

# MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY



## CETO QUICK LOOK:

Dealing with the Civilian Population in Post-Saddam Iraq  
February 6, 2003



**Introduction.** The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab conducted a Fast Train Wargame Thursday, January 30, 2003. Its purpose was to examine ways US forces dealt with local populations, from the US Marine Corps Combined Action Program (CAP) experience in Vietnam to other experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan, with the focus on dealing with the civilian population in a post-Saddam Iraq. Participants included former and current senior Defense, State, and Agency officials, as well as retired Marine Corps General Officers, officers who served in the CAP and with Special Forces in Vietnam, and distinguished authors and academics.

Subsequent to the Fast Train, the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO)<sup>1</sup> held several other discussions and distilled the major points surrounding this issue into this Quick Look report. Several attachments are included to provide additional information (*see side bar*). For the most part the information in this report will neither be new nor surprising to Marine commanders. It is submitted merely to assist commanders in discussions as to potential Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and training to prepare for operations in a post-Saddam Iraq.

Although a huge amount of work already has been done within the Pentagon, US Central Command, and elsewhere to develop policies and procedures to be implemented in a post-Saddam Iraq, little of this information was available for this effort. Nevertheless, Marines and their

commanders will need to know those policies and more importantly, how to apply them within their sectors.

### Attachments

**CAP-Like Experiences in Vietnam, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan**

**Urban Swarm – Tactics for the Urban Environment**

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<sup>1</sup> CETO is a think tank dedicated to developing new ideas for the US Marine Corps. CETO operates as a division of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab.

**Assumptions.** The following assumptions describe the situation US and Coalition forces may face in a post-Saddam Iraq:

- US and Coalition forces initially will be responsible for Iraqi governance.
- US and Coalition forces will establish and implement policies and rules pertaining to governance, weapons prohibitions, and disarmament.
- Iraq will have a developed infrastructure that functions and provides a wide range of services, but may have some interruptions in places due to conflict.
- There will be many organizations and groups involved in providing the Iraqi people with basic necessities after combat operations.
- The Iraqi people are likely to be generally compliant with US and Coalition forces and the policies and rules they implement.
- The potential exists for violence directed at the US and Coalition force and at Iraqi individuals and groups.
- Boundaries will be based on ethnic, clan, religious and cultural topologies rather than traditional terrain features.

**General Considerations.** Based on these assumptions, the following considerations describe some of the things Marines and their commanders will need to think about when developing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and training to prepare for operations in a post-Saddam Iraq.

### ***Window of Opportunity***

A window of opportunity may exist in the first 30 to 60 days of US and Coalition forces arriving in-country. This period is critical because everyone within Iraq and the rest of the world will be watching to see exactly what the US and the Coalition will do and how we will do it.

The policies and rules the US and the Coalition implement at the very beginning and the way our forces interact with the Iraqi people will set the tone for longer-term efforts and garner either Iraqi and international support or condemnation. The US and the Coalition will need to quickly establish and implement policy decisions and rules, and our forces will need to communicate them to the Iraqi people in order to elicit their compliance. US and Coalition forces will need to quickly exert their control over the Iraqi infrastructure which will be central to providing the basic necessities of life to the Iraqi people. The more that US and Coalition forces generate the perception that a post-Saddam era is better than the past, the easier we will find our duties.

### ***US and Coalition Responsibilities for Post-Saddam Iraq***

Although there may be a US or an international diplomat responsible for administering Iraq, such as the Special Representative to the Secretary General in Somalia or the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will take time for his civilian organization to arrive and take charge. Therefore, at least initially, the US and Coalition military will be responsible for administering Iraq.

This initial US and Coalition force assumption of responsibility for governance within Iraq may begin well before the official end of combat operations in all areas. This will include responsibility for insuring that basic services such as civil law protection and the distribution of basic necessities such as food, water, medicine, shelter, electricity, et al, are available to all Iraqis. It also will include establishing policies and rules for the country as a whole and for regional and local levels –

communicating them to the Iraqi people, and enforcing them in a timely fashion with fairness and common sense.

In addition to dealing with the Iraqi military, from disarmament to demobilization and reintegration or training and use in various roles, the US and Coalition forces will be responsible for three major areas that will be absolutely critical to mission success:

- First and foremost is **maintaining a safe and secure environment** for the Iraqi people.
- Second is **insuring that the Iraqi people have the basic necessities of life** – food, water, shelter, heat, governance, medical, press, schools, etc. Both of these will be major areas of interest not only for the Iraqi people, but for the US and international public as well.
- Third is the **rapid return of control of the Iraqi infrastructure and national institutions to Iraqis** in keeping with our “liberation” vice “conquering” mindset.

### *Iraqi Infrastructure*

Commanders at all levels will need to understand the political and social dynamics of Iraq because these dynamics will need to be the baseline for how US and Coalition forces operate and interface with the people. They will need to be familiar with the organizations and individuals that are responsible for performing key functions within Iraq, in particular those providing humanitarian relief and other basic necessities. Although individual Marines and soldiers will not need to know the specifics of these dynamics, they must be familiar with and understand the policies and rules within their area of operation and must be able to communicate them to the Iraqi people.

Iraq is a modern country; it is not a Somalia or Afghanistan. It has a developed infrastructure that functions and provides a wide range of services. Much of this infrastructure will remain in place and will be capable of functioning after the arrival of US forces in Iraq. Critical infrastructure that has been destroyed inadvertently during combat operations, or by withdrawing forces loyal to Saddam, should be given high priority for rebuilding projects.

Existing infrastructure (both human and physical) should be leveraged to the greatest extent practicable and augmented with assets from the military, other US and Coalition governmental departments and agencies, and NGOs. US and Coalition forces will need to work with the Iraqi infrastructure and determine how best to overlay themselves with it in order to control civil society. They will need to establish combined and joint Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) and work closely with US State Department, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and other officials to prioritize US, Coalition and other assistance and development efforts. They also will need to establish Civil Military Councils at various levels that facilitate the interface with the Iraqi people and give them the opportunity to address various issues such as security, humanitarian relief, schools, etc. Military commanders should be prepared to participate actively and lead these councils and other efforts that address the people’s needs.

Another major challenge US and Coalition forces will face is how to selectively leverage the talents of Iraqis to operate and administer the infrastructure. The current regime in Iraq rests on three pillars: the kinship network that surrounds and supports Saddam; the institutions of party and state that implement his orders; and an elite that enjoys most of the benefits

of the state-controlled oil resources. Saddam refers to the first two pillars respectively as “ahl al-thiqah” (the people of trust whom he can rely on for loyalty) and “ahl al-kihbrah” (the people of expertise who are the technocrats and professional administrators). The people of trust are drawn almost wholly from Saddam’s kinship group, his extended family and clan. A system of marriages within the clan has strengthened this extended family and its hold on power. During Saddam’s long tenure, his extended family has occupied key posts in the security system and Republican Guards.

It will be important to identify “white” and “black” lists of those Iraqis who should remain in key leadership positions within the infrastructure, and those who should be removed from power. In this process, the US military will have to balance how much of the clan network can be removed without bringing a halt to the institutions, especially security. The ahl al-kihbrah (the experts, technocrats, and educated professionals) are more numerous than the “people of trust” and are in the various institutions of state. The bureaucracy, which together with the educational establishment employs about 17 percent of the workforce, is the repository of much of Iraq’s educated middle class, and it will remain the bulwark of the government after any regime change.

### ***Potential for Violence***

Although the Iraqi people are likely to be generally compliant with US forces and the policies and rules they implement, potential exists for violence directed at US and Coalition forces and at Iraqi individuals and groups. This potential will increase over time limited only by highly demonstrable progress in both the quality of life for the people and the “Iraqization” of governance.

The way in which US forces arrive in Iraq will set the tone for how the Iraqi people will see and interact with them. Will the US have to fight in order to get in or will there be some type of negotiated settlement that opens the door for a peaceful US entry?

Having to fight will cause casualties among the civilian population and damage some infrastructure; whether this is done by US or Iraqi forces, the US will be blamed. Fighting also may cause the Iraqi people to rally behind their government, just as the Serbian people rallied behind Slobodan Milosevic throughout the NATO bombing campaign, and view the US as an oppressor and occupier, not a liberator. This scenario also may make it more difficult initially for US forces to control and obtain the support of the existing Iraqi infrastructure to provide the Iraqi people with the basic necessities of life.

If there is a negotiated settlement and a peaceful entry, US forces may be seen more as liberators and may be able to more quickly coordinate with the existing Iraqi infrastructure.

In either scenario, there may be fighting among different ethnic groups to settle past wrongs, to seek independence from Iraq, or simply to take advantage of the confusion of the situation. There may be simple crime and lawlessness. There may be demonstrations and riots for food or for control of certain areas. There most likely will be groups and individuals who will be unhappy with the arrival of US forces for various reasons, whether ideological or pragmatic. Other countries such as Iran also may attempt to destabilize the situation and target US forces, Iraqi civilians or NGOs to raise security concerns, sow seeds of discontent, disrupt humanitarian relief, and turn public opinion against the US.

### ***Other Organizations***

In addition to US and Coalition military and the existing Iraqi bureaucracy, there will be other organizations and groups involved in providing the Iraqi people the basic necessities of life. This most likely will include USAID, the United Nations and its subordinate organizations such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the European Union and its Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Arab League, and a wide range of international, non-governmental, and private organizations. Some of these organizations already may be operating in Iraq, while most will not begin their efforts until after the US military has arrived in Iraq and provided a safe and secure environment for them to operate.

The US military must be prepared to deal with these organizations and to leverage their capabilities. Operating some type of a CMOG has proven effective in past operations for coordinating with these organizations. Information sharing with these various groups can be a significant source of valuable insights and information, but also can be a possible operational security challenge.

### ***Areas of Responsibility***

Iraq is a very complex society, with different ethnic groups, religions, and political identities. Marine commanders will need to understand the differences within these groups and between different sectors.

When assigning military areas of responsibility and sectors for operations, commanders should carefully set boundaries that take ethnic, clan, religious, and cultural perspectives into consideration. These areas should not be based alone on traditional geographic imperatives.

### ***General Disarmament***

In order to maintain a safe and secure environment, not only will the US need to deal with the Iraqi military, but it will need to establish and implement policies and rules pertaining to weapons prohibitions and disarmament for the Iraqi police and civilian population. There may be a total disarmament and weapons confiscation or turn-in policy, or there may be prohibitions on certain types of weapons or the carrying of weapons in public places. Different locations may have different rules. The military will need to publicize these rules throughout their sectors and use various Iraqi officials to help explain and facilitate the process.

### ***Potential Application of Combined Action Program Experience***

Supporting the post-Saddam security infrastructure will be a primary goal of US and Coalition military forces. One method for providing both combat support and ensuring that these forces are carrying out their responsibilities in accordance with US policy is through the context of combined patrols and security operations. Ideally this also would apply to searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and other banned weapons systems and supporting infrastructure. It also might include apprehension of suspected war criminals and their subsequent protection from reprisal pending trials and appropriate retribution.

A brief description of the Combined Action Program (CAP) experience in Vietnam along with more recent experiences dealing with civil populations in Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan is at Attachment 1.

A CAP-like concept could be a tool that has application in Iraq at the precinct or township level. It could be used to oversee

the performance of local law enforcement and the public safety apparatus, and facilitate cooperation and understanding between the US and Coalition force and Iraqi's operating the infrastructure. It also could provide a means of interfacing with the Iraqi people within the context of nation building and not as conquerors.

As indicated in Bing West's revision to *The Village*, the CAP provided the indigenous people with an enduring context as to American ideals, values, and way of life. Even thirty years after the war and in spite of national efforts to shape perceptions, villagers remembered the CAP members fondly and had their concept of America shaped by their shared experience. A similar experience could occur in Iraq.

CAP is unlikely to have application everywhere and at all times. Saturation patrolling – possibly using the “Swarm Tactics” developed within Project Metropolis – may have more applicability in areas where there is greater threat or an effective local public safety/security apparatus is not available. This is particularly likely in the larger cities. See Attachment 2 for a discussion of Swarm Tactics.

### ***Linguistic and Cultural Expertise***

US and Coalition commanders and their forces will need translators and linguists who can read and write as well as listen and speak in the appropriate languages, using the correct accents. It is important that they be trustworthy. It also will be important to use individuals from the same ethnic and cultural group that the forces are dealing with. Although some US and Coalition forces may have their own military personnel who possess these skill sets, most will not. Most linguists will have to come from within Iraq. The challenge will be to establish a mechanism to screen, vet, and

hire people with these skill sets, and then to check to insure that what they are translating is correct. Military and civilian linguists most likely will be serving with Special Operations Forces and other US governmental officials, and might be able to provide assistance in this process.

Commanders will also need people on their staff with an in-depth understanding of Iraqi national and local perspectives, history, culture, customs, etc. Political Officers from the State Department should be able to provide some assistance in this area. There are many individuals with this expertise based on years of experience and academic study who could provide invaluable assistance. They could be contracted on a temporary basis and used as advisors in the same way USAID mans its operations in places such as Afghanistan today.

### ***Human and Cultural Intelligence and Information***

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Cultural Intelligence, and information will all be critically important not only for mission success but also to protect the force. Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, provides an overview of information gathering; a summary of that information is at Attachment 3.

### ***Operational Employment***

Joint Pub 3-07.3 provides several valuable suggestions concerning Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping missions. To successfully perform their missions, US and Coalition forces will need freedom of movement, open access to all areas within their assigned sectors, and the ability to freely patrol, observe, monitor, verify, and report their findings.

Key factors concerning employment of the force include:

- Active Patrolling
- Rapid responses to alleged or actual violations of agreements or other incidents
- Effective operation of checkpoints
- Close liaison with all parties
- Constant vigilance throughout the operational area

### ***Post-Combat Activities***

Post-combat activities will require interagency and multinational planning. They may include military support to relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction or development, negotiation and mediation, management of arms, or human rights investigations conducted by other agencies. In some cases, military forces will provide direct support to a recovering nation or population.

A major consideration concerning post-combat activities is that they should begin as soon as operations permit. Civilian populations will need the basic necessities of life, and based on the character of the combat operations, the population may be in dire need of some things such as medical treatment, shelter, food and water.

Guidelines for planning post-combat or post-hostility activities are discussed in detail in Joint Pub 3-07.

### ***Training***

Leadership education includes classroom instruction, discussion of lessons learned and historical experiences, an exchange of

ideas, and situational exercises. Training for a specific mission is done at both the individual and unit level and is tailored to specific mission and situation. See Attachment 4 for a comprehensive list of suggested training from Joint Pub 3-07.3.

### ***Measures of Effectiveness***

Commanders should develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) that support their mission as a means to evaluate operations and guide decision making. There is no single all-encompassing checklist for MOEs; they will vary according to the mission. Joint Pub 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, provides a good discussion of MOE characteristics and includes examples.

A summary of the types of characteristics MOEs should possess is at Attachment 5.

In the beginning of operations, metrics to measure the success of the mission may be more military specific, such as the number of Iraqi leaders replaced, the number of weapons turned in or confiscated, the number of ambushes against US and Coalition forces, etc. Over time the metrics will become more civilian oriented, such as drops in mortality rates, increases in food and water available, decreases in the incidents of disease, increases in per-capita income, increases in calorie intake, reduction in the number of refugees and displaced persons, increases in the number of people moving back into their homes, and increases in the presence and capabilities of NGO and international organizations.

## **Attachment 1**

### **Combined Action Program-Like Experiences Vietnam, Somalia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan**

Since the Marine Corps' Vietnam experience with the Combined Action Program, the concept of working with local populations has evolved over time.

In Vietnam, the Marine Corps instituted the CAP as a tactic for defense in-depth. Platoons and squads were assigned to villages and hamlets where Marines and local militia forces were involved in counterinsurgency and pacification efforts.

In Somalia, the Unified Task Force assigned US and other national forces to various Humanitarian Relief Sectors where they were responsible for all operations in their areas. It also established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) which served as the central hub for coordination between the military and the United Nations (UN), non-government organizations (NGO), and other similar humanitarian relief organizations.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, the NATO headquarters assigned forces to various sectors where they are responsible for all operations in their areas. They also established Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Forces (CJMOTF) which coordinated nation building and humanitarian relief efforts with international organizations, NGOs, local governments, and civilian populations. The CJMOTFs also provide officers to work directly with and in support of UN and other organizations responsible for civil reconstruction, elections, establishment of a judicial system, demining, and other governmental organs. Additionally, during the initial years in Bosnia, Special Forces teams lived in the villages and towns where they monitored and reported on the activities and compliance of the factions and groups with agreements; they also served as a direct communications link between NATO and faction commanders..

In Afghanistan, the Joint and Combined headquarters again established a CJMOTF which performs similar functions as discussed above. The headquarters also created Joint Regional Teams with civil and military membership, including coalition forces, small Afghan National Army contingents, US Special Forces, USAID and State Department officials, and others. These teams will have enough capability – with on-call backup – to provide increased security for reconstruction by the Afghan government and international donors.

## **Attachment 2**

### **Urban Swarm – Tactics for the Urban Environment**

This tactic is similar to the tactics used by police in responding to an emergency, which requires backup. The swarm envisions numerous small teams of fireteam or squad size operating in a dispersed non-contiguous fashion in the urban environment. As these units patrol in their assigned area, they must be ready to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by neighboring teams. Whether they can respond to a call for assistance will be dependent upon their own current situation and distance from the supporting request.

As a call for assistance is transmitted, the requester should give an estimate of his requirements. This request would be transmitted to all other teams on the net and the COC. The battletwatch captain would then direct the appropriate teams to respond to the request, and adjust other units to fill or cover gaps that are created.

Alternative methods could include the teams closest responding without direction, simply reporting their intention to respond. As we move closer to improved situation awareness at all levels, where all units have the current location of adjacent units, this form of response will be more feasible.

Command of teams responding to a request could also take several forms. The commander or leader of the unit requesting support, as the one with the best awareness of the situation could assume tactical command of responding units. Other options could include the senior commander on scene assuming command, or in some instances, a command element being sent to the scene by the battletwatch captain.

Another option for command in crises is to have units conduct the swarm tactic as a version of the Platoon Patrol Base. In this case, the platoon commander and platoon sergeant would be in the vicinity of the platoon patrols, and these personnel would be on scene in case of emergency. This thought process could be carried up to company, battalion, etc. with appropriate levels of command available to meet the situation. What must be avoided is “over commanding” a situation.

Key to this tactic is speed, and flexibility. The requesting leader must be able to quickly and concisely inform the responding units of the situation, and maneuvering them to advantage as they arrive on scene. The responding units must also have the flexibility and training to enter an emerging situation seamlessly. Implicit in this concept is the capability of junior leaders to assume increased levels of responsibility and command. The tactic also requires the COC to be able to quickly respond to the crises and to adjust forces to the gaps that are created.

What must be avoided at all costs in this tactic is establishing patterns. If units respond to crises in redundant or similar patterns, the enemy will quickly observe this and can easily create crises in order to lure responding units into ambushes, or to exploit the temporary void created on the battlefield by responding units.

**Attachment 3**  
**Information, Human and Cultural Intelligence**  
**Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations**

The methodology for collecting information is generally the same as that for other military operations. However, in these types of operations, the sources are different and collection efforts are directed toward:

- Leaders of disputing parties
- Civilian populations
- Insurgent elements
- Terrorists
- Police and paramilitary forces
- Criminal activity
- Historical background that led to the dispute
- Cultural, ethnic, and religious factors
- Economic conditions
- Unique environmental threats to the force and others

Special Operations forces, including Civil Affairs and PSYOP often can provide information about the attitudes and needs of the civilian populace.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) will be critical to these dealing with civilian populations. All members of the force are potential sources of information, particularly if they can speak the local languages. Personnel from NGOs and international organizations may also provide valuable information, without jeopardizing their legitimate security concerns.

Cultural Intelligence is essential for commanders, staffs, and forces prior to deployment and while deployed. This should include a basic overview of the country and region, its people, their customs, religions, government, and economy. It also should identify the traditional do's and don'ts appropriate to that culture, and identify key communicators and organizations within the assigned areas of operation

Sharing unclassified information and providing timely and frequent liaison with the NGOs and other organizations will help them perform their missions while building support and confidence with the military force.

## **Attachment 4 Training**

### **Joint Pub 3-07.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations**

Members of a deploying force will require individual knowledge and proficiency in the many areas, such as:

- US objectives and the implications of military activities
- Regional orientation, such as geography, climate, ethnic groups, a brief history of the area, an overview of political aspects, belligerent parties and their weapons systems
- Customs and basic language phrases
- Negotiation and mediation skills
- Understanding roles and contributions of NGOs
- Organization, mission, and background of the higher-level civil headquarters in charge of the operation
- Rules of Engagement and appropriate use of force
- Information gathering and reporting such as the types of information collected and reporting formats
- Vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, weapon, and insignia identification
- Media interaction
- Detainee handling
- Individual, vehicle and building searches, to include procedures for searching females
- Riot control measures
- Use of non-lethal weapons
- Antiterrorism measures
- Counterintelligence measures
- Sniper recognition and countermeasures
- Reaction to hostage situations
- Identification of mines and unexploded ordnance
- NBC identification, detection, and protection
- Driver education
- Land navigation
- Marksmanship
- Survival skills including actions if kidnapped
- First aid
- Field sanitation
- Physical security
- Evacuation procedure
- Convoy operations
- Airmobile operations
- Checkpoint construction
- Stress management

Units preparing for deployment should train in collective tasks, including:

- OP operations
- Patrolling
- Command Post operations
- Convoy operations
- Route reconnaissance
- Cordon and search
- Checkpoint operations
- Investigating procedures
- Collecting information
- Monitoring boundaries
- Supervising a truce or cease fire
- Maintaining law and order
- Escorting VIPs and belligerent parties

Effective situational training exercises can present members of a deploying force with situations they expect to encounter during their mission. By reviewing lessons learned and after action reports of similar operations, leaders can identify unique situations that their units can expect to encounter. Unit leaders decide what the proper response is in each of these situations, and train the unit accordingly. These responses become an immediate action drill and should be well rehearsed. Some samples of situations that may be appropriate include:

- Members of the belligerent parties or local populace request assistance
- The force apprehends a civilian criminal
- A crowd mobs a food distribution truck or center
- Someone discovers a land mine
- A sniper engages a patrol
- Someone finds a dead body
- A relief worker requests transportation on military vehicles
- A member of the military force is taken hostage or kidnapped
- A convoy encounters a belligerent party at a checkpoint
- A person or vehicle fails to stop when ordered to do so
- A family approaches a checkpoint and must be searched
- Someone is observed stealing something from a force member or vehicle
- A large crowd of onlookers lingers outside the entrance to the base camp and interferes with movement into and out of the gate

**Attachment 5**  
**Measures of Effectiveness**  
**Joint Pub 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign**  
**Humanitarian Assistance**

MOEs should possess the following characteristics:

- **Appropriate.** They should correlate to the audience objectives.
- **Mission Related.** They should reflect the specific military objectives to reach an end state.
- **Measureable.** Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than non-quantitative ones and generally are the measure of choice when the situation permits. Clear measurement criteria should be established when using non-quantitative MOE.
- **Numerically Realistic.** MOEs should be limited to the number required to portray the relief environment.
- **Sensitive.** They should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions.
- **Universally Understood and Accepted.** MOEs should be clear and consensus-based among the US and its Coalition partners, other US departments and agencies, the Iraqi infrastructure, NGOs, and others to insure that all concerned focus on efforts desired as well as the criteria for transition and termination of the military's role.
- **Useful.** MOEs should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.
- **Valid.** MOEs should accurately measure the phenomenon intended.

**Attachment 6**  
**Considerations for Humanitarian Assistance, Peacekeeping, and**  
**Peace Enforcement Operations**  
**General Anthony Zinni, USMC Retired**

(As published in Appendix E Planning and Employment Considerations for MOOTW, Marine Corps Operations, MCDP 1-0)

One of the United States military's most experienced leaders in the field of MOOTW, General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Retired), has developed the following considerations for humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations:

- Each operation is unique. We must be careful what lessons we learn from a single experience.
- Each operation has two key aspects: (1) the degree of complexity of the operation, and (2) the degree of consent of the involved parties and the international community for the operation.
- The earlier the involvement, the better the chance for success.
- Start planning as early as possible, including everyone in the planning process.
- Make as thorough an assessment as possible before deployment.
- Conduct a thorough mission analysis, determining the centers of gravity, end state, commander's intent, measures of effectiveness, exit strategy, and the estimated duration of the operation.
- Stay focused on the mission. Line up military tasks with political objectives. Avoid mission creep and allow for mission shifts. A mission shift is a conscious decision, made by the political leadership in consultation with the military commander, responding to a changing situation.
- Centralize planning and decentralize execution of the operation. This allows subordinate commanders to make appropriate adjustments to meet their individual situation or rapidly changing conditions.
- Coordinate everything with everybody. Establish coordination mechanisms that include political, military, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and the interested parties.
- Know the culture and the issues. We must know who the decision makers are. We must know how the involved parties think. We cannot impose our cultural values on people with their own culture.

- Start or restore key institutions as early as possible.
- Don't lose the initiative and momentum.
- Don't make unnecessary enemies. If you do, don't treat them gently. Avoid mindsets or use words that might come back to haunt you.
- Seek unity of effort and unity of command. Create the fewest possible seams between organizations and involved parties.
- Open a dialogue with everyone. Establish a forum for each of the involved parties.
- Encourage innovation and nontraditional responses.
- Personalities often are more important than processes. You need the right people in the right places.
- Be careful whom you empower. Think carefully about who you invite to participate, use as a go-between, or enter into contracts with since you are giving them influence in the process.
- Decide on the image you want to portray and keep focused on it. Whatever the image, humanitarian or as firm, but well-intentioned agent of change, ensure your troops are aware of it so they can conduct themselves accordingly.
- Centralize information management. Ensure that your public affairs and psychological operations are coordinated, accurate, and consistent.
- Seek compatibility in all operations; cultural and political compatibility and military interoperability are crucial to success. The interests, cultures, capabilities, and motivations of all the parties may not be uniform, but they cannot be allowed to work against each other.
- Senior commanders and their staffs need the most education and training in nontraditional roles. The troops need awareness and understanding of their roles. The commander and the staff need to develop and apply new skills, such as negotiating, supporting humanitarian organizations effectively and appropriately, and building coordinating agencies with humanitarian goals.

**Attachment 7**  
**Operational Priorities**  
**Excerpt from the Draft Small Wars II Manual**

*Stop the bleeding, Start the breathing*

First Aid Steps

Priority of effort will vary with the specific situation, but a useful methodology is to categorize tasks in the following prioritized hierarchy: physiological needs; safety and security needs; satisfactory interpersonal relations with family, friends, and society; self-esteem and personal reputation needs; and self-satisfaction needs.

Physiological Needs. The basic requirements of life: food, water, clean air.

Safety Needs. Once physiological needs are satisfied, the desire for security; stability; protection; freedom from fear, anxiety, and chaos; law and order; begins to manifest itself.

Interpersonal Relations. Once physiological and safety needs are reasonably well satisfied, the need for fulfilling interpersonal relations with family, friends, and loved ones asserts itself. When unsatisfied, a person will lament the absence of friends and loved ones. Attaining a place of belonging will become more important than anything else. Everyone wants to have a sense of place, of being needed, appreciated and belonging. This is a common trait of all primates.

Esteem Needs. All people with healthy psyches have a need for a stable, positive evaluation of themselves. This is derived from self-esteem and from the esteem of others. Dignity, prestige, reputation, status recognition, fame, and glory are all manifestations of the basic need for esteem.

Priority of effort for military operations should be assigned in the order listed above - highest priority going to physiological needs, followed by safety needs, etc. Planners should group identified challenges and deficiencies within each category and develop a prioritized list of tasks. The relative importance of the military component is highest for ensuring physiological and safety needs and becomes more of a supporting effort when facilitating the higher order needs. Certainly, in some situations, the mission might only dictate assurance of physiological and safety needs, but in nearly all cases this would merely be to ameliorate the symptoms and would not be aimed at fixing the causes of the conflict. Sustained solutions will in almost all cases require addressing group and personal belongingness and esteem needs. It is important to recognize that all needs in the hierarchy are interdependent. Physiological needs provide the foundation for safety needs and safety needs in turn provide the foundation for interpersonal needs etc. Once fulfilled, each category of needs is then subsumed and the predominant motivation comes from the desire to fulfill the next order need. This progressive and interdependent hierarchy explains why humanitarian operations are never long appreciated. Starving victims fed and nursed to health today, will soon forget the deeds of their benefactors and in short order will be pursuing fulfillment of the next order needs, their earlier fear and hunger pangs quickly relegated to distant memory. The small wars planner must anticipate this progression and be prepared to respond when the populace is satisfied and prepared to continue the quest for greater self-satisfaction at the next level

of hierarchy. One could say this hierarchy represents with more fidelity what the founding fathers called the pursuit of happiness. Our conduct of small wars must be responsive to and be prepared to cope with this innate desire.

This hierarchy of needs is analogous to the life saving steps of stop the bleeding, start the breathing.... While it is self-evident that sustenance, shelter, and safety must be a top priority, and usually do receive top priority, it is equally important for the military to consider belongingness and esteem needs. While exceedingly difficult to do, if these needs can be satisfied, even partially, it will greatly facilitate the stabilization of a fractured society and is the best guide to creating a sustainable peace.

## **Attachment 8**

### **Anecdotal Input from an Australian Officer**

#### **Based on his Experiences in Somalia and East Timor**

The issue of handing over law and order to a newly implemented or existing police force is an interesting dilemma. The policy has to come from the US Government on what form of law and order is to exist.

For instance in Somalia the lawyers (you have to have them) decided that existing Somali law should be used as the enforcement tool for the newly raised police force. The problem was, unknown to us, that the police force decided to settle a few old scores. They did this via capital punishment and public executions which is fine, however you as the occupying force who put that police force in power are now supporting the use of violence against the people. The other issue is due to the concern and continued requirement to rid the country of weapons. It was decided to only lightly arm the police force. The police force could not handle large violent crowds which are inevitable if power, water and food are cut off. Will US forces support the local police in crowd control or any other situations they cannot handle? If so, are they trained and equipped to do so? If you get involved in crowd control you will be once again drawn into direct violence against the local population.

In East Timor it was decided that during the interim period of raising and training a local police force that the military would handle all local security and crowd control. Police from all over the world (US, Australians and South Africans in particular) were handling local police issues while large scale riot control was handled by a Portuguese Police Battalion. These guys were brutal to say the least and eventually their mere presence at the scene would diffuse any situation. But what it did do is alleviate the military from local police issues. However there continued to be a requirement to provide military security to the interim police while undertaking their duties. There is then a period where the newly raised indigenous police force must be accompanied by military personnel until their acceptance and authority is established.

The next issue is command and control of civil military interface. Regardless of how much any commander decides he doesn't want to play civil / military ops he is a fool to ignore it. He can however empower personnel throughout all levels of his organization to handle day to day issues of the civil / military relationship. This is run in parallel to his military chain and must exist at a minimum of the Coy level and above. In Australia, in the absence of a dedicated organization, we employ our arty battalion to do this. I admit this is fine if the guns are not undertaking primary missions, but because liaison exists between guns and maneuver commanders at all levels and this is an ideal organization. They have the personal ear of commanders at all levels and have their own C2 structure and communications to ensure civil / military affairs doesn't interfere with ops.

These are only a couple of issues, but certainly the emphasis is that there is no easy way out of town in this scenario and the more you ignore and not prepare for it, the more **years** you will spend trying to extract yourself.

**Attachment 9**  
**Peace Enforcement Operations Fundamentals**  
**Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations**

- The ultimate measure of success in peace enforcement operations is political, not military.
- The area of operations will normally be characterized by some density of civilians
- Impartiality is desirable but not necessary. It may neither be attainable nor central to achieving success.
- Restraint in the use of force or, where appropriate, the use of non-lethal force will be required.
- Peace enforcement forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force to separate the combatants physically.
- If the threat of force fails, the peace enforcement force may have to engage in offensive actions.
- Participation in operations with multinational partners involves several unique factors for commanders and staffs to consider.

**Attachment 10  
Range of Military Operations and Tasks**

**Time-Phased, Sequential, and / or Concurrent**



<p><b><u>Combat</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High tempo ops</li> <li>• Develop transition plan</li> <li>• Identify interpreters</li> <li>• Initiate consolidation ops as areas liberated</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Consolidation</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Begin white / black lists</li> <li>• Seal borders</li> <li>• Limited humanitarian assistance (HA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• medical</li> <li>• food / water</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Clean-up</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Firm base-security ops / patrols</li> <li>• Develop indigenous security force concept</li> <li>• Increase HA role <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• medical</li> <li>• food / water</li> <li>• power / energy</li> <li>• sanitation</li> </ul> </li> <li>• UN / NGO involvement</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>PK / PE</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Firm base-security ops / patrols</li> <li>• Form constabulary security forces <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• train</li> <li>• advisor role</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Enable commerce / economic activity</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Stability Opns</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organize national defense forces</li> <li>• Heavy Humanitarian support</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Handover</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UN / US monitor</li> <li>• Reduced presence</li> <li>• Focus on training</li> </ul>
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## Attachment 11 References

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