Published: 17 January 2008
Air & S pace Power Journal-Spring 2008

One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam by Timothy N. Castle. Columbia University Press (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup), 61 W. 62nd Street, New York, New York 10023, 1999, 368 pages, $73.50 (hardcover); 368 pages, $21.00 (softcover).

Dr. Timothy Castle’s book One Day Too Long chronicles an example of the difficult decisions the military makes in times of war and the consequences of faulty decision making. In the 1960s, when senior Air Force leadership decided to locate a ground-based radar site within Laos (only 20 miles from the North Vietnamese border), it acted upon several assumptions. First, since the location, named Site 85, would allow all-weather bombing of Hanoi, the leaders of Thirteenth and Seventh Air Forces believed—as did the all-volunteer crews manning the site—that it would help shorten the Vietnam War. Second, both military and embassy leaders felt that they would have ample time to evacuate the site in the event of attack (which they knew would eventually occur). Third, the Air Force assumed it could successfully execute all aspects of the mission “under radar,” even after the site’s evacuation. As in all Laos-based operations, “plausible deniability” would cover a host of secret sins.

Unfortunately, all three assumptions turned out to be false. As Dr. Castle meticulously documents, the site quickly turned from focusing on Hanoi to directing its efforts toward the enemy troops massing in the valleys below the mountaintop site. He also shows, in stark detail, that both Air Force leadership and the US ambassador to Laos bungled the evacuation, holding fast to the belief that evacuation was unnecessary even after the attack began. (In their defense, even the men at Site 85 didn’t seem too concerned by the initial mortar attack launched by the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao.) Finally, Dr. Castle writes of the ultimately unsuccessful attempts by the Air Force to deliberately misrepresent the truth of what happened at Site 85 to the families of the 11 men still missing and unaccounted for to this day.

The decisions made by our leadership often favor larger goals at the expense of individuals. Military members make sacrifices freely, understanding that they serve at the behest of their commanders. But when the Air Force can show no greater gain to balance out the loss of the individual, we must ask why any sacrifice is warranted.

Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, former Air Force chief of staff, notes in a dust-jacket blurb that the loss of Site 85 “should be a subject for mandatory study in our professional military education system.” He is correct, and the more junior the officer reading One Day Too Long, the better. By instilling in our ranks a sense of shock over the problems that Dr. Castle squarely faces, hopefully this book can prevent such a tragedy from happening again.

Mr. Glenn Leinbach
Cleveland, Ohio

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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