Air Campaign in Prospect1. One exception is Richard E. Simpkin's Race to the Swift. Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (London: Brassey's Defence, 1985), a very useful work on the theory of operations in the ground campaign.
2. The Battle of Cannae (216 BC) was a major clash near the ancient village of Cannae, in Apulia, Italy, between the forces of Rome and Carthage during the Second Punic War, in which the Carthaginian general Hannibal won a great victory. The eventful campaign was begun by a new, aggressive move by Rome. An exceptionally strong field army, estimated at between 48,000 and 85,000 men, was sent to crush the Carthaginians in open battle. On a level plain near Cannae, chosen by Hannibal for his battleground, the Roman legions attacked. Hannibal deliberately allowed his center to be driven in by the Romans' superior numbers, while Hasdrubal's cavalry wheeled round to take the enemy's flank and rear. The Romans, surrounded on all sides and so cramped that their superior number aggravated their flight, were practically annihilated.
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, transl. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 595.
4. J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1958), pp. 95-103.
5. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. 2 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), pp. 37-39.
6. See subsequent discussion in this chapter on Vietnam -- the one example that on the surface could be seen to contradict these general principles.
7. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, transl, and ed. by Frank Ziegler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 31.
8. Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45 (Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), pp. 36-37.
9. Ibid., p. 86.
10. Telford Taylor, The Breaking Wave (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 71.
11. Ronald Lewin, Rommel: As Military Commander (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 275.
13. The Impact of Allied Air Interdiction on German Strategy for Normandy (Washington, DC: US Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, 1969), p. 14.
14. Generalleutnant Klaus Uebe, Russian Reactions to German Airpower in World War II (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1964), p. 100.
15. William W. Momyer, Air Power in Three Wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam) (Washington, DC: US Air Force, 1978), p. 117.
16. Randolf S. and Winston S. Churchill, The Six Day War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), pp. 86, 177.
17. The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 161, 204. The London Sunday Times Insight Team of reporters combines first-rate investigative journalism with lively writing and opinion. The team has authored several books, including best-sellers Philby, An American Melodrama, Do You Sincerely Want to be Rich?, and Watergate. The Yom Kippur War derives from the extensive coverage of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in the London Sunday Times during October 1973.
18. A.J.C. Lavalle, ed., The Vietnamese Air Force 1951-75: Analysis of Its Role in Combat (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, US Air Force Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Vol. 3, Monographs 4-5, 1976), pp. 58-59.
19. The Yom Kippur War, pp. 161-204.
20. Taylor, pp. 108-10.
21. Bekker, pp. 348-9.
22. The Yom Kippur War, p. 213.
23. During this period, the few British raids on the German homeland had no military effect on the battle -- although their subsequent political effect perhaps was significant. More on this aspect when deception is discussed.
24. Richard Suchenwirth, Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1959), pp. 66-67.
25. Taylor, pp. 150-51.
26. Bekker, pp. 313-18.
27. Murray, p. 285.
28. Our emphasis is on the issue of air to defend against air because experience to date has shown that ground-based defenses, whether antiaircraft artillery or guided missile systems, have not been able to provide effective opposition to an air offense.
In 1973, Syrian missile defenses on the Golan Heights forced the Israelis to stop their air attacks for several hours, after which time the Israelis destroyed the missiles and the positions the missiles were to protect.
This 1973 ground-based defense success is the best so far recorded. This observation is not meant to say that ground-based defenses can be ignored by the attacker, or that they have no utility for the defender. For the latter, they may help channelize enemy air operations or may at least force the enemy to devote some effort to overcoming defenses. In the absence of defenses, he might apply that effort in a more dangerous fashion. At some point, perhaps with the introduction of directed-energy weapons, ground-based defense may succeed in thwarting the offense for an extended period. The operational commander must be alert to that possibility: Technological advantages can be crucial.
29. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (New York: Ballantine Books, 1963), p. 137.
30. Clausewitz, pp. 357-59
31. Suchenwirth, pp. 117-18.
32. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur 1941-45 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), pp. 207, 227.
33. James. p. 281.
34. Ibid., pp. 197-99.
35. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949), p. 324.
36. James, p. 324.
37. Kenney, pp. 276-78.
38. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Air Power (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, 1946), p. 14.
39. Kenney, p. 241.
40. Japanese Air Power, p. 15.
41. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 60.
42. The Yom Kippur War, pp. 161, 167.
43. Ibid., pp. 213, 238.
44. Ibid., p. 204.
45. Bekker, p. 229.
46. The V-1 and V-2 missiles had little military impact. Had there been enough of them, had they been more accurate, and had the Germans concentrated them against the ports, they might have been more significant.
47. To illustrate, less than 1 percent of American military pilots have become aces (shooting down five or more enemy aircraft), but that 1 percent has accounted for more than 30 percent of all enemy aircraft destroyed in the air. Gene Gurney, Five Down and Glory (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957, 1965), pp. 207, 242.
48. Suchenwirth. p. 83.
49. Bekker, p. 312.
50. Ezer Weizman, On Eagle's Wings (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), p. 223; and Churchill, p. 86.
51. Japanese Air Power, p. 14.
52. Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. Strategic Air War Against Japan (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Airpower Research Institute 1980) pp. 76-80; and Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, transl. by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Avon Books, 1971), pp. 365-67.
53. During American planning and execution of the bombing campaign against Germany, some of the planners maintained, that destroying enough single-target systems would win the war. Critics of this approach disparagingly referred to these target systems as "panaceas." In retrospect, the petroleum, transportation, and electrical generating systems might have come close to qualifying as real "panaceas." See the remainder of this chapter and chapter 5 for more detail.
54. A. J. C. Lavalle, ed., The Tale of Two Bridges and the Battle for the Skies over North Vietnam (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, 1976), p. 151.
55. Murray, pp. 274-76.
56. Bekker, p. 7.
57. Ibid., p. 31.
58. Taylor, pp. 138-39, 151-59.
59. Murray, pp. 274-76.
60. Bekker, pp. 200-201; and Taylor, p. 145.
61. Bekker, p. 240.
62. Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company [Penguin Books], 1983), pp. 25-27.
63. Japanese Air Power, p. 10.
64. Murray, p. 282.
65. Benjamin S. Lambeth, Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War (Santa Monica, Calf.: Rand Corporation, 1984), pp. 4-7.
66. Paul S. Cutter, "EW Won the Bekaa Valley Air Battle," Military Electronics/Countermeasure, January 1983, p. 106.
67. Lambeth, p. 8.
68. A victory for the English, on 26 August 1346, in the first decade of the Hundred Years' War against the French. Edward III of England landed 4,000 men-at-arms and 10,000 archers (longbowmen) on the Cotentin peninsula in mid-July 1346 and ravaged lower Normandy west of the Seine and as far south as Poissy, just outside Paris. Philip VI of France advanced against Edward with 12,000 men-at-arms. Edward turned sharply northeastward, crossing the Seine at Poissy and the Somme downstream from Abbeville, taking a defensive position at Crecy-en-Pon thieu, where he posted dismounted men-at-arms in the center, with cavalry to their right and left, and archers on both wings. Italian crossbowmen in Philip's service began the assault on the English position, but were routed by the archers and fell back into the path of the French cavalry's first charge. More and more French cavalry came up to make further thoughtless charges at the English center. But while the center stood firm, the archers wheeled forward and the successive detachments of horsemen were mowed down by arrow shots from both sides.
69. Douhet (1869-1930), an Italian military officer, generally is regarded as the father of strategic air power. Trained as an artillery officer, from 1912 to 1915 he commanded the Aeronautical Battalion, Italy's first aviation unit. Through his efforts, the three-engine Caproni bomber was ready for use by the time Italy entered World War I. Douhet's theory of the important role of strategic bombing in disorganizing and annihilating an enemy's war effort was incorporated into future military plans of Italy and the United States. He further advocated creation of an independent air force.
70. Murray, pp. 6-14.
71. Hansel, pp. 18-19.
72. US Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 25-26.
74. Cutter, p. 106.
75. The operational commander's duty is to ensure that he masses superior forces at a particular time and place. That he is inferior in the theater does not relieve him of his duty. In fact, it is the essence of generalship.
76. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cates, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. II (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 704-6.
77. The Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom Kippur War, p. 161. In addition, note that the Israelis lost all of these aircraft to ground-based defenses. This action is the only known instance before or since in which such defenses had an effect on this scale.
78. The Relationship Between Sortie Ratios and Loss Rates for Air-to-Air Battle Engagements During World War II and Korea -- Saber Measures (Charlie) (Washington, DC: Headquarters, US Air Force, Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, 1970), p. 15.
79. J. F. C. Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. III (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963), p. 471.
80. Lambeth, p. 8.
81. John H. Morrow, German Air Power in World War I (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), p. 109.
82. Galland, pp. 150-1, 187.
83. Bekker, pp. 232-42; and Taylor, pp. 151-161.
84. Galland, pp. 30-31.
85. Bekker, p. 242.
86. Ibid., p. 525.
87. Momyer, pp. 147-48.
88. Clausewitz, p. 95.
89. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-53 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 261-63.
90. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 611.
91. Momyer, p. 168.
92. Suchenwirth, pp. 90-91.
93. David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (New York: Avon Books, 1978), p. 175.
94. Ibid., p. 92.
95. USAF Tactical Operations: World War II and Korean War (Washington, DC: USAF Historical Division, Liaison Office, 1962), p. 30.
96. F. M. Salagar, Operation "Strangle" (Italy, Spring 1944]: A Case Study of Tactical Air Interdiction (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1972), p. 62.
97. Ibid.. p. 66.
98. Lewin, p. 274.
99. Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1976), p. 429.
100. Summaries of Selected Military Campaigns (West Point, N.Y.: Department of Military Art and Engineering, US Military Academy, nd, Special Printing for the Department of History, US Air Force Academy, 1960). p. 142.
101. Murray, p. 281.
102. Impact of Allied Air Interdiction on German Strategy for Normandy, p. 1.
103. Fuller, Decision Battles, Vol. 3, p. 560.
104. Impact of Allied Air Interdiction on German Strategy for Normandy, pp. 11-14.
105. USAF Tactical Operations: World War II and Korea, p. 30.
106. Murray, p. 274: and Uebe, p. 100.
107. James, pp. 292-97.
108. Kenney, p. 275.
109. The Yom Kippur War, pp. 182-83.
110. Eube, p. 25.
111. Cutler, pp. 99-100.
112. Oleg Hoeffding, German Air Attacks Against Industry and Railroads in Russia, 1941-45 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1970), pp. 25-27.
113. A. Goutard, The Battle of France 1940, transl. by A. R. P. Burgess (New York: Ives Washburn, 1959), p. 132.
114. Murray, p. 125.
115. Ibid., p. 282.
116. Air Campaigns in the Pacific War, p. 28.
117. Churchill, pp. 181-86.
118. Bekker, p. 195.
119. Ibid., pp. 434-35.
120. Condensed Analysis of the 9th Air Force in the European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: US Army Air Forces, Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Office of Air Force History, 1984; reprinted from 1946 edition), p. 29.
121. James, pp. 485-88.
122. Ibid., pp. 392-94.
123. Air Campaigns in the Pacific War, p. 32.
124. Bekker, p. 411.
125. Ibid., pp. 411, 421.
126. Ibid., p. 439.
127. Momyer, pp. 307-11.
128. Murray, p. 86.
129. Kenney, pp. 270-71.
130. Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957), p. 81.
131. Taylor, p. 164.
132. Ibid., p. 71.
133. Suchenwirth, pp. 64-65.
134. Taylor, pp. 99, 164; and Bekker, pp. 243-46.
135. Bekker, pp. 200-201, 223, 229; and Taylor pp. 135, 138-39.
136. Taylor, pp. 151-59.
137. Bekker, p. 243: and Taylor, p. 164.
138. Taylor, pp. 163-65; and Bekker, pp. 247-48.
139. Galland, pp. 151-53.
140. Murray, p. 278.
141. Galland, pp. 240-41.
142. Suchenwirth, p. 188.
143. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
144. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Transl. and ed. by Anthony G. Power (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1984), p. 177.
145. Hoeffding, pp. 22-23.
146. Fuller, Decisive Battles of the Western World, Vol. 3, p. 296.
147. Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), pp. 317-21.
148. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cates, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. IV: The Pacific -- Guadalcanal to Saipan (August 1943 to July 1944) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. iv.
149. With the exception of the loss of Burma, Japanese lines in the China-Burma-India theater were not much different in August 1945 than in August 1942. Summaries of Selected Military Campaigns. (West Point, N.Y.: Department of Military Art and Engineering, US Military Academy, nd, Special Printing for Department of History, US Air Force Academy, 1960), pp. 152-163.
150. Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 3, 4.
151. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur 1941-45 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), p. 190.
152. Ibid., pp. 331-32.
154. Ibid., pp. 334-35.
155. Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 39-42.
156. James, pp. 607-9.
157. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 213-16.
158. Craven and Cates, Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. II, pp. 428-30.
159. The Israeli attack on Arab air in the June 1967 war is perhaps the only example of a single battle on a single day winning theater air superiority.
160. Richard Lee Scott, Jr., Flying Tiger: Chennault of China (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 70, 90-92.
161. Brown, p. 10.
162. Churchill, p. 82.
163. Bekker, pp. 430-31.