Foreword

We are a nation at war, and our Marines and Sailors in combat remain our number one priority. We will continue our focus on the following:

- Achieve victory in the Long War
- Right-size our Corps to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in the Active Component
- Provide our Nation a naval force that is fully prepared for employment as a MAGTF across the spectrum of conflict
- Reset and modernize to “be most ready when the Nation is least ready”
- Improve the quality of life for our Marines and our families
- Rededicate ourselves to our Core Values and warrior ethos
- Posture the Marine Corps for the future

*Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* established the direction of the Corps for the uncertainties ahead. It confirmed our core beliefs as an institution and the warfighting concepts we have validated in the crucible of war — from the sands of Iraq to the mountains of Afghanistan. To continue to fulfill our legislated role as an expeditionary force in readiness, we must remain agile, multicapable, and lethal. We must always be prepared to respond when our nation calls.

This document contains my guidance for the implementation of *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025*. Inside are specific tasks, deadlines, and responsible agencies. Together, we will build a Corps that is ready to meet the challenges of the future.

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Overview

The Commandant’s Planning Guidance of November 2006 identified seven areas of focus for the Marine Corps. One of these seven areas is to “Posture the Marine Corps for the Future.” Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 (MCV&S 2025) represents the initial phase of achieving CMC’s goal of providing the Nation’s expeditionary “Force of Choice.” The following explanation is provided as an overview of the Vision and Strategy Decision Process (Fig. 1), which will be used to achieve the Marine Corps strategic goals.

The second phase in this process is the decomposition of the strategy section and the derivation of the specified and implied tasks to produce planning guidance to achieve the strategic objectives listed in MCV&S 2025. Over the course of several weeks, The Strategic Vision Group (SVG) convened an Implementation Plan Working Group (IPWG) that conducted mission analysis of the ten objectives. The raw resultant product of the IPWG was approximately 130 specified and implied tasks in total. Over the course of several iterations, the task list has been narrowed to a concise categorization of tasks classified as “essential.” What remains are 41 “essential” tasks, each linked to specific or in some cases multiple strategic objectives.

During the third phase of the implementation process, task execution will be assessed and approved; performance indicators will be validated or realigned; and implementation guidance will be modified as required. These tasks must be continually validated, verified, and adjusted at regular intervals to coincide with quarterly Executive Off-Site conferences where senior leadership will consider the impact of the tasks on the Corps’ vision. The senior leadership of the Corps will therefore directly influence the development of the future Corps through critical decision points as members of the Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC). These decisions and the efforts to “Posture the Marine Corps for the Future” will ultimately be incorporated in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Additionally, while the Marine Corps continues unconstrained requirement generation in capability planning, prioritization and coordination of these efforts are necessary to establish and maintain tempo and momentum in our Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development.

A schematic of the process described in the aforementioned text is depicted in the following graph:
Figure 1

Institutionalizes the concepts & processes & lays the foundation for the sustainment & evolution of the vision and strategy.
Vision

Vision Statement

The Marine Corps of today and 2025 will fight and win our Nation’s battles with multicapable MAGTFs, either from the sea or in sustained operations ashore. Our unique role as the Nation’s force in readiness, along with our values, enduring ethos, and core competencies, will ensure we remain highly responsive to the needs of combatant commanders in an uncertain environment and against irregular threats. Our future Corps will be increasingly reliant on naval deployment, preventative in approach, leaner in equipment, versatile in capabilities, and innovative in mindset. In an evolving and complex world, we will excel as the Nation’s expeditionary “force of choice.”

The Marine Corps of the future will be—

- Dedicated to making Marines imbued with the ideal of selfless service to the Nation.
- Prepared to “live hard” in uncertain, chaotic, and austere environments.
- Deployed forward with relevant and timely capabilities.
- Forged to be lean, agile, and adaptable as individuals and as an institution.
- Focused on executing sustainable expeditionary operations.
- Trained and equipped to lead joint and multinational operations and enable interagency activities.
- Educated and trained to understand and defeat adversaries in complex conflicts.
- Committed to taking care of Marines and their families.
Trends point to shifts in the character and forms of future warfare. Many states will improve their conventional capabilities, and states and non-state actors alike will be able to acquire lethal capabilities. A significant trend is the blurring of what was previously thought to be distinct forms of war or conflict—conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality—into what can be described as hybrid challenges.

**Strategy Statement**

The Marine Corps’ unique contribution to national defense is its role as the Nation’s force in readiness, able to respond rapidly and decisively to crises anywhere in the world. The Corps will continue to fulfill that role—while improving its combat capability to prevail against emerging threats in complex environments.

The Corps will be—

- **Organized** to execute operations with lethal and lean MAGTFs that are mission tailored and able to operate as part of a naval and joint team.
- **Optimized** to conduct naval expeditionary operations while retaining the institutional agility, battlefield flexibility, and initiative to meet constantly changing conditions of war.
- **Modernized** with equipment and logistics that expand expeditionary capability and preserve our ability to operate from the sea.
- **Postured** to prevent or respond to crises with forward positioned MAGTFs—both afloat and ashore—that are engaged and ready to act decisively in response to combatant commanders’ requirements.

These methods will be employed in order to provide the Nation unmatched strategic freedom of maneuver and operational flexibility throughout the 21st century.

**Strategy Objectives**

- Focus on the Individual Marine
- Improve Training and Education for Fog, Friction, and Uncertainty
- Expand Persistent Forward Presence and Engagement
- Posture for Hybrid Threats in Complex Environments
- Reinforce Naval Relationships
- Ensure Amphibious Force Levels Meet Strategic Requirements
- Create Joint Seabasing Capabilities
- Lead Joint/Multinational Operations and Enable Interagency Activities
- Maintain a Ready and Sustainable Reserve
- Build and Deploy Multicapable MAGTFs

The achievement of these objectives will ensure that the Marine Corps is proficient in the identified six core competencies; thereby realizing the vision.

**Core Competencies**

- The Corps conducts persistent forward naval engagement and is always prepared to respond as the Nation’s force in readiness.
- The Corps employs integrated combined arms across the range of military operations and can operate as part of a joint or multinational force.
- The Corps provides forces and specialized detachments for service aboard naval ships, on stations, and for operations ashore.
- The Corps conducts joint forcible entry operations from the sea and develops amphibious landing force capabilities and doctrine.
- The Corps conducts complex expeditionary operations in the urban littorals and other challenging environments.
- The Corps leads joint and multinational operations and enables interagency activities.

**Common Themes**

- Our success has been and will continue to be our dedication to our Core Values and the warrior ethos – “Every Marine a Rifleman” and “Every Marine to the Fight.”
- We must achieve victory in the Long War and provide relevance well into the 21st century.
- By right-sizing the Corps we will sustain forward persistent presence with a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio and improve the quality of life for our Marines, Sailors, and their families.
- Marines are an integral part of the naval service. The Marine Corps is the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness – organized, trained, and equipped to conduct naval campaigns, operate on and from naval platforms, or to execute sustained operations ashore.
We must reset and modernize the force, exploiting technology in command and control, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, training, and unmanned systems to “be the most ready when the Nation is the least ready.”

Crucial to our expeditionary mindset and posture is the necessity to lighten the load of the individual Marine and our MAGTFs.
Objective Task Clusters

The 10 Strategy Objectives from Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 have been clustered into three groups according to similarity and interdependence. Essential tasks which are related to specific, or in some cases, multiple objectives in the cluster have been binned below each of the three clusters accordingly.

As noted in the Overview section, during the third phase of the implementation process, task execution will be assessed and approved; performance indicators will be validated or realigned; and implementation guidance will be modified as required.

For each task the Office of Primary Responsibility will develop a set of measurable parameters to enable the Commandant to track the progress of that task in a quantifiable way. These metrics will be considered as part of the deliverable for each task.

Focus on the Individual Marine - Improve Training and Education for Fog, Friction, and Uncertainty - Posture for Hybrid Threats in Complex Environments – Build and Deploy Multic和平able MAGTFs - Maintain a Ready and Sustainable Reserve

We must analyze the current skill sets and posture future capabilities of the MAGTF to optimize it for operations against hybrid threats in complex environments without sacrificing conventional capabilities. The blurring character of conflict across the range of military operations will require dispersed and decentralized command and control. To conduct operations against hybrid threats in complex environments; such as urbanized littorals, mountainous terrain, and dense jungles, we must have robust intelligence capabilities. All efforts in this vein must improve situational awareness and enable decisionmaking at lower levels.

1. NLT 01 Oct 2009, DC CD&I develop a plan to improve the ability of small unit leaders across the MAGTF to improve their intuitive ability to assess, decide, and act while operating in a more decentralized manner. The plan should address—
   a) Virtual and physical methods for developing unfamiliar training environments, physical and virtual, that expose junior leaders to uncertainty, fog, and friction.
   b) Training devices and systems that enhance our ability to immerse Marines in time-constrained scenarios that closely replicate combat situations.
   c) NLT 01 Dec 2009 brief CMC on COAs to institutionalize a Squad Immersive Training Environment (SITE) at each MEF as a Program of Record (POR).
   d) Methods to share training venues that include ethical decision making and evolving complex environments.
   e) Professional military education initiatives that will enhance the junior leader’s ability to more effectively operate and lead in complex environments with hybrid threats.
2. NLT 01 May 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC Aviation and DC PP&O, develop a plan to leverage existing and identify new technology in developing training devices, systems, simulations, and combat equipment in order to enhance small unit teamwork and improve small-unit leader tactical acumen and decision making. Keep in mind Service imperative to lighten the load.

3. NLT 01 Sep 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC I&L, develop a POA&M to establish training and education support centers at all major Marine Corps installations in order to improve TECOM support to home station training.

4. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC M&RA in coordination with DC CD&I, provide an assessment of any recommended changes to recruiting, retention, assignment, training, and professional education plans, policies, and procedures to develop and sustain junior leaders to operate in decentralized environments. Specifically address assignment policies that maximize operating force tour lengths, and increase the maturity and performance of the junior leader.

5. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC M&RA provide an assessment of any recommended changes to current manpower plans, policies, and procedures that manage individual special skills and regional expertise. Assignment policies should promote unit cohesion prior to the start of Predeployment Training Programs.

6. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC M&RA and DC I&L continue to improve the quality of life of our Marines and Sailors and their families. Specifically—

   a) Provide an assessment and any recommended changes that would improve the quality of life of our Marines, Sailors and their families;

   b) Assess how well our installations are providing support to our activated Reserve Marines and families on independent duty.

7. NLT 01 Oct 2009, DC PP&O provide a plan to determine force rotation and force lay-down requirements that balance a forward postured Marine Corps with deploy-to-dwell ratios that relieve stress on the force.

Marine employment and integration of air and ground-based capabilities reflects our innovative approach to warfighting. Our MAGTFs must be decisive across the range of military operations with their capacity tailored to combatant commanders’ requirements. They must also be trained, manned and equipped to operate as an integrated system through the air, land, and maritime domains, and the information environment.
8. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC CD&l brief CMC on how the Marine Corps will ensure that the responsibilities and equities inherent in Command Element advocacy are defined, articulated, and incorporated in the efforts of the other MAGTF advocates in order to ensure integration in overall MAGTF development.

The Marine Corps must retain its excellence in training and education; ensure sound, rapid decisionmaking; and hone proficiency at applying the capabilities of the MAGTF.

9. NLT 01 Dec 2009, DC CD&l in coordination with DC PP&O will conduct an analysis of CMC-directed training requirements, inspections and reports. When complete, DC CD&l will brief CMC on a plan for consolidating requirements in order to increase time for unit level individual and collective training to meet Mission Essential Task (MET) training requirements.

10. NLT 01 Dec 2009, CD&l, in coordination with DC I&L, DC PP&O, and DC Aviation, create a long-range plan to institutionalize both large-scale exercises and combined arms training in support of developing multi-capable MAGTFs. Training should focus on combined arms operations, urban operations, amphibious operations, and irregular warfare and should seek to leverage alternate venues with realistic complex terrain. The plan should ensure that MAGTFs are assessed on their ability to operate against hybrid threats in a complex environment. Ensure that information operations (IO) training is integrated across the range of military operations.

11. NLT 01 Jul 2009, DC CD&l in coordination with DC I&L, DC PP&O and DC Aviation, develop a range modernization strategy that optimizes use of available land, air, and sea space and seeks to—

   a) Preserve/enhance live fire and combined arms training,
   b) Leverage technology to provide better feedback,
   c) Facilitate cross service utilization,
   d) Support the Joint National Training Center (JNTC),
   e) Mitigate encroachment
   f) Recapture littoral training capabilities.

The strategy should account for the range requirements of future ground and aviation weapon systems that link USMC installations with other services’ installations. The strategy must provide for live/virtual/constructive training venues and it must exercise all elements of the MAGTF and support the training of MEB-level MAGTFs in complex environments.
12. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC I&L in coordination with DC Aviation, MFC/MFP, and DC CD&I, develop a Land and Airspace Acquisition strategy that includes the prioritization of processes for land and airspace acquisition and also addresses encroachment control using federal, state, and local governmental and nongovernmental partnerships to reduce incompatible urban growth near our installations to maximize support to the operating forces.

The demand for robust intelligence capabilities has further multiplied with emergent hybrid threats employing a potent combination of conventional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic capabilities simultaneously in complex environments such as densely populated urbanized littorals. Marine Corps ISR must provide the means to identify, analyze, predict, target, and assess these varied threats, ultimately supporting MAGTF operations and decentralized decision making at lower echelons.

13. NLT 01 Dec 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC Aviation, DC PP&O, DC I&L, DIRC4, and DIRINT, develop, and brief CMC, on a plan to enhance command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and processes to collect, fuse, and distribute relevant information throughout the battlespace, down to the squad level.

Specifically address—

a) The interoperability of ground, aviation, logistics and C2 systems that integrate a common MAGTF operating picture.

b) The use of both manned and unmanned systems that will allow the MAGTF to effectively operate in the information environment.

c) Current and future Navy-Marine Corps systems that enable ship-to-shore command and control.

d) The development of organic systems that are interoperable with joint and interagency systems, as well as capable of operating in a multinational setting, to facilitate the capability and capacity in a complex information environment.

14. NLT 01 May 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DIRINT, DIRC4, DC PP&O and DC Aviation, provide CMC a brief addressing the way-ahead for enabling the MAGTF with advanced, persistent surveillance, and reconnaissance over extended ranges and in complex operating environments. This should reflect ongoing and planned initiatives for the integration and networking of ground and aerial sensors to include non-traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (NTISR). The way-ahead should exploit the capabilities of manned and unmanned systems and integrate data from ISR, NTISR, and national assets.
15. NLT 01 Mar 2009, DIRINT develop a plan to establish a Service capability for long-range threat assessment and operating environment forecasting, to support planning for future operating concepts and force development.

We must reconcile equipment size and weight limits to remain both operationally deployable by sea and tactically effective ashore ensuring adequate protection for our Marines. Our integrated combined arms doctrine, centered on the power of multicapable MAGTFs, will prove as relevant in the future as it has throughout our rich history. In complex urban terrain, future operations will often necessitate coordinated, precise fires from ground, air, and naval fire support platforms to rapidly engage the fleeting opportunities often found in irregular warfare.

16. NLT 01 Apr 2009 DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O, DC Aviation and DIR C4 brief CMC on efforts to enhance the ability of the MAGTF to employ organic and joint all weather fires with greater precision and responsiveness. Specifically, shape this modernization to exploit the fleeting opportunities found in hybrid warfare.

17. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC CD&I will develop a brief to CMC that identifies Marine Corps plans to significantly increase the capacity and capability of complementary nonlethal systems that supplement lethal systems and allow for increased options for force application relative to the threat with the ability to limit collateral damage and lethal effects.

18. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC I&L and MARCORSYSCOM brief CMC on efforts to improve the aggressive research, development, acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of equipment that has inherent force protection capability, and that is lighter, easier to maintain, and promotes energy efficiency. Ensure interoperability with and between naval platforms and joint systems.

The emerging security environment and our expeditionary Marine Corps require a logistics capability that is leaner, lighter, less energy-intensive, and capable of being effectively sustained over a greater distance.

19. NLT 01 Apr 2009 DC CD&I, Logistics Integration Division, in coordination with DC I&L and DC Aviation, will brief CMC on current efforts and future plans to sustain the MAGTF, delivering critical support over extended distances without drawing on other combat units for force protection. The brief will specifically address the development and fielding of unmanned air, ground, and maritime delivery systems and the establishment of habitual relationships with GCE units where feasible.

20. NLT 01 May 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O, DC I&L, DC Aviation, DIR C4 and DIRINT brief CMC on how the Marine Corps will enhance reach-back capabilities connected to the appropriate joint, interagency or supporting establishment to support deployed forces with relevant resources and expertise that cannot otherwise be provided within the operating forces.
21. NLT 01 Apr 2009, DC I&L with DC CD&I, in coordination with DC PP&O, MARCORSYSCOM, and the operating forces (MARFORs), provide a POA&M which outlines actions and initiatives to increase agility and lighten the footprint of tactical logistics within the operating forces by extending forward the reach of operational-level logistics providers such as Marine Corps Logistics Command. Examine the viability of options such as strategically positioning supplies/equipment, forward-positioning maintenance, developing a theater-deployable sustainment maintenance capability, and leveraging distribution by actively employing multiple distribution channels.

We will employ a total force approach to meet the Marine Corps’ force generation requirements and pursue policies and operational practices to better develop and access the skill, knowledge, and expertise of Marines in the Reserve Component.

22. NLT 01 May 09 DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O and MARFOR commanders complete a review of the reserve component force structure and identify the optimal reserve force structure to meet Marine Corps force generation requirements. Ensure that we retain a balanced mix of reserve capabilities across the elements of the MAGTF while also seeking out ways in which reserve units may provide unique capabilities. Consideration should be given to using the reserve component as an operational as well as a strategic force provider. Additionally, identify any opportunities to leverage unique abilities of reserve Marines.

23. NLT 01 Feb 2009, DC PP&O in coordination with DC CD&I, DC M&RA and MFR identify policy and process changes necessary to optimize employment of the Reserve Component.

a) Specifically address using the Reserve Component as an operational as well as a strategic force provider. Explore initiatives which provide continuous improvement in the Reserve Component activation and mobilization process in order to sustain the all-volunteer force and to increase the responsiveness, accessibility, and warfighting readiness of the Reserve Component in support of the total force Marine Corps.

b) Address opportunities to leverage unique abilities, cultural expertise, and experience of Reserve Marines working in the interagency, international organization and multinational environment to complement the active component in areas of stabilization operations, civil military activities, and train, advise and assist.
Expand Persistent Forward Presence and Engagement - Lead Joint/Multinational Operations and Enable Interagency Activities

The Marine Corps seeks to provide tailored and persistently engaged, contingency capable MAGTFs for world-wide employment. Marines will consistently deploy in the littoral and deliberately engage per the campaign plans of their respective combatant commanders. Additionally, we will look for opportunities to increase the number of Marines in advisory positions assigned to government and military assistance organizations, including country teams. We will constantly assess and develop opportunities to utilize forward positioned MAGTFs to act decisively as theater “first responders” and to lead or enable Joint / Multinational / Interagency efforts to prevent and respond to crisis, in response to combatant commander requirements.

24. NLT 01 Mar 2009, DC PP&O, in coordination with other DCs and Directors, develop a detailed POA&M depicting the sequential tasks required to provide regionally-focused, contingency-capable MAGTFs to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Included in the POA&M will be a comprehensive evaluation of the CCDR requirements across the full range of military options. The POA&M will specifically address the following:

a) Prioritization of CCDR requirements for TSC, TAA, and Crisis Response

b) Optimization of USMC participation in CCDR Theater Campaign Plans

c) Planning for a sustainable concept of operations to provide balanced, regionally-focused MAGTFs

d) Participation in other security cooperation activities as directed by CMC

25. NLT 01 Dec 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O, DC Aviation and DC I&L develop the future predeployment training program that includes individual, MAGTF component, and MAGTF collective training in support of regionally-focused MAGTFs. The program must be Mission Essential Task List (METL) based and balance conventional core skills training with capability and capacity in the following mission areas: train-advise-assist (TAA), civil affairs, stability operations and humanitarian support operations.

26. NLT 01 Mar 2009 DC CD&I, in coordination with DC PP&O, and DIRINT develop a plan prioritized by region and country to increase cultural expertise and language proficiency, in order to enhance cultural intelligence throughout the Marine Corps.
27. NLT 01 Oct 2009, DC PP&O in coordination with DIRINT, and DC M&RA, establish the requirements to assign Marine Corps personnel to billets external to the Marine Corps that enhance our engagement capability. Specifically assess billets within other US government agencies, partner and friendly nation’s militaries, and military assistance organizations, in accordance with a prioritized strategic regional focus.

28. NLT 01 Mar 2009, DC PP&O develop options to provide an advisor capacity within each MEF.

29. NLT 90 days after metrics and requirements are determined, but NLT 01 Dec 2009 DC M&RA develop a plan to institutionalize a process that manages the lifecycle of personnel with regionally focused expertise in training and advisory activities.

A clearly changing characteristic of the modern battlespace is the shift from a primarily military focus to one that achieves a greater degree of operational integration of all instruments of national power. The Marine Corps seeks to better integrate joint, multinational and interagency capabilities into our training, education, campaign planning and operations while also improving our own capabilities to lead joint forces.

30. NLT 01 Aug 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O, develop a plan to

   a) Expand training, PME opportunities, initiatives and personnel exchanges that better prepare Marine leaders to lead complex joint, interagency and multinational teams, and

   b) Expand training and PME opportunities at Marine Training and Education venues for joint, multinational, and interagency personnel.

31. NLT 01 Aug 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC PP&O, DC Aviation and MFC/MFP develop a comprehensive training plan that increases the level of joint, interagency and multinational participation in our training and exercise programs. Include consideration of “whole of government” participation in major Service-level exercises and to explore alternate training venues for these activities.

32. NLT 01 Apr 2009. DC M&RA in conjunction with DC CD&I develop a plan for tracking Marines with joint, interagency, and combined training and education experience.
33. NLT 01 Oct 2009, DC PP&O, in coordination with DC CD&I, schedule specific exercises for MAGTF CEs to serve as JTF HQs; develop and maintain the capability for all MEFs to provide a JTF command group.

34. NLT 01 Jul 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC I&L, DC PP&O and DC Aviation, develop a plan to create virtual training venues for MAGTF, joint, interagency, multinational and international organization training. The virtual training venues should link USMC installations with other agencies’ installations to facilitate training opportunities.

35. 01 May 2009, DC CD&I in coordination with DC PP&O develop a concept for incorporating all instruments of national influence to achieve “combined actions” at all levels.

36. NLT 01 Jul 2009, DC I&L in coordination with DC PP&O brief CMC on a plan to develop sustainment solutions that maximize existing and new cross-Service, host nation, multinational, interagency agreements.

**Reinforce Naval Relationships – Create Joint Seabasing Capabilities – Ensure Amphibious Force Levels Meet Strategic Requirements**

We must leverage the inherent global reach, presence, and operational flexibility of naval expeditionary forces to prevail in the urban littorals and other challenging environments. To improve our naval operational capability, relationships and skills must be developed and nurtured side-by-side with our Navy counterparts.

37. NLT 01 Jul 2009, DC PP&O in coordination with other DCs, Directors and MARFOR Commanders, develop a plan to reinvigorate naval relationships. This plan should include—

   a) The development/refinement of maritime capabilities in support of a cooperative maritime strategy. These capabilities should include forcible entry from the sea, Maritime Intercept Operations, and other naval expeditionary tasks as determined appropriate.

   b) Refine and clarify command relationships within the naval service.

   c) Re-evaluate and codify the assignment of Marines to persistent USN-related billets. Explore options to make billet more attractive to USMC personnel.
38. NLT 01 Nov 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC PP&O, DC Aviation, the Navy, and the MARFORs develop a plan to renew emphasis on core amphibious operations training and education. The plan should focus on naval expeditionary force tasks like joint forcible entry and maritime intercept operations. Specifically address reinvigorating our amphibious operations capability.

39. NLT 30 Sep 2009, DC I&L in coordination with DC Aviation and DC PP&O produce a plan to increase USN-USMC interoperability and further integrate naval logistics capabilities and equipment that support deployed forces both afloat and ashore.

To balance a forcible entry capability and increase persistent presence, the minimum force of operationally available amphibious ships must be continuously assessed.

40. NLT 01 Feb 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC P&R, DC PP&O, DC Aviation and DC I&L, establish single authority charged with formalizing Operational Posture-Risk Assessment Tool efforts to continually assess the number and types of ships necessary to meet future amphibious ship requirements, and formally engage in the N8 annual Long Range Shipbuilding Strategy process and the Surface Warfare Enterprise.

The ability to project power from the seabase and minimize the footprint of our forces ashore provides tremendous flexibility to the joint force commander.

41. NLT 01 Jan 2009, DC CD&I, in coordination with DC PP&O, DC Aviation and DC I&L, develop options for the Sea Base concept to support full range of military options (TSC) and other CCDR requirements in a joint fight.

   a) Develop options for optimization of MPF(F) in support of things other than MCO

   b) This assessment should consider that the requirements for MCO, contingency operations, and cooperative engagement may differ significantly, requiring a greater number and variety of ships than that of previous estimates.
Conclusion

As the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps is actively taking steps to improve our capabilities and maintain current and future relevance. The power of the Marine Corps will always center on the individual Marine and the MAGTF. The Marines and MAGTFs of the future will continue to adapt to meet the future challenges of different environments. This vision and strategy require a focused effort by all hands — driven by this implementation plan, which we will continually assess. Our metrics will be based on the synchronization of our efforts to advance the Corps’ capacity to succeed in complex environments against hybrid threats. Thank you for your leadership and focused efforts towards this goal; it is a testament to your foresight and will undoubtedly serve our Marines in combat well into the next conflict.