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# **APPENDICES**

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## GLOSSARY

Admeasure	To measure the various dimensions, capacities, and tonnage of a ship for official registration.
Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) System	The Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue system is an international program run by the Coast Guard to provide resources to help any vessel in distress on the high seas. Participating merchant vessels provide sailing plans, periodic position reports, and a list of the vessels' capabilities to the Coast Guard. The AMVER center then provides a surface picture to rescue centers that contains the position of participating ships in the vicinity of an emergency that can be used to assist a vessel in distress.
Acceptable Presence	Forward presence by U.S. forces that regional countries do not find threatening or objectionable.
Aids to Navigation	Equipment used to assist mariners in determining position and warn of dangers and obstructions by providing references such as audio, visual, or electronic signals.
Armed Service	An organized military force of a nation or group of nations.
Battle Streamers	Battle streamers are 2 3/4-inch wide by 4-foot long cloth ribbons that are attached to the ceremonial version of our Coast Guard colors. They represent Coast Guard heroic actions in naval engagements throughout the history of our Service. Our earliest battle streamer is for the Maritime Protection of the New Republic from 1790-1797. The Coast Guard started using battle streamers in 1968.
Capability	The ability to execute a specified course of action.
Command and Control	The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Commander's Intent	The commander's intent conveys the "end state" and the commander's desired course of action. The concept of operations details the commander's estimated sequence of actions to achieve this end state and contains essential elements of a plan—i.e., what is to be done and how the commander plans to do it. The commander's intent reflects the individual's vision and conveys the commander's thinking through mission-type orders, in which subordinates are encouraged to exercise initiative and are given freedom to act independently.
Culture	The beliefs, customs, and institutions of an organization.
Doctrine	Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
Domestic	Pertaining to one's own or a particular country.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)	The Exclusive Economic Zone is comprised of those waters seaward of a coastal state's territorial sea and extending no further than 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea is drawn. In this zone, a coastal state may exercise jurisdiction and control over natural resources, both living and non-living.
Effective Presence	Having the right assets and capabilities at the right place at the right time.
Force-in-Being	Forces that are capitalized and in a sufficient state of readiness to respond as needed. As one of the nation's five Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is a specialized, capitalized, complementary, non-redundant force-in-being available to the National Command Authorities as a specialized instrument of national security.
Function	See Roles.
High Seas	The sea or ocean beyond the territorial waters and contiguous zone of a country.
Humanitarian	Having concern for or helping to improve the welfare of mankind.
International Maritime Organization (IMO)	The International Maritime Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations that is responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing pollution from ships.
Intermodal	The relationship between different modes of transportation. An "intermodal connection" is a place where cargoes move from one mode of transportation to another, such as a container yard where shipping containers are transferred from ships to trucks or rail cars.
International	Between or among nations or concerned with the relations between nations.
Joint	Activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of more than one armed service of the same nation participate.
Lightering	The process of discharging or loading vessels anchored offshore. In the United States, the term generally is used to describe the process of offloading liquid cargo from a large tanker located in a designated "lightering zone" into smaller coastal tankers or barges.
Mandate	To authorize or decree a particular action, as by the enactment of a law.
Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ)	In 1984, the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of the Navy signed a memorandum of agreement establishing Maritime Defense Zone Commands to coordinate the defense of the coastal United States. Coast Guard Atlantic Area and Pacific Area Commanders are responsible to their respective Navy Fleet Commanders-in-Chief for coastal defense planning and operations, as well as for validating the requirements for naval coastal warfare missions. Since 1994, MDZ has expanded to include foreign harbor defense, port security, and coastal sea control in littoral areas. The MDZ Commanders employ forces composed of active and reserve units of the Coast Guard and Navy.

Memorandum of Agreement	An agreement between two or more agencies concerning mutually supporting services and responsibilities.
Missions	<p>1. The mandated services the Coast Guard performs in pursuit of its fundamental roles. Syn: Duties. The missions the Coast Guard performs in fulfilling its roles are:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Search and Rescue; Marine Safety; Recreational Boating Safety; Port and Waterways Security; Maritime Law Enforcement—Drug Interdiction; Maritime Law Enforcement—Living Marine Resources; Maritime Law Enforcement—Alien Migrant Interdiction; Maritime Law Enforcement—General; Marine Environmental Protection; Aids to Navigation; Ice Operations; Bridge Administration; Vessel Traffic Management; National Defense; and International Ice Patrol.</p> <p>2. Tasks or operations assigned to an individual or unit.</p>
Marine Transportation System (MTS)	The Marine Transportation System consists of waterways, ports, and their intermodal connections, vessels, vehicles, and system users. Each component is a complex system within itself and is closely linked with the other components.
National Security	<p>National Security:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A collective term encompassing both the national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations.</li> <li>2. A favorable foreign relations position.</li> <li>3. A defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.</li> </ol>
Port State Control Program	The Port State Control program exists under congressional mandate to eliminate sub-standard vessels from U.S. waters. It came about as a result of an increased number of non-U.S. flag commercial and passenger vessels arriving and departing U.S. waters. The program requires boardings of foreign flag vessels prior to their entry to U.S. ports to ensure compliance with international conventions such as SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) and MARPOL (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) and provides for detention of vessels found not in compliance with requirements.
Principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)	The principles of military operations other than war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war that are universally true and relevant. Military operations other than war focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, and promoting peace, and may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime, conflict, and war.
Principles of War	The principles of war represent the best efforts of military thinkers to identify those aspects of warfare that are universally true and relevant. The principles of war generally focus on large-scale, sustained combat operations, during which the primary goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible.

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Regulatory	Of or concerning a rule, law, order, or direction from a superior or competent authority regulating action or conduct.
Roles	<p>The enduring purposes for which the Coast Guard is established and organized. Syn: Functions. Our fundamental roles are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Maritime Security. Protect America's maritime borders and suppress violations of federal law in the maritime region.</li><li>• Maritime Safety. Save lives and property at sea through prevention and response activities.</li><li>• Protection of Natural Resources. Protect the marine environment and the natural resources within it through prevention and response activities.</li><li>• Maritime Mobility. Provide essential services that undergird an effective, efficient, and safe marine transportation system.</li><li>• National Defense. Defend the nation as a full partner with the Navy and the other U.S. Armed Forces in support of America's national security and military strategies and operations.</li></ul>
Search and Rescue (SAR)	Search and Rescue is the use of available resources to assist persons and property in potential or actual distress. The Coast Guard is the lead agency for Maritime SAR. The Commandant has divided the Maritime SAR Area into two sections, the Atlantic Maritime Area and the Pacific Maritime Area. The Atlantic Area Commander is the Atlantic Area SAR Coordinator, and the Pacific Area Commander is the Pacific Area SAR Coordinator.
Specialized Service	An armed service specialized for a certain type or class of duties. The Coast Guard operates as a specialized service when part of the Navy.
Tactical Level	The level at which the missions are actually executed. For example, a small boat responding to a search-and-rescue mission.

# THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

As a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, the principles of war also apply to the Coast Guard, particularly when we engage in joint military operations with the Navy and the other armed services. Like the broader principles to which the Service adheres, these principles do not constitute a checklist that should be memorized. Rather, they provide a framework for thinking about the requirements of warfare and, when taken out of the context of combat, other types operations as well.

The principles are as follows<sup>52</sup>:

- **Objective.** The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces' capability and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nevertheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objective must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not directly contribute to achieving the objective.
- **Mass.** The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.
- **Maneuver.** The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.
- **Offensive.** The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.
- **Economy of Force.** The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, or deception in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.
- **Unity of Command.** The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multi-national and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command.
- **Simplicity.** The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.

- Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place in a manner for which it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

- Security. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing our vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases our combat power and preserves freedom of action.

## THE PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Military Operations Other Than War encompass a broad range of military operations and support a variety of purposes, including: supporting national objectives, deterring war, returning to a state of peace, promoting peace, keeping day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict, maintaining U.S. influence in foreign lands, and supporting U.S. civil authorities consistent with applicable law. Support of these objectives is achieved by providing military forces and resources to accomplish a wide range of missions other than warfighting. The principles of war, though principally associated with large-scale combat operations, generally apply to MOOTW, though sometimes in different ways. Strikes and raids, for example, rely on the principles of surprise, offensive, economy of force, and mass to achieve a favorable outcome. However, political considerations and the nature of many MOOTW require an underpinning of additional principles described below. MOOTW that require combat operations (such as some forms of peace enforcement, or strikes and raids) require joint force commanders (JFC) to fully consider the principles of war and principles of MOOTW.<sup>53</sup>

- Objective. Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
  - JFCs must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. As an example, excessive U.S. casualties incurred during a peacekeeping operation may cause abandonment of the operation.
  - Although defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW, it is important to do so to keep U.S. forces focused on a clear, attainable military objective. Specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment and phase transitions.
  - The political objectives that military objectives are based on may not specifically address the desired military end state. JFCs should, therefore, translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through a rigorous and continuous mission and threat analysis. JFCs should carefully explain to political authorities the implications of political decisions on capabilities and risk to military forces. Care should be taken to avoid misunderstandings stemming from a lack of common terminology.
- Change to initial military objectives may occur because political and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation, or it may occur because the situation itself changes. JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective. These changes may be very subtle, yet they still require adjustment of the military objectives. If this adjustment is not made, the military objectives may no longer support the political objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force security may be compromised.
- Unity of Effort. Seek unity of effort in every operation.
  - This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. However, in MOOTW, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international, foreign, and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort.
  - While the chain of command for U.S. military forces remains inviolate (flowing from the National Command Authorities through the combatant commander to

- the subordinate JFC), command arrangements among coalition partners may be less well-defined and not include full command authority. Under such circumstances, commanders must establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort. Because MOOTW will often be conducted at the small-unit level, it is important that all levels understand the informal and formal relationships.
- Security. Never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.
    - This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.
    - The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. This protection may be exercised against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to the operation; for example, terrorists, or looters after a civil crisis or natural disaster. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. All personnel should stay alert even in a non-hostile operation with little or no perceived risk. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to plan for and posture the necessary capability to quickly transition to combat should circumstances change.
    - In addition to the right of self-defense, operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of U.S. military operations should still be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation inherent in MOOTW, coupled with the potential for rapid change, require that operations security be an integral part of the operation. Operations security planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the possibility coverage may compromise essential security or disclose critical information.
  - Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations. The perceived neutrality of these protected elements may be a factor in their security. Protection of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) or private volunteer organization (PVO) by U.S. military forces may create the perception that the NGO or PVO is pro-U.S. Therefore, an NGO or PVO may be reluctant to accept the U.S. military's protection.
  - Restraint. Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
    - A single act could cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.
    - Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the rules of engagement (ROE) and are quickly informed of changes. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war, consistent always with the right of self-defense. Restraint is best achieved when ROE issued at the beginning of an operation address most anticipated situations that may arise. ROE should be consistently reviewed and revised as necessary. Additionally, ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

- Perseverance. Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. The underlying causes of the crisis may be elusive, making it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option's impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action, but frames that action within the larger context of strategic aims. Often, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success. This will often involve political, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to supplement military efforts.
- Legitimacy. Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable.
  - In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. This audience may be the U.S. public, foreign nations, the populations in the area of responsibility/joint operations area, or the participating forces. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. The prudent use of psychological operations and humanitarian and civic assistance programs assists in developing a sense of legitimacy for the supported government.
  - Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. It may be reinforced by restraint in the use of force, the type of forces employed, and the disciplined conduct of the forces involved. The perception of legitimacy by the U.S. public is strengthened if there are obvious national or humanitarian interests at stake, and if there is assurance that American lives are not being needlessly or carelessly risked.
  - Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace which it governs. Because the populace perceives that the government has genuine authority to govern and uses proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that government as legitimate.

## FURTHER READING

Hamilton's Vision and Circular of 4 June 1791—No other service or agency of the federal government ever received clearer sailing directions than the Coast Guard did from its founder, Alexander Hamilton. It is known that Hamilton had a deep and abiding concern as to the conduct of the crews. This is evidenced by his superbly crafted 4 June 1791 "Letter of Instruction." As Captain-Commandant Horatio Davis Smith wrote in his early history of the U.S. Revenue Marine Service, "the Circular embodied the views of the Secretary concerning the Service he had created, the success of which was problematical, and over whose fortunes he watched with considerable solicitude. He was ever ready to listen to suggestions of officers tending to improve the Corps, and stood ready to aid the elevation and improvement of the Service by personal influence and the ready eloquence, of which he was such a complete master." Hamilton's Circular, available on the Internet at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/hamiltonletter.html>, should be thoroughly reviewed and studied by all Coast Guard personnel—officer, enlisted, civilian, and auxiliary.

Headquarters Circular No. 126 of 16 October 1936—There is a tendency to believe that current statements are original expressions of purpose and expectation, but in truth they are not. *America's Maritime Guardian* is not the first authoritative statement of Coast Guard doctrine. In 1936, for example, Headquarters Circular No. 126 laid down doctrine that with minimum editing (largely to update our mission set) would be as applicable today as it was more than 60 years ago. Circular No. 126 is available on the Internet at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gcp/history/HQCircular126.html>.

Strategic Planning Documents—*America's Maritime Guardian* describes what we do, why we do it, and who we are as an organization. It does not describe the challenges we face as a nation and Service, our vision for the future, our goals to reach that future, or when and how we plan to reach our goals. These subjects are addressed in the following strategic planning documents.

- The White House. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. December 1999.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*. 1997.
- Department of Transportation. *Strategic Plan* (current edition).
- United States Coast Guard. *Coast Guard 2020*. May 1998.
- United States Coast Guard. *United States Coast Guard Strategic Plan* (current edition).
- Office of Naval Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center. *Threats and Challenges to Maritime Security*. 1 March 1999.
- Mendel, William W. and Murl D. Munger. *Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1997.
- Office of National Drug Control Policy. *The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998: A Ten-Year Plan*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1998.
- Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard Roles and Missions. *A Coast Guard for the Twenty-First Century*. December 1999.

History—*America's Maritime Guardian* provides a brief overview of the rich history of the Coast Guard and its predecessor organizations. A better knowledge of the history of the Coast Guard, as contained in the following recommendations, will enhance the reader's understanding of our Service. The Coast Guard Historian's Office also maintains a list of the best books on Coast Guard history in print on the Internet at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/bestbooks.html>.

- Beard, Barrett Thomas. *Wonderful Flying Machines: A History of U.S. Coast Guard Helicopters*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996.
  - Browning, Robert M., Jr. "The Coast Guard Captains of the Port," in Jan M. Copes and Timothy Runyon, ed., *To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic*. New York: Westview Press, 1994.
  - Evans, Stephen H. *The United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915: A Definitive History*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1949.
  - Johnson, Robert Erwin. *Guardians of the Sea: History of the United State Coast Guard, 1915 to the Present*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1987.
  - King, Irving H. *George Washington's Coast Guard: Origins of the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1789-1801*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1978.
  - King, Irving H. *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1996.
  - King, Irving H. *The Coast Guard Under Sail: The U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1789-1865*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1989.
  - Junger, Sebastian. *The Perfect Storm*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997.
  - Larzelere, Alex. *The Coast Guard at War*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997.
  - Noble, Dennis L. *Lifeboat Sailors: Disasters, Rescues, and the Perilous Future of the Coast Guard's Small Boat Stations*. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2000.
  - Noble, Dennis L. *Lighthouses & Keepers: The U.S. Lighthouse Service and Its Legacy*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997.
  - Noble, Dennis L. *That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878-1915*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1994.
  - Noble, Dennis L. and Truman R. Strobbridge. *Alaska and the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service, 1867-1915*. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.
  - U.S. Coast Guard. *International Ice Patrol*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, July 1984.
  - Willoughby, Malcolm F. *The U.S. Coast Guard in World War II*. New York: Arno Printing, 1980.
- Maritime Policy—The Coast Guard not only executes U.S. maritime policy, we also play a significant role in the development of that policy. The following are excellent books on maritime policy issues.
- Degenhardt, Henry W. *Maritime Affairs: A World Handbook*. New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1985.
  - Fuss, Charles M., Jr. and W.T. Leland. *Sea of Grass*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996.
  - Galdorisi, George V. and Kevin R. Vienna. *Beyond the Law of the Sea*. Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1987.
  - Ginifer, Jeremy and Michael Pugh, ed. *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1994.
  - Kearsley, Harold J. *Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century*. Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing, 1992.
  - Oakley, Robert B. *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998.

- Staly, Robert Stephens, II. *The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping*. New York: Lynne Rienr Publishers, 1992.
- Till, Geoffrey, ed. *Seapower: Theory and Practice*. Essex, UK: Frank Cass, 1994.
- Wang, James C.F. *Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law*. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992.
- Williams, Michael C. *Civil-Military Relations and Peace-keeping*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 321, August 1998.

Legal Authorities—The Coast Guard has been granted broad legal authority to act. The following publication outlines the numerous sources of that authority.

- Coast Guard Legal Authorities, COMDTPUB P5850.2B.

## Endnotes

- 1 *Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National Military Strategy*; 3 October 1995. This document may be found on the Coast Guard Intranet site at <http://cgweb.comdt.uscg.mil/g-opd/NAVGARD/navgard1.htm>.
- 2 Stephen H. Evans, *The United States Coast Guard, 1790-1915: A Definitive History* (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949), p. 5 [hereafter Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*].
- 3 Quoted in Robert Erwin Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 1.
- 4 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 13.
- 5 Act of August 4, 1790 (1 Stat. L., 145, 175) (ten per cutter—a master, three mates, four mariners, and two boys).
- 6 Dennis L. Noble, *Lighthouses & Keepers: The U.S. Lighthouse Service and its Legacy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 7. There were at least eleven lighthouses in the colonies before the Revolution, but the first one is generally agreed to have been the Boston Light, located on Little Brewster Island, Boston Harbor, Massachusetts. *Id.*, p. 5.
- 7 Act of August 7, 1789 (1 Stat. L., 53).
- 8 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 4.
- 9 Act of July 1, 1797 (1 Stat. L. 523, 525).
- 10 Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, p. 2.
- 11 Act of December 22, 1837 (5 Stat. L. 208).
- 12 Act of July 7, 1838 (5 Stat. L. 304), quoted in Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 29.
- 13 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 29.
- 14 Joshua M. Smith, "So Far Distant from the Eye of Authority": The Embargo of 1807 and the U.S. Navy, 1807-1809," in William B. Cogar (ed.), *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Twelfth Naval History Symposium* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), p. 132.
- 15 For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Warren S. Howard, *American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837-1862* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1963).
- 16 Quoted in *The U.S. Coast Guard: A Historical Overview* by the Office of the Coast Guard Historian.
- 17 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 76.
- 18 President Lincoln invoked the provisions of section 98 of *An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage*, 2 March 1799, which stated that "revenue cutters shall, whenever the President of the United States shall so direct, co-operate with the navy of the United States, during which time, they shall be under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy...." 1 Stat. L. 626, pp. 699-700.
- 19 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 75, citing *Army and Navy Journal*, 26 November 1864. This claim was verified by Captain (E) J. H. Pulsifer, USCG (Ret.) in the *U.S.C.G. Association Journal*, 1917, Vol. I, No. 1.
- 20 For many decades the Service had no official title, although "Revenue Marine" or "Revenue Service" seem to have been the most common appellations in the 1800s. Not until 1863 did Congress actually call the Service by name. In that year, Congress used the name in *An Act in Relation to Commissioned Officers of the United States Revenue Cutter Service*, 4 February 1863, 12 Stat. L. 639.
- 21 Irving H. King, *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 11-13.
- 22 *Id.*, p. 13.
- 23 In 1872, the fleet consisted of 35 cutters, of which 25 were steamers. *Id.*, p. 14. In 1881, the numbers were 36 and 31, respectively. *Id.*, p. 17.
- 24 Joe A. Mobley, *Ship Ashore! The U.S. Lifesavers of Coastal North Carolina* (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, 1994), pp. 26-27.
- 25 For a discussion of the *Huron* and *Metropolis* disasters and their effect, see Mobley, *Ship Ashore!*, pp. 53-90.

- 26 This task was a precursor to those associated with Maritime Defense Zones during the late twentieth century.
- 27 Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, pp. 169-72. In his letter to Congress, the President wrote:
- On the 11th of May, 1898, there occurred a conflict in the Bay of Cardenas, Cuba, in which the naval torpedo boat *Winslow* was disabled, her commander wounded, and one of her officers and a part of her crew killed by the enemy's fire.
- In the face of a most galling fire from the enemy's guns the revenue cutter *Hudson*, commanded by First Lieutenant Frank H. Newcombe, [USRCS], rescued the disabled *Winslow*, her wounded commander, and remaining crew. The commander of the *Hudson* kept his vessel in the very hottest fire of the action ... until he finally [was able to tow] that vessel out of range of the enemy's guns, a deed of special gallantry. *Id.*, pp. 171-2.
- 28 Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, p. 20.
- 29 King, *The Coast Guard Expands*, p. 232.
- 30 Coast Guard aviation traces its beginnings to 1915, when Lieutenants Elmer F. Stone and Norman B. Hall of the cutter *Onondaga* persuaded Captain Benjamin M. Chiswell to allow them to fly search missions for the cutter in a borrowed aircraft. Their success led Congress to authorize a fledgling aviation program, but Congress failed to follow up with appropriations. The program lay dormant until after World War I, when the Coast Guard established an air station in Morehead City, North Carolina, using an abandoned naval air station and borrowed Navy flying boats. Again, the failure of appropriations doomed the program, and the air station closed in 1922. Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, pp. 42, 67.
- 31 P.L. 755, June 22, 1936, 49 Stat. 1820. The law did not apply on the inland waters of the United States, except the Great Lakes and their connecting waters.
- 32 During World War II, even the reserves required augmentation in order to meet port security needs. In June 1942, the Coast Guard established a Temporary Reserve made up of men and women who were excluded from full-time military service. By 1944, 50,000 served, primarily as a part-time Volunteer Port-Security Force. Robert M. Browning, Jr., *Captains of the Port* (Washington, DC: Coast Guard Historian's Office, 1993), pp. 15-16.
- 33 *Id.*, p. 177.
- 34 *Id.*, pp. 195-196.
- 35 *Id.*, pp. 220-22. The acronym LORAN, adopted to conceal the project from our enemies, was a shortened version of "Long Range Navigation." *Id.*, p. 221.
- 36 Alex Larzelere, *The Coast Guard at War: Vietnam 1965-1975* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 7.
- 37 *Id.*, p. 121.
- 38 Originally known as the "Atlantic Merchant Vessel Emergency Reporting System," AMVER became operational on 18 July 1958. A history of AMVER may be found on the Coast Guard Internet site at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g opr/amver/history.htm>.
- 39 Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea*, p. 341.
- 40 The Timber Reserve Act of 1822, 3 Stat. L. 651 (23 February 1822) authorized the President to "employ so much of the land and naval forces of the United States" as necessary to preserve public stands of live oak, used to build the stout hulls of U.S. men-o'-war, located in Florida. According to Evans, the Revenue Marine enforced this law. Evans, *Definitive History of the Coast Guard*, p. 29.
- 41 Act of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152, codified at 33 U.S. Code § 407.
- 42 The three forward-deployed fleets are the Fifth Fleet in the Arabian Gulf/Middle East, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific.

- 43 Interagency Task Force Report on Coast Guard Roles and Missions, *A Coast Guard for the Twenty First Century*, 3 December 1999, p. ix.
- 44 This document can be found on the Coast Guard Intranet site at <http://cgweb.comdt.uscg.mil/gopd/NAVWARD/navgard1.htm>.
- 45 10 U.S. Code § 5062.
- 46 The prohibition is statutory for the Army and Air Force (Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. L. 145, 152; codified at 18 U.S. Code § 1385); it is a matter of policy for the Navy and Marine Corps.
- 47 14 U.S. Code § 2.
- 48 *Annual Report of the United States Coast Guard for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1915*, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1915, Treasury Department Document No. 2746, Coast Guard, p. 45.
- 49 Alexander Hamilton, *Letter of Instruction*, 4 June 1791, ¶ 3; available on the Internet at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/hamiltonletter.html>.
- 50 Irving H. King, *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 8, 198.
- 51 Hamilton, *Letter of Instruction*, ¶ 14.
- 52 Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine For Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), pp. A1-A3.
- 53 Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995).