Air University Review, May-June 1967
Canada’s Role in the United Nations
John W. Holmes
To understand Canada’s
role in the United Nations, one must know its general approach to the part it
should play in world affairs. Central to this approach is the concept of the
middle power with a specific kind of function. Being too skeptical—or
unimaginative—to see ourselves as having a preordained destiny vis-á-vis the human race, we Canadians have recognized that
we should nevertheless find ourselves a sensible career. If this is to be a
successful career in international diplomacy, it must be related to our power
and influence, neither underestimating nor overestimating them.
We have to see ourselves in perspective. We are not a failed great power; we
are a self-respecting middle power. We can be a close and loyal friend of our
large allies, seeing ourselves not as their equal partners but as having
different things to do in our common interest in world order. As a middle power
our role is more constructive if it is played not in isolation but in
association with many other countries —with friends and allies and fellow
members of the world community. For us, international associations and above
all the United Nations are of supreme importance. Without them we would be
ineffectual.
We were not always like this. Before the Second World War we were almost as
careful as the United States
to avoid entangling alliances. We were born into a worldwide empire, and that
gave us a somewhat broader view. After we had secured our undoubted right
to decide our own policies, even to go to war or not as we wanted, we showed
little interest in making use of our new freedom. Independence we saw as something passive that
would protect us from involvement, not something active to be used in world
politics. Unlike the United States,
we joined the League of Nations, but it must
be admitted that a powerful motive for doing so was that separate membership
established our position as an independent state. It was our assumption that we
lived in “a fireproof house,” that we were peace-loving and ought not to be
dragged even by the League of Nations into
wars set off by naturally aggressive foreigners in other continents. There was
some justification for our reluctance. Our position towards the League was not
heroic, but it was dangerous for a League of Nations that did not include the United States
and other large powers to pretend to enforce collective security.
Every nation had a terrible lesson to learn in 1939—45. We realized the
futility of the effort to avoid international commitments. We were inevitably
involved in the war, not just because we felt committed to stand at Britain’s side
but because all humanity was threatened. It was better therefore to try actively
to prevent wars. By the end of the war we were deeply
involved in plans to create a new and more solidly based world organization and
to play our part in it zealously. It was easier for us to support the United
Nations than the League of Nations because it did include all the major powers
and isolationism had vanished from North America.
We accepted the wisdom of an international organization which, in security
matters, gave a special position to the great powers. However, instead of
sitting back and leaving all the tough questions to the great powers, we fought
hard for a greater voice for the lesser powers—especially the middle powers,
of whom we were a leading specimen.
Canada
a middle power
The term “middle power” was popularized towards the end of World War II. It
appealed particularly to countries like Canada who were resentful of the
way in which the great powers had dominated war strategy. Canada was the
third-strongest of the Western allies, but Roosevelt and Churchill made all the
decisions. We were prepared when the United Nations was established to give a
special place—even a veto —in the Security Council to the major military
powers, but we did not accept the idea of a world organization in which,
because of their military strength, they would dominate everything. We had a
theory that each country should have a special function in world organization
in accordance with its special capacities and special interests. Because we
were a second-class military power, we accepted a second-class place in the
Security Council; but because we were a major trading country, we asked for a
position of greater influence in bodies dealing with international trade.
Because we had no colonies and no experience of colonial administration, we did
not want a place on the Trusteeship Council; but as one of the three countries
that had worked together during the war to produce atomic energy, we claimed
and got permanent membership in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and
have had a seat on all subsequent U.N. bodies concerned with disarmament.
Functionalism is not a rigid theory but is a general approach to world
politics which we have retained. It is partly a continuing resistance to the
hegemony of the great powers, but it is also an attempt to find a workable
formula for a world in which there is an increasing number of independent
states of various sizes which must collaborate with each other but which cannot
be organized into anything like a central world government, with an upper and a
lower house. It is an attempt to find for each country its unique place in the
world. A healthy state, like a healthy citizen, should feel it has a
constructive role to play in international politics. We Canadians, for example,
when we lack assurance that we are playing a useful and distinctive part in
international bodies, tend to feel that our national destiny is something
purely mischievous—like needling the United States, pursuing
independence for its own sake, or acting in a generally capricious manner. It
is in the interest of our large allies to encourage us to find a sensible
vocation even if they think we take a wayward view of policy from time to time.
Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada most of the time from the Twenties
to the Fifties, argued that Canada
should stay out of overseas quarrels because we had no national interests in
remote places. When he passed from the scene shortly after the war, he was
succeeded by a man with a different approach. Louis Saint Laurent and his new
Minister for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, supported by a greatly
expanded Department of External Affairs and a bolder Canadian spirit, set out
to play a constructive role in any way that seemed likely to contribute to the
peace and prosperity that were as essential to Canada as to any country. Soon Mr.
King’s maxim was turned upside down through our active involvement in the
United Nations. In 1947 Mr. Pearson was looked upon as the arbiter between Jews
and Arabs in Palestine.
In 1948 Canada
was active in the settlement of the conflict between the Dutch and the
Indonesians. By 1954 we were called upon to man the frontiers of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia
in tripartite international commissions to supervise the Geneva Agreements. The
reason we were involved was precisely that we had no special interests
in those areas and were expected, therefore, to be fair and impartial.
For a middle power linked closely with a super power, it is good to have a
large organization like the United Nations. There we can combine with other
lesser powers to put forward constructive proposals to which the great powers
must pay attention. Our active part in the establishment of U.N. peacekeeping
operations has given our armed forces an arduous but exciting role that is
peculiarly satisfying. The Canadian soldier preventing murder in Cyprus or
standing on duty between Arabs and Israelis can understand very easily that his
purpose in life is useful. This is not to say that he is more useful
than the soldier on NATO duty, but the job needs less explaining. There is no
doubt that the credibility of our diplomacy has been strengthened by our
willingness to contribute.
The Canadian approach to the U.N. has been pragmatic rather than
doctrinaire. Since 1945 Canadian governments have tended to regard the U.N. as
an experiment that would extend its authority and learn by practice a precedent
to prevent conflict. Although we regret that it has not made more progress, do
not look upon it as a job that failed. It is an association of states—we
the United Nations—not Operation Thunderball. Because
we were never under the illusion that we were setting up a world government to
control all countries with its own police force, we are not cynical now, just
worried. The job of the U.N. is conciliation and diplomacy, not enforcement. So
long as the great powers are restrained the threat of mutual nuclear
destruction, the U.N. can be effective in preventing fights from getting out of
hand. It was not designed to cope with struggles between the great powers at
first hand or, as in Vietnam,
at second hand. There is no use expecting it to impose peace in such
situations; it can only urge the powers to negotiate. If they are prepared to
do so, then its corridors, its peacekeeping machinery, its moral pressure can
be helpful.
If a middle power like Canada
is to play an effective part in United Nations diplomacy, it must have some
concern for its image. A satellite state, a yes-man in diplomacy, carries
no weight. For many years Canada
had to make clear to the world, and perhaps to
Americans more than others, that its foreign policy was not run from Whitehall. The problem
now is to make clear that its policies are not made in Washington. On most fundamental issues Canada has no desire to differ from the United States
because we are allies and share fur mental interests and values. This is no
guarantee, however, that Washington and Ottawa
will not differ on tactics to be followed achieve their common goals, as they
often do in the U.N. It is by no means a bad thing the United States that Canada should operate somewhat
differently, and it need not be assumed that this implies hostile intent. At
the time of the Suez crisis, for example, Canada and the United States were agreed on the
establishment of a United Nations force as a means of persuading the British,
French, and Israelis to withdraw. If the United States had taken lead in
this proposal it would have become a cold war issue, the Russians would have
opposed it, and the nonaligned would have abstained. Secretary of State Dulles
himself preferred that Mr. Pearson take the initiative so that there would be a
better opportunity of getting broad support. This does not mean, of course,
that there are no matters in which the United States should take the lead;
it simply means that it is better to have tactical alternatives to fit
situations. For various reasons—because Canadians are allowed to travel to
China and trade with China, because Canada has an Embassy in Havana, because
Canada is a member of the tripartite International Control Commission for
Vietnam and has officers in Hanoi, and simply because Canada is not strong
enough to excite fear—Canadians have been able on occasion to play the role not
of neutrals but of intermediaries, exploring grounds for possible agreement. We
think that the variation in our behavior is not only useful in itself but also
necessary if we are to preserve the essential image of independence. There is
no good argument for Canada
differing from the United
States merely to show its independence.
Fortunately there are enough situations in which there is an honest difference
of opinion to make clear to the other members of the United Nations that we are
our own masters.
an evolving role in U.N.
This article is principally concerned with the role of the United Nations in
maintaining security and preventing disputes. If I have failed to mention the
U.N.’s economic and social functions, it is not because Canada is
disinterested in them. Because we are one of the world’s leading trading
nations and because of our large resources and considerable industry, Canada is a
more significant economic power in the world than a military power. For this
reason and because of our “functionalist” principles, much of our energy in
U.N. affairs is put into economic bodies and projects. Like other Western
nations, Canada
is much concerned with economic aid to developing countries. In the early years
we were one of the principal contributors to aid programs. As other and larger
countries have restored their economies, our aid contribution has become
relatively less imposing. However, we have continued to direct a larger
proportion of our economic assistance through the United Nations and other
international organizations than do most countries.
Special interest attaches to the Canadian role in international
peacekeeping. Canada
is one of the few countries that has had
representatives in virtually every U.N. operation of this kind. Those in which
we did not participate were the two earliest U.N. operations, in Indonesia and in Greece. Since then, after it came
to be recognized that except in special circumstances it was wiser not to
incorporate troops from any of the great powers, Canada has been asked to serve
on every occasion.
We do not normally include under this heading the U.N. police action in Korea. There
the United Nations was itself conducting a military action. In peacekeeping
operations, so called, the U.N. normally does not take sides but organizes
neutral intervention to prevent hostilities from getting out of hand and to
promote a settlement. For the record it should be mentioned, however, that
Canadians did participate in the Korean operation. At the height of this
action Canada had some eight
thousand servicemen in the Far East theater, one of
the largest contributions next to those of the United
States and the Republic
of Korea.
In a special category also should be mentioned Canadian participation in the
International Control Commissions for Vietnam,
Laos, and Cambodia. These
commissions resemble in many ways a U.N. operation, though they were
established not by the United Nations but by the Geneva Conference in 1954. A
practical disadvantage for the Indians, Poles, and Canadians who make up the
commissions is that they are obliged themselves to provide many of the logistical
services that would otherwise be organized by the United Nations, the costs
being borne by those who participated in the Geneva Agreements. Canada has been
sending officers to these commissions since 1954. Although the maximum number
of service personnel at any one time in the three Indochinese countries was not
much over 200, these were almost all highly trained officers, and the strain on
army personnel has been greater than is apparent from the numbers.
The role of these commissions has been misunderstood and, in the Canadian
view, frequently maligned. It was clearly never intended that such small bodies
should enforce the Geneva Agreements. The commissions were of greatest
value in their early stages, assisting in the disengagement of the forces and
with populations being moved between north and south. Since then the assignment
has been arduous and frustrating. The commissions are not authorized to prevent
the parties by force from violating the terms of the Agreements, and they could
not possibly do so. Their function is to report such violations to the “Co-Chairmen”
of the continuing Geneva Conference, the Foreign Ministers of Britain and the Soviet Union. If the Agreements are violated, as they
certainly have been, it is up to the great powers who signed the Agreements to
exert the necessary pressure. Whenever there is an agreement of this kind,
there is bound to be some kind of supervisory body or tribunal set up. It mayor
may not do its job well, but it should in no way be confused with a police
force. Because of the ambiguous position of the commission in Vietnam in the
present circumstances, Canadians have been tempted to withdraw. They have
stayed on, though, in the belief that, however frustrating and even humiliating
the role of the commission may be, it should remain in place as at least a
symbol of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and because it may perform useful
functions in the investigation of claims and counterclaims or possibly in the
effort to reach a state of negotiation.
U.N. observer groups
One category of U.N. operations in which Canada has participated is what
might be called the “observer groups.” The earliest in which Canadians took
part were the United Nations Military Observer Groups India/ Pakistan
(UNMOGIP) and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine
(UNTSO). These operations illustrate one of the problems of being a
peacekeeper. One begins in the expectation that it is a matter of holding the
line for a short time and withdrawing when a settlement is reached.
Unfortunately settlements are not often reached. Sometimes the very fact that
the U.N. presence guarantees security keeps the parties from the negotiating
table. Canadian observers have been in Kashmir since 1949 and in Palestine since 1954. The
numbers have varied, but at present there are 9 in Kashmir and 20 in Palestine. At first,
Canadian officers from the militia or retired servicemen went to these jobs,
and the Canadian government as such was not much involved. It proved difficult
to get nonprofessionals, and as the government began to realize by the
mid-Fifties that it was in the peacekeeping game for a long time, provision was
made to send officers from the regular forces. Although ground forces, and
therefore army personnel, are usually required, both the Royal Canadian Air
Force and the Royal Canadian Navy have played some part. In one instance
Canadian participants were almost entirely from the Air Force. That was the
1963-64 operation known as UNYOM, in which RCAF observers and aircraft, along with
Yugoslav ground forces, were to see that an agreed
truce was maintained in Yemen.
Unfortunately the participants in the fighting and their principal backers had
no will to keep the truce, and the U.N. force was withdrawn. More
successful operations in which Canadians took part as observers were the United
Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958-59, to which 77 men were
sent, and the United Nations India/Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) in
1965-66. This latter mission was set up at the time of the recent outbreak of
fighting between India and Pakistan. Canada provided
12 observers, an air transport unit, and a senior air adviser, a total of 112
people.
For the same reason that Canadians are considered suitable to serve in these
operations, senior Canadian officers are asked to assume special functions for
the United Nations. Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns served as Chief of Staff
of UNTSO from 1954 to 1956. Being the man on the spot, he was then asked by the
Secretary-General at the time of the Suez
crisis to be the first Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force. He
continued in this position until 1960. Major General B. F. Macdonald, who had
been senior Canadian officer in Cyprus,
was called in 1965 to be the Chief Officer of UNIPOM, where he served until
UNIPOM was disbanded in March 1966 after tranquillity—relative
at least—had been re-established.
U.N. “forces”
In all these operations, including the commissions in Indochina,
the role was primarily observation, and participation was largely by officers.
On a broader scale have been the U.N. bodies that could more easily be called “forces,”
though the term is hardly indicative of their job to maintain order rather than
combat aggression. These forces are the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East
(UNEF); the U.N. Force in the Congo (UNOC); and the U.N. Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP).
UNEF. Canada was closely associated with
UNEF because the initiative in proposing the force was taken in the Assembly by
the Canadian External Affairs Minister, Mr. Pearson, now
Prime Minister. Canada
was terribly concerned over this crisis because it involved such sharp
differences among its closest friends. For this reason and because Canada has
tried to follow a policy in the U.N. of never advocating an expenditure of
finances or men without being willing to contribute, it was natural that
Canadians were offered for UNEF. The Egyptians were somewhat concerned at first
because of the similarity of Canadian army uniforms to those of the British “aggressors.”
After some initial difficulties, Canada provided an air
communications squadron, administrative and communications troops, and
subsequently a reconnaissance squadron, as well as the Commander, General
Burns. At present the Canadian strength in UNEF is 850. The tour of duty is one
year.
Congo.
To the Congo
force the Canadian contribution was smaller. Here, as in UNEF, Canada was
called on for the special and technical services usually lacking in the forces
of small countries. It is because Canada, among the middle powers,
has a relatively large and sophisticated military establishment that its help
usually proves indispensable. There were certain political reasons why its
troops might not be acceptable in Egypt, but no other country was
willing and able to supply the specialist forces. In the Congo this was
to prove even more true, because the Secretary General
preferred, if possible, to have non-white troops. The fact that Canada was a NATO ally of Belgium was
also held against Canadians in some quarters. Nevertheless, the U.N.
desperately needed what Canada
alone was able to provide. There is no other country, furthermore, that can
provide both English-speaking and French-speaking servicemen, and the
importance of the latter was demonstrated not only in the Congo but also in Indochina.
Canada was asked in the Congo to
contribute the troops required to maintain internal and external communications
for the force. Over three hundred specialists from the Canadian army went,
including both communications and logistics experts. The RCAF produced all the
personnel needed to manage air control towers handling U.N. air operations. In
addition the RCAF Air Transport Command took on a large part of the airlift
responsibility provided to previous operations by the U.S. Military Air
Transport Service. Of the three operations designated as “forces” the Congo
is the only one from which Canadians have as yet been able to withdraw. They
stayed there until the operation ended in 1964.
Cyprus.
Canada had three strong
reasons for being concerned about the security situation in Cyprus in 1964: Cyprus
was a member of the Commonwealth, and Greece
and Turkey
were fellow members of NATO. It had been suggested that a force drawn from NATO
or the Commonwealth might go to Cyprus,
and Canada
would undoubtedly have been included in either. When the situation became
dangerous in the spring of 1964, Canada took the initiative by
offering to send troops so that a U.N. force could be set up. The Canadian
External Affairs Minister was able to persuade others to join Canada, and by
this action an extremely nasty situation was averted. Canada, however, grown somewhat wary from its long experience, tried to
prescribe certain understandings. One of these was that there be a determined effort at mediation alongside the
peacekeeping operation. The role of the peacekeeping force or group is normally
not to seek a settlement but to hold the ring. Too often the fact that the ring
has been held has prevented the disputants from reaching a settlement. In Cyprus a
mediatory effort was set up apart from UNFICYP.UNFICYP, partly for financial
reasons, has been on a short-term, usually three-month-renewable basis.
Mediation has not got very far, but Canada has always agreed to
prolongation of UNFICYP. At present there are about a thousand Canadian military
personnel serving in Cyprus,
and in support of the operation the RCAF maintains a scheduled transport
service between Canada and Cyprus. It
might be noted in this connection that a good deal of the cost of all these
operations is paid by Canada.
Unlike other participants, Canada
provides troops at normal Canadian foreign service
pay, so that the cost to the U.N. is less than that for any other national
soldier.
a permanent U.N. force?
Canada
has been as aware as any country of the difficulties caused by the need for
sudden improvisation when a crisis calls for the deployment of a U.N. force. It
was inevitable, therefore, that Canadians should take
a considerable interest in the idea of a permanent U.N. establishment. Like
other strong supporters of the United Nations, Canada would like a trained and
organized U.N. force ready for action at any time. However, having been much
involved in the politics and diplomacy of creating forces to suit occasions, we
fully recognize that this is not possible. We have accepted, therefore, the
position stated by the late Dag Hammarskjöld in his report to the General
Assembly in 1960, that governments in a position and
willing to do so should maintain contributions in a state of readiness to meet
possible demands from the United Nations.
The Canadian military, who have suffered particularly from the necessity of
improvisation, would like to see within the U.N. Secretariat a military staff
to consider contingency plans and direct operations with more military
understanding than is possible at present.* While the government would like to
move in this direction, it recognizes the formidable difficulties caused by the
opposition of the Soviet Union and many nonaligned countries. Canadian policy
has been to make the best of what we can achieve rather than to push impossible
plans to a confrontation that would endanger the whole idea of peacekeeping.
In the debate that has raged recently over the financing of peacekeeping, Canada, while
clinging to the principle that these operations ought to be paid for in
equitable proportions by all members, nevertheless sought compromise solutions.
Canada,
as a member of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, in the 1966
Assembly put forward concrete proposals. Recognizing that a mandatory
apportionment would be possible only when the Security Council, including its
permanent members, agreed that this should be done, the Canadian representative
suggested that the Assembly put forward certain guidelines. He recognized that
the constitutional issue could not be settled by the majority’s forcing its
view on the minority. The Charter conferred primary responsibility for
maintaining peace on the Security Council, but it gave the Assembly the right
to discuss this subject and make recommendations. Thus it recognized that, if
the Council was unable to make decisions in this field, the Assembly might be
able to do so. Canada
put forward a resolution, cosponsored by a number of other countries, which, in
addition to these recommendations, would have established a special scale for
financing peacekeeping operations, under which the less-developed countries
would contribute five percent of the cost and the balance would be borne by
other members. T would not be mandatory but would serve a guideline. The
proposal, however, narrowly failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority.
standby forces for U.N.
Canada
has itself maintained and developed the principle of a national standby force.
This concept in Canada goes
back to the Korean War, when Canada
announced that it would maintain a brigade for service in Korea, for NATO
purposes, or for other U.N. operation. Fifteen years ago the Canadian military
looked upon peacekeeping services as outside their normal course of duty. The
requirements for Indochina, beginning in 1954,
and then for UNEF in 1956 appeared at the time to be temporary, but they were a
considerable drain on a small force. It came to be realized by military
planners that this must become one accepted aspect of Canadian military
activity. Having made this adjustment, the services have welcomed the
opportunities for varied and active service in different parts of the world. In
the various theaters where they have worked, frequently on assignments as much
diplomatic as military, Canadian servicemen have acquired skill and adaptability.
They have learned to accept the restraint and discretion required when military
forces operate, sometimes entirely without arms, to keep other people from
shooting. It has not been easy, and in the Congo
and Cyprus
they have had the experience of being beaten up or fired upon without
responding with the force that would be brought to bear in a conventional
military situation.
A large proportion of Canadian servicemen have had experience of this kind,
and they possess a considerable store of knowledge to be passed on to others in
training. Canada
has been interested also in sharing its expertise with other countries.
Recognizing that because of political difficulties the U.N. Secretariat itself
could do little, the Canadian government in 1964 planned a peacekeeping
conference in Ottawa and invited all those countries that had responded
affirmatively the Secretary-General’s request for standby forces for U.N. duty
to participate. Twenty-three countries sent representatives to this meeting.
Although it was organized outside the United Nations, it was not intended to
bypass the will of the U.N. It was not a political discussion but a
consultation of military men to learn from each other how to prepare themselves
better for other U.N. calls.
For some years Canada
has maintained units specifically on call for U.N. service. Although this
practice has been justified in that some troops are always prepared and
inoculated for instant dispatch, the difficulty has been that requirements vary
greatly. The demand for technical and special services has made it necessary to
call on other units. The “White Paper on Defence” in
1964 concluded:
Preparations for United Nations service on the part
of Canadian military personnel must be varied, with an emphasis on mobility.
While the training and equipment of such forces may be of a special nature, the
best results can be accomplished through the establishment of regular military
formations, which need not be earmarked exclusively for United Nations service
and which can be used for other roles as required.
The same White Paper stressed the need for mobility as regards deployment,
method of operation, and logistic support. This was one reason why the White
Paper, which gave a new direction to Canadian defence
preparations, placed heavy emphasis on mobile forces that could be used for all
Canada’s
varied military requirements, including peacekeeping.
Whether Canadian forces will be required again for this kind of duty is
never known. It is by no means certain, of course, that the U.N. will be able
to finance such operations again. However, the fact that Canada has been
asked to serve in every such U.N. operation for over fifteen years suggests
that further calls are likely, and it is well to be prepared. Forces are
prepared for NATO even though we trust they will never go into action. If we
take for granted that the world will not settle down without occasional
perturbations, then in all probability, regardless of the constitutional
problems, the U.N. will find some way to intervene. If further calls are made
on Canada,
there is no doubt that Canadian authorities will be willing and Canadian forces
prepared to play their part under whatever peculiar circumstances obtain.
Toronto,
Ontario
*For views of a Canadian with much peacekeeping experience and
suggestions for practical improvements see Lt.-Col. R. B. Tackaberry
Keeping the Peace (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
1966).
Contributor
John W. Holmes (M.A., University
of Toronto) is Director General,
Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto. He joined the Canadian Department of
External Affairs in 1943. While in the Foreign Service he was First Secretary
in London, Charge d’Affaires
in Moscow, and Acting Canadian Representative to
the United Nations in New York.
From 1951 to 1953 he was External Affairs member of the Directing Staff, National Defence
College, Kingston, and then Assistant Under-Secretary
of State for External Affairs. He became President of the Institute of International
Affairs in 1960. Mr. Holmes is a member of the
Council of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, the Advisory Council of
the World Security Trust, London, the Steering Committee of Encuentros—Siglo XX, the Executive Committee of Canadian
University Service Overseas, and the Academic Senate of Brock University. His
writings on Canadian foreign policy and other international subjects have been
widely published in professional magazines and books.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air
University. They do not
reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense,
the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
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