Air University Review, March-April 1978

U.S. Military Technology

the Soviet perspective

The term "technology" suggests a variety of meanings. It may define a body of applied scientific knowledge or even the actual product of this competence. Moreover, advanced technology may not be visible in the product itself but rather in the process that created the prototype. Integrated circuits and computer software are obvious examples.¹ However, such definitional distinctions become academic when considered within the context of national security. Technology emerges as a critical national resource and an equally important dimension of international political power. Most industrially advanced nations covet and nurture this asset. Consequently, a perception of future technological trends may well emerge from trends in acquisition and development.

The Soviet Union shares this perspective with one notable exception. The Soviet leadership's perception of American technology is filtered through the lens of contemporary Marxism-Leninism and a unique view of Russia's historic relationship with the West.

Historically, Russia, with few exceptions, has lagged behind the West in technological development. From the earliest days of the Soviet state, its leaders recognized this fact and tried to rectify it. In 1921, for example, an exasperated Lenin complained,". . , it is necessary to establish who will be responsible for acquainting us with European and American technology clearly, timely, practically and not formally."² Three years later, Joseph Stalin concluded that "American efficiency…combined with the Russian revolutionary sweep" are essential to the successful construction of socialism in Soviet Russia.³ Neither statement is surprising when considered in relation to the observation of Dr. Herbert S. Levine, an economist at the University of Pennsylvania, that ". - modern Russian history--from the middle of the 15th Century to the present day-had been dominated by the need perceived by Russian leaders to catch up with the more advanced nations of the West."⁴ This motivation has not abated in recent years. On the contrary, it has assumed even a greater sense of urgency. In a 1969 address to the International Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties, General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev declared:

… . we must compete in the scientific-technical arena. The struggle here will be long and hard. But we are resolved to carry it out seriously to prove the supremacy of socialism.⁵

Such competition is not only a reflection of the "historically inevitable struggle between socialism and capitalism" but the essence of a new stage of socioeconomic development. The 1961 Soviet Communist Party Program concluded that ". . . humanity is entering a period of scientific-technical revolution associated with the mastering of nuclear energy, the conquest of space, the development of chemistry, the automation of production and other enormous achievements of science and technology."⁶ Over time this concept has proved to be more substantive than polemical.

It [the scientific and technical revolution] defines the accepted ideological stance toward science and its social role. The concept's development is a way of seeking popular support for leadership goals. It also assigns a national priority to science and scientific achievement and exhorts greater effort from the scientific community.⁷

This Interpretation by Dr. Thomas P. Kridler of the U.S. Air Force's Foreign Technology Division offers a framework within which to gauge the actual Soviet commitment to science and technology. During the decade of the 1960s, the U.S.S.R.'s research and development establishment expanded rapidly. For example, the number of research institutes increased from 1729 in 1960 to 2388 in l969. ⁸ By the early 1970s the Soviets claimed that one out of every 250 people in the nation was employed in science; the growth in the science labor force exceeded by several times the growth in the nation's total labor force; and, furthermore, 15 percent of each annual college-level graduating class entered a scientific career.⁹ Between the years 1970 and 1976, Soviet scientific and engineering manpower engaged in research and development increased from 600,000 to 800,000 individuals.¹⁰ It is estimated that during the same period, at least a quarter million engineers were graduated annually. This is five times greater than that of any other country in the world.¹¹

A major effort in the Soviet drive to catch up and surpass the West is devoted to the application of science and technology to military needs. "Scientific research should be subordinated primarily to the interests of further strengthening of the army and navy."¹² The judgment is that of Victor G. Kulikov, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. Moreover, this assertion is corroborated by the growth in Soviet research, development, test, and evaluation expenditures since 1964. In thirteen years, this financial investment has increased from approximately $9 billion per annum to a current expenditure of about $20 billion.¹³

One of the principal formulations created by Soviet military theoreticians to explain and justify this commitment to military-oriented research and development is the ". . - sharp, leap-like transition from conventional to nuclear-missile weapons as the main means of waging war and the corresponding new means of achieving the basic aims of the war, [which] comprise the essence of the contemporary revolution in military science."¹⁴ The "revolution in military affairs" demarcates a historical period concurrent with the revolution in science and technology.

The first stage began in the Soviet Union with the "creation of atomic weapons" in 1953, and it was followed in 1960 by the "emergence of a carrier for the atomic charge (rockets) and the creation of nuclear-missile weapons under the control of the newly established Strategic Missile Forces. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are now in the midst of the third and final stage. It is characterized by the "comprehensive automation of military equipment and the combat actions of troops, the intensive introduction of scientific knowledge into the military field, notably for control of troops."¹⁵

In their survey of military applications of automated control and management systems in the United States, V. A. Baranyuk and V. I. Vorob'yev noted that while the employment of an excessively large number of different types of computers is an important deficiency of such systems, the immediate prospects in this field include the standardization of hardware, the development of time-sharing multiprocessor computers, and the development of mobile computer systems for troops control in the field. The authors urge their Soviet counterparts to analyze foreign experience critically "in adopting means of automation in the practical activities of headquarters staffs and military establishments" in order to reach the "most objective conclusions."¹⁶

The impact of science and technology as manifest in the "revolution in military affairs" is considered by many Soviet military analysts to be the most important condition and the basis for raising the military might of the capitalist states.¹⁷ Yet, a fundamental question remains: 'What are the technological aspects of this "condition," and how are they perceived by the politico-military hierarchy of the Soviet Union?

In his evaluation of the Defense Department's research and development program for fiscal year 1978, Dr. Malcolm R. Currie related technology to military power in the following manner.

Technology, per se, does not equate to military power. Rather the real significance of technology to the balance of military power lies in the ability of each nation to transform its scientific discoveries and engineering breakthroughs into military capability--in the form of equipment which enhances or multiplies force effectiveness and Which can be deployed in militarily significant numbers…¹⁸

Strategic weapon programs such as the B-1, the Trident, and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, together with various tactical systems, demonstrate this relationship. The development of each of these systems prompted a spate of commentaries that partially reveal a Soviet perception of U.S. military technology and what it may augur for the future.

The following examples reflect some of the assumptions relative to American science and technology that consistently appear in Soviet publications. For instance, in one of his many commentaries on the role of science in military strategy, Colonel V. M. Bondarenko argues that "science has become an independent element in the system of the defensive might" of the Soviet Union; "militarization as usual is a characteristic feature of the development of scientific knowledge…"in the United States.¹⁹ The growth in U.S. defense expenditures is often cited to justify this assertion. Citing the increase from FY 1970 of $74.5 billion to $112.3 billion for the fiscal year that ended 30 December 1976, S. Novoselov concludes in his July 1976 article published in Military Knowledge, the monthly journal jointly sponsored by Soviet Civil Defense and DOSAAF,* that

A significant portion of the US military budget goes for the continued buildup of strategic offensive weapons: purchases and maintaining the combat readiness of ICBMs in underground silos and on nuclear-powered submarines, plus scientific research and experimental design work on the development of new types of weapons.²⁰

*DOSAAF, the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

The American military-industrial complex is accused of attempting to "expand the range of military applied scientific research and development in order to establish conditions for the constant qualitative improvement of military potential… in order to make use of new scientific discoveries for military purposes."²¹ Finally, the "fruits" of U.S. science and technology are converted into a "lever with which it will be able to create new ways in which other states are dependent on American imperialism" or to entice "scientists from other capitalist countries… to perpetuate the so-called 'technological gap' between the economies of the socialist countries and that of the United States."²²

As one might expect, the development of the B-l, Trident, and the cruise missile provided ready grist for the Soviet agitation and propaganda machinery. The standard fare included allegations of "mass protest movements" and "broad domestic opposition" in the United States to the continued development of these systems.²³ Of greater significance are those political and technical commentaries subsumed beneath such obvious Soviet rhetoric.

In a 13 June 1975 speech at the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses on the occasion of his victory in the single-party elections to the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet, General Secretary Brezhnev proposed an international ban on the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems. In some quarters, this declaration was welcomed as a sincere step toward further arms control, while others dismissed the proposal as merely a Soviet propaganda ploy designed to orchestrate international pressure opposed to the development and deployment of the B-1 and Trident. The latter interpretation is far closer to Brezhnev's true motives. As the General Secretary declared in the CPSU Central Committee Report to the 25th Party Congress eight months later,

We specifically proposed reaching agreement on banning the creation of new and even more destructive arms systems, particularly new submarines of the Trident type equipped with ballistic missiles and new strategic bombers of the B-1 type in the United States and analogous systems in the USSR.²⁴

The nature of such analogous systems in the Soviet Union was never clarified. Nevertheless, explanatory articles generated in support of the Brezhnev proposal are quite revealing; in particular, an essay contained in the monthly, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, published by the Soviet Union's Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC). The article was written by two senior staff members of this institute, General-Lieutenant (Retired) M. A. Mil'shteyn and L. S. Semeyko.

The authors pose the following question: "What does the United States see as the main directions in the creation of a new, 'super-powerful weapon'?" Based on an analysis of "U.S. sources," they foresee three alternatives: first, "the production of new weapons on the basis of already known types (classes) of mass destruction weapons-nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological (biological)"; second, "the development of fundamentally new types of mass destruction weapons differing fundamentally from existing ones in terms of their physical nature "; and, finally, "the creation of original systems mainly connected with new delivery weapons. "²⁵

In support of the first proposition, Mil'shteyn and Semeyko state that "scientific research work is being performed in the United States on the utilization of uncharged-particle and charged-particle accelerators to create weapons of powerful destructive action…²⁶ The second trend is illustrated by research in the field of genetic weapons. It is alleged that the Advanced Research Projects Agency—" ‘an elite of civilian scientists engaged in highly risky scientific research work of a revolutionary nature' in the military field" is involved in such an effort.²⁷ Research into military applications of lasers together with the B-1 and Trident systems exemplify the third trend. Interestingly, the authors appear to give credence to an unattributed report that indicated the "possibility of arming the B-1 strategic bomber with a laser gun . . ."²⁸

U.S. military technology, therefore, is perceived broadly in terms of specific products that are, in and of themselves, examples of advanced technological achievement. The Soviets do not indicate that they foresee any curtailment of this trend.

Such a conclusion does not imply the existence of a reactive relationship between Soviet military research and development and similar activities in the United States. There is little evidence to question the veracity of the late Marshal A. Grechko's contention, expressed during the 24th Party Congress, that "the constant strengthening of the armed forces is an objective necessity for the successful building of socialism and communism "²⁹ Nevertheless, the potential for a reciprocal Soviet response does exist. The current Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Dimitri F. Ustinov, commented that "our country's economy, science and technology are now at such a high level that we are capable, within the shortest period, of matching any type of weapon that the enemies of peace create."³⁰

About four years ago, a leading Soviet observer of American military affairs, V. M. Kulish, argued that the main direction of the "military-technical race being conducted in the United States reflects two principal trends: modernization of existing arms . . . the development of a broad front of long-range scientific studies that will provide a good freedom of selection."³¹ A TASS political news observer, Vladimir Goncharov, subsequently described one outcome of these earlier U.S. studies, viz., the B-1, as follows: "It does not attend meetings, deliver speeches or give interviews, nevertheless it plays an important part in the election campaign battles, now unfolding in the United States…Its sharp beak, glassy eyes, and widespread wings rub shoulders on newspaper pages with the emblems of the biggest American political parties."³²

While the Soviet press gave wide play and implicit approval to the U.S. congressional debate surrounding procurement funding for the B-l during the spring of 1976, President Carter's decision to discontinue deployment of the B-1 in favor of the cruise missile elicited a uniformly negative response within the U.S.S.R. In its initial coverage of the President's 30 June 1977 announcement, TASS, the official Soviet press agency, attached far greater importance to his decision to authorize deployment of strategic cruise missiles in contrast to the cancellation of B-l production although the dispatch did note that "the United States will continue tests and research for perfection of the 'B-l' bomber."³³ In the judgment of Oleg Skalkin, a Pravda columnist, "There was simply no other outcome. "The White House," he concluded, "was too strongly committed by election campaign promises to prevent the production of these aircraft."³⁴ However, the American decision to begin deployment of air-launched cruise missiles was viewed by Izvestiya's V. Kobysh as a significant reinforcement of "US military-strategic potential."³⁵

The sources of information available to Soviet military and political analysts are, in many respects, as interesting as the insights gleaned from their writings. The party and governmental organs of the U.S.S.R. literally pursue a vacuum cleaner approach to the acquisition of Western scientific and technical knowledge. The techniques range from the translation of professional articles to espionage. While the methods vary, the goal does not. Each technique is designed to extract the maximum advantage for the Soviet Union in its military and technical competition with the United States.

Today, the scientific and technological data mechanism that Lenin lacked exists in the Soviet Union. It is the responsibility of the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI), a branch of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. VINITI provides information storage and retrieval and abstracts domestic and foreign literature. In 1971, it was reported that VINITI processed publications from 117 different countries which encompassed approximately one million articles, books, and descriptions of Inventions.³⁶ A. I. Mikhaylov, the present Director of VINITI, stated in 1973 that the number of items compiled for publication in its journal of abstracts increased since 1961 at an average rate of 5 percent per year; the journal's preparation time from original sources was reduced from 7.5 to 4 months; and, the number of subscriptions had increased from 264 to 3l7,000.³⁷ VINITI also publishes "Express Information" reports, which contain sources with limited access, and the reference work Results of Science and Technology.³⁸

Among the principal consumers of VINITI publications are IUSAC and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), two of the Kremlin's key foreign policy think tanks. As a Stanford Research Institute study concluded, "Information generated by this system serves a dual function: it is used directly to supplement Soviet knowledge in specialized fields and as a primary input into the strategic intelligence activities of the USSR concerned with long-range forecasts of the future. "³⁹

While the international technology transfer issue falls beyond the purview of this paper, the channels utilized provide the Soviet leadership with a valuable source of information. Professor Joseph Berliner of Brandies University labeled these: publications, products, and people in ascending order of importance and effectiveness.⁴⁰ The first channel is comprised of VINITI et al. The significance of the last two conduits graphically emerged during the course of the May 1972 Nixon-Bergen summit in Moscow.

Points of the agreement on "Basic Principles of Relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." endorsed at this conference states:

The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the US and USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.⁴¹

As a consequence, eleven intergovernmental cooperative agreements were developed in such fields as environmental protection, space cooperation, transportation, and atomic energy. The cooperative agreement that dealt with the general field of science and technology has provided the basis for a rapid Increase in American trade with the Soviet Union. Of the total number of contracts for industrial equipment placed with American firms, half are for the Kama River heavy truck production complex.⁴²

The recent growth in U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial and cooperative ventures spawned a commensurate increase in official travel between the two countries. During the first eleven months of 1975, approximately 859 Soviet commercial groups came to the United States, more than four times the figure for 1972. The number of official Soviet representatives almost doubled, reaching 1197 during the same period. The number of Soviet exchange visitors also doubled in less than four years, and the figures on groups jumped from 330 in 1972 to 530 for the first five months of 1975. By way of comparison, about 5500 American commercial and technical travelers journeyed to the Soviet Union in 1975 as opposed to 2300 in 1972.

Scientific and technological symposia offer a prime source of information on U.S. technology to the Soviets. Among those academic functions included in the proposed itineraries of Communist bloc exchange visitors during 1975 were the Seventh Conference on Laser Atmospheric Studies sponsored by the Stanford Research Institute and the Sixth International Conference on High-Energy Physics and Nuclear Structure at Santa Fe, New Mexico.

The breadth of technological data flowing to the Soviet Union through each of these various overt mediums defies accurate measurement. Moreover, there is a covert dimension to this process. The Scientific and Technical Directorate of the KGB engages in clandestine operations abroad and coordinates the scientific and technical espionage of all other KGB divisions. This organization is also responsible for liaison with the State Science and Technical Committee (GKNT), and it determines the membership of Soviet scientific exchanges with other nations. Western technical data with respect to nuclear, space, and missile research, cybernetics, and industrial techniques remain an area of intense interest to Soviet intelligence collectors,⁴³

To those in the United States who remain skeptical about the aggregate benefit of increased cooperation with the Soviet Union, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev responds curtly: "Those who believe that we need contacts and exchanges in economic, scientific and technological spheres more than others need them are mistaken."⁴⁴

Marxism-Leninism provides an ideological device by which the relative status of its rivalry with the United States can be "scientifically" demonstrated by the Soviet leadership; it is referred to variously as the "balance or correlation of forces." This concept integrates military, political, economic, and social considerations and the correlation is determined by ". . . capabilities developed with respect to. and effectiveness in utilizing, not just one or another, but the combination of these elements."⁴⁵

Although the Soviet Union recognizes the United States as the most powerful economic, scientific, and technical country in the capitalist world, its national leadership is confident that the world correlation of forces has shifted decisively in favor of socialism and communism.⁴⁶ From the perspective of Georgi A. Arbatov, Director of IUSAC, "the changing balance of forces… is contributing to the shifting [of] the main bridgeheads of the struggle into non-military spheres," one of the most important of which is science and technology.⁴⁷

Paradoxically, the very confidence with which the U.S.S.R. approaches the struggle between capitalism and socialism is tempered by a continuing awareness of U.S. technological power. The future credibility of America's nuclear deterrent may well hinge on the operational deployment of such weapon systems as Trident and the strategic cruise missile. This is one eventuality that the Soviet Union undoubtedly wants to impede.

To isolate, let alone study, Soviet perceptions is an exercise fraught with obstacles. However, encouragement is to be found in an appraisal made more than a century ago in Russia by a French traveler, the Marquis de Custine.

In a free society everything can be published--and it is forgotten because it is all seen at a glance. Under absolutism everything is hidden, but maybe divined; that is what makes it interesting.⁴⁸ His wisdom remains an appropriate commentary on the Soviet Union today.

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

1. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, The Technology Balance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International cooperation in Science and Space, 93d Cong., 1^st and 2d sessions, 4-6 December 1973, no. 27, p. 28. Hereafter referred to as The Technology Balance. J. Fred Bucy, International Technology Transfer—Chairman’s Plenary Sessions Summary, National Security Affairs Conference, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1976, p. 209.

2. V. I. Lenin, Polnoye Sobranbiye Sochinenii, 5^th edition, Moscow, 1965, vol. 53, pp. 163-64, in Mose L. Harvey, Leon Gouré, and Vladimir Prokofieff, Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy, Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972, p. 214.

3. Harvey, Gouré, and Prokofieff, p. 105.

4. The Technology Balance, p. 25.

5. Thomas P. Kridler, Soviet Science Policy of the Seventies, DIA DST1830S-160-76, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, 10 May 1976, p. 2.

6. Ibid., p. 6.

7. Ibid., p. 8.

8. Ibid., p. 3.

9. Ibid., p. 8.

10. U.S. Department of Defense, Program of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) FY 1978, 18 January 1977, p. II-25.

11. General George S. Brown, US Military Posture for FY 1977, 20 January 1976, p. 88.

12. Marshal ‘Victor G. Kulikov, "Soviet Military Science Today," Kommunist, May 1976, p. 43.

13. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report FY 1978 (Executive Summary), 17 January 1977, p. 12.

14. Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Moscow, 1972, trans. by the U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, p. 253.

15. Ibid., p. 255.

16. V. A. Baranyuk and V. I. Vorb’yev, Automated Control System for Staffs and Military Installations, Moscow, Voyenizdat, signed to press 24 April 1974, p. 211.

17. General-Colonel N. A. Lomov, editor, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Moscow, 1973 in W. M. Carpenter et al., Soviet Perceptions of the United States, Arlington: Stanford Research Institute, 1975, p. 181.

18. U.S. Department of Defense, RDT&E, FY 1978, p. II-2.

19. Colonel V. M. Bondarenko, "Soviet Science and Strengthening the Defense of the Country, "Communist of the Armed Forces, September 1974; pp. 23, 24.

20. S. Noveselov, "In the Nuclear Vaults of the Pentagon," Military Knowledge, July 1976, p. 44.

21. G.S. Khozin, "Book Review, "USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 12, December 1975, p. 79.

22. Yu. P. Davydov, V. V. Zhurkin, and V. S. Rudnev, Nixon Doctrine, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, signed to press 18 September 1972, p. 120. Harvey, Gouré, and Prokofieff, p. XIII.

23. Moscow Domestic Service. 6 February 1971, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union,7 February 1977, p. B-14. A. Tolkunov, "Clouds over the Ghetto," Pravda (Moscow), 7 January 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 11 January 1977, pp. Soviet Union, 7 December 1976, p. B-1.

24. M. A. Mil’shteyn and L. S. Semeyko, "The United States and the Question of New Types of Mass Destruction Weapons," USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 5, May 1976, p. 32.

25. Ibid., p. 27.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., pp. 29, 30.

28. Ibid., p. 33.

29. Harvey, Gouré, and Prokofieff, pp. 24-25.

30. "Soviet Defense Minister Says Russians Can Match Any New U>S> Weaponry, " New York Times, 18 February 1977, p. 7.

31. V. M. Kulish, Military Force and International Relations, Moscow, 1972, trans, in JPRS 58947, 8 May 1973, p. 59.

32. V. Goncharov, "Dangerous Game," Izvestiya, 6 July 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 21 May 1976, p. B-3.

33. TASS Dispatch, 30 June 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 1 July 1977, p. B-1.

34. O. Skalkin, "International Week," Pravda, 3 July 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 5 July 1977, p. AA-3.

35. V. Kobysh, "Dangerous Game," Izvestiya, 6 July 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 8 July 1977, p. AA-3.

36. W. M. Carpenter, p. 174.

37. "The Status and Prospects of Development of Scientifc Information Systems," Herald of the USSR Academy of Sciences, March 1973, trans. in JPRS 59000, 14 May 1973, p. 1.

38. Ibid., pp. 2, 3.

39. W. M. Carpenter et al., Soviet Perceptions of the United States, p. 174.

40. The Technology Balance, p. 4.

41. Lawrence H. Theriot, "U.S. Governmental and Private Industry cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Fields of Science and Technology," in Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, U.S. Cong. Joint Economic Committee, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 740.

42. The Technology Balance, p. 4.

43. John Barron, KGB (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1974), p. 107.

44. A. Stroganov, "To Whom Is Cooperation More ‘Advantageous’?" Socialist Industry, 5 January 1977, trans. in FBIS Soviet Union, 12 January 1977, p. B-11.

45. The Technology Balance, pp. 114-15.

46. G. A. Arbatov, "USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, no. 10, October 1973, trans. in JPRS 60504, 9 November 1973, p. 4.

47. Ibid., p. 11.

48. Michael Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1969), p. 5.

Paul M. Kozar (M.I.A., Columbia University) is a Military-Political Affairs Analyst with the Air Force Intelligence Service. Additionally, he is studying for his Ph. D. in Russian Area Studies at Georgetown University. His professional training has also included attendance at the Defense Intelligence School.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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