Air University Review, March-April 1978

In the post-World War II atomic era, the issue of the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those countries then possessing them the United States and the Soviet Union) was typically referred to as the "third country" problem (before Great Britain acquired the capability), then the "fourth country" problem (until France detonated a nuclear device in 1960), and, finally, symbolic of the emerging trend, simply the "nth country" problem. This issue of nuclear proliferation was generated a sizable body of literature both within and outside the scientific communities of many countries during the past fifteen years or more.¹ Whether optimistic or pessimistic in outlook, the basic assumptions of much of this literature can be summarized as follows: (1) the technological inputs for nuclear weapon development are beyond the capability of all but the most advanced states; (2) the capital outlay requirements for such weapon systems are prohibitive even for those states possessing the requisite technological capability and resources; (3) the acquisition of nuclear weapon poses as many problems to a nation's security as such weapons are designed to resolve; and (4) a primitive nuclear arsenal is not cost-effective.

The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is aided, therefore, strategic and political considerations aside, by the extremely costly and complex technological demands placed on countries considering the nuclear option. In fact, the question of proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be separated from that of the proliferation of nuclear technology. Indeed, it is nuclear technology that "has risen above nuclear weapons and is proliferating into every corner of the world."² As long as such technology remains complex and capital intensive, the nth country problem remains manageable. However, more than one study of the problem has ended on a note of caution comparable to that in the National Planning Association's study of 1960: "It is not inconceivable that simpler methods will in time be developed."³

The time has now arrived to reopen the issue raised in this statement in light of widespread discussion within the scientific community, recently made public by declassified research of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)* involving purportedly significant advances in laser isotope separation and in laser fusion.⁴ This analysis will make some exploratory observations on the question: Do research advances in the use of lasers for the enrichment of uranium and for fusion power portend a profound technological breakthrough in both cost and development factors which add a new dimension to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation?

*1974, Public Law 93-438 reorganized the AEC by functions into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). The older title will be retained in this analysis as it is the more familiar of the two.

Since the first laser demonstrations by Theodore H. Maiman in 1960, research has been under way in laser application to computers. surgery, and a variety of other uses, including nuclear fusion and isotope separation. In these latter areas, a major focus has been to develop an alternate source of civilian energy that will replace conventional nuclear reactors. Conventional production of nuclear energy uses enriched uranium as the fuel for fission reactions that release usable energy. Capital casts, technological complexity, enriched uranium fuel supply, and waste disposal are all factors that have inhibited the application of nuclear energy to electrical power production. Those working with lasers are hopeful that laser induced fusion reactions might provide an attractive alternative, minimizing the drawbacks of conventional nuclear energy methods by providing an energy source that is clean, safe, efficient, low-cost, and uses readily available, relatively inexhaustible fuel materials.⁵

Research efforts in these areas were begun during the 1960s in the laboratories of a number of countries: for the United States, the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories of the University of California, the Oak. Ridge National Laboratory, Sandia Laboratories at Albuquerque (under AT&T's Western Electric Company), Exxon Nuclear, and KMS Industries of Ann Arbor: in Russia, the Lebedev Physics Institute; the Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics in West Germany; the Limeil Laboratory in France; and government-sponsored research in Israel, among others.

Initial research successes were apparently handicapped by the technological limitations of laser design and of high-power requirements, but with advancing laser technology, breakthroughs in laser applications were reported in the mid-1960s by N. C. Basov of the Lebedev Institute in the Soviet Union.⁶ This, in turn, led to substantially increased research programs in several of the aforementioned countries.

In the United States, for example, advances at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, and Oak Ridge⁷ (among others) have generated a more than tenfold increase in AEC-provided funds for laser fusion research since 1970, to a level of some $30 million annually.⁸ AEC support for laser isotope separation research and development (R&D) alone--a segment of the much larger laser fusion program--was projected to increase from less than $1 million in fiscal year 1974 to over $10 million in fiscal year l975.⁹ It is reported that industrial funding on laser separation research by Exxon-Avco Nuclear is comparable to this latter figure.¹⁰ At the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory alone, which did not begin a laser separation R&D program (Project Jumper) until 1971, the budget had risen to $5.7 million for fiscal 1975. The AEC invested an additional $3.1 million for similar R&D at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory during the same period.¹¹

Such an increase in financial support in this short period of time would seem to validate the observation that "..... laser-induced fusion has recently joined magnetic-confinement fusion as a prime prospect for generating controlled thermonuclear power."¹² Of more pressing interest to those concerned with the problems and prospects of nuclear proliferation, however, is the impact of these research advances on the nth country question.

A brief comparison of existing and potential uranium-production methods will help provide insight into the revolutionary potential of laser technology.

Essential to any nuclear program, whether for civilian power production or for nuclear weapon production, is the availability of "enriched" uranium.¹³ Natural uranium is composed primarily of two isotopes: fissionable U-238 and fissile U-235. "Enrichment" involves the process of concentrating the fissile uranium isotope U-235, which comprises only 0.7 percent of uranium in its natural state. For use in civilian power reactors, this concentration must be increased to about 3 percent; nuclear weapons demand an enrichment to over 90 percent.

Various methods, both present and future, can produce the required materials.

A common method of acquiring nuclear weapon material is as a by-product of the generation of electrical power from nuclear reactors, since reactors that utilize uranium as their fuel source produce plutonium (Pu). However, as with U-235 and U-238, Pu-240 is formed from Pu-239 and is not desired for military use. Thus, the fuel can be left in the reactor for only a short time. As a method of acquiring weapon-grade material, therefore, it is an extremely slow and very inefficient means of utilizing the uranium feeder ore. Only gram lots of weapon-grade Pu-239 can be extracted from a ton of feeder ore. The Israeli reactor at Dimona, for example, is rated at 24 megawatts and could produce 4-6 kilograms of Pu-239 per year if operated at full capacity.¹⁴ This amount would be sufficient for a single, small-yield nuclear weapon. A nation desiring to develop a modest-sized nuclear force in a reasonable period of time would, therefore, be inclined to seek alternate methods of acquiring the needed fissile material for warheads.

An alternate method used specifically for the production of enriched uranium is gaseous diffusion.

The standard method for enriching uranium, gaseous diffusion involves the diffusing of hot uranium hexaflouride gases up and down porous stacks of synthetic membranes that pass and collect the lighter U-235 in their upper layers. Since each pass increases the U-235 concentration only slightly, the process must be repeated thousands of times before high levels of enrichment are achieved for weapon-grade material. The process is slow and costly and requires massive production facilities. At the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, for example, buildings to house the "cascades" of diffusion stacks (cells) cover some sixty acres and are often half a mile long. Investment costs and energy demands are equally impressive. The three gaseous diffusion plants presently operating in the United States require some 6000 megawatts of electrical power at peak production (approximately 1 percent of the total power generated nationwide)¹⁵ The investment figures for the construction of such a facility are widely quoted at between $1 to $3 billion; the French plant at Pierrelotte is reported to have cost close to $1 billion some ten years ago.¹⁶

Thus, the technological demands, investment and operating costs, energy requirements, and impossibility of disguising such a facility have acted as deterrents to nuclear proliferation. Even in those countries that have invested in gaseous diffusion plants,¹⁷ a search has been under way to discover less cumbersome and less expensive methods of enriching uranium such as the gas centrifuge.

Research in the gas centrifuge process has been under way in several countries since the early 1960s, particularly in the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and France. Essentially, the centrifuge process relies on extremely powerful gravitational forces produced through the rotation of long, rotating drums. Uranium hexaflouride gas is pumped into the drum, and the rotation movement disperses the molecules outward from the center. As pressure builds, the molecules of the lighter U-235 isotope concentrate toward the center, and this enriched flow is then passed into the next centrifuge drum in the cascade for similar treatment. This process is repeated until the desired enrichment level is achieved. The process is similar to that of gaseous diffusion, except that the separation factor is reportedly ten times higher than that achieved by the diffusion method. Therefore, an advantage to the centrifuge process is the shortened time required for uranium enrichment in comparison to the more repetitious separation process in gaseous diffusion.

It is projected that the centrifuge process will supplant the gaseous diffusion process some-time in the 1980s. Although initial capital outlay is expected to be comparable to that for gaseous diffusion facilities, the power requirements are estimated to be only 10 percent of that needed for gaseous diffusion operations, as well as operating costs decreasing by 20-30 percent.¹⁸ Even at this, however, the technological requirements and investment costs remain beyond the capacity of all but a handful of nations.

For these reasons, a nation desiring nuclear energy sources or weapon-grade fissile materials cannot avoid being interested in the research advances and potential offered by lasers for uranium isotope separation and fusion power. At present, such nations are hound largely to the slow and inefficient production of plutonium from nuclear power reactors or to the purchase of enriched uranium from the few highly advanced nations possessing gaseous diffusion facilities.

As noted earlier, the use of lasers for uranium isotope separation has made rapid progress in the past decade. Essentially, the process consists of adjusting tunable dye lasers to extremely fine frequencies (corresponding to absorption frequencies characteristic of the isotope in question), which can then excite one isotope of an element without exciting other isotopes. This is possible due to the difference in atomic weight between two isotopes of the same element. The excited isotope can then be ionized and separated by any of several methods: chemical, electrical, or magnetic.¹⁹ Although laser isotope enrichment is hypothetically applicable to any element, its potential employment for uranium separation/enrichment is of particular interest.

Projections released by the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory indicate that the physical plant facilities for such a process arc minuscule in comparison to those for gaseous diffusion or centrifugation; thus, investment costs would be less than for either of the aforementioned processes. In addition, energy demands should be far less than even the centrifuge process requires, and the laser process would he the most efficient user of the natural uranium fuel, removing virtually all the U-235 (in comparison to the approximately 60 percent use-level achieved by either diffusion or centrifugation).²⁰ This results from the extremely high separation factor in laser isotope separation, which produces more enrichment in fewer stages and requires no cascades as in gaseous diffusion plants.

Laboratory successes with this method have been reported from various sources within the past several years. In an address before the Eighth International Quantum Electronics Conference in June 1976, Benjamin B. Snavely of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory announced results of experiments conducted at Livermore that succeeded in separating microscopic quantities of the uranium isotope in which the proportion of U-235 exceeded 60 percent.²¹ According to a report in the March 22, 1974, issue of Science, Israeli scientists have also succeeded in enriching uranium through the employment of lasers.²² In testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in October 1973, Exxon Nuclear's president, Raymond L. Dickeman, reported laboratory successes in cooperation with Avco Everett Research Laboratories. He predicted that within two years Exxon Nuclear would begin the construction of a pilot plant for uranium enrichment utilizing a laser process and that by the mid-1980s processing on a commercial scale would be feasible at an overall cost of 10 to 20 percent below projected costs by gas centrifuge methods.²³

Although the ability to jump rapidly from laboratory to commercial scale production has not been optimistically accepted by all observers, it would seem likely that the laser isotope enrichment process is largely a function of time. If this process realizes its preliminary promises of low cost and high efficiency, it will make "alternative

enrichment processes economically obsolete," according to the AEC's former general manager, John A. Erlewine.²⁴

The implications of such developments are of the first magnitude. The successful commercial development of laser enrichment technology might not only greatly reduce the cost and complexity of acquiring enriched uranium for civilian power reactors but also do the same for nuclear warhead materials.

Research in laser isotope separation enrichment is only a segment of a much larger AEC research and development program in laser fusion. Unlike laser separation, laser fusion research is geared directly to producing a fusion reaction of elements, such as deuterium (found in water) and lithium or tritium. It is speculated that first generation plants would he similar to fission plants, consisting of a reactor, heat exchange, and generator.²⁵

Success at this stage is not readily known, as much remains classified for security reasons, both military and industrial; however, in 1974 KMS Industries announced success with laser fusion experiments. Although such claims met with skepticism among some observers,²⁶ it has been reported that KMS signed a contract to work closely with both the Los Alamos Scientific and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratories.²⁷ Although the AEC has hopes of developing a system that produces more power than it consumes sometime in the l980s, there are scientists who predict that the laser enrichment process will prove successful much sooner than laser fusion efforts.²⁸

Even if laser fusion advances were to remain in the more distant future in comparison to laser isotope enrichment advances, ultimate success in such efforts would produce an inexhaustible source of inexpensive neutrons for energy production from ordinary water. It might also produce, however, a low-cost and readily available source of weapon-grade material for nuclear weapons. Either way, they both represent significant new elements to the nth country problem, which require serious investigation and clarification in the years ahead.

A typical gaseous diffusion plant requires an initial investment of between $1 to $3 billion for the physical plant itself and, since its operation requires approximately 2000 megawatts of electrical power, forces investment in large-scale power plants (unless a nation is fortunate to have a ready supply of cheap hydroelectric power).

A centrifuge facility is projected to be somewhat more capital intensive (initially) than a diffusion plant, with cost-declines likely for successive plants that place it on a level comparable to gaseous diffusion plants.²⁹ The savings accrue in the centrifuge process from the much lower power requirements needed for, its operation--about one-tenth the energy requirements for a diffusion plant. Tie cost comparisons in the two techniques are represented in Table I.

Source: Adapted from William J. Wilcox, Jr., D. M. Lang, and S. A. Levin, Process Selection for New Uranium Enrichment Plants (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 1975), pp. 7-8.

Theoretically, a laser separation enrichment facility should be less capital intensive than either a diffusion or centrifuge facility, since size requirements are minimized (only a single pass being required for enrichment rather than the thousands of repeated stages found in the cascade-stack method of gaseous diffusion plants). Additionally, energy power requirements are less than for either of the above methods.

0verall, the laser separation method would appear to offer three distinct advantages over either the gaseous diffusion or centrifuge methods:

    (1) less costly and complex plant facilities--since a single pass can theoretically produce enrichment levels above 90 percent;

    (2) less energy demands--approximately 10-100 kilovolts per separated atom by centrifuge and 3 megavolts per separated atom by gaseous diffusion;

    (3) more efficient use of the feeder ore-which might ultimately amount to a saving of between $40-$l00 billion by the end of this century.³⁰

Although figures for cost comparison purposes remain a matter of conjecture, the figures in Table II provide a general indication of the cost involved.

Source: See James W. Dubrin, Laser Isotope Separation (University of California Press: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, November 1974), p. 16.

 

Although figures for cost comparison purposes remain a matter of conjecture, the figures in Table II provide a general indication of the cost involved.

Projected costs of a laser fusion facility are not widely available as yet, but it is speculated that the capital costs of the support facilities, at least, should be no greater than those of conventional plants. The savings derive from operating costs, which are projected to be extremely low in comparison to existing methods. According to one source, the costs for deuterium and lithium would amount to about 3¢ per million British thermal units (BTU) compared to present figures of 40¢ million BTU for fossil fuels.³¹ On the basis of these figures, laser fusion methods remain attractive at even several times the capital outlay of conventional nuclear power plants.

Cost comparison figures for gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge processes versus laser isotope separation and laser fusion processes are observably an intriguing source of speculation. Although uranium enrichment will probably be processed by conventional methods for at least the next decade, it is certainly not too soon to begin evaluating the potential impact of these newer methods under laboratory development, for in somewhat Draconian overtones, the program director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory has announced that "the main thrust of the research for the next several years is to demonstrate the feasibility of laser-induced. thermonuclear reactions regardless of their final application…"³²

The major assertion of this analysis is that technological advances in laser isotope and laser fusion may in time so reduce the cost and complexity of uranium enrichment as to induce present nonnuclear nations to reevaluate their positions on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whether this will lead to a situation where, as stated by one researcher at Los Alamos, "the whole world had better be little bit uneasy, because it will be a whole lot easier to make bombs,"³³ provides the focus for the remainder of this article.

The acquisition or availability of fissile material for nuclear weapons does not, in itself, constitute a nuclear capability. Any nation contemplating the nuclear option must have available to it the requisite scientific and technological expertise in nuclear, materials, and electronics fields, among others, to enable it to resolve the complex problems in uranium enrichment production; warhead design, assembly, and testing; and development of delivery systems. As noted by former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, in an article published some years ago, "these problems will not be swept away through the growing availability of plutonium."³⁴

In addition, a nation must evaluate the nuclear option in light of its economic capabilities, geographic location, alliance commitments, domestic pressures, overall military capability, and the presence or absence of regional threats. The variety of these considerations makes an impact study of laser enrichment effects on the nth country problem of extremely difficult insofar as providing concrete or definitive conclusions. In general, however, one can begin such an assessment to with the proposition that the above variables, either singly or in combination, would seem to be rule out for the foreseeable future all but a dozen or so of the present near-nuclear states that regardless of advances in laser research. It is for this handful of states that laser enrichment and laser fusion advances might well activate (or to reactivate) debates over the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

For Western Europe, such a list might include Italy, West Germany, and Sweden if they view American defense commitments as weak and Soviet intentions toward Europe as increasingly hostile. For Asia, a nuclear China and, more recently, India are forcing a reevaluation of security conditions in Japan, Australia, and possibly Indonesia. Elsewhere, regional conflicts, both real and potential, expand the nth country problem noticeably: in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru); in Africa (South Africa versus black Africa; in South Asia (India versus Pakistan); in the Far East (North Korea versus South Korea); and in Central Europe (East Germany versus West Germany).

It is largely, though not exclusively, for these nations that advances in uranium enrichment techniques might hold the greatest interest. Yet all nations must grapple with a complex variety of interrelated problems and demands when evaluating their need and ability to take up the nuclear option.

It has become conventional wisdom as portrayed by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox in their pioneering work on nuclear weapon proliferation that "only the most sophisticated among industrial nations" can opt for a nuclear weapon capability.³⁵ The reasons for this are varied, but they include research and development costs, manpower skills, production facilities, weapon design, and delivery systems. Many of these factors exist both for the production of weapon-grade materials and for delivery systems as well.

Acquiring the nuclear option requires a sizable investment of capital in research and development programs prior to and during the development of military weapon systems. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the annual level of world military R&D expenditures during the past decade was from $15 to $16.5 billion. Of this amount, 85 percent was spent by the United States and the Soviet Union; an additional $2 billion was spent by the United Kingdom, France, China, and West Germany. The remaining 3 to 4 percent of the total constitutes the R&D expenditures of the rest of the globe, with Japan, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and India the dominant investors.³⁶

For a nation to develop the broad range of weapon systems symbolic of a great power requires military R&D outlays in the range of $5 to $10 billion annually. A more limited nuclear capability can be achieved with annual R&D expenditures of $500 million to $1 billion.³⁷ In examining defense budgets of the world’s nations, one finds that even a limited outlay of $500 million annually for R&D constitutes the total defense budget of some 16 of the world's more advanced nations, and if one considers the larger expenditure figure of $1 billion, the number of countries increases to 30 or more. In fact, only some 20 nations have defense budgets in excess of $1 billion³⁸ Table III provides a general comparison of research and development outlays for a variety of near-nuclear countries.

A cursory glance reveals that only West Germany comes anywhere near the base figure suggested in the SIPRI study. To increase present military R&D to the base level of $500 million would require both a sizable increase in present defense budgets and the division of total R&D funds from the governmental and industrial sectors. R&D outlays for nuclear weapons can constitute from 15 to 25 percent of a country's total annual defense expenditures, but this amount appears to be beyond the present resources of all but a small percentage of the present nth countries. Laser processes are likely to increase the R&D demands for nuclear and nonnuclear states alike.

Source: Adapted from 1SIPRI, Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972), pp. 76-83; 2United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 788-89; 3Military Balance, 1974-1975 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), passim.

Suffice it to say that a nation embarking on a nuclear capability must expect to devote financial resources of a magnitude beyond the resources of the majority of nations. For most nations it would amount, in essence, to the creation of an entire new industrial sector to a nation's economy, a fact which could lead to imbalance and distorted economic growth, at least for developing nations. To illuminate the point, Beaton and Maddox compare a developing nation's decision to build nuclear production facilities as equivalent to constructing the nation's electric generating system or building several of the world's largest steel complexes.³⁹

Even with those nations possessing the requisite financial resources, there are other restraining factors such as manpower skills. The inhibiting factor becomes evident when it is realized that most of the countries now generating power from nuclear reactors rely on the major nuclear powers for technical advice and support. The industrial, scientific, and engineering skill demands placed on a nation when building enrichment facilities (whether conventional or laser) are considerable. A country must have skilled labor for plant construction, but even more difficult to find are the trained metallurgists, scientists, and engineers for plant and weapon systems design and the technicians and maintenance personnel for ongoing operations and repairs. If the experiences of Sweden and Britain are any indication, more than 10,000 technically skilled workers and hundreds of research scientists are needed to build and maintain a production facility alone.⁴⁰ In addition to this manpower requirement, a United Nations study conservatively estimates that at least 500 scientists and 1300 engineers are needed to develop and maintain warhead production facilities, and an additional 19,000 personnel (more than 5000 of them scientists and engineers) are required to produce delivery vehicles of the intermediate ballistic missile variety.⁴¹ A country survey of scientists and engineers in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook reveals more than 50 nations with fewer than 8500 personnel in these categories.⁴² The scientific and technical manpower R&D levels for a cross section of countries considered capable of achieving nuclear status within 5-10+ years are represented in Table IV. For comparative purposes, a 1961 survey of 400,000 scientists and engineers doing R&D work in the United States showed that 250,000 (5 of 8) were involved in space and defense projects.⁴³

As revealed by Table IV, only Japan achieves an R&D manpower level of a magnitude approaching that of the United States. For the remainder, the gap is quite significant and varies greatly among the selected countries themselves. Even among countries with comparable R&D manpower levels, the industrial base of a Sweden or Belgium alters the significance of these figures in comparison with a Chile, Argentina, Egypt, or Pakistan, whose less-developed industrial bases would be significantly affected by the diversion of scarce manpower resources into military R&D. The gap in manpower levels between near-nuclear countries such as those listed in Table IV and the remainder of the developing countries of the world is as significant as the gap between near-nuclear countries and Japan or the United States.

Clearly, for most of the nonnuclear countries of the world, manpower may well be a more inhibiting factor than finances. Laser advances are neither likely to alter this observation nor lessen the requirement. Although physical plant requirements for laser isotope separation are much smaller (hypothetically) than conventional processing plants, laser-based technology is no less demanding of high skills.

In addition to the production of fissile material for weapons, one must consider the financial, industrial, and manpower demands of nuclear warhead design and construction. Although little is available in the general literature of the field, William Davidon and his associates have provided an indication of the extent and complexity of the problem. The range of activities includes exacting measurements of the properties of the bomb materials; theoretical and experimental design of the weapons; purification, heat treatment, and alloying of the fissionable materials; preparation of shaped charges of explosives; manufacture of electronic and other components for fusing and detonating; and instrumentation for design. manufacture, and testing.⁴⁴

Success in this effort would require an annual investment of approximately $2 million per warhead for a modest program producing ten 20 kt-sized bombs yearly,⁴⁵ and a design effort of 10 to 20 top-ranked scientists working continually for two to three years.⁴⁶ In addition, the testing of a nuclear device requires an expenditure of some $12 million.⁴⁷

Source:United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 788-89.

 

Table V. Weapons development projects of near-nuclear countries, 1960-68 Source: Adapted from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development ( Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972), pp. 46-47.

 

delivery systems

A nation embarking on a nuclear strike force is limited to four options for its delivery system: subsonic fighter-bombers, supersonic fighter-bombers, fixed land-based missiles, and mobile land-based or sea-based missiles. To ensure success, a nation will have to design a system that is within its technological means and financial resources. For most states, this would mean a manned delivery system, as the experience of both the United States and the Soviet Union testifies to the enormous investment requited for intermediate and long-range ballistic missile systems, whether land- or sea-based. Even such a technologically advanced nation as France relies more on its Mirage IV supersonic bombers for its nuclear strike force than on its ballistic missile system.

The cost requirements for even a relatively simple subsonic bomber force can be quite formidable. The British subsonic Vulcan bomber fleet developed in the 1950s represents an investment of $1.5 to $3 billion.⁴⁸ To develop a supersonic bomber would require average annual R&D expenditures of $80 to $100 million per plane excluding bombs. For comparison, the average annual R&D figures for a single solid-fuel, intermediate-range ballistic missile is from $300 to $500 million.⁴⁹

An examination of major military R&D programs of various near-nuclear countries reveals that nearly all have an existing or potential capability in the area of manned delivery Systems, but few have operational programs in the ballistic missile category. (See Table V.) Of those nations listed, only three have invested R&D resources in all the major weapon categories (Japan, Israel, and Sweden), and two others invested in four of the five major categories. For most of the countries listed, research and development experience is focused on conventional armament categories, although seven have some degree of familiarity with special purpose missiles but not with ballistic missile systems.

If an nth country should decide, nonetheless, to embark on a missile delivery system, the French experience proves instructive. Table VI provides investment figures for the French nuclear program from 1960 to 1964 and is indicative of program costs. The total cost of the French program for the last decade has been variously estimated at between $8 to $15 billion.⁵⁰ In general, then, a nation deciding on a modest nuclear capability should expect to invest approximately $1.5 billion annually.⁵¹

Source: Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 92. Table VI. French nuclear program cost, 1960-1964

Should a nation make the monumental decision of embarking on a full-scale program to develop delivery systems comparable to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, it could mean a development time frame of up to twenty years and an investment of $4 to $5 billion annually.⁵² A total investment of $50 to $80 billion is frightening to even the most advanced of the nth countries.

On the basis of the above considerations, the best that even the most ambitious nth country could hope to attain would be a modest-sized nuclear force, comparable to that of Britain or France. To what extent would breakthroughs in the commercial application of laser isotope separation processes alter this situation? A glance at Table VII reveals that the acquisition of fissile material for nuclear weapons is only a small part of the total cost picture.

Since figures are as yet not available on investment costs of a single laser isotope separation facility (other than the broad assumption that it should be significantly less than for contemporary methods), it is difficult to provide comparative data. If one assumes, for illustrative purposes, that the employment of laser methodology could produce a fissile program of the French magnitude for the cost of a small plutonium-based program listed in Table VII, then a near-nuclear country could indeed acquire a warhead stockpile of respectable proportions. This does not affect, however, the procurement costs and annual operating costs of various delivery modes. The development of nuclear warheads appears to constitute only 5 to 10 percent of the total investment costs of a nuclear weapon program, depending on the method of processing and the size and type of delivery systems. (It should be cautioned, nevertheless, that the above assessment does not take into account the possibility of using commercial aircraft already available to nonnuclear nations.)

Source: Data adapted from Report of the Secretary-General, Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons (New York: United Nations, 1968), pp. 24-26.

In addressing the problem of nth country nuclear proliferation, one would be more precise to speak in terms of N minus 5 to 10 years. When the decision is made to acquire the nuclear option, two to three years of effort are needed for the planning, design, and construction of conventional enrichment facilities; and an additional two to three years for material production and weapon assembly.⁵³

In Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the AEC estimated that, within five to ten years after deciding on the nuclear option, the following countries could join the ranks of the nuclear powers: Australia, Canada, West Germany, Italy, India (has since exploded a device), Japan, and Sweden. Other nations requiring more time to achieve the status included: Argentina, Netherlands, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Israel, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.⁵⁴ The general capabilities of several of the nations cited are represented in Table VIII.

The decision to develop a nuclear capability involves even more than the technical obstacles and considerations presented here. To some nations there are political and moral considerations that work against a pro-nuclear decision (Japan, Sweden. Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland, for example)⁵⁵ For these and others, there is the broader concern of the global impact of nuclear spread. All but eight of the above nations (India, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain) have either signed or ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁵⁶

Strategic considerations further serve as an ameliorating influence. The most that any of the nth countries could hope to achieve is a strategic capability comparable to that of Britain or France--a capability that has produced as many problems (or more) for security as it has resolved. Whether such a capability can provide even regional security is a question that has been the focus of much of the Indian debate over the nuclear option.⁵⁷

Table VIII. Nuclear capabilities of fifteen near-nuclear countries

Although the tangible impact of laser isotope separation/enrichment and laser fusion processes remains for the future, it is suggested that such advances will neither dispel nor resolve the problems, demands, and considerations discussed. It is not at all conclusive that "rapid proliferation is much more likely in the next decade than ever in the past simply because it will be technically more easy ’⁵⁸ Simply because technology advances, it is not that much easier.

The most likely impact of these new technological advances--if they prove successful and achieve their designers' claims--is to reduce the five- to ten-year time frame now imposed on nth countries. Although it is true that the cost figures for weapon-grade materials will probably be reduced considerably, the much more important consideration bearing on the nth country problem would appear to be the potentially greater ease of generating such materials through laser application. This could conceivably reduce the nuclear option time frame from N minus 5 to 10 years to perhaps N minus 2 to 5 years. Whether this time compression would automatically lead to unprecedented nuclear proliferation or instead produce a situation of potential proliferation is an important distinction to examine.

One can only conclude that laser advances will be a major factor in contributing to potential proliferation, but it is quite possible that such advances will not cause actual proliferation. The latter depends on prevailing international trends, alliance configurations

One could also adopt the position that, by shortening the time frame for nonnuclear states to N minus 2 to 5 years, laser advances might be a significant step in the direction of dampening rather than exacerbating the nth country problem.⁵⁹ This hypothesis is based on the observation that by shortening the lead time, near-nuclear nations would, still retain the nuclear option without forcing them to make the crucial decision immediately simply because of the excessive development span demanded under present methods of nuclear material production.

In short, one can still subscribe to former Defense Secretary Schlesinger's observation that the acquisition of fissile material does not. elevate a nation to the status of a nuclear power. Whatever advances are actually made in the emerging field of laser fusion and laser isotope enrichment would seem to have only a negligible to slight effect on the major considerations in nth country proliferation--weapon research and development costs and manpower/skill demands.

1. A sampling of such works might include: George Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962); William B. Bader, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968); Bennett Boskey and Mason Willrich, editors, Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control (New York: The Dunellen Co., Inc., 1970); Richard N. Rosecrane, editor, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); and George Fischer, The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, translated by David Willey (London: Europa Publications, 1971).

2. Johan Jorgen Holst, Security, Order, and the Bomb (Oslo: Hestholns Boktrykkeri, 1972), p. 129.

3. William C. Davidon, Marvin I. Kalkstein, and Christoph Hohenemser, The Nth Country Problems and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association Pamphlet No. 108, January 1960), pp. 6-7.

4. Much of the declassified literature can be found in such journals and publications as Scientific American, Physics Today, Science, and Science News. It is interesting to note that prior to the AEC’s decision, two major laser bibliographies—Kujo Tomiyasu, The Laser Literature: An Annotated Guide (New York: Plenum Press, 1968); and Edward V. Ashburn, editor, Laser Literature: A Permuted Bibliography (North Hollywood, California: Western Periodicals Co., 1967)-shed little light on the revolutionary advances then under way.

5.Likely candidates widely cited for energy sources include deuterium (a virtually inexhaustible element found in the oceans); the less common tritium; and, potentially, the common isotope of boron, B-11. See John L. Emmett, John Nuckolls, and Lowell Wood, "Fusion Power by Laser Implosion," Scientific American (June 1974), pp. 24-37; and Moshe J. Lubin and Arthur P. Fraas, "Fusion by Laser," Scientific American (June 1971), pp. 21-33.

6. For an overview of the developments of the 1960s, see Lubin and Fraas.

7. "A method for converting the fusion energy from laser-ignited deuterium-tritium pellets into electrical power was evolved at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory early I 1969 in conjunction with fusion-power feasibility studies that had been under way there since 1967." Ibid., p. 29.

8. John Nuckolls, John Emmett, and Lowell Wood, "Laser-induced Thermonuclear Fusion," Physics Today (August 1973), p. 46. The authors suggests that the Soviet Union’s investment I laser research is of comparable size.

9. Robert Gillette, "Uranium Enrichment: Rumors of Israeli Progress with Lasers," Science (March 22, 1974), p. 1173.

10. William D. Metz, "Uranium Enrichment: Laser Methods Nearing Fullscale Test, " Science (August 16, 1974), p. 602.

11. Physics Today (September 1974), 20; and Metz, p. 603.

12. Nuckolls et al., p. 46.

13. Descriptions of these processes have been derived from Gillette, pp. 1172-73; Beaton and Maddox, Chapter One; Davidon et al., Chapter One; Boskey and Willrich, Chapter Four; and SIPRI, The Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT (Stockholm; Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972), Appendices 1 and 2.

14. Beaton and Maddox, pp. 171-73.

15. Gillette, pp. 1172-73.

16. Rosecrance, p. 135.

17. At present, gaseous diffusion plants are in operation in the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and China.

18. Gillette, p. 1173.

19. See Metz, pp. 602-3, and Science News (June 22, 1974), pp. 396-97, for descriptions of this process.

20. See James W. Durbin, Laser Isotope Separation (University of California: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, November 1974), p. 16.

21. Science News, p. 396.

22. Gillette, p. 1172.

23. Ibid., pp. 1172-73; and Metz, p. 602.

24. Gillette, p. 1173.

25. Schematics of such a system are found in Lubin and Fraas, pp. 28-30.

26. "Laser Fusion Claims: An Evaluation, "Science News (May 25, 1974), p. 333.

27. Physics Today (March 1975), p. 20.

28. Metz, p. 603.

29. William J. Wilcox, Jr., D. M. Lang, and S. A. Levin, Process Selection for New Uranium Enrichment Plants (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, 1975), pp.7-8.

30. Benjamin B. Snavely, Laser Enrichment of Uranium, Why, How, and When (University of California: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, September 3, 1974), pp. 2-5.

31. Lubin and Fraas, p. 33.

32. Benjamin M. Elson, "Laser Studies as Nuclear Power Trigger," Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 25, 1974), p. 46. Italics added.

33. Gillette, p. 1174.

34. James R. Schlesinger, "Nuclear Spread," The Yale Review (October 1967), p. 79.

35. Beaton and Maddox, p. 21.

36. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Resources Devoted to Military Research and Development (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972), Chapter One.

37. Ibid., pp. 10-14 and 44-52.

38. The Military Balance: 1973-1974 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), pp. 74-75. This includes such nth countries as Czechslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Japan.

39. Beaton and Maddox, p. 22.

40. Ibid., p. 23.

41. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons (New York: United Nations, 1968), p. 28. Hereafter referred to as Report of the Secretary-General.

42. United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 788-89.

43. John S. Tompkins, The Weapons of World War III (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 201.

44. Davidon et al., pp. 20-21.

45. Quester, p. 61.

46. Davidon et al., p. 24.

47. Report of the Secretary-General, p. 24.

48. Beaton and Maddox, p. 75.

49. C. J. E. Harlow, Defence, Technology, and the Western Alliance (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, I, 1967), p. 22.

50. Fischer, p. 33.

51. Schlesinger, p. 82.

52. Ibid., p. 73.

53. Davidon et al., p. 21.

54. Nonproliferation Treaty, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 10, 11, 12 and 17 July 1968, p. 31.

55. For an examination of these considerations, see the cross-national survey in SIPRI, The Near-Nuclear countries and the NPT (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1972).

56. For the text of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and list of signatories, see Boskey and Willrich, pp. 151-68. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile and signatories to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

57. See A Strategy for India for a Credible Posture against a Nuclear Adversary (New Delhi: The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses), n.d.

58. James E. Dougherty and J.F. Lehman, Jr., editors, Arms control for the Late Sixties (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967), p. 162.

59. I am indebted to Mr. Ryukichi Imai who advanced this interesting thesis in a different respect in his article, "The Changing Role of Nuclear Technology in the Post-NPT World: A Japanese View," found in Holst, pp. 120-30.

I am indebted to Joseph M. Mack of the Los Alamos Scientific laboratory, who introduced me to the advances being made in laser isotope separation and laser fusion. Both he and Professor Roger B. Handberg, Jr., of Florida Technological University, have offered valuable suggestions and critiques of this article.

Robert L Bledsoe (Ph.D., University of Florida) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Florida Technological University, Orlando. Dr. Bledsoe was an Intelligence Officer in the Latin American Branch, Military Capabilities Division, of the Defense Intelligence Agency. His special interests are defense policy and techniques of international violence, particularly deterrence theory and low-level techniques of subversion, coups, and unconventional war theory.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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