officer of another nation who was engaged in the contingency planning of tactical nuclear targets. This was less of an academic exercise for this particular officer than it might have been, say, for an American or even for a Briton, for the targets were not only in Europe but in this officer's own country and in parts of it he had known from boyhood. It was made known to me that this officer was showing signs of strain and I had him moved to other work, for the military servant of a nation state can even now be put under moral strain in situations where conflicts of loyalties arise. The tendency towards international structures will almost certainly increase and the incidence of such situations is unlikely to grow less.

Let me draw together these thoughts upon the moral, as distinguished from the professional, aspect of obedience. The fighting man is bound to obedience to the interest of the state he serves. If he accepts this, as MacArthur certainly did, he can still, rightly or wrongly, question, like MacArthur, the authority of men constitutionally appointed to identify and interpret the state's interest. He could even, like de Gaulle, flatly refuse to obey these men. Those who consider General MacArthur open to a charge of insubordination may consider that General de Gaulle was probably open to a charge of no less than treason. Neither is constitutionally permissible. A case in moral justification might just possibly be made for both, though such a case is always stronger when the results of the act are seen to be in the outcome beneficial. "Treason doth never prosper," wrote Sir John Harrington in the days of Queen Elizabeth the First. "What's the reason? For if it prosper none dare call it treason." In the event,
de Gaulle became in the fullness of time President of the French Republic. It was poor Petain that they put on trial.

Finally there is disobedience on grounds of conscience to an order, lawfully given, whose execution might or might not harm the state but which the recipient flatly declines, for reasons he finds compelling, to carry out. This will be done by the doer at his peril; and the risk, which can be very great, must be accepted with open eyes.

Another possible cause of strain upon the military is divergence in the ethical pattern of the parent society from that of its armed forces. Samuel Huntington, in the book *The Soldier and the State*, which will always occupy a high place in the literature upon this topic, spoke in the late 1950s of tendencies in the United States towards a new and more conservative environment, more sympathetic to military institutions. He suggested that this "might result in the widespread acceptance by Americans of values more like those of the military ethic."17 The course of events since Huntington wrote thus, in 1956, throws some doubt on the soundness of any prediction along these lines. The qualities demanded in military service, which include self-restraint in the acceptance of an ordered life, do not seem to be held in growing esteem everywhere among young people today. In consequence, where a nation is involved in a war which cannot be described as one of immediate national survival and whose aims, however admirable they may be, are not universally supported at home and perhaps not even fully understood there, strains can be acutely felt. Limited wars for political ends are far more likely to be productive of moral strains of the sort I have here suggested than the great wars of the past.

The wars of tomorrow will almost certainly be limited wars, fought for limited ends. The nation-in-arms has vanished; the general war is no longer a rational concept. But the nation state will persist for a time yet and the application of force to its political ends will persist with it. These ends, however, will be limited and the means limited too- not by choice of the military but by choice of their employers, the constitutionally established civil agencies of the state. These employers will also be watching most carefully the level of demand being made, on the military behalf, on national resource. If this level rises so high as to prejudice enterprises higher in the national scale of priorities than preparation for war, they will be resisted. There are signs that the very high priority given to the demands of the military upon a national resource in the United States in the third quarter of the twentieth century will not persist into the fourth.

Ladies and gentlemen, in addressing myself to the topic chosen for this memorial address, "The Military in the Service of the State," I have selected only a few aspects of a big and complex theme. Let me end with something like a confessio fidei- a confession of faith. I am myself the product of thirty-five years' military service- a person who, with strong inclinations to the academic, nonetheless became a professional soldier. Looking back now in later life from a university, I can find nothing but satisfaction over the choice I made all those years ago as a student- a satisfaction tinged with surprise at the good sense I seem to have shown as a very young man in making it. Knowing what I do now, given the chance all over again, I should do exactly the same. For the military life, whether for sailor, soldier, or airman, is a good life. The human qualities it demands include fortitude, integrity, self-restraint, personal loyalty to other persons, and the surrender of the advantage of the individual to a common good. None of us can claim a total command of all these qualities. The military man sees round him others of his own kind also seeking to develop them, and perhaps doing it more successfully than he has done himself. This is good company. Anyone can spend his life in it with satisfaction.

In my own case, as a fighting man, I found that invitations after the World War to leave the service and move into business, for example, were unattractive, even in a time when anyone who had had what they called on our side "a good war" was being demoted and, of course, paid less. A pressing invitation to politics was also comparatively easy to resist. The possibility of going back to Oxford to teach Mediaeval History was more tempting. But I am glad that I stayed where I was, in the Profession of Arms, and I cannot believe I could have found a better or more rewarding life anywhere outside it.
Another thought arises here. The danger of excessive influence within the state to which I have been referring does not spring from incompetence, cynicism, or malice in the military, but in large part from the reverse. What is best for his service will always be sought by the serving officer, and if he believes that in seeking the best for his service he is rendering the best service he can to his country, it is easy to see why. He may have to be restrained. He can scarcely be blamed.

The military profession is unique in one very important respect. It depends upon qualities such as those I have mentioned not only for its attractiveness but for its very efficiency. Such qualities as these make of any group of men in which they are found an agreeable and attractive group in which to function. The military group, however, depends in very high degree upon these qualities for its functional efficiency.

A man can be selfish, cowardly, disloyal, false, fleeting, perjured, and morally corrupt in a wide variety of other ways and still be outstandingly good in pursuits in which other imperatives bear than those upon the fighting man. He can be a superb creative artist, for example, or a scientist in the very top flight and still be a very bad man. What the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or airman. Military institutions thus form a repository of moral resource which should always be a source of strength within the state.

I have reflected tonight upon the relationship between civilians and military in the light of past history, present positions, and possible future developments and have offered in conclusion my own conviction that the major service of the military institution to the community of men it serves may well lie neither within the political sphere nor the functional. It could easily lie within the moral. The military institution is a mirror of its parent society, reflecting strengths and weaknesses. It can also be a well from which to draw refreshment for a body politic in need of it.

It is in the conviction that the highest service of the military to the state may well lie in the moral sphere, and the awareness that almost everything of importance in this respect has probably still to be said, that I bring to an end what I have to offer here tonight in the Harmon Memorial Lecture for the year 1970.

5. Ibid., p.377.
6. Ibid., p.378.
7. Ibid., p.380.
8. Ibid., p.381.
17. Huntington, Soldier and the State, p.458.
General Sir John Winthrop Hackett has, to a unique degree, combined the careers of soldier, scholar, and educator. After taking some courses at Oxford University, he was commissioned in the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars in 1931. Prior to World War II he served in the Middle East where he completed a thesis for the degree of B. Litt. at Oxford. In 1942, he became commander of the 4th Parachute Brigade in the Middle East Theatre and led it through the Market/Garden Operation in Europe in September 1944. In 1947, he returned to the Middle East as Commander of the Transjordan Frontier Force. From 1963 to 1964 he was Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and from 1966 to 1968 he was Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Rhine. During his wartime service he was wounded several times and decorated for gallantry. He served as Commandant of the Royal Military College of Science from 1958 to 1961 and is presently the Principal of King's College, London. General Hackett is the author of *The Profession of Arms* (Lees Knowles Lectures for 1962).

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