
The Implications Of Chaplaincy Involvement Within Information Operations

By David E. Smith, Chaplain (Colonel), USA

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Army Chief of Chaplains, the Army Chaplain Corps, or the United States Army.

Editorial Abstract: Chaplain Smith reviews the importance of IO as an element of information policy within the context of military strategy, then examines the impact of military religious support operations. Though based on an Army perspective, the implications of unit level ministry participation in information operations, and how this may affect religious support and mission accomplishment, are applicable to all military services.

“Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders.”

– Ronald Reagan, London,
14 June 1989.¹

This statement, made a few months before the Berlin Wall opened, suggests the power of information. As we place the above quote within the context of our global community, information is power and therefore provides opportunities to all people. Walls, wire, and governments cannot hold information captive. Just the opposite situation exists. We live in a world of information overload, where information transcends all aspects of government, diplomacy, economics, and commerce. In understanding the significance of information, the United States has taken steps in order to effectively use it as a tool of national power and national security policy. In the last decade of the twentieth century, military strategists began to understand how informational power may affect military operations because of the “CNN factor.”² Information can assist or hinder mission accomplishment on the battlefield as well as successful negotiations in US foreign policy. Technological advances in information delivery as well as the affects of media coverage have demanded that the US review its information policy to confront current and future national security threats.

This article discusses the importance of information operations as an element of information policy within the context of military strategy. We will review the implications of Unit Ministry Team (UMT) participation in information operations for the Army chaplaincy. This will assist us to better understand the impact of UMT involvement in IO, plus its effect on religious support and mission accomplishment. From this, we will propose alternative roles for the UMT.

Background

The concept of information operations is new. However, history has proven the importance of information as a part of national power within a larger national security policy. Within the realm of international politics, the acronym DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic),



A chaplain's influence. (Defense Link)

illustrates the various elements of national power. Information consists of two elements: public diplomacy and information operations. Each element impacts the other in implementation of information policy. Therefore, we must examine the element of public diplomacy in order to better understand the importance of information operations in the context of military strategy. According to Michael McClellan, Counselor for Public Diplomacy, US Embassy, Dublin, public diplomacy is a term that has only recently come into use with the merger of the former United States Information Agency into the Department of State.³ He defines public diplomacy as “the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or

countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives.⁷⁴ Public diplomacy promotes the nation's interests by informing, engaging, and influencing people in other nations.⁵ Information operations is a fairly new concept within the Department of Defense. As defined by US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, Information Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect the adversary's and influence others' decision making processes, information and information systems, while protecting one's own information and information systems.⁶

Current US Policy and Army Doctrine

An effective information policy will improve the external image of the US, assist in shaping US foreign policy and receptivity of US initiatives abroad, as well as build public support at home, and provide critical capabilities in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Surveys suggest that world opinion of the US, especially within the Arab and Muslim states, generates strong anti-Western sentiment. The US has struggled in building consensus for its foreign policy initiatives, especially within the Arab and Muslim world, and even across Europe. In 2005, the director of the Pew Research Center said "attitudes toward the United States 'have gone from bad to worse'."⁷⁷ Public diplomacy has not been effective in stemming the tide of negative attitudes toward the US. On the "home front," we need to look no further than our GWOT information policy to see the effects of the current situation in Iraq on the will of the American public, as well as with Congress. Over the course of the last two years, public opinion and the will of Congress toward US involvement in Iraq has significantly declined. Also, the US-led coalition has not been effective in winning the Iraqis' hearts and minds. "One of this trend's key causes has been the US military's ineffectiveness in disseminating its message to Iraqi people, its dissemination to make the Iraqi information environment conform to its information operations and public affairs doctrine on how things should be done, rather than vice versa."⁷⁸ Coalition forces have made progress in improving Iraq's infrastructure, governance, and security. However, these positive results have not translated into curbing the insurgency's power base or in changing the negative environment. Captain Bill Putnam, a US Army Reserve Military Intelligence Officer who recently completed a tour in Iraq, stated in "Winning Iraqi Hearts and Minds," that "improving security and providing basic services and jobs will go a long way toward winning the Iraqis over, but this is not enough if the coalition lacks the ability to have its message reach the Iraqi people."⁷⁹ The US and its coalition partners can succeed in tactics and operations, but still lose the war if the US is unable to win the war of ideas.

Why has the US been ineffective in both public diplomacy and information operations? The *US National Security Strategy*, *US National Defense Strategy*, *US National Military Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, all address the increasing dependence upon information as an

important element of national power.¹⁰ However, the lack of coordination, integration, synchronization, and implementation within US foreign policy highlights demonstrates our ineffective use of information: "An essential starting point is to recognize that US foreign policy is weakened by a failure to include public diplomacy systematically in the formulation and implementation of policy."¹¹ The US has a serious image problem abroad. However, it is not enough for the US to attempt to improve its image if its foreign policy contradicts its values. The US has not strategically linked its public diplomacy with foreign policy. An effective information policy requires comprehensive departmental and interagency coordination and cooperation. Several agencies participate in public diplomacy: Department of Defense, State Department, and the US Agency for International Development. All have a vested interest in public diplomacy. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World suggests there is a lack of interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide the Department of State and all federal agency information efforts.¹² This results in an inconsistent message within US foreign policy and a lack of unity of effort. As we review the other US information policy element—information operations—we see the concept of influencing the enemy's decision making process or using information to benefit the US, is not new. The US demonstrated recent successes influencing other countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Libya.¹³ However, Captain Putnam states that the US has achieved limited success in Iraq.¹⁴ An analysis of information operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests the US led coalition has not successfully used its superior technology, public affairs, and the media against the insurgency. In any insurgency, a military imperative is to win the hearts and minds of the local people.

The US experiences difficulty in integrating both elements of information power, which sharply contrasts our technological advantage in information systems. In addition, the US fields the most capable military force in the world. The challenges within information policy have led the US to make several changes in order to take advantage of our technological superiority and military capabilities. We will review only those elements that affect information operations. Allen W. Bratschelet writes in *Field Artillery Journal*: Information Operations are growing in importance, playing a critical role in national security. Uniquely, IO effects often transcend the traditional battlefield, extending beyond the intended military target and breaching the bounds of the commander's kinetic battlespace. Occasionally decisive, though more often a force multiplier, IO can shape the battlefield, creating the conditions for the commander to employ his chosen defeat mechanism.¹⁵

Bratschelet cites several sources that address the significance of IO: *Joint Vision 2020*, *National Security Strategy* (2001), the *Transformational Planning Guidance*, and the *Information Roadmap*.¹⁶ Each of these documents describes the transcending importance of IO in current and future military operations. Information superiority becomes a critical factor in gaining and maintaining full spectrum domination. However, to get to this point, the Department of Defense (DOD) must initiate

a doctrinal shift. Christopher J. Lamb writing in *Joint Force Quarterly* states that according to the DOD Transformational Planning Guidance, pursuing transformation means “the Department must align itself with the information revolution not just by exploiting information technology, but by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and operating concepts.”¹⁷ The Secretary of Defense requires DOD make IO a core military competency, meaning IO is no longer a supporting or enabler capability. With this commitment, DOD has been directed to integrate IO into contingency and crisis action planning, execution of military operations, and training and equipping of the force. The result of this recommendation is the Information Operations Roadmap, suggesting the importance that DOD has placed on developing IO into a critical warfighting capability. The Roadmap provides a common framework from which Services and Combatant Commanders can understand how IO contributes to joint plans and operations, and provides an understanding of IO’s functions and related capabilities. The Roadmap also provides a new supporting definition: “IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related activities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”¹⁸ Additionally, the revised (13 Feb 2006) Joint Publication 3-13 *Information Operations*, aligns itself with DOD’s Information Operations Roadmap. The revised joint doctrine adds several important changes: realigns public affairs (PA) and civil military operations (CMO) as related capabilities, adds a chapter on intelligence and communications support, and discusses the relationship of IO to strategic communications. Additionally, the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) has proposed a program statement to the Joint Action Steering Committee that will introduce a publication to specify multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for cultural impact on tactical operations. The MTTP will provide a “greater understanding of the cultural aspects of societies and the potential impact on tactical operations when US forces fail to recognize, respect, and understand host nation customs and courtesies.”¹⁹


UMT Involvement in IO

IO-related capabilities of public affairs (PA) and civil-military operations (CMO) are very important for our discussion. Both these activities make a significant contribution to IO. Delineating these core capabilities will provide each activity with the freedom to coordinate, integrate and execute their primary missions, while concurrently maintaining the flexibility to support the other core IO capabilities. By pursuing their own objectives, PA and CMO can complement IO. However, success requires close coordination and integration between all of them. The same holds true within religious support (RS) operations. As we investigate information operations as it pertains to the Army chaplaincy and the Unit

Ministry Team (UMT), we must review US Army Chaplaincy doctrine in reference to IO. Chaplains have both Title 10 US Code and Army Regulation 165-1 responsibilities to provide RS, in order to ensure the free exercise of religion for all soldiers. A commander has RS responsibility within his/her command. However, it is the chaplain who provides RS to include religious services, sacraments and rites, pastoral care, religious education, religious/humanitarian support, and religious support planning/operations and training. Thus, statutory and regulatory authority for ministry rests solely with the chaplain, and the US government recognizes the primary role of religious support belongs to the religious community. The federal government also recognizes the special religious support needs of armed forces personnel, and the difficulty of providing organized, effective religious support. The isolation, unique environment, and training for combat zones throughout the world generate special religious support requirements. The federal government provides the chaplaincy to meet these needs.²⁰

The chaplain does not accomplish this mission alone: chaplains and chaplain assistants form a Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The UMT is a task organized, or mission-based organization, designed to provide religious, spiritual, and ethical needs for a particular unit’s soldiers, families, and authorized civilians. RS includes three major functions: nurture the living, care for the dying, and honor the dead.²¹ But, the UMT must function beyond religious leadership roles functions as a staff element responsible for coordinating the RS mission within the command. As noted in FM 1-05, *Religious Support*, the chaplain and chaplain assistant have specific staff responsibilities. These are to develop and implement the commander’s RS program, exercise staff supervision and technical control over RS throughout the command, translate operational plans into battlespace ministry priorities, advise the commander and staff on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operation, and support the commander in the execution of CMO.²²

Current doctrine, whether Joint, Army, Religious Support, or Information Operations, makes negligible mention of chaplain or UMT involvement in IO. As noted earlier, CMO is a related function of IO. FM 1-05, *Religious Support*, describes UMT involvement in military operations other than war (MOOTW) as providing commander’s liaison with local religious leaders, and faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations (IO).²³ However, these regulations prohibit the chaplain from performing as a sole participant in mediations, or direct participant in negotiations.²⁴ FM 1-05 provides an abbreviated appendix on religious support in CMO. Additionally, as the UMT conducts mission analysis for a specific operation, they can assist the staff by providing a religious assessment of the area of operation, as part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). In the current GWOT, culture and religion are of primary importance in the planning and execution of the IO campaign plan. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, religion is foundational to understanding the culture, commerce, government, and the people in each



Chaplain's Corps Insignia. (US Army)

country. The UMT can be instrumental in providing an in-depth analysis of local faith practices, religious and social structure, and the potential influence of the local religious leaders. None of these activities are IO-specific functions. However, there is an additional level of UMT involvement that transcends the traditional RS role. Chaplain (Colonel) William S. Lee, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Burke, and Lieutenant Colonel Zonna M. Crayne, in their Air University College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education paper, strongly advocate for chaplain involvement during the stability phase as a religious liaison officer.²⁵

UMTs have contributed significantly to the information environment in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Commanders have requested UMTs participation in IO related functions: CMO, liaison with local religious leaders, developing an Inter-Religious Council (IRC), and in-depth religious assessments.²⁶ Because of UMT involvement in IO related functions, commanders have also requested UMT participation in the IO cell. However, the chaplaincy does so with no definitive doctrinal guidance, and no training in IO processes. Currently, the United States Army Chaplain Center and School does not include IO or other related capabilities as part of the critical tasks for either officer or enlisted schools. The only formal IO training a team may receive is prior to deployment, when the supervisory UMT designs and conducts certification training for an exercise. The team may receive training at a combat maneuver training center at the request of the supervisory UMT. Additionally, teams do not receive in-depth cultural understanding or world religion training—whether at the tactical, operational or strategic level—unless they are selected for an advanced civilian degree, for Chaplain Corps utilization in a specific position.

Our discussion of information policy and information operations doctrine brings our current operational and strategic environment into focus. In the post-Cold War, the paradigm for war has shifted to a non-linear battlespace as the US fights a non-state actor. As US forces remain engaged simultaneously in combat and stability operations, the enemy's primary weapon has been information. In his *Military Review* article on IO in Iraq, Norman Emery states "a guerrilla force does not have the strength to fight a state or invading force directly and relies on actions in the information environment to gain an advantage."²⁷

Therefore, IO can be a combat multiplier in current US operations. The Coalition recognizes IO's importance, and has begun to integrate it into all aspects of the mission, in order to re-shape the information environment.²⁸

Chaplain (Colonel) William Sean Lee strongly supports using chaplains in the religious liaison role. He provides several historical examples of how and where US Army commanders, as well as foreign militaries, have used chaplains as a religious liaison during stability operations. He states the US Army Chaplaincy is "uniquely suited and positioned" to integrate and operate as a religious liaison.²⁹ In light of the current operational environment, specifically the GWOT, commanders have expanded the doctrinal role of US military chaplains beyond their traditional RS responsibilities. Commanders have also requested chaplains formally liaise with indigenous religious leaders. In these instances, the chaplain worked directly with local religious groups and leaders, dialogued and built relationships, promoted goodwill, and assisted in establishing formal IRCs.³⁰

What accounts for commanders relying on the chaplain in this newly defined role? We can identify several factors. Chaplains have the professional development, from their chaplain basic course, to handle the daily experiences of working in a pluralistic environment. Chaplains have extensive interpersonal skills, an understanding of group dynamics and the human psyche, and negotiation skills that come from hours of counseling. By doctrine, chaplains and the UMT are part of the staff process. Therefore, they also understand the commander's intent, mission, critical tasks, risk analysis, and end state. So, chaplains are uniquely qualified and positioned at the unit level to function in this expanded role. The UMT also has a reach back capability via internet research databases, providing current, accurate and detailed information on specific religions, as well as local nuances (in major areas). Also, the team can contact subject matter experts at the US Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center. However, UMTs—specifically chaplains—have several critical deficiencies and limitations. A noted deficiency is that most UMTs have not received world cultures and world religions training, therefore they do not understand in-depth issues about a particular religion or religious group. Also, most UMTs have

not attended either Army or Joint IO training, therefore they do not understand IO organizational structures, or the intricacies of IO planning, integration, synchronization and execution. The *IO Roadmap* endorses a professionally trained and educated cadre capable of IO planning and execution.

Issues

We must address three issues. First, a chaplain's authority for ministry in the military rests both with the government, and the respective religious community which endorses that chaplain. Army chaplains serve as clergy representing those respective faiths or denominations. A chaplain's call, ministry, message, ecclesiastical authority, and responsibility come from the religious organization the chaplain represents. Chaplains preach, teach, and conduct religious services in accordance with the tenets and rules of their tradition, the principles of their faith, and the dictates of conscience.³¹

As noted earlier, a chaplain's role as religious leader is to provide three support functions: nurture the living, care for the dying and honor the dead. Even the religious support activities provide opportunities for the free exercise of religion in support of the commander's religious plan. Additionally, FM 1-05 delineates a chaplain's role as a staff officer: "The chaplain is a personal staff officer responsible for coordinating the religious assets and operations within the command. The chaplain is a confidential advisor to the commander for religious matters."³² Particularly interesting for this discussion, FM 1-05 specifies 12 responsibilities. Only one bullet mentions indigenous religious groups: the chaplain's responsibility is to advise the commander and staff, with the Civil Military Operations Officer (grade GS-9) on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operations.³³ Additionally, within the same list of responsibilities, doctrine specifies support to the commander in the execution of Civil Military Operations.³⁴ FM 1-05, Appendix A, *Religious Support in Civil Military Operations*, describes the chaplain's role as an advisor to the commander with the limitation of no direct participation in: negotiations, mediations as sole participant, or human intelligence collection and/or target acquisition.³⁵ An additional role requires religious support opportunities for soldiers to participate in CMO activities, and to provide certain RS to refugees and displaced persons, when directed by the commander.³⁶ The appendix further reminds the UMT that the Army chaplain's responsibility is to provide worship opportunities and pastoral care to soldiers and authorized civilians in the area of operations.³⁷ Current doctrine clearly delineates UMT responsibilities as religious support and advisor to the commander. The religious communities that endorse chaplains to serve within the military do so within these parameters. Notably, a particular religious community may not support chaplain involvement in IO because it falls outside statutory and regulatory guidelines, and the interests of a particular faith group or denomination.³⁸ Secondly, commanders have responsibility for RS operations as well as IO within their area of operations, and chaplains perform or

provide RS on their behalf. As time and experience of using UMTs in IO builds momentum, or as commanders identify that IO could bring victory at a decisive point for a particular mission or campaign, commanders could re-prioritize a UMT's mission focus from RS to IO. If so, the team would be limited to either providing the commander the best IO support, or the best RS. An IO focus would likely encumber a UMT in providing several vital RS tasks, pending current operations. This is especially true in OIF, where the coalition is simultaneously engaged in combat and stability operations. Such an environment could preclude the UMT from providing critical, time-sensitive RS tasks such as casualty care during an engagement or mass casualty event, or pastoral care to soldiers experiencing battle fatigue. Thus, team involvement in IO could produce second and third order effects such as time limitations, and less allowance for conduct of critical RS. Thirdly, shaping desired battlespace effects, perception management, credibility, image and message projection are all important IO aspects. The measure of success or failure hinges on the IO effort's ability to influence the targeted audience to accomplish a desired effect. Ideally, influence causes adversaries or others to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. It results from applying perception management to affect the target's emotions, motives, and reasoning. Perception management also seeks to influence the target's perceptions, plans, actions, and will to oppose friendly forces. Targets may include noncombatants and others in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Area of Operations, whom the commander wants to support friendly force missions—or not resist friendly force activities.³⁹

What tool can measure the effectiveness of influence? One method is through effects based operations (EBO) and effects based targeting (EBT). Both provide a systems approach that link actions with a desired outcome, measured by matrices. Lee, Burke, and Crayne have designed a tool that specifically assesses the required chaplain competencies with the effectiveness of the Inter-Religious Council. Their model organizes required competencies, and connects their use to a desired outcome using the functional action model of assess, plan, implement, and evaluate—like the EBT methodology.⁴⁰ Both methods measure a desired outcome or effect. The commander could evaluate the IRC's effectiveness and modify the membership or agenda to meet a desired end state. This too could prove problematic for the UMT if a specific religious leader, group or Inter-Religious Council becomes the target of a non-lethal effects campaign. In his paper, "The Chaplain as Indigenous Religious Liaison Officer," Chaplain (Major) Jonathan Gibbs discusses the doctrinal, practical, and philosophical problems of this methodology. One could misperceive the chaplain's purpose for establishing dialogue, relationships, and goodwill, viewing it as a means to an end. A group or individual could feel they were being selected for influence or manipulation in support of the military commander's agenda.⁴¹ Gibbs addresses the doctrinal and ethical dilemma with the EBT concept, which falls into possible compromise of the chaplain's non-combatant status, due to participation in target acquisition.⁴² Even though

the chaplain would be involved in non-lethal targeting, neither the commander nor the chaplain can know of the second or third order effects of targeting a specific religious leader or group. Thus, compromising the chaplain's non-combatant status becomes a significant issue.⁴³

Recommendations

At the Tactical Level: expand the role of the tactical echelon UMT, battalion and brigade equivalent, during Phase IV, Stability, from the traditional and statutory RS function to include the additional role of IO. This would be a related function, with strict parameters and guidelines. The tactical level UMT's primary role is to personally deliver comprehensive, timely, effective RS to all soldiers in their AO. Again, if the commander tasks the UMT with the additional function of IO, the RS mission would be seriously hindered. The tactical echelon UMT conducts critical religious support tasks during Phase I, Deter; Phase II, Seize the Initiative; and Phase III, Dominate. During these phases the UMT should not participate in IO roles. The UMT remains the only battle operating system (BOS) that can provide RS for the commander, to the unit. The commander has other BOS elements with the training and knowledge of the indigenous religious leaders and groups, and who can provide IO support, to include initiating an IRC. The commander can also request—through Brigade, Division or Joint Task Force—a Civil Affairs UMT, Division UMT, or a Chaplain Detachment to conduct IO. During Phase IV, Stabilize, the tactical echelon UMT provides critical and timely RS to include critical event debriefings; pastoral care to the caregiver, casualties, and grieving unit members. However, the UMT can provide valuable IO support to include establishing the IRC, and developing relationships with local religious leaders. Also, the UMT may work closely with CMO in mutual supporting tasks.

Notably, and very importantly, if our forces conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations, RS should take precedence. The UMT must assess critical tasks, both RS and IO, prioritize accordingly, and inform the commander. UMT participation in IO missions must be a related capability, similar to the CMO or PAO. This would provide the team adequate distance from other IO missions or requirements. Another important note: UMTs at this echelon normally do not have the tactical, operational, technical—and at times faith maturity—to conduct such sensitive operations in the IO realm. To ask a new captain chaplain or young non-commissioned officer chaplain assistant to “win the hearts and minds” of people from a different culture, who speak another language, and whose religion has different values, places both the UMT and IO missions at risk. Therefore, during the transition to Phase IV or its initial stages, the Division UMT or equivalent should ensure tactical echelon UMTs are trained and certified in conducting both IO supporting tasks, and considerations of host nation religious background. Also, the UMT must be briefed on the parameters and rules of engagement (ROE), and know both their allowances and prohibitions under Title X of

the US Code. Additionally, the brigade UMT is responsible for performing or providing RS, supervision and training for the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) UMTs, as well as AO-wide religious support planning, coordination, synchronization, and execution. When the BCT conducts combat operations, the brigade UMT remains continually engaged in mission requirements. However, during Phase IV, the BCT UMT can provide a valuable supporting role in IO. The BCT level team brings maturity and experience to the staff, and should conduct a vigorous IO training and certification process for the battalion UMTs during the transition between Phase III and Phase IV. Of course, the BCT UMT must first receive the same training, through the same IO certification process.

Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations UMTs bring an added dimension. These units have adapted additional capabilities and training to operate in a MOOTW environment, and conduct stability operations. These teams have experience, knowledge, and understanding of how indigenous religions can impact the mission. The only caveat would be to require these UMTs to receive additional training in IO processes, in order to understand the limitations and parameters of participation in IO-related functions, plus the ramifications of IO campaign themes. All battalion, brigade, and group level UMTs must know how to develop a religious area/impact assessment and apply critical analysis in order to advise the commander on indigenous religious leaders and groups, and their impact on the mission. The UMTs role in religious cultural awareness would provide valuable, detailed information to the PAO, command information, host nation support as well as IO.

At the Operational Level: expand the role of the Division/Corps UMT from the traditional and statutory function of coordinating, synchronizing and providing RS to include the additional role of IO. The operational level UMT continues in its role to coordinate, synchronize, supervise, and execute RS across the commander's AO. At this level, the UMT provides an additional critical role as advisor to the commander. The UMT advises the commander with essential information on soldier and unit morale as affected by religion, moral/ethical decision making, quality of life issues, and the impact of indigenous religion on the mission.⁴⁴ During Phase 0 and Phase I, the UMT can make a valuable contribution during mission analysis in providing the commander a detailed assessment of religion and the local religious leaders in AO. UMTs at this level have experience to take information, conduct critical analysis, and provide a recommendation. The UMT should provide religious analysis as an additional function. Similarly, the religious analysis products would be available to the PAO, command information, host nation support, and IO. The UMT should integrate itself into the staff process of the IO section (as an IO related function). This will allow the UMT to plan, support, and coordinate multiple, simultaneous actions within IO and RS operations. During Phase IV, the UMT can provide IO support as it involves itself as a religious liaison to indigenous religious leaders and groups. The UMT must

provide the additional support as trainer to the tactical echelon UMTs in IO functions, host nation religious background, and ROE for UMT participation in the IRC or other liaison activities.

At the Strategic Level: expand the role of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) UMT from the traditional and statutory RS functions of coordination, delivery, synchronization, and synergy; staff supervision of RS; management and training of UMTs. Establish liaison with host nation religious leaders and other coalition/joint ministry teams, to include the additional role of IO as a related function. Combatant commands and other major Army command level UMTs should provide strategic guidance and training for IO participation, and an in-depth host nation religious analysis to include the religious leaders and their probable influence. Also, the strategic level UMT should provide the tactics, techniques, and procedures for subordinate UMT involvement in IO processes; the method to conduct a religious cultural impact; critical religious analysis; and probable effect on the mission. The strategic level UMT must monitor and assess UMT participation in IO through after action reports, surveys, and reviewing performance in IO campaigns.

Chaplain Detachments (CD): Expand chaplain and chaplain assistant authorizations to include one chaplain (grade O-4) and one chaplain assistant (grade E-6) for a chaplain detachment in each division, specifically trained in liaison skills, developing and coordinating an IRC, and other IO related functions. According to FM 1-05, CDs represent a supplemental capability to “provide flexibility, robustness, and specific liaison functions for religious support.”⁴⁵ A CD would provide the commander the capability to augment the tactical level units during Phase III and Phase IV. This element would be assigned to the division and attached to the BCT for operational control during a specific operation or phase. Their responsibilities would include: training BCT UMTs in IO processes and indigenous religions; providing the commander a point of contact concerning indigenous religious issues; coordinate, develop, and participate in an IRC; and communicating with local religious leaders.

Unit Ministry Team Role: the UMT will participate in IO only as a related capability, similar to the CMO and PA. This will allow the UMT to retain its statutory and traditional religious role of providing RS. If we allow UMTs to participate in IO, we must not compromise the primary purpose and rules under which they operate.

Requirements

Both joint and Army doctrine will need to reflect these recommended changes for both information operations and religious support. Primary doctrinal focus should be pronouncement of personal RS delivery, but must include broader emphasis on the UMT role as the commander’s advisor and IO processes. IO doctrine will need to include RS as a related activity like CMO and PA, and must address RS and IO at all echelons. Doctrine must address the specific parameters

and prohibitions of UMT participation. Commanders and UMTs must know the limitations, restrictions, and value added which doctrinal changes bring to the IO and RS operations. This will precipitate a necessary modification and update in UMT critical tasks training. UMTs must become proficient in world cultures and religions, and in core competencies needed to facilitate as a religious liaison. USACHCS must update the POI for the basic and advanced courses, for both chaplains and chaplain assistants. USACHSC should provide: distance education to update the operational and strategic level UMTs on joint and multi-national environment considerations; updates in joint education, training and exercises; and UMT after action reports from current operations. Finally, USACHCS should develop a portable training package to include religious analysis, IO processes, establishing an IRC, and staff integration in the IO cell. Additionally, UMTs must attend Joint and/or Army IO training.

Conclusion

In light of the current strategic and operational environment, these recommendations incorporate a vision of integrating the UMT in IO at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The proposed recommendations are important because the status quo is just not an option. To do nothing only prolongs the inevitable: a UMT will commit an error because the UMT operates without doctrine and the necessary training to support the IO mission. This error could have tactical, operational and even strategic consequences.

Notes

¹ Glenn A Tolle, “Shaping the Information Environment,” *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May/June 2002, Vol. 82, Iss. 3, 47.

² Zachary P. Hubbard, “IO in the Information Age,” *Journal of Electronic Defense*, Horizon House Publications, April 2004, Vol. 27, Iss. 4, 51.

³ Michael McClellan, “Public Diplomacy in the Context of Traditional Diplomacy,” *National Security Policy and Strategy*, Vol. 2, Academic Year 2006, 177.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁵ Edward P. Djerejian, “Changing Minds, Winning Peace, A New Strategic Direction for US Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World,” Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 13.

⁶ FM 3-0, Operations, Chapter 11, Section 1.

⁷ Djerejian, p. 15.

⁸ William Putnam, “Winning Iraqi Hearts and Minds,” *Army*, January 2005, Vol. 55, Iss. 1, 7.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁰ Each of these documents, in of themselves, points to the importance of information just by their publication and distribution. Their purpose is to keep people informed. However, each document has a more powerful, underlying purpose, that is to influence the reader. The documents themselves become a tool within the information element of national power.

¹¹ Peter G. Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2002, p. 3.

¹² Djerejian, 15.

¹³ Zachary P. Hubbard, "IO in the Information Age," *Journal of Electronic Defense*, Horizon House Publications, April 2004, Vol. 27, Iss. 4, pp 52-56

¹⁴ Putnam, 7.

¹⁵ Allen W. Batschelet, "Information Operations for the Joint Warfighter," *Field Artillery Journal*, July/August 2004, Vol. 9, Iss. 3, 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁷ "Information Operations as a Core Competency," *Joint Force Quarterly*, December 2004, Iss. 36, 88.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Clear and Commander Evans, "Cultural Impact on Tactical Operations (CITO) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques Program Approval," memorandum for Deputy Director, Futures Center, Director, Capabilities Development, Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command, Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, 17 January 2006.

²⁰ FM 1-05, *Religious Support*, April 2003, paragraph 1-9.

²¹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 1-13.

²² *Ibid.*, paragraph 1-19.

²³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 2-18.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph A-2.

²⁵ Chaplain (Colonel) William S. Lee, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Burke, and Lieutenant Colonel Zonna M. Crayne, "Military Chaplains as Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability Operations," CADRE Paper, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, February 2005, 2. The authors reviewed the importance of religion in the international arena and in current operations. Because of this importance, they discuss the use of chaplains as religious liaisons during stability operations.

²⁶ The author served as the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain, June 2003 to July 2005. He reviewed the after action reviews (AAR) from the UMTs returning from several OEF rotations as well as conducted interviews with the BCT UMTs returning from OIF. His findings indicated that most battalion commanders and all brigade commanders requested the unit chaplain to conduct various IO related missions: CMO activities, liaison with local religious leaders, and initiate an IRC.

²⁷ Norman Emery, "Information Operations in Iraq," *Military Review*, Fort Leavenworth, May/June 2004, Vol. 84, Iss. 3, 12.

²⁸ The author attended a video teleconference with GEN George Casey, Junior, Commander, Multi-national Force, Iraq, and a briefing with MG Peter Chiarelli, former commander of 1st Cavalry Division. Both stated the importance in current operations of a well defined and executed information campaign.

²⁹ Chaplain (Colonel) William Sean Lee, *The Army Chaplaincy*, "Blessed are the Peacemakers: The Emerging

Role of Army Chaplains as Religious Liaisons," Winter/Spring 2005, 59.

³⁰ The author, while serving as the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain in OIF, asked his two US division counterparts, 101st Airborne [Air Assault] and 1st Armor Division, if they or their UMTs participated in the expanded role of IO. Both division chaplains assessed that where chaplains and commanders engaged indigenous religious leaders, coalition forces had some success in decreasing anti-coalition actions. Because of this degree of success, commanders demanded more time from the chaplain to participate in this role.

³¹ FM 1-05, paragraph 1-9.

³² *Ibid.*, paragraph 1-19.

³³ *Ibid.*, paragraph 1-19.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, paragraph 1-19.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph A-2.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, paragraph A-3.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, paragraph A-3.

³⁸ As noted earlier in the paper, PA and CMO are related IO functions. Because the UMT has doctrinal responsibility to provide support to the commander in the execution of CMO as well as advising the commander on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations, the UMT already provides an IO related function. The author recommends the formal inclusion of religious support operations as a related IO function.

³⁹ FM (Interim) 3-09.42, *HBCT Fires and Effects Operations*, paragraph 7-89.

⁴⁰ Lee, Burke, and Crayne, 24,25.

⁴¹ Chaplain (MAJ-P) Jonathan Gibbs, "The Chaplain as Indigenous Religion Liaison Officer", 4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴³ As stated in AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the US Army, paragraph 4-3, chaplains are non-combatants and shall not bear arms. The US Army Chief of Chaplains has further delineated activities, such as combative training, prohibiting chaplain involvement. c

⁴⁴ FM 1-05, paragraph 5-11.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph G-1. 



Chaplain (COL) Dave Smith, US Army, is currently serving as the Command Chaplain for Southern European Task Force (Airborne), Vicenza Italy. Previous assignments include serving as the Division Chaplain, 82nd Airborne Division, where he deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also served as the Command Chaplain for NATO at SHAPE, Belgium. Chaplain Smith received a Bachelor of Arts from Penn State University, and Masters Degrees from Wesley Theological Seminary and Syracuse University, and graduated from the Army War College. Readers can contact him at david.edward.smith@us.army.mil