


# U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy

## Strategic Deterrents During the Cold War

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August 2014

**U.S. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL  
WARFARE POLICY**  
**Strategic Deterrents during the Cold War**

by  
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# About the Author

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# Abstract

The United States invested a great deal of time, energy, and resources into developing chemical and biological weapons between 1941 and 1991. This investment was seen as necessary to counter the potential use of chemical or biological weapons by the Axis during World War II and later, to counter potential use by the Soviet Union. Then, as today, the key to a credible deterrent included demonstrating the capability to use these weapons as well as the will to wield them. Even as nuclear weapons were being developed and stockpiled, chemical and biological weapons shared a basis in strategic deterrence theory.

While much effort has gone into studying the technological and operational characteristics of chemical and biological weapons, much less has been directed at understanding the development of U.S. policy at the most highest levels of office. The Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* has included several memorandum, letters, and meeting transcripts from presidential administrations that may illuminate the decision process of our political and military leadership in this regard. There are additional documents from DoD's FOIA site, the Eisenhower Library, and other Internet sites that were not included, for whatever reason, in the State Department's collection.

The following chapters include unclassified, publicly released documents from the Eisenhower administration to the Carter administration addressing various contemporary and strategic issues relating to chemical and biological weapons. Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. military was expected to develop and retain an offensive capability to use these weapons in both tactical and strategic operations. This collection has a limited amount of commentary, and is intended primarily as a resource for those practitioners interested in better understanding the evolution of strategic deterrence theory and those who seek to better understand the rationale of why the U.S. government invested in the development of these unconventional weapons.



## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction

Reading about the issue of chemical and biological weapons during the Cold War era, one typically sees a focus on the nature of the weapons themselves. That is to say, there are many books about the physical characteristics and properties of chemical and biological warfare agents: what they could do to people if released, how the United States and the Soviet Union selected and tested these weapon systems, or what weapon systems were developed to disperse them. Conversely, there are the well-publicized government “scandals” relating to chemical and biological (CB) weapons: the use of human volunteers to test non-lethal biological agents, Project 112 and “Ship Hazard and Defense” (SHAD) testing, the Dugway Proving Ground sheep incident, the use of riot control agents in Vietnam, the open-sea burial of chemical munitions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and other issues.

CB weapons were developed as strategic weapons during World War II, before the arrival of nuclear weapons. In general, we know about the national policy shifts throughout the Cold War. President Franklin Roosevelt was adamantly opposed to using chemical weapons other than as a deterrent capability, even as his administration oversaw the largest increase in chemical weapons development and production in U.S. history. President Dwight Eisenhower changed national policy to allow the consideration of the employment of CB weapons during general conflicts, but only with presidential approval. President Richard Nixon unilaterally halted the U.S. offensive biological weapons program, but allowed the chemical warfare research to continue. President Ronald Reagan convinced Congress to restart production of new chemical weapons, but his successor, President George H.W. Bush, cancelled the U.S. offensive chemical weapons program in anticipation of a new global treaty outlawing the production, storage, and use of those weapons.

We know these basic facts. What we have not understood is the question of why senior policymakers supported the development, testing, and production of CB weapons during the Cold War. After all, aren't chemical weapons called the "poor man's atomic bomb?" Why did the United States and the Soviet Union continue robust chemical weapons programs when both had vast nuclear arsenals? Of course, the answer is relatively simple: CB weapons use would have significantly impacted the general nature of a major conflict between the superpowers, and so both had vested interests in understanding the use and impact of CB weapons on combat situations. Both sides had developed the infrastructure, the delivery systems, the military training, and the political will to employ CB weapons. They needed to develop CB weapons to offer a credible deterrent against the use of CB weapons by their respective adversary.

Similar to nuclear weapons, CB weapons were "unconventional" in that their use was not expected in conventional combat operations without a deliberate political decision to escalate the conflict. While we understand that nuclear weapons are much more destructive than CB weapons, all three weapons required political approval for their development and use. As tools of political statescraft, these weapons require us to better understand the political discussions that went on regarding their potential use. This understanding has been elusive, as the current autobiographies of major political leaders do not go into any detail on their administration's dealings with CB weapons. It is not an area that was publicized, either due to security concerns or in fear of the potential public blowback. There are many insightful books on how the major players supported nuclear weapons development, or negotiated arms control efforts to downsize the staggering destructive potential of nuclear weapons, but few about CB weapons. What we do have, however, is this fascinating collection of historical documents within the State Department.

The Department of State's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series offers an easily searchable collection of historical documents from several presidential administrations, currently from Truman through Carter. This project is ongoing, with the Nixon files just added in 2011. To use that example, the National Security Archives (a public internet site) maintains a very in-depth on-line collection of official memoranda from the Nixon administration relating to the famous study of U.S. policy on chemical and biological warfare. The *Foreign Relations* series brings us

new information: the actual transcripts of administration officials discussing the pros and cons of CB weapons within the context of national security. It is fascinating to read the meeting transcripts in which a Navy captain from the State Department has to explain to Henry Kissinger what a toxin is and how it differs from a nerve agent. Unfortunately, this archive becomes very thin with the Carter administration and does not cover the Reagan administration at all, so we are missing out on the concluding Cold War perspectives on dealing with CB weapons.

The Cold War was a unique period of time in which foreign policy and national security issues were fiercely debated and shaped with the specter of total war hanging over the globe. The development and proposed use of CB weapons were part and parcel of the debate, right along with nuclear weapons. That perspective is sadly lacking in today's discussions, in which very serious people (who should know better) pooh-pooh the potential threat of CB weapons and focus nearly exclusively on nuclear weapons. More frighteningly, some points of view would call for a world without unconventional weapons, with the naïve perspective that this would somehow make the world safer. At the least, chemical and biological weapons offered a buffer between the escalation from conventional and nuclear conflicts. They augmented the conventional capabilities of U.S. forces facing superior numbers on future battlefields.

The world during the Cold War was shaped in particular by the seminal events of the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the attempts to bring these weapons under control in the 1970s. The following sections are taken directly from the *Foreign Relations* series.

### **The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955<sup>1</sup>**

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (also known as the Warsaw Pact) was a political and military alliance established on May 14, 1955 between the Soviet Union and several Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union formed this alliance as a counterbalance to the North Atlantic Treaty

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<sup>1</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, "The Warsaw Treaty Organization, 1955," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/warsaw-treaty>.

Organization (NATO), a collective security alliance concluded between the United States, Canada, and Western European nations in 1949.

The Warsaw Pact supplemented existing agreements. Following World War II, the Soviet Union had concluded bilateral treaties with each of the East European states except for East Germany, which was still part of the Soviet occupied-territory of Germany. When the Federal Republic of Germany entered NATO in early May 1955, the Soviets feared the consequences of a strengthened NATO and a rearmed West Germany, and hoped that the Warsaw Treaty Organization could both contain West Germany and negotiate with NATO as an equal partner. Soviet leadership also noted that civil unrest was on the rise in Eastern European countries and determined that a unified, multilateral political and military alliance would tie Eastern European capitals more closely to Moscow.

The original signatories to the Warsaw Treaty Organization were the Soviet Union, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic. Although the members of the Warsaw Pact pledged to defend each other if one or more of them came under attack, emphasized non-interference in the internal affairs of its members, and supposedly organized itself around collective decision-making, the Soviet Union ultimately controlled most of the Pact's decisions. The Soviet Union also used the Pact to contain popular dissent in its European satellites, for example in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1981.

By the 1980s, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was beset by problems related to the economic slowdown in all Eastern European countries. By the late 1980s political changes in most of the member states made the Pact virtually ineffectual. In September 1990, East Germany left the Pact in preparation for reunification with West Germany. By October, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland had withdrawn from all Warsaw Pact military exercises. The Warsaw Pact officially disbanded in March and July of 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

### **The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, "The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis>.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. The crisis was unique in a number of ways, featuring calculations and miscalculations as well as direct and secret communications and miscommunications between the two sides. The dramatic crisis was also characterized by the fact that it was primarily played out at the White House and the Kremlin level with relatively little input from the respective bureaucracies typically involved in the foreign policy process.

After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, and while the Kennedy administration planned Operation Mongoose, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt. Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL-28 bombers, during routine surveillance flights, and on September 4, 1962, President Kennedy issued a public warning against the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Despite the warning, on October 14, a U.S. U-2 aircraft took several pictures clearly showing sites for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers to consider options and direct a course of action for the United States that would resolve the crisis. Some advisers—including all the Joint Chiefs of Staff—argued for an air strike to destroy the missiles, followed by a U.S. invasion of Cuba; others favored stern warnings to Cuba and the Soviet Union. The President decided upon a middle course. On October 22, he ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” legally distinguished this action from a blockade, which assumed a state of war existed; the use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States.

That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to

Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction or completed, and return all offensive weapons to the U.S.S.R. The letter was the first in a series of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin throughout the remainder of the crisis.

The President also appeared on national television that evening to inform the public of the developments in Cuba, his decision to initiate and enforce a “quarantine,” and the potential global consequences if the crisis continued to escalate. The tone of the President’s remarks was stern, and the message unmistakable and evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. Nevertheless, during October 24 and 25, some ships turned back from the quarantine line; others were stopped by U.S. naval forces, but they contained no offensive weapons and so were allowed to proceed. Meanwhile, U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent. On October 26, Kennedy told his advisors it appeared that only a U.S. attack on Cuba would remove the missiles, but he insisted on giving the diplomatic channel a little more time. The crisis had reached a virtual stalemate.

That afternoon, however, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a message the evening of October 26, which meant it was sent in the middle of the night Moscow time. It was a long, emotional

message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali had reported earlier that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.”

Although U.S. experts were convinced the message from Khrushchev was authentic, hope for a resolution was short-lived. The next day, October 27, Khrushchev sent another message indicating that any proposed deal must include the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. That same day, a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance jet was shot down over Cuba. Kennedy and his advisors prepared for an attack on Cuba within days as they searched for any remaining diplomatic resolution. It was determined that Kennedy would ignore the second Khrushchev message and respond to the first one. That night, Kennedy set forth in his message to the Soviet leader proposed steps for the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba under supervision of the United Nations, and a guarantee that the United States would not attack Cuba.

It was a risky move to ignore the second Khrushchev message. Attorney General Robert Kennedy then met secretly with Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly Dobrynin, and indicated that the United States was planning to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey anyway, and that it would do so soon, but this could not be part of any public resolution of the missile crisis. The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba.

The crisis was over, but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL-28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine. U.S. Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1963.

The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s image domestically and internationally. It also may have helped mitigate negative world opinion regarding the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. Two other important results of the crisis came in unique forms. First, despite the flurry of direct and indirect communications between the White House and the Kremlin—perhaps because of it—Kennedy and Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled

throughout the crisis to clearly understand each others' true intentions, while the world hung on the verge of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the "Hotline." Second, having approached the verge of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

### **Détente and Arms Control, 1969–1979<sup>3</sup>**

Between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, there was a thawing of the ongoing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. This détente took several forms, including increased discussion on arms control. Although the decade began with vast improvements in bilateral relations, by the end of the decade events had brought the two superpowers back to the brink of confrontation.

Two decades after the Second World War, Soviet-American tension had become a way of life. Fears of nuclear conflict between the two superpowers peaked in 1962 in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, paving the way for some of the earliest agreements on nuclear arms control, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Although these agreements acted as important precedents, the U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam increased tensions again and served to derail any efforts in the mid-1960s to pursue further arms agreements. By the late 1960s, however, both countries had several concrete reasons for resuming arms talks. The ongoing nuclear arms race was incredibly expensive, and both nations faced domestic economic difficulties as a result of the diversion of resources to military research. The emergence of the Sino-Soviet split also made the idea of generally improving relations with the United States more appealing to the USSR. The United States faced an increasingly difficult war in Vietnam, and improved relations with the Soviet Union were thought to be helpful in limiting future conflicts. With both sides willing to explore accommodation, the early 1970s saw a general warming of relations that was conducive to progress in arms control talks.

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<sup>3</sup> Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, "Détente and Arms Control," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/detente>.

In practical terms, détente led to formal agreements on arms control and the security of Europe. The signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968 was a clear sign of an emerging détente. Then, in 1972, the first round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks yielded the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, along with an interim agreement setting caps on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles each side could develop. At mid-decade, in 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe emerged from two years of intense negotiations to sign the Helsinki Final Act, which recognized political borders, established military confidence building measures, created opportunities for trade and cultural exchange, and promoted human rights. By the end of the decade, however, cracks had begun to form in the precarious U.S.-Soviet relationship. The leadership of the two countries signed a second SALT agreement but did not ratify it, although both nations voluntarily adhered to the provisions for reduced limits on strategic weapons for years thereafter.

The breakdown of détente in the late 1970s stalled progress on arms control. Ultimately, the United States and the Soviet Union had different visions of what détente meant and what its pursuit would entail. Overblown expectations that the warming of relations in the era of détente would translate into an end to the Cold War also created public dissatisfaction with the increasing manifestations of continued competition and the interventions in the Third World. By the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the spirit of cooperation had been replaced with renewed competition and formal implementation of the SALT II agreement stalled. Arms control talks ceased in the early 1980s and only restarted when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union.

### **Organization of This Book**

The chapters in this book are organized along the presidential administrations, starting with the Eisenhower administration and going through the Carter administration. Most of the material comes from the *Foreign Relations* series, with the exception of some documents from the Eisenhower Library, the DoD FOIA office, and presidential directives and presidential review memoranda from the Carter administration. All of the footnotes to the documents come from the *Foreign Relations* series. All of

the classification markings are from the original text; the documents themselves have been declassified and approved for public release. In the interests of brevity, I have omitted major sections of text that are not related to CB weapons (for instance, discussions of conventional warfare or economic policies within documents addressing broad defense guidance or analyses).

It is my hope that offering the direct information from this series will allow researchers to more quickly access original material from the historical archives and come to a better understanding of the strategic discussions between senior policymakers and the important documents that directed specific objectives and actions relating to CB weapons. I have used text boxes to offer my own comments on the documents. This material is only meant as a starting point for research and analyses, and should be reviewed in the larger context of national security policy.

## CHAPTER 2

### **Eisenhower Administration (1952-1960)**

During this timeframe, the U.S. government recognized that it would no longer be the sole nation with ownership of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. At the same time, American superiority offered a continued advantage in strategic affairs, allowing military planners to suggest that they ought to be able to employ NBC weapons along with conventional munitions during general conflicts. The term “weapons of mass destruction” had been standardized by the United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948, but was still catching on within the U.S. government. They were referred to as “special munitions,” “certain American weapons,” “strategic weapons,” but not often called WMD. Certainly the “Atoms for Peace” initiative, formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and discussions about NATO’s role in supporting nuclear operations dominated the arms control discussions. NBC weapons were all tools of statecraft, and while senior policy makers recognized the significant power of nuclear weapons, they also addressed the desire to maintain superiority in the area of CB weapons technology.

Starting with the Truman administration and leading through Eisenhower’s administration, the U.S. government embarked upon a massive development of defense infrastructure to support the development, testing, and production of CB weapons. Facilities were built at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, to produce sarin nerve agent and fill munitions, and Dugway Proving Ground was reactivated for testing CB weapons. The U.S. Army also built a biological weapons production plant at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. British scientists would discover the formulation for VX nerve agent, leading to U.S. research and adoption of that agent for its arsenal by 1957. The U.S. military was developing chemical and biological warheads for its surface-to-surface missiles and a 115mm nerve-agent filled rocket. The

U.S. military would initiate large-area coverage field trials with CB agents and simulants in an effort to determine how to effectively use CB weapons during combat operations. Chemical munitions were sent to Okinawa and Germany as theater retaliatory capabilities. Operation Whitecoat, the use of human volunteers to test non-lethal biological agents, would begin in 1954.

The most important discussion in this chapter is the debate in determining the U.S. policy on using CB weapons in general war. The Eisenhower administration had initially maintained the Truman administration's policy on CB warfare, which was to undertake chemical warfare only in retaliation against its use by an enemy and even then, only by the decision of the president. The Soviet Union had accused the United States of using biological weapons against North Korea in 1952, an accusation later proven false. After the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, the growing Soviet strategic forces capabilities increased concerns as to the ability to counter their unconventional weapons. As a result, the U.S. CB weapons program began to receive increasing attention and funds.

Given indications that the Soviet Union was developing CB weapons as well as atomic weapons, the military required clear policy on what it ought to be planning in the course of preparing for warfare against another superpower. This decision to allow the first use of CB weapons during general warfare, but only after presidential approval, was a significant change in national security policy, which had previously discussed unconventional weapons as usable tools only to deter adversarial use of the same. It is important to note that, as early as the Eisenhower administration, senior policy officials viewed CB weapons as strategic weapons—different than nuclear weapons, but deserving of the same close attention. The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of foreign policy discussions during the Eisenhower administration.

### **Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy<sup>1</sup>**

Concerns about the international spread of communism and the growing power of the Soviet Union dominated most foreign policy decisions during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

U.S. foreign policymakers observed with concern as the Soviets tightened their hold on Eastern Europe. In Africa and Asia nationalist movements challenged colonial governments. U.S. officials suspected that communists dominated these movements and received support directly from the Soviet Union. In order to counterbalance the Soviet threat, President Eisenhower supported a doctrine of massive retaliation, which called for the development of technology necessary to match and even surpass Soviet nuclear capability. Recognizing that nuclear war was a last resort, U.S. officials supported engaging in conventional limited wars. In an effort to prepare for potential military conflicts, President Eisenhower exercised unprecedented executive authority in deploying the U.S. military abroad, without specific authorization from the U.S. Congress. These Cold War policies served to increase the foreign policymaking power of the presidency, and to expand U.S. international obligations.

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<sup>1</sup> Original text from the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "1953-1960: Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960>.

This document is identified as document 7 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d7>.

**Report to the National Security Council by the Psychological Strategy Board<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 28, 1952

Confidential

NSC 126

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on  
Public Statements With Respect to Certain American Weapons

At the direction of the President, the Council and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, in 1950 took under consideration the general problem of weapons information, including atomic weapons, in order to make appropriate recommendations to the President on the subject. Subsequently the President on December 5, 1950 issued a directive on "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy" which is attached hereto.<sup>2</sup> The NSC Staff kept the problem under continuing review and on November 21, 1951 the Senior NSC Staff agreed that the matter should be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for appropriate action.

The enclosed memorandum on the subject by the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the Council,

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<sup>1</sup> Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

<sup>2</sup> The directive, not printed, specified that all statements on foreign policy be cleared in advance by the Department of State, that all statements on military policy be cleared in advance with the Department of Defense, and that advance copies of statements on either subject be submitted to the White House for information.

the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator of the recommendations contained in paragraph 4 a thereof as approved by the Psychological Strategy Board, including the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

It is recommended that, if the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator concur in this recommendation, the Psychological Strategy Board's enclosed memorandum on the subject be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve its transmittal to all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government together with a Presidential directive along the lines of the draft directive enclosed.<sup>3</sup>

**James S. Lay, Jr.**

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (Allen)  
to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)*

Washington, February 27, 1952

Confidential

Subject:

PSB action on Publicity with Respect to Certain American Weapons

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<sup>3</sup> By memorandum action of Mar. 27, the Council and the reference agency heads concurred in the recommendation. In a memorandum of the following day, Lay informed the Council and the agency heads that "the President has this date approved the recommendation of the Psychological Strategy Board contained in paragraph 4-a of the reference report on the subject, and has referred the report to the Press Secretary to the President to arrange for the issuance of a Presidential directive to appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government along the lines of the draft directive contained therein." (S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 126 Series)

1. A series of conflicting statements made last fall by high officials of the Executive Branch of the Government produced considerable public confusion as to the facts concerning our atomic and related developments. They raised doubts as to the degree of unity and confidence within the Government on the purposes of these weapons. Particularly, they gave rise to considerable fears abroad, as to U.S. intentions with respect to the use of these weapons.

2. For these reasons, the Psychological Strategy Board at its 4th meeting, October 25, 1951, directed the preparation of a staff study on the problem. At its seventh meeting, December 20, 1951, acting on the recommendations contained in the staff study, PSB created a committee chaired by the Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, to prepare a "national information policy" on the subject.

3. It was agreed at the Senior NSC Staff Meeting of November 19, 1951, to refer to PSB for appropriate action, in connection with this project, a draft report by the NSC on "Release of Information Regarding New Weapons," dated July 5, 1950,<sup>4</sup> action on which had not been completed.

4. The attached memorandum, Subject, "Memorandum on Public Statements with Respect to Certain American Weapons" has been prepared in response to the above Board action.

a. At its 10th meeting, February 21, 1952, the Psychological Strategy Board approved the memorandum, recommended that it be transmitted to appropriate departments and agencies as an enclosure to a Presidential directive (draft attached), and directed that its views be communicated to the Executive Secretary, NSC. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator joined in this approval and these recommendations.

b. The committee also examined the question of the adequacy of speech clearance machinery as it relates to statements covering these weapons. It concluded that the machinery created within departments and agencies in response to the Presidential Directive of December 5, 1950, "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy," should be used for the

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

enforcement of the attached memorandum rather than that a new clearance procedure should be established.

For the Psychological Strategy Board:

**R.B. Allen**

[Subenclosure]

**Memorandum on Public Statements With Respect to Certain  
American Weapons**

The fact of American atomic superiority undoubtedly has a deterrent effect on Soviet leaders. Whether unconsidered statements about atomic and other new weapons produce any significant deterrent effect on the Kremlin may be doubted.

While well-considered statements on atomic and other new weapons can develop confidence in the determination and strength of the U.S. and the rest of the free world, ill-considered statements on these subjects can be used by the Soviet-led Communists to encourage a belief that the U.S. might use these weapons in a reckless, irresponsible way.

Within the U.S. itself, ill-considered statements about these weapons may create a false sense of security, lead to expectation of miracles in war and possibly jeopardize the maintenance of a balanced defense program, both military and civil.

It follows that we must be extremely careful in our public statements about atomic weapons. The same applies to guided missiles and biological, radiological and chemical weapons.

Of note, here is an early example of defense policy equating the importance of atomic weapons with that of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. While biological weapons were still in the development stage and radiological weapons remained largely theoretical, they were all thought of as unconventional weapons requiring special consideration.

Before statements and releases on atomic and other new weapons are made, these questions should be answered:

1. Will this information strengthen the morale of the free world?
2. Will this statement at this time help the American public to understand and accurately appraise the capabilities of these weapons?
3. Will this statement create the fear that the U.S. may act recklessly in the use of these weapons?

In the months ahead, as new developments in these weapons transpire, we must so present that information to the world as to buttress the confidence of the free world in America's sense of responsibility for the maintenance of the peace as well as of the fundamental values of the West.

*Note:* Statements prepared in pursuance of this memorandum shall be cleared in conformity to the President's directive of 5 December 1950, "Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy." It is understood also that statements dealing with atomic weapons developments should be cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission.

[Here follow a draft letter of transmittal from the President to Secretary Acheson, intended to serve as a prototype for circulation to all Departments concerned of the PSB Memorandum on Public Statements With Respect to Certain American Weapons, and the text of the Presidential Directive on Public Discussion of Foreign and Military Policy, December 5, 1950.]

This document is identified as document 23 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d23>.

### **The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State**

Washington, 13 May, 1952

Top Secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States' position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy.<sup>1</sup> The proposed message, which representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 1952<sup>2</sup> was intended to be in consonance with national policy, included the following statement:

“I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the U.S. would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy.”

It appears to the Department of Defense that acceptance by the United States of the proposed language in the foregoing quoted statement would constitute an extension of the policy contained in NSC 112<sup>3</sup> and would

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<sup>1</sup> The subject message has not been found in Department of State files.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of the Department of State informal draft substance of discussion at the State-JCS meeting of Apr. 23 is in State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417.

<sup>3</sup> For text of NSC 112, “Formulation of a U.S. Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments,” July 6, 1951, see *Foreign Relations, 1951*, vol. I, p. 477.

permit a degree of atomic disclosure which, in the opinion of this Department, would jeopardize the security of the United States, unless there was prior agreement to and development of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations plan or any other plan equally as effective.

At the request of Mr. Nash, who had been furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the proposed message, Mr. Hickerson agreed on 29 April 1952 not to dispatch the message.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which I am in general agreement, are forwarded herewith. In view of the great importance of the question involved, it is recommended that there be undertaken through the machinery provided by the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, or perhaps through the National Security Council, the establishment of this Government's position on the relationship between the proposed system of disclosure and verification, the plan for international control of atomic energy and an international program for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.

Sincerely yours,

**Robert A. Lovett**

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense  
(Lovett)*

Washington, 30 April, 1952

Top Secret

Subject:

United States Position on Regulation of Armaments and Armed Forces.

1. Reference is made to a proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, authorizing the United States Representative on the Disarmament Commission to make a statement on the United States position with respect to a system of disclosure and verification, including atomic energy. This proposed statement was discussed at length with representatives of the Department of State on 23 April 1952. At that time the representatives of the Department of State assured the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the proposed statement is intended to be in consonance with national policy.

2. It is requested that you note particularly the first sentence of paragraph 4 of the proposed statement, which reads:

“I can state without equivocation that, if agreement can be reached upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, the US would be prepared to proceed through all stages of such a system before agreement had been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy.”

3. United States policy on disarmament is contained in NSC 112. When the President approved this document, he specifically approved a statement of Basic Principles and the Conclusions. These Principles, together with the initial Conclusion, are listed in the Appendix hereto<sup>4</sup> for ready reference. The Basic Principles may be summarized as follows:

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<sup>4</sup> The appendix, entitled “Excerpt from NSC 112”, is not printed.

- a. A system of disclosure and verification is but one facet of the larger problem of the regulation of armaments and armed forces;
- b. United States security demands that the first step in the regulation of armaments be achievement of international agreement on at least the general principles involved; and
- c. The international control of atomic energy must be based on the United Nations Plan, or a no less effective plan.

The initial Conclusion states in substance that a system of disclosure and verification logically would be the first step in the implementation of an agreed international program for the regulation of armaments.

4. It appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that acceptance by the United States of the language in the proposed Department of State message would seem to constitute a change in basic United States policy. It would go even beyond the statement made by Mr. Acheson to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 [19] November 1951, in which he said that the United States would agree to the determination by the Disarmament Commission, as an administrative matter, when disclosure should progress from one stage to the next.<sup>5</sup> It should be borne in mind that the rules of voting procedure for the Disarmament Commission do not require unanimity, and thus the United States would be denied the power of the veto to prevent the progress of disclosure from stage to stage if at any time circumstances are such as to prejudice United States security.

5. Acceptance of the philosophy underlying the proposed message would commit the United States:

- a. To take disclosure and verification out of the framework of control and regulation of armaments and armed forces;
- b. To pursue a system of disclosure as an end in itself;
- c. To disclose data concerning its complete atomic energy program, including details of design and fabrication of atomic weapons, to an international agency which has no authority, no control, no ownership of facilities, but merely a right of inspection. This inspection might in

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<sup>5</sup> For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 3, 1951, pp. 879–889, or Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 309–320.

practice be considerably circumscribed by a State entering into the arrangement solely in order to serve its own ends, thus nullifying the effectiveness of the system;

d. To disclose, in effect, all current results of research and development programs including guided missiles, bacteriological warfare, and chemical warfare, among others; and

e. To abrogate the United Nations Plan for the control of atomic energy without the substitution of another for it.

**Para 5d**—While both the United States and the Soviet Union had access to German nerve agents, production and stockpiling of chemical munitions was highly classified. The nerve agent VX had not yet been discovered. No one within the military wanted to allow transparency of these special munitions, especially as there was no treaty preventing the development of CB weapons.

6. The course of action described in paragraph 5 above would appear to require permissive legislation from the Congress. This would require justification before the Congress of a plan for the United States to make complete disclosures of atomic data to an agency which does not possess adequate powers and authority for the exercise of control. From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this degree of atomic disclosure to such an agency is not justifiable.

7. The possible effects of the proposed Department of State message might seriously jeopardize the security of the United States. The Soviet Union has been assisted in becoming a formidable military menace by a number of things it has obtained from the Western World. Its TU-4, the backbone of its long-range air force, was copied from a B-29 illegally interned following a forced landing in Soviet territory. Its jet engine in the MIG-15 is a development of a British 3500-lb. thrust jet engine given the Soviets after the war. The implosion principle was obtained by the Soviets through the espionage of Fuchs. It is likely that the Soviets have obtained a gunsight from an F-86 which made a forced landing in an area under Soviet control. From the military viewpoint, it would be most unwise for the United States to make a further addition to this growth in Soviet military knowledge by agreeing to exchange with the Soviet Union

complete data on the design and fabrication of atomic weapons. It is in this area that the United States possesses qualitative as well as quantitative superiority and, in all likelihood, would be giving up far more than it could hope to receive in return. Accordingly, the disclosure of such data by the United States might well have the effect of advancing the date when the Soviet Union would be capable of approaching atomic parity with the United States.

8. The Department of State representatives in their discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed the opinion that the President's speech on 7 November 1951<sup>6</sup> with respect to a plan for reducing armaments constituted a change in the United States policy set forth in NSC 112. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied carefully the text of the President's radio address of that date and are unable to arrive at the same interpretation placed upon it by representatives of the Department of State. The President, after describing the several parts of the disarmament program, said:

“Such a program would have to be agreed upon by all the countries having substantial military power and ratified according to their own constitutional practices.”

This statement would seem to imply that an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention, embodying at least the general principles for a program of control and regulation of armaments, would be entered into by the participating nations.

9. With respect to atomic weapons, the President in his radio address stated:

“... the plan already approved by a majority of the United Nations fits right into this present proposal of ours for the control and reduction of armaments ... atomic energy would be controlled under the provisions of the United Nations plan. We continue to support this plan as it now stands ...”

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<sup>6</sup> For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951, pp. 623–627.

It should be noted that the United Nations Plan, among other things, provides for the following:

- a. A strong and comprehensive international system of control and inspection;
- b. Such an international system of control and inspection should be established by treaty or convention. The system of control should become operative only when those Members of the United Nations necessary to assure its success by signing and ratifying the treaty have bound themselves to accept and support it;
- c. The treaty should include establishment in the United Nations of an international control agency possessing adequate powers and properly organized, staffed, and equipped; and
- d. The treaty should embrace the entire program for putting the international system of control and inspection into effect.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware that if the Department of State is able to negotiate agreement upon an effective system for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification, if necessary before agreement has been reached on a system of effective international control of atomic energy, it will have succeeded in creating the conditions which well might result in a fundamental, and perhaps even a major, alteration in the Soviet system. As a tactic, therefore, it might be desirable to make some concession from established policy. The danger to the United States seems to lie in the extent to which disclosures can be agreed to and still not impose intolerable or unacceptable risks upon United States security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, are strongly of the opinion that the United States should not be committed to make disclosures of atomic data beyond Stage III prior to reaching agreement on an effective system for control of atomic programs. It is in Stages IV and V that the United States presently possesses, to a maximum degree and in the area of greatest sensitivity, qualitative as well as quantitative superiority.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the stages set forth in UN doc. DC/C.2/1, Apr. 5, 1952; for text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 346–356.

11. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a course of action which would possibly lead to the disclosure of the Atomic Energy Program beyond Stage III, even if accompanied by such process of verification as might be granted by the USSR, would jeopardize the security of the United States unless there is prior agreement to and development of the control procedures encompassed within the United Nations Plan or any other plan equally as effective. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are convinced that reliance upon any other safeguard would be illusory.

*Recommendations*

12. a. In light of all of the foregoing, and in any event, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as military advisors to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, recommend urgently against any course of action under which the United States might offer to proceed beyond Stage III of any system of disclosure and verification in advance of prior agreement on the other features of the United Nations Plan, including its terms of control of atomic energy;

b. With specific reference to the proposed message from the Secretary of State to the United States Delegation, United Nations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that it not be dispatched, and further that, in the interests of national security, any instructions to the United States Delegation reflect the views outlined in the foregoing; and

c. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you inform the Department of State of the substance of these views.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Omar N. Bradley**  
*Chairman*

This document is identified as document 10 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d10>.

**Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 5, 1952.

Top Secret  
NSC 114/3

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on  
United States Programs for National Security

References:

- A. NSC 114 Series<sup>2</sup>
- B. NSC Action No. 575<sup>3</sup>
- C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 18, 1951<sup>4</sup>

The President on October 18, 1951, approved the recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 575-a) with respect to the FY 1953 national security programs described in NSC 114/2, subject to certain additional reviews and understandings stated in Reference C. Subsequently, the President requested that the departments and agencies responsible for each of these programs, prepare for his information and for

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<sup>1</sup> Copies to the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation on the NSC 114 Series, see *Foreign Relations, 1951*, vol. I, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, p. 5.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1951*, vol. I, p. 237.

the National Security Council, current summary statements of those programs, as approved by the President for presentation to the Congress.

The enclosed current summary statements, prepared in response to the President's request, reflect his decisions as to the objectives, nature, magnitude and timing of the FY 1953 national security programs, and supersede those contained in Part II of NSC 114/2. Accordingly, the enclosures are transmitted herewith for the information of the President and the National Security Council.

**James S. Lay, Jr.**

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[Enclosure 3]

*Summary Statement No. 4—The Federal Civil Defense Program  
(Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)*

[Washington,] March 26, 1952.

Secret

1. The Civil Defense Program<sup>5</sup> is designed, through the use of an organized and trained civilian population, to minimize the effects of enemy attacks and to insure the retention of our productive capacity and will to fight. FCDA is approaching its objectives through two phases: (1) the planning and developmental phase and (2) the operational phase, which arises during a period of civil defense emergency.

2. The Federal Civil Defense Administration, as a result of continuing study and analysis, as well as the recent availability of final 1950 census data, has revised its list of target areas used for civil defense planning purposes. The present list, announced on February 4, 1952, includes 191

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<sup>5</sup> Further documentation on the Civil Defense Program is in the NSC 131 Series, "Evacuation of Civilian Population in Civil Defense," May 19 and June 12, 1952 in the S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 131 Series.

target areas, of which 67, including 89 principal cities, have been designated as critical target areas from the standpoint of atomic attack. The civil defense plan contemplates organization not only for effective defense of these areas but also for the possibility of attacks on other areas throughout the Nation by atomic, biological, chemical and other weapons. In brief, the plan provides for individual and community self-help, for aid to be made immediately available from neighboring communities when needed through the operation of mutual aid agreements, for mobile support forces to move in on orders from unaffected areas, and for fixed support facilities in the unaffected areas to furnish aid to casualties and refugees.

...

This document does not directly discuss CB weapons, but does offer another acknowledgement that U.S. civil defense against CB weapons was discussed at the highest levels in the same breath as U.S. civil defense against atomic weapons.

This document is identified as document 15 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d15>.

**Draft Statement Submitted to the Senior Staff of the National Security Council by the Staff Assistants of the Senior Staff Steering Committee<sup>1</sup>**

[Washington,] August 12, 1952

Top Secret

Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security

Summary and General Conclusions

1. If the Soviet rulers should attain, in their judgment, the capability of defeating the United States or of so reducing its power potential as to render it permanently incapable of effectively challenging Soviet power and if they should come to believe that such action would not involve serious risk to the maintenance of their regime, they would probably deliberately initiate general war.
2. The Soviets might attack the West if they were convinced as a matter of fact, rather than theory, that an attack by the West was actually imminent.

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<sup>1</sup> This draft statement was transmitted to the National Security Council for information and circulated as an appendix to NSC 135/1. For further information on the origins and drafting of this statement, see the editorial note, p. 56. The covering memorandum from Lay to the NSC Senior Staff dated Aug. 13 reads: "The enclosed draft conclusions on the subject, as tentatively agreed on by the Senior Staff on August 12, are transmitted herewith for final review by the Senior Staff at its meeting on Thursday, August 14, 1952 with a view to completion of a report for submission to the National Security Council." A three-line summary of Senior Staff action at the meeting of Aug. 12 is in the S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, "Senior Staff, 1950-52."

8. The Soviet orbit now has formidable military capabilities. It has succeeded in maintaining large and increasingly well-equipped Soviet armed forces, in expanding and improving the satellite armed and paramilitary forces, and in developing significant atomic, electronic and possibly BW and CW capabilities. The Soviet long-range air force is capable of atomic attack on the United States and might achieve surprise in the initial strike. The Soviets would be able to support extensive military operations of an offensive nature during the early phases of a general war.

9. The Soviet orbit is expanding its current production; it is also expanding its industrial, economic, and scientific potential. There are indications that these latter developments are long range in nature. The USSR has demonstrated a high level of scientific and technical capability in several vital military fields, notably nuclear energy, aircraft design and production, electronics and chemical warfare.

10. The United States and its major allies have responded to the perilous situation of 1950; they have responded collectively to the attack upon South Korea; they are improving the security position in Western Europe and in the Pacific; they, and particularly the United States have significantly improved their readiness for war.

11. The United States is increasing its atomic strength and may soon develop a thermonuclear weapon. There is, in fact, every indication that its present quantitative advantage in atomic weapons stockpile, in means of delivery and in the production of fissionable materials will be further increased. The U.S. is also developing an increasing variety of mass destruction weapons and methods for their delivery; well dispersed overseas bases are being established within range of the sources of Soviet political and industrial power.

...

**Para 11**—This threat assessment is the first of many mentioning unconventional weapons. Of note is the term “mass destruction weapons and means for their delivery.” We often attribute one of the first public usages of the WMD term to the Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who spoke in 1956 about “means of mass destruction, such as atomic, thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons,” but his statement was four years after this assessment. It has been suggested that Zhukov was speaking of U.S. military capabilities to use unconventional weapons against the Soviet Union.

This document is identified as document 88 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d88>.

**Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 8, 1953

Secret  
NSC 151

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on  
Armaments and American Policy

References:

- A. NSC Action No. 725<sup>2</sup>
- B. Memo for NSC Planning Board from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 4, 1953.<sup>3</sup>

The enclosed interim report by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Armaments and American Policy of the NSC Planning Board, which the Planning Board has considered and concurred in, is submitted herewith pursuant to Reference A, for early consideration by the Council of the Recommendations contained in pp. 3-4<sup>4</sup> thereof. Also enclosed for Council information is an Annex to the report containing an outline of the type of information to be released under the proposed policy. The *Ad Hoc*

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<sup>1</sup> Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of Defense Mobilization, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.

<sup>3</sup> The memorandum of Feb. 4, transmitting the Report of the Panel of Consultants, is not printed. (S/P-NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 112) For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to pagination in the source text; for the recommendations, see p. 1152.

Committee and the Planning Board had the assistance of Dr. Vannevar Bush in their preparation and consideration of the enclosed report.

The enclosure relates to the possible means of carrying out Recommendation One by the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament in the report circulated by Reference B. The *Ad Hoc* Committee is preparing another report on other recommendations made by the Panel of Consultants.

It is recommended that if the Council adopts the Recommendations contained herein that they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation in accordance with paragraph 3-d thereof by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Psychological Strategy Board.

**James S. Lay, Jr.**

[Here follows a table of contents]

[Enclosure]

Interim Report by the Ad Hoc Committee of the NSC Planning Board on  
Armaments and American Policy

Introduction

1. *Panel Recommendation on Candor Toward the American People.* The first recommendation of the Department of State Panel of Consultants on Disarmament was that the United States Government “adopt a policy of candor toward the American people—and at least equally toward its own elected representatives and responsible officials—in presenting the meaning of the arms race.”

...

### Recommendations

3. With respect to the first recommendation of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament, we recommend:

- a. that an affirmative policy of candor toward the American people be adopted;
- b. that a policy of continuing candor on the atomic arms race be accompanied as it develops by public indications of such decisions as may be taken with respect to national security programs. It should be recognized that the degree to which the objective of such a policy will be achieved in the initial stages will be affected by the Government's ability to inform the public of its views on the programs required to deal with the dangers involved in the atomic equation;
- c. that the agencies of the U.S. Government should not restrict the distribution within the Government of material involving information about atomic energy and the atomic equation (other than "Restricted Data" of a technical nature) more rigidly than other information of comparable security classification. Officials of the U.S. Government whose responsibilities would be carried out more effectively with such information should have access to it;
- d. that a government agency such as the Psychological Strategy Board (which would be augmented for this purpose by the addition of interested agencies not now represented thereon) be made responsible for considering information now available and subsequently developed on the atomic arms race and for making recommendations on the advisability and timing of public release. This agency could also be given responsibility for recommending the release of information in other matters (such as chemical and biological warfare) related to the security of the United States.

...

11. Public knowledge of the dangers to the United States from a Soviet atomic attack and from such other lesser means of destruction as biological and chemical warfare is likely to focus particular attention on problems of continental defense, both civil and military. This aspect of the

policy of continuing candor will raise special problems which could be dealt with in several ways:

a. It is possible to decide to withhold the disclosure of the facts about the atomic arms race for a year or so in order to give more time for study of the problems of continental defense (civil and military) and for decisions with respect to the programs to be undertaken. The difficulty is that unofficial disclosure is likely to continue and, as the facts become known more fully by this means, the public will grow increasingly critical of its Government for trying to keep it in the dark. Here public reaction is unpredictable, and might result in fright or demands for precipitous action as easily as public support for sensible programs.

b. If a continuing policy of candor beginning soon is decided upon, before definitive decisions have been made with respect to all aspects of programs of increased civil and military continental defense, disclosure could be accompanied by general assurances that the Government is moving forward in the development of continental defense programs. Such general assurances may not be wholly effective in view of the recent unofficial publication of much of the material in the East River Report<sup>5</sup> and the Summer Study Group, Project Lincoln, since it is already widely thought that there are specific programs which can be undertaken provided enough funds are appropriated for the purpose.

c. A policy of continuing candor beginning soon can be accompanied by an announcement of at least the initial decisions with respect to additional programs of civil and military continental defense. Such a program of disclosure would be an evolving one and should also be tied in with later decisions on defense programs, as they are taken.

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding Project East River, see footnote 2, p. 20.

While CB were considered a "lesser means of destruction," it was seen as important to develop defense policy regarding CB weapons in a parallel fashion with atomic weapons, as they all fall into that category of unconventional weapons employed to achieve strategic policy objectives.

This document is identified as document 65 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol II, National Security Affairs*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p1/d65>.

**Report to the National Security Council by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 18, 1953

Top Secret  
NSC 140/1

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955

References:

- A. NSC 140<sup>2</sup>
- B. NSC Action Nos. 687 and 699<sup>3</sup>

The enclosed memorandum from the Chairman of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council and its attached report on the subject prepared by the Subcommittee pursuant to the directive contained in NSC 140 are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council. The enclosures will be scheduled on the agenda of an early Council meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> A notation on the source text reads: "Edwards Report" and indicates an additional classification: "Special Security Handling". Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Directors of Defense Mobilization and Central Intelligence; the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.

<sup>2</sup> Dated Jan. 19, p. 205.

<sup>3</sup> Regarding NSC Action Nos. 687 and 699, see footnote 2, p. 206.

The principal supporting documents referred to in the first page of the enclosed memorandum are available in this office for study by authorized personnel.

The enclosed report is being referred to the agencies represented on the Subcommittee for comment prior to Council action.

*It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of this report and that access to each copy be strictly limited and individually controlled on an absolute need-to-know basis. No additional copies of this report or of any part of it may be made. This report is subject to recall at the direction of the President.*

**James S. Lay, Jr.**

...

[Attachment]

*Report of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council<sup>4</sup>*

[Washington, undated]

Top Secret

The Summary Evaluation

The Problem

1. To prepare a summary evaluation of the net capability of the USSR to inflict direct injury on the United States for the period up to July 1, 1955.

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<sup>4</sup> A short table of contents has been omitted from the beginning of the report.

## Discussion

### I. Soviet Capabilities

1. On the basis of the latest agreed intelligence estimates, we have made the following evaluations of Soviet capabilities:

#### *A. Mass Destruction Weapons*

2. *Atomic Weapons:* The USSR's stockpile of atomic weapons is estimated to consist of approximately the following numbers of weapons of about 80 KT power:

Mid-1953	120
Mid-1955	300

The USSR probably can make weapons of smaller or larger yield than those indicated above and in so doing would increase or reduce the number of weapons in stockpile. We believe that the USSR will not have a deliverable thermonuclear weapon or significant quantities of radiological warfare agents during the period under review.

3. *Biological Weapons:* The USSR will probably possess a capability to produce and disseminate virulent biological agents on a limited scale.

4. *Chemical Weapons:* The USSR will probably possess the capability to engage in large-scale chemical warfare using World War II-type standard chemical agents. By mid-1955, the USSR will probably possess limited stocks of nerve gas.

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Here we find another early instance of U.S. officials using the term "weapons of mass destruction" to include atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. This usage was more typical of the State Department than it was of the Defense Department.

This document is identified as document 19 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol XIX, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d19>.

## National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 1, 1955

NSC 5515/1

### STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

#### REFERENCES

- A. NSC Action No. 1260–c
- B. NSC 5438
- C. NSC 5515
- D. NSC Action No. 1366<sup>2</sup>

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget, and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley for the Attorney General, at the 243rd Council meeting on March 31, 1955,<sup>3</sup> noted the Study contained in NSC 5515, amended as set forth in NSC Action No. 1366–b, and enclosed herewith as NSC 5515/1.

Because of the sensitivity of the information therein, this Study is being given a limited distribution; *it is requested that special security*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5515 Series. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*.

*precautions be observed in its handling and that access to it be limited on a strict need-to-know basis.*

**James S. Lay, Jr<sup>4</sup>**

**[Enclosure]**

STUDY OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE SOVIET ACTIONS

Scope of This Study

1. This study, based on a report by a special subcommittee of the NSC Planning Board,<sup>5</sup> describes what possible Soviet action or series or group of actions should leave no doubt in the President's mind as to the need for taking immediate military action to save the United States from the consequences of enemy attack, or to postpone, lessen or prevent imminent enemy attack.

2. For purposes of this study, the term "military action by the U.S." includes action ranging from lesser measures (such as mobilization, redistribution of U.S. forces, a possible warning to the USSR accompanied by a limited demonstration of force, etc.) all the way to actual hostilities. The study is limited to consideration of the Soviet actions which might be taken; it does not identify the sources or methods by which intelligence or information of such actions might be derived, or identify the precise nature of the military actions (war plans) which might be taken. While refraining from dealing with the nature of U.S. counteraction, the study nevertheless does not imply that the U.S. response should necessarily be uniform in nature. The U.S. response would have to be adapted to the danger to the U.S. inherent in each instance, and might include actions other than military measures.

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> This subcommittee was composed of representatives from four government agencies. The chairman, Jacob D. Beam, represented the Department of State. Colonel Weldon H. Smith, USAF, attended for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Huntington Sheldon, Assistant Director for Current Intelligence, and his alternate, Dr. Ray S. Cline for the CIA; and Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, for the FBI. A copy of the subcommittee's draft report, submitted to the National Security Council Planning Board on February 28, is in Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, S/P Record Copies Jan.–May, 1955.

3. Possible Soviet actions have been examined in terms of their bearing on the imminence and probability of an attack on the U.S. by the USSR. The possibility can not be excluded that certain actions, obviously acts of war, might be undertaken by the USSR without warning, such as a declaration of war on the U.S., a Soviet military attack on the continental U.S., or the detonation of a nuclear weapon in the U.S. However, such acts are outside the scope of this study, the purpose of which is to identify and anticipate Soviet actions preliminary to an attack.

4. Possible Soviet actions preliminary to an attack upon the continental U.S. are listed in the next section of this study under three categories according to the degree of certainty or imminence of such an attack.

5. There is no hard and fast dividing line between the categories of possible Soviet actions. It is probable that Soviet actions enumerated in category I would not occur in isolation from those listed in categories II or III. The impression of simplicity and precision given by the lists which follow should not be allowed to disguise the fact that a difficult and complex value judgment would be involved in determining the exact significance of certain of these actions within the context of the general situation existing at the time of their occurrence.

6. This study can be considered valid only in terms of the current world situation and of Soviet capabilities as set forth in current National Intelligence Estimates. As the world situation and Soviet capabilities develop in the future, the significance of certain of the Soviet actions considered herein will doubtless change. Therefore, this study cannot be viewed either as a long-range or all-inclusive guide.

7. It is assumed that firm and conclusive evidence that the USSR had decided to undertake any of the actions listed below would be equivalent to the occurrence of the act itself. The order of listing in any category is not necessarily an indication of priority. Moreover, it should be noted that nothing in this study affects the mission of the Watch Committee of the IAC, which is "To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action by the USSR, or its Allies, which endangers the security of the United States."

### Possible Hostile Soviet Actions

8. Although as previously mentioned the possibility of total surprise cannot be excluded, it is considered that Soviet actions immediately threatening the safety of the continental U.S. would probably occur against a background of increased international tension and a drastic change toward an offensive posture by Soviet military forces.

#### *Category I*

9. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged in and of itself as clear evidence that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is certain or imminent.

...

b. Introduction into or possession within the U.S. of a complete nuclear weapon, assembled or unassembled, or of the nuclear components of a nuclear weapon, of Soviet origin or under Soviet direction.

...

#### *Category II*

10. Any of the following specific Soviet actions should be judged as clear warning that Soviet attack upon the continental U.S. is probably imminent:

...

f. Soviet attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into bases abroad where U.S. forces are located or into areas under U.S. jurisdiction outside the continental U.S.

g. Soviet attempts to introduce into the U.S. or areas under U.S. jurisdiction significant amounts of biological, chemical or radiological warfare agents.

...

This document is identified as document 61 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol XIX, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d61>.

**Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 27, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5501; NSC 5602;<sup>2</sup> Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam", dated September 16, 1955;<sup>3</sup> Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956<sup>4</sup>)

Mr. Dillon Anderson began his briefing of the Council by inviting its attention to the Annex to NSC 5602, which contained the NSC Planning Board's current "Estimate of the Situation". He commented on the several paragraphs until he reached paragraph 3. As to paragraph 3, respecting the "Chances of General War", he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to insert an additional sentence elaborating on the possibility of war occurring as a result of miscalculation on one side or the other.

The President commented that he could not see any essential difference between the sentence which the Planning Board had originally included on this point and the added language recommended by the Joint Chiefs of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 28.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5602 is not printed, but see NSC 5602/1, Document 66.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see vol. I, p. 535.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, Document 57, and footnote 1, *supra*, respectively.

Staff. Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs believed that the danger of war by miscalculation was a consideration which could not be too strongly emphasized. The President then suggested that the JCS sentence be included.

...

The discussion over changing the long-standing U.S. policy of “no first use” regarding the employment of unconventional weapons in general combat is interesting in the following pages. Note the first sentence of the next paragraph in particular: integrating NBC weapons “with other [conventional] weapons.”

Coming to paragraphs 11 and 12, dealing with the policies of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons and also with chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, Mr. Anderson said he would read these paragraphs in their entirety because they were new. Having done so, Mr. Anderson indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a change in the second sentence of paragraph 11. This now read “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President.” The Joint Chiefs had suggested that the sentence should read as follows: “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and will be used in military operations short of general war when the effectiveness of the operations of the U.S. forces employed will be enhanced thereby. For such operations, the decision as to specific uses will be made by the President.” Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not, as they usually did, given the reasons behind their proposed change, Mr. Anderson asked Admiral Radford if he would speak to the point.

Admiral Radford said he would be very glad to comment. There seemed, he said, to be a widespread impression that nuclear weapons were designed only for offensive use. In point of fact, however, these weapons affected our defensive strength just as much as our offensive strength. He cited various weapons to illustrate this assertion. Accordingly, continued Admiral Radford, it would make a tremendous difference defensively if

our U.S. forces could not use nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves. It was his opinion that nuclear weapons would soon be so thoroughly integrated in the U.S. armed forces that inability to use these weapons would greatly reduce both our defensive and offensive capabilities. Indeed, the idea of some dividing line between use and non-use of these weapons was getting us further and further from the realm of the possible and the actual.

Colin Gray argues in his book *Weapons Don't Make War* that labeling weapon systems as "offensive" or "defensive" only muddies the policy debate—that while we may have defensive policies, our weapon systems are just weapons. While the President correctly notes in the next paragraph that there are certain political factors tempering the use of these weapons, that is the point of defining policy objectives rather than labeling weapons as "strategic" or "defensive."

In response to Admiral Radford, the President adverted to the political implications in the use of nuclear weapons. In these peripheral or small wars which we are talking about, the United States might become involved, for example, through the United Nations. If this occurred, the use of nuclear weapons would raise serious political problems in view of the current state of world opinion as to the use of such weapons. While, said the President, he agreed emphatically with Admiral Radford from a strictly military point of view, we could nevertheless not ignore the political factor. He did not say that world opinion was right in its views about the use of nuclear weapons in small wars. It was nevertheless a fact, and the President predicted that it would be some considerable time before the United States reaches a point where it can adopt any military course of action it regards as appropriate without regard for the political repercussions of such a course of action.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed he had an idea which might reconcile the JCS and the Planning Board language in paragraph 11. Could we not, he asked, use a slightly different formula to cover the use of nuclear weapons in general war and in operations short of general war? He said he had no objection to the use of the JCS language with respect to

general war, but he preferred the language suggested by the Planning Board with regard to operations short of general war.

The President said that having taken one position in response to Admiral Radford's views, he was now about to take a quite different position in response to the point raised by Secretary Dulles. He asked that the Council imagine the position of a military commander in the field. His radar informs him that a flock of enemy bombers is on the point of attacking him. What does the military commander do in such a contingency? Does he not use every weapon at hand to defend himself and his forces?

Secretary Dulles responded by insisting that the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs was no more responsive to the situation described by the President than was the language of the Planning Board, inasmuch as the JCS language itself called for approval of specific use of atomic weapons by the President. Secretary Dulles agreed, however, that the United States forces would make use of nuclear weapons if these forces were directly attacked by the enemy. The President thought that this point should be made specific in the statement of policy.

Admiral Radford commented that in the event of an attack on our forces by an enemy using nuclear weapons, such U.S. defensive forces might suffer such severe initial defeat that they would be unable to recover and go on to victory. In such a case you would have to use nuclear weapons for defense. The President stated his agreement with the point made by Admiral Radford.

Secretary Humphrey said that he wished to raise the very important point of the costs of our preparation for war. He said that it was impossible to prepare dual methods of fighting a future war. Accordingly, we have got to use nuclear weapons in the event of a future war. When you talked in a policy [paper] about "maybe you will use them, maybe you won't", you were getting into very, very deep water. Secretary Dulles said that it appeared that we must choose between having all the military flexibility we wished and losing all our allies. The automatic employment of nuclear weapons in certain instances would surely cost us our allies. Secretary Dulles said he would freely admit that we must do more to educate our

allies on our position, but that a decision now in favor of automatic use of these weapons might actually prove disastrous to the United States.

The President commented that we were now talking chiefly of defensive nuclear weapons. It would be well to remember that current U.S. forces have in every case at least some capability with so-called conventional weapons. What we are seeking now, in connection with paragraph 11, is language which will state that we can use any weapon available to us in the event that our forces are directly attacked by the enemy. Secretary Dulles agreed with the President.

Secretary Robertson said he wished to refer to the point earlier made by Secretary Humphrey with respect to the impossibility of preparing to fight two kinds of wars. He added that the Defense Department felt a very great need for Council guidance as to the manner in which preparation for future war should be made. Secretary Robertson then referred to the footnote at the bottom of page 6 of NSC 5602, in which the State Department proposed an additional paragraph to be inserted after paragraph 12 and to read as follows: "If time permits, the United States should consult appropriate allies, including NATO, before the final decision to use nuclear and chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons is made by the President."<sup>5</sup> In addition to the qualification proposed by the State Department, "if time permits," Secretary Robertson suggested the qualification "and if an attack on U.S. forces is not involved." The President said he thought very well of Secretary Robertson's proposal.

Secretary Dulles said he would like to pursue the discussion a little further. Suppose we turned our attention to the situation in Berlin. What happens if the Soviets impose a new blockade on Berlin? As the Council knew, it was agreed U.S. policy in this contingency to attempt to push through such a blockade. [*remainder of paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified*]

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<sup>5</sup> In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, dated February 24, Bowie recommended that the final clause of this sentence should be redrafted to read: "before any final decision to use nuclear or chemical, bacteriological, or radiological weapons is made by the President. (Underlining to indicate changes.)" The underlined words are printed in italics. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, S/P Chron. TS)

At this point the President suggested that the Council suspend action in paragraphs 11 and 12 until such time as it should receive the new paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with these problems.<sup>6</sup> Governor Stassen said he supported the position taken by Secretary Dulles, as opposed to the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Dulles added a warning of the terrible repercussions which we would experience if we had recourse to the use of nuclear weapons against the colored peoples of Asia.

Admiral Strauss asked permission to speak at this point. He said he would simply like to add, for the information of the Council, that we have at present no radiological weapons and, as far as he knew, no requirement for them.

As noted earlier, radiological weapons were a theoretical form of combat; it was a possible technological development, but not one particularly sought after by the practical-minded, conventionally-focused military leadership.

Dr. Flemming said he would like to refer once again to the memorandum sent to the Council by Secretary Wilson together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As he understood Secretary Wilson's position in this memorandum, the Secretary had concluded that the policy set forth in NSC 5602 did not represent the kind of policy the United States required in the face of the existing situation. Was the issue which the Council had been discussing, with respect to paragraph 11, an illustration of what the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind when they said that we should have a more incisive and specific policy statement than that contained in NSC 5602? Secretary Robertson replied that this was precisely the type of problem about which the Defense Department believed there was need for much clearer delineation of U.S. policy.

At this point Secretary Dulles again suggested that the best solution for the problem raised in paragraph 11 would be for the Council provisionally to

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<sup>6</sup> Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

adopt the language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the use of weapons in general war, and the language proposed by the Planning Board with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war. We should also add, said Secretary Dulles, words to indicate that these concepts needed further elaboration and that we should have a study of them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In response to this suggestion, the President again stated that Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 of NSC 5602 should be held in abeyance pending receipt of this study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was no need, thought the President, for immediate Council action on NSC 5602.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then undertook to explain to the National Security Council the origin and development of the ideas and language in paragraph 11. He pointed out that a high level committee had been set up in the Department of Defense which was called the "NSC 5501 Committee". This Defense Department committee had initially decided on appropriate language to cover the problem of the use of nuclear weapons. They had thereafter sent this language to the Planning Board for its consideration, and this language had been adopted with some few changes by the Planning Board. Mr. Anderson indicated, however, that the Planning Board had had no knowledge of the special JCS study of this problem to which reference had been made in the course of the discussion. He wondered whether this problem should not be added to the other major problems set forth in the covering memorandum by the Planning Board to NSC 5602, which problems the Planning Board felt should be the subject of further study and consideration by the National Security Council.

The President then observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have reported the contents of their study of the use of nuclear weapons prior to the time when the Planning Board had reached its decision as to appropriate language for paragraph 11. In other words, said the President, turning to Mr. Anderson, you and the Planning Board were under the impression that paragraphs 11 and 12, as agreed upon by the Planning Board, were acceptable to the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Anderson nodded agreement, but Admiral Radford insisted that the JCS recommendation as to the language which the

Planning Board should use for paragraph 11 was the same language which they were now proposing as a substitute for the existing Planning Board language. In point of fact, the Planning Board had not accepted the original JCS suggestions and had changed them in the course of its deliberations. Mr. Anderson agreed that this was correct, but pointed out that the Defense member and the JCS adviser of the NSC Planning Board had agreed to accept the revision made by the Planning Board in the language originally sent by the Joint Chiefs for inclusion in paragraph 11.

Dr. Flemming said he wished to raise a question with respect to paragraph 12, regarding chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons in general war. He asked whether he was correct in believing that our previous policy had been that we would have recourse to such weapons only in retaliation against their use by an enemy. Did the present language of paragraph 12 thus amount to a change in policy respecting the use of such weapons? The President commented that the chief purpose of paragraph 12 was to encourage research and development in these weapons fields. Mr. Anderson added that previous policy respecting the use of these weapons called for their use only in retaliation. Accordingly Dr. Flemming's surmise was correct, and the present paragraph 12 constituted a change in our policy.

Secretary Dulles then asked the President whether Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 was to be held in suspense. The President indicated that paragraph 12 was OK as written, but that Council action on paragraph 11 would be suspended pending further study and report to the Council by the Department of Defense.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 9, Document 62.

This document is identified as document 62 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol XIX, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d62>.

**Memorandum of Discussion at the 278th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 1, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5501; NSC 5602; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955; Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956)<sup>2</sup>

...

Mr. Anderson said that the Council had now completed its consideration of NSC 5602, and recapitulated the decisions of the Council. In particular he suggested that paragraph 11 of NSC 5602 be tentatively adopted subject to revision following consideration of the study of nuclear weapons expected from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President said he understood that the Department of Defense wanted to suspend action on paragraph 11. Admiral Radford, however, stated that he believed paragraph 11 as it stood would be satisfactory without the additional language proposed by the Department of State. Secretary Robertson pointed out that the new paper from the Joint Chiefs, on the subject of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on March 2.

<sup>2</sup> See footnotes 2–4, *supra*.

use of atomic weapons, would be ready for the President's consideration early next week. The President indicated that action on paragraph 11 would be suspended.<sup>3</sup>

At the very end of the meeting, Admiral Strauss pointed out, with respect to paragraph 12, that the United States possessed no radiological weapons and, moreover, he knew of no requirement for such weapons. In the light of this information, inclusion of the reference to radiological weapons in paragraph 12 might lead to a misunderstanding. Accordingly, the President directed the deletion of the reference to radiological weapons in paragraph 12.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>4</sup>

a. Discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5602) in the light of the conclusions, comments and recommendations of the NSC Planning Board contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of February 13, and the views of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosures to the reference memorandum of February 24.

b. Adopted NSC 5602, subject to:

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<sup>3</sup> In a memorandum dated March 15 to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Executive Secretary Lay stated that the President, taking note of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense entitled "Presidential Authorization for the Use of Atomic Weapons," dated February 15, approved paragraph 11 of NSC 5602/1, with the addition of a final sentence. The paragraph, as approved, reads as follows: "It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President." (Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Natl. Sec. Affs. Records, Presidential Approval-Atomic Energy)

<sup>4</sup> Paragraphs a-h and the Notes that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1522, approved by the President on March 15. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

(1) Addition (on page 6, paragraph 11) of a final sentence reading: “Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.”

(2) Substitution (on page 6, paragraph 12) of the words “chemical and bacteriological” for the words “chemical, bacteriological and radiological”.

(3) Deletion of the footnote on page 6, and insertion of an additional paragraph 12 as follows:

“If time permits and an attack on the U.S. or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.”

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This document is identified as document 66 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol XIX, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d66>.

## **National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1956

NSC 5602/1

### BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council

#### *REFERENCES*

A. NSC 5501<sup>2</sup>

B. NIE 11-3-55; NIE 11-7-55; NIE 11-13-55; NIE 11-13/1-55; NIE 100-7-55; SNIE 100-8-55<sup>3</sup>

C. NSC 5602

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 6.

<sup>3</sup> NIE 11-3-55 was not declassified. NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1958," June 23, 1955, is not printed. (Both in Department of State, INR-NIE Files) NIE 11-13-55, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Summit Conference," October 4, 1955, is not printed. (Ibid.) NEE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," December 6, 1955, is not printed. (Ibid.) NIE 100-7-55 is Document 39. SNIE 100-8-55, "Probable Trends in the Military Programs of Selected Free World Governments," December 13, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, INR-NIE Files)

D. Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956

E. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive, subject: "U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam", dated September 16, 1955<sup>4</sup>

F. NSC Action No. 1522<sup>5</sup>

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Ralph Spear for the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 277th and 278th meetings of the Council on February 27 and March 1, 1956, discussed the subject on the basis of the reference report (NSC 5602) in the light of the recommendations of the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 13, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of February 24, 1956, The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5602, subject to the changes set forth in NSC Action No. 1522-b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5602, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5602/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5602/1 is a substitute for NSC 5501 and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5602/1.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnotes 2-4, Document 61.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 10, Document 62.

**[Enclosure]**

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policies: maintaining the security of the United States and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions.

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Section B

Elements of National Strategy

*I. Military Elements of National Strategy*

In the following paragraphs is the famous policy change in its final form: separating out nuclear weapons from CB weapons, but nonetheless promoting the integrated use of unconventional weapons during the conduct of general warfare, upon approval by the President. Note there is no discussion about their use solely as a strategic deterrent, but certainly they play a role in "detering general war" (para 14).

...

11. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.

12. To the extent that the military effectiveness of the armed forces will be enhanced by their use, the United States will be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

13. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons is made by the President.

14. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also continue accelerated military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war. Such ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. They

must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation.

16. With the coming of nuclear parity, the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the free world to resist aggression. The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in a position where they must choose between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risks of nuclear devastation. The apprehensions of U.S. allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter local aggression can be lessened if the U.S. deterrent force is not solely dependent on such weapons, thus avoiding the question of their use unless and until the deterrent fails. In the event of actual Communist local aggression, the United States should, if necessary, make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons. In the last analysis, when confronted by the choice (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.

17. National security policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other free world countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to convince its allies, particularly its NATO allies, that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN. The United States should provide new weapons (non-nuclear) and advanced technology to

allies capable of using them effectively, taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities and the likely availability of funds. Atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses, to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war. The United States should continue to provide military and other assistance, including where deemed appropriate new weapons and advanced technology, to dependable allied nations where such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power. Special attention in the technological field should be directed to assisting selected U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems, and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of free world scientific and technological resources.

...

## Annex

### ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

#### *I. Relative Free World and Communist Bloc Capabilities*

1. *U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Capabilities.* The United States is now capable of inflicting massive nuclear damage on the USSR, and will acquire by about mid-1956 the capability to mount a decisive nuclear strike against the USSR.<sup>6</sup> The United States will have a marked net superiority in nuclear striking power from then until some time in 1958. During that year, and thereafter, the USSR will almost certainly develop and maintain

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<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this estimate, “decisive” means damage such that either (1) the ability to strike back is essentially eliminated, or (2) civil, political, and cultural life is reduced to a condition of chaos. “Strike” means an action carried to completion within hours or days, as compared to an “offensive” which is of longer duration. [Footnote in the source text.]

the net capability to strike a crippling<sup>7</sup> blow at the United States, but the United States should still be able to inflict equal or greater damage on the USSR, provided that it takes adequate steps to protect and to continue the development of its effective retaliatory power.

2. In an attack on the United States, especially a surprise attack, the USSR, at least until it develops a long-range ballistic missile capability, would place chief reliance on nuclear attacks by aircraft. Also, substantial launching of missiles from submarines would be possible, and clandestine methods could be used against specially selected targets. Chemical and biological capabilities would probably be employed as secondary means of attack. In any event, the most probable primary objective of an initial Soviet nuclear strike would be the earliest possible destruction of U.S. and allied nuclear capability, world-wide; but this would almost certainly be combined with attacks on other U.S. and major allied forces and war reserves, and on key production complexes.

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<sup>7</sup> "Crippling" is used to indicate a degree of destruction, disruption and loss of life that, while not decisive, would raise serious question as to the ability of the United States to recover and regain its status as a great industrial nation for a considerable period of years. [Footnote in the source text.]

This document is identified as document 119 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol XIX, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d119>.

**Memorandum of Discussion at the 325th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, May 27, 1957<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 27, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707; NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2; NSC 5707/3; NSC 5707/4; NSC 5707/5; NSC 5707/6; NSC 5707/7; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated May 24, 1957)<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Cutler commenced his briefing with a reminder to the Council of the new approach to the revision of basic national security policy. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)<sup>3</sup> He suggested that before explaining to the Council the major differences

<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on May 28.

<sup>2</sup> NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. Regarding the February 19 memorandum and NSC 5707, see footnote 2, Document 110. Regarding NSC Action No. 1675, see footnote 13, Document 110. Regarding NSC 5707/1–6, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 117. The May 24 memoranda transmitted to the NSC a memorandum on NSC 5707/7 from the JCS to Secretary of Defense Wilson, dated May 24, and a revision of paragraph 49 of NSC 5707/7 proposed by the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

<sup>3</sup> Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.

which had developed in the paper on the use of nuclear weapons in local war, he would like to clear up certain less significant points of controversy. Accordingly, he asked the Council to turn to paragraph 12, on page 5 of NSC 5707/7, which read as follows:

“12. The United States will [produce and]<sup>4</sup> be prepared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war\*\* to the extent that they will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

“\*Proposed by ODM Member.

“\*\*ODM Member proposes deletion of the phrase ‘in general’.”

After reading the paragraph and explaining the difference between the majority view and the ODM view, Mr. Cutler asked Mr. Gray to speak to the point.

Mr. Gray said that he did not wish to stand on the inclusion of the bracketed phrase “[produce and]”. He said, however, that he wanted at least to raise the question as to the wisdom of limiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons to general war as opposed to limited conflicts.

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford for his views. Admiral Radford replied that the text of paragraph 12 as written, without the bracketed language and without the deletion of the phrase “in general war”, was satisfactory to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford explained that if a situation developed in which a commander wished to use these weapons in a local conflict, he would apply for authority to order the use of such weapons, and we could make a decision at the time. As far as military planning was concerned, the question was not particularly serious.

Secretary Wilson said he favored leaving paragraph 12 as it was and as Admiral Radford had suggested. Mr. Gray repeated that he was not pressing for the changes proposed by the ODM Member of the Planning Board. The President said it was all right to leave it as written, because the

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<sup>4</sup> All brackets in this document are in the source text.

phrase “be prepared to use” implied at least some production of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Accordingly, Mr. Cutler suggested that the paragraph be left as written in NSC 5707/7.

...

Mr. Cutler stated that he would now like to have the Council turn to the major area of policy cleavage in NSC 5707/7. These cleavages occurred in paragraph 11, 15 and 17. At the same time, he invited the Council’s attention to the sheets which had been passed out to the members of the Council, on which were noted paragraphs 11, 15, 16 and 17 as they were set forth in existing policy (NSC 5602/1) and as these paragraphs would read in the proposed revisions in NSC 5707/ 7. (Copies of these sheets<sup>5</sup> are filed in the minutes of the meeting.) The existing and proposed versions of these paragraphs were read by Mr. Cutler as follows:

**“ Existing Policy (NSC 5602/1)**

**“ Proposed Revision (NSC 5707/7)**

“11. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President. Such authorization as may be given in advance will be determined by the President.”

“11. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons, to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States, to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view, and to use them when required to achieve military objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.”

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may

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<sup>5</sup> The sheets are filed in the minutes.

realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening into general war. Such ready forces must be sufficiently versatile to use both conventional and nuclear weapons. They must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Such forces must not become so dependent on tactical nuclear capabilities that any decision to intervene against local aggression would probably be tantamount to a decision to use nuclear weapons. However, these forces must also have a flexible and selective nuclear capability, since the United States will not preclude itself from using nuclear weapons even in a local situation.”

16. With the coming of nuclear parity, the ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will of the Free World to resist aggression. The United States and its allies must avoid getting themselves in a position where they must choose

realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. “The use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war. Furthermore, the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, to oppose local aggression, U.S. forces must have a flexible and selective nuclear capability and, when its use is required, apply it in a manner and on a scale best calculated to prevent hostilities from broadening into general war.” No comparable paragraph.

“16. U.S. security is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World countries, in providing their share of military forces and in furnishing bases for U.S. military power (although U.S. dependence on such bases is likely to

between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider entails undue risks of nuclear devastation. The apprehensions of U.S. allies as to using nuclear weapons to counter local aggression can be lessened if the U.S. deterrent force is not solely dependent on such weapons, thus avoiding the question of their use unless and until the deterrent fails. In the event of actual Communist local aggression, the United States should, if necessary, make its own decision as to the use of nuclear weapons. In the last analysis, when confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to take these risks if necessary for its security.”

“17. National security policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate major allies and certain other Free World countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It is important for the United States to take the necessary steps to convince its allies, particularly its NATO allies, that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that the United States is committed to their defense and

diminish over the long run). The United States should take the necessary steps to convince its NATO and other allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as its own, and that, while their full contribution and participation must be forthcoming, the United States is committed to their defense and possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN.”

17. a. The United States and its allies must accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities, and the likely availability of funds, the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear

possesses the capability to fulfill that commitment. The United States should strengthen as practicable, the collective defense system and utilize, where appropriate, the possibilities of collective action through the UN. The United States should provide new weapons (non-nuclear) and advanced technology to allies capable of using them effectively, taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities and the likely availability of funds. Atomic energy legislation as it relates to weapons should be progressively relaxed to the extent required for the progressive integration of such weapons into NATO defenses, to the extent of enabling selected allies to be able to use them upon the outbreak of war. The United States should continue to provide military and other assistance, including where deemed appropriate new weapons and advanced technology, to dependable allied nations where such assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate contributions to collective military power. Special attention in the technological field should be directed to assisting selected U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems, and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of Free World scientific and technological resources.”

weapons systems less nuclear elements). “b. Additionally, the United States should in the future, as feasible and appropriate, provide selected major allies with nuclear weapons with nuclear elements under arrangements which insure their employment in accordance with combined operational plans and common objectives. The United States should assist selected major U.S. allies rapidly to develop their own advanced weapons systems (excluding nuclear elements except in the case of the U.K.) and in other ways significantly to increase utilization of Free World scientific and technological resources. To achieve the foregoing, atomic energy legislation relating to nuclear weapons should, as necessary, be progressively relaxed.”

In the course of commenting on paragraph 17–b, Mr. Cutler pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested the substitution of the phrase “the United Kingdom and Canada” for “selected major allies” in the first sentence of the paragraph, and the deletion of the last two sentences.<sup>6</sup>

Mr. Cutler then said that the State Member of the Planning Board had indicated great concern over the proposed revision of paragraphs 11, 15 and 17. While he had not actually suggested alternate language, he had set forth the general views of the State Department on these paragraphs in the Annex to NSC 5707/7,<sup>7</sup> beginning on page 23. Mr. Cutler then read paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Annex, as follows:

“3. Three factors greatly complicate the problem of dealing effectively with limited hostilities:

- “a. The wide range of contingencies as to objectives, participants, locale, extent, weapons, tactics—and the degree of intervention required from the United States.
- “b. Our continued dependence on our allies and other Free World countries. If local aggression is to be prevented, we must rely on them to maintain their will to resist, their appropriate share of military forces, and access to their territories for the Free World military operations. Our policy and strategy cannot succeed unless they consider that their interests are served as well as our own.
- “c. The extensive capabilities available to the USSR for direct or indirect local aggression using both conventional forces and nuclear weapons systems, and extending from threat to enticement.

“4. To fulfill our political purposes, our military policy and strategy for dealing with limited hostilities must:

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<sup>6</sup> In their May 24 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, transmitted to the NSC in the May 24 memorandum cited in footnote 2 above, the JCS offered two reasons for these changes: “(1) To limit the statement of policy to provide for only the near term objective. (2) To avoid untimely reference to changes in the Atomic Energy Act.” (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5707 Series)

<sup>7</sup> State Reservation on Paragraphs 11, 15 and 17,” was attached as an Annex to NSC 5707/7. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

- “a. Leave the President free to choose the appropriate means (including choice as to nuclear or non-nuclear weapons) for responding to limited hostilities in the light of actual political and military circumstances.
- “b. Offer the best prospect for coping with limited hostilities effectively with minimum risk of their expanding into general war.
- “c. Not risk erosion of alliance and base arrangements vital to our security.
- “d. Not lead threatened nations to reject U.S. military support in case of limited hostilities; or facilitate Soviet indirect aggression and subversion or foster accommodation.
- “e. Not prejudice our moral leadership in the world by appearing to commit us to use of undue force.”

As a procedure, Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council look first at paragraph 17 of NSC 5707/7, pointing out that in addition to the objections of the State Member of the Planning Board, the AEC Observer believed it premature to authorize giving nuclear weapons to foreign nations or assisting them technically in developing their own, and that he was therefore opposed to modifying existing legislation on this subject.

The President turned to Admiral Strauss and asked why the Atomic Energy Commission was opposed to changing the existing atomic energy legislation relating to nuclear weapons. Admiral Strauss replied that the AEC objection was based on the belief that the protection of classified information relative to the construction of nuclear weapons was not adequately safeguarded by our allies. If such information became available to the Soviets it would constitute information some of which we do not think the Soviets now have. Admiral Strauss therefore counselled that our policy should be to keep nuclear warheads under our own U.S. control, although they should be located in close proximity to the weapons in which they would be used in the event of war.

Apropos of the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs, the President asked Admiral Radford whether he had carefully considered the effect on our other allies of a U.S. policy which would restrict the provision of nuclear weapons and warheads to the United Kingdom and Canada alone. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs had considered this matter, but had agreed that from the point of view of U.S. national security the most important course of action was to give such nuclear weapons to Canada for the air defense

of the continent, in which the role of Canada was an integral part of the total defense picture. Admiral Radford admitted that providing these weapons to the United Kingdom would constitute a more difficult problem. [*1 sentence (44 words) not declassified*]

The President then suggested that subparagraph 17-b be rewritten to state in effect that in order to integrate the air defense of the continent, it was essential that Canada be provided with ground-to-air nuclear weapons. Admiral Radford replied that for that matter the Joint Chiefs of Staff would just as soon drop out the entire subparagraph, since the matter could not now be decided in any event (presumably because of the requirement for a change in the legislation). The President said that this was the way he certainly felt about it. Secretary Wilson and Secretary Quarles agreed on the desirability of deleting subparagraph 17-b altogether, in view of the existing world situation.

Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford if he thought deletion of subparagraph 17-b was indeed the best solution, or would it be better to go back to the phraseology on this subject which was contained in NSC 5602/1, the old policy. On further consideration, Mr. Cutler suggested that perhaps the best solution would be to delete subparagraph 17-b and adopt subparagraph 17-a, provided the course of action in subparagraph 17-a could be accomplished now without any change in legislation. Admiral Strauss and Admiral Radford agreed that there was no existing bar to carrying out the course of action set forth in subparagraph 17-a.

Mr. Cutler then suggested that the Council turn its attention to paragraph 15, which contained the most serious split of views with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in local aggression and related matters. He reminded the Council that the President had requested the Defense Department to draft its views on this subject in the manner which most fully represented the views of the Defense Department. He then called on Secretary Dulles to speak on this issue.

Secretary Dulles stated that he wished to speak rather generally of the new concept formulated by the Defense Department in paragraph 15 and in several other places in NSC 5707/7. He said he would preface his remarks by saying that he believed he accepted as fully as anyone present, and

certainly more fully than any of his State Department colleagues, the inevitability of the general use of nuclear military power as conventional. As new sources of power have been developed historically, there were inevitably great difficulties of adjusting to them; but nevertheless one had in the last analysis to be realistic and to make the adjustment. The real problem, therefore, was the timeliness of the steps proposed by the Defense Department in NSC 5707/ 7, rather than the ultimate inevitability of treating nuclear weapons as conventional weapons. This, said Secretary Dulles, was not the time, in his opinion, to go as far as these paragraphs of NSC 5707/7 suggested. In the first place, in point of fact the United States does not now possess any nuclear weapons which are really limited in scope and power. Our so-called "little bang weapons" are actually of the type which produced such sensational results at Hiroshima. Thus, whether we have yet reached a point where we could wage a limited war with this kind of nuclear weapons, is very doubtful indeed.

Secondly, the concept of selectivity simply cannot be disregarded, and the apparent proposal to do so would run counter to public opinion as it has come down through the ages. The time will undoubtedly come when atomic weapons will be so varied and so selective that we can make use of them without involving widespread devastation, but that time is not yet. Thus, whereas the language of paragraphs 15 and 16 of the existing policy (NSC 5602/1) had emphasized that we should be prepared to make use of force selectively, the proposed revision of paragraph 15 in the present paper (NSC 5707/7) merely says that we will use atomic weapons selectively. Secretary Dulles stressed that he did not believe that we were yet ready and prepared to exercise a selective nuclear capability. If he were wrong, and we already did possess this selective nuclear capability, it was certainly something that the National Security Council should know about.

At this point Admiral Strauss interrupted, and asked if he could point out that nuclear weapons were now being developed which were approximately 10%, or even 5%, of the size of the weapon used at Nagasaki. Admittedly, however, these small weapons were in comparatively limited quantity at the present time. They were expensive,

but the number of them could be increased if this were directed by authority.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that if in fact we now do have sufficient nuclear weapons to permit us to use them and at the same time confine the effects to local theatres of operations, it was extremely important that we should know this fact. Admiral Strauss indicated that this was a recent development. Secretary Dulles continued, pointing out that even if we do now have this capability (and he had not known it), our allies certainly do not realize that we possess such a capability. Accordingly, we must convince our allies that we have this capability and that these weapons can be used in such a way as to avoid the entire devastation of vast areas. Until we do so, the course of action proposed in the revision of paragraph 15 could be very dangerous indeed. For example, Chancellor Adenauer<sup>8</sup> believes, as a result of deep religious feelings, that the use of this type of force and this sort of weapon is wrong. Furthermore, said Secretary Dulles, he well remembered, some fifty years ago this week, the Peace Conference of 1907 at The Hague. This Conference was called to try to control warfare by submarines and balloons, there being no aircraft to control or exclude. The attitude of the German delegation on this occasion made a very deep impression on everybody. It was their view that it was simply not practical to make exceptions of any particular weapon and, indeed, that perhaps the best deterrent to war was to avoid making war more humane. Perhaps the Germans were right in this respect, but their timing was certainly wrong, and a very bad impression was made for Germany.

For reasons such as this, the United States could not disregard important elements of world opinion, and Secretary Dulles said he was convinced that world opinion was not yet ready to accept the general use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts. If we resort to such a use of nuclear weapons we will, in the eyes of the world, be cast as a ruthless military power, as was Germany earlier.

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<sup>8</sup> Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was then having talks with U.S. officials in Washington. Documentation on his visit to the United States, May 24-29, is scheduled for publication in volume XXVI.

Secretary Dulles indicated that each of the Assistant Secretaries in the State Department had been asked to give his reaction to this problem.<sup>9</sup> All of them were strongly opposed to the policy on the subject proposed in NSC 5707/7, because of the disastrous effect of such a policy on public opinion in the areas for which these Assistant Secretaries were responsible. Secretary Dulles predicted that all this would change at some point in the future, but the time had not yet come, even if the United States is beginning to manufacture these smaller nuclear weapons. The State Department people prefer the older concept that “force” would be applied selectively, rather than the new concept that “nuclear weapons” will be applied selectively. Hence Secretary Dulles said that it was his view that the policy proposed in paragraph 15 of NSC 5707/7 reflected the wave of the future. As our allies become more and more acquainted with the facts of our selective nuclear capability, this wave of the future will be accepted by them. Meanwhile, the limitations on this issue set forth in NSC 5602/ 1 should be retained in the new basic national security policy paper. To illustrate his point, Secretary Dulles alluded to specific illustrations in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 of NSC 5707/7.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his general observations, Mr. Cutler suggested that before the Council got down to considering the details of the phrasing of the paper, it should hear from Admiral Radford or Secretary Wilson on the general subject which had just been discussed by Secretary Dulles.

Admiral Radford stated that he personally did not disagree with much that Secretary Dulles had said. Perhaps much of the difficulty stemmed from the use to which this paper would be put. It is, of course, not given wide publicity. Nevertheless, in the Free World people do believe that U.S. military planning is along the line set forth in NSC 5707/7, and furthermore, said Admiral Radford, in his view we really adopted the essentials of this policy as far back as 1953. We have gotten a decision

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<sup>9</sup> The memoranda are in Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5707 Series. A memorandum from Bowie to Dulles summarizing the memoranda was not declassified. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)

from the President, and we are in fact planning essentially along the lines of the military strategy set forth in NSC 5707/7.

Admiral Radford went on to say that for many years to come our stockpile of atomic weapons will not be so great as to permit any promiscuous use of such weapons. Moreover, for years to come the United States will continue to have very great conventional military capabilities. Nevertheless, we cannot go along with the old language of NSC 5602/1 with respect to the military elements of our national strategy. The language of NSC 5602/1 was simply too open and too fuzzed up to be useful for military planning purposes in the Defense Department.

Secretary Wilson commented that he was conscious that his own personal point of view was not as different from that of the Secretary of State as might seem to be the case. NSC 5707/7 was, after all, a secret policy paper, and one that is looking ahead to the future. After the President had interrupted briefly to express his strong and continued opposition to sending classified NSC papers overseas, Secretary Wilson continued his remarks. He noted that in the area under discussion, our program must be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in character. As Admiral Radford had pointed out, the United States still has strong conventional military capabilities. But the other side of the picture was this: The Defense Department was often severely criticized for seeming to develop two or even three different kinds of strategy, and Secretary Wilson said he could not go for this course of action either. There was, after all, no real way of avoiding resort to new military power once such power appears in the world. Accordingly, nuclear power must be developed and exploited, although on an evolutionary basis.

Finally, said Secretary Wilson, he was profoundly troubled about the definitions of limited war. Any kind of war in which U.S. military personnel were involved was very liable to develop into a big war. Secretary Wilson did not think that the United States should fight small wars. It should keep out of them. There should be no more Koreas. Accordingly, Secretary Wilson advised that this matter be clarified in the present paper and not leave the Defense Department to develop two strategies, each one of which cost billions of dollars. He said he would

recommend that the Defense Department concept be rewritten to take account of the evolutionary development of the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Dulles commented that it likewise seemed to him that his own views were not greatly different from those of Admiral Radford and Secretary Wilson. But the evolutionary process of which Secretary Wilson had spoken must be timed both with relation to the techniques of the art of war and with the development of public opinion. He said that he felt a great sympathy for and an acceptance of the views of the Defense Department, but he did not want the United States to get out of step with world opinion.

The President stated that he had talked over these problems with Mr. Cutler prior to the meeting. At this time the President said that he himself had proposed a new sentence as an introduction to the second paragraph of paragraph 15 of NSC 5707/7, which the President read as follows: "local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved." The President said that he had also a substitute for the last sentences in the second paragraph of paragraph 15, which he thought might meet the points which had been raised in the Council discussion thus far. The President read these sentences as follows: "Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war."

Admiral Radford first referred to earlier discussions on measures required to protect Taiwan from Chinese Communist aggression and the need to use nuclear weapons in its defense. He added that what the President had suggested seemed to him exactly what we needed by way of revision. Mr. Cutler agreed with Admiral Radford, and reread paragraph 15 in its entirety as amended by the President. In explanation of his amendments, the President pointed out that military action in Berlin could not be kept

local in character; nor, probably, could military action in the Near East. Limited wars could really only be limited in underdeveloped areas.

Secretary Dulles then stated his objection to the statement in paragraph 15 that “The use of nuclear weapons in limited war is unlikely by itself to result in general nuclear war.” The President added that with respect to his inclusion of language in the last sentences of paragraph 15 to indicate the development of a flexible and selected capability for *use as authorized by the President*, this qualification was not likely to impose any problems, because in the contingency of limited war as opposed to general war, it would not be difficult, in a timely manner, to get the President’s authorization for the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Cutler suggested that if the language proposed by the President was agreeable, the Council look at paragraph 11, with particular reference to what he understood to be the views of the Secretary of State. Secretary Dulles said he would prefer the phraseology “and to use them when required to achieve *national* objectives” rather than the phraseology “when required to achieve *military* objectives.” The President and other members of the Council agreed with Secretary Dulles’ preference.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to paragraph 17-a, and the Secretary of State indicated that he did not like the phraseology “The United States and its allies *must* accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World, etc., etc.”. The President asked Secretary Dulles whether he meant that in effect we, the United States, accept nuclear weapons as an integral part of our arsenal, and we are trying to educate our allies to the same acceptance. Secretary Dulles said that the President was right, and that we were furthermore making considerable progress in getting our allies to accept this concept. Admiral Radford noted that as far back as 1953 the State Department had been charged in our basic national security policy paper with the effort to convince our allies that nuclear weapons should be an integral part of the Free World’s arsenal. He added that the State Department had done very well in carrying out this task. Mr. Cutler suggested that in place of the word “must”, we should insert the phrase “should continue to persuade”. The Council accepted Mr. Cutler’s amendment.

Mr. Cutler then asked Secretary Dulles whether he believed it desirable, as was suggested in the State Department annex to NSC 5707/7, that there should be a further study by an informed and disinterested group of the problem of the limited use of force or hypothetical studies of limited war. Secretary Dulles replied in the negative, as did the President and Admiral Radford, both with emphasis. The President, however, added that he would like to have Admiral Strauss come in with a report and a diagram delineating nuclear weapons available to the United States, from the 10-megaton weapon all the way down to the smallest size of nuclear weapon, as encompassed in our present programs. This should include the percentages of the different categories of weapons.<sup>10</sup>

Secretary Humphrey turned to the President and said he had just one observation to make. Let us be sure that we are clear, and that the language we choose is clear, as to the kind of program we are planning—the program for military planning of weapons, not the program for diplomacy. Secretary Humphrey warned that if we did not tailor our military planning and our military expenditures to nuclear capabilities, the result would cost an awful lot of money. No misunderstanding can be permitted that we are engaged in developing and continuing two distinct military capabilities and two different military strategies. The President commented that there just must be good sense and good judgment in this matter. Secretary Wilson strongly supported the point made by Secretary Humphrey.

Although Secretary Dulles was obliged to leave the meeting at this point to keep his engagement with Chancellor Adenauer, Mr. Cutler asked the President's permission to call attention to a number of other paragraphs in NSC 5707/7 which had been agreed to in the Planning Board but which, nevertheless, marked a significant change of emphasis over the equivalent paragraphs in NSC 5602/1. In the course of pointing out these agreed paragraphs, Mr. Cutler came to paragraph 19, reading as follows:

“19. In those countries with which the United States does not have mutual security agreements, the United States should, where appropriate, avoid

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<sup>10</sup> For a summary of Strauss' report, see Document 121.

the provision of grant assistance as a means of compensation for base rights.”

With respect to this paragraph, Secretary Wilson said he believed that it should be deleted in its entirety. The United States should decide only on an ad hoc basis what it should do by way of compensation for base rights. Moreover, it was inopportune to agree to the policy set forth in paragraph 19 at the very time that former Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash was engaged in a review of U.S. base problems world-wide.<sup>11</sup> Admiral Radford strongly supported Secretary Wilson’s views. The President commented that in place of paragraph 19 he would prefer to put in language suggesting that we should look at our overseas bases with a very jaundiced eye, to see if in point of fact we needed them all (laughter).

Mr. Cutler suggested elimination of paragraph 19, and this met with general agreement.

*The National Security Council:*<sup>12</sup>

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5707/7, prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of the discussion at the NSC meetings on the NSC 5707 Series; in the light of the revision of paragraph 49 of NSC 5707/ 7 proposed by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memoranda of May 24, 1957.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5707/7, subject to the following amendments:

(1) *Page 5, paragraph 11:* Revise to read as follows:

“11. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other

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<sup>11</sup> Regarding Nash’s study, see footnote 2, Document 83 and Document 172.

<sup>12</sup> Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1728, approved by the President on June 3. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.”

(2) *Page 5, paragraph 12*: Delete the bracketed words and the footnotes.

(3) *Page 6, paragraph 15*: Revise to read as follows:

“15. Within the total U.S. military forces there must be included ready forces which, with such help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (a) to present a deterrent to any resort to local aggression, and (b) to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such local aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be required to suppress quickly the local aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of maldeployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted.

“Local aggression as used in this paragraph 15 refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of an appropriate flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”

(4) *Page 7, paragraph 17*: Revise to read as follows:

“17. The United States should continue efforts to persuade its allies to recognize nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World and the need for their prompt and selective use when required. Taking into account the protection of classified data, the essential

requirements of U.S. forces, production capabilities, and the likely availability of funds, the United States should continue to provide to allies capable of using them effectively advanced weapons systems (including nuclear weapons systems less nuclear elements).”

(5) *Page 8, paragraph 19*: Delete, and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

(6) *Page 21, old paragraph 49*: Delete the paragraph except for the title “*Stockpiling\**”, and substitute the following footnoted:<sup>13</sup>

“\* Action on this paragraph has been deferred pending further report to and consideration by the Council of the views of the interested departments and agencies.”

(7) *Pages 23 and 24*: Delete the Annex and the footnotes relating thereto, in view of the revisions agreed upon in paragraphs 11, 15 and 17, and in the light of the agreement by the Council that a study as suggested in paragraph 5 of the Annex is not needed at this time.

c. Noted the President’s request that the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, make a presentation of the types of nuclear weapons produced or being developed, by size of yield, and the approximate percentage of each type in the stockpile.

*Note*: NSC 5707/7, as amended and adopted, approved by the President and circulated as NSC 5707/8,<sup>14</sup> for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, with the understanding (a) that progress reports to the Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5707/8, and (b) that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

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<sup>13</sup> Because paragraph 19 was deleted, this paragraph became paragraph 48 in NSC 5707/8. See footnote 7, *infra*.

<sup>14</sup> *Infra*.

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, for appropriate action.

**S. Everett Gleason**

Yes, the NSC spent a lot of time on details relating to nuclear weapons. We all understand the overwhelming primacy of nuclear weapons over CB weapons. Again, what is interesting is that they did include CB weapons in this policy development, and that the policy for CB weapons use was developed in line with nuclear operations theory.

This document is identified as document 18 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d18>.

## Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 7, 1958

*Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7 April 1958.*

### PRESENT

Secretaries McElroy, Quarles, Brucker, Gates, Douglas, Sprague, Dulles;  
Generals Taylor, Pate, White; Admiral Burke; Mr. Gerard Smith;  
Admiral Strauss; General Cutler; General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said he had brought the group together at the President's request to consider a matter which Secretary Dulles had raised with the President a few days before—pertaining to the strategic concept under which we are now working.

At his request, Mr. Dulles presented the problem. He recalled that in December 1950 he had advanced the doctrine of “massive retaliation”<sup>2</sup> somewhat as an offset to a speech by former President Hoover supporting

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Exchange. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 9. Another memorandum of this conversation by Smith is in Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military Issues 1958–1959.

<sup>2</sup> In an address delivered before the American Association for the United Nations in New York on December 29, 1950, Dulles outlined a strategic doctrine that pointed out the difficulties of area defense and emphasized deterrence through the capacity for counterattack. Dulles had also stressed, however, that “total reliance should not be placed on any single form of warfare or any relatively untried type of weapon.” The term “massive retaliation” was not used in this address. For text, see *The New York Times*, December 30, 1950.

a “fortress America” Doctrine.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Dulles thereafter supported the use of a capacity for massive retaliation as a deterrent, avoiding the necessity for sufficient local strength everywhere to hold back the Soviets. Now he thought new conditions are emerging which do not invalidate the massive retaliation concept, but put limitations on it and require it to be supplemented by other measures.

Since 1950, the Soviets have themselves gained great destructive power. The capacity for massive attack is no longer a deterrent which we alone have. The prospect is now one of mutual suicide if these weapons are used.

After the Sputnik launch, the concern was that a Soviet nuclear missile attack could not be defended against as well as waves of Soviet bombers. Thus the strategic deterrent policy had to be rethought.

As a result, our allies are beginning to show doubt as to whether we would in fact use our H-weapons if we were not ourselves attacked. In fact, we cannot ourselves be sure that we would do so because the situation may be quite unclear during the critical period. As present leaders drop out in major allied countries, new governments seem bound to be even more skeptical.

Accordingly the question must be asked, “Have there been developments in the nuclear field that make possible an area defense based upon tactical weapons?” The idea is one of local defense against local attack, possibly through the use of atomic artillery against key passes, for example into [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. There is the further question whether, if our concept is simply that of general war, we build weapons only for that, thus leaving us unable to take other kinds of action, and making us prisoners of a frozen concept.

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<sup>3</sup> “Our National Policies in This Crisis,” a radio address delivered by Hoover on December 20, 1950. Text is *ibid.*, December 21, 1958.

In summary, he added these comments about the concept of massive retaliatory attack: This was inevitable when conceived in 1950; it is deteriorating as an effective deterrent; it is giving rise to increasing doubts on the part of our allies; it may be subject to alteration through the development of new weapons. While he could not speak as to the military points, it is State's considered opinion that although we can hold our alliance together for another year or so, we cannot expect to do so beyond that time on the basis of our present concept. Accordingly, we should be trying to find an alternative possessing greater credibility.

Mr. McElroy then spoke, indicating that in his opinion the question has been appropriately raised. He said it is one which Defense has been studying. There is some possibility that thermonuclear weapons are coming to be like chemical warfare—neither side will think their use worthwhile. He said he felt that our weapons position, as Secretary Dulles had indicated, is substantially governed by the strategic concept, under which we have concentrated on producing large weapons in recent years. Secretary Dulles commented that he is not proposing that we give up the capacity for massive retaliation. Mr. McElroy said a central question is whether we could conceive of tactical weapons being used without provoking the use of the “big ones.” Many people think this could not be done.

An interesting reference to the question of using unconventional weapons, leading into the discussion of limited nuclear warfare and the use of small-yield devices.

General Twining pointed out that the Chiefs are aware of the problems, and are trying to avoid getting into a rigid position. Initially, and he thought wisely, there was a concentration on the large weapons. But now we are building a great many small ones. He added that we could not stop an attack [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] for example, with small weapons alone.

Secretary McElroy acknowledged that we have not spelled out just how we would use tactical weapons, for example, if the Chinese were to renew

the attack in Korea. The question is whether there is something between conventional and massive nuclear attack. He thought it is worth putting some time against this question, for we may come out with something new.

Admiral Burke commented that we now have the capacity for massive retaliation. We need to develop the capacity for smaller operations. Our need is, not rigidity, but an ability to move effectively into big, intermediate or small operations. Mr. Dulles recalled that Churchill had said that it was our retaliatory power that saved Europe over the postwar years; Mr. Dulles did not think that this would remain true for another decade.

General Taylor said there should be a clear realization as to how limited we are in the field of small weapons. There are major possibilities in this field, however. He referred to the possibility of having tactical atomic weapons of size ranging from ten tons TNT equivalent to 100 tons in 1960 or 1961. Mr. Dulles said he felt there was a proven need for more graduated weapons.

Secretary Quarles then spoke, indicating that he thought the massive retaliation concept is inescapable. We cannot rely on area defense, since the enemy could use the same kind of weapons against us. He thought that the defense has not gained relative to the offense through the development of nuclear weapons. Secretary Dulles commented that perhaps the study will bring out something different from what we are doing now. If it does not, perhaps we should not be making tactical weapons at all. Mr. McElroy said that these observations do not imply that the study should not be made—he thought that it clearly should.

General White pointed out that we are building a great number of small weapons at the present time. Secretary Dulles said there was, however, a lack of tactical doctrine. He felt it was extremely important to have such a doctrine, because the decision to “press the button” for all-out war is an awesome thing, and the possibility that such a decision would not be taken must be recognized.

Secretary Gates said there is also a question to be considered: if the deterrent fails to deter, then what should our retaliatory force be designed to do. General Twining said we must keep ourselves flexible in this regard. Logically, great industrial and communications centers are probably the correct targets; however, military men have to plan with the realization that they might be prohibited from attacking such targets. If they are held to attack military targets only, they must have much greater numbers of weapons and vehicles.

In the concluding remarks, Mr. Dulles said that the matter involves considerations of such high policy that he saw little point in having the problem studied by staff level people. Mr. Quarles commented that there is much in the background of our thinking in this matter that bears on the points raised in the discussion. Mr. Dulles said that background is not enough; we must have something we can present to our allies.

**A. J. Goodpaster<sup>4</sup>**  
***Brigadier General, USA***

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

This document is identified as document 24 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d24>.

## **National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1958

NSC 5810/1

### NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

#### REFERENCES

- A. NSC 5707/8
- B. NIE 100-58
- C. NSC 5810
- D. NSC Action No. 1903

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, at the 364th Council meeting on May 1, 1958, discussed the draft statement of Basic National Security Policy contained in NSC 5810, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon (particularly with reference to paragraphs 13 and 14), as presented orally at the meeting. The Council adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5810, subject to the amendments and provisos set forth in NSC Action No. 1903-b.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5810 Series. Top Secret.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5810 as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5810/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of U.S. Government, with the understanding that final determination on budget requests based thereon will be made by the President after normal budgetary review.

NSC 5810/1 supersedes NSC 5707/8, and is the basic guide in the implementation of all other national security policies, superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict with it. Progress reports to the National Security Council on other policies should include specific reference to policies which have been modified by NSC 5810/1.

Existing basic policy in paragraphs 14 and 15 of NSC 5707/8, without change, has tentatively been included as paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1, pending submission on or before June 16, 1958, by the Department of Defense (perhaps in the form of a limited-distribution supplement) or recommendations for any revision of the military strategy outlined in NSC 5810/1, after further consideration in the light of Council discussion at the 364th Meeting.

Subparagraph 27-d of NSC 5810 has been deleted, and has been referred, together with the alternative proposed by the Secretary of State, to the Council on Foreign Economic Policy for review of existing policy on international commodity agreements and advice on June 2, 1958, to the Council as to the results of such review.

**James S. Lay, Jr.<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **Enclosure**

[Here follows a table of contents.]

### STATEMENT OF BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

#### Preamble

1. The spiritual, moral, and material posture of the United States rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength, and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality, and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Our constant aim at home is to preserve the liberties, expand the individual opportunities and enrich the lives of our people. Our goal abroad must be to strive unceasingly, in concert with other nations, for peace and security and to establish our nation firmly as the pioneer in breaking through to new levels of human achievement and well-being.

<p>One might view this section as a statement of the U.S. grand strategy for the Cold War.</p>
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These principles and fundamental values must continue to inspire and guide our policies and actions at home and abroad. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policy.

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## SECTION B

### ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY

#### I. Military Elements of National Strategy

8. A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war should one be forced upon the United States. This stress on deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of general nuclear war, the danger of local conflicts developing into general war, and the serious effect of further Communist aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not pay.

9. If this purpose is to be achieved, the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail in general war should one develop. In addition, the deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the United States and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force against such aggression.

10. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.

b. The U.S. nuclear stockpile should include, in varying sizes and yields, standard weapons and clean<sup>3</sup> weapons as feasible, to provide flexible and selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.

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<sup>3</sup> Nuclear weapons capable of being exploded with greatly reduced radioactive fallout. [Footnote in the source text.]

11. The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

12. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is made by the President.

13. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

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This document is identified as document 64 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d64>.

## **Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 9, 1959

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting (34) and Agenda Item 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. *Basic National Security Policy* (NSC 5810/1;NIE 11-4-58;NIE 100-59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Overseas Internal Security Program”, dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of Military Mobilization Base Program”, dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy” dated June 19 and July 6<sup>2</sup> and 7,<sup>3</sup> 1959; NSC Action No. 2103)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject. (A copy of Briefing Note, only portions of which were actually used at the Meeting by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum enclosed a July 2 memorandum from Franklyn W. Phillips, Acting Secretary of the NASC, giving NASC views on paragraph 62 of NSC 5906. (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) See the Supplement. Paragraph 62 was discussed at NSC meetings on July 23 and July 30; see Documents 68 and 69.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see the Supplement.

Mr. Gray then directed the Council's attention to Paragraph 13 reading as follows:

"13. [Par. 11 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their [stock piling and]<sup>5</sup> use will be made by the President.

Mr. Gray explained that he understood that the reason the Budget and Treasury wished to have the decision as to the stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons made by the President as well as the decision as to their use, was that these two departments felt that either too much money was being spent on the development of chemical and biological weapons if we did not actually plan to use them in war, or that too little money was being spent on these weapons if we did plan to use them in war. Mr. Gray then called on Director Stans for further elucidation.

Mr. Stans expressed the view that the whole U.S. policy with respect to chemical and biological weapons should be reconsidered. He repeated that we have spent too much money on these weapons if we do not intend to use them and too little money if we do plan to use them. He thought that there should be in the near future a full-scale presentation by the Department of Defense on chemical and biological weapons.

The President observed that what this government had always done with respect to these weapons was first of all to make sure that we had a good defense against their employment by the enemy and, second, that we had sufficient chemical and biological weapons to retaliate if the enemy used them on us. This was the policy, said the President, that he had lived with ever since 1918. However, he added, he would certainly like to see a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject.

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<sup>5</sup> Budget-Treasury proposal

Interestingly, the President states here that the purpose of CB weapons was strategic deterrence, which is contrary to the 1956 policy decision to consider the integrated use of these weapons in general warfare. And yet it appeared that there was a disconnect between the policy and the actual production and storage of CB weapons needed to meet policy objectives.

Dr. Killian asked to be heard on this issue and stated that this was another example where it would be prudent to give more research and development attention to a problem if we could obtain a clear policy directive to do so. There were great possibilities in developing disabling chemical agents which showed great promise of being able temporarily to incapacitate the enemy without actually having lethal effects. For this reason Dr. Killian expressed opposition to the inclusion of the phrase proposed by the Budget and Treasury because inclusion of the phrase would tend to put a damper on further efforts in research and development on chemical and biological agents. Mr. Stans denied that the phraseology he was proposing was designed to put a damper on further research and development on chemical weapons. What he wanted, said Mr. Stans, was no further procurement of chemical and biological weapons until U.S. policy on their use had been clarified. Dr. Killian answered that he had no objection to the inclusion of the phraseology proposed by Budget and Treasury if this was all the words were intended to convey, but he repeated that he did not wish to retard research and development work on these weapons and would object to the inclusion of the phrase if this was its intention.

Secretary McElroy observed that the problem of chemical and biological weapons had been reviewed with him at a high level in the Department of Defense and he would be glad to present the results to the National Security Council if this were desired. On the other hand, he opposed including the phraseology proposed by the Treasury and Budget because it would add one more burden to the many burdens that the President was already carrying. The President in turn commented that he supposed that the decision on stockpiling these weapons would depend largely on the results of research and development in this field.

Mr. Gray suggested that Paragraph 13 be included without the Budget and Treasury proposal at least until such time as the Defense Department made its presentation to the Council on chemical and biological weapons.

...

*The National Security Council:*<sup>6</sup>

...

d. Agreed that paragraph 13 should remain as stated in existing policy (paragraph 11 of NSC 5810/1) pending a presentation to the Council at an early date by the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, on the subject of chemical and biological weapons.<sup>7</sup>

...

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<sup>6</sup> The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2105, approved by the President on July 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

<sup>7</sup> The presentation was made to the Council by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer on February 18, 1960. See Document 92.

This document is identified as document 70 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d70>.

## **National Security Council Report<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 5, 1959

NSC 5906/1

[Here follow a note from Lay to the National Security Council and a table of contents.]

### **BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

#### **Preamble**

1. The spiritual, moral, and material posture of the United State rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength, and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality, and freedom of the human being under God. These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Our constant aim at home is to preserve the liberties, expand the individual opportunities and enrich the lives of our people. Our goal abroad must be to strive unceasingly, in concert with other nations, for peace, security and justice and to establish our nation firmly as the pioneer in breaking through new levels of human achievement and well-being.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series. Top Secret.

These principles and fundamental values must continue to inspire and guide our policies and actions at home and abroad. When they are challenged, our response must be resolute and worthy of our heritage. From this premise must derive our national will and the policies which express it. The continuing full exercise of our individual and collective responsibilities is required to realize the basic objective of our national security policy.

...

## Section B

### Elements of U.S. National Strategy

#### *I. Military Elements of National Strategy*

...

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation's war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. Designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.<sup>2</sup>

b. The U.S. nuclear stockpile should include, in varying sizes and yields, standard weapons, and clean<sup>3</sup> weapons as feasible, to provide flexible and

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<sup>2</sup> Paragraph 12-a of NSC 5906 was approved by the President with the understanding that it is not to be interpreted as a change in policy but rather as a clarification of existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons and the requirement for maintaining balanced forces. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>3</sup> Nuclear weapons capable of being exploded with greatly reduced radioactive debris. [Footnote in the source text.]

selective capabilities for general or limited war, as may be required to achieve national objectives.

13. The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.

14. If time permits and an attack on the United States or U.S. forces is not involved, the United States should consult appropriate allies before any decision to use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is made by the President.

15. In carrying out the central aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain as part of its military forces its effective nuclear retaliatory power, and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet knockout blow, even by surprise. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.

...

This document is from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, filed under Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman file).

## **Briefing Note for the NSC Mtg, Feb. 18, 1960**

February 16, 1960

### Technological Developments in Non-Lethal Weapons and Doctrine for Possible Use

The next item on the Agenda is a presentation by Defense on “Technological Developments in Non-Lethal Weapons and Doctrine for Possible Use,” which has been prepared in collaboration with Dr. Kistiakowsky [in the memo, the clause attributing collaboration to Kistiakowsky was manually crossed out].

As background, it may be of interest to recall to the Council that an old 1950 paper (NSC 62 of February 1, 1950) had provided that

“The United States will undertake gas warfare only in retaliation against its use by an enemy and on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief.” [Emphasis added]

The policy of “only in retaliation” was modified in the revision of Basic Policy in 1956, and at the present still appears in virtually the same form in our current Basic Policy paper (Para. 13 of NSC 5906/1) in the following language:

“The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their use will be made by the President.”

I will remind the Council that when that paragraph was discussed last summer (July 9, 1959) during our review of Basic Policy, the Director of the Budget expressed concern that we were spending too much money on

these weapons if we do not intend to use them, and too little money if we do plan to use them. The Council agreed at the time that the paragraph should remain as stated, pending a presentation to the Council by Defense (in collaboration with the Special Assistant for Science and Technology) on the subject of chemical and biological weapons (NSC Action No. 2105-d).

We shall now hear the presentation.

This document is identified as document 92 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v03/d92>.

### **Editorial Note**

At the 435th meeting of the National Security Council on February 18, 1960, the Council took up as the first item a briefing by General [Lyman] Lemnitzer and Dr. [Herbert] York on technological developments in non-lethal weapons and military doctrine for their possible use. Dr. York described several such weapons, including tear gas and agents causing temporary paralysis, discoordination, Q-fever, and encephalitis. General Lemnitzer outlined several possible scenarios for their use in hypothetical wartime situations. Dr. York noted that the U.S. stockpile of chemical and biological agents was one-fourth that of the Soviet Union, and that most of the Soviet agents were lethal. Dr. [George] Kistiakowsky stated that the Science Advisory Committee (SAC) about a year previously “had concluded that research and development in this field should be continued since the prospects were definitely bright.”

At the conclusion of the discussion, President Eisenhower said “one great difficulty occurred to him in connection with the use of incapacitating agents. While the use of such agents was a splendid idea, if we tried to use them in a humane manner, our enemy would probably charge us with germ warfare and then would proceed in retaliation to use lethal chemical and biological weapons.” The President further pointed out a lack of U.S. defensive equipment for such warfare. “The President said chemical and biological weapons had considerably less discrimination than a bullet.” Dr. Kistiakowsky, supported by Allen Dulles, urged that a sharp distinction be made between chemical warfare, such as tear gas, which had been accepted throughout the world in police actions, and biological warfare, which had not. General [Nathan] Twining agreed with the President concerning retaliation, and stated that if the United States intended to use incapacitating agents it should publicize their non-lethal

effects to the greatest possible extent. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) See the Supplement.

There is no record of the Lemnitzer brief. Obviously this discussion took place long before US forces starting using riot control agents in Vietnam. But, this argument that the use of RCAs might escalate to the use of lethal CB weapons would come up again in the 1960s. However, it's a poor argument to limit one's tools because of a theoretical concern about other nations' perceptions and perceived ignorance over the significant differences between lethal and non-lethal CB weapons.

This document is from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, filed under Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman file).

February 18, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 435<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 18, 1960

Present at the 435th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding (for Item 1); Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State, presiding (for Items 2, 3 and 4); Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense; and Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the Council meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Fred Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury, Maurice A. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget; and John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1); Also attending the meeting were General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; General Thomas S. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency; Maj. General Wilton B. Persons, The Assistant to the President; Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Karl G. Harr, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination; George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary; Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; from the Department of Defense – Dr Herbert F. York, John N. Irwin, II, Samuel Clements, and Lt. Col. Edward V. Needels; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE FOR POSSIBLE USE  
(NSC Action No. 2105-d; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 13)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background, recalling the 1950 policy that the US will undertake gas warfare only in retaliation against its use by an enemy and the present policy, dating biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces, the decision as to the use of such weapons being made by the President. Mr. Gray also referred to the view of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, expressed during the review of Basic Policy in July 1959, that we were spending too much money on chemical and biological weapons if we did not intend to use them and too little money if we did intend to use them. Mr. Gray noted that NSC Action 2105 adopted at that time called for the presentation which was about to be made by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer.

Dr. York stated that one of the important fields of chemical and biological warfare was controlled temporary incapacitation. Research and development in this field might open up a new dimension of warfare in which incapacitating agents would be used in situations short of all-out war and in situations where the use of nuclear weapons was not possible or feasible. In the term controlled temporary incapacitation, the word "controlled" meant that the time of onset, the duration and the severity of incapacitation could be regulated; the word "temporary" meant that persons subjected to incapacitating agents would eventually completely recover from the direct effects, although minor indirect effects might persist permanently; the word "incapacitation" referred to a variety of effects including extreme irritation, black-out, lethargy, paralysis, discoordinated actions, temporary illness and lack of a will to fight. Dr. York then displayed a chart on chemical incapacitating agents indicating that tear gas (CN-CS) was available now, an anesthetic agent (SN) which caused temporary paralysis would be available soon and a discoordinating agent (K), which would make a cat afraid of a mouse, would be available in the future. A chart of biological incapacitating agents was displayed

indicating that an agent causing Q-fever (OU) was available now and NU (VEE) agent would be available soon. A Rift Valley fever agent (FA) and tailored variants of the other agents would be available in the future. Dr. York then reported with the aid of a chart that chemical incapacitation agents had about the same efficiency in the field as tactical nuclear weapons in as much as a 10,000 pound missile, 5 per cent of which was chemical agent, could cover one square mile. It was hoped that by 1965 a 10,000 pound missile could cover 10 square miles. Dr. York displayed charts on technical advances and potentials of biological warfare agents indicating that agent concentration and agent storage (now one year; soon to become 3 years) would soon be improved. Charts also showed that the biological decay rate was several per cent per minute and the efficiency of dissemination of biological agents depended on the fraction of the munitions which consisted of the agent.

Agent SN was Sernyl, a trademark name for phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP. Sernyl was used as an anesthetic in the 1950s, removed from practice in 1965 due to adverse side effects. Agent K was lysergic acid diethylamide, or LSD. Neither one was stockpiled as a military munition.

To be clear on the comparison with a tactical nuke, what the good doctor meant was that the use of 500 pounds of chemicals dumped into one square mile—a considerable amount—would be equal in incapacitating value to a small (less than 10 kiloton?) nuclear weapon in that same area (e.g., a DAVY CROCKETT). The whole selling point of CB weapons was to demonstrate a similar mass casualty capability that didn't start escalation toward a nuclear exchange. And at the tactical level, this statement was fairly accurate, at least regarding large quantities of CB agent dispersed over a small area of unprotected persons.

Turning to weapons systems Dr. York indicated that biological and chemical agents might be disseminated by means of manned aircraft sprays, drone aircraft sprays, toxic darts, grenades, tactical rockets, special operations, ballistic missiles, or bomblets prepared for use with aircraft, rockets or ballistic missiles.

The US has a relatively poor posture vis-a-vis the USSR, Dr. York continued, our stockpile of chemical and biological agents being one-fourth that of the USSR. Moreover, most of the Soviet agents are lethal. In addition we have trained in chemical and biological warfare only 1/30 of the troops that the USSR has trained and we do less in defense against such agents than the Soviet Union does. In the latter connection Dr. York said that the need for research on defense against chemical and biological agents had been strongly indicated by a recent experiment in which an aircraft flew along a flight line of 230 miles releasing simulated agents. After three days the simulated agents covered 30,000 square miles. If the airplane had released powerful chemical or biological agents instead of the simulant, the area would have sustained casualties of 30 per cent. Dr. York then called on General Lemnitzer to continue the presentation.

General Lemnitzer said that Dr. York had described the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons; he would deal with the doctrinal aspects of these weapons. Chemical and biological agents had been very effectively developed since World War II but the doctrine for their use had not changed very much. General Lemnitzer thought that such agents had a number of advantages. They have important search capabilities for use against dispersed or concealed targets; they are flexible, since they can cause either casualties or incapacitation and the length of the latter can be controlled; coverage of a large area is possible; heavy casualties can be inflicted without physical destruction or property damage. Accordingly, chemical and biological agents might have a great potential in future warfare, especially where friendly civilians may be present in an area occupied by enemy forces. General Lemnitzer said he would give three examples of the possible use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents. The first example concerned trouble in [deleted]. He asked the Council to assume that important areas in [deleted] had been seized by Communist forces. The task of friendly forces was to retake key areas, capture or disarm the Communist forces and prevent their re-entry into the country. This assumed situation provided opportunity for the use of NU, which caused a form of encephalitis. A lethal agent could not be used under these conditions because friendly civilians and enemy forces were present in the same area.

General Lemnitzer then displayed a map of [deleted] showing areas assumed to be held by Communist forces and areas on which bomblets of NU would be dropped or which would be subjected to spray from aircraft. He estimated that two medium bomber loads would incapacitate all the people in the area shown on the map. An [deleted] could be covered by the use of more planes. After the biological agent had had a chance to take effect (three days), parachutists would be flown in to take over the area.

Turning to Example No. 2, General Lemnitzer asked the Council to assume that the Communists had organized a movement in [deleted] designed to take over [deleted]. Stimulated by Communist agitation, mobs had marched on [deleted]. It had been decided to disperse the crowd by ordering helicopters to spread tear gas. All persons subjected to the tear gas would eventually recover after breathing fresh air for a sufficient length of time, but immediately on being subjected to tear gas they would be impelled to seek fresh air in the shortest time possible. One helicopter could cover a circle of a thousand yards in diameter in this manner. The apparatus necessary for this use of chemical agents was under development and would soon be available. This procedure would enable friendly forces to [deleted] without bloodshed.

Example No. 3 concerned [deleted]. It was assumed that strong insurgent guerrilla forces had seized [deleted] in the area and had rounded up as hostages several thousand US and UK civilians. Friendly forces were required to regain control of the area before [deleted] and to recapture the hostages before they were executed. A chemical agent sprayed from an aircraft could within five minutes prostrate all personnel in the area for twelve hours, during which time friendly forces could move in and regain control. 2600 pounds of the agent would cover a square mile and there would be no physical damage.

General Lemnitzer said his examples had been confined to incapacitating agents but lethal agents could be used in the same way. The examples had also been examples of catching the enemy by surprise. He had illustrated only an offensive use of chemical and biological agents; however, before using such agents offensively it was necessary to develop a strong capability to defend against them.

Dr. York, concluding the presentation, said that he had been impressed by the development of possibilities in the field of controlled temporary incapacitation over the last several years. He thought it was possible the researchers were on the trail of something revolutionary. The use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents extended from mild control up to effects comparable to those of tactical atomic weapons. The Defense Department proposed to expand the budget for chemical and biological warfare, which was now \$50 million a year, by a factor of three by 1965.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the Science Advisory Committee about a year ago had looked into the question of chemical and biological warfare and had concluded that research and development in this field should be continued since the prospects were definitely bright. He reported that he had independently made his own study of incapacitating agents and had come to the same conclusion. The Science Advisory Committee had recommended that research and development in the field be strengthened. The President said he concurred.

Mr. Stans noted that a year ago he had been told that the US had a \$300 million inventory in chemical and biological agents. He wondered whether this inventory was being reevaluated in the light of recent developments. General Lemnitzer thought the inventory referred to by Mr. Stans was an inventory carried over from World War II. There had been little production of chemical and biological agents since World War II. Mr. Stans asked whether he was correct in understanding that there would be no substantial stockpiling of chemical and biological agents during the research and development period. General Lemnitzer confirmed Mr. Stans' understanding. The President said that since chemical and biological agents could be manufactured at a reasonably rapid rate, capacity for manufacturing rather than a stockpile would be needed. Secretary Gates, referring to public and world opinion on the use of chemical and biological weapons, wondered whether such use should not be put in the same category as the use of atomic weapons; that is, use should be made subject to decision by the President. Mr. Gray read Paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 indicating that under present policy Presidential decision is required for the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The President said one great difficulty occurred to him in connection with the use of incapacitating agents. While the use of such agents was a splendid idea, if we tried to use them in a humane manner, our enemy would probably charge us with germ warfare and then would proceed in retaliation to use lethal chemical and biological weapons. He understood that some of these lethal weapons, particularly nerve gas, were quite terrible. Before we used chemical and biological weapons, we would need to have proper defensive equipment. He understood that at the present time US gas masks would not protect against all types of lethal agents. Dr. York said present masks protected against all agents except those absorbed by the skin. He added that we had no protection against bullets and therefore would be in no worse position in chemical warfare than we were now in other forms of warfare. The President said chemical and biological weapons had considerably less discrimination than a bullet. Dr. York felt that at the very least chemical and biological weapons were no worse than atomic weapons.

Dr. Kistiakowsy said that a sharp distinction should be made between chemical warfare and biological warfare. Chemical warfare, e.g., the use of tear gas, had been accepted throughout the world in police actions, but biological warfare had not been so accepted. Mr. Dulles strongly agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsy saying that we ought to assimilate our use of incapacitating agents to the use of tear gas. He felt we needed some incapacitating agent which we could use respectably.

General Twining agreed with the President that if we began the use of chemical or biological agents, our enemy would retaliate with lethal agents. If we intend to use incapacitating agents we should publicize their non-lethal effects to the greatest possible extent.

At this point the President left the meeting and the remainder of the meeting was presided over by Secretary Herter.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Department of Defense, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2105-d., as presented by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

## CHAPTER 3

### **Kennedy Administration (1961-1963)**

The Kennedy administration continued the growth of the U.S. CB weapons program that was initiated in the Eisenhower administration. Along with a desire to increase nonproliferation activities was a ramp-up in the number and types of unconventional weapons. Between 1961 and 1968, there was a significant increase in research and development efforts, resulting in new CB weapons that the military tested and developed to be used on the battlefield at the tactical and operational levels. The U.S. Army was introducing the M55 nerve agent-filled rocket and chemical warheads for the Little John, Honest John, and Sergeant tactical missiles into its arsenal, just as the Air Force was developing new spray tanks and aerial bombs for its planes. Nerve agent-filled weapons were deployed to Okinawa and Germany. This mirrored similar modernization efforts by the Soviet Union, as that country developed chemical warheads for Scud and FROG missiles, as well as chemical-filled artillery shells, aerial bombs, and rockets. At the same time, there were clear indications of the desire by senior policymakers to regulate the potential use of CB weapons through continued arms control talks.

The Cuban Missile Crisis remains the keynote issue of the Kennedy administration as far as unconventional weapons, but there was ample discussion on CB weapons as well. The Kennedy administration approved the large scale use of toxic herbicides in Vietnam to attack North Vietnamese crops (in response to a formal request by the South Vietnamese government), and later to destroy vegetation around military bases and along rivers to reduce the chance of ambushes. Project 112, a series of tests using CB weapons and simulants, was initiated in 1963 to better understand the dispersion of aerosols in the open air. The shipborne trials were known as “Shipboard Hazard and Defense” or SHAD. Kennedy’s administration would not have to deal with the use of riot control agents in Vietnam, but the policy for their use during combat was

discussed. The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of foreign policy discussions during the Kennedy administration.

### **The Presidency of John F. Kennedy<sup>1</sup>**

President John F. Kennedy assumed office on January 20, 1961, following an eight-year career in the Senate. The first Catholic president, Kennedy was also the second youngest to ever serve in the office. In his inaugural address, Kennedy proclaimed “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Kennedy came into the presidency determined to reenergize the foreign policy establishment. To that end, he assembled a team of young White House and National Security Council advisers—the so-called “best and the brightest”—which included McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, Ted Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Kennedy selected Dean Rusk, a taciturn Southerner and president of the Rockefeller Foundation, as his Secretary of State. Respected within foreign policy circles, Rusk had served in several positions at the Department of State, including Deputy Under Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Rusk believed that the Secretary of State served at the pleasure of the President and thus did not seek control of foreign policy. Kennedy selected Robert S. McNamara, the president of Ford Motor Company, as his Secretary of Defense. Harvard dean McGeorge Bundy served as his National Security Advisor. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen W. Dulles, continued in that position, which he had held since 1953.

The Kennedy administration inherited the containment doctrine of the 1940s and 1950s, and maintained the belief that Communism was a threat to the United States. However, the brinkmanship of the Eisenhower era seemed archaic to the Kennedy idealists in their new international vision. Kennedy implemented the “flexible response” defense strategy, one that

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<sup>1</sup> Original text from Office of the Historian, U.S. State Department, “1961-1968: The Presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,” <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968>.

relied on multiple options for responding to the Soviet Union, discouraged massive retaliation, and encouraged mutual deterrence.

In April 1961, a few short months into his administration, Kennedy authorized a clandestine invasion of Cuba by a brigade of Cuban exiles. The CIA covert operation had been formulated and approved under President Eisenhower. Relying on faulty intelligence, the operation collapsed in two days with the defeat and capture of anti-Castro forces at the Bay of Pigs. The spectacular failure of this Cold War confrontation was a setback for Kennedy, and one he became determined to overcome. Though he took full responsibility for the failed operation, the CIA's reputation was tarnished and Kennedy soon replaced DCI Allen W. Dulles with John A. McCone. Similarly, the Bay of Pigs fiasco affected Kennedy's level of respect for the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, placing a strain on the civil-military relationship that would remain under stress throughout the administration. McNamara's management reforms in the Pentagon, the administration's focus on counterinsurgency warfare, and finally the policy toward the war in Vietnam all found the uniformed military leadership in disagreement with the administration.

Tensions with the Soviet Union dominated U.S. foreign policy. Kennedy first met formally with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in June 1961 at the Vienna Summit to discuss Berlin, Laos, and disarmament. Ailing and unprepared, Kennedy came across as an inexperienced adversary to his Russian counterpart. The two continued a series of formal and public exchanges as well as more informal and very confidential exchanges—the “pen pal” correspondence. This channel was intended to give the two men a chance to informally exchange ideas under the heightened pressure of the Cold War. Still, the construction of the Berlin Wall in late 1961 and the military standoff between U.S. and Soviet troops there kept both nations on high alert.

The Cold War reached a frightening apex in late 1962 when the Soviet Union gave the Cuban Government medium-range ballistic missiles to defend against another U.S. invasion. American intelligence photographed Cuban missile sites, leading to a naval blockade and quarantine of Cuba. The tense thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis tested the mettle of the Kennedy administration and his team of trusted advisers. Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles, averting nuclear war, but resolving little between the two nations.

Kennedy avoided war in Laos, rejecting a military proposal to send American troops to fend off a communist insurgency there. However, he authorized sending troops and military advisers to the U.S.-backed nation of South Vietnam and steadily increased their numbers throughout his presidency. The administration was determined not to lose either the nation of South Vietnam or the broader region of Southeast Asia to communism, cementing its military commitment to Vietnam.

This document is identified as document 130 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VII, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d130>.

**Memorandum from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 21, 1962

SUBJECT

Resumption of Atmospheric Tests

Without more information than I have it is not possible to hazard an opinion as to whether atmospheric testing should be resumed. From what I have heard I assume a decision has been reached, however, to resume tests for legitimate reasons of military security, and not for political and psychological considerations.

The political price of test resumption will be paid most directly in the United Nations and in terms of public opinion around the world. The immediate problem, therefore, is to cushion the shock and moderate the adverse political effects of such testing. There are the following possibilities:

(1) Assuming that it is not realistically possible to delay the announcement on March 1 that the United States will resume atmospheric testing, every effort should be made to channel the controversy out of the United Nations and into the Geneva 18-nation Conference. We should press there for immediate consideration of a test ban treaty together with an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as specified in the present U.S. disarmament program, but without prejudice to more general disarmament discussions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Weapons Tests 2/17/62-4/4/62. Confidential.

(2) A new test ban agreement, to be most negotiable, should not involve elaborate international controls or inspection arrangements. One possibility would be a comprehensive ban on all testing, with a limited number of inspection challenges by each side to investigate whenever national detection systems indicate that there is clandestine testing. The agreement would be temporary—perhaps of two years duration—so as to allow time to work out a definitive treaty with broader controls, in the context of other disarmament measures. To deal with the problem of clandestine test preparations, we could propose continuous observation of known testing sites and maintain our own standby preparations for resumption of tests. This is not the only type of treaty we might propose, but it has the virtue of relative simplicity. The important point is to keep pressing for a test ban agreement even as we test.

(3) Other initial steps which we could suggest at the outset of the Geneva meeting to improve our posture include:

(a) a proposal to set aside specified quantities of delivery vehicles (bombers and missiles) for eventual destruction;

(b) immediate cut-off of fissionable materials production, with sequestration of specified quantities of weapons material for ultimate peaceful use;

(c) various measures to reduce the risks of war by surprise attack or miscalculation through systems of fixed or mobile observation groups, aerial observation, and reciprocal inspection in specified zones. (We should prepare the best possible mix of regional security arrangements: area to be covered; limitations to be placed on weapons, manpower and movement; facilities for observation and inspection);

(d) an agreement prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction;

(e) an updating of the 1925 Convention to prohibit the use of chemical, biological and radiological warfare;<sup>2</sup>

Now we see more use of the term “weapons of mass destruction” as the State Dept and ACDA increasingly talk about arms control and general disarmament goals with the Soviet Union. At the same time, there is a clear distinction between nuclear and “other” unconventional weapons, because of the desire to use specific treaty vehicles for particular policy objectives.

(f) a non-aggression agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, perhaps linked with limitations on certain types of forces near East-West demarcation lines;

(g) immediate drafting of the Charter of an International Disarmament Organization and of arrangements for a United Nations Peace Force.

(4) I recognize that each of the foregoing measures could involve some disadvantages for the United States, but we must realize that without any of them our disarmament posture is thin and featureless. We should be prepared to offer some specific proposals to offset the Soviet propaganda onslaught calling for immediate and radical disarmament measures without adequate controls.

(5) I assume that the rationale for the decision to resume testing will be set forth fully and persuasively in a statement by the President which will be circulated to all UN Delegations in New York.

(6) I conclude with the suggestion that if testing must be resumed and an announcement is to be made promptly, we should attempt to:

(a) channel the discussion into the 18-nation Conference in Geneva;

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and entered into force on February 8, 1928 (for the United States on April 10, 1975), see 26 US Treaty 571.

- (b) urgently propose a new test ban treaty;
- (c) propose at the outset an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- (d) propose two or three other initial arms control steps of the type suggested above.

Unless we are prepared to come forth with a group of such initial measures, and unless the President indicates in his announcement that he intends to make such proposals, we shall be exposed to widespread protests and growing demands for unrealistic and unacceptable disarmament measures.

Let us *lead* not *follow*. The essential point is that test resumption makes it all the more necessary to press for a test ban and other immediate disarmament measures. Let us not insist on unattainable perfection in inspection and control and thereby jeopardize the whole disarmament enterprise.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> This last paragraph is handwritten.

This document is identified as document 139 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VII, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d139>.

**Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carl Kaysen) to President Kennedy<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 27, 1962

SUBJECT

Issues on Disarmament

1. At the Geneva meeting, which begins in two weeks, we are committed to try to make progress on all three levels of disarmament: a plan for general and complete disarmament; first steps in putting this plan into effect; and concrete measures not necessarily connected with the GCD plan. You have made these commitments in your recent exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev.

The Conference will present a challenge to us at three levels: making some real progress in getting disarmament agreement in the not too likely event that the Soviets are interested in so doing; conducting the discussion in such a way as to educate the participants to the realities and complexities of the problems of disarmament, whether or not we achieve useful agreements at this time; and seeking a victory in what will undoubtedly be a propaganda contest with the Soviet Union.

2. There is as yet little agreement within the government on many of the problems involved either in choosing a plan for GCD to present to the Conference, or in deciding what concrete independent measures we should offer. Accordingly, there will be many issues which you must decide in the next week or ten days. They fall into two classes: those related to plans

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Eighteen Nation 1/62-2/62. Secret.

for GCD and first steps thereunder, and those related to concrete measures of disarmament not necessarily part of GCD.

3. At present we have a broad U.S. statement of principles on GCD (25 September Statement of Principles to the UNGA) and three attempts of varying degrees of completeness to embody these principles in plans. These are the ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; the White House Staff revision of ACDA Draft Plan No. 1; and the proposals of the ACDA Memorandum of February 24.<sup>2</sup> None of these has been finally selected by ACDA or cleared within the government. The major features of the three principal plans are sketched below:

4. ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD in a series of stages that deal first with the strategic delivery vehicles of the NATO-Warsaw Pact countries and would subsequently be broadened to cover all armaments in all countries. Specifically, the first stage of the plan would reduce strategic delivery vehicles of all types of the NATO and Warsaw Pact states to parity at 1,000 vehicles for each side. Within this limit, continued production would be permitted. In the second stage, Communist China and other allies of the NATO-Warsaw Pact states would be included, and all arms would be reduced to a parity at defined levels, with a parity of 500 for strategic vehicles. Subsequent stages would apply to all countries and all arms. Inspectors would be stationed at declared production facilities, and all destruction would be verified. Inspection against undeclared activities would be based on progressive opening of zones which would result in the progressive opening up of all countries as disarmament progressed. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the third stage.

The White House Staff revision of ACDA Plan No. 1 proposes to achieve GCD through stages that deal from the outset with all major armaments. Initially it would apply to the NATO and Warsaw Pact States, and would subsequently be broadened to include all countries. Specifically, the first

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<sup>2</sup> ACDA Plan No. 1 is the same as the ninth revision of the Foster Plan; see footnote 6, Document 72. The White House revision, dated January 30, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7/61-6/62. Regarding the February 24 ACDA paper, see footnote 2, Document 135.

stage proposes to reduce all major armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Pact States by 30% for each individual type of weapon. From the outset there would be a complete production cutoff. In the second stage, the armaments of all countries, including Communist China, would be reduced to 40% of initially declared levels. Subsequent stages would reduce armaments by stages to final agreed levels. Inspectors would be located at declared facilities and destruction would be verified. To inspect against undeclared facilities complete access would be obtained progressively to zones so that access would be obtained progressively in direct proportion to the amount of disarmament achieved. This plan envisages establishment of an international control organization and police force during the second stage.

The ACDA memorandum of February 24 does not contain a complete plan. The alternatives it examines deal only with the first stage of a GCD plan. The apparently preferred alternative calls for a 30 percent reduction of strategic delivery capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. The paper discusses, without recommendation, whether the 30 percent reduction should be measured in terms of individual types of equipment, categories of equipment, or delivery capacity measured in megatons. The paper also discusses, without recommendation, whether or not a production cutoff should be included in the first stage. Later stages are not discussed in detail in this proposal, although presumably the agreement would be broadened to cover all armaments and all countries in a second or subsequent stage. Inspection methods are not discussed, even in broad, conceptual terms.

5. In choosing among plans there are five major issues to be considered:

a. *Specificity of the plan.* Do we discuss only the first stage, plus a general discussion of goals? Do we discuss the first and second stages, with a more detailed discussion of goals and some discussion of transition procedures from stage to stage? How much attention is given in the plan to the development of international peace-keeping machinery and its relation to the stages? The February 24 ACDA memorandum really discusses only the first stage. The two earlier documents are complete plans which go through all stages with more or less equal detail. Perhaps a middle position

would be more satisfactory; namely, a fairly detailed discussion of the first two stages, plus some indications of how the processes might run further and the character of the ultimate goals.

b. *Linkage*. What should the relation be between reductions in strategic striking forces and reductions in conventional forces, and, in particular, reductions in personnel strength? Neither the first ACDA plan nor the latest memorandum provides for linkage at the outset. The revised ACDA plan does. The arguments involved are complex. On the one hand the present balance of forces is in our favor in nuclear striking power; in the Soviets' favor in conventional forces. This argues for parallel reduction in both. On the other side is the argument presented in ACDA's memorandum that we should not reduce conventional strength until we get the Chinese Communists into the agreement, and that this must be left for the second or even a later stage. This argument applies with particular force to personnel strength, but it also reaches naval and tactical air strength. Linkage avoids the difficult problem of defining "strategic" and "tactical" weapons.

c. *Production cutoffs*. Do we forbid new production, as well as reduce existing stocks? In essence, this is a problem of whether we limit numbers but continue to have an armaments race in the various quality dimensions of armament, or try to eliminate the race altogether. A related question is whether we define reduction in terms of individual types of weapons, or broader or narrower categories such as strategic delivery vehicles, or missiles with ranges of 6,000 km or more. A combination of reductions defined in terms of types and a production cutoff result in limiting competition in all dimensions of weaponry. Reductions defined in terms of categories, delimited in various ways, without production cutoffs, represent an attempt to allow quality competition to go on within limits.

d. *Inspection and its relation to staging*. A major part of the negotiability of any proposal will depend on the inspection procedures contemplated. An important general question is whether or not we wish to decide on an inspection plan now or leave the whole matter open for the conference. Both of the earlier ACDA plans rest on the notion of zonal inspection in which each side selects for inspection one of a number of previously

agreed zones in the territory of the others. The memorandum of February 24 proposes no specific inspection procedure. Zonal inspection appears to be the most promising attempt yet made to meet the Soviet opposition to inspection without disarmament. It is clearly easier to operate this form of inspection if all armaments are included from the first stage. Otherwise the question of what facilities within a zone should or should not be open for inspection arises, and again the question of inspection without disarmament appears.

*e. Proportionality vs. parity.* There is the question of whether reductions should be by equal proportions or should have a goal of parity. This issue is really one of staging. The ultimate goal might be parity or some other agreed set of force levels, but movement toward it could be by equal proportional reductions in early stages, adjusting in later stages to achieve the agreed goal.

6. The proposed concrete measures of disarmament which are effective independently of a plan for general and complete disarmament fall into three classes: those concerned with nuclear weapons, more general measures which purport to reduce the danger of surprise attack and proposals for establishing expert study groups. The important measures of the first class are a cutoff of the production of fissionable material for military use combined with a transfer from stockpiles to peaceful uses and a nuclear test ban. The combination of the first two of these measures would provide a substantial measure of arms control. The problems inherent in them are well known. In respect to the nuclear test ban, the most important question is what controls additional to those proposed in the Geneva treaty would be needed to deal with the danger of secret preparation for testing in violation of the treaty. In connection with the production cutoff and transfer from military stockpiles to peaceful uses, the problem arises as to whether the offer of 40,000 kg per year, suggested in the ACDA memorandum of February 24, is not too one-sided even as an initial position. The relative size of our stockpiles and production facilities suggest that a 2-for-1 offer on our part might be both more attractive and a better propaganda point.

The proposals for advance notification of major military movements, the establishment of observation posts at transfer station centers, and the exchange of military missions between NATO and Warsaw Pact raise little question except as to their effectiveness. The same cannot be said about a proposal to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. The distinctions between transfer and the present procedures under which we operate both our NATO stockpile and the bilateral arrangements with certain of our allies is so subtle that it is difficult to see how we could succeed in explaining it in the Geneva forum in the face of the obvious target it would present for Soviet polemics. It may be better to treat this as the ACDA memorandum proposes treating the problem of an experts committee on biological and chemical warfare, something we respond to but take no initiative on.

**CK**

This document is identified as document 152 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VII, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d152>.

**Telegram from the Department of State to Secretary of State (Dean) Rusk, in Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 13, 1962, 8:06 p.m.

Tosec 26. For Sec and Foster. At White House suggestion this telegram is to set forth armament decisions of March 9, 1962 as supplemented by further discussion. It has been approved by the President.

1. The United States will propose an across-the-board cut of 30 per cent in both strategic and conventional weapons in increments of 10 per cent a year over a three-year period. In presenting this position there should be no indication, without further specific authorization by the President, that the reduction of strategic delivery vehicles can be separated from other disarmament measures for the purpose of being negotiated as a separate measure.

2. With respect to strategic weapons this cut is to be both in numbers and in total destructive capability, of which total full loaded weight is a possible yardstick. Since the distinction between intercontinental and less than intercontinental is still under study, some more general formulation should be used such as that strategic weapons will be divided into categories which reflect the realities of the military situation.

3. Production of strategic delivery vehicles and other armaments would be limited in Stage I to some percentage of the number of vehicles and armaments in the inventories of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the beginning

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1362. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and initialed by Fisher (ACDA) and cleared by Kaysen (White House), Nitze (Defense) (by Fisher), and Navez (S/S).

date of Stage I. Begin FYI. In preparation is a paper on the limitation on production using 5, 10, 15 and 20 as possible percentages for permitting production of new vehicles. End FYI. The percentage should be in addition to production needed for replacement, training and peaceful purposes. With respect to all of the above, Delegation is authorized to propose that all production of new and improved armaments and testing of new and improved armaments would be halted in Stage II.

4. On armaments other than strategic delivery vehicles reductions will be according to categories specified in the March 3 memorandum to the President.<sup>2</sup> Reductions within certain of these categories will be by numbers and by total weight and any description of the proposal should leave room for either or both of these methods of reduction being applicable as later decided to be appropriate.

5. Because inspection for the stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons of chemical and biological warfare are now considered so difficult these weapons are not included in the proposed reductions of 30 per cent. To deal with these two groups of weapons the U.S. will propose at an appropriate time that two international experts commissions be established along the lines indicated in the March 3 memorandum to the President.

6. The United States should continue to press the proposal of 2.1 million force levels. The United States would be prepared to proceed at least through the first stage in the absence of the Chinese Communists although the possibility of a defeasance procedure (comparable to that in the test ban) should be examined.

7. Inspection is the subject of a separate detailed telegram, Todis 44.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 146.

<sup>3</sup> Todis 44 to Geneva, March 13, transmitted a suggested text for Secretary Rusk's statement on verification to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/3-1262) Rusk's statement to the committee on March 15, however, touched on the verification issue only in general terms. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 142-149.

8. The United States will propose that, contingent on agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material for use in weapons, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each transfer 50,000 kg of U-235 to peaceful purposes. FYI. Study is being given to whether we should propose a proportional transfer of U.S. 60,000 kgs to U.S.S.R. 40,000 kgs of U-235 and what would be the effects of transfers of various sizes and in various other proportions. End FYI.

9. The United States will propose that the reduction of armaments proposed for Stage I be applied in the same general ratio for Stages II and III.

**Ball**

This document is identified as document 93 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VIII, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d93>.

## **Draft Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 22, 1962

### BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

[Here follow a table of contents and Part One, “Principles and Purposes.”]

#### PART TWO: A STRATEGY

##### I. Military Policy

###### *A. The Role of U.S. Force*

1. *Force and policy.* The positive and constructive objectives of national policy depend intimately and in a variety of ways on the existence of appropriate U.S. forces and the evident will to use them to protect vital interests of the free community. Now and for the foreseeable future U.S. military policy is a crucial determinant of the fate of the free community because our military strength is proportionately great in relation to our population and command over resources, and because the security of our allies is intimately dependent on our strength and will to exercise it. There is hardly a diplomatic relationship we conduct that is not colored by an assessment of U.S. military power and of the circumstances in which we are likely to bring it into play. In generating this power the motivation of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 6/22/62. Secret. For information on previous drafts, see Documents 70, 83, and 90. The underlined text represents the portions that were intended to be included in short version of the paper, which was circulated on August 2. (Attachment to memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McNamara, October 15; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 (Relo) BNSP 31 Mar 62)

men in the expert employment of weapons of war continues as a responsibility of the population at large. It is brought to and maintained at a fine edge of effectiveness by the nation's military services, which provide a basic source of leadership for present and future generations of military men.

2. *Major Missions.* To sustain the free community, U.S. forces have four major missions:

a. *To deter or deal with a direct nuclear assault against the U.S. or other vital areas.*

b. *To supplement allied and friendly forces in deterring or countering Communist non-nuclear attacks on the free community or in sea areas or on lines of communication vital to its survival.*

c. *To support friendly peoples against Communist and Communist-inspired efforts to undermine their governments and fragment their societies through subversive, paramilitary and guerrilla operations.*

d. *In the event of war to conduct hostilities so as to minimize damage to the U.S. and its allies, preserve their interests, frustrate opposing military forces, and bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the U.S. and its allies. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare, whether it be non-nuclear or nuclear, local or global; in this sense, it is a goal of U.S. policy that any war be a limited war.*

*For all these missions it should be recognized that effective deterrence has as its basis the evident military capability to prevent a potential enemy from achieving greater gain than loss by using force. While many other factors contribute to deterrence, this requirement for such a capability is constant and must be satisfied.*

...

I include this discussion on strategic nuclear forces to demonstrate the contrast between nuclear and CB weapons, which are discussed below. Although many people disagree with the inclusion of nuclear weapons with CB weapons under the title “WMD,” we can see that, starting in the 1960s, there was at least a clear understanding that nuclear weapons were the primary focus at the strategic level.

#### D. Strategic Forces

9. Scale and Character of Strategic Nuclear Forces. *Attainment of a stable military environment requires strategic nuclear forces sufficiently effective so that Sino-Soviet leaders would expect—without question—the Bloc's present power position to be worsened drastically as a result of a general nuclear war. In assessing the appropriate scale of a U.S. effort designed to meet this requirement it should be borne in mind that the Soviet calculus must take into account not merely relative Soviet strength after a nuclear exchange but also its consequences for the Communist position in Eastern Europe, for the relative power of Communist China, and for the possibilities of maintaining Communist control over the Russian base.*

*To meet the objectives indicated above the U.S. should, for the relevant planning period through the mid-1960's, maintain a sophisticated mix of delivery vehicles so dispersed, hardened, mobile and controlled that:*

*a. the USSR could not count with confidence, despite any technological break-through it might reasonably expect to score, upon neutralizing or blunting a large proportion of U.S. retaliatory power;*

*b. the U.S. could, even under unfavorable circumstances (e.g., an initial Soviet surprise attack), substantially reduce the military capabilities of the enemy.*

*To achieve not only the objectives indicated above, but also greater stability in the international military environment, our U.S. strategic forces and plans for their use should be designed so that they will continue an element of stability in grave international crises. Thus, our strategic*

*nuclear forces should be sufficiently invulnerable so that their survival and effectiveness need not rest (i) on the U.S. striking first; (ii) on the U.S. taking in a crisis such "crash measures" to reduce these forces' vulnerability as the Soviets might consider evidence of impending attack or as would materially reduce the forces' operational effectiveness; (iii) on an instant U.S. response to ambiguous evidence of impending enemy attack.*

10. Presidential Control. *The planning and design of U.S. strategic forces should offer an increasingly wide range of options, at alternative levels of violence and against alternative target systems, which the President or authorities pre-designated by him could review in advance and choose among in the event. Our strategic forces must increasingly be susceptible of discriminating and controlled use, under centralized military command, in accordance with such high level decisions. Highly survivable command, control, and communication systems should be developed and maintained (i) which provide for authorization by the President, or authorities pre-designated by him in case he is unable to function, of initial use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, especially including periods of great tension or hostilities; (ii) which ensure, insofar as feasible, that conduct and termination of operations are also continuously and sensitively responsive to political decisions by the President or authorities pre-designated by him. The expectations of individuals about the occasions on which nuclear weapons would be used, and the methods of using them, should not be allowed to narrow to the point that flexibility in execution is in any way reduced.*

11. General war may come about in a variety of ways (through pre-meditated attack, preemption, escalation, or inadvertence) and may take different forms, dependent upon the time when it occurs, the accuracy of U.S. intelligence estimates, the kinds of targets the enemy chooses to attack, and the capabilities of the U.S. to prevent repetitive or follow-up strikes. *To fix in advance a specific pattern for the conduct of operations is virtually impossible, and our targeting plans and command-control system must, as has been indicated, be designed so as to enable the direction of operations by the President and authorities designated by him before or*

*during the conflict. Within these limitations, pre-attack strategic nuclear planning and preparations will be aimed at:*

*a. reducing the strategic nuclear offensive capabilities of the enemy, and particularly his ability to mount repetitive attacks against U.S. and Allied population centers.*

*b. retaining ready, survivable strategic nuclear forces under centralized control for possible selective use against his urban-industrial centers; against other major elements of enemy strength; and for use in other ways which will contribute to c. below.*

*c. facilitating the conduct of negotiations designed to bring the war to an end on terms which are consistent with U.S. interests, as set forth in this paper.*

The prospect of confronting reserve U.S. nuclear forces after any attack may give a potential enemy powerful incentive to refrain from planning or executing unrestricted attacks on U.S. or Allied civil society. Such ready forces, held in reserve and threatening—by their very existence—surviving enemy targets, may also conceivably extend deterrence into the wartime period, and thus destroy the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue the war. Moreover, the goal of ending hostilities on acceptable terms requires that plans and operational decisions preclude the prospect of an unarmed U.S. confronting armed opponents. *For all these reasons, it is essential—whatever the size, composition and effectiveness of U.S. strategic forces—that the U.S. not disarm itself, by expending all ready strategic nuclear forces in initial attacks.*

12. *Optimum Use of Strategic Nuclear Weapons.* A major problem in connection with the design and use of these strategic forces relates to the optimum use of nuclear weapons if we must initiate such use.

On the one hand, since 1945 American policy has ruled out the initiation of nuclear attack on the Soviet Union as a means of bringing the cold war to an end and providing a definite victory for the Free World. Aside from its violation of our moral and political tradition a policy of initiating

nuclear war was always shadowed by its consequences for Western Europe; and its rationality on strictly military grounds has been gradually reduced with the Soviet acquisition of medium and long-range nuclear delivery capabilities.

On the other hand, we are committed explicitly to defend the populations and territory of Western Europe, and we have similar though implicit commitments to use nuclear weapons rather than accept major defeat in Asia and the Middle East.

This situation immediately raises the question of whether, if we initiated use of nuclear weapons, a limited use of nuclear weapons with a concomitant risk of escalation of nuclear engagement by the other side would be the sensible course to follow, or whether an initial strike against Soviet strategic nuclear delivery systems would be the optimum course.

At the present time this question—involving complex problems of intelligence assessment and projection as well as evolving military technology—is subject to legitimate debate. The answer may well vary according to circumstances which cannot be foreseen in advance.

13. Current Policy. *In order not to foreclose this issue of optimum initial U.S. use of nuclear weapons, it is important to preserve utmost flexibility in our plans and posture. Three propositions warrant special comment in this connection.*

a. *We should try to convey to the Soviets: (i) That we do not intend to mount an initial strategic strike if their forces do not transgress the frontiers of the free community; (ii) that if they do we would strike first under certain circumstances if this was necessary in order to protect our vital interests; (iii) that we are not so prone to mount an initial strategic strike in the event of grave crises or limited conflict as to maximize the incentive for the Soviets to take a pre-emptive action in these contingencies. This is, in effect, the manifold message we have conveyed with respect to West Berlin.*

b. *We must not lock ourselves into plans and assumptions regarding an initial U.S. strategic strike against Soviet nuclear delivery systems, which*

*could play somewhat the same role in a major international crisis that the great powers' mobilization and war plans played in 1914, e.g., create such pressures for early military moves, in order to destroy enemy nuclear forces, as to deny diplomacy the time it needs to resolve the crisis peacefully.*

*c. We have not and should not set an absolute requirement that our strategic forces be able substantially to destroy all Soviet nuclear delivery systems in a first strike. For one thing, such an objective does not appear practical.*

Interestingly, in the next few paragraphs, we see the terms “active defense” and “passive defense” outlined in top national policy documents; both would continue to be used as terms of art in counterproliferation strategy discussions more than thirty years later.

#### *E. Active and Passive Defense*

*14. Active Defense. The prime objectives of active defense systems are to improve stability by:*

- a. helping to protect U.S. retaliatory forces;*
- b. preventing the enemy from cheaply and easily wreaking devastation on U.S. population and industrial center;*
- c. accomplishing maximum attrition of the attacking force and complicating enemy planning.*

*Attainment of the second of these objectives will present increasing difficulty as the USSR develops more sophisticated weapons systems; hence, the actual level of resources to be devoted to this mission should be reconsidered frequently and thoroughly.*

*15. Passive Defense. Passive defense measures will not preclude the USSR from inflicting heavy damage on the U.S. should it wish to do so. If it were the primary enemy purpose to overcome passive defense measures,*

there are numerous weapons options available to him. A more reasonable assumption, however, is that the allocation of resources to long-term and costly development of inter-continental weapons systems would not be significantly affected by U.S. measures of passive defense designed to reduce loss of life from nuclear attack. *In the light of the various circumstances under which hostilities might be conducted, passive defense has three main purposes:*

- a. *To prevent or limit avoidable fatalities or casualties from nuclear conflict not involving massive attack directly upon U.S. population centers. This purpose can be separated into two parts: the first, limitation of casualties and fatalities from blast, heat and other immediate effects of nuclear detonations; the second, limitation of casualties and fatalities from fallout, spreading fires and other indirect effects of nuclear detonations. The first can be accomplished only through a combination of active and passive defense measures; systems to accomplish this on a nation-wide basis are not yet sufficiently efficient to warrant their adoption. The second can be attained by a system of fallout shelters, together with local organization, planning and training to use the system.*
- b. *To maintain continuity at all feasible levels of government. This will require particular attention to such tasks as establishing and promulgating lines of succession to official positions; providing for the safekeeping of essential records; establishing control centers and alternative sites for government emergency operations; and providing for the protection and maximum use of essential government personnel, resources and facilities.*
- c. *To strengthen, mobilize and plan for the management of the nation's resources in the interest of current and future national security. In this connection, continuing attention must be given to planning, training, stockpiling, research and development, and other preparations necessary to: (i) the stabilization and organized direction of the civilian economy in times of national emergency; (ii) the prompt initiation of post-attack industrial rehabilitation programs necessary to national survival, rehabilitation and recovery; and (iii) the proper organization of remaining human and material resources.*

*These passive defense steps are essential, lest the U.S. socio-economic system collapse or be distorted into an unacceptable form even following an attack of limited scale not directed primarily against our civil society. Sustained effort and public education by the Federal Government will be required for their execution. Care should be taken, however, not to generate unwarranted expectations as to what such programs can accomplish, not to allow these measures to divert public attention and energies from other needed national security tasks.*

*F. General Purpose Forces*

...

18. *Conduct of Local War. In conducting local war the U.S. should:*

- a. seek to bring the war to a conclusion on terms satisfactory to the U.S., and make clear to the enemy the specific political objectives for which the U.S. is fighting where this will contribute to doing so;*
- b. be prepared to fight locally in direct conflict with Sino-Soviet forces;*
- c. protect the interests of the friendly people involved;*
- d. seek to control the scope of intensity of the conflict to minimize the risk of escalation to general war, recognizing that this may sometimes require controlled and deliberate intensification of the conflict;*
- e. conduct military operations so as to limit damage in the area of conflict and enhance allied solidarity and effectiveness.*

19. *Deployment and Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons.* We can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation if we initiate the use of nuclear weapons, tactically or otherwise. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences, for example, for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.

A very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to use such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and there might be acutely undesirable political consequences from taking such action.

It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But these prospects are not rated very highly.

Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations—all these considerations suggest that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.

Studies of the use of nuclear weapons, either for battlefield or interdiction purposes, are underway and should be urgently prosecuted. Pending the completion of these studies, tentative guidelines are:

a. Scale and Nature: *U.S. forces should have sufficient tactical nuclear capabilities (i) to deter enemy initiation of tactical nuclear warfare; (ii) to enhance (in conjunction with a manifest U.S. intent to use nuclear weapons, if necessary) the primary deterrent, which is and will continue to be, posed by U.S. non-nuclear and strategic nuclear capabilities, to major or all-out Communist non-nuclear assault; (iii) to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons selectively for military advantage, if circumstances should arise (e.g., at sea or in the air) where we would gain militarily from a local nuclear exchange and where such an exchange would be unlikely to cause escalation; (iv) to permit a very limited use against valid military targets in other circumstances, primarily in order to demonstrate our will to resist aggression.*

b. Organization and Deployment: *U.S. and allied tactical nuclear capabilities should be so deployed, and their command and control should be so organized as: (i) to preserve carefully the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons; (ii) to ensure that initial use of tactical nuclear weapons—even after non-nuclear hostilities have begun—will take place only on the President's decision; (iii) to ensure that continuing control will be exercised over use of tactical nuclear weapons, within limitations established by the President at as high a level of authority as is consistent with the character of the conflict and the likely grave consequences of a nuclear mistake. In order to accomplish the purposes indicated above and ensure that nuclear weapons are as immune to accidental or deliberate unauthorized use as is consistent with their operational effectiveness: (i) High priority should be given to incorporating, as a matter of urgency, all needed and operationally feasible technical safeguards in nuclear weapons specified by the President in allied and in U.S. hands; (ii) U.S. custodians of warheads in allied hands should be given the training, equipment, [2-½ lines of underscored source text not declassified]; (iii) Periodic review of these arrangements and safeguards and of the state, command and control, organization, and deployment of U.S. and allied nuclear weapons and of their nuclear components should be undertaken to ensure that they are the optimum from the standpoints indicated above.*

c. Use: *Tactical nuclear weapons should be used in local war only when it is clear that the objectives stated in paragraph 18 would be furthered by, and could not be attained without, use of nuclear weapons. In determining whether this condition exists and, if so, how nuclear weapons should be used, account should be taken of: (i) our ability or inability to frustrate the aggression without using nuclear weapons; (ii) the likely military effects of a local two-way nuclear exchange; (iii) the political effects of such a local nuclear exchange—both locally and worldwide; (iv) the physical effects of the exchange for the country being fought over; (v) the chances of exchange escalating into general nuclear war.*

Translation: While we don't believe in the utility of limited nuclear warfare, we're still going to produce nuclear weapons and maintain the capability to employ them at the tactical level.

...

### *I. Supporting Programs*

The following programs provide support for all the types of U.S. forces and missions described in this chapter.

...

*28. Chemical and Biological Warfare. United States military forces should have a capability to use and defend against chemical and biological weapons. Chemical and biological weapons should only be used in case of direct decision by the President that such use is warranted by the political military situation, except for the use of: (i) existing smoke, incendiary, and riot control agents in appropriate military operations, and (2) riot control agents in suppressing civil disturbances.*

...

As a minor note, it is instructive to see the parallel of Presidential authority to release the use of nuclear and CB weapons during military operations. It is also interesting to see the clear distinction of smoke, incendiary, and riot control agents from toxic chemical munitions long before their prominent use by U.S. forces in Vietnam.

This document is identified as document 261 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VII, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d261>.

## Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1963

### SUBJECT

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary [of State]  
Ambassador Dobrynin (USSR)  
John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had been instructed by his government to raise two questions with the Secretary, the first dealing with the Franco-German Treaty (see separate memcon)<sup>2</sup> and the second with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Ambassador then proceeded to deliver an oral *démarche* on the latter subject, the text of which is attached.

In commenting on the Ambassador's statement, the Secretary said that he wished to underline again the difference between proliferation of national nuclear capabilities and multilateral arrangements which did not increase national capabilities either to produce or to control nuclear weapons. In his press conference today, the President has said that we intend to find a way by which Europe will take more interest in the political direction of NATO

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Guthrie and approved in S on February 10.

<sup>2</sup> The Franco-German treaty was signed on January 22. The memorandum of conversation is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. I.

without increasing national nuclear capabilities.<sup>3</sup> It is not possible now, the Secretary continued, to be exactly precise regarding the arrangements we have in mind for a multilateral force since this arrangement will depend to some extent on discussions within NATO. However, he could say that it was a basic interest of the United States to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The document previous to this one, which described U.S. policy on the use of unconventional weapons, was written prior to the Cuban missile crisis. This one was written after, which might explain the emphasis on nonproliferation. The only CB weapons point is in footnote 4 of this document, relating to restrictions on German manufacture of NBC weapons.

As for Canadian forces and discussions with Canada to which the Ambassador alluded, the Secretary pointed out that Canada is part of NATO and of North America. The Soviets have weapons capable of striking North America and our arrangements for the defense of this area are no different from arrangements which we have with many other countries. These arrangements are, furthermore, long-standing and well-known. As for the concern expressed by the Soviet Government over the Franco-German Treaty, the Secretary noted that the French Government has already called public attention to the agreement of 1954 wherein the Federal Republic of Germany committed itself to renounce the right to manufacture nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> Such reference was made by the French Foreign Minister speaking before the National Assembly on January 24 of this year. The President also referred to this question today.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the President's remarks at his press conference on February 7, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, pp. 152-154.

<sup>4</sup> Under Protocol No. III (and annexes), October 23, 1954, which amended the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany agreed not to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons in its territory. For text, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, pp. 979-984.

<sup>5</sup> In his press conference.

As for the Soviet contention that the multilateral arrangements in NATO will provide the Federal Republic of Germany with access to nuclear weapons, the Secretary said this is not what we are talking about. He told the Ambassador he completely rejected the notion that the United States on the one hand professes interest in non-proliferation to the Soviets while on the other hand it is taking steps which actually lead to proliferation. He assured the Ambassador that there was no deception on our part and again noted the fundamental difference between national nuclear forces and multilateral arrangements. As he had already told the Soviet Foreign Minister, if the Soviets wished to make arrangements with their allies similar to those which we hope to make with ours, the United States will not object. After protestations from Dobrynin that the Soviet Government did not like any such arrangements, the Secretary pointed out that since Western arrangements have yet to be made, the Soviet Government does not really know what it is protesting about and at the moment is "boxing shadows". The Secretary also pointed out that the United States is not the only Western nation possessing nuclear weapons and that the United States could not guarantee control over weapons possessed by the United Kingdom and France. He assured the Ambassador that the statement of the Soviet Government which had just been made to him would be studied and that he hoped to talk further with the Ambassador on the subject of non-proliferation. He reiterated that what we were seeking in our multilateral arrangements was not just a legal formula but an arrangement which would exclude the possibility of those not now possessing nuclear weapons from firing such weapons. Finally, the Secretary said that it would be better not to tell the press that he and the Ambassador had discussed this subject since in the Secretary's view the differences between the two governments were not so great as the Ambassador professed and we should not complicate the problem by bringing it to public attention.

## Attachment<sup>6</sup>

### ORAL STATEMENT MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS BY AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO SECRETARY RUSK

February 7, 1963

In the course of exchange of opinion between the USSR and the U.S. on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons both sides stated that they are interested in reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result of the negotiations the positions of the USSR and the U.S. have come somewhat closer although there still remain differences in approach to the question of not allowing transfer of nuclear weapons to the countries not possessing such weapons by indirect means—through military alliances. The considerations of the Soviet Government on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons were most recently set forth in detail to Secretary Rusk on January 10 this year.<sup>7</sup> Up till now we have not received a reply from the U.S. Government.

Meanwhile, events have occurred recently which are directly related to the subject of the exchange of opinion between the U.S. and the USSR. The Government of the United States is speeding up the implementation of its plan of creating multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which in fact provides for access to nuclear weapons of armed forces of all countries—

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<sup>6</sup> Secret. The source text is a condensed version of Dobrynin's statement. In a February 8 memorandum to the Secretary, William R. Tyler noted that his staff had prepared "a slightly condensed version" of Dobrynin's oral *démarche* at the Secretary's request. "The condensation," he noted, "consists primarily of elimination of reference to a Soviet statement of January 10 this year and to 'negotiations'," presumably to head off possible criticism in case the Secretary decided to give the French Ambassador and the British Chargé copies. On February 9, the Secretary gave copies of the condensed text to French Ambassador Alphand and British Chargé Greenhill and asked for their governments' comments. (Memorandum of conversation, February 9; Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6) See the Supplement. Copies of the marked-up longer version as well as Tyler's memorandum are attached to this memorandum of conversation. Also attached is a February 11 note from Swank to Tyler, stating that Secretary Rusk commented that both the oral statement and the revision thereof should be classified "confidential."

<sup>7</sup> See Document 257.

members of NATO including also the FRG. American representatives are conducting talks with representatives of those countries concerning the place and role of each of them in the question of managing rocket-nuclear weapons. Judging by reports a considerable role in this matter is being assigned to military units of West Germany.

We are told that West Germany although it will be a participant of the multilateral nuclear forces of NATO which are being planned will not become a full and equal master of rocket-nuclear weapons and that the U.S. will ultimately retain in its hands control over the use of these weapons.

The Soviet Government cannot agree by any means that such kind of "limitations" with regard to access of the FRG to rocket-nuclear weapons allegedly exclude the possibility of use of nuclear weapons by the West German revenge-seekers for their own purposes with all the dangerous consequences which ensue from this.

In obvious contradiction with the task of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the treaty concluded recently between France and the FRG which provides in particular for a comprehensive military cooperation between these two countries and does not exclude the possibility of direct transfer of nuclear weapons to the FRG. Appraisal of the consequences of this treaty dangerous for the cause of peace was given in the notes of the Soviet Government to the Governments of France and the FRG the contents of which were brought to the attention of the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare again that transfer of nuclear weapons to the West German armed forces irrespective of the manner in which this is carried out would greatly complicate and aggravate the situation in Europe. The world would be confronted with a new danger and the Soviet Union naturally would be compelled to take all the ensuing measures.

I have been instructed to draw the attention of the U.S. Government to the fact that the situation which has now developed cannot be regarded as normal. It turns out that, on the one hand, the U.S. tells us that it is

interested in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and is having talks with us concerning an agreement on this question while, on the other hand, it takes practical steps directed one way or another to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, it is also necessary to mention a recent statement by the Canadian Minister of Defense to the effect that negotiations have been going on for the last two or three months between the U.S. and Canada with regard to supplying American nuclear warheads to Canadian Air Force units placed at the disposal of the joint Canadian-American command—North American Air Defense (NORAD).

It is quite obvious that all these plans and actions of the U.S. and other nuclear powers—whether it is creation of multilateral nuclear forces of NATO or bilateral agreements on nuclear armaments—lead in the long run to one end—to proliferation of nuclear weapons which not only does not facilitate but, on the contrary, hampers, if not makes altogether impossible, reaching an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government would not like to face the situation when the U.S. Government would have confronted us with the fact of a deal within NATO saying: here is our position agreed upon with our NATO allies, let us discuss an agreement on this basis.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state that if the U.S. Government actually proceeds with proliferating nuclear weapons to other states participating in NATO and the number of states possessing nuclear weapons is increased the Government of the Soviet Union will be compelled to draw from this necessary conclusions and will respond in kind, that is, will see to it that appropriate countries friendly towards the USSR will receive nuclear weapons.

The position of the Soviet Union is clear: we conduct negotiations guided by the desire to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and we will not agree with any proposals which do not ensure actual solution of this task.

This document is identified as document 141 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol VIII, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d141>.

## **Summary Record of the 517th Meeting of the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 12, 1963, 11 a.m.

### *Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee*

General Taylor presented the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report<sup>2</sup> and introduced General Leon Johnson, with the suggestion that the President might wish to question him about the report.

The President asked whether, even if we attack the USSR first, the loss to the U.S. would be unacceptable to political leaders. General Johnson replied that it would be, i.e. even if we preempt, surviving Soviet capability is sufficient to produce an unacceptable loss in the U.S.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, 517th NSC Meeting. Top Secret. Drafted by Smith. The 21 attendees at this meeting in the Cabinet Room included the President, Rusk, McNamara, Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Seaborg, McCone, Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, and eight members of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee headed by General Leon W. Johnson. (Ibid., President's Appointment Book)

<sup>2</sup> The Report has not been found. In a memorandum to Bundy dated August 28, Colonel Smith stated that the briefing would cover the report's conclusions concerning projected results of general war at various intervals in the 1963-1968 period. Casualties and damage in the United States would "increase over the years. Soviet damage and capabilities will remain somewhat constant (because their capabilities are increasing). Probably the major NESC conclusion is that during the years 1964 through 1968 neither the US nor the USSR can emerge from a full nuclear exchange without suffering very severe damage and high casualties, no matter which side initiates the war." Smith held that the study raised one major issue. U.S. "offensive and defensive weapons currently programmed will not reduce damage from a full nuclear exchange to an acceptable level. Consequently, there is a need for development of new offensive and defensive weapons." (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, WYS Chron File, Apr-Sep 63)

The President asked whether then in fact we are in a period of nuclear stalemate. General Johnson replied that we are.

Referring to a statement of the Air Force Association which appeared in this morning's Washington Post,<sup>3</sup> the President asked how we could obtain nuclear superiority as recommended by the Air Force Association. General Johnson said this was a very difficult question to answer. He acknowledged that there is no way, no matter what we do, to avoid unacceptable damage in the U.S. if nuclear war breaks out. He later acknowledged that it would be impossible for us to achieve nuclear superiority.

Secretary McNamara said that Defense Department studies showed that even if we spend \$80 billion more than we are now spending, we would still have 30 million fatalities in the U.S. in the 1968 time period, even if we made the first strike against the USSR.

The President said these fatality figures were much higher than those he had heard recently in Omaha.<sup>4</sup> As he recalled it, SAC estimated 12 million casualties.

General Taylor said these were higher casualty figures than the President had ever seen. Today's figures include two new factors:

1. Soviet weapons were targeted on U.S. cities.
2. The use by the Soviets of huge megaton weapons was included in the computations for the first time.

The President said that de Gaulle believed that even the small nuclear force he is planning will be big enough to cause unacceptable damage to the USSR. He asked why we need to have as much defense as we have if, as it appears, the strategy is based on the assumption that even if we strike first we cannot protect the security of the U.S. in nuclear warfare.

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<sup>3</sup> The statement was printed in The Washington Post, September 12, 1963.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 118.

General Johnson replied that no matter what we do we can't get below 51 million casualties in the event of a nuclear exchange. We can, however, bring down this number by undertaking additional weapons programs.

The President asked if this doesn't get us into the overkill business. General Johnson replied in the negative. We can cut down U.S. losses if we knock out more Soviet missiles by having more U.S. missiles and more accurate U.S. missiles. We estimate that we can save 20% in megatonnage down in the U.S. if we can achieve more accurate missiles. The more Soviet missiles we can destroy the less the loss to us. There is no question but that we can increase the accuracy of our missiles. The Soviets are not competing with us on numbers of missiles. They need, according to our calculation, only 1200 weapons. They, of course, can increase the megatonnage by enlarging the size of their weapons.

General Johnson said that his personal conclusions from this study were three:

1. We have to get better weapons, especially anti-ballistic missile weapons, to increase the number of Soviet missiles that we keep from landing in the U.S.
2. We must perfect ways of stopping missiles fired by Soviet submarines.
3. We must pay greater attention to chemical and biological warfare weapons. The problem with such weapons to date has been that the incubation period is three days, but conceivably could be brought down to one day.

That is to say, the military recognized that the continued investment of R&D into CB weapons would continuously increase their utility on the battlefield. Also, they recognized it as a national security concern along with nuclear weapons employment.

General Johnson pointed out that each of the strategies used against the USSR resulted in at least 140 million fatalities in the USSR. Our problem

is how to catch more of the Soviet missiles before they are launched and how to destroy more of the missiles in the air over the U.S.

Secretary McNamara said there was no way of launching a no-alert attack against the USSR which would be acceptable. No such attack, according to the calculations, could be carried out without 30 million U.S. fatalities—an obviously unacceptable number. Under conditions existing in 1968 with our forces on the alert, only 300 warheads are used to produce the casualties in the Soviet Union. Ninety-five percent of our force is for non-fatality purposes. Thus, preemption today or in 1968 is not an acceptable course of action.

“I’m not saying we wouldn’t get our hair mussed, Mr. President, but I do say not more than ten to twenty million dead depending on the breaks.”  
Gen. “Buck” Turgidson, *Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*, 1963.

Secretary McNamara said the President deserved an answer to his question as to why we have to have so large a force. The answer lies in the fact that there are many uncertainties in the equations presented in today's report. The factors included in the report are probable, but they do not represent the entire range of possibilities. By introducing pessimistic factors, the estimates given today are drastically changed. He said the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying our current force level and they would be recommending a force level to meet a reasonable anticipated situation. The Chiefs are now considering the range of our weapons in relation to the range of anticipated factors.

General Johnson said he had concluded from the calculations that we could fight a limited war using nuclear weapons without fear that the Soviets would reply by going to all-out war. He said that the Russians have obviously made similar calculations, and, seeing the unsatisfactory estimated results of an all-out nuclear war, would not escalate a limited war even if we used tactical nuclear weapons.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the deep schizophrenia involved in the present nuclear situation. If Congress knew the conclusions presented in the report, the Administration could get funds for aid and information programs which are the resources we must rely on in our effort to prevent all-out nuclear war.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the fact that this study and the existence of the sub-committee itself had been one of the few government projects which had been kept secret.

Mr. McCone asked General Johnson what he thought would happen to our capability, if, in an arms agreement, we accepted a percentage reduction in the number of our weapons. He doubted such a percentage cut would have much effect. Secretary Rusk agreed that we would have to go very deep in an arms cut to have a substantial effect on our capability. General Taylor said: "That is, if the Russians honestly carry out a comparable cut."

The President said he concluded from the report that the forces which will be used under present circumstances are conventional, limited and tactical. General Johnson agreed, adding that nuclear war is impossible if rational men control governments.

Secretary Rusk said he agreed, but he did not get much comfort from this fact because, if both sides believed that neither side would use nuclear weapons, one side or the other would be tempted to act in a way which would push the other side beyond its tolerance level. He added that a response to pressure might be suicidal, being prompted by a desire to get it over with. He referred to the current situation as "This God Damn poker game."

General Taylor agreed that the conclusions of the report did mean that there was a low possibility of escalation. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that we can't assume that nuclear war won't happen and referred again to suicidal tendencies. He wondered who else could be exposed to the conclusions of the sub-committee.

The President again said that preemption was not possible for us and that that was a valuable conclusion growing out of an excellent report.

Secretary Dillon returned to the subject of publicizing the conclusions of the report. He recalled that a similar report three years ago indicated that we would be doing much more damage to the Soviet Union than they would do to us. Today's report indicated damage would be more nearly equal. Consequently, he thought that it would be easier for us to make public the conclusions of this report.

Secretary Rusk said we could get out the basic facts of the report without identifying it. Some of the information was already in the public domain.

General Taylor suggested that the intelligence community should review the report before any decision is made about making it public. He thought that the war game held on SIOP was better to use as a basis of judgment because this war game dealt with an actual situation in the current year.

The President thought that at some time we might consider making some of the report available to some of the Congressional leaders.<sup>5</sup>

(Attached is a copy of notes taken by the sub-committee members of the National Security Council discussion.)

Bromley Smith<sup>6</sup>

Attachment<sup>7</sup>

**RESUME OF DISCUSSION DURING NESC BRIEFING OF 12  
SEPTEMBER 1963**

Speaker—President—Is the level of damage we receive after we pre-empt against the Russians unacceptable?

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<sup>5</sup> NSC Action No. 2470, dated September 12, states that the Council: "Discussed the report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee." (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>7</sup> Top Secret

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Yes (followed by a description of the range of US fatalities resulting from the study through the years 1964 through 1968).

Speaker—President—I have read the statement in this morning's paper by the Air Force Association. What is meant by their reference to nuclear superiority versus nuclear stalemate? How could you get superiority?

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Stated he believed the members of the Committee of the Air Force Association which drafted the resolution did not have the facts as brought out in the report being presented at this time. (The last subsidiary attack was explained.)

Speaker—Mr. McNamara—Indicated he had a study conducted examining the scale of fatalities after having added 80 billion dollars to the defense budget for blast shelters, increased weapons systems—both offensive and defensive. Under all of these conditions in the 1968 time period, the minimum number of fatalities was in excess of 30 million.

Speaker—President—At Omaha I remember being briefed that if we preempt our casualties may be on the order of 12 million.

Answer—Gen. Taylor—That briefing was related to the present SIOP.

Gen. Johnson—The variance rests in the difference in targeting objectives of the Soviets. The weight of effort devoted to urban industrial targets was the key to the variation in US casualties. The results of the Omaha report were obtained by the Soviets firing their retaliation counter force, this did not seem reasonable.

Speaker—Mr. Rusk—Does your study deal with any effects other than the direct weapon effects—such as disease, pestilence?

Answer—Gen. Johnson—No. However, the AEC made a study of the long term effects and basically concluded that not enough was known in this area. As a consequence, a letter was sent to Dr. Johnson, Assistant to

the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, recommending additional efforts to provide answers on long term effects.<sup>8</sup>

Speaker—President—Why do we need as much as we've got?

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Explained the reason was to reduce the damage and fatalities to our country. Improvement in US systems is of particular importance. Also the development of an ABM defensive system would be of greatest significance, particularly when deployed in an area such as the eastern segment of the US where approximately 70% of the population is concentrated.

Speaker—President—In the discussion the President asked about our conclusions from the offset attack on 23 cities.

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Discussed the results of the attack.

Speaker—President—If we can't pre-empt and reduce fatalities, then what? Why do we have as much as we've got? Doesn't it get into the overkill business?

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Indicated that the Soviet knows without any doubt that we can destroy him due to the size of our force. In effect, there should be no margin for error in his assessment of our capabilities. Effort must now be expended to improve the systems in reliability and accuracy. Certainly along with this is the importance of multiple forces—bombers, SLBMs, ICBMs—to compound the Soviet problem. The statement on overkill has been exaggerated since our expectancy of damage against the Soviet time sensitive ICBMs in 1964 was calculated as no higher than 20%, whereas the 1968 estimate reached 70%. If this expectancy were increased to 90%, the overall megatonnage down on the US would be reduced by 20%.

Answer—Mr. McNamara—Gen. Johnson's group has assumed probable planning factors and they seem to me to be reasonable assumptions. They do not represent all the possible factors so we must decide whether we are

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<sup>8</sup> Neither the study nor the letter to Gerald W. Johnson has been identified.

protecting ourselves against pessimistic factors of Soviet capabilities. By assuming a range of US forces we have calculated a range of US and Soviet fatalities. Large changes in forces result in only small changes in fatalities.

Speaker—President—Why does he have a smaller force?

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Soviet may consider he has sufficient force with which to deter, especially when viewed in relation to the scale of fatalities he is given the capability to produce in this country. (Described manner in which assessments are carried out and assistance rendered by NMCSSC.)

Speaker—Gen. Johnson—Volunteered that he would be very disturbed if the President considered this report indicated that we could reduce our forces and/or not continue to increase to those programmed. If a reduction should take place, the relative position of the US and Soviets would become less in our favor. The President said he understood.

Speaker—Gen. Johnson—Discussed the need for an effective ABM defense; emphasis on Laser and Casaba-Howitzer, intercepting sub-launched missile in boost phase. Also brought in new efforts in chemical and biological warfare such that biological warfare may be adaptable to strategic purposes.

Speaker—Mr. McCone—What would be the effect on casualties of incremental cuts in US and Soviet forces in the event of arms reduction?

Answer—Mr. Rusk—It would be necessary to go very deep into the forces by such cuts before there would be any significant effect.

Speaker—President—Would it be advantageous to tell the Soviets what probable casualties may result from an exchange in order to convince them of the possible outcome?

Speaker—Mr. Bundy—This report is one state secret which has been well kept and it would be a mistake to cite figures from it. There would then be a precedent for someone to ask about any comparable figures from next year's report.

Speaker—Mr. Rusk—I believe such figures for casualties have already been made public. The President has spoken of it on some occasions.

Speaker—Gen. Taylor—I think we should ask the intelligence community how much information of this nature has already gotten out (i.e., casualty figures). (Mr. McCone accepted the query and a review of official US and Soviet statements will be made.)

Speaker—Mr. Rusk—Asked about the difference in results between a high state of alert and no alert.

Answer—Gen. Johnson—This comparison was not made in the study.

Speaker—President—What about pre-empt today with the Soviets in a low state of alert?

Answer—Mr. McNamara—(Today's situation not actually answered.) In the many studies I have had done for me I have not found a situation in which a pre-empt during a low-alert condition would be advantageous. Under no circumstances have I been able to get US casualties under 30 million. In fact, I have not been able to get them down to 30 million. In 1968 we can have 3000 warheads and 5000 MT on alert. Of this force, 95 percent will be used in counterforce attacks or for purposes other than to create casualties. They can destroy us with a few weapons and we can do the same to them. Therefore, pre-empt is not advantageous for either side.

Speaker—Gen. Taylor—The question then is whether we are justified in continuing military targeting.

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Indicated this had to be continued for the potential reduction it made in US casualties.

Speaker—Mr. Rusk—Gen. DeGaulle can sit on the sidelines with five weapons and deter.

Speaker—President—Is that why DeGaulle is satisfied with a small force?

Answer—Mr. Rusk—According to Gen. DeGaulle, he can inflict unacceptable damage on anyone.

Speaker—President—DeGaulle is then using atomic weapons as a trip-wire.

Speaker—Gen. Johnson—Gen. Peter Gallois (French)<sup>9</sup> told me, when I was stationed at SHAPE, that certain elements in France believed that in time NATO would collapse and that the fight would be between the US and the Soviets. At that time the French wanted to be able to sit on the side lines and say to the Soviets—Don't touch us, if you do, it will cost you five Hiroshimas.

Speaker—President—He believed this was probably correct and that DeGaulle would not use nuclear weapons to defend Hamburg.

Speaker—President—Consider the study to be very good and helpful. Asked how long worked on it and who composed the group.

Answer—Gen. Johnson—Explained the foregoing. Also explained why today's force was not too large.

Speaker—President—This argues in favor of a conventional force.

Speaker—Gen. Johnson—Stated that he was convinced from this report that you could resort to nuclear weapons in a limited situation without it expanding into all-out nuclear war.

Speaker—President—I have been told that if I ever released a nuclear weapon on the battlefield I should start a pre-emptive attack on the Soviet Union as the use of nuclear weapons was bound to escalate and we might as well get the advantage by going first.

Speaker—Gen. Johnson—Stated he did not consider this necessarily true under the circumstances which exist.

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<sup>9</sup> Pierre Gallois, former head of the French Air Force.

Speaker—President—Since pre-emption does not show any advantage—and the Russians also recognize this—it is possible that the US could use tactical nuclear weapons in Laos without the Soviets assuming we would also use them in Europe on the slightest provocation. (This is not an assured understanding of the comment as made—it came in garbled in its import and intent.)

The meeting was concluded by a discussion of the manner in which this information could be released to Congressional groups. It was finally agreed that the source (NESC) should be protected and when the information is finally released, it should appear as though originating from another agency.



## CHAPTER 4

### **Johnson Administration (1964-1968)**

In addition to continuing the development and testing of CB weapons started in the Kennedy administration, the Johnson administration had to address the increasing public awareness of the use of riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam. Although riot control agents, herbicides, and incendiary devices are all specifically exempted by the U.S. Senate as not being toxic chemical munitions as defined under the Geneva protocol, there were strong opinions from the disarmament community and anti-war groups that, if not an aspect of chemical warfare, certainly this use might encourage other nations to use lethal chemical weapons. The public focus on military operations in Vietnam resulted in a desire to revisit U.S. policy on CB weapons and clarify the administration's position. Again, nuclear weapon topics such as China's development of an atomic bomb and negotiations to craft a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty may have dominated White House discussions, but there were still CB weapons issues on the table.

The Soviet Union continued to present challenges to the United States, with military assessments noting the continued modernization of its unconventional weapons. The 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (document 64) is interesting in that the intelligence community assessed the chance of CB weapons proliferation as unlikely. However, the administration would wrestle with the issue of Egyptian use of chemical weapons during the Yemini civil war in 1967. The administration would also oversee the sea burial of chemical weapons under Operation CHASE or "Cut Holes and Sink 'Em," the controversial decision to put tons of obsolete chemical munitions onto old Liberty ships and sink them in the deep ocean. Near the end of the administration, the U.S. military's open air testing efforts became more visible, as an alleged release of VX nerve agent at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 prompted Congressional hearings into how the CB weapons program was being executed.

Fortunately for the Johnson administration, that burden of disclosure and policy analysis would fall to the next administration. The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of foreign policy discussions during the Johnson administration.

### **The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 brought his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency. Dean Rusk continued to serve as Secretary of State and stressed to the new President the necessity of continuity in foreign policy. President Johnson vowed that the nation would keep its commitments "from South Vietnam to West Berlin." Johnson retained Kennedy's close group of advisers and the National Security Council under Bundy continued to prove vital to foreign policy decision-making. Walt Rostow replaced Bundy as National Security Advisor in 1966.

President Johnson continued the U.S. military commitment to South Vietnam. Escalation followed with the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized Johnson to take any measures he believed necessary to retaliate, and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. That year, Johnson won a landslide election. In early 1965, the U.S. military launched Operation Rolling Thunder, a bombing campaign against the North. Soon after, Johnson introduced U.S. ground combat forces with the landing of Marines at Danang. By 1967, nearly 500,000 troops were in Vietnam. Following the surprise defeat of the Tet Offensive in 1968 and facing dwindling public support for the war, Johnson announced that he would not seek a second term as President.

Though preoccupied with Vietnam, the Johnson administration faced challenges elsewhere. In Latin America, riots in Panama in 1964 led to concessions that still preserved U.S. control of the Panama Canal. In an unpopular move, Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 to intervene in their civil war and prevent another Cuba. Tensions flared in the Middle East in 1967 during the Arab-Israeli War. Johnson warned that

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<sup>1</sup> Original text from Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "1961-1968: The Presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson," <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968>.

the United States would oppose aggression by any state in the area but encouraged diplomatic negotiations. In 1968, the administration faced another major crisis when the Soviet Union led Warsaw Pact troops in an invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet crackdown tested détente, but both powers avoided confrontation. Following the election of Republican Richard M. Nixon, Johnson left office on January 20, 1969.

This document is identified as document 43 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d43>.

## **Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FOR FY 1970–1974 (JSOP-70) (U)

### Part I—Purpose

1. *Time Period.* This Plan covers the mid-range period beginning on 1 July 1969 (M-Day) and extends for five years thereafter.
2. *Purpose.* The purpose of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1970–1974 (JSOP-70) is to translate national objectives and policies into military objectives, to prescribe strategic concepts for the employment of forces, to define basic undertakings to achieve these objectives and concepts, and to provide:
  - a. Information to commanders of unified and specified commands, and planning and program guidance to the military services, for the mid-range period under conditions of cold, limited, and general war.
  - b. The Secretary of Defense with military advice for the development of the FY 1967 budget, justification for departmental FY 1967 program objectives as they pertain to major combatant forces, and a reassessment

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 3130 (15 July 64) Sec 1. Top Secret. Although the paper is undated, the bottoms of several pages are marked “Revised” followed by one of the following dates: July 21, July 22, and August 5, 1964. The paper is attached to a covering report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This report is dated July 15, but contains revised and corrected pages, dated August 5 and 11, that reflect the decisions of the JCS at their August 5 meeting. Also attached are a distribution list and table of contents.

of military aspects of the previously approved annual increment of the Department of Defense Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program.

c. Intelligence estimates of potential enemy capabilities, including capabilities of communist satellite countries, and estimates of future force levels of selected Free World countries, for use in the development of military strategy for the attainment of national objectives during the mid-range period; and planning guidance which will provide a basis for the development and accomplishment of intelligence support commensurate with planning, operational, and strategic concepts.

d. Logistic planning guidance as a basis for the development of Service logistic plans and programs to support JSOP objective force levels.

e. General nuclear weapon planning guidance and nuclear weapons damage considerations.

f. Planning guidance for the conduct of counter-insurgency, unconventional, and psychological warfare.

g. Planning guidance for the development, control, and use of chemical, biological, and radiological materials.

**Para 2g**—Remember that at this point in time, US policy is to have the ability to retaliate in kind, in addition to using CB weapons in general warfare, if approved by the President.

h. Planning guidance for the development of requirements for appropriate maps, charts, and geodetic analyses.

i. Communications and electronics planning guidance to support the strategy and basic undertakings of the plan.

j. An estimate of strategically desirable and reasonably attainable force objectives for Free World allied countries as the military basis for the establishment of a US position with respect to military assistance, and for the development and review of NATO and other allied mid-range plans;

and a military estimate of the minimum country forces (Force Guidelines) to achieve US objectives in nonaligned Free World countries.

k. Advice and assistance on research and development matters by preparing statements of:

(1) Broad strategic guidance to be used in the preparation of an integrated Department of Defense program;

(2) Broad military capabilities desired; and

(3) The military importance of these development activities which are essential to support the strategic concept, the military objectives, and the needs of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

l. Planning guidance for command and control systems in support of military operations and administration.

m. Planning guidance for development and employment of space systems in support of military objectives, strategy, and basic undertakings.

## Part II—Strategic Appraisal

1. *General.* This appraisal summarizes the world situation likely to affect warfare, military strategies, and the global balance of military power from the present through FY 1974. It contains a brief analysis of the communist threat and probable trends in the world situation which affect the security, objectives, and stability of the United States and other Free World nations. More detailed information is contained in the Intelligence Annex (Annex A).<sup>2</sup> While advances in science and technology will continue to affect the development of weapons and conduct of warfare during the period, the major powers and other technologically advanced nations will continue efforts to reduce their vulnerability to attack, to protect and improve their military forces, and to improve their relative technological, political, and

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<sup>2</sup> A footnote to a list of Annexes A–N in the table of contents indicates that the annexes would be published and forwarded separately. They have not been found.

economic postures. For factors influencing specific technological developments during the period of the plan, see appropriate annexes.

**Para 1**—Things that we have forgotten today: advances in science and technology, to include “weapons of mass destruction,” do not give the military permission to ignore the potential effects of those advances on military affairs. Also, don’t forget about non-military tools during warfare.

## *2. Development of the World Situation.*

a. The world situation will continue to be influenced by (1) the struggle between communist nations on the one hand and the free societies and other nations who share similar interests on the other; (2) the struggle of newly emergent and underdeveloped nations for self-determination, increased international status and influence, and a greater share of the world's material wealth; (3) the conflicts of interests and traditional rivalries between nations and ethnic groups; (4) the internal struggles within Free World nations which tend to move them away from Free World orientation; and (5) varying degrees of discord.

b. The Soviet Bloc will increase pressures on the Free World as opportunities present themselves, and will relax pressures when it is to its advantage to do so. Any signs of US or Allied weakness in critical situations will intensify Soviet tactics aimed at achieving advantages; the employment of communist military power will remain a constant threat. The Asian communists will seize every opportunity to undermine US standing; when they judge that circumstances permit, and attendant risks are acceptable, they will supplement political warfare with organized and externally directed and supported guerrilla action by indigenous forces, as well as by higher intensity military action. Communist China and the Soviet Union, individually and possibly in concert, will continue to instigate and support what they term “wars of liberation,” with the aim of weakening the position of the West and establishing communist-oriented governments. Means used to support dissidents will probably range from political and economic assistance to providing military equipment, training, and advisors. Other communist nations and communist parties in

the Free World nations, with the support and encouragement of the Soviet Union and/or Communist China, will attempt increasingly to embarrass and harass the United States and nations of the Western Alliance. The Soviet and ChiCom estimates of relative US-Soviet-Communist Chinese strength and their evaluation of Western reactions to Sino or Soviet probes will be equally important to their decision as to the courses of action to pursue.

c. Both the Soviet Union and the United States can be expected to continue their advocacy of general and complete disarmament, but basic differences continue to block any substantive agreement. Disarmament conferences, along the lines of the current Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, will in all probability continue. Recognizing that agreement on a comprehensive general and complete disarmament treaty cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future, both East and West are expected to continue to seek agreement on separable, more limited measures following the precedent established by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the "Hot Line" Agreement, and the UN resolution prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in space. A major bar to the adoption of substantive proposals has been the unwillingness of the USSR to agree to adequate verification measures necessitating inspection on or over Soviet territory. There is little possibility that the USSR's position on verification will make possible major disarmament agreements during the period of this plan. A basic objective of Soviet disarmament policy has been, and is expected to continue to be, elimination of the nuclear threat at the outset of disarmament without materially reducing the preponderant conventional capability of the USSR. As long as the Soviets hold to this position, any substantive disarmament agreement would be possible only at the expense of United States nuclear superiority.

**Para 2c**—That is to say, nuclear weapons can in fact substitute for conventional inferiority, in particular when one side has more troops or more advanced conventional weapons than the other.

Unilateral measures coincident with fulfillment of military requirements or budgetary considerations are expected to be announced by both sides from

time to time for their political impact as steps toward peace, and in the hope that the announcement will stimulate a similar response by the other side. Such measures might include shut-down of fissionable material production, destruction of obsolescent equipment, and total or selected cessation of weapon system production. Each side may seek propaganda advantages by selecting measures which the other side will find politically difficult or undesirable to implement. The pace, nature, and scope of arms control and disarmament measures during the period will be dependent largely upon the economic burden of armaments, concern over stability of the world balance of power, emergence of nuclear capable third powers, and the mutual desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or surprise attack. In any case, it is possible that—in order both to achieve stabilization and to meet world pressures for reducing the danger of war—the two sides will undertake tacit agreements resulting in some degree of arms limitation.

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#### *4. The Soviet Bloc Threat*

a. *General.* While striving to improve Soviet Bloc security, especially that of the USSR, the Soviet rulers will attempt to advance toward their overall objective of achieving a communist world under Soviet leadership.

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#### *d. Future Trends in Soviet Military Programs*

(1) *Strategic Attack Forces.* In the buildup of strategic strike forces, the Soviets have recently been placing major emphasis upon weapons for inter-continental attack, particularly ICBMs. It is believed that the Soviet ICBM force will grow in numbers and improve in quality, as will their missile submarine force, and they will continue to possess a significant though reduced force of bombers. In the ICBM force, qualitative improvement will be emphasized; it is believed that the Soviets will introduce follow-on systems characterized by better accuracy, larger payloads, better reliability, and easier handling and maintenance. It is believed that they will also attempt to improve survivability by deploying

a greater proportion of their ICBMs in hard sites, by providing their submarines with the recently developed submerged launch ballistic missiles which have longer range than their present surface launched missiles and by increasing the readiness of their strategic forces. If current estimates are correct, it would appear that the Soviets would not be able during the period of this plan to pursue successfully a strategy of attacking US nuclear striking forces prior to launch to such an extent that damage inflicted by US retaliatory strikes could be considered acceptable, but they will have a force capable of attacking major US cities and a portion of US nuclear delivery forces or, alternatively, of varying the relative weight of effort on these two target systems. Similarly, the Soviet Union probably would have a significant capability for retaliation even after an initial US attack. It is believed that Soviet strategic attack forces intended for Eurasian operations are nearing planned levels. The large missile forces deployed primarily against Europe will probably remain at about their present size, but survivability will be enhanced through hardening and possibly by the introduction of ground mobile systems. The medium bomber force will probably decline in size over the next several years, but capabilities will probably improve with the continued introduction of supersonic aircraft. Thus, the Soviets will maintain massive forces for strategic attack in Eurasia and will improve these forces.

(2) *Strategic Defense Forces.* Although the Soviets are aware of planned reductions in US bomber forces, this threat will remain a matter of great concern for the period of this estimate. The massive defenses deployed over the past several years provide a measure of the Soviets' concern with this problem, and evidence indicates that the Soviets are continuing to strengthen these defenses. The total number of interceptor aircraft will probably decline, but a larger percentage of the remaining force will be all-weather types. Deployment of the SA-3 for low-altitude defense probably will continue in order to supplement the existing medium and high altitude defenses around the more important targets and astride what the Soviets consider to be the more likely peripheral penetration routes. It is possible that more attention will be given to sheltering the civil population from fallout, but in view of construction needs in the economy, it is doubted that a large-scale shelter program will be undertaken. The Soviets might hope through development and deployment of an

antimissile system to offset US strategic superiority to some extent. The available evidence leads to the conclusion that the Soviets have not yet been successful in developing effective and reliable systems for defense against strategic missiles. It is believed that the Soviets would not regard as acceptable for wide-scale deployment any ABM system that does not have continuous readiness and an almost instantaneous reaction time together with a very high level of accuracy, reliability, and discrimination. Considering the effort devoted to ABM development, it is possible, though by no means certain, that the Soviets will achieve such a system within the period of this appraisal. When and if a satisfactory system is developed, the Soviet leaders will have to consider the great cost of large-scale deployment. They would almost certainly wish to defend key urban-industrial areas and they may seek to defend some portion of their ICBM force in order to strengthen their deterrent. Beyond these generalizations, the extent to which they would commit resources to ABM defenses cannot be estimated.

(3) *Soviet Ground Forces*. The Soviet ground forces are formidable and modern, with a large number of combat strength divisions backed up by a large mobilization potential. All presently existing divisions have been at least nominally converted to one of three types: tank, motorized rifle, or airborne. The modernization program has made heavy demands on resources in short supply in the USSR, and it is believed that Soviet ground force capabilities are still adversely affected by quantitative and qualitative deficiencies in equipment. During the past several years, the Soviets have reduced the total number of their divisions and have also reduced the proportion maintained at high levels of combat readiness. It is estimated that the total number of Soviet divisions lies in the range 110–140 and that 60–75 of these are now maintained at combat strength, i.e., at 85 percent or more of total authorized wartime personnel strength. The remainder are at either reduced strength (60–70 percent of authorized personnel) or at cadre strength (25 percent or less). The modernization of Soviet ground forces will continue. The extent of improvement, however, will be closely related to trends in total size; the larger the forces which the USSR, elects to retain, the more it will have to contend with obsolescence and shortages. The Soviets may, therefore, choose to maintain a smaller number of ground divisions which could be kept at a

higher state of readiness. If the Soviets decide that they must seriously respond to the contingency of non-nuclear warfare, they will probably provide increased combat support as well as increased service support. Present trends in the ground weapons development program point to a continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. The Soviets could probably have the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons which they would consider requisite for theater forces within two or three years, unless priority is given to air and missile defense warheads. Soviet procedures for the control and use of such weapons are likely to improve significantly. More and better general purpose vehicles and increased reliance on pipelines will reduce somewhat the Soviet dependence on rail lines for logistic support. In recent years, Soviet theater forces have acquired important tactical missile capabilities, including unguided rockets and ballistic and cruise missiles. Nuclear and toxic chemical bombs and warheads have been provided for tactical use; it is believed that their release is kept under strict political control. During the past year, the Soviets appear to have modified somewhat their expectation that any major conflict in Europe would either be nuclear from the start or would inevitably escalate. Their recent writings indicate that some thought has been given to the possibility of non-nuclear war in Europe. While Soviet capabilities to conduct non-nuclear warfare remain formidable, efforts to gear their theater forces for nuclear operations have had some adverse effects on conventional capabilities.

Of interest, the Soviet use of tactical nuclear weapons and “toxic chemical bombs and warheads” are grouped in the same paragraph. While U.S. plans during World War 2 were to use chemical weapons at the strategic level, Cold War plans saw them as supporting tactical operations. However, both tactical nuclear weapons and chemical weapons are considered unconventional.

(4) *Strategic Deployment Capability.* In recent years, the USSR has increased its concern with areas remote from its borders, and the Cuban venture shows that it can deploy small ground and air contingents to distant areas and maintain them once deployed. However, there is no

evidence that the USSR has established any special military component trained and equipped specifically for independent small scale operations, and it is severely limited in airlift, sealift, and naval support suitable for distant, limited military operations. It is possible that over the next few years the Soviets will seek to improve their capabilities for such operations through the designation and training of appropriate forces, and the development of equipment specifically for their use and logistic support. They may attempt to overcome their geographic disadvantages for applying such forces by negotiations with neutralist countries to utilize available facilities for refueling and maintenance of Soviet military aircraft or naval ships.

(5) *Naval Forces.* Much of the impetus for change in the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by US carrier task forces and missile submarines. The Soviets now have operational about 45 ballistic missile submarines—nine of them nuclear-powered—which carry a combined total of about 125 short-range (350 nm) missiles designed for surfaced launching. The USSR is developing longer range missiles for launching from submerged submarines. In addition, the Soviets have developed submarine-launched cruise missiles, which are probably designed primarily for use against ships but could be employed against land targets. In mid-1967, the Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and about 20 nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they will probably have initiated routine submarine patrols within missile range of the United States. The USSR's capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable of mounting a large scale torpedo attack and mining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Its capabilities for operations near the continental United States are more limited, but are growing. Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved by the conversion of jet bombers to employ anti-ship missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement of ASW forces in coastal areas and in the open seas. It is believed the Soviet Navy is capable of

carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that it has a negligible ASW capability in the open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, it is believed that over the next five years, the USSR will be able to achieve only a limited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance on submarines operating in the open seas.

(6) *Tactical Aviation and Missiles.* It is believed that the Soviets will continue to modernize Tactical Aviation, improving its ground attack capabilities in particular. It is expected that the rate of modernization will increase over the next few years, and that tactical aircraft with much improved range and payload characteristics will be introduced. It is expected that there will be a gradual decline in total numbers of tactical aircraft. The numbers of guided missiles in Soviet theater forces will probably remain about constant, but new and improved systems will probably be introduced. It appears likely that additional free rocket launchers will be assigned to divisions. Field force air defense capabilities will improve over the next few years through the modernization of Tactical Aviation and probably through the introductions of the SA-3 or follow-on SAM systems into ground formations. It is believed that a transportable ABM system for field force defense against ballistic missiles having ranges of several hundred nm could probably achieve operational status during 1964. There is no basis for determining the extent to which such a system may be deployed, but it seems likely that considerable improvement of defenses against aircraft would be a prerequisite to deploying an ABM vulnerable to aircraft attack.

(7) *Nuclear Weapons.* In the extensive 1961–1962 nuclear test series, the Soviets probably satisfied their most pressing weapons test requirements. Research and development in this field over the next few years will probably continue to focus upon the exploitation of these test results, and their translation into weapons. The Soviet weapons stockpile still consists largely of weapons developed from tests conducted before the moratorium of 1958. It is estimated that, in general, a minimum of about two years is required after testing before a new nuclear weapon begins to enter stockpile. Thus, some weapons developed in the 1961–1962 test series are probably now entering inventory, with priority probably given to strategic

weapons, particularly ICBM warheads. Probable trends in stockpile weapons include higher yields for strategic weapons and a broader spectrum of weapons for tactical use. As the stockpile of fissionable materials grows, restrictions on the availability of weapons for tactical use and for strategic defense will ease.

(8) *Chemical Warfare*. It is believed that the USSR now possesses a substantial chemical warfare capability based on extensive stocks of CW agents, a variety of chemical munitions, including warheads for tactical rockets and missiles, and a wide range of defensive equipment. The Soviet CW research and development program continues to be active on a scale generally comparable with that in the US. Current efforts are focused on developing new toxic agents and munitions for their delivery. The lack of a satisfactory method for timely nerve agent detection remains a major weakness. Many studies potentially applicable to discovery and development of nonlethal incapacitating agents are in process, and a new agent of this type could appear at any time.

**Para 4d(8)**—The Johnson administration continued the robust development of chemical munitions begun during the Kennedy administration. Agent BZ, an incapacitating agent, was introduced into the Army's inventory around 1961, but it was unclear exactly how it was to be used. While the Army did have chemical detector kits, these were manually operated to identify what hit your unit, not to warn them to mask up. There were no reliable automatic chemical agent detectors until the M8 system was fielded in 1968.

(9) *Space Weapons*. On the basis of evidence presently available, it is not possible to determine the existence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space, apart from the Cosmos photographic satellites, which probably perform military support functions. However, it is believed the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for offensive and defensive weapon systems. Soviet decisions to develop military space systems will depend on their expected costs and effectiveness as compared with alternative systems, possible political advantages or disadvantages, and the Soviet estimate of US intentions and

capabilities in comparable fields. For accomplishing military missions it is believed that within this decade, orbital weapons will not compare favorably with ICBMs in terms of reaction time, targeting flexibility, vulnerability, average life, and positive control. In view of these considerations, the much greater cost of orbital weapon systems, and Soviet endorsement of the UN resolution against nuclear weapons in space, it is believed that the Soviets are unlikely to develop and deploy an orbital weapon system of military significance within the period of this estimate. If they should nevertheless do so, developmental testing should be observable at least a year or two prior to their attainment of an accurate, reliable system. In the defensive weapons field, it is believed that the Soviets intend to develop a capability to counter US military satellites. By modification of existing equipment, including air defense early warning radars and ballistic missiles, the Soviets probably could develop a limited anti-satellite capability within a few months after a decision had been made to do so. Evidence indicating that the Soviets have made such a decision is not available. The Soviets could also be working toward a system designed specifically for satellite interception, but it is almost certain that no such system is operational at present. The use of co-orbiting satellites or other advanced techniques during the period of this estimate seems much less likely.

(10) Soviet Bloc leaders probably continue to view their combined military power as adequate to meet military situations in Eurasia in which the nuclear capabilities of the Western Powers are not involved. They probably also conclude that they possess sufficient military power to deter the West from launching general war except under extreme threat to vital national or common interests. They almost certainly conclude that in the event of general war their military power would be unable to prevent unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union.

*e. Deterrence.* The Soviets see the present situation as one in which both sides are deterred from deliberately initiating general war or from knowingly initiating courses of action which would involve grave risk of such a war. They undoubtedly recognize the superiority of the United States in strategic power, but they are confident that they possess a credible deterrent based on both their massive capabilities against Eurasia

and their growing intercontinental striking forces. Thus, the Soviet leaders do not regard the deliberate initiation of general war as a feasible course of action either for themselves or for the West. Moreover, despite increased Soviet attention to the possibility of limited wars with the West, it is believed that they will remain very reluctant to commit their own forces to such wars. In this situation the Soviets would take the opportunity to conduct aggressive maneuvers of many sorts and to undertake a comprehensive effort aimed at attaining a military technological breakthrough.

(1) In strategic terms, this line of policy suggests that presently, and for some time to come, the Soviet strategic forces will be numerically inferior to those of the US and more vulnerable to attack. The Soviet leaders must recognize, therefore, that the US would enjoy a considerable advantage should it strike first, and that the relative invulnerability, the fast reaction time, and the mobility of US strategic power make a Soviet first strike completely irrational. Nevertheless, in assessing the military balance, the Soviets are confident that they possess a credible deterrent based on both their massive capabilities to devastate Eurasia and their growing intercontinental striking power. Thus, the Soviets see the present situation as one in which both sides are deterred from deliberately initiating general war or from knowingly initiating courses of action which would involve grave risk of such a war. The increasing nuclear capability of the US and USSR will continue to have a restraining influence on both sides and will influence the type of conflict and tend to reduce the level and intensity of conflict which might occur.

(2) Soviet decisions as to force structure and military programs over the next several years are likely to be made in the context of a situation in which, although the US enjoys a clear strategic advantage, a condition of rough mutual deterrence exists. The Soviets will seek to improve their strategic capabilities vis-a-vis the US; however, policy decisions will be influenced by the continuing strain on economic resources, and the pressure arising from competition with the US in scientific and technological developments with military applications. Such decisions will be greatly influenced also by the Soviet estimate of the political situation,

the opportunities which it affords, and the contribution which military power can make to the realization of these opportunities.

(3) It is believed that in these circumstances the primary concern of Soviet policy will be to continue to strengthen their deterrent against US attack primarily through a gradual buildup of ICBMs, hardening of sites, and increased mobility through missile submarines. At one time the Soviets may have considered an attempt to achieve capabilities sufficient to neutralize US strategic forces in a first strike, and they almost certainly have also considered the lesser goal of achieving rough parity with the US in intercontinental weapon systems. In the aftermath of Cuba they may have considered a substantial increase in their military effort. Evidence does not indicate, however, that the Soviets are presently attempting to match the US in numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles. Recognition that the US would detect and match or overmatch such an effort, together with economic constraints, appears to have ruled out this option. On the other hand, available evidence on the development of large nuclear warheads and compatible delivery vehicles strongly suggests that the Soviets may be seeking to improve their position relative to the West by increasing the destructive power of their numerically inferior intercontinental strategic attack forces.

(4) Continuation of present lines of policy will ensure the Soviets of a growing credibility for their deterrent. However, the dynamism of Soviet policy depends to a great extent on the proposition that the balance of forces in the world is shifting in favor of the communist world. The Sino-Soviet rupture has already badly damaged this thesis, as has the inability of the Soviets to match the West in military power. It is conceivable that at some point a Soviet leadership would come to believe that they had to forego their expansionist aims, unless they could greatly improve their relative military strength, or at least refurbish the world's image of this strength. They might even be willing to make new economic sacrifices or assume some risks in order to accomplish this. What precise programs they might undertake in pursuit of such an aim cannot now be stated, but it cannot be ruled out that changes in the scale or character of Soviet programs could come about in this way.

(5) On the question of how a general war might begin, most Soviet military writings assume deliberate, surprise attack by the US, although some consider escalation from limited war and a few allow for the possibility that general war would begin accidentally. The criticality of the initial period of a nuclear war and the importance of surprise have led some military writers to advocate a form of pre-emptive action by the USSR: i.e., a “spoiling” or “blunting” action launched coincident with or slightly before an enemy attack. However, known doctrinal discussions do not consider a Soviet first strike. In the standard scenario, the USSR survives a nuclear attack, regains the initiative, and goes on to prosecute the war.

(6) Current Soviet doctrine holds that a general war will inevitably involve the large-scale use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, beginning with a strategic exchange which may decide the course and outcome of the war in its initial phase, a relatively brief but not clearly defined period of time. To the Soviets, the importance of this phase implies the necessity to use all available forces at the outset of a general war; the doctrinal writings which are available have noted and rejected such US concepts as controlled response and damage limiting strategies. Moreover, no restraint is evident in targeting concepts for the initial phase of a general war; while enemy nuclear striking forces are evidently to be the primary targets of Soviet nuclear strikes, powerful nuclear blows are also to be directed against communication and control centers, industrial and population centers, and groupings of enemy armed forces.

(7) Despite the primary role attributed to nuclear and missile forces, current Soviet doctrine envisions the commitment of large theater forces virtually at the outset of a general war. It is argued that, even if the war is relatively short, large forces of all types would be required to defeat comparable enemy forces, to overrun base areas, and to occupy territory in Eurasia. Moreover, it is also held that the conflict may be protracted rather than brief and that, in this case, extensive theater campaigns would be required. Thus, current Soviet doctrine supports a military policy emphasizing strategic attack and defense capabilities, but supports as well the maintenance of large general purpose forces for use in all phases of general war.

(8) It is believed that debate continues, not only over subsidiary propositions, but over central tenets of doctrine as well. Certain key issues, such as the decisiveness of the initial phase, evidently remain unresolved. Moreover, certain vital questions seem to have been ignored. For example, while purporting to deal with a global war in which all types of weapons are employed, the current military writings to which there is access, concern themselves almost exclusively with theater forces in Europe. Adequate consideration is not given to the effects of a strategic nuclear exchange on subsequent operations. Virtually no attention is given to the way in which a general war might be brought to a successful conclusion; it seems to be assumed either that US society would collapse as the result of the initial nuclear attack, or that in a long war the Soviet system would prove the more durable.

f. *Miscalculation.* Soviet strategy recognizes that, while general war is unlikely, it cannot be excluded as the result of miscalculation by either side or as the outcome of a crisis in which both sides become progressively committed. The Soviets are unable to be certain in advance what the circumstances surrounding the beginning of a general war would be. A miscalculation could occur if the Soviets misjudged either the importance to the West of an issue and the actions which the West might take in support of its position, or even the consequences of the policies being pursued by a third party associated with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, such a crisis might arise should the West miscalculate in a similar way.

g. *Pre-emptive attack.* If the Soviet leaders were ever absolutely certain that the West was irrevocably committed to an imminent strategic nuclear attack against them, there is little question that they would themselves strike pre-emptively. Such certainty, however, on the part of any country about the intentions of another is extremely unlikely. The Soviet leaders probably conclude that it would be impossible to count upon incontrovertible advance evidence that the enemy was irrevocably committed to an imminent attack. Moreover, for the Soviet Union, the compulsion to strike first, when the threat of hostile attack is still ambiguous, declines as US missile systems become more important and less vulnerable and the advantage to be derived from a first strike

consequently decreases. This trend of Soviet thinking is suggested by assertions that an aggressor cannot neutralize the retaliatory capability of a powerful opponent. Nevertheless, a surprise attack—that is to say, one delivered in a period of no particular tension and after entirely secret military preparations—is the only one which would give the Soviet Union a chance of destroying any significant part of the Western nuclear strike capability before it could be launched. Therefore, in spite of its unlikelihood, it remains a possible, though improbable course of action for the Soviet Union.

h. *Escalation.* A number of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general war. While such statements are intended in part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view also reflects a genuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably also extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some Western military action on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involved in a limited war with the US or Allied forces, it is believed that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately into general war, but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary to achieve their local objectives. They would also seek to prevent escalation both by restraints in the employment of their own forces and by political means. In view of the increasingly grave consequences of escalation, it is believed that over the next few years the Soviets will remain very reluctant to commit their own forces to limited warfare against Western forces. Despite recent Soviet references to the possibility of limited war involving tactical nuclear weapons, it is considered highly unlikely that the USSR would introduce such weapons into a limited conflict. The Soviet doctrinal debate, as far as it is known, has not dealt with limited war; it is therefore

possible that discussion has been limited by official attitudes. Public Soviet statements have usually insisted that a limited war which involved the major nuclear powers would inevitably escalate into general war. Official pronouncements to this effect have almost certainly been designed in large part to deter the West from the local use of force, but they probably also reflected Soviet fears of becoming involved in limited war. The Soviets now appear to be modifying their position to allow for the possibility that even a limited war involving the major nuclear powers would not necessarily escalate to general war. They may now be persuaded that in the present strategic situation, the initial military reactions to a local crisis would be limited, and that it is therefore, not in the Soviet national interest to be doctrinally committed to inevitable escalation.

#### 5. Chinese Communist Threat

a. *General.* Communist China's foreign policy will probably continue generally along current lines. Peiping will remain strongly anti-American and will strive to weaken the US position, especially in Asia, but is unlikely, knowingly, to assume great risks. Communist China's military force will probably not be used overtly except in defense of its own borders or to assert territorial claims against India. However, in the event that military operations against Communist Asian allies constitute, in the ChiCom view, a threat against ChiCom territory, their military forces may be employed overtly. Subversion and covert support of local revolutions will continue to be Communist China's primary mode of operation in Southeast Asia and, to a necessarily more limited degree, elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

b. *Modernization of Armed Forces.* The modernization of the armed forces, which was progressing steadily until about 1960, has practically ended, except for the continued introduction of radar and certain other electronic equipment. Domestic fabrication of fighter aircraft and submarines has ceased and inventories are being reduced by deterioration and cannibalization. In general, the Army has been less affected than the other Services.

c. *Advanced Weapons*

(1) The intelligence data available do not permit a high degree of confidence in estimating the future development of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, and this appraisal is made in light of this general caution.

**Para 5c**—“Advanced weapons” appears to be another name for nuclear weapons; chemical and biological weapons were not considered to be “advanced.” Policymakers understood the primacy of nuclear weapons, and the Chinese nuclear program was the issue of the day.

(2) The Chinese Communists have given high priority to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. If the normal number of difficulties are encountered a plutonium device might be tested in late 1964 or 1965, or even later depending upon the extent of difficulties. Beginning the year after a first detonation, the single reactor thus far identified could produce enough material for only one or two crude weapons a year. The Chinese have a few bombers which could carry bulky weapons of early design.

(3) Communist China is probably concentrating on a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) system of basically Soviet design, either the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The earliest date either missile would be ready for deployment is believed to be 1967. It is unlikely that a compatible nuclear warhead would be available until 3 or 4 years after a first detonation.

(4) The detonation of a nuclear device would boost domestic morale. Although it is possible that the ChiCom leaders would experience a dangerous degree of over-confidence, it is more likely that they will concentrate on furthering their established policies to:

(a) Utilize their nuclear capability to enhance their political position as a world power, particularly with respect to the developing nations,

(b) Force their way into world disarmament discussions and other world councils,

(c) Overawe their neighbors and soften them for Chinese-directed communist subversion, and

(d) Tout Chinese-style communism as the best route for an underdeveloped nation to achieve industrial and scientific modernity. In pursuing these policies, increased confidence of ChiCom leaders would doubtless be reflected in their approach to conflicts on the periphery of Communist China.

*d. Domestic Production.* Communist China almost certainly intends to achieve domestic production of all necessary weapons and materiel for its armed forces. It has a long way to go before reaching this goal, however. The Chinese at present are probably unable to produce even MIG-17s entirely by themselves, and it will be a number of years before they can design and produce more advanced types of military aircraft. Indeed they may have chosen instead to concentrate their limited resources on missiles. Their wholly domestic naval shipbuilding capacity is likely to be restricted to surface ships of the smaller types during the next few years.

*e. Military Policy.* The decline in the relative effectiveness of Communist China's military equipment and weapons is likely to temper its policy, especially in circumstances where it might confront US armed power or sizable US-equipped Asian forces. However, the Chinese Communist Army will continue to be the strongest in Asia and will provide a powerful backing for Chinese Communist foreign policy. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably place additional demands on Chinese military dispositions and capabilities, since one of the consequences of China's new "independence" from the USSR will be the need to keep a closer watch than previously on the long China-Russian border which the Chinese still consider a "difficult" and "unsettled" question. Her slowly developing nuclear weapon and missile capability will increase an already considerable military advantage over Asian neighbors. However, for the foreseeable future she will not approach the advanced weapons might of the United States or USSR, particularly in the field of long-range striking power. For this reason, among others, the ChiComs would be unlikely to

attribute a decisive importance to modern weaponry. They would probably continue to rely primarily on a huge ground force and, unless confident of Soviet support, would try to avoid hostilities which might escalate into nuclear war. Considering the chances of retaliation, it is difficult to conceive of any situation in which Communist China would be likely to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the next decade or so.

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This document is identified as document 56 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d56>.

## **National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 21, 1964

NIE 4-64

### LIKELIHOOD OF A PROLIFERATION OF BW AND CW CAPABILITIES

#### The Problem

To assess the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to achieve biological and lethal chemical warfare capabilities during the next three years or so.

#### Scope Note

This estimate excludes the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, since these countries have been considered in NIE 11-10-63: "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical Warfare," dated 27 December 1963, Secret;<sup>2</sup> and NIE 11-6-64: "Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare," dated 26 August 1964, Secret.<sup>3</sup> These

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates 4, Arms and Disarmament, Box 1. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. A cover sheet, prefatory note, title page, and table of contents are not printed. According to the prefatory note, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. Representatives of the State Department, DIA, and NSA concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates 11-64, USSR, Box 3.

estimates also contain general information on BW and CW agents, delivery systems, military doctrine, and defense measures.

Our consideration of BW agents includes all those suitable for use against personnel, livestock, crops, and materiel; consideration of CW agents excludes incapacitating and riot control agents, and smoke, flame, and defoliant chemicals.

This estimate does not concern itself with BW or CW as instruments for clandestine use in assassination, small-scale terrorism, and the like.

Translation: small-scale use of CBRN hazards is not a WMD incident, or at least not a top national security issue. This important policy point is still lost on many defense analysts today.

### Summary and Conclusions

A. For any reasonably modernized state, and even for many of the less developed nations, there are few obstacles in the way of acquiring at least some BW and CW capability. The technology underlying BW and CW is widely known or easily obtainable through open sources; the physical facilities required to develop and produce agents are in great part quite easily adaptable from existing chemical and pharmaceutical facilities; the means of delivery comprise a wide range of conventional weapons and even non-military equipment; and, overall, the costs are relatively small, at least for an offensive capability appropriate to most states' conceivable needs. (Paras. 8–12)

B. Yet despite these considerations, there is not now a trend toward the proliferation of BW or CW capabilities in the world. Such proliferation could occur during the next few years, notably through a snowballing process of mounting fear and suspicion, and of action and reaction on the part of particular sets of adversaries among the middle and smaller powers, but proliferation cannot now be judged likely. (Paras. 17–24)

In 1964, industrial capability and technical knowledge to create CB weapons was limited to the major powers. Today, the case is often made that the spread of technical knowledge and greater access to industrial capability equates to a greater CB weapons threat. However, that assertion doesn't match against known lack of development of CB weapons by nation-states or sub-state groups.

C. A number of factors work to restrain BW and CW proliferation. The very fact that many states could achieve a capability with relative ease gives these weapons the quality of a two-edge sword. Prudence would dictate that countries deciding to acquire an offensive or retaliatory capability should also undertake to develop a defensive capability, and the requirements of doing so would add to the price, almost prohibitively if adequate provision were made for civilian needs. Most military doctrine on CW, and even more so on BW, lays emphasis on the defensive aspects of the problem, which is some evidence of a reluctance to be the first user. And finally, there exists an almost universal popular moral and psychological abhorrence of these forms of munitions, which adds to official reluctance to contemplate their use. (Paras. 2-7, 17-24)

*[3 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) and 4-line table not declassified]*  
(Paras. 1, 16)

G. Almost any semi-industrialized country could easily acquire token native capabilities in either field (i.e., enough for one or two attacks on important targets). Any country could quietly acquire through commercial channels at least a token capability in the less toxic World War I-type CW agents. (Paras. 1, 16)

Of course this statement is still true today, but that's not the point. The question is what the motivations of the country are (next paragraph) and whether U.S. forces would fail to complete their combat missions as a result of such attacks (and the answer is "no").

H. Present evidence does not warrant an estimate that any nation is now determined to achieve a meaningful operational capability in either BW or CW during the next few years. We believe that most states will remain reluctant to do so. Nonetheless, some may proceed toward this goal, as a deterrent or retaliatory measure in case a potential adversary develops a capability, as a supplement to nuclear weapons, or possibly as the best available substitute for them. [*3 lines of source text not declassified*] (Paras. 17–24)

[Here follow the Discussion section (pages 4–8); Part II. Capabilities (pages 8–9); Part III. Intentions (pages 9–11); and Appendix (page 13).]

This document is identified as document 76 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d76>.

**Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 16, 1965

JCSM-112-65

SUBJECT

Draft Policy Paper—Chemical and Biological Warfare (U)

1. Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-29945/64, dated 10 December 1964, subject as above, which forwarded a draft, “National Policy Paper—Chemical and Biological Warfare,” for comment and recommendation, plus draft national policy paper.<sup>2</sup>

b. A memorandum by the Director, Correspondence and Directives Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated 31 December 1964, subject as above,<sup>3</sup> which advised that the primary goal of the draft policy paper is the preparation of a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), that efforts should be focused accordingly, and that detailed comment on the background material is not required.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 1266, 385 Methods and Manner of Conducting War 1965. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Neither the draft paper nor the December 10 memorandum attached to it is printed. (Ibid.) The words “plus draft national policy paper” were added by hand.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

c. JCSM-184-64, dated 13 May 1964, subject: "Chemical and Biological Weapons,"<sup>4</sup> which forwarded to you draft responses to items of chemical and biological information requested by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

d. JCSM-404-64, dated 13 May 1964, subject: "Chemical and Biological Weapons,"<sup>5</sup> which forwarded to you supplemental information for the coordinated State/Defense review of chemical and biological policy.

2. The draft national policy paper, forwarded by reference 1a, includes an abstract which contains specific statements of chemical and biological policy. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this abstract are reflected in the line-in line-out recommendations attached at Appendix A.<sup>6</sup>

3. In accordance with the request in reference 1b, a proposed NSAM based on the policy views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in this revised abstract, is attached at Appendix B. In the event that substantive changes are considered necessary to the proposed NSAM, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the opportunity to review and comment on such changes.

4. The draft paper in reference 1a was useful in the consideration of national policy for chemical and biological weapons. However, the source information contained in references 1c and 1d provides a more comprehensive consideration of chemical and biological operations and it is suggested that it be used as the primary source in support of the proposed national chemical and biological policy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**L.J. Kirn**<sup>7</sup>  
*Rear Admiral, USN*  
*Deputy Director, Joint Staff*

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<sup>4</sup> A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 320 (29 Oct 63).

<sup>5</sup> A copy is *ibid.*, Sec. 2

<sup>6</sup> Neither Appendix A nor B is printed.

<sup>7</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Kirn signed the original.

## **MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1965

General Westmoreland has requested a reaffirmation of his authority to use standard riot control munitions in certain specified combat situations in South Vietnam and Ambassador Lodge has supported his request. This authority would extend only to lacrimatory agents (tear gas) known as CS and CN. Use of nausea-producing agents DM and CN-DM would not be authorized.

The agents would be used primarily to clear tunnels, caves, and underground shelters in cases where their use will lead to far fewer casualties and less loss of life than would the combat alternatives which involve high explosive or flame munitions. Of particular importance would be the reduction in casualties to civilians who are inevitably mingled with hostile military elements as the result of VC tactics.

I agree with General Westmoreland that the use of these riot control agents far outweighs disadvantages that may accrue; in fact there is every indication that we may be in for censure if civilian casualties should accrue because we didn't use tear gas. The disadvantages to which I refer are the likelihood of some sharp international criticism, spurred by Communist propaganda, of the U.S. Government authorizing the employment of what will inevitably be called "poison gas".

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

And here is the crux of the problem: there was no denying that tear gas was militarily effective. The stuff worked, the effects were temporary and generally not harmful, and given scenarios of ununiformed irregulars mixing with South Vietnamese civilians, it was a good option, particularly for law enforcement efforts. There was a deliberate misperception by some arms control advocates and anti-war critics that any weapon employing a chemical was the same as a toxic chemical munition—a perception that was picked up and echoed by the media. At the least, the (untested) idea that use of riot control agents might escalate to toxic chemical weapons use was one that troubled arms control advocates.

Unless you indicate otherwise I will reaffirm to General Wheeler the current national approval for use of the riot control agents CS and CN under the combat conditions described above.

Secretary Rusk concurs in this recommendation.

If you approve, the Department of State will send a message to all posts informing them of the decision and providing public affairs guidance.

(signed)  
**Robert S. McNamara**

This document is identified as document 118 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d118>.

**Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 7, 1966

JCSM-147-66

SUBJECT

Military Strategy for Fiscal Years 1968 Through 1975

1. JCSM-15-66,<sup>2</sup> dated 10 January 1966, subject: “Changes and Revisions in Content and Transmittal Procedures of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), Parts I-V and Part VI (U), “informed you of certain procedural changes instituted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the JSOP.

2. Transmitted herewith are:

a. A resume of the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning over-all military strategy for the period 2-10 years hence (Appendix A).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 3130 (10 Dec 65) Sec 1 IR 5216. Top Secret. The memorandum forms Enclosure A to a report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 28 (JCS 2143/268-2), which was revised on March 7 or later to indicate revisions in Enclosure A and Appendix A to Enclosure A, several pages of which bear the typed note: “Revised by Decision—7 March 1966” or “Revised” followed by the March 1, 3, or 4 dates.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure A to JCS 2143/268-1. [Footnote in the source text. JCSM-15-65 has not been found.]

b. Tentative major force-level decision-issues which the Joint Chiefs of Staff will address in Part VI of the JSOP (Appendix B).<sup>3</sup>

c. Parts I–V of JSOP 68–75<sup>4</sup> (Appendix C, forwarded separately).

3. Force levels considered necessary to implement this strategy together with supporting rationale will be forwarded as Part VI of JSOP 68–75 about mid-March 1966. At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide you with their analyses and recommendations on the major decision-issues listed in Appendix B.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the separate force analyses of the draft memorandums for the President, prepared for the upcoming budget year, be developed within the context of the over-all military strategy contained in Appendix A as supported by the more detailed treatment in JSOP 68–75. They further recommend that Appendix A be utilized as the principal basis for your draft memorandums for the President on over-all US military strategy and force levels for Fiscal Years 1968 through 1975.

5. Without attachments, this memorandum is Unclassified.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Earle G. Wheeler<sup>5</sup>**  
*Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff*

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Enclosure A to JCS 2143/260. [Footnote in the source text. JSOP 68–75 has not been found.]

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

## **Appendix A<sup>6</sup>**

### MILITARY STRATEGY FOR FY 1968 THROUGH 1975 (U)

#### Part I

#### Introduction

##### *General*

1. (U) The basic missions of the US Armed Forces are two: (1) to deter or deal decisively with any military attack against the United States and its possessions and (2) to protect and project US interests on a global basis in support of national goals.

##### *National Goals*

2. (U) Five major goals<sup>7</sup> of US foreign policy are:
- a. To deter or defeat aggression at any level, whether of nuclear attack or limited war or subversion and guerrilla tactics.
  - b. To bring about a closer association of the more industrialized democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia in promoting the security and prosperity of the Free World.
  - c. To help the less developed countries carry through their revolution of modernization without sacrificing their independence.
  - d. To assist in the gradual emergence of a genuine world community, based on cooperation and law, through the establishment and development

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<sup>6</sup> Top Secret. A title page and table of contents are not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Department of State pamphlet "Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy," 24 September 1962; and Department of Defense "Commanders Digest," 12 February 1966. [Footnote in the source text. The text of the former, issued as Department of State Publication 7432, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 15, 1962, pp. 547–558. The Department of Defense publication has not been found.]

of such organs as the United Nations, the World Court, the World Bank and Monetary Fund, and other global and regional institutions.

e. To search for means of reducing the risk of war, of narrowing the areas of conflict with the communist world, and of encouraging the re-emergence in communist countries of the nationalism and individualism which are already changing and dividing the once-solid communist bloc.

3. (C) The United States must take an active part in shaping a world compatible with freedom or yield to the communist powers a major opportunity to shape the world to our disadvantage. The role of US military forces in this concept is (1) primarily, to deter the use of hostile force and, if deterrence fails, to enable the United States together with its allies to defeat the enemy, and (2) secondarily, to participate in nonwar diplomatic, economic, and psychological operations to the degree their unique capabilities and their primary role permit. Derived from the national goals and fundamental military role for US forces are basic military objectives.

*Military Objectives*

4. (S) Four basic military objectives of the United States are:

a. Protect and defend the United States and preserve both its status and freedom of action as a dominant world power. The military forces required to achieve this objective must first be capable of deterring or dealing effectively with any military attack against the United States.

b. Be capable of supporting US world-wide interests. The military forces of the United States should be able, in conjunction with allied and friendly forces as available, to deter or deal effectively with any military attacks against other areas essential to US security.

c. Support US foreign policy and diplomatic efforts abroad. Included herein are military programs to assist friendly governments in the prevention and defeat of subversion, insurgency, and aggression which threatens their survival. Concomitant tasks of US forces are the capability to protect US property as well as US and selected nationals and their

properties as required. This responsibility extends, as appropriate, to ensuring the freedom of the sea, air, and space regions for the United States and friendly powers and to denying their use for purposes adverse to US interests.

d. Maintain active forces in a high state of readiness, strategically deployed, mobile, and adequately supported to conduct military operations so as to achieve US objectives, minimize damage to the United States and her allies, and force a conclusion of hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States and its allies, while keeping hostilities at the lowest scale of conflict commensurate with the achievement of US objectives.

#### *Strategic Considerations*

5. (TS) The overall strategic concept designed to support US national goals and achieve US military objectives is to prevent or to defeat aggression wherever and whenever US national interests are adversely affected. This requires (1) a military posture of sufficient strength and flexibility to permit exercise of the initiative by the United States in the conduct of military, political, and economic affairs and (2) the coordination and exploitation to best advantage of all instruments of national power. Deterrence, collective security, and flexible response are the basic elements of this concept.

6. (C) Deterrence of a nuclear exchange is the first responsibility of US strategy since national survival is clearly at stake; at the same time, US strategy must also provide for the capability to deter aggression at any lesser level of conflict. To insure deterrence, US forces must be clearly capable of making both direct and indirect attack on the United States or its interests grossly unattractive and unprofitable. The military capability to control, defeat, or destroy the enemy and the firm resolve of the United States to use its forces if required must be obvious as well as real.

7. (C) Collective security involves the acquisition, the development, and stability of those allies who can now or ultimately will contribute to US security interests world-wide.

8. (S) Flexible response is essential to the prevention of conflict escalation and is, therefore, an inextricable element of deterrence. Flexible response requires a combination of modern, mobile, and balanced forces which will permit the exercise of a wide range of options to employ military forces under varying conditions and threats to achieve US objectives.

9. (C) Translation of these considerations into a force structure depends on the interaction in the world environment between US national goals and the threat to their accomplishment.

## Part II

### Global Strategic Appraisal

#### *Threat*

1. (U) Today's world appears to be somewhere between (1) a bipolar world and a polycentric world; (2) an environment in which the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) are challenging Free World interests and an environment in which the CPR is challenging USSR as well as Free World interests; (3) a globe divided on lines of ideology and political organization and on lines of race and economic development; and (4) a world of law organized to respect the inter-dependencies of modern life and a world of conflict disorganized by competing ideologies and social turmoil.

2. (S) The most dangerous threat to US interests is posed by the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. This threat is so serious—regardless of the estimated intentions of Soviet leaders—that it must receive primary cognizance in the formulation of military strategy and in the development of adequate countering force levels. Concurrently, it must be recognized that, without ever resorting to a strategic nuclear attack, the USSR and/or the CPR could expand the communist-dominated world until the United States and its allies are finally isolated and subjected to piecemeal domination.

3. (S) The USSR now has the capability to conduct a massive nuclear attack against Eurasia with manned aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles,

and submarine-launched missiles. The Soviet strategic offensive force of ICBMs, SLCMs/SLBMs, the heavy bombers, and some medium bombers can wreak enormous damage on the United States in a first strike but cannot at the present time destroy enough of the US strategic nuclear force to preclude retaliatory destruction of the Soviet Union as a viable society. Additionally and apart from Soviet nuclear capabilities, the USSR/Warsaw Pact and the CPR have significant conventional forces which pose major threats to the Free World.

4. (TS) Without a clear belief that they would emerge as the dominant world power, Soviet leaders are not likely to initiate deliberately a strategic nuclear exchange. This does not preclude the possibility of strategic nuclear war through escalation or miscalculation. Further, the United States cannot safely discount the possibility that Soviet leaders might launch a pre-emptive strike if they considered themselves irretrievably committed in a confrontation or if they believed a nuclear attack on the USSR was imminent.

5. (S) The fact that the United States and the USSR each has the ability to inflict extensive destruction on the other, regardless of which strikes first, has a paradoxical impact on the formulation of military strategy. It decreases the likelihood of strategic nuclear war but increases the necessity that the United States maintain a balanced strategic nuclear force superior to that of the Soviet Union. It increases the importance of conventional military power but inhibits its application in direct confrontation between major powers because of the risks of escalation. It diminishes the role of lesser powers in high-intensity conflicts but enlarges their role in mid- and low-intensity conflicts.

6. (S) The US and USSR strategic nuclear capabilities are expected to remain superior to those of any other nation for the period of this appraisal, provided no unbalancing arms control or disarmament agreements are negotiated. The actual and potential nuclear capability of the United Kingdom is not considered to be in competition with US interests. France's nuclear efforts are weighted more toward a political and psychological effect than toward a direct military threat and are aimed primarily at gaining leadership in Europe. However, in the current

worldwide environment and considering the militant and sometimes irrational orientation of Chinese communist officials, the growing nuclear capability of the CPR—although expected to remain less than that of France for the next decade—constitutes a significant political, psychological, and military threat to US security interests.

7. (TS) The CPR has initiated a long-range, broad-based program in support of nuclear weapons development. A weaponized version of their 1964 fission device probably is available now in limited numbers, and Communist China at this time has some bombers—but no missiles—capable of delivering nuclear weapons. There are indications of some developmental work on ICBMs and construction of missile launching submarines; however, the CPR appears to be concentrating first on obtaining MRBMs. By 1970, the CPR could have sufficient medium range missiles and warheads to threaten peripheral states. Hence, nuclear attack and nuclear blackmail become feasible CPR courses of action in the Western Pacific-Asian area. Additionally, the CPR may be able to pose a limited nuclear threat to the United States and to the USSR by the early 1970's. Communist China certainly will attempt to exploit these capabilities, as well as its large conventional forces, to threaten its neighbors and to undermine US commitments in the Asian area without, however, subjecting its growing potential to serious risk.

8. (S) There is no longer a communist bloc in the traditional sense of a monolithic structure subservient to Moscow. Independent factions are developing because of the growing tendency of East European countries to emphasize national rather than ideological and bloc ambitions as well as because of the increasingly bitter Sino-Soviet dispute which has its deepest roots in national rather than ideological differences. The trend in Europe toward independent national policies probably will be enhanced by increased East-West trade and other forms of communications stimulated by historical orientation. Although there may be some temporary accommodations for purposes of expediency, the Sino-Soviet rift is likely to persist and, in the absence of overt war between the United States and either the USSR or the CPR, to crystallize. Competition between the USSR and CPR may intensify their activities in areas of interest to the United States; on the other hand, the rift, for as long as it continues,

lessens the magnitude of the otherwise combined military threat to the United States.

9. (S) There has been a trend toward a general stabilization of the US–USSR relationship—although this trend could be reversed suddenly. Contributing to this stabilization are the maturing of the Soviet society, the continued economic advancement of West Europe and Japan, and the divisive tendencies within the communist group of nations.

10. (C) This stabilization of US–USSR relations has significant ramifications:

a. The focal point of the cold war is shifting to the underdeveloped two-thirds of the world.

b. The cold war has become less linear and more triangular, with the CPR, the USSR, and the United States—each with its allies—at the apexes.

c. The Soviet Union and the CPR, without disavowing their intent ultimately to achieve world domination, have reoriented their strategies; i.e., the Soviets' espousal of “Wars of National Liberation” and the Chinese communists' doctrine of “People's Wars” to wear down, isolate, and destroy opposing advanced states.

11. (C) The underdeveloped world is particularly susceptible to communist insurgency because of the prevailing militant and immature nationalism coupled with the instability inherent in the modernization process. The coming decade is likely to be critical because of revolutionary trends stemming from the inability of governments to cope with social and economic problems; further, exacerbation of this situation by the disruptive competition between the USSR and CPR for influence in these areas must be anticipated. Whether the continuing conflicts in the underdeveloped regions will be primarily military or primarily political and economic will depend on two factors: (1) the success of the current US military effort in Vietnam and (2) the ability of the Free World to execute effective political, economic, psychological, and military preventive programs.

12. (S) In summary, of all the forms of warfare, general nuclear war, although the most dangerous threat, is the least probable for the next decade. Continued low-intensity conflict, particularly in the underdeveloped portion of the world, is almost certain. Limited war in the underdeveloped areas is a continuing possibility because (1) militant and immature nationalism prevails in many states; (2) there remain many traditional unresolved issues between neighboring states and races; and (3) there will be the possibility of escalation of Soviet or CPR-instigated insurgencies. Limited war in the developed portion of the world is unlikely because (1) the dangers of escalation are magnified by the intimate involvement of both US and USSR interests and (2) the relative postures of the advanced states are sufficiently balanced that each would be reluctant to initiate a limited war without explicit US or USSR backing which is considered unlikely in the absence of extreme provocation (e.g., a serious threat to the allied position in Berlin or Western military intervention in an East German uprising).

**Para 12**—Important point of context: although nuclear warfare is the most dangerous threat, it is also the least probable. This doesn't mean we can afford to neglect the prospect of nuclear warfare, but at the same time, there are many conventional and irregular challenges. The current U.S. perspective on nuclear warfare is very similar.

13. (S) Fundamental to the entire question of the likelihood of conflict is recognition that the most important single factor in deterring Moscow, Peking, or their allies from the use of force in any portion of the conflict spectrum is opposing military power—the existence of superior US strategic nuclear capabilities and US military presence at, or an obvious capability to deploy military power rapidly to, the point of contest. With its allies the United States is presently superior militarily and has the potential to exert superior military force globally if it decides that the situation merits the requisite military, political, and economic decisions. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet schism bears so importantly on US strategic planning that, should there be a USSR-CPR accommodation, the basic threat and consequent Free World force posture will have to be reassessed.

*Balance of Military Power*

14. (S) At present the balance of strategic military power appears to favor the United States. There are a number of factors, however, which could lead to upsetting this favorable balance, such as unmatched technological breakthroughs in nuclear strategic systems by the USSR, failure to consider basic US–USSR disparities in deciding on force levels, unverified arms control agreements or unbalanced arms reductions, and major shifts in alliances and alignments.

15. (TS) The Soviet Union is improving its strategic nuclear posture relative to that of the United States. It undoubtedly will seek continued qualitative and quantitative force improvements and may be seeking to enhance its relative posture through arms control agreements. Primary Soviet efforts have focused on a build-up of ICBMs; the hardening and dispersing of missile sites; developing active air and missile defense systems; an increased mobility of land-based and sea-based ballistic missile systems. There is evidence that the Soviets are deploying a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, and are working on larger nuclear warheads with compatible delivery vehicles; and they have the capability to develop and deploy multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The Soviets probably could attain an operational capability with a MIRV in the period 1970–1975. They could already have developed a limited antisatellite capability based on an operational missile (e.g., the SS–4) with a nuclear warhead and on existing electronic facilities. A breakthrough or major advance in any of these areas could alter, in their favor, the present ratio of the US–USSR strategic nuclear postures unless the United States, through its own vigorous development and modernization program, keeps pace.

16. (TS) There are three basic disparities between the United States and the USSR which must be considered in determining the minimum US strategic nuclear force levels. First, the Soviet Union, as a closed society, has an advantage in thwarting intelligence collection; it can secretly increase its forces quantitatively and qualitatively with less chance of detection than if the United States made the same attempt. Second, the Soviet Union probably has less inhibitions about executing a first strike.

Third, there are significant differences in population distribution which, in conjunction with higher missile payload capacities, favor the Soviet Union. Hence, equality in US and USSR strategic nuclear forces is less than parity for the United States when the asymmetry in intelligence, in population distribution, and in willingness to strike first are considered. Thus, the strategic nuclear advantage must be clearly in our favor both actually and in the view of potential enemies.

17. (C) Arms control is a desirable objective for national security policy if it actually reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of war. However, an arms control or disarmament agreement which resulted in a state or a group of states improving its military posture vis-a-vis other states probably would be more destabilizing than stabilizing. There is ample evidence that the USSR and other communist states do not subscribe to the idea of arms control in the same way Western governments do, to include the traditional and doctrinal attitude of communist states toward treaties and agreements. A fully adequate verification system in effect prior to implementation of any arms control or disarmament agreement is essential to US security.

**Para 17**—An interesting comment on arms control: Colin Gray suggests in his 1993 book *Weapons Don't Make War* that arms control does not reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of war, but instead represents the fallacy that technical expertise (acquired through verification) can sidestep the policy challenges of directly addressing national security threats.

18. (TS) Comprehensive or threshold test ban treaties are cases in point. There are serious gaps in US hard intelligence about Soviet knowledge and capabilities in the newest weapon effects areas; in fact, there are indications that the USSR already may have made gains in nuclear weapons technology beyond current US capabilities. Should probable Soviet developments in BMD systems with drastically improved nuclear effects warheads be deployed prior to compensating accomplishments by the United States, the military balance of power could be critically upset in favor of the USSR. Vigorous nuclear testing within the restrictions of the

present Limited Test Ban Treaty is necessary to permit the United States to increase effectiveness and better to assure survival of its offensive nuclear weapons and defensive systems against the effects of the improved Soviet nuclear weapons. To stop or even further to limit testing would foreclose the possibility of attaining essential knowledge of BMD, of improved silo hardening, of better penetration aids, and of other strategic weapon technology for the United States.

19. (TS) Space competence is important to national security just as it is to national growth and prestige. In recent Moscow parades, the Soviets displayed what they alleged to be an orbital missile. Despite a number of Soviet allusions to “orbital rockets,” probably advanced for propaganda purposes, it is not believed that the USSR has an orbital bombardment capability, and there is no evidence of an intention to develop such systems. It is estimated that the Soviets will not deploy offensive weapons in space within the next ten years. However, it is clear that Soviet space technology is well advanced, and their current peaceful objectives in this medium sooner or later may be accompanied by hostile demonstrations or acts seeking to obtain a military advantage in space. A lack of parallel or countervailing space capabilities would place the United States at a disadvantage, regardless of its earth-based strategic deterrent strength.

20. (S) A significant destabilizing element in the world environment is the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. There are a number of countries which have the capability to become members of the “Nuclear Club” if they make such a decision, with India, Israel, and Sweden being the most likely to do so in the short run. In the long run, the FRG and Japan probably will become the serious contenders. Such nuclear proliferation as may occur over the next ten years is not likely to affect materially the existing thermonuclear duopoly. Although widespread independent national nuclear capabilities are basically deleterious to US security interests, it may not be within the reasonable power of the United States to preclude nuclear proliferation. Even though multilateral nuclear partnership arrangements tend to reduce unilateral US military flexibility, the political and psychological requirements of national policy may be such as to override the military disadvantages. Hence, considering all

factors, additional nuclear sharing arrangements may become desirable in specific instances to maintain favorable power relationships.

21. (TS) Evidence indicates that the Soviets can support substantial toxic chemical warfare (CW) operations and that research on improving toxic nerve agents and efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents is continuing. The Soviets have a variety of chemical munitions and delivery vehicles for dissemination of chemical agents and they possess a wide range of good defensive CW equipment. While Soviet CW munitions probably will be used in the tactical sense, the Soviets have consistently grouped toxic agents with “weapons of mass destruction” in political and classified military writings. Decision to use such weapons probably will be taken at the highest political level in the Soviet government.

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**Para 21**—After a great deal of discussion on Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons, we do get at least one paragraph on chemical warfare capabilities. This document clearly acknowledges that nuclear weapons are different from chemical weapons and require special direction. Interestingly, there wasn't any discussion about the Soviet Union's BW capabilities. Note how the assessment puts quotes around “weapons of mass destruction”—still not a term universally used by the Defense Department as it is today.

This document is identified as document 121 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d121>.

**Memorandum from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense (Foster) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1966

SUBJECT

Determination of a DoD Position on Chemical and Biological Warfare

As you are aware, the Department of Defense has been participating since November 1963 in an interagency effort to develop a national policy on Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare. This effort was initiated at the instigation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the approval of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mr. McGeorge Bundy).<sup>2</sup> Before even posing the question of a national policy a Defense position had to be established and efforts in this direction have been going on with JCS and several offices of OSD contributing. The various actions were closely coordinated with members of your Policy Planning Staff and with Mr. Barber.

My staff have [sic] reviewed the progress to date for me, and I find that the thrust of the effort has essentially evaporated. Rather than resurrect the effort and proceed from where we left off, we should make a fresh start. The only stipulations I would suggest are that (1) we concentrate on arriving at a DoD position irrespective of whether we proceed from there

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is probably to an ACDA memorandum from William C. Foster to the Committee of Principals, October 29, 1963, and Bundy's memorandum to Foster, November 5, 1963. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, General 7-11/63)

to an official national policy position, and (2) we start with face-to-face discussions rather than the distribution of memoranda.

It is unclear why the DoD position was so nebulous at this time, given that this was not a new administration developing its first thoughts. There was a significant effort in developing and testing CB weapons by the Army, Air Force, and Navy. It may be that, given arms control talks, there was no prepared position at the OSD level to develop its unconventional weapons capability while at the same time supporting national direction toward arms control efforts. But of interest is this idea that DoD had to develop a position before a national policy was developed rather than after. Clearly, DoD wanted to be in control of the issue and not passively responsive.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of a DoD position. Lack of this is reflected in ambiguity and indecision in the CB planning of the military departments and OSD offices. If we are to spend our resources wisely, an agreed upon position has to be generated. Dr. MacArthur of my staff is quite willing to assume responsibility for the coordination of the OSD position provided you are in agreement. If you would nominate a senior member of your staff, Dr. MacArthur would like to meet with your nominee at an early date and agree on a course of action.

**Finn Larsen<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> Larsen signed for Foster above Foster's typed signature

This document is identified as document 122 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d122>.

**Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Committee of Principals' Deputies<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 19, 1966

SUBJECT

Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (U)

Since November 1963, in compliance with a request of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, this Agency has been conducting studies on the arms control and disarmament aspects of chemical and biological warfare. Concurrently, in response to the same directive the Departments of State and Defense have been conducting studies concerning those areas relating to CB weapons where they have prime responsibility and interest. The ultimate objective of these related studies is to formulate an agreed inter-agency statement of policy which could be developed into national policy guidance.

The attached paper, titled "Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy", which is forwarded for your consideration and comment, represents the tentative conclusions of this Agency on policies which the U.S. should adopt with respect to these weapons. It reflects the hypothesis that the spread of lethal chemical and biological weapons to states which do not now possess them is, *prima facie*, not in the national interest. Part III, titled "Basic Elements of Policy" proposes policies flowing from the hypothesis that are designed to minimize the risk that U.S. actions in the field of CB weapons might encourage other nations to acquire capabilities to use these potentially destabilizing weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret. An attached April 22 memorandum from McNaughton to the Chairman of the JCS requests comments on the ACDA paper by May 20.

While it is believed that the suggested policies are in the national interest, there may be compelling military and political factors which militate against their adoption. It is requested, therefore, that in commenting on the attached draft, implications of the policies relating to military capabilities and international relations be emphasized. Your comments on arms control aspects would also be welcome. In light of the delay since inter-agency studies on CB weapons were inaugurated, early action on this matter would be appreciated.

**Adrian S. Fisher**

**Attachment**

**CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE POLICY<sup>2</sup>**

**I. Purpose**

To propose for discussion a policy for the US to adopt with respect to chemical and biological weapons. Attention is focused on those aspects of policy which relate to arms control and disarmament.

**II. Background and Scope**

*Background*

Since November 1963, in response to a request by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, this Agency has been studying the arms control aspects of CB weapons. Also in November 1963, the Department of State proposed an inter-agency review of the entire CB field, with its goal a statement of related national policy.<sup>3</sup>

Since that time, two draft policy papers on CB warfare have been prepared and circulated for informal comment, one by the Department of Defense in

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<sup>2</sup> A table of contents is not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, November 15, 1963. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, William H. Brubeck Series, Disarmament 11/63)

December 1964,<sup>4</sup> and one by the Department of State, in May 1965.<sup>5</sup> While each of these papers has helped to narrow down the pertinent problems which require resolution, ACDA's concern is that neither one stresses the issue of proliferation commensurate with the evolving threat as we see it. ACDA views the spread of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to states not now possessing them, particularly the developing states, as not in the national interest and as a threat to world peace. Although studies made in early 1964 estimated CB proliferation not to be imminent, there have been an increasing number of signs since that time, particularly from Israel, the UAR, Iraq and Indonesia, which may indicate the beginnings of a dangerous trend.

### *Scope*

The policies discussed in this paper are designed to minimize the risk that US actions in the field of CB weapons might encourage other nations to acquire capabilities to use these destabilizing weapons. They reflect, for the most part, official statements and policy decisions on such matters as use of CB weapons, sales of CB munitions to foreign nations, technical assistance and public information in the CB field, all of which have proliferation implications.

We have also suggested a definition for the term "CB Weapons of Mass Destruction", which appears without definition in the US draft outline of a GCD treaty<sup>6</sup> and for which an agreed definition would be necessary in the event proposals for the control of CB weapons are entertained as separable measures. It is our view that all CB weapons are not "weapons of mass destruction" as frequently categorized.

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<sup>44</sup> See footnote 2, Document 76.

<sup>5</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>6</sup> The quoted phrase appears in the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," submitted by the United States to the UN Disarmament Commission on April 29, 1965. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1965, pp. 115, 116.

Amazing point: ACDA—a partner of the State Dept—would want to take CB weapons out of the “WMD” definition. Admittedly, the supposition that CB weapons do not cause “mass destruction” on the scale of nuclear weapons has long been challenged, but it was a pretty standard definition, and accepted at least by the arms control community and disarmament advocates.

In addition, this paper suggests an approach to the difficult problem of control of CB weapons. In so doing, it recognizes that first priority must continue to be placed on the prevention of nuclear war, and that efforts to control CB weapons should not hinder or delay our efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Our immediate objective in proposing these policies is to present the proliferation aspects of chemical and biological weapons for discussion and comment by interested agencies of the Government. Our ultimate intent is to arrive at an agreed position which can be incorporated into the national policy recommendations that will result from the current inter-agency review of the whole field of chemical and biological weapons.

A collateral, but important, objective of this paper is to be prepared for the unexpected introduction of the question of control of CB weapons at a future disarmament conference, or to take advantage of an opportune time for Western initiative.

### III. Basic Elements of Policy

#### *A. Definitions—*

1. The term “CB Weapons of Mass Destruction” refers only to lethal chemical and biological weapons; it excludes all other CB weapons such as the non-poisonous tear gases, “CN” and “CS,” and any analogous weapons having the primary purpose of only temporary incapacitation without residual injurious effect.

2. Smoke, flame and incendiary agents should not be considered as CB weapons.

*B. Use—*

The US should continue to adhere to its declared policy of “no-first-use” of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, but this policy should not extend to those non-toxic CB weapons, as specifically designated by the President, which cause only temporary incapacitation without residual injurious effect.

This language was in reference to US use of riot control agents in Vietnam. As President Johnson escalated US involvement in Vietnam, battlefield use of riot control agents in many forms (grenades, bulk powder backpack and aerial dispensers, and other field expedient methods) also increased. The M106 “Mighty Mite” portable blower had not yet been fielded at the time this memo was released. Some non-governmental activists suggested that the ongoing use of RCAs would escalate to the general employment of lethal CB weapons.

As to the “no-first-use” policy, I am unaware of any deliberate presidential direction that changed the Eisenhower administration’s policy set in 1956. This may have been more of a general understanding of policy direction rather than a formal declaration.

*C. Non-Proliferation—*

1. *Assistance to Others*—The US should not assist any other state or groups of states to acquire CB weapons of mass destruction.

2. *Discouraging Acquisition*—The US should take no actions that would encourage any other state or group of states to acquire CB weapons of mass destruction and should, as appropriate, discourage such acquisition.

3. *Information Exchange*—While the US should continue for the present to honor its existing cooperative arrangements with the UK, Canada, Australia, and France, it should not enter into agreements with any additional states dealing with the exchange of technical data on CB weapons of mass destruction.

4. *Public Information*—The US should maintain close control of information about CB programs. CB information released to the public should be limited to that necessary to establish the distinction between lethal and non-lethal CB weapons and to justify military use of tear gas where such use is necessary for humanitarian reasons.

*D. On Seeking Agreements*—

1. *Non-Proliferation*—Efforts to achieve a CB non-proliferation agreement should not be sought publicly or with the USSR until after a nuclear non-proliferation agreement has been achieved. Thereupon, the US should support efforts to forestall the acquisition of CB weapons of mass destruction by additional nations and should be prepared to enter into international agreements designed to achieve that objective. In the event that a nuclear non-proliferation agreement can not be obtained, the desirability of a CB non-proliferation agreement should then be considered in the light of conditions prevailing.

2. *CB Free Zones*—The US should support the creation of CB Free Zones after the establishment of Nuclear Free Zones. When an NFZ has been established then the US should support expansion of the denuclearized zone so as to also exclude CB weapons of mass destruction from the designated zone. Should the issue of CB Free Zones be pressed before NFZ's are established, the question of US support would be contingent on conditions then prevailing.

3. *Ban on "First-Use"*—Although the US should continue to adhere to its declared "no-first-use" policy on CB weapons of mass destruction, it should not so bind itself by international agreement, unless such action by the US would assist materially in obtaining adherence by other nations to a more comprehensive agreement, such as a CB non-proliferation agreement, which the US may wish to support.

4. *Other Agreements*—Other, more far-reaching agreements looking towards the eventual elimination of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of all nations should be sought when adequate means of verification are available to protect national security.

[Here follows Part IV, Discussion, pages 7–23.]

This document is identified as document 125 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d125>.

**Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 5, 1966

JCSM-296-66

SUBJECT

The Foreign Intelligence Effort of the United States

1. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in response to a memorandum for you by the Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, dated 19 April 1966,<sup>2</sup> subject as above, has prepared a reply and forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the draft memorandum and consider that it is responsive to the request.
3. The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, consulted with the offices of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the Services and considered their views.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a memorandum, substantially the same as that contained in the Appendix hereto, be forwarded to the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 70 A 6649, 350.09 1966 Jan- . Top Secret; Noform; Restricted Data.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, on a "Special Handling—Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals" basis.

5. Without attachment, this memorandum is Unclassified.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**John C. Meyer**<sup>3</sup>  
*Major General, USAF*  
*Deputy Director, Joint Staff*

## **Appendix**

### **Draft Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford)**

#### SUBJECT

Principal Intelligence Gaps and Deficiencies (C)

1. (C) In your memorandum of 19 April 1966, you requested my views and comments regarding the principal gaps and deficiencies which, in my opinion, inhibit performance within the Department of Defense of its responsibilities and functions which significantly affect the national security.
2. (S) In the light of the above criterion, I have endeavored to identify and select those questions to which intelligence is currently not able to supply a fully satisfactory response and each of which is of such importance as to represent either a significant area of strategic uncertainty in force-oriented and strategic planning or a significantly inhibiting factor in the conduct of military operations. In this process, I have solicited the views of the major components of the Department of Defense, including the commanders of the unified and specified commands.

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Meyer signed the original.

3. (TS) The following is a list of those subject areas which represent important gaps and deficiencies measured against the needs of the Department of Defense for intelligence support. This list is not exhaustive but is intended rather as a statement of those unanswered questions which, because of their importance, currently assume an exceptional degree of prominence within the Department of Defense. The items are not listed in order of importance; each is significant in its relation to major elements of the Department of Defense mission.

a. *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV)*. Significant Soviet capability to employ MIRV will affect the force requirements and technological planning for future US ballistic missile defenses (BMDs).

b. *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to BMD*. There is substantial evidence that the Soviets are deploying a BMD. The capability and characteristics of such a system are not known to us at this time; however, depending upon its effectiveness, such a system could drastically affect the strategic balance and US deterrent capability. BMD developments against short-range (battlefield) and medium-range ballistic weapons are also of concern.

c. *Soviet Allocation of Fissionable Material*. The wide range in the estimate of nuclear material available to the Soviets and the manner in which this material is allocated to major categories of nuclear weapons, such as strategic bombs, strategic missiles, and battlefield weapons, creates uncertainties in assessment of Soviet capabilities. Consequently, US planning must be based on assumptions the validity of which cannot be stated with adequate confidence.

d. *Soviet and ChiCom Nuclear Weapons Development Program*. More information is needed on the scope and direction of both Soviet and ChiCom nuclear weapons development programs. Although we have monitored individual Soviet nuclear tests over the past years and estimated their design parameters, we have inadequate over-all intelligence on Soviet broad objectives for the future. On ChiCom nuclear weapons development, we appear able to maintain a degree of surveillance over their testing program, but we continue to lack sufficient information on the

broad objectives of their weapons program; in particular, we lack sufficient indication of their intentions and capabilities to develop deliverable weapons and to minimize weapons diameters.

e. *Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities and Intentions With Respect to Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems.* The present and future capabilities of the Soviets and ChiCom to employ nuclear weapons directly affect US war plans and tactics. For example, we lack information on the Soviet intent and capability to deploy a solid propellant ICBM, field a mobile ICBM, develop new strategic aircraft, or employ ballistic missile submarines and on the ChiCom intent and capability to produce strategic delivery systems. Insufficient knowledge forces planning to be based on assumptions which, if incorrect, can invalidate plans, affect national security, and waste resources.

f. *Soviet Activities in Enhanced Nuclear Weapons Effects (Specifically Hot X-Rays) (S-RD).* Specific knowledge of Soviet work in these areas is needed for US strategic missile development and hardening antiballistic missile planning and for establishing concepts of operation.

g. *Soviet Capabilities and Intentions in Space.* There is a deficiency in our present ability to detect launch, including zero orbit and the first orbit of Soviet space vehicles and their potential military application, and to provide early detection and subsequent tracking of altered orbits of such vehicles. In addition, the Soviet Union has conducted several sophisticated space experiments about which the United States had no foreknowledge and has not yet duplicated. Some knowledge of the technological advances which made this possible would assist our space program, particularly the manned orbiting laboratory.

h. *Surveillance of ChiCom Military Movements as an Indicator of Intentions in Southeast Asia.* The situation in Southeast Asia could be altered rapidly by the introduction of large numbers of Red Chinese into the North Vietnam area. One of the first indications would be a buildup of ground and air forces in Southern China and naval surface and submarine forces in adjacent sea areas. We are not getting intelligence coverage of these areas with the timeliness, frequency, and quality required.

i. *Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities in Support of Protracted Operations.* More knowledge is needed of those aspects of force structure and logistics support capabilities that determine the size of committed forces and the duration for which they can be committed. In the case of the Soviet Union, this consideration applies to both nuclear and nonnuclear operations and will similarly apply to Communist China when that country attains significant nuclear capability.

j. *Effectiveness of the Soviet's Stored Obsolescent Weapons.* Information is lacking regarding the total capability represented by obsolescent Soviet weapons in storage and their ability to reactivate, man, and support them. In particular, their ability to obtain pilots for tactical aircraft is not known.

k. *Communist General Purpose/Tactical Military Capability.* There is a persistent over-all deficiency in intelligence available on communist general purpose/tactical forces. Specific deficiencies include current and future information on detailed order of battle, combat and service support, mobilization capability, electronic surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, tactical air support, tactical nuclear weapons and doctrine, and tactical air defense capabilities and systems, ground and air, low and high altitude (with special regard for future air defense systems). This over-all deficiency embraces considerations of timeliness, accuracy, and degree of detail and particularly the posture and capabilities of mobile weapons systems. It continues to inject significant uncertainties into force-oriented and strategic planning and into the establishment of readiness postures.

l. *Soviet Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW).* There is insufficient information available on Soviet antisubmarine warfare capabilities to enable an assessment of the threat posed by this capability against nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines.

m. *Soviet and ChiCom Research and Development.* The principal gap in scientific and technical intelligence, which has the most significant effect on our national security, has been the inability to obtain definitive information on applied development projects and programs in the time period between the end of general research and the appearance of development testing or deployment.

n. *Soviet and ChiCom Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological and Chemical Warfare.* Lack of specific knowledge of biological and chemical warfare activities prevents our effective defense planning for offensive and defensive material and for establishing operational posture.

**Paras 3d and 3n**—It is important to note the DoD’s admitted lack of understanding of the motivation and goals behind those nations developing unconventional weapons. Although the U.S. government understood the weapon systems posed a threat, it was unclear on how they were going to be used in the conduct of general warfare.

...

4. (U) In addition to the above, as you are well aware, we are beset with many intelligence deficiencies and problems associated with the conduct of military affairs in Southeast Asia. Although of immediate importance, these have not been specifically delineated in the above list since they have been, and are continuing to be, comprehensively addressed in response to a White House memorandum signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 4 January 1966, subject: “Review of the US Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities in Selected Areas of Southeast Asia and the Far East,” and which was based on the PFIAB report to the President, dated 9 December 1965, same subject.

5. (U) On behalf of the Department of Defense, may I assure you of our continued and wholehearted cooperation.

This document is identified as document 127 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d127>.

**Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 21, 1966

JCSM-344-66

SUBJECT

Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22689/66, dated 22 April 1966, subject as above.<sup>2</sup>

b. A memorandum by the Deputy Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), for the Deputies to the Committee of Principals, dated 19 April 1966, subject as above.<sup>3</sup>

c. JCSM-112-65, dated 16 February 1965, subject: "Draft Policy Paper—Chemical and Biological Warfare (U)."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret. A September 1 covering memorandum from McNamara to the Chairman of the JCS indicates McNamara's concurrence with the JCS view that a national policy on chemical and biological weapons should be established. He added that he had directed his staff to prepare a recommended Defense position for JCS comment during October and to use the draft NSAM included with JCSM-112-65 (Document 76) in developing the position.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, Document 122.

<sup>3</sup> Document 122.

<sup>4</sup> Document 76.

2. (S) In reference 1a, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comments on an ACDA paper, attachment to reference 1b, which sets forth that agency's tentative conclusions on policies which the United States should adopt with respect to chemical and biological weapons. The Deputy Director, ACDA, believes that, while the suggested policies are in the national interest, there may be compelling military and political factors which militate against their adoption.

3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a request from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration), provided, in Appendix B to reference 1c, a proposed National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) on chemical and biological weapons. No action has been taken on the proposed NSAM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to hold the view that a national policy on chemical and biological weapons should be established as a matter of priority. They further believe that policy matters regarding arms control and disarmament aspects should not be considered until such time as a national policy has been established or, at least, until a DOD position is determined.

4. (S) The proposed NSAM forwarded in reference 1c continues to reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, they recommend that:

a. The proposed NSAM contained in reference 1c be used as the basis for establishing the DOD position on the chemical and biological warfare policy issue in question.

b. Efforts be made to attain a national policy as soon as possible.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff be afforded an opportunity to comment on any possible DOD revisions to their proposed NSAM, as well as to participate in the review of any over-all State/Defense/ACDA inter-agency policy proposals prior to final adoption.

d. ACDA and other interested governmental agencies be advised that no action within the Department of Defense will be taken on the ACDA paper in reference 1b until such time as, preferably, a national policy on

chemical and biological weapons has been established or, at least, until such time as a DOD position is determined.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

**Earle G. Wheeler<sup>5</sup>**  
*Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff*

This document is fascinating in that the JCS pushes back against ACDA and State in developing a national policy on CB weapons. It may be that the Services were concerned that having the option to use CB weapons was being taken away from them as a result of arms control discussions in Geneva on disarming all nations from developing and using CB weapons. This concern about changing national policy is further outlined in McNamara's response in the next document.

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.

This document is identified as document 145 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d145>.

**Letter from Secretary of Defense McNamara to Secretary of State Rusk<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 17, 1966

Dear Dean:

I am attaching for your comments a Defense draft NSAM on the subject of chemical and biological warfare policy.<sup>2</sup> It has been prepared in response to a State request for a Defense position.<sup>3</sup>

The draft states that the President does not now expect to authorize first use of lethal CB weapons. With respect to incapacitants, it reflects the actual situation as it now exists by stating that the President may authorize their use in certain situations of national urgency. In my view, we should keep this option open until we have better information concerning specific incapacitating agents, their military effectiveness, and the political consequences of their use. Accordingly, I have asked the members of my staff to conduct a study on the role of incapacitating agents. The results of this study will be reflected in next year's Draft Memorandum for the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FR 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret. Drafted by Commander Morris on November 1 and rewritten on November 16. An attached November 17 memorandum from McNamara to the JCS notes that the letter reflected the principal points made in JCSM-637-66 and offered "to discuss the draft policy with you at your convenience, if you wish." A copy of JCSM-637-66, "Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy," October 3, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 3260 (10 Dec 64) S.2 IR 2095.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> The State request was transmitted to the Department of Defense under cover of a November 3 letter, but it has not been further identified. (Letter from Vance to Llewellyn Thompson, November 16; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- )

President on Theater Nuclear Warfare. In the meantime, I believe policy guidelines such as those in the attached draft NSAM would be appropriate and desirable.

I share your interest in reaching an early joint position which we can recommend to the President. I would be happy to discuss the draft policy with you at your convenience, if you wish.

Sincerely,

Bob<sup>4</sup>

As a minor note, it is instructive to see that U.S. policy on (lethal) CB weapons would be reflected in the president's memorandum on theater nuclear warfare. Again, while CB weapons are not massively destructive, they do share the distinction with nuclear weapons of being "unconventional."

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

This document is identified as document 153 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d153>.

**Letter from Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to Secretary of Defense McNamara<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1966

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your letter of November 17 transmitting a Defense draft NSAM on chemical and biological warfare policy.<sup>2</sup> Our initial reaction is that there are large areas of agreement between your draft and the CB paper developed in State<sup>3</sup> and previously sent to Defense and other interested agencies. Both drafts are now being studied by members of my staff. After completion of this work, it may be useful to follow up on your suggestion to discuss any remaining issues. You will recall that Bill Foster stressed the desirability for developing basic national policy in the CB field in a letter to the Committee of Principals in October, 1963.<sup>4</sup> More recently, on April 19, 1966, Butch Fisher addressed a letter on the same subject to the Deputies.<sup>5</sup> In view of ACDA's continuing interest in our CB policy, I suggest that it would be desirable to invite Bill, as well as Dick Helms and Len Marks, to join the discussions. I will subsequently be in touch with you about a mutually agreeable time.

Sincerely,

**Nick**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Document 145.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 145.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 121.

<sup>5</sup> Document 122.

This document is identified as document 154 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d154>.

**Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1966

SUBJECT

Policy on the Use of Biological Weapons

After an extensive review of the subject, your Science Advisory Committee has recommended in the attached memorandum (Tab A) that the U.S. Government publicly state that it is our policy not to initiate the use of biological weapons.

This recommendation was made prior to the recent adoption by the U.N. General Assembly (91 in favor including the U.S., 0 against, and 4 abstaining) of a Resolution (Tab B)<sup>2</sup> calling for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the "Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare."<sup>3</sup> This Resolution implicitly associates us with the principle of "no first use" of biological and chemical warfare agents. However, in our statement on the Resolution to the U.N. General Assembly, which made clear that riot

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 6648, 384 1966 Jan- . Secret. Copies were sent to Moyers and Rostow. An attached December 10 covering memorandum from Hornig to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara asked for their Departments' views on the proposed "no first use" policy with respect to biological weapons. Also attached is a December 15 memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asking for comments by the JCS on the PSAC recommendation no later than December 30.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; for text of Part B of UN General Assembly Resolution 2162 (XXI), adopted December 5, see Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 798-799.

<sup>3</sup> The United States did not ratify this treaty until 1975. For text, see 26 UST 571.

control agents and defoliating chemicals are not covered by the Geneva Protocol, we failed to state explicitly what our policy on biological weapons is.<sup>4</sup>

I believe that our support of the U.N. Resolution goes a long way toward answering the criticism that the U.S. is the only major power that has not signed the Geneva Protocol and the charge that our use of riot gas and defoliants in Vietnam might escalate into chemical and biological warfare. I am afraid, however, that this improved position could be undercut by our failure to be explicit in stating that it is our policy not to initiate the use of biological weapons.

**“defoliants in Vietnam”**—Operation Ranch Hand had been initiated in 1962 for anticrop operations in North Vietnam, but had continued to play a larger role over time in South Vietnam to eliminate ambush sites around bases and along rivers.

I understand that you will receive in the next few weeks a petition signed by several thousand scientists relating to our position on chemical and biological warfare.<sup>5</sup> This could be handled with the least fuss and controversy if a prior low-key statement of “no first use” for biological weapons were on the record.

I have discussed the problem with Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach, and they both agree that our public position would be much stronger if we clarified this point.

I recommend, therefore, that at a forthcoming press conference, probably in answer to a question, you make a brief statement (Tab C)<sup>6</sup> on the U.N. Resolution that would set forth explicitly that it is the policy of the United

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<sup>4</sup> Reference presumably is to the statement by U.S. Representative James M. Nabrit, Jr., on December 5; see Documents on Disarmament, 1966, pp. 800–802.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 170.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

States not to initiate the use of biological warfare weapons. If you concur, I will clear the statement with DOD and State.

**Donald Hornig**

**Tab A**

Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson

Washington, December 8, 1966

**SUBJECT**

Use of Biological Weapons

Your Science Advisory Committee has reviewed the problem of biological warfare and has concluded that we should formalize our policy of “no first use” of biological weapons. In view of public uncertainty as to our policy in this field and the mounting domestic and international concern regarding the use of biological and chemical weapons, the Committee recommends that, at a suitable opportunity, an official statement be made along the following lines:

“As a matter of policy, the United States has never made military use of biological weapons and our policy will continue to be not to use such weapons unless they are first used against us.”

In explaining the use of riot control agents and defoliants in Viet Nam, senior officers of your Administration have made clear that it is against our policy to initiate the use of chemical warfare. There has not, however, been comparable public statement concerning a policy of “no first use” of biological weapons.

The United States is the only major power that did not sign the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which essentially proscribed the first use of biological as well as chemical agents. In the absence of a publicly stated position, this leaves us particularly vulnerable to charges that it may be our intention to employ such agents.

Technically speaking, the Geneva Protocol addressed bacteriological weapons, not viral weapons or toxins, but it is generally understood to address biological weapons. Also, the Protocol did not outlaw first use of CB weapons against non-signatories, nor does it say anything about production, storage, or transfer of these weapons to other states.

On the basis of a continuing review over the past few years of the various biological agents, both “lethal” and “non-lethal,” that are presently under study by the Defense Department, your Committee has concluded that the problems associated with these agents appear to outweigh any military advantages that might be attained by their use. In general, the risks associated with these weapons are so great and the uncertainties as to their military effects so large that your Committee believes it extremely unlikely that we would, in fact, consider initiating the use of these weapons in a military conflict.

It seems unlikely that the “Committee” did any serious evaluation of existing US BW agents or delivery systems; instead, this appears to be the usual exaggeration of future threat agents and in particular contagious diseases. Certainly DoD didn’t seem to agree during the Nixon administration. The next paragraph in particular goes on to elaborate on potential challenges.

The risk associated with massive use of biological weapons is essentially impossible to predict. In many applications there is the possibility of creating a new focus of endemic infection which might constitute a continuing hazard. In addition, we have scanty experience with the ecological consequences of disturbing the natural biological equilibrium of an area by the introduction of substantial quantities of viable, infectious organisms. Finally, there is at least a theoretical possibility that the use of biological agents on a large scale may result in mutations producing new strains of unusual virulence or even a new form of the disease for which treatment is not available.

At the same time, we have been presented with no scenarios, nor have we thought of any ourselves, in which the military value seems significant. This applies particularly to the so called incapacitating biological agents which are intended to make the subject very sick without killing him. It is not possible at this time to predict the reliability of any of these agents and some would have significant lethality when applied in massive doses to a large population. There is also considerable uncertainty as to how effective such agents might be in reducing the military potential of enemy forces in an actual combat situation.

While the Committee claims ignorance of the effectiveness or utility of BW agents, the military was developing and testing delivery systems, demonstrating their effectiveness in covering large areas and developing concepts of operation. These questions were easily answerable. At the least, the utility of BW agents as a deterrent seems to have been lost.

For these reasons, your Science Advisory Committee concludes that a policy of “no first use” of biological weapons is sound and recommends that it would be advantageous to formalize it in a public statement.

**Donald Hornig**

This document is identified as document 424 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d424>.

**Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 3, 1967

SUBJECT

Poison Gas in Yemen

Since your discussion in staff meeting this morning Peter Jessup has requested a full CIA rundown on the evidence of the UAR's use of poison gas. The intelligence community has already gone over the evidence we have with inconclusive results. The study Peter has requested will give us the latest judgment.<sup>2</sup>

Spurgeon Keeny is also in touch with the agency's scientific people and we will stay in touch with Dr. Hornig's staff. Spurgeon rightly feels that they can be useful in making sure the intelligence people make the most of the evidence we have.

State doesn't want us to get too far out in front on this, and I think they're right. The UN now has two formal requests--one from Yemen and one surprisingly from the UAR--to investigate Saudi charges.<sup>3</sup> The next step

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> No CIA study has been found.

<sup>3</sup> In response to a Saudi suggestion that the United States analyze blood samples from alleged Yemen poison gas victims, telegram 123250 to Jidda, January 22, instructed the Embassy to state that it would be preferable if scientific tests to determine UAR use of poison gas in Yemen were performed by an international agency or in a country having no direct interest in the region. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN)

should be a UN investigation, which we'd support. (The convention on poison gas is a UN, not a Red Cross responsibility.)

Our public posture so far has been that we do not have conclusive independent evidence of our own and therefore can not pronounce ourselves on the merits of the case. However, we do deplore the use of poison gas anywhere. That may continue to be the best posture, but CIA's study will hopefully give us a better base for our behind-scenes maneuvers.

**Hal**

There were no UN verification teams to investigate the case; the claims of "poison gas" (actually aerosols and liquids rather than gas) were based on medical reports and information from international journalists. Lacking solid physical evidence, the policymakers were unsure how to make any formal accusations.

This document is identified as document 170 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d170>.

**Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Hornig) to President Johnson<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 14, 1967, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Scientists' Petition on Chemical and Biological Weapons

This morning (11:00 a.m.) Mr. Adrian Fisher, Deputy Director of ACDA, and I received on your behalf the attached petition and transmittal letter,<sup>2</sup> opposing any actions weakening the present prohibitions and restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons and specifically criticizing the U.S. for the use in Vietnam of “non-lethal” anti-personnel chemical weapons and anti-crop herbicides.

The petition has been signed by over 5,000 scientists and physicians, including 127 members of the National Academy of Sciences. I was informed that the group would discuss the petition with the press at 2:00 p.m. today.<sup>3</sup>

Specifically, the petition urges you to:

—Institute a White House study of government policy regarding CB weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Warfare, Chemical and Biological, Box 51. Secret. A copy was sent to Rostow.

<sup>2</sup> Neither the petition nor the transmittal letter has been found, but the petition is extensively summarized in *The New York Times*, February 15, 1967, pp. 1, 16.

<sup>3</sup> The scientists' press conference was reported *ibid*.

—Order an end to the employment of anti-personnel and anti-crop chemical weapons in Vietnam.

—Declare the intention of the United States to refrain from initiating the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The covering letter commends the United States for its recent support of the UN General Assembly Resolution calling on all States to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol<sup>4</sup> and recommends that the United States should now accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

Mr. Fisher and I had a very good discussion with the scientists who delivered the petition. The group has clearly given this problem a great deal of responsible thought. They are seriously concerned about the broader implications of the problem, and this is not simply a disguised criticism of the Administration's policy in Vietnam.

In our initial reaction, I recommend that we simply state we are studying the petition and that I acknowledge the letter on your behalf along these same lines.

As a follow up, I would recommend that at an early press conference in response to a question on the petition, you make a statement clearly stating that we have a “no first use” policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare, with the exception of riot gases and herbicides. Although this would not directly respond to all the points in the petition or transmittal letter, it would deal directly with the most important general question. As you recall, I suggested such a statement in a memo to you (copy attached)<sup>5</sup> setting forth the concern of your Science Advisory Committee on the general problem of biological warfare. Although Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach both agreed with the proposed statement, McNamara preferred not to push the matter at that time in the face of JCS objections unless there were [sic] a clear and urgent reason for doing so. If you are interested, I believe it would be possible to clear such a statement within the government, particularly if the statement were a low-key reiteration

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 154.

<sup>5</sup> Document 154.

and clarification of the position we have already taken in supporting the UN resolution.

**Donald Hornig**

1. Hornig to acknowledge petition, stating the matter under study.
2. Hornig to clear statement on “no first use” of chemical and biological weapons with McNamara and Katzenbach.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Neither of these options was approved or disapproved or marked to “Discuss.”

This document is identified as document 173 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d173>.

### **Editorial Note**

In response to the recommendation of Donald Hornig for a Presidential statement affirming a “no first use” policy with regard to chemical and biological warfare (see Document 154), President Johnson requested that Walt Rostow investigate the possibility of such a statement. Spurgeon Keeny drafted a specific statement for Rostow to forward for clearance or comment by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and ACDA Director Foster. The draft statement reads as follows:

“There should be no misunderstanding about our policy with regard to biological and chemical warfare. We have never used biological weapons, and we do not intend to initiate the use of biological weapons in the future. We have not engaged in gas warfare since World War I when such weapons were widely used, and we do not intend to initiate the use of gas warfare in the future. Riot control agents and herbicides, both of which are widely used by responsible governments, clearly do not fall in this category, and we have explained our position on them many times.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Warfare, Chemical and Biological, Box 51)

In a March 10, 1967, note to Rostow, Keeny explained that he had kept Rostow's memoranda to the three principals “very short since the principals and their staff know the background of this problem. Moreover, I did not want to appear to prejudice the questions one way or the other except to the extent of indicating Presidential interest in making a statement if it is acceptable to the principals.” (Ibid.) A copy of Rostow's brief March 10 memorandum to the three principals, which transmitted the statement for clearance or comment, is *ibid*.

In a March 17 memorandum to Rostow, Katzenbach responded that he concurred in the proposed public statement but suggested that the last sentence be changed, as follows:

“Riot control agents that are widely used by police forces throughout the world, and herbicides that are commonly employed in many countries, clearly do not fall in this category, and we have explained our position on them many times.”

Katzenbach believed that his proposed change “would be more in line with our past statements and make it clear that these agents are widely used domestically and not solely by governments against people of other countries.” (Ibid.)

No reply from Foster has been found. For McNamara's response, see Document 178.

This document is identified as document 178 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d178>.

**Letter from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1967

Dear Walt:

I have reviewed the proposed public statement on chemical and biological warfare policy which you forwarded with your memorandum of 10 March.<sup>2</sup> I am attaching the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the President's information.<sup>3</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the President should not be advised to make a public statement on this subject at this time. I agree that it would be preferable that the President not make a public statement now. However, if the President should decide a statement is desirable, I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Warfare, Chemical and Biological, Box 51. Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary Rusk and ACDA Director Foster.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 173.

<sup>3</sup> Not attached, but it is identified in a list of enclosures at the end of the letter as JCSM-171-67, "Proposed Presidential Policy Statement Concerning Chemical and Biological Warfare," March 29, 1967. In this paper the Joint Chiefs opposed a Presidential policy statement and as rationale referred to the draft NSAM attached to Secretary McNamara's November 17, 1966, letter to Secretary Rusk. "The proposed draft NSAM," they continued, "provides the President with options which should not be preempted by a public statement but which should be retained as the prerogative of the President. Increased efforts should be made to finalize the proposed draft NSAM for consideration by the President." They also advanced a proposed public statement if a public statement was clearly required. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 313 (10 Mar 67) 1967 IR #580) For McNamara's November 17 letter, see Document 145.

recommend he use the statement provided to Dr. Hornig in January. I am attaching a copy of that statement for your information.<sup>4</sup>

Sincerely,

**Bob**<sup>5</sup>

The Scientists' Petition is a relatively well-known historical fact within the CB warfare timeline. Less known, perhaps, is that DoD advised the President not to issue a public statement regarding the "no first use" policy or the use of defoliants in Vietnam. Even as the arms control community ramps up its efforts, DoD increasingly pushes back to retain these military weapon systems. But the executive branch still has to answer to the legislative branch (see next document).

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

This document is identified as document 447 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d447>.

**Telegram from the Dept of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 23, 1967, 9:06 p.m.

200653. For Tubby from Rostow. Ref: Geneva 3809,<sup>2</sup> 3821.<sup>3</sup>

1) When you see Gallopin again you should stress seriousness our concern at use of poison gas by UAR against Yemen. We discussing this with ICRC in strictest confidence in hope they will take steps on their own to investigate gas use in part of world where for practical purposes they are only neutral, impartial observer. We hope ICRC will act fast to strengthen its representation in Middle East including Yemen.

2) Might be helpful to tell Gallopin you discussed subject with Freymond, who previously discussed subject on personal basis with me. Sieverts will bring additional info on gas types and use. Material for use with ICRC will

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts (U), cleared by Battle, and approved by Rostow.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3809 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva, May 22, Ambassador Robert W. Tubby reported that, as instructed, he expressed to Jacques Freymond of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) U.S. concern at reports of repetitive use by the United Arab Republic of lethal chemical weapons in Yemen. Freymond had suggested that Tubby see ICRC Executive Director Roger Gallopin and that he personally urge a strong, formal ICRC protest to the UAR if the facts warranted. Tubby noted that it would be useful in this regard if he could be provided as soon as possible with U.S. Government information regarding the types of gas it believed the UAR had been using in Yemen. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 3821 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva, May 23, Tubby reported that he met that day with Gallopin who stated that it was unlikely that the ICRC would make a public statement in the absence of clear evidence of use of gas by the UAR. (Ibid.)

be provided by telegram. Might be best to hold this material until Rochat returns and presents his findings.<sup>4</sup>

The State Department cables have many mentions of “poison gas” rather than the term “chemical weapons.” It is unclear why they used the generic and outdated term “poison gas”—a World War I relic—when contemporary arms control discussions specifically used the term “chemical weapons.”

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

This document is identified as document 448 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d448>.

**Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 25, 1967, 8:57 p.m.

202562. For Tubby and Sieverts. Ref: Geneva 3809.<sup>2</sup>

1. Information in paragraph 2 may be passed to selected ICRC officials on a non-attributable basis and cannot be further disseminated or used publicly.

2. Begin non-attributable information: Following are UAR gas attacks reportedly carried out in Yemen since January 1, 1967: (a) January 5 attack on Kitaf in which 155 people and many animals allegedly were killed and more than 40 people injured. (b) May 6 attack on Bait Maran in which 2 people killed and 15 injured. (c) May 11 attack on Gahr and Gadafa where 51 and 24 respectively were reported killed. (d) May 17 attack on Gadafa where 100 people hiding in cave allegedly were killed. (e) week of May 14-20 attacks at villages of Naugher, Queais, and Kor in the Arhab and Khaulan areas. International Red Cross official said total casualties in those three villages plus Gahr and Gadafa during week were 243. There is corroborative evidence that on at least one occasion a highly lethal nerve gas agent was present in the area attacked. Mustard and perhaps phosgene may also have been used. End classified non-attributable information.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 447.

**Para 2**—Clearly these are not mass casualty or mass destruction incidents, but it does demonstrate the policy challenge of addressing CB weapons attacks that didn't fit the "Fulda Gap" scenario of massive barrages of CB agents that theoretically might devastate major cities. The more appropriate concern was the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons against civilians.

3. Information this paragraph can be published. Following are examples of press and radio mention which has been made of UAR attacks: (a) UPI January 31 said correspondent John Lawton and other Western correspondents who visited site of the Kitaf attack believed there was little doubt gas had been used. Yemeni reports claimed 150 people were killed. (b) A Yemeni royalist radio broadcast heard February 12 claimed on February 8 UAR aircraft dropped gas bombs on Bani Salab village and killed 75 people and 40 sheep. (c) Reuters reported February 17 a Yemeni soldier alleged 19 people were injured and 32 killed during a UAR gas attack on royalist positions at Bayt Al-Suraym between Sanaa and Hodeidah February 6. (d) Spokesman for royalist forces in Yemen stated during broadcast from Jidda February 15 that on February 5 UAR aircraft used poison gas bombs for second time in Anis area. (e) Jidda press May 14 carried royalist report UAR planes made poison gas attack on May 11 on the Yemeni town of Hairan, northeast of Sanaa, leaving 75 dead. (f) Jidda paper al-Nadwa quoting royalist command reported May 18 that UAR planes attacked a village 30 kilometers from Sanaa on May 16. (g) According to Reuters, South Arabian Broadcasting Service announced May 20 that UAR bombers using high explosives and poison gas raided royalist villages of Bayt Ghadir, Bayt Jabas, and Nawfal 20 miles north of Sanaa on May 18 and killed 38 people. Begin FYI. In case you are asked about New York Daily News erroneous story May 20 reporting that US officials have evidence poison gas bombs dropped in an attack on Najran and Jizan "last weekend" bore markings indicating Russian origin, no evidence gas employed in Saudi Arabia. Story said scientists were seeking to determine whether "as suspected, the gas was a new kind of nerve gas," also stated "it has been established that phosgene gas was the lethal agent in the earlier attacks." The article said officials believed the gas used on

Najran and Jizan was “a much more modern type of lethal agent and was being used for experimental purposes by Communist scientists.” End FYI.

**Rusk**

Some allege that Soviet crews were manning the Egyptian bombers, given the precise nature of the aerial attacks, while others theorize that Egypt could have had an indigenous capability to produce nerve agent. In either case, it is interesting to note that casualties numbered in the single and double digits; these attacks were not “mass destruction,” but rather the integrated use of unconventional and conventional munitions.

However, having this data on casualties caused specifically by chemical weapons did not lead to any particular U.S. actions against the perpetrators. Egypt was not a signatory of the Geneva Protocol at this time, and therefore there was no formal legal recourse.

This document is identified as document 116 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XI, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d116>.

### **Letter from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated [June 1967?]

*My dear Mr. Chairman:*

I should like, first of all, to congratulate you upon your role in bringing together the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan at Tashkent and upon the agreement achieved there.<sup>2</sup> As you know, we encouraged both India and Pakistan to adopt a constructive attitude at these discussions. I am sure you share my view that the agreement leaves many difficult problems between these two countries unresolved, but progress toward peace anywhere is to be welcomed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13. No classification marking. A January 24 cover memorandum to another copy from Benjamin H. Read to McGeorge Bundy states that "this is the message to Mr. Kosygin as delivered by Ambassador Thompson at 3:00 p.m. today." (Ibid., National Security File, Head of State Correspondence File, Pen Pal Correspondence, Kosygin, Box 13) A January 23 memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, transmitting the draft of this letter, reads in part as follows: "This letter now has the agreement of Rusk, Ball, McNamara, Foster and myself. We have managed to find language which gives a little more reassurance to the Soviet Government on nonproliferation than we have managed before now, while at the same time it fully protects our interest in nuclear arrangements that will keep the Germans with us. The major contribution is George Ball's definition of proliferation in the fifth paragraph. That definition is a shade more binding than the language we have used before now, but it is entirely consistent with everything we have said to the Germans." (Ibid., National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Vol. II, Box 13)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Agreement between India and Pakistan for a Withdrawal of Troops in Kashmir and Normalization of Diplomatic Relations, signed at Tashkent, U.S.S.R., on January 10. Text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966*, pp. 681-682.

I regret that I am unable to report even a modest step toward peace in Vietnam as we have had no significant response from the other side. I am, of course, aware of the position of your Government in this matter and I refer to it only to express my disappointment that the efforts of the United States to stimulate the first moves toward peace in that unhappy area have been met merely by a public repetition of rigid positions which are known to be impossible for us to consider.

I have read with care your letter on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons delivered by Ambassador Dobrynin on January 11, 1966.<sup>3</sup> I appreciate the forthright statement of your views and welcome this opportunity to respond frankly to some of the points on which our views differ.

You have emphasized the great significance which your Government attaches to the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The long-standing concern of the United States with this problem has been amply shown by the major initiatives we have taken, beginning with the U.S. draft non-proliferation declaration which was given to Ambassador Dobrynin by Secretary Rusk in April 1963.<sup>4</sup> The latest U.S. proposal was the draft non-proliferation treaty presented at the disarmament talks in Geneva on August 17 last year.<sup>5</sup> We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union has also presented a draft treaty at this last session of the General Assembly.<sup>6</sup>

In order for us to approach a meeting of the minds on this question, I think we must first agree on the meaning of the concept of "proliferation." We believe that "proliferation" results when a non-nuclear nation acquires its own national capability or the right or ability to fire nuclear weapons without the explicit concurrent decision of an existing nuclear nation. This is the reasonable meaning of the term. It seems to us that we are much more likely to reach an understanding by agreeing to a precise definition

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<sup>3</sup> Document 108.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 85.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 92.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 98.

of “proliferation” such as this than by attempting to discuss the question in terms of such a loose concept as “access.”

If you agree to the above definition, you will, I believe, recognize that the United States has shown its willingness to enter into an agreement that would effectively forbid proliferation.

Although this text focuses on nuclear proliferation issues, the discussion of what constitutes “proliferation” is an important concept for CB weapons as well.

Our willingness is based on the strong conviction that it would be contrary to the interests of the United States if any presently non-nuclear nation were to acquire such a right or ability to fire nuclear weapons. In this respect, I believe that your interests and ours coincide. Since you have concentrated your comment on the Federal Republic of Germany, let me make it clear that this position applies to the Federal Republic of Germany as to all non-nuclear powers, and is so understood by the Federal Republic of Germany.

At the same time, I must also make clear that we are not prepared to enter into any agreement that would deny our allies the possibility of participating in their own defense through arrangements that would not constitute proliferation.

The situation would be different if the European member states of NATO were not presently threatened by nuclear weapons. But the unhappy fact is that the Soviet Union has many hundreds of missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at the territories of these nations. Under those circumstances our allies have a vital and just interest in participating with us in their defense. That is the purpose of NATO and that purpose is steadfast. None of the defense arrangements under discussion between the United States and its NATO allies would involve relinquishment of nuclear weapons to the national control of a non-nuclear country, now or at any time in the future. They are entirely consistent with, and indeed reinforce, the principle of non-proliferation. To deny the possibility of

such arrangements might only promote proliferation by encouraging states to develop national nuclear forces for their own protection.

Moreover, if because of unwarranted Soviet concern over possible NATO defense arrangements our two governments failed to act together to meet the real threat of proliferation which looms in other regions, that threat might spread even to Europe. Our two governments would bear a heavy responsibility.

Some of the comments in your letter show a misunderstanding about the effectiveness of the control that the United States maintains over its nuclear weapons. Our physical and legal arrangements are and will remain such as to insure beyond doubt that these weapons will not be used without the consent of the United States Government. I can assure you that the concerns you express on this point are groundless. It would be helpful to me to have a similar assurance with respect to the arrangements you may have with any of your allies as to which you have not provided us with any information.

I have noted your comments with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany. I must take strong exception to your unwarranted use of the epithet "West German revanchists" in relation to the Bonn Government. The Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken a treaty commitment never to use force to achieve reunification or modification of its present boundaries, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes in which it may become involved.<sup>7</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany is the only nation in the world that has renounced the production of atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons on its territory.<sup>8</sup> Chancellor Erhard has stated as recently as last month that the Federal Republic of Germany neither intends nor desires to acquire national control over nuclear weapons. As

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Declaration by Chancellor Adenauer, recorded in the Final Act of the Nine-Power Conference, London, October 3, 1954; text in Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, p. 422.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Protocol III on the Control of Armaments, signed at Paris by the Foreign Ministers of the Western European Union (including the Federal Republic of Germany), October 23, 1954, to the Brussels Treaty of March 17, 1948; entered into force May 6, 1955. Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 979-984.

stated in the communique following his visit here in December, Chancellor Erhard and I firmly believe in the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.<sup>9</sup> There is no conflict between this principle and the understanding that we reached during his recent visit that there should be continued discussion between our countries and with other interested allies to work out arrangements to assure NATO members an appropriate share in nuclear defense.

In the above paragraph, again, we see the nature of diplomatic efforts to address “atomic, bacteriological, and chemical weapons” in the same scope of foreign policy.

There can be no question of priority between arrangements for such defense and a non-proliferation agreement since they are not in conflict with one another. I can assure you that any arrangements we may conclude within NATO will not result in proliferation. You can satisfy any concerns you may have on this score by joining with us in a treaty that would prohibit all forms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The United States stands ready to sign such a treaty now.

To expedite the working out of an appropriate draft treaty, I accept your proposal that representatives of our two governments exchange views during the forthcoming session of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The U.S. Representative will be authorized, in his capacity as Co-Chairman, to conduct such an exchange of views with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It is my hope that the opportunity thus afforded will be fully utilized to remove any further misunderstandings that may hinder the achievement of a mutually acceptable draft non-proliferation treaty. My Government will make every effort toward that end.

I would also hope that, while giving urgent consideration to working out a non-proliferation treaty, the Co-Chairmen will also renew their

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<sup>9</sup> See the joint statement issued on December 21, following discussions between Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson; text in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1165-1167.

consideration of other measures that could contribute to halting or limiting the nuclear arms race.

For if the treaty we seek is to receive the widest adherence, we must take account of the view expressed by a number of non-nuclear countries. They have made clear that their renunciation of nuclear weapons would be facilitated by evidence that the nuclear powers are themselves prepared to halt the nuclear arms race.

Our Governments have a strong mutual interest in acting together to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in achieving a closer understanding on other means to curb the nuclear arms race. I want to assure you of my earnest intention to make the exchange of views that is about to take place in Geneva a fruitful one and to contribute to the successful outcome I am certain both of us deeply desire.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

This document is identified as document 453 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d453>.

**Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 22, 1967, 12:37 p.m.

11599. Ref: Geneva 145.<sup>2</sup>

1) ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] concern over UAR gas use in Yemen fully justified by information available to us, including press reports. Gas attacks continued for two weeks after ICRC Delegation visit to Gahar (May 16), then stopped in June, during and after Sinai crisis. Attacks resumed July 2-3, with dozens of gas bombs dropped on several villages, including al Darb in area of Khaulan, with many victims killed or gravely affected by gas. Further attack occurred July 15 at Hajjah, with 150 reported dead.

2) As ICRC knows, we fully share their concern about this subject. Committee's public statement on gas use in Yemen, and delegation report sent to four parties, were significant actions in calling attention to subject, though these actions have not received the wide publicity they merit, due in part to fact that Middle East news coverage in past two months has been occupied by Sinai crisis. UAR may have been encouraged to resume gas attacks in July because of relative lack of public outcry.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts (U) on July 21, cleared by Brewer and Senior Intelligence Officer Susan T. Tait (INR/RNA), and approved by Eugene Rostow.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 145 from Geneva, July 12, reported that the ICRC was becoming increasingly concerned over unconfirmed reports that UAR planes had again carried out poison gas attacks on scattered villages in the royalist areas of Yemen. (Ibid.)

3) We sympathize with ICRC request re gas masks, medicaments and related equipment. We see practical difficulties in mass distribution such materials, and wonder if this is what Committee has in mind. Effective use of masks, medicines, and equipment requires training or supervision of type not easy to arrange in conditions of this area. Many Yemeni illiterate and would require oral instructions in use of masks. Yemeni known to fear injections and would be hard to train to make proper use of medical kits.

**Para 3**—Interesting that these same issues of protecting civilians from chemical weapons effects came up in reference to the protection of Syrian civilians in 2012–2013.

4) Mass distribution might have significant propaganda effect and thus deter UAR from further attacks. If this is Committee's intention, limited or general appeal to societies or governments for masks, medicaments and equipment would seem more appropriate than private request to us. It goes without saying USG would be prepared respond positively.

5) As alternative to mass distribution, Committee might consider establishing small stock of needed items, to be stored with its own medical supplies, for its own use and for distribution to Yemenis in areas likely be affected. We would be willing quietly supply masks, medicines and equipment on this basis. However, most such equipment readily available commercially in Europe, so might be simpler for Committee to purchase items itself, financed from Committee's general funds to which we have made, and expect continue to make, substantial contributions. We understand West Germans may have 20,000 surplus masks in which Israel formerly interested. Committee might wish contact Bonn directly, suggesting Germans make available as whole or partial grant.

6) Particularly because inhumane gas campaign continuing, we believe additional actions needed focus world attention on this problem. We wonder whether ICRC has yet received replies from any of four recipients of its original report. If ICRC has no plans publish report, is Committee thinking of sending it to UN? In our view some such positive action would

make significant contribution toward generating atmosphere in world public opinion which would render such outrages less likely in future.

7) We remain deeply concerned on this subject but desire stay in background because of sensitive intelligence and propaganda implications. Mission should discuss subject frankly and informally with Committee in this light and report fully.

**Rusk**

Jonathan Tucker suggests in his book *War of Nerves* that during this time, the White House might have been concerned about charges of hypocrisy in light of U.S. military use of riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam. Another possibility is that events in Vietnam just overwhelmed the NSC and there were no clear, visible U.S. national security interests in Yemen, other than concerns about Soviet military assistance to Egypt and possible proliferation of chemical weapons technologies.

This document is identified as document 454 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d454>.

### **Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Jidda, July 23, 1967, 0931Z

281. State 10446.<sup>2</sup>

1. Appreciate rationale re Dept's conclusion that no positive action should be taken now to assist various anti-UAR Yemeni groups. I should point out, however, that pursuant SecState 219929<sup>3</sup> I have stopped actively urging Saudis not to assist Yemeni royalists or to continue restrain them. Instead, I have taken line with Rashad and others that Saudis aware of dangers and matter is one for them to decide. Saudis have quickly sensed our more relaxed line which, I suspect, is one reason we beginning hear rumors of Saudi help to Yemeni royalists and of permitting them try their luck.

2. I respectfully request Dept's reconsideration of one possible item of aid to Yemeni royalists, namely 20,000 (or as many as we can provide) gas masks. UAR continues indiscriminately use poison gas in Yemen. On our part we no longer seeking obscure this fact. Various items in US press including US News and World Report and Drummond's article in Washington Post, are publicizing it. Pursuant State 217282,<sup>4</sup> we here are also discreetly urging Yemeni royalists give wider, more effective

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling..

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 10446 to Jidda, July 20, informed the Ambassador that after further examination of the possibility of assisting Yemeni groups, the Department had concluded that no positive action should be taken at that time. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> Document 451.

<sup>4</sup> Dated June 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 YEMEN-SAUD)

publicity to these poison gas attacks. However, apart from more publicity, a real need exists for some gas mask protection. We could supply such masks though Saudis if we prefer not to be directly involved. Even if it became known, provision of such equipment could scarcely be labeled as offensive help to Yemeni royalists, but as essential defense need to meet blatant UAR use of gas against combatants and non-combatants alike in Yemen. It would also show Yemeni royalists that our concern with Yemen is an impartial one.

There is no evidence that any U.S. protective masks were sent from the United States to Yemen.

3. In this connection, I assume that with YAR withdrawal of recognition from USG our political commitments in Yemen have been wiped clean. We ought now try to establish contact with as wide spectrum of Yemeni political contacts as possible. We should seek develop at least some influence with all groupings, but at this time commit ourselves to none. By doing so, hopefully, we may at some future time be able to exert constructive influence for a broadly based Yemeni Govt. This will have to include Yemeni royalists who have shown remarkable staying power. It is unrealistic continue to ignore them. Apart from few personal contacts with Ahmad Shami, we have heretofore leaned over backwards to avoid contact with royalists to avoid embarrassing our relations with UAR and YAR. These considerations obviously no longer apply. Assume Dept has no objection to a discreet but overt effort on our part to broaden, our personal bases, our circle of Yemeni royalist contacts.<sup>5</sup>

4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concurs.

**Eilts**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 13532 to Jidda, July 27, informed the Embassy that the Department had no objection to a discreet effort to broaden its circle of Yemeni royalist contacts on a personal basis. Regarding the Ambassador's request for 20,000 gas masks for the royalists, the telegram stated that the United States should avoid direct involvement with any Yemeni faction at that stage. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda)

This document is identified as document 456 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d456>.

**Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 2, 1967, 1524Z

14947. Ref Jidda 383<sup>2</sup>

(1) Re SAG interest in what USG had in mind in its public reference to support of international action to deal with gas problem<sup>3</sup> (para 4 reftel), you may inform Masud following response Dept spokesman to press question August 1 as to whether US trying to collect its own evidence on gas warfare situation: "No, I would not say that this is a case in which the United States is trying to lead the field. We have been concerned about the reports. We would like to see the countries most affected take some initiative and as I indicated before we would be prepared to support any appropriate international action."

(2) FYI. Understand British may shortly approach us on this problem (London 714).<sup>4</sup> We have no preconceived notions on this subject but

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, and Daniel Brown (NEA/P); and approved by Battle. Repeated to Geneva, London, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Dated July 30. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> On July 27 Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the State Department's Office of News, told a press conference that the United States continued to be deeply disturbed by the many reports regarding use of poison gas against civilians in Yemen, condemned such actions as inhumane and entirely contrary to the laws of nations, and would support international action to deal with this problem. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 630-631)

<sup>4</sup> Dated July 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN)

character USG support would certainly take account of specific international action which might be proposed by state or states directly concerned. End FYI.

**Rusk**

And so the official U.S. position would be to decry the use of chemical weapons, but in light of the Six-Day War in the Middle East and pressing priorities in Vietnam, there would be no further actions. On the military side, most impressions were that the use of chemical weapons during the Yemeni civil war was an outlier case and not one U.S. forces should expect to face. That impression would change in 1975 when U.S. military leaders became aware (as an after-fact of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War) of the significant amount of CB defense equipment incorporated into Soviet vehicles and units.

This document is identified as document 101 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v21/d101>.

## **Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 9, 1967

### US-UK TALKS ON UN AFFAIRS

Washington, August 9-10, 1967

### ADEN-YEMEN GAS

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *United Kingdom*

Ambassador Dean, UK Embassy Washington  
Minister Tomkins, UK Embassy Washington  
Sir Leslie Glass, UKUN  
Sir Richard Beaumont, Foreign Office  
David Hildyard, Foreign Office  
Anne Warburton, Foreign Office  
Stephen Egerton, UKUN  
Alan Urwick, UK Embassy Washington

##### *United States*

Ambassador Goldberg  
IO Assistant Secretary Sisco  
NEA Assistant Secretary Battle  
USUN Ambassador Buffum  
USUN Ambassador Pedersen  
NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies  
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, INR/RSB

Aden Ambassador Beaumont offered to give a briefing on the latest situation in Aden. He said British objectives were (1) to extricate British forces from Aden in good order, and (2) to leave behind a viable and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI).

unified independent state. The first objective he described as “imperative”; the second, although less imperative, was one that the British were trying very hard and sincerely to achieve. The HMG offer to provide a deterrent naval force after independence (the date for which, Beaumont said, was still January 9, 1968) was designed to give confidence to the new state. The British would also keep a bomber force on Masira Island and continue to support the Bedouin Legion in the East Aden Protectorate.

The British remained faced with a political deadlock in Aden resulting from the intensification of extremism in Adeni political groupings brought about by outside pressures and the intimidation of the population caused by terrorism. Today it was hard to say who controls Aden. The British believed, however, that the Federal Government, with its backwoods tribal support, represented a genuine political force which would have to be recognized in any post-independence government. The British were having a hard time convincing the UN Special Mission of this. The British felt strongly that the rural component of the population must have appropriate representation in the new government if the new state were not to disintegrate. The danger of giving the urban elements an overwhelming voice was borne out by recent defections from the Federal Army. There was a real danger that if the post-independence government was of an extremist nationalist complexion the Shaikhs would withdraw their forces from the army and civil war would ensue.

The British believed that FLOSY had lost ground to some extent to the NLF in recent months and that the NLF, although still primarily a terrorist organization, was nevertheless developing some political leadership capability. The trade unions, which used to be the most important force in Aden politics, were now split between FLOSY and the NLF. The South Arabian League contained able men but the organization seemed to fall between two stools--not radical enough for the urban nationalists and too radical for the up-country rulers. Also, most of the SAL leaders were in exile.

Beaumont wished to put two requests to the USG in the interest of facilitating the transition to a viable independent South Arabian state. First, it would be helpful if the US could make some kind of statement in

support of the territorial integrity of the new state. Secondly, it would also help if the US could in the near future make a decision to offer some kind of economic assistance to the new state. The British appreciated the problems that the US would have in extending economic aid of any magnitude. However, even a token gesture along these lines would help to steer the situation in a constructive direction. The aid offer would not have to be specific, and it could be directed to the newly-created state rather than to the present government. HMG itself was planning to extend economic assistance to the new state in the amount of \$140 million spread over three years.

Beaumont emphasized that the British adhered to their timetable for withdrawal from Aden. In fact the withdrawal of military forces was slightly ahead of schedule.

Ambassador Glass said that so far as the UN Mission was concerned HMG's objectives were to achieve a caretaker government which would provide for a cooling off period and a coalescing of political forces. The original effort of the Mission had been a great disappointment to the HMG. Now British efforts were concentrated on keeping the Mission from "becoming a nuisance." In recent days the Mission had become somewhat more constructive. HMG had hoped that the nationalist political groups would agree to meet with it in Geneva but FLOSY had now said it would not, and the NLF had done likewise. High Commissioner Trevelyan had urged that the Federal Government send representatives to meet with the Mission.

Responding to the two British requests of the USG, Ambassador Battle said that both would pose difficult problems. This would be particularly true in terms of Congress, which recently had expressed criticism of our extending our commitments to additional territories. We would look into the question of whether our existing statements concerning support for the territorial integrity of the states of the area could somehow be defined to include South Arabia. On aid, he did not wish to leave the British with unjustified expectations. Given existing pressures on foreign aid generally, it would be difficult for the US to do anything substantial in South Arabia. Perhaps some technical assistance would be feasible. Ambassador Battle

assured the British officials that their requests would receive careful consideration.

*Use of Poison Gas in Yemen*

Ambassador Beaumont said there were two aspects to this issue. First, the UAR's use of poison gas, now pretty well established, had shocked people on humanitarian grounds in Britain. Secondly, it seemed to offer an opportunity to attack the double standard that prevailed in the Afro-Asian world whereby the "imperialist" powers came under constant criticism for "atrocities" but apparently the Afro-Asian states could never commit any sins. Ambassador Beaumont saw an advantage in raising the issue in various forums so as to bring some pressure to bear on the UAR to stop this practice and also to adopt moderate policies generally in Yemen.

Ambassador Glass said unfortunately the Arab-Israel conflict had made it more difficult to condemn the UAR for its use of gas. Such a move could now be labelled by the Arab extremists as an anti-Arab tactic. The most feasible tack might be to get the GA's third Committee to consider a general resolution condemning the use of gas (without specifying the UAR). The trouble was the Third Committee tended to be erratic. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution in 1966 condemning the use of gas in wartime, and it might be possible to introduce another resolution extending this condemnation to use under any circumstances. This resolution had been dealt with in the First Committee with disarmament questions.

Ambassador Battle said it was difficult for us to do anything in the UN when the parties most directly concerned were unwilling to push a charge against the UAR. Of late the Saudis had not been willing to break Arab solidarity by pushing this issue. At present we didn't see any other group that would be willing to take the lead on it. Sir Patrick Dean wondered whether the Scandinavians might not play this role. He pointed out that the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers would be meeting in a week or so and that perhaps the UK and US might wish to stimulate them to take the lead on this issue. Mr. Sisco said he was doubtful that they would, adding that one problem with bringing up the gas issue in the GA was that it might tend to unify Arabs on the broader Arab-Israel question.

Ambassador Goldberg said that personally he had been shocked at the use of gas, and that American public opinion was outraged. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the US because of Congressional and private pressures, not to make some move. However, he saw that the US could not bring the issue up formally but he thought we should actively stimulate either the Scandinavians or the Latin Americans to raise it. Mr. Sisco said that as a fallback position we might want to organize certain states to take the lead in preparing documentation on the case. It was left that the US and UK delegations in New York would consult on the matter inter alia to consider means of moving ahead if Saudi Arabia remained reluctant to give active support. It would be necessary to be in touch with the Scandinavians and the Saudis.

This letter was not in the *Foreign Relations* series, but it represents an excellent discussion of U.S. CB weapons policy from DoD to the Congress.

### **Letter from Director of Defense Research and Engineering<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 9, 1967

Honorable Edward W. Brooke<sup>2</sup>  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Brooke:

This letter is in response to your inquiry of November 3rd in which you enclosed a letter from the Physicians for Social Responsibility, of Boston, Mass. I would like first to answer the specific questions applicable to the Department of Defense and then to offer some general information. I will repeat the question asked by the Physicians for Social Responsibility and give my answer to each.

1. It is our understanding that the current Army Field Manual FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, states: "The United States is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases, of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare. Is this the case?"

Answer. This is a factual statement, correctly quoted.

2. Are the other branches of the Armed Forces officially guided by the same statement or a similar one?

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Edward Brook (R-Mass.) served in office between January 3, 1967 and January 3, 1979.

Answer: The U. S. Navy, in NWIP 10-2, "The Law of Naval Warfare", Section 612 b, states:

"The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological weapons.

"Although the use of such weapons frequently has been condemned by States, including the United States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by treaty, a State legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their use. However, it is clear that the use of a poisonous gas or bacteriological weapon may be considered justified against an enemy who first resorts to the use of these weapons."

This statement applies also to the U.S. Marine Corps. The U.S. Air Force has no comparable regulation. In a joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps-Air Force Regulation, "Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical and Biological Weapons Employment and Defense, the statement is made:

"3. Policies

a. The decision for U.S. Forces to use chemical and biological weapons rests with the President of the United States."

3. In December 1966 the United States voted in favor of a United Nations General Assembly resolution supporting the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In view of this, should not the language of the field manual quoted above be changed so as to emphasize international restraints on chemical warfare, rather than the lack thereof? Will this be done?

Answer: The restraint on CB weapons, and the requisite authority for their use is amply clear with the Armed Forces. There are no current plans for revision of FH 27-10.

4 & 5. These are, I believe, properly the province of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, you should know that *we* have been working with ACDA for several years in study of the very difficult technical problem of verification of CB disarmament.

6. What chemical agents are being used presently in the Vietnam war for anti-personnel, anti-crop, or anti-foliage purposes? Do the tactical advantages of their use outweigh such serious disadvantages as the weakening of international restraints against chemical warfare? Will the Administration order an end to their use?

Answer: Anti-personnel agents used are riot control agents. Two types have been authorized: CN (chloroacetophenone) and CS (ortho-chlorobenzilydene-malononitrile). The latter is used almost exclusively.

Anti-crop and anti-foliage agents are the same. They are: a mixture of the butyl esters of 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, cacodylic acid and a mixture of 2,4 D and Tordon (4-amino-3,5,6-trichloropicolinic acid). All have been widely used for agricultural purposes in this and other countries.

We have repeatedly weighed the pros and cons of using these materials. We are convinced that their use is not only military advantageous but has resulted in saving many lives among civilians as well as in our own and our adversaries' military forces. For these reasons we have no intention of discontinuing their use.

It hardly seems to me that the U.S. position on chemical and biological warfare is ambiguous. Our policy was stated forthrightly by President Roosevelt during World War II. It was honored by President Truman, it was reiterated by President Eisenhower, and it has been repeated publicly by many spokesmen of the present administration. These include Secretaries Risk and McNamara as well as Ambassadors Goldberg and Nabrit. An explicit statement of the U.S. position was made last February by Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance in testimony before the

Disarmament Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  
He said:

"The Department of Defense has consistently supported measures aimed at achieving limitations on chemical and biological weapons.

"The proposal for general and complete disarmament tabled by the United States at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva states as an objective of our Government the elimination of all stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

"We supported the United States affirmative vote in the United Nations General Assembly last December on a resolution calling on all nations to observe the principles and objectives of the Geneva protocol of 1925. We have observed these principles consistently since 1925, although the United States, as you know, did not ratify the Geneva protocol.

"We have consistently continued our de facto limitations on the use of chemical and biological weapons. We have never used biological weapons. We have not used lethal gases since World War I and it is against our policy to initiate their use. We have used riot-control agents in Vietnam - agents similar to those used by police forces throughout the world. We have also used herbicides to destroy vegetation and crops in Vietnam.

"I have indicated that we seek international understandings to limit chemical and biological warfare and that we have not used weapons of the sort condemned by the Geneva protocol. I should also point out that we have at the same time maintained an active chemical and biological program. In the last few years we have placed increasing emphasis on defensive concepts and materiel. As long as other nations, such as the Soviet Union, maintain large programs, we believe we must maintain our defensive and

[The rest of the document is missing]

This document is identified as document 188 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d188>.

## **Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

### MILITARY STRATEGY FOR FY 1970 THROUGH FY 1977 (U)

#### Part I

#### Introduction

##### *Purpose*

1. (U) This Volume of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan develops the military strategy for the period FY 1970–FY 1977. It emphasizes those elements of the strategic concept which influence major issues that should be addressed in the FY 1970 Department of Defense budget. It also considers the implications of the current conflict in Southeast Asia relative to the strategic concept for the mid-range period.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, 511 (27 Jul 67) Sec 1 IR 1870. Top Secret. A title page, foreword, and table of contents are not printed. This paper forms Enclosure A to a report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 2143/312) entitled “The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for Fiscal Year 1970 Through Fiscal Year 1977 (JSOP 70–77),” which is not printed. Although the report bears the date July 27, 1967, it was actually written later, for it notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after making amendments, approved Enclosure A at their August 11 meeting and forwarded it to the military services and the commanders of the unified and specified commands on August 18. The foreword to the paper printed here identifies it as Volume I of a 3-volume paper comprising JSOP 70–77 and also lists proposed Annexes A–L to supplement Volumes II and III. Neither Volumes II and III nor the Annexes has been found.

*Objectives*

2. (U) *General*. As one of the elements of national power, military force is justified on the basis of its contribution to the support of national policy. US national security policy is not contained in any single, nationally-approved document. It is constantly and dynamically evolving through informal and formal processes. It emerges from this process that US national security interests will be served best by fostering a peaceful international community which is not inimical to the US Government and is based upon consent of the governed, dignity of the individual, and respect for the rule of law. Attainment of this world of peace with justice through peaceful means is a US national goal in the most fundamental sense. Nevertheless, throughout the mid-range period the presence and exercise of US military power will continue to be essential to protect the interests of the United States and its allies, while conditions favorable to peaceful attainment of this goal are being pursued.

3. (U) *National Security Objective*. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and preserve its freedom to pursue its national objectives as the leading world power. The development of a world community which lends itself to this objective is implicit in its meaning.

4. (S) *Basic Military Objectives*. The basic US military objectives derived from the national security objective are:

a. Deter any military attacks against the United States; if deterrence fails, deal effectively with such attacks by conducting the operations required to terminate hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States, while limiting damage to the United States.

b. Deter, in conjunction with available friendly forces, any military attacks against other areas the security of which is essential to US objectives; if deterrence fails, deal effectively with such attacks by conducting the operations required to terminate hostilities under advantageous conditions which facilitate achievement of US and compatible allied objectives, while minimizing damage to US and allied interests.

c. Assist in the self-defense efforts of selected governments to prevent or defeat subversion, insurgency, and encroachments, when the stability and survival of these governments are important to US objectives.

d. Ensure freedom of the sea, air, and space regions for the United States and friendly powers, maintain surveillance over the use of those portions of these regions important to US security, and deny their use for purposes adverse to US interests.

e. Employ military forces and resources to accomplish such other missions as may be directed by US national political authority, to include:

(1) Support of US foreign policy and diplomatic undertakings.

(2) Protection, in areas outside the United States, of US nationals, their properties, and lawful interests; US property; and selected foreign nationals and property.

(3) Assistance in the maintenance of order under constituted authority within the United States.

## Part II

### Global Appraisal

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#### *Balance of Military Power*

14. (S) The most dangerous threat to the United States is posed by the rapidly growing strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. This threat is so serious in its potential consequences, regardless of the estimated intentions of the Soviet Union, that it must receive primary cognizance in the formulation of military strategy and in the development of force levels. Although Soviet strategic offensive forces can inflict enormous damage upon the United States in a first strike, they cannot, at the present time, destroy enough of the US nuclear offensive and defensive forces to preclude retaliatory destruction of Soviet Union urban-industrial

resources. However, the Soviets are continuing to build forces, which it is believed will increase their confidence in a retaliatory capability sufficient to assure the destruction of a significant portion of US industrial resources and population. They are also active in efforts, through both strategic offensive and defensive programs, to improve their ability to reduce the damage the United States can inflict on the USSR should deterrence fail and strategic nuclear war occur. In addition, the USSR has the capability to conduct a massive nuclear attack against Eurasia. In the absence of continued US improvements in strategic capabilities, Soviet offensive and defensive systems could attain in the course of their development significant counterforce and defensive damage-limiting capability against the United States. It is necessary, therefore, for the United States to make timely improvements in its strategic offensive and defensive capabilities, to preserve a credible deterrent to convince the Soviets that they cannot achieve a viable first strike option.

15. (S) Irrespective of the unlikelihood of deliberate Soviet initiation of a strategic nuclear attack, the possibility of strategic nuclear war through escalation or miscalculation cannot be dismissed. Further, the United States cannot safely discount the possibility that Soviet leaders might launch a preemptive strike if they considered themselves inextricably involved in a major confrontation over critical objectives. Finally, they might launch a preemptive strike if they believed nuclear attack upon the USSR were imminent.

16. (S) The US and USSR strategic nuclear capabilities are expected to remain superior to those of all other nations for the period of this appraisal. However, by 1970, the CPR probably will have sufficient missiles and warheads to attempt nuclear blackmail in the Western Pacific-Asian area. In the early 1970s, the CPR is expected to be able to pose a limited nuclear threat to the United States and to the USSR.

17. (S) Strategic power relationships could be upset by: unmatched technological advances in weapon systems, particularly in strategic nuclear systems; violations of major arms control agreements; unbalanced arms reductions; and major shifts in alliances and alignments. For example, if the Soviets were to achieve warheads having significantly

improved nuclear effects for their ballistic missile defense systems, prior to compensating accomplishments by the United States, the military power relationship would be upset, perhaps critically, in favor of the USSR. For these and other reasons, a vigorous US nuclear test program is necessary within the restrictions of the present Limited Test Ban Treaty.

18. (S) The Warsaw Pact and the CPR have significant general purpose forces which pose major threats to Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, and a limited threat outside these areas. The USSR will gradually modernize its general purpose forces to improve their capabilities to engage in sustained nonnuclear as well as nuclear warfare. The emphasis probably will be on improving active combat support and service support units. It is believed that the resulting augmentation will be accompanied by a corresponding reduction in the number of divisions, so that toward the end of the mid-range period there will be a reduced number of larger divisions with better support, with no significant change in the total number of men in the ground forces. Soviet capabilities for airborne and amphibious assault remain tied to support of Eurasian operations. These contiguous capabilities are being expanded markedly as the capacity and efficiency of air and sealift forces are increased. The expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet and the development of very large transport aircraft will also improve Soviet capabilities to move unopposed military forces to distant areas. However, developments thus far do not signify any urgent Soviet program to acquire capabilities for opposed distant operations.

19. (C) The increasing maritime strength and capability of the Soviet Union derive from three elements of seapower: a combatant navy, a merchant marine, and a fleet of oceanographic, survey, and fishing vessels. The Soviet merchant marine and oceanographic fleet can be classed with those of the leading nations of the world. The Soviet navy, although not a balanced force by Western standards, is quantitatively the second largest in the world, and is undergoing qualitative improvement in both the strategic and general purpose categories. As Soviet maritime capabilities continue to grow, the USSR will increase its capability to meet its own shipping requirements and to expand its political influence throughout the world through economic and military assistance.

20. (S) Evidence indicates that the Soviets have stockages to support substantial chemical warfare operations and that training of personnel in their use has been extensive. Research to improve toxic nerve agents and efforts to develop nonlethal incapacitating agents are continuing. The Soviets have a variety of chemical munitions and delivery vehicles for dissemination of chemical agents and a wide range of defensive chemical warfare equipment.

**Para 20**—This paragraph includes the requisite chemical weapons assessment, again without any mention of biological weapons. The important note is that it is distinct from the threat defined as strategic nuclear attacks in para 15; policymakers understood that not all WMD are equal.

21. (C) The likelihood of conflicts involving US interests during the mid-range period, as well as their form and outcome, will depend upon the degree to which the United States and its allies maintain a military capability that provides a credible deterrence and effective flexible response throughout the spectrum of potential conflicts. However, even if the US posture is improved to counter the growing and increasingly complex threat, deterrence will not be infallible, and conflicts will occur. Some judgments on the likelihood of conflict are possible in the context of such continuing US posture improvements.

- a. Strategic nuclear war, although the most dangerous threat, is the least likely of all levels of warfare.
- b. A conventional war of the dimensions of World War II is the least likely of all forms of nonnuclear warfare, primarily because of the probability of escalation to or beyond the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
- c. Nonnuclear conflicts, limited in scope and/or objectives, are more likely.
- d. Continued low-intensity conflicts, particularly in underdeveloped areas of the world, are certain and these conflicts may increase in frequency.

### Part III

#### Regional Appraisals

##### *General*

22. (U) This Part expands the global appraisal in Part II into more specific appraisals for each of the major regions of US security interest. These regional appraisals, and the preceding world appraisal, provide the background for the strategic concept which follows in Part IV. Together, the appraisals and concept serve as a basis for subsequent presentation in Part V of force planning guidance for over-all objective force level analysis and derivation in succeeding Volumes and Annexes of JSOP 70–77. The sequential treatment of regions and areas does not imply a fractionalization of the threat or a priority among mutually exclusive area concepts, since the threats to all areas are in some respects identical and in most respects overlapping. The regional and area concepts and the US global concept for strategic nuclear offensive and defensive operations are interrelated.

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31. (S) The military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact constitute a formidable element of the threat. While the Warsaw Pact leaders probably believe that they now possess sufficient military power to deter NATO from resorting to all-out nuclear war, except under extreme threat to its critical interests, they are, nevertheless, expected to continue to spend large sums on improving their capabilities. In particular, the Soviets probably will continue to:

a. Seek by every possible means, including research, development, and production, to acquire a clear military advantage over NATO. They can be expected to exploit any significant increase in their military capability.

b. Pursue their objectives from a position of impressive military strength based on nuclear, massive conventional, chemical, and biological capabilities.

Someone remembered that biological weapons needed to be mentioned.

- c. Improve and expand their nuclear and antiballistic missile capabilities.
- d. Deploy naval forces and merchant fleets worldwide on an increasing scale and in increasing competition with NATO countries.
- e. Increase the Warsaw Pact forces' capabilities for a wide range of military operations.

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#### *The Americas*

53. (S) The primary threat to North America will be from Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The ballistic missile threat is expected to increase. That threat may be supplemented by weapons deliverable from orbit or with depressed trajectories, if such systems are developed. The CPR will represent a growing threat in the 1971–1980 time frame. Since the most likely air or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack approach is via the polar regions, Canada's aerospace and participation in NORAD continue to be of great significance. Inasmuch as submarine-launched missiles pose a threat off both coasts of North America, it is important that US-Canadian antisubmarine warfare arrangements be continued. It is expected that military relations between Canada and the United States will continue to reflect the fundamental identity of common defense interests, but may be affected by Canada's growing nationalism and by its increasing sensitivity to any form of US pressure.

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58. (S) Latin American desire to stay clear of a nuclear power struggle has resulted in a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) Treaty having been agreed to by most Latin American countries. The NFZ will undoubtedly come into existence but the Treaty is worded so that there should be no adverse effect on US transit and overflight rights. However, there are other

important factors associated with this Treaty, such as extravagant territorial sea claims, which are potentially inimical to US interests.

#### Part IV

### Strategic Concept

#### *General Considerations*

59. (S) *General*. The principal objective of US military strategy is the deterrence of aggression at any level, with emphasis on deterrence of strategic nuclear attack on the United States since national survival would be clearly in jeopardy. Should deterrence fail, the principal objective of US military strategy is the termination of hostilities under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and minimizing damage to US and allied interests. Accordingly, the three basic elements of the US strategic concept are collective security, credible deterrence, and flexible response.

60. (S) *Collective Security*. The first goal of collective security is to acquire and assist allies who will contribute to US security interests worldwide, particularly through mutual efforts to counter threats posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China and their respective allies. The second goal is to obtain the cooperation and assistance of other nations in programs to eliminate internal weaknesses and instability which attract and facilitate subversion, insurgency, and armed aggression.

a. The United States should enter alliances and other collective security arrangements selectively, stressing maximum reliance upon indigenous forces to protect their national and regional interests. US participation should be based upon the degree to which US interests are involved; the threat; and the willingness, desires, and capabilities of the peoples concerned to support mutual goals.

b. Inherent in collective security is forward defense. This comprises a combination of elements, including strong indigenous military forces; forward-deployed US forces; pre-positioned equipment and supplies; forces fully capable of rapid deployment, quick entry into combat, and

sustained operations, as necessary; and US strategic mobility capabilities; all complemented by US strategic nuclear power. Collective security embodies cooperative efforts toward common goals, which include combined action to counter aggression and to assist other nations. There must be increased emphasis on regional efforts toward self-help and economic and military assistance by third nations.

61. (S) *Credible Deterrence*. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. Credible deterrence is a function of obvious capability and known determination to employ it when necessary. Deterrence could fail for a number of reasons, important among which are miscalculation of intent or resolve, underestimation of military capabilities, or commission of an irrational act. Forces structured solely to deter may be insufficient to achieve US objectives if deterrence fails. It is important that deterrent credibility be established for all levels of conflict. There is an essential relationship among all the levels of deterrence.

Important point in para 61 and below: strategic deterrence is a broader topic than nuclear weapons, although nuclear weapons are certainly a component of strategic deterrence policy.

- a. The United States must be known to possess a level and mix of strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems, which have sufficient survivability and assured capability to penetrate under all conditions of war outbreak, to guarantee unacceptable damage to any state, or combination of states, and which have, concomitantly, the capability to limit damage to the United States and its allies.
- b. Deterrence of an enemy's use of nuclear weapons within a theater requires survivable, controlled, and versatile strategic offensive and defensive forces and dual-capable (nuclear and nonnuclear) general purpose forces, capable of rapid and discriminate response at levels of intensity appropriate to the circumstances.
- c. Deterrence of nonnuclear aggression is based on both US and allied dual-capable general purpose forces and US strategic forces.

Requirements include continued efforts by Free World nations to strengthen their military capabilities; US forces capable of arriving in potential conflict areas quickly, in strength, and prepared for peacekeeping and such combat operations as may be necessary; strategic mobility capabilities; and US forces deployed to selected forward locations as evidence of US determination and unequivocal involvement.

d. Deterrence of subversion and insurgency is best accomplished through preventive efforts aimed at establishing effective political, economic, technological, psychological, sociological, and military programs. The key military requirements are to deter outside military support to insurgency, to assist in the creation and employment of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of contributing effectively to internal security and stability, and to participate in support of other government agencies in nonmilitary programs.

62. (S) Flexible Response. A capability for flexible response requires the United States to have an array of options to cope with all the levels and scopes of conflict. This will provide a capability for controlled increases or decreases in the application of military power to US advantage throughout the spectrum of warfare. US initial engagement, and subsequent increases in commitment if necessary, should be on a scale and intensity such that the enemy will have neither the time nor the capability to accommodate to our efforts, thereby insuring his timely defeat, minimum costs in US and allied lives and resources, and achievement of US objectives. Additionally, US forces must be capable of executing national options of response that are not limited to the location and manner of conflict selected by the enemy.

a. To defeat subversion and insurgency, US strategy must encompass and integrate diplomacy, military and economic aid, technical assistance, cultural exchange, economic sanctions, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare. Preventive programs must be continued and strengthened. Maximum possible use must be made of indigenous forces to deal with local insurgents; in addition, US forces may be necessary to support local forces, to engage and defeat the insurgents, and to interdict or defeat external support.

b. The United States must have the capability of committing general purpose forces in accordance with terms of alliances, in support of UN resolutions, and on the basis of US unilateral decisions. This objective necessitates a high degree of flexibility, a strategic deployment capability to all points of the globe, a versatile capability to engage enemies whose capabilities range from primitive to sophisticated, and the ability to deploy to and fight in all environments.

(1) Against the background of the relative total military capabilities of the United States and the USSR, the strategic implications of conflict at sea become significant as a means for bringing military pressure to bear in support of limited objectives.

(a) In the case of the United States and its allies, it provides options to deter and coerce the Soviet Union and its allies to the advantage of Free World interests.

(b) In the case of the Soviet Union and its allies it provides options to bring military pressure to bear in selected instances against vulnerable US and allied sea lines of communications to gain limited objectives.

(2) US employment of coercive options at sea should take into consideration joint employment of over-all US military strength if major interests are at stake.

c. General purpose forces must include a strong tactical nuclear capability for the option of effective quick response in raising the threshold of conflict against enemy superiority, when necessary to defeat the enemy, and to respond to possible enemy use of tactical nuclear weapons. For such quick response, tactical nuclear weapons must be collocated with dual-capable forward-deployed forces.

d. At the level of strategic nuclear war, US strategy must provide multiple options to national authorities, to include a selection of execution choices as to countries and tasks under varying conditions of war outbreak. Under all conditions, US strategic offensive and defensive forces must comprise a capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the war-supporting and urban-industrial resources of the enemy. Concomitantly they must be

capable of: destroying or neutralizing (with or without collateral damage constraints) a comprehensive military target system; limiting damage to the United States and its allies; maintaining continued strategic superiority; conducting selective attacks; and terminating hostilities under conditions of relative advantage to the United States. These capabilities would also provide options to deter and coerce the enemy. General purpose forces also figure importantly in US options for flexible response at the level of strategic nuclear war. They contribute both during and subsequent to strategic nuclear operations and exploit the advantage achieved in these operations, thus furthering progress toward achievement of US objectives in the post-termination period.

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## Part V

### Force Planning Guidance

#### *General*

67. (U) This Part of the strategy presents broad guidance to serve as a bridge between the strategic concept and the analyses and judgments essential in the planning process continued in the succeeding Volumes and Annexes.

#### *Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces*

68. (C) The US strategic offensive and defensive forces should have an assured predominance over the collective capability of the USSR, the CPR, or any other state or group of states. These forces must be sufficient to ensure that following a strategic nuclear war the United States will retain a position of strategic advantage relative to other nations of the world.

69. (C) A clearly superior US strategic nuclear military posture requires offensive and defensive forces which are capable, under all conditions of war outbreak, of assuring destruction of the enemy's urban-industrial areas

(i.e., assured destruction) while limiting damage to the United States (i.e., damage limiting) and, to the extent practicable to its allies.

70. (S) [6 lines of source text not declassified] Forces assigned the damage-limiting task provide the capability through offensive and defensive means to reduce the effect of the enemy's attack. Damage-limiting forces should be in balance with assured destruction elements. An effective damage-limiting capability requires a combination of offensive forces, ballistic missile defense, air defense, space defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, and civil defense. A force of survivable strategic offensive forces, intelligence and early warning systems, strategic defensive forces, command and control systems, and effective passive defense measures will strengthen the credibility of the US deterrent against attacks on the United States and its allies. This in turn will strengthen the assurance that the fear of escalating nonnuclear conflicts works to the advantage of the United States. A proper mix of US strategic offensive and defensive capabilities would tend to make increased defensive efforts and expenditures the enemy's preferred response option, and would exact greater direct and indirect attrition of the enemy's attack, so as to reduce the potential for damage to the United States and its allies if deterrence fails.

71. (S) A mix of strategic offensive forces is necessary to permit a range of options at varying levels of intensity of attack against alternative target systems. A combination of land and sea-launched missiles and manned aircraft carrying bombs and missiles, equipped with active and passive defense systems, will be required through the mid-range period. Such a mix provides options ranging from a show of force to the assured destruction task. These forces must be survivable, continue to be maintained in a high degree of alert, and must be capable of discriminate and controlled use.

a. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] To the extent feasible, US deployment of forces for this option should emphasize their commitment to the Communist Chinese threat in order to reinforce the deterrent effect upon Communist China, reassure US allies in Asia, and derive the potential benefits of [3 lines of source text not declassified].

b. Residual strategic offensive and general purpose forces must provide an effective capability, [4 lines of source text not declassified].

c. Command and control facilities and arrangements must be secure, reliable, and survivable to ensure that strategic forces are immediately responsive to political and military decisions on the initiation, conduct, and termination of hostilities.

72. (S) The United States should have active and passive defenses in depth for protection against attack from land, sea, air, and space, by all types of weapon systems, whether employed selectively or simultaneously. A foremost requirement for the defense of the United States is the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. Such a system should provide a significant limitation of damage to US population, military capabilities, industrial and other resources. This defense must be integrated with an improved defense against aerodynamic vehicles, improved ASW capabilities, a comprehensive civil defense program, and a program for protection of military forces against attack effects, to assure the necessary damage-limiting capability.

73. (S) The United States requires reliable and near real-time surveillance of enemy and friendly forces. Enemy forces must be kept under surveillance prior to the outbreak of hostilities in order to obtain technical intelligence, to perform mission identification, to monitor arms control agreements and treaties, and to provide strategic warning. During hostilities, surveillance must provide tactical warning. In the exercise of command and control, surveillance is required to insure that US forces and resources are employed with maximum effectiveness. This surveillance should provide indications of enemy strategy, and knowledge of enemy tactics, order of battle, and the effectiveness of enemy and US weapons. Timely and precise analysis of the relative success of an exchange is required so that the best interests of the United States can be served in controlling the progress of hostilities and achieving advantageous war termination. These missions will require aircraft, satellite systems, ocean surveillance systems, and other systems and sensors.

*General Purpose Forces*

74. (S) General purpose forces, supported by appropriate strategic mobility capability, are an integral part of the over-all US deterrent posture. They constitute the principal means to meet threats at levels less than strategic nuclear war. Their capabilities also provide options to deter and coerce the enemy. General purpose forces will usually operate in association with allies, under the collective security and forward defense aspects of the strategic concept. This requires consideration of allied or other friendly in-being and potential force capabilities. Whenever feasible, these capabilities should be developed as the first line of defense against aggression. US military assistance should be considered in that context.

75. (C) Active and Reserve general purpose forces should be balanced in combat capability and sufficient in quantity, quality, mobility, and logistic support to provide forward deployed forces and a strategic reserve of US-based forces which, in conjunction with allied forces, can assure the defense of key strategic areas and essential LOCs, and respond to contingency situations. They should be supported by appropriately structured strategic lift forces and pre-positioned materiel, and include a training, replacement, and rotation base in the United States for deployed forces.

76. (S) General purpose forces must be capable of operating in a nuclear or nonnuclear environment. They should be equipped with both single-purpose and dual-capable weapons systems for air, land, and sea operations. These should include air and missile elements on quick reaction alert. Tactical nuclear capabilities should provide a variety of options for responding to, initiating, and waging nuclear warfare at all levels below strategic nuclear war. They must be capable of selective application for military advantage in circumstances where significant military gain without further expansion of conflict is likely. In addition, they should be capable of conducting military operations in strategic nuclear war in conjunction with strategic offensive and defensive forces.

77. (S) During the mid-range period, there will be a continuing requirement for a substantial US military presence in and around Europe facing the Warsaw Pact. Even after the Vietnam conflict has ended,

substantial deployed forces, including forces afloat, and land and sea-based prepositioned equipment and supplies will be required in the Pacific-Asian area to face the Soviet and CPR threats and to contribute to area stability.

78. (S) US military forces must be capable of employing chemical and biological weapons, of conducting operations in a toxic environment, and of defending against their use by an enemy.

...

**Para 78**—While the official-unofficial policy is “no first use,” it is still expected that US forces be capable of employing CB weapons as part of general warfare. This is an aspect of deterrence, not the immoral use of a WMD or use of ineffective weapons with unknown effects.

This document is identified as document 208 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d208>.

## **National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 13, 1968

NIE 4-68

### THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

#### The Problem

To assess the capabilities of foreign nations to introduce biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and to estimate the likelihood of such introduction over the next few years.

#### Conclusions

A. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. We do not believe, however, that any potential enemy would plan the clandestine use of BW or CW on a scale sufficient to achieve strategic military objectives. We do not rule out the use of BW or CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. The relatively small quantities required for these

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Miscellaneous CIA Memoranda [4 of 4], Box 14. Top Secret; Restricted Data. A title page and prefatory note are not printed. According to the prefatory note, the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. Representatives of the CIA, Department of State, DIA, NSA, and AEC concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction.

purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection. Therefore we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and unlikely in view of the risks involved.

In March 1968, there was a release of VX nerve agent at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, allegedly affecting more than 6,000 sheep. One early idea floated was that Soviet spies could have deliberately released nerve agent in Utah in an effort to discredit the U.S. CB warfare program and to stop open air trials. That idea was later discounted by forensics analysis and other data. Jonathan Tucker notes in his book *War of Nerves* that NORAD officers were concerned in 1960 that Soviet spies might use CB agents to kill crews at early warning stations in order to blind the United States from a Soviet first strike. He also notes a warning by Brig Gen Jack Rothschild in 1964 that nerve agents might be used against U.S. missile sites and SAC bases prior to a Soviet first strike.

B. The Soviets could introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and might consider doing so if they planned a deliberate surprise attack on the US. Considering the large numbers of strategic weapons now in their arsenal, however, the Soviets would see the contribution of a clandestine emplacement effort as marginal and would consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipitating a US preemptive attack.

C. Because the Chinese have no other means of attacking the US with nuclear weapons, they might consider a clandestine emplacement effort with the object of deterring the US from attack on Communist China. Their capabilities to carry out such an effort, however, are much less than those of the USSR. Moreover, they could not be sure that the US would be deterred and they would have to consider that detection might result in, rather than stave off, a devastating US strike. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that Communist China will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

D. We have considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear

weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. If they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

## Discussion

### *I. Introduction*

1. In considering the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the US, enemy leaders would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from specific US security measures, but also from the chance of US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the US as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude.

2. We believe, therefore, that the range of circumstances in which weapons of mass destruction might be clandestinely introduced into the US is quite narrow—that an enemy nation would consider this course only in the context of planning an attack on the US or of deterring the US from an attack on itself. Smaller stakes would not be worth the risk. Such weapons could not be brought in secretly in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Any plans for their use, we believe, would envision the use of limited quantities to achieve results unattainable by other means.

3. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. Although small quantities of BW agents could be effective against large targets, the delayed action of such agents makes them unsuitable for use in situations requiring an immediate or precisely timed effect. Relatively large quantities of CW agents are required to obtain effective concentrations over extensive target areas, and

it would be difficult to introduce them clandestinely in such quantities. Moreover, the effects of BW and CW agents cannot always be predicted accurately; adverse weather can limit or even prevent the effective use of BW and CW agents against some targets.

4. We do not rule out the use of BW and CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. But because the relatively small quantities required for these purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection, we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and therefore unlikely in view of the risks involved. The following discussion, therefore, is limited to a consideration of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

**Paras 3-4**—This section is interesting in that the intelligence community notes the ability of any nation with significant industrial capability to produce CB warfare agents at least for small-scale use. Yes, getting an effect over a large area would require larger quantities, but those nations with a CB weapons program could in fact predict casualties based on dissemination principles and weather data without difficulty. At the same time, this NIE suggests that anyone within the United States could develop small quantities of agent for clandestine use, thus the Soviets wouldn't try to move agents over the border. This view was not particularly informed, given the lack of available monitors at the borders, and the significant technical expertise and specialized equipment required to make nerve agents, mustard agents, or anthrax.

5. Only four foreign nations—the USSR, the UK, France, and Communist China—have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Beyond these, only India is likely to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years; Israel and Sweden might do so. We can foresee no changes in the world situation so radical as to motivate the UK, France, or any of the potential nuclear powers to attempt to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the US. For this reason, the balance of this discussion will be concerned only with the remaining nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

## *II. Soviet and Chinese Capabilities*

6. Both the USSR and Communist China can produce nuclear weapons which could be adapted for clandestine introduction into the US. [*11 lines of source text not declassified*]

7. Nuclear weapons with weights of up to 1,500–2,000 pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty. [*1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified*] a Chinese weapon could yield [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The difficulties and risks of introducing higher yield or heavier weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. But higher yield weapons could be brought into US waters in merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship. Such devices could also be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea.

8. Both the USSR and Communist China could make the physical arrangements necessary to bring nuclear weapons secretly into the US, but Soviet capabilities in this respect are much greater than Chinese. We believe that if either country undertook such a program, they would rely on their own agent organizations rather than on political sympathizers in the US. Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of espionage and sabotage capabilities in the US and presumably have formed an organization for the latter purpose. Should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel and could bring in weapons or weapon components under diplomatic cover. The large diplomatic establishments in Canada and Mexico could serve as bases for the operation.

9. There are no Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in the US, Canada, or Mexico. The absence of such bases precludes the use of diplomatic pouches for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components and the use of secure diplomatic communications for planning and control of such an operation; it also makes more difficult the

introduction and control of agents. Nevertheless, the Chinese could introduce agents under the guise of bona fide immigrants.

10. In considering Soviet and Chinese capabilities, we have also considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely on two counts. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. And if they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

### *III. Strategic Considerations*

11. If the Soviets or Communist Chinese have considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, they have almost certainly been influenced by the same general considerations: the element of risk, the opportunities for clandestine introduction, and the results that could be achieved. The two countries, however, occupy vastly different strategic positions vis-a-vis the US. Thus, while we believe that neither would consider the use of this tactic except in the context of a possible general war, differing strategic considerations might lead the Soviets and the Chinese to see the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons in a somewhat different light.

12. *The USSR.* The Soviet leaders, like those of the US, must take account of the possibility of general war in their military planning. In such planning, the Soviets would consider the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, if at all, only as a supplement to the main attack by their large strategic attack forces. Because they have already achieved an assured retaliatory capability, they would probably consider a clandestine emplacement effort as potentially useful only in support of a deliberate or preemptive Soviet attack and directed toward delaying or reducing a US retaliatory attack. Possible targets might include important government headquarters, key military command and control facilities, missile detection and tracking radars, and possibly some manned alert forces. The Soviets would recognize, however, that even if such an effort

were successful, it could not prevent US retaliation or reduce it to an acceptable level.

13. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, the Soviets would have to weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly, with little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack. Thus, clandestinely introduced weapons would have to be in position at the time the attacks were launched. In the case of a preemptive attack, the circumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons after a decision to preempt. To prepare for this contingency beforehand, the Soviets would have to accept the risk of maintaining weapons in the US for an indefinite period of time. These difficulties would not obtain if the USSR decided deliberately to initiate general war in a period of low tension; weapons could be introduced into the US a relatively short time before use. But the Soviets would have to consider the risk of jeopardizing the element of surprise on which this course of action relies, and that discovery might precipitate a US preemptive attack which would be disastrous for the USSR. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that the USSR will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

14. *Communist China.* The Chinese have no capability at present to attack the US with nuclear weapons. They probably have an ICBM system in the early stages of development, which could become operational several years from now. But they may fear that when it does the US antiballistic missile deployment will have rendered it largely ineffective. In these circumstances, they might see some advantages in clandestinely introducing and emplacing nuclear weapons in the US. Inasmuch as they could not deliver such an attack on a scale sufficient to achieve a decisive military objective, their object would presumably be to deter the US from a course of action that gravely threatened their national security. Consequently, the most likely targets would be population centers.

15. Clearly, the Chinese would also see grave disadvantages in such a move. So long as the US was unaware of their existence, the concealed weapons would have no effect upon its actions. Indeed, the risk of their discovery would be an ever-present, continuing danger to the Chinese

themselves. Once the Chinese announced that nuclear weapons were emplaced in the US, the announcement would touch off an intensive search and extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the Chinese could not be sure that the US would in fact be deterred. On the one hand, the US might consider such an unverified announcement as a mere bluff. On the other it might take the clandestine introduction of such weapons as a *casus belli* and, having taken such action as it could to safeguard its population, launch a devastating nuclear attack on China. [3 lines of source text not declassified] It is conceivable that some Chinese regime might be willing to accept such risks of national destruction, but we think it unlikely.

This document is identified as document 220 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol X, National Security Policy*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v10/d220>.

**Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1968

SUBJECT

Chemical and Biological Warfare Policy (CM-3676-68)

Reference is made to your memorandum on the above subject, dated 25 September 1968,<sup>2</sup> requesting that the Department of State be queried on when their position on the DOD draft NSAM<sup>3</sup> would be available and to a memorandum of 1 October 1968, from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning and Arms Control, ISA, to the Director, Joint Staff, in which the Director was informed that DOD had requested that the State Department convene the Political-Military Group to discuss State's position on the subject.<sup>4</sup>

A meeting of the Political-Military Group was held at the Department of State on 16 October 1968.<sup>5</sup> Each principal designated a representative to participate in a Working Group to resolve differences now existing between State and the DOD draft NSAM. The Working Group has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1498, 384 1968 Jan- . Secret.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum to the Secretary of Defense noted among other things that the Department of State had not yet replied to Secretary McNamara's November 17, 1966, letter to Secretary Rusk (Document 145) and requested asking the Department of State for a statement of its position "preferably prior to the beginning of CY 1969." (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1498, 384 1968 Jan- )

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; see Document 145.

<sup>4</sup> The memorandum from Morton H. Halperin is in the Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 72 A 1498, 384 1968 Jan- .

representatives from State, ACDA, ISA, and J-5 of the Joint Staff. Mr. Keeny of the Executive Office of the President has been invited to attend. The first meeting of the Working Group was held Tuesday, 22 October 1968 at the State Department.<sup>5</sup>

**Paul H. Nitze**

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<sup>5</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

This document is identified as document 271 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XI, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d271>.

## **Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1968

SNIE 11-12-68

### EMPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS

#### DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED

##### The Problem

To estimate the capabilities of US intelligence to monitor a ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed—defined as the ocean floor outside territorial waters—and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet or third country deployment of such weapons, during the next 10 years or so.

##### Scope

For the purposes of this estimate, the following types of weapons are assumed to be prohibited:

- a. Manned or unmanned installations containing nuclear weapons or missiles, encapsulated nuclear missiles, and nuclear mines, resting on, anchored to, or imbedded in the seabed.
- b. Nuclear weapon systems designed to operate primarily on the seabed but having the characteristic of mobility.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4. Top Secret; Limited Distribution.

While chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction could theoretically be emplaced on the seabed, the problems of their detection and identification would be the same as in the case of nuclear weapons. Likewise, the considerations affecting intent would be virtually the same. Hence in this estimate, only nuclear weapons are specifically discussed.

Mobile strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems of mass destruction whose principal object is to make use of the seas, as opposed to the seabed, are assumed not to be banned and are, therefore, beyond the scope of this estimate. Neither will the temporary anchorage of ships or submarines to the seabed, whether for emergency purposes, for purposes incident to navigation, for purposes of avoiding detection, or for preparations to launch missiles, be considered in this estimate.

#### Conclusions

A. We believe that neither the USSR nor any other country would, during the period of this estimate, deploy weapons of mass destruction on the seabed in violation of an agreement banning such deployment. If any signatory decided that it could no longer tolerate the restrictions imposed by the agreement, we believe that it would abrogate the agreement openly rather than try secret evasion, probably after making covert preparations for the prohibited emplacement in advance of the announcement.

B. The time required for detection and verification of a violation would vary with the nature, size, and location of the prohibited deployment. It would be difficult for us to identify a seabed weapon system as such prior to deployment. Detection of predeployment activity, however, and of support systems and activities associated with installation, checkout, maintenance, resupply, and command and control, would arouse our suspicions and would probably lead to eventual detection and identification of the prohibited deployment.

C. We believe that deployment under the open ocean would be detected before a large number of missiles became operational. The deployment of a small number might escape detection for some time after they became operational. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

D. Even after detection of deployment, verification of a violation would probably be a costly and time-consuming process, [*1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified*].

## Discussion

### *I. General Considerations*

1. In assessing our ability to monitor an agreement of the sort being considered here, it must be remembered that we are dealing with the development and deployment of radically new weapon systems, the characteristics of which we can only imagine on the basis of our knowledge of relevant US and Soviet technology. Essentially, we are faced with consideration of two general types of weapon systems. The first would employ a missile deployed on the seabed and launched to a distant target. Such a system would be highly sophisticated and would use new technology and new methods of operation and control. The other type would consist of a nuclear weapon emplaced on the seabed near its intended target to be exploded without ejection from the water, in the nature of a mine. The characteristics of any such systems would be much different from the characteristics of those weapon systems upon which our past monitoring experience is based. In this respect, any judgments which we make with respect to our capability to monitor a seabed weapons agreement must necessarily be tentative.

2. Our regular sources of intelligence information—SIGINT, overhead photography, and human sources—would be a significant part of our detection capabilities [*5 lines of source text not declassified*].

3. [*11 lines of source text not declassified*]

[Here follow Part II: “The Likelihood of Seabed Weapons Deployment” and Part III: “The Monitoring System.”]

This document is identified as document 291 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XI, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d291>.

## **Special National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 7, 1968

SNIE 11-16-68

### **THE SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL<sup>2</sup>**

#### Note

This paper is addressed primarily to the subject of the Soviet attitude toward negotiation of limitations on strategic weapons systems. It also evaluates briefly the significance of the Soviet nine-point memorandum on disarmament issued on 1 July 1968.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Johnson Library, Clifford Papers, Kosygin—Talks with Soviet Union (3), Box 22. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence departments of the Departments of State and Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Security Agency; concurred in by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor (Deputy Director, Central Intelligence), Thomas L. Hughes (Director, INR), Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll (Director, DIA), Marshall S. Carter (Director, NSA), and Dr. Charles H. Reichardt (AEC). William O. Cregar (FBI) abstained; the subject being outside his jurisdiction.

<sup>2</sup> Some of the considerations which bear on this subject are discussed in greater detail in NIE 11-4-68, "Main Issues in Soviet Military Policy," dated 19 September 1968. Secret. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-4-68 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, Box 4.]

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 252.

## The Estimate

### *I. Background*

1. Traditionally, the Soviets have appeared to view arms control and disarmament primarily as a field of political warfare. While such considerations have continued to color much of the Soviet attitude during the past few years, the USSR did enter into agreements on nuclear testing in 1963, on weapons in outer space in 1967, and this year on nuclear nonproliferation. There were advantages to Soviet foreign policy in doing so, and in addition, the progress which was being made in their strategic programs gave the Soviet leaders confidence that their relative position would not be disadvantaged by these limited agreements. The willingness of the Soviets to entertain more far-reaching agreements with the West will obviously depend on a very complex interplay of military, political, and economic considerations.

2. The Soviet nine-point disarmament memorandum publicly issued on 1 July 1968 was primarily a propaganda document. With various points addressed to different potential forums, the memorandum was evidently not intended as a package proposal. Probably it was aimed mainly at claiming the initiative for the USSR and obscuring the fact that it was the US which, for more than 18 months, had pressed for a new effort to negotiate limitations on strategic weapons. Most of the proposals contained in the memorandum are old standbys which have been used in a propaganda context for many years (e.g., calls for banning the use of nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, for abolishing foreign military bases, and for prohibiting nuclear armed bomber flights outside national frontiers). But a few of them concern matters on which Moscow has expressed interest in other ways, and on which it may see advantage in serious negotiation. Such proposals concern limitation of strategic weapons systems, peaceful uses of the seabed, banning underground nuclear testing, and some measures for regional arms control. None of these is fundamentally new either; all are items that have been periodically promoted by the USSR at the UN and elsewhere. Clearly, the first of these is the most basic in its implications for the relationship between the two powers and the only one now contemplated for bilateral negotiations.

3. The Soviets had, of course, agreed to have talks with the US on strategic arms limitations several days prior to the issuance of the nine-point memorandum, which was released in connection with a Kosygin speech made at the Moscow signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The moment chosen for the USSR's belated acceptance of the US proposal suggests that the motives which underlay the decision must have been complex. The response came during a period when there seemed to be no noticeable relaxation in Soviet propaganda attacks against the West; it coincided with the buildup of heavy military and political pressures against Czechoslovakia; and it was announced only months before a change of administrations in Washington. Moreover, the Soviets had long maintained that major steps toward improving relations with the US were impossible during the Vietnam War. While on the face of things the moment chosen may seem improbable, some of these circumstances may actually have given the Soviets incentives to move when they did.

4. Both political and military factors probably figured in the long delay of the Soviet response. For one thing, the Soviets have customarily responded to US arms control initiatives with a great measure of caution and suspicion. On so complex and sensitive an issue as strategic arms limitations, the misgivings—probably, in fact, the resistance—of certain elements both within and outside the Soviet political leadership must have been considerable. The period of delay permitted a further narrowing of the gap between Soviet and American strategic forces; the Soviets are now approaching the US in numbers of operational inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and are also building a submarine force similar to the Polaris. They must now have strengthened confidence in their possession of an assured destruction capability, and considering qualitative differences in weapon systems such as warhead yield, the target system to be attacked, and damage-limiting capabilities, they may actually consider that they have now achieved rough strategic parity with the U.S. Thus, they must believe that their bargaining position in negotiations has become stronger.

5. The Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia has complicated the political environment bearing on arms control. It indicated that Moscow's determination to preserve a secure position in Eastern Europe outweighed

other considerations, including its interest in early negotiation on strategic arms control. It is still too soon to evaluate the full implications of the Czech crisis for Soviet policy, and specifically for Soviet attitudes toward arms control. The move toward new disarmament negotiations was probably calculated to help offset the opprobrium the USSR suffered from the Czech intervention. How Moscow's attitude toward strategic arms talks now develops will also depend on the impact of recent events on attitudes and policies in Washington. The Soviets have maintained that the Czech crisis is no one's business except their own and Eastern Europe's and a matter quite apart from questions of mutual interest to both East and West. It was in this spirit, at least, that Gromyko recently reaffirmed Soviet desires to begin talks with the US.

*II. Considerations Affecting the Soviet Approach to Negotiations: The Strategic Relationship*

6. Having significantly improved their relative position in strategic forces in recent years, the Soviets probably believe that a considerable sustained effort will be necessary to maintain the position they have now achieved; the Soviets must recognize that the competition in this field will not stand still. They probably fear that projected US programs will once again increase the US relative advantage considerably, unless the Soviets themselves undertake strenuous new efforts. The choices posed for the Soviet leaders at present are: (a) to attempt to keep pace by making the indicated effort; (b) to permit the US to move out far ahead once more; or (c) to attempt by agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship at a point less unfavorable to the USSR than it ever has been.

7. It seems likely that, after the effort they have made and the resources they have expended, the Soviet leaders would find it intolerable to see their improved position degraded. No doubt there would be some who would argue that the forces the Soviets will have under current programs would give them an assured destruction capability for many years to come, regardless of what the US did. But it is unlikely that the pressures of military leaders and the play of Kremlin politics would permit resigned acceptance of a widening gap. The argument for staying in the race, for political as well as security reasons, would probably prevail in the end.

8. Faced, however, with the oncoming US programs—Poseidon and Minuteman III (with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles), and Sentinel—the Soviets must recognize that, if they want to stay in the race, they have their work cut out for them. Not only would there be enormous economic costs, but the Soviets would inevitably have some doubts of their ability to match the US over the whole range of technological development for more advanced systems. Moreover, further large allocations of resources to strategic forces would tighten the squeeze on other military programs. This would be particularly troubling to those military leaders who feel that the general purpose forces are now in pressing need of refurbishing and perhaps enlargement.

9. The outlook for the competition between the US and the USSR in the field of ballistic missile defense probably offers the Soviets grounds for concern. They have a system of limited effectiveness deployed at Moscow, but they evidently realize that more development work is needed before extensive deployment would be worthwhile.<sup>4</sup> They recognize that the US program in this field is still at an early stage and will not affect the balance of strategic power for some years, but they know that development work is going forward in the US and that deployment is planned. While the Soviets, on the basis of the extensive work they have already done, are probably confident that they can sustain the competition in this field, they may also come to believe that the net result would be a vast expenditure of economic resources without any effective return in increased security.

10. Thus, there are incentives for the Soviets to consider more seriously now the option of negotiations to limit strategic forces. They could calculate that an agreement to stabilize the strategic relationship, or at least to slow down the competition, if achieved in the next year or two, would be the best means of preserving the improved relative position the USSR has been acquiring. They might further think that, even if no agreement was finally reached, the process of negotiation itself, because of the

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<sup>4</sup> For a full discussion of the status and prospects of the Soviet antiballistic missile program, see NIE 11-3-68, "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses," dated 31 October 1968. Top Secret, Restricted Data. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 11-3-68 has not been found.]

expectations it would arouse in the US and elsewhere, would act to slow the pace of the competition for a time.

*Economic Factors*

11. Economic considerations doubtless contributed also to the USSR's decision to discuss strategic arms control. To the extent that the Soviets had been motivated by the desire to limit over-all military costs and free resources for other purposes, they would presumably continue to want to avoid provoking a new surge in arms competition. Soviet spokesmen have, over the past year, repeatedly pointed to the high level of defense expenditures in the US. Though some of these statements were probably intended as arguments for, or justification of, increases in Soviet defense outlays, others almost certainly reflected the Soviets' concern over similar rising costs in the USSR.

12. Over the past several years, the Soviets have been following a policy of expanding strategic programs and increasing investment in the consumer goods and services sectors of the economy while allowing rates of growth of investment in heavy industry to decline. This policy limits the output of producers goods and will ultimately retard the over-all rate of economic growth. Thus, the Soviet leaders probably must divert resources to the producers goods sector of the economy in the near future or risk seriously impairing future capacity for satisfying military as well as civilian objectives. The important question is which claimant is going to yield—the consumer or the military—and when? In the past, the Soviet decision would have been quite predictable: the consumer has traditionally borne the brunt of any resource bind. The Soviet leaders probably recognize that the political cost of this course is greater in their society now than it used to be. Therefore, as certain strategic programs approach planned levels, some Soviet leaders might prefer to avoid heavy new expenditures for follow-on military programs. An arms control agreement could reduce the pressures for such programs.

13. It is conceivable that the new military requirements generated by the Czech crisis may aggravate the resource allocations problem and thus add to Soviet incentives to seek strategic arms limitations. The Soviets may consider that their occupation of Czechoslovakia and new uncertainties

about the contributions of their allies will require further strengthening of Soviet forces in the European forward area and the reinforcement of their general purpose forces in the western USSR. These requirements, in addition to the ongoing buildup of military forces along the Chinese border, will probably lead to substantial increases in Soviet theater forces in general. The cost of meeting these demands will add to the current record high level of defense spending that already appears to be generating potentially serious economic problems. The Soviets may thus at this time be interested in strategic arms control as a way of conserving some economic resources for other military programs and also as a way of relieving strains in the economy generally.

### *III. Factors Affecting the Course of Negotiations*

14. Soviet willingness to enter into arms control talks with the US does not, of course, signify a firm commitment to strive for an agreement. In the early phases, the Soviets would probably concentrate on probing the US position. Should they decide to get down to serious business, the negotiations would inevitably be hard and prolonged.

15. The political climate at the time of talks, and developments on the international scene which might affect it for better or worse, would have a considerable bearing on success or failure. There will be the usual suspicion and mistrust on the Soviet side, and the problem of breaking through resisting layers of bureaucracy to get decisions will be particularly formidable in view of the complexity of the issues. It is likely also that there will be divisions among the top leaders, and that politicking for future place and power will figure in the positions they adopt. Thus, the obstacles to actual achievement of an agreement will be great, especially in the absence of some simultaneous advance toward resolution of the more basic East-West issues and the improved political climate so generated.

16. The Soviets will approach negotiations with one basic criterion in mind: they will want their right to equality in strategic forces acknowledged in principle. In fact, one motive they had for accepting the US invitation to negotiate was probably the belief that the US move tacitly conceded this right, or at least could be so construed by them.

Acknowledgment of the claim to equality would be valued not merely on security grounds, but also because of the implication it would carry that the USSR was entitled to a political role in world affairs equivalent to that of the US. Thus, the Soviets would be sensitive to any attempt from the US side to “negotiate from strength” or to claim a permanent advantage in strategic forces.

17. What in fact constitutes equality—in view of the different composition of strategic forces on the two sides and their different geopolitical situations—would be recognized by the Soviets as a proper subject of negotiation. They would surely bargain hard and take every advantage, but would probably be willing in working out the problems of equivalence to consider trade-offs between different weapons systems of the two sides. Their view of the nature of power would lead them to weigh other ingredients than numbers of strategic weapons alone—other kinds of forces, political strengths and influence—in measuring the relative power of the two sides. Once involved in the negotiations, therefore, they would probably not be disposed to break off merely because of difficulties encountered, and they would also recognize the political costs of doing so.

18. The problem of verification which has dogged all previous disarmament negotiations will persist. The Soviets will probably continue to resist verification procedures which require the presence of foreign inspectors in the USSR. Traditionally, the Soviets have regarded such inspection arrangements as militarily disadvantageous and politically harmful. If anything, their fear of ideological contagion is currently heightened. Thus, Moscow is still unlikely to accept an arms control agreement which cannot be verified primarily through national means.

19. In sum, we believe that Moscow's incentives to try for strategic arms limitations and for stabilizing the USSR's strategic relationship with the US are stronger now than they have been. Nevertheless, the forces and institutions in the USSR with a vested interest in stalling and even blocking movement toward arms control continue to be strong, and will weigh heavily against the prospects for achieving an agreement. Moreover, the absence of a political climate of mutual trust between the US and USSR could strengthen the case of those forces in the USSR

opposed to serious negotiation and, in general, hamper efforts to achieve agreement.

Not much to say here about arms control other than both sides had a pretty reliable and predictable process of negotiating with each other. There was a clear tie between arms control and broader political issues; the focus of arms control was not merely an issue of eventual global disarmament.

This document is identified as document 302 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Vol XI, Arms Control and Disarmament*, <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v11/d302>.

**Airgram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, December 24, 1968

A-2804

**SUBJECT**

XXIII General Assembly: Evaluation of Results in the Disarmament Field

**SUMMARY**

The adoption by the XXIII General Assembly (GA) of a moderate resolution (2456A) regarding the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNC)<sup>2</sup> represents in our judgment a significant accomplishment for those who support the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This resolution incorporates the essential points of the U.S. position on NNC follow-up. It will not cause complications for the NPT, and in effect, constitutes an endorsement for the idea that the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states must work together rather than in opposition on nuclear problems. This GA session was also outstanding in demonstrating the virtually unanimous desire that the U.S. and USSR get on with strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), an absence of any serious or active pressure for further security assurances, and broad ignorance and distrust of the International Atomic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6. Confidential. Drafted by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack on December 21, and cleared by Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Officer.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a four-part resolution (A-D) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1968. Parts B and D were approved unanimously with some abstentions; Part A was adopted by a vote of 103-7, with 5 abstentions; Part D was adopted 75-9, with 30 abstentions. Text of the resolution is in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 797-801.

Energy Agency (IAEA), as evidenced particularly by the Mexican resolution (2456C) calling for a study by the UN Secretary General (SYG) on peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) services (see USUN 8583).<sup>3</sup> End Summary.

## PART I—NNC

### *1. Resume of Negotiations on the NNC Resolution.*

Early in the session, the Italian Delegation, strongly supported by Brazil, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan, took the initiative in organizing a prestigious group of UN delegations in order to formulate a GA resolution on the NNC which would establish a UN ad hoc committee to pursue NNC recommendations in the fields of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and security assurances. Other invitees were Mexico, Chile, Argentina, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Japan. Initial reactions suggested that the Italian effort would be difficult to stop, particularly since many delegations (including the Netherlands) were reluctant to oppose the Italian plan and thereby risk exclusion from whatever committee might be established. The Japanese had initially intended to suggest a resolution establishing a new committee to focus on assurance, but they were dissuaded by the US from pursuing this within the Italian group.

The idea of a counter-resolution effort and the first draft of the counter resolution were developed by the US Delegation, which encouraged the Japanese and Netherlands Delegations to establish a counter-resolution group which ultimately also included Finland, Canada, Austria and Australia. At the same time, the US and USSR took an extremely stiff position in the First Committee against the creation of any new body. The efforts of the Italian Mission group then shifted to seeking an early meeting next year of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) (an existing body) to consider peaceful uses and security assurances.

The counter-resolution group, which held most of its meetings at the Finnish Mission, advocated positions acceptable to the US, i.e., that no

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<sup>3</sup> Dated December 18. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6)

decision to convene a UNDC session should be taken before the XXIV GA and that there should be no revision of the UNDC's terms of reference explicitly to include peaceful uses. The group accepted virtually all of the recommendations of the US regarding the counter resolution and disagreed on only one point. Despite US opposition, the Finnish group maintained that it was essential in order to increase the chances of success for the counter resolution that it "endorse" rather than "note" the declaration adopted by the NNC in Geneva. During a series of lengthy meetings between the Italian and Finnish groups, the latter several times appeared on the verge of collapse but was propped up by frequent reminders that the Italian group would have clear sailing if no counter resolution survived.

The crucial turning point came on December 3 when negotiations broke down between the two groups and the Finnish group tabled its draft resolution (A/C.1/L.450),<sup>4</sup> thus gaining the tactical advantage of priority in the First Committee voting. Shortly thereafter the Italian group tabled its resolution (A/C.1/L.451). Further negotiations between the two groups resulted in a "compromise" resolution essentially the same as that of the Finnish group and, in general, in accordance with US desires.<sup>5</sup>

The compromise resolution (2456A), *inter alia*, endorses the NNC declaration; takes note of the NNC resolutions; requests the Secretary General (SYG) to transmit the NNC results to the appropriate bodies; invites these bodies to report on action taken; requests the SYG to place on the agenda of the XXIV GA the question of implementation of the NNC results, including (a) the question of convening the UNDC in early 1970 to consider disarmament and the related question of security, and (b) international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The resolution also requests the SYG to appoint an experts group to prepare a report on the contribution of nuclear technology to the developing countries.

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<sup>4</sup> Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 761-762.

<sup>5</sup> A/C.1/L.458, December 13, which became part A of Resolution 2456 (XXIII).

## *2. Relationship to the NPT.*

Throughout the session, the U.S. and USSR stressed that the establishment of a new body or a 1969 meeting of the UNDC would, as a practical matter, complicate and delay the acceptance and entry into force of the NPT. Although this argument was not welcomed by some of the prominent NPT abstainers, those who strongly support the Treaty, e.g., the Netherlands, Finland and Canada, shared our concern that the NPT could be prejudiced by procedural steps being pushed by the Italian group. (The Italians professed throughout that only their proposals could “save” the NPT by restoring the confidence of the non-nuclear-weapon states that the nuclear powers would in fact live up to their obligations under the NPT.)

The conflict between the groups regarding the NPT was symbolized by the fact that the Italian Mission resolution was co-sponsored by five non-signers of the NPT (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Pakistan) and only one signer (Yugoslavia), a fact alluded to publicly in particularly heavy-handed fashion by the Byelorussian representative. In contrast, the Finnish Mission's resolution was co-sponsored by four NPT signatories (Austria, Canada, Finland, and the Netherlands), and only two non-signers (Australia and Japan).

The effectiveness of the argument of the need to protect the NPT was finally demonstrated when Ambassador Shahi (Pakistan), an original member of the Italian groups, stated in his speech introducing the final compromise resolution: “Let me give the assurance, if any assurance is required, that there is no desire that the UN Disarmament Commission, if it is convened, should weaken the positive results which have been achieved in the field of disarmament by way of the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other.”

## *3. Failure of Efforts to Provoke Confrontation Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapon States.*

When the session began, there was considerable talk, particularly among non-NPT signatories, about forcing a confrontation between the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. Several non-nuclear-weapon states insisted in the

corridors that the nuclear powers would have no choice but to join a new ad hoc committee if one was formed. However, members of the Finnish Mission group, particularly the Japanese, insisted that the cooperation of the nuclear powers was essential to achieve any worthwhile results in the nuclear field. Throughout the lengthy negotiations between the two groups, the Finnish group often rejected proposals solely on the grounds they would be unacceptable to the nuclear powers, i.e., the U.S., since the USSR had by then taken a completely negative stance. The acceptance of the final compromise resolution, which most members knew the U.S. had helped develop, thus represents a recognition that the cooperation of the nuclear powers is essential to progress in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament.

One of the most significant results of this session would appear to be a setback for, and possibly even the burial of, the idea that the non-nuclear powers can or should organize themselves as a political force, as some attempted at the NNC, for the purpose of confrontation with the nuclear powers. It is also significant that the stress on the need to protect the NPT, in the end, contributed to unifying, rather than dividing, the members of the UN who overwhelmingly supported the final compromise resolution.

#### *4. Role of the United States.*

The United States effort was fundamentally assisted by our ability early in Committee deliberations to propose an attractive compromise position which we could then stand by. (The U.S. Delegation appreciates the efforts in Washington which resulted in timely and helpful instructions.) The U.S. Delegation's corridor activities were, unavoidably, conspicuously visible. Nevertheless, the members of the Finnish group appeared to welcome the frequency and frankness of their contacts with the U.S. Delegation. Although initially disagreements between the U.S. and a few other delegations, particularly the Italian, appeared fairly sharp, when the final compromise resolution was adopted, there were no appearances of resentment against the U.S. by the Italian group. Members of the Brazilian and Italian Delegations said they were satisfied with the final result.

### *5. Role of the Non-Nuclear.*

(a) *Italy.* The Italians invested considerable effort in promoting a new ad hoc body, as evidenced in part by the heavy reinforcement of their Delegation with senior officials from Rome and Geneva. Because the Italians pursued their aims in company with a number of other prestigious delegations, failure to achieve their main objective, the establishment of a new committee, did not stand out as a purely Italian failure (in contrast to the picture perceived by all in the Italian attempt to amend the Outer Space Treaty).

(b) *Pakistan.* The Pakistanis made a strong effort to preserve their image as the promoters of the NNC. They volunteered to be the rapporteurs for the Italian Mission group and introduced the final NNC compromise resolution even though this resolution was largely the product of the Finnish group.

(c) *Brazil.* Castro, though widely understood to be strongly sympathetic to the Italian group's efforts, did not permit himself to be identified as a leader of the group. His behavior contrasts sharply with what we understand was a heavy-handed performance by da Silveira at the NNC in Geneva.

(d) *Yugoslavia.* The Yugoslavs expressed discomfort at participating in the Italian Mission group with so many prominent non-signatories of the NPT. They hung on, however, in an effort to make some mark on the question of security assurances.

(e) *India.* The Indian Delegation worked actively on both sides of the street. It remained in the Italian group, but allowed the impression to develop that it would welcome the success of the Finnish group's efforts, providing there was no mention of the NPT in the preamble of the Finnish resolution. (Members of the Finnish group felt considerable annoyance when, after deleting all references to the NPT, they did not wind up with Indian co-sponsorship for the final compromise resolution.)

The initial Indian concern focused on Pakistan's role. India had considerable misgivings about the creation of any ad hoc committee since

this would clearly give Pakistan a major role; but India was even more strongly determined to be on any committee that might be set up and therefore stayed with the Italian group until its failure was assured. A Pakistani delegate delivered himself of several pronouncements to others that India had again played its traditional game of deceit.

(f) *Mexico*. Garcia Robles kept his eyes riveted throughout on objectives of primary concern to Mexico, i.e., the endorsement by the GA of the NNC resolution on the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and authorization for a SYG study on PNE services. Both of these ideas were initially embedded in the Italian Mission draft resolution. When it became apparent that the Italian resolution might not be the one finally adopted, Garcia Robles lost no time in launching separate initiatives to achieve his aims. Although he was successful, we heard a number of expressions of irritation at his performance. Garcia Robles' position appeared particularly strong because of his traditional hold on Latin American votes. Mexico's participation in the Italian group, along with Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, gave the impression that the Latin Americans would vote as a bloc for any product of the Italian group.

(g) *The Netherlands*. Eschauzier played an active and constructive role in the Finnish group, despite the fact that he clearly felt vulnerable to pressures from the Italians because of his Government's desire to maintain the cooperation of the Italian Government in various European projects.

(h) *Finland*. Jakobson was a strong member of his group's negotiating team; he was unquestionably inhibited, however, by the fact that the USSR might not support (and in the event did not support) his group's compromise resolution.

(i) *Australia*. The Australians (Shaw and Evans) played a vigorous and effective role in stiffening the spine of the Finnish group. We have the impression from several conversations that the Australian UN Delegation wished to turn in a helpful performance in order to compensate somewhat for Australia's failure so far to sign the NPT.

(j) *Japan*. Ogiso played a key role, in very close contact with the U.S. Delegation, in developing the counter-resolution effort. This was a

particularly ticklish task because the Japanese UN Mission, before Ogiso's arrival in New York, had accepted an invitation to participate in the effort of the Italian Mission group. (USUN believes it would be warranted, assuming Embassy Tokyo thinks it appropriate, for the Embassy to express to Ogiso, and perhaps also to his superiors, the U.S. Delegation's appreciation for the most constructive and skillful role played by the Japanese Delegation and particularly Ogiso.)

#### *6. Role of the Developing Countries (LDC's).*

A curious feature of the struggle over the NNC resolution was that the LDC's, and particularly the Africans, remained almost totally on the sidelines while two groups of relatively advanced countries argued privately about formulation of their resolutions. Although a number of influential and responsible LDC's were courted, especially by the Finnish group, they refrained from active participation.

An interesting insight was provided when Pinera (Chile), an activist within the Italian Mission group, was overheard to tell Kolo (Nigeria) that the Italian group was attempting to promote the interests of the LDC's. Kolo responded tartly that in fact the Italian group was telling the LDC's what ought to be good for them rather than actually obtaining their participation. Kolo's remark is less than fair, however, since both the Nigerian and Kenyan Delegations were initially invited to participate in the Italian Mission deliberations. The Kenyan Delegation never showed up and the Nigerian Delegation only appeared for the first few meetings. The Ethiopians were completely inactive.

The great mass of LDC's were, in fact, content to accept in total the results ironed out by the Italian and Finnish groups. We are virtually certain that the LDC's would have accepted any result achieved by the two groups. The LDC's disinterest probably was equally a mixture of their desire to avoid making a difficult choice and their feeling that the details of nuclear issues are much more remote from them than are many other matters with which they are preoccupied at the UN.

### *7. Role of the USSR.*

Although initially members of the Soviet Delegation appeared anxious to support the counter-resolution effort promoted by the U.S., Moscow apparently took an extremely negative and tough stance against any NNC resolution that gave stature to NNC results. Moreover, it eventually became clear that the Soviets, who had resorted to the transparent maneuver of directing Bulgaria and Hungary to introduce a negative resolution on the NNC results, had a strong interest in pursuing a resolution containing a formula that would exclude the FRG from participation in NNC implementation activities. (The Bulgarian resolution (A/C.1/L.452) requested the SYG to transmit NNC results “to the Governments of States Members of the UN, to the IAEA, to the specialized agencies concerned and to other international organizations concerned.” The compromise resolution uses the formula “to the Governments of States Members of the UN and members of its specialized agencies and of the IAEA, and to the international bodies concerned.”) This probably explains why the Hungarians, joined by the Soviets, felt compelled to insist on voting, which they lost, on the question of priority between their resolution and the final compromise resolution.

When the session was concluded, the Soviets and their allies, who voted against the compromise resolution, were completely isolated. (The other nuclear powers, including specifically France, voted in favor of the compromise resolution.) The introduction of the Soviet-inspired resolution was tactically useful, however, in that it permitted the U.S. and others to argue that the Finnish Mission resolution was a genuine compromise between the extreme positions staked out by the Italian and the Bulgarian-Hungarian resolutions.

## PART II—SECURITY ASSURANCES

### *1. Absence of Pressure for Further Assurances.*

Despite the attention it received at the NNC, the issue of security assurances did not come to life at the XXIII GA. There was, of course, considerable grumbling that the security situation is far from satisfactory. However, we were not confronted by proposals of new formulas for

positive assurances or for non-use of nuclear weapons, and virtually no interest at all was shown in introducing or adopting the FRG NNC resolution on the non-use of force.

The desire to have the proposed ad hoc committee or the UNDC take up this question was pressed only by Yugoslavia and Brazil. Although at the outset of the session the Brazilian Foreign Minister had proposed a special conference on security, the Brazilian Delegation displayed no initiative whatever in pursuing this idea which thereafter was quietly buried. The security issue was reduced to a passing reference in the final compromise NNC resolution.

### *2. Effect of US Views.*

The US views on security assurances appear to have gained some ground. Although Pakistan has been a major supporter of further security assurances, Ambassador Shahi, in introducing the compromise NNC resolution, quoted favorably and at length from the assurances section of Foster's November 19 statement to the First Committee.<sup>6</sup> Lebanon did the same in urging Cyprus to withdraw its resolution (A/C.1/L.449).

### *3. Reasons for Less Interest in Assurances.*

There are several probable reasons for this lessened interest in assurances:

- (a) The Czech invasion demonstrated that nuclear weapons are not the only or necessarily the most relevant element of military power that can affect the security and independence of smaller states.
- (b) Many countries appreciate our point that the time is not propitious for further efforts with the Soviets towards additional assurances.
- (c) The Soviets did not pursue vigorously their non-use proposal, partly to avoid trouble for the NPT, partly to keep the Czech situation from being dragged into the disarmament debate, and partly to avoid the possibility of

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<sup>6</sup>Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 718-727.

ending up with a GA resolution that would be some variant of the FRG NNC resolution on non-use of force.

(d) The states traditionally concerned with assurances, such as Yugoslavia, appeared to be more interested in keeping this issue in front of the public than in coming up with new formulas or arrangements—thus the emphasis was on procedural initiatives such as handing the problem to an ad hoc committee or the UNDC.

(e) There appears to be wider understanding of the fact that the assurances question is difficult and complex (and properly a matter for Security Council consideration) and that the principal nuclear powers have gone as far as they can in SC resolution 255<sup>7</sup> and their parallel declarations.

(f) Many UN members appear to appreciate that greater security lies in a gradual strengthening of the UN and the achievement of further measures of disarmament and arms control. (A member of the Yugoslav Delegation readily conceded that a pledge not to use nuclear weapons would have had no relevance in deterring the Soviet aggression against Czechoslovakia.)

#### *4. Conclusion.*

It seems clear that SC resolution 255 has not put us on a “slippery slope” leading to greater demands for assurances. It is equally clear that we face no urgent pressure to alter our position on the assurances issue.

### PART III—SALT, USSR MEMORANDUM, GCD, CTB, CBW, AND ARMS TRANSFER REGISTRATION

#### *1. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).*

A matter on which there was virtual unanimity was the desirability of prompt initiation of US-Soviet strategic arms limitations talks. Speakers in the First Committee frequently referred to the urgency of holding such

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<sup>7</sup> Submitted by the United States, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on March 7, 1968 (ENDC/222), it was approved by the U.N. Security Council on June 19 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, France, India, and Pakistan). Text *ibid.*, p. 444.

talks and pointed particularly to the obligations in Article VI of the NPT of the nuclear powers to proceed with disarmament negotiations. It was never in doubt that Pakistan's resolution (2456D), which urged bilateral talks at an early date, would be adopted without opposition (Cuba and France abstained).

## *2. Soviet Activities—USSR Memorandum and Foreign Bases Item.*

A noteworthy aspect of the disarmament debate was the decision by the Soviets not to push to a vote their resolution (A/C.1/L.443) on the USSR July 1 disarmament memorandum.<sup>8</sup> This memorandum, which lists Soviet disarmament proposals, was included as a separate GA agenda item at the request of Foreign Minister Gromyko. (Gromyko placed great emphasis on the Soviet memorandum in his speech to the General Assembly.)<sup>9</sup> Although the memorandum was already before the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the Soviet resolution requested that it be transmitted to the ENDC by the SYG. The Soviets withdrew this resolution after the US persuaded them and the eight non-aligned members of the ENDC to insert a preambular reference to the USSR memorandum in the omnibus resolution on GCD (2454B).<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, the Soviets did not promote their old propaganda item on the elimination of foreign bases. Although listed as a separate agenda item, this subject received virtually no attention. It was disposed of by including a reference to the 1966 GA resolution on bases<sup>11</sup> with other previous UN disarmament resolutions listed in the preamble of the GCD resolution.

We made clear to the Soviets early that we would strongly oppose separate resolutions on either of these items. The lack of a greater Soviet effort to

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<sup>8</sup> Regarding the Soviet Union's July 1 memorandum, see footnote 6, Document 252.

<sup>9</sup> Gromyko's speech has not been further identified.

<sup>10</sup> Parts A and B of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2454 (XXIII) on general and complete disarmament were adopted unanimously on December 20, with a few abstentions in each case. Text in Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 793-796.

<sup>11</sup> Presumably a reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2165 (XXI), December 5, 1966, which called for an end to foreign bases in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Text *ibid.*, 1966, p. 804.

press them can be ascribed to their desire (a) to appear moderate and cooperative in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, (b) to preserve for the benefit of NPT an atmosphere of US-USSR cooperation in disarmament, and (c) to avoid questions about the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Republic which might well have been stimulated by a debate on foreign bases.

### *3. General and Complete Disarmament (GCD).*

Led by Sweden, the non-aligned delegations demonstrated a renewed interest in a serious examination of major disarmament steps of the type included in plans for GCD. In fact, collateral measures were not mentioned in the non-aligned draft of the omnibus GCD resolution until we suggested that a reference to them be included. We anticipate that this interest in further work on major disarmament proposals will be registered at the ENDC.

### *4. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB).*

The Swedes made an effort to sneak into the test ban resolution (2455)<sup>12</sup> their concept that a comprehensive test ban should prohibit all nuclear explosions, including PNE tests. At the insistence of the US, however, the Swedes returned to the language of previous resolutions which refer solely to the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. The US Seismic Investigation Proposal received little comment although the British expressed their interest and support privately to the Soviet and several other delegations.

### *5. Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW).*

The Soviet agreement to use the formula "chemical and bacteriological (biological)" throughout the terms of reference (TR) for the SYG's CBW effects study represents an advance in obtaining acceptance of the US position on this issue. This is particularly true in light of the precedent, to which we earlier expected the Soviets to cling, of the term "chemical and bacteriological" in the ENDC report that recommended the SYG study.

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<sup>12</sup> Text *ibid.*, 1968, pp. 796-797.

The US Delegation encountered some difficulty in arriving at an acceptable resolution (2454A) on the CBW study due to the assertiveness of the Polish Delegation and a tendency on the part of the Canadians and British not to fight with the Poles about points that were of more interest to the US than to Canada and the UK. Moreover, a strong UK objection to the TR worked out by the US and Soviet Delegations, and accepted by the Canadian Delegation, almost wrecked US effort to provide the TR to the SYG. The UK Delegation continued to press its objection to the "bacteriological (biological)" formula with the Secretariat and the US Delegation even after the TR had been read to the First Committee and handed over to the Secretariat. The UK Delegation hopes this difference will not affect the CBW study, but the UK and Soviet experts may not be able to avoid a resumption of the dispute when drafting the CBW study report.

#### *6. Arms Transfer Registration.*

The Danish arms transfer resolution (A/C.1/L.446)<sup>13</sup> ran into trouble from the outset when the Soviets let it be known they opposed it. The Arabs and Indians were successful in convincing most LDC's that arms registration is an unworkable idea and could hurt their interests. Notwithstanding our expressed intention to support the resolution, our NATO allies, including Italy, Belgium and Turkey, were unenthusiastic about the Danish proposal and the resolution was eventually withdrawn.

### PART IV—FUTURE PROSPECTS

Although the post-NNC antagonisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states gave way to an improved atmosphere at the conclusion of the XXIII GA, what happens in the future will depend on developments in the fields of peaceful uses and disarmament. In both fields appearances are important, and so long as work on each appears to be progressing satisfactorily, the present climate can probably be maintained. (Our views on the need to improve the image of the IAEA were expressed in USUN 8583.) The atmosphere in the future will also depend on what is accomplished during the coming year in implementing the constructive

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<sup>13</sup> Dated November 21; *ibid.* p. 728.

proposals of the NNC and in demonstrating that the proposals the U.S. does not like have been carefully evaluated and proved impractical. Even if concrete results are not extensive, evidence of efforts by the U.S. to respond to the issues highlighted at the NNC and active participation by the U.S. in existing bodies will prevent charges that the U.S. is disinterested in problems of great importance to others.

**Buffum**



## CHAPTER 5

### **Nixon Administration (1969-1972)**

The Nixon administration had inherited a number of festering CB weapons-related problems from the Johnson administration. The controversies included the use of riot control agents in Vietnam, Congressional investigations into the Dugway Proving Ground sheep incident, sea burial of chemical weapons off of U.S. coastlines, reports of U.S. troops exposed to nerve agent stored on Okinawa, and the public acknowledgement of U.S. chemical weapons being stored in Germany. A United Nations report released in 1969 called for the worldwide elimination of CB weapons due to their potential threat to the general populace. In addition, a UN General Assembly resolution called for the prohibition of all CB weapons use in armed conflict as a generally-recognized rule of international law. All of these issues drove the Nixon administration to conduct a review of U.S. CB weapons policy (National Security Study Memorandum 59), leading to the famous announcement by President Nixon in November 1969 to unilaterally stop the U.S. offensive biological weapons program. According to Ken Alibek, the Soviet Union assumed that the U.S. BW program had merely gone covert, and continued its development of offensive biological weapons.

The Nixon administration was not so interested in nonproliferation as much as it was controlling what the Soviet Union had in the way of existing weapon systems (e.g., SALT I and the ABM Treaty), working with China as an emerging power, and getting U.S. forces out of Vietnam. During this time, Israel and India were working on their nuclear weapons programs with little interference from the U.S. administration. The administration's review of CB warfare policy would involve heated discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department on the value of CB weapons as a strategic deterrent. The transcripts of discussions among senior policy makers reveal a great depth of detail as to

the pros and cons of various proposed options. Interestingly, SecDef Melvin Laird did not seem to agree with the Joint Chiefs in their desire for the continued retention of CB weapons and the use of riot control agents and herbicides in Vietnam.

During this time, the Nixon administration stopped the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, pending the results of scientific studies. The U.S. Army prepared to move its chemical weapons from Okinawa to Johnston Atoll in line with diplomatic efforts to return Okinawa to Japanese control. Negotiations in Geneva would lead to the signing of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction (referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention). Calls for the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol caused that article to be resubmitted to the Senate for its advice. The U.S. Army appointed a program manager for chemical demilitarization in 1972, with the first project being the cleanup of Rocky Mountain Arsenal. That same year, General Creighton Abrams, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, had decided to disestablish the Army's Chemical Corps. It was a very turbulent and politically-charged time. The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of foreign policy discussions during the Nixon administration.

### **The Presidency of Richard M. Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

President Richard M. Nixon assumed office on January 20, 1969, as an experienced practitioner of foreign policy. He came into the presidency with clear views on the broad objectives of his administration in foreign relations, and with a determination to control major foreign policy initiatives from the White House. During the post-election transition period, Nixon selected Dr. Henry A. Kissinger as his National Security Advisor, and approved a proposal drafted by Kissinger concentrating the interagency policymaking process in the National Security Council. Nixon selected William P. Rogers as the Secretary of State and Melvin R. Laird as the Secretary of Defense. General Earle G. Wheeler served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) until July 1970, when he was replaced

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<sup>1</sup> Original text from Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "1969-1976: The Presidencies of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976>.

by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard M. Helms, continued in that position, which he had held since 1966.

Nixon was a realist, convinced that power was the core dynamic of the international system; while willing to take advantage of summit meetings for political and diplomatic purposes, he was highly skeptical about personal diplomacy. His central concern through his presidency lay in managing great power relationships in the bipolar international system. As the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger matured, a close partnership evolved, generally with Nixon laying out the broad outlines of policy and Kissinger helping Nixon work out his thoughts, then tirelessly executing the detailed actions necessary to implement broad policy. While Nixon's major foreign policy initiatives tended to come as great surprises when announced, they had long been in his thoughts, and had been worked out well before his inauguration. During the summer of 1967, for example, he spoke at the Bohemian Club in San Francisco, taking the opportunity to outline his thoughts on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Similarly, in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in October 1967, he emphasized the importance of bringing China into the community of nations.

But he believed the achievement of any of these larger visions rested on his ability to reach an honorable end to the Vietnam War. Nixon thought that defeat in that conflict would prolong and deepen the division in the United States, and place the country in a position of weakness in dealing with the Soviets. He and Kissinger projected that the appearance of American weakness would encourage the Soviet Union to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy, in the end creating the risk of war between the superpowers.

Nixon expected to end American involvement in the Vietnam War within a year, but this hope was dashed when his initial strategy—increasing diplomatic and military pressure on North Vietnam, while offering conciliatory negotiating terms—failed to yield a settlement. He and Kissinger turned to a dual strategy: pursuing a negotiated settlement, while building up South Vietnamese forces and withdrawing U.S. troops, a process known as “Vietnamization” of the war.

The policymaking process became increasingly concentrated and acrimonious during Nixon's first administration, with Kissinger and Rogers repeatedly clashing over organizational and personal roles. These

clashes generally occurred at times of crisis, imposing a cost on Nixon and on the policy process in general. Kissinger's deputy, General Al Haig, became an increasingly influential advisor to Nixon, especially on issues related to the war in Southeast Asia.

Nixon's major policy initiatives came to fruition during 1972 and early 1973: the "opening to China" with the Beijing Summit in February, the dawn of détente with the Moscow Summit in May, and the end of American involvement in the Vietnam War in January 1973. By that time, the Watergate scandals had begun to envelope Nixon's presidency, with increasing costs in distraction, stress, and political weakness during his remaining time in office. The Nixon administration also grappled with the consequences of the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, namely the energy crisis precipitated by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo against the United States.

This document is identified as document 94 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## National Intelligence Estimate<sup>1</sup>

NIE 11-11-69

Washington, February 13, 1969

### SOVIET CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE CAPABILITIES

#### The Estimate

#### I. Toxic Chemical Warfare

##### *A. General*

1. Throughout its history the Soviet Union has placed heavy emphasis on the development of chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. In early years this emphasis derived largely from the disastrous effects of World War I chemical attacks against the Russians by the Germans. Although CW was not used during World War II, the Soviets had an ample supply of chemical munitions and required no assistance in this respect from their allies. After World War II, the Soviets continued their CW development, aided by the seizure of German nerve agent production facilities and personnel.

2. In post-World War II years, the sharp expansion of the Soviet CW program was probably due in large part to a lag in nuclear weapons

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. The table of contents is not printed. The full text of this NIE is in the CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room ([www.foia.cia.gov](http://www.foia.cia.gov)). The NIE later served as a source for discussion at the NSC Review Group meeting of October 30 and the NSC meeting of November 18 regarding chemical and biological warfare issues. See Documents 97 and 103.

availability. Classified Soviet documents suggest that as late as 1961 up to two-thirds of the warheads for tactical missiles and Frogs were chemical rather than nuclear.

3. In recent years the numbers of nuclear weapons available to Soviet theater forces has increased significantly and the proportion of chemical warheads for tactical missiles and rockets has probably declined to about one-third. However, continued stress on the importance of chemical munitions is evident in Soviet military writings, organization, training, and armament, suggesting that the Soviets will continue to retain a significant proportion of chemical warheads in inventory.

*B. Doctrine Governing Use*

4. Soviet military documents and exercises indicate that the Soviets appreciate both the capabilities and limitations of toxic chemical weapons. They appear to be satisfied that these weapons can play an important part in theater operations; documents and exercises stress their utility in a number of specific tactical situations. On the other hand, we have no evidence of any consideration of the use of chemical munitions in long-range delivery systems, either independently or in conjunction with strategic nuclear weapons, and we believe that their use in a strategic role is not now planned.

5. While the USSR appears to have decided that chemical weapons are essentially tactical weapons, toxic chemical agents have been regularly and consistently grouped with nuclear weapons as “weapons of mass destruction” in political declarations and in classified military writings. Soviet field service regulations characterize modern combat either as waged with weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, or as waged with conventional means. Thus it appears that the Soviets think of these chemical weapons as subject to the same political constraints as those imposed upon the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, we believe that the initial use of either of these types of weapons would be a matter for decision at the highest political level.

**Para 5**—This discussion of Soviet CB weapons policy is quite possibly the best and most complete coverage in the entire *Foreign Relations* series, if not all U.S. government writings. Of particular importance is the point that CB weapons use was viewed as a strategic policy decision just as was nuclear weapons use, while it was acknowledged that the use of CB weapons would be at the theater-level or tactical employment. This view is not dissimilar to current U.S. policy perspectives, and yet there is this constant dialogue as to whether to consider chemical weapons as a WMD.

6. Classified and unclassified writings provide strong evidence that the Soviets see no restraints on the use of toxic chemicals in situations involving the use of nuclear weapons on any scale. They would almost certainly use chemical weapons in the event of general nuclear war. We believe, however, that they would not initiate their use in a conventional conflict against an opponent capable of retaliation in kind. They would almost certainly retaliate in kind if attacked with chemical weapons, and they might use toxic chemicals in a nonnuclear war against a power incapable of retaliation in kind.

### *C. Tactical Doctrine*

7. Soviet tactical doctrine for the use of “weapons of mass destruction” prescribes the employment of CW primarily in close coordination with nuclear weapons, so as to capitalize on the particular attributes of each. The doctrine indicates that CW may be used instead of nuclear weapons, for example, in an area of engagement where material damage to the target is to be avoided. Through surprise and employment in mass, toxic agent munitions are intended to provide large-scale casualties and demoralization throughout the tactical zone of operations, thereby permitting rapid maneuver and seizure of critical objectives of fast-moving ground forces.

8. There is good evidence that, once the Soviet Government has decided to use weapons of mass destruction, the *front* commander<sup>2</sup> will

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<sup>2</sup> In the Soviet Army, a *front* is a wartime organization composed of several field armies. Although similar to a US army group, a *front* is not directly comparable. [Footnote in the original.]

normally determine the operations in which chemical agents will be used, the numbers and types of weapons allotted, and coordination with use of other munitions. To fulfill local tasks, chemical weapons would be used on the decision of divisional commanders.

9. Soviet CW doctrine provides for chemical attacks against the “rear areas as a whole,” indicating a more extensive use of toxic chemical weapons at greater distances behind front lines than is usually considered in Western planning. Such a concept is noted particularly in Soviet doctrine for neutralization of enemy missile sites, including those for longer range missiles designated as “operational-tactical,” and in the provision of chemical warhead options for missiles that have ranges up to 300 nautical miles (n.m.).

10. Targets for coverage by chemical weapons, designated in Soviet doctrine, include areas of offensive or defensive combat, areas of troop concentration, command posts, control points, missile sites, and reserves. Chemical munitions are particularly useful when an attacking force wishes to cause casualties, but to leave undamaged enemy facilities such as airfields, bridges, and roads, as well as combat equipment and auxiliary materials. They can also be used to deny the use of terrain.

11. According to Soviet doctrine, tube and multiple rocket type artillery are the major means of disseminating toxic CW munitions in close combat. These means may be supplemented by chemical bombs delivered by fighter-bomber aircraft. The fire offensive is to begin with “massed group and single strikes” delivering chemical as well as nuclear and conventional munitions. Chemical agents delivered by missiles as well as by aircraft would be used against enemy targets in the rear and also to prepare for the landing of amphibious or airborne forces in enemy territory. Coordination of nuclear and chemical weapons, particularly in connection with missile delivery, is a well-published point in Soviet military doctrine. Operationally, the chemical missile would be targeted from 5 to 10 kilometers (km) from the predicted impact point of a nuclear missile and would be used at the same time. By this tactic, personnel that have been protected from nuclear radiation and blast by the “shadow effect” of terrain features would be exposed to the effect of the chemical agent.

12. In a 1961 Soviet Army exercise, use of 226 nuclear missiles and 277 missiles carrying chemical warheads was simulated. In the first mass

strike, 63 nuclear and 24 chemical missiles were utilized; in the next two strikes, 194 chemical and 150 nuclear missiles were employed. The remaining missiles were used in subsequent smaller actions. This evidence indicates that it then was the Soviet practice to use the greater portion of the chemical warheads in operations subsequent to the initial, predominantly nuclear, strike. Since 1961, the ratio of chemical to nuclear warheads has declined. Recent evidence indicates the Soviets still intend to use the greater portion of chemical warheads subsequent to the initial strike.

**Paras 11-12**—In other words, chemical weapons were not merely “the poor man’s atomic bomb” but rather played a distinct role in major combat operations.

13. Soviet CW doctrine seeks “practically instantaneous annihilation of personnel” through coverage of large areas by heavy, lethal concentrations of toxic agents. The Soviets envisage the delivery of such heavy concentrations by massive-fill missile warheads detonated at fairly high altitudes. Soviet military literature refers to the achievement of up to 80 percent casualties in impact areas; the 80 percent figure contrasts sharply with Western CW concepts which visualize no requirement to achieve over 30 percent casualties. This Soviet CW doctrine probably reflects both a traditional penchant for massed fires and the earlier need to compete with nuclear warheads as “weapons of mass destruction.” The doctrine also helps to explain large Soviet CW agent stockpiles.

#### *D. Chemical Agents*

##### *Nerve Agents*

14. Nerve agents have never been employed in major warfare,<sup>3</sup> but laboratory and field testing have shown them to be extremely toxic. Unlike the older agents, these organophosphorus chemicals are practically odorless, and the problem of timely warning has not been solved. One class

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<sup>3</sup> Nerve agents may have been employed by the UAR in Yemen. [Footnote in the original.]

of nerve agents, known in the West as “G” agents because of their German origin, is relatively volatile and presents a lethal hazard by either inhalation of a minute quantity or contamination of unbroken skin by about one gram of agent. A family of even more toxic nerve agents, known in the West as “V” agents, has been developed since World War II. These present a hazard primarily by skin contamination because of their much lower volatility, but a very small drop (on the order of 0.01 gram) can be lethal. Since World War II, the Soviets have produced several of these nerve agents of increasing toxicity and effectiveness.

15. The first nerve agent developed and adopted by the Soviets was tabun, a G-agent, the quantity production of which probably began about 1946 or shortly thereafter. Manufacture of the agent probably continued through the 1950’s, but stopped when emphasis shifted to other agents. Existing stocks of tabun, whether in bulk or in filled munitions, have gradually diminished as the result of agent deterioration. Nevertheless we believe that about half the Soviet tabun stock is still available.

16. The G-agent, sarin, became known to the Soviets at the close of World War II, when they took over the German production facility. Quantity production of sarin in the USSR probably began about 1960. Production of another G-agent, soman, probably began about a year later. It is more toxic than sarin; no adequate therapy is known. Both of these agents are now in the Soviet stockpile. Soman is available both in the normal liquid form and as a thickened agent.

17. At least one V-agent is in the Soviet arsenal and available for employment. This type of agent may have been known to the Soviets as early as 1953, but they definitely obtained information on V-agents from Western sources in 1955 and 1956. Under priority action and assuming Soviet knowledge of the existence of V-agents as early as 1953, V-agent production could have begun as early as 1956; in any case, at least one agent of this type had probably entered stockpile by the late 1950’s or early 1960’s.

18. The agent used as a chemical fill in tactical rockets, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles is described in Soviet sources as an “agent of the VR-55 type.” The lack of evidence as to the exact nature of this agent is a major gap in our knowledge of Soviet CW capabilities. It appears to be a persistent nerve agent or nerve agent mixture that is at least two or three times more toxic than the Western agent VX, and 25

times as toxic as sarin. According to Soviet sources, VR-55 reaches the ground in vapor, aerosol, and droplet form and is persistent for one to three days. To obtain this effect the Soviets may use a thickener to retard evaporation during the fall. It has also been suggested that VR-55 might be a mixture of a highly toxic V-agent with an unknown, extremely toxic, semi-persistent G-agent. The highly persistent V-agent might retard the evaporation of the more volatile G-agents to permit sufficient G-agent to reach the ground and supply the vapor hazard.

*Older Agents*

19. World War I-type agents still in the Soviet stockpile include hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene. Hydrogen cyanide is a tactical, nonpersistent agent. The Soviets claim the ability to produce and maintain an effective concentration lasting from 10 to 15 minutes over an area. A thickened or otherwise evaporation-retarded agent form may be used since hydrogen cyanide normally dissipates rapidly. Since the cyanides are common items produced by the chemical industry, military supply would probably come from diversion of industrial production rather than from a special facility.

20. The vesicant agent, mustard, either alone or mixed with lewisite, is an important agent in the Soviet arsenal. Manufacture of mustard in the USSR took place in both World Wars. There is no information which indicates current production.

21. Phosgene is another World War I agent that is still in the Soviet stockpile. The chemical industry uses phosgene as a common reactant, and the chemical is readily available. Although its toxicity is low compared to that of nerve agents and its volatility is high, its lack of persistence, cheapness, and ready availability seem to influence Soviet retention of the agent in their CW stockpile.

In this area, the Soviets were distinct from the United States: they didn't throw away any of their old chemical munitions, while the United States had at least gotten rid of its old hydrogen cyanide and phosgene stocks and most of the WW2 mustard-filled munitions.

*Incapacitants*

22. The USSR is working on CW incapacitants such as the US hallucinogen BZ or an agent very closely related to it, as well as other types of hallucinogens. We believe that the Soviets have a good understanding of the chemistry of these agents and their mode of action, but there is no firm evidence that an incapacitant has been put into the Soviet CW stockpile.

*Stockpile and Further Production*

23. The Soviets have an extensive stockpile of various toxic chemical agents and munitions designed for employment with a variety of tactical ground, air and naval weapons. Central chemical depots under national control are believed to be in each military district. We estimate that the Soviet agent stockpile is on the order of 275,000 tons, but there is some recent evidence which suggests that this figure may be high. We believe that over half the stockpile consists of modern nerve agents and the remainder of older chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and phosgene.

24. Soviet toxic chemical production capacity is expanding. Current stockpiles appear adequate for wartime operational requirements; additional stocks may be deemed necessary by the Soviets on the assumption that some would be destroyed in the event of strategic attacks, or would be immobilized in their generally remote depots by the disruption of transportation systems.

*E. Chemical Munitions*

25. The USSR has a wide variety of modern ground, air, and naval munitions designed to disseminate lethal and harassing agents, screening and signaling smokes, and flame and incendiary agents. During World War II, toxic CW munitions included shells, mines, multiple ground-launched chemical rockets, massive-fill and cluster bombs, and aerial spray tanks. Since then the Soviets have been very successful in developing new toxic agents for dissemination by the most modern means, such as missiles, and also in adapting older agents for dissemination by modern weapons, such as highly mobile rocket artillery.

*Ground Munitions*

26. The Soviet ground forces have a variety of toxic chemical delivery means including artillery and mortar shells, multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets, Frog systems, and Scud tactical ballistic missiles. This array of offensive weapons would enable the Soviets to create a toxic environment over a large area. Any or all of these weapons could also be used in defensive tactics and could be supplemented by the Soviet stocks of chemical mines, used alone or interspersed in high explosive (HE) minefields. Burning-type munitions, such as grenades, pots, and candles, filled with irritant agents would also be used to produce casualties or to degrade the enemy's combat capability by forcing troops to mask.

27. Smaller caliber tube artillery rounds were toxic-filled up to and during the World War II years. Chemical rounds are probably now available for light and medium artillery and the 120 mm mortar. Sarin, soman, mustard, and mustard-lewisite mixtures would probably be used to fill Soviet artillery and mortar shells, and hydrogen cyanide might also be used. Chemical artillery shells are suitable for use on small area or point targets and would be available as "gas" (toxic) or "fragmentation-gas" rounds. Fragmentation-gas rounds have unthickened nerve agents or mustard as the fill and are fitted with relatively large bursters so that the chemical agent is disseminated almost entirely as an aerosol or vapor. Chemical rounds with low order bursters and point detonating fuzes are used to disseminate persistent chemical agents such as mustard for heavy liquid contamination on the target and to disseminate volatile nonpersistent agents such as hydrogen cyanide at ground level. Airburst rounds with low order bursters are designed to obtain larger, more even area coverage than can be obtained with the groundburst types. They are normally filled with persistent type agents such as mustard and possibly thickened soman.

28. Bulk-fill warheads are probably available for multiple-rail rocket launchers capable of firing 140 mm, 200 mm, or 240 mm rockets. Because of their high rate of fire and high ratio of chemical fill to total weight of round, these weapons are ideal for quickly covering large-area tactical targets with toxic concentrations of nonpersistent agents.

In fact, the U.S. M55 rocket (115mm), filled with either sarin or VX agent, was modeled on the Soviet multiple-rail rocket launchers.

29. The Soviets consider chemical landmines especially useful in defensive situations. The USSR has pressure-activated and electrically detonated chemical landmines. During World War II these were filled with mustard or mustard-lewisite mixtures; while some mines may still have these fillings, newer agents may be used now.

30. Soviet tactical missiles and rockets with massive-fill warheads are the primary means for delivering heavy concentrations of VR-55. The Soviets maintain that the optimal altitude (i.e., altitude providing maximum ground coverage) for the detonation of Frog-delivered massive fill warheads is 400 meters, and that for Scud-delivered warheads, 1,600 to 2,000 meters. Using this technique, the results obtained with the Frog warhead are described by the Soviets as 80 percent casualties over one-third of a square mile; with the Scud warhead, 80 percent casualties over three-fourths of a square mile. Lesser percentages of casualties are claimed downwind from these areas of maximum agent concentration. The Soviet description of effects obtainable with these techniques is presumably based on optimum weather conditions. The inaccuracies in the Frog and Scud systems would also have to be taken into account in a Soviet decision to employ massive-fill, high-altitude CW attack. The Frog CW warhead probably contains about 400 pounds of agent, and the Scud warhead about 800.

#### *Naval Munitions*

31. Soviet literature indicates considerable training emphasis on CW in the navy. Any or all of the Soviet Navy's cruise missiles could carry chemical warheads, but shipboard storage might prove hazardous. The most likely candidate for such warheads are those cruise missiles used by naval coastal defense units.

32. The Shaddock cruise missile can carry an agent payload of about 1,200 pounds about 300 n.m. The warhead may be a massive-fill type such as those for the Frogs and Scuds, and similarly detonated. The Soviets may also have developed a technique for the release of chemicals on a line from a cruise missile.

33. The Soviet Navy probably has 85 mm and 100 mm chemical shells for naval guns. Recent information indicates the stockpiling of 130 mm chemical shells for destroyers and 152 mm chemical shells for cruisers. Such shells are stored in port and placed on ships only during major exercises or in wartime.

*Air Munitions*

34. Soviet air munitions include massive-fill and cluster bombs, and possibly spray dissemination devices. The specific characteristics of Soviet chemical bombs are not known positively, but World War II types included individual bombs and bomblet clusters for disseminating lethal and harassing agents. Soviet crop-dusting activity indicates an excellent capability for spraying toxic agents from low performance aircraft. Spray tanks were developed in World War II for both fighters and bombers, but we have no evidence of such equipment for modern Soviet high performance aircraft. The Soviets have air-to-surface missiles which are capable of carrying CW agent payloads. Soviet aerial incendiary bombs probably include individual bombs filled with white phosphorus, thermite, napalm-type agents, or "Pirogel" (a mixture of powdered metal and petroleum products), and clusters of bomblets with thermite or thermite-HE fillings.

*F. Chemical Warfare Defense*

35. The Soviets possess large quantities of a wide range of equipment for use in chemical defense, much of it of recent design. Extensive training in its use is integral to military exercises for all Soviet and East European forces—ground, naval, and air—and dilute toxic agents are sometimes employed in this training. Equipment and training for CW defense are combined with that for radiological defense, and the special chemical troops are responsible for both types of defense. The dual nature of such defense is stressed in military training, and there are a number of recent examples of Soviet forces donning chemical defense equipment following simulated nuclear strikes.

36. The single most critical weakness in Soviet chemical defense is the problem of nerve agent detection. The Soviets have some manual and automatic devices for the detection of local concentrations of nerve

agents, but we do not believe they are capable of giving timely warning of chemical attack.

37. We judge that the chemical defense equipment supplied the individual Soviet combat soldier is technically adequate to protect him in a toxic environment for a limited time, depending on the nature and concentration of the agent. Soviet troops exposed to contamination would be treated at decontamination facilities established by chemical troops. The equipment and procedures to be used at these facilities appear to be technically adequate.

38. Chemical warfare defense is stressed in Soviet civil defense indoctrination and exercises. Civil defense organizations are supplied with chemical defense equipment and gas masks are available for purchase by the general populace. We believe it unlikely, however, that any significant portion of the population has acquired protective equipment.

39. We believe that the Soviets will continue research and development on chemical defense, but we have no evidence regarding particular lines of development. We presume that major attention will be devoted to problems of nerve agent detection, protection, and treatment.

#### *G. Direction and Organization of the Chemical Warfare Program*

40. The principal responsibility for the program lies with the Chief of Chemical Troops, subordinate directly to the Commander in Chief of the Ground Forces. Administrative control of the Chemical Troops, including those in the Military District organization, is maintained by the Chief of Chemical Troops. Other activities under his supervision include various CW schools. The Central Chemical Proving Ground, at Shikhany, and other chemical test areas are directly under the Chief of Chemical Troops. Filling plants and central depots for storage of CW munitions, bulk agents, and other CW material are probably his responsibility.

41. Separate and distinct from the administrative control responsibilities of the Chief of Chemical Troops is the operational control of Chemical Troops, which is maintained by the commanders of military districts, groups of forces, armies, divisions, and smaller units, through the chiefs of chemical troops of the respective elements. The chemical officers so assigned advise their commanders on the use of CW weapons and other CW matters such as detection and

decontamination. They also command the chemical troops, such as the chemical battalions assigned at the military district and army level. In peacetime a chemical company is an integral part of a division, and a chemical platoon is part of a regiment. In wartime, appropriate chemical units are also assigned to *fronts*, armies, and battalions. The main duties of these personnel are related to CW defense, including detection and decontamination; they are responsible also for handling toxic munitions and agents in storage and transport.

## II. Biological Warfare

### *A. General*

42. The Soviets are conducting research and development programs on the possible military applications of biological agents. In previous years, virtually all available evidence could be related to Soviet work in epidemiology, public health, and sanitation, and defensive aspects of biological warfare (BW), but recent evidence points to the development of BW weapons.

### *B. Doctrine Governing Use*

43. Soviet documents indicate that the USSR expects NATO to employ BW in the event of war and is preparing to defend against it. We believe that political considerations would weigh heavily against Soviet initiation of BW. In Soviet writings the subject is linked with nuclear and chemical warfare in terms that indicate a high degree of political control and restraint. The Soviet assessment of relative military advantages and disadvantages of the use of BW weapons, as well as the vulnerability of the population, would also impose restraint.

44. We believe it highly unlikely that the Soviets would employ BW in an initial strategic attack, although it might subsequently be used in the course of a general war. BW is especially suitable for clandestine delivery. The Soviets probably believe that BW weapons are of doubtful effectiveness in many tactical situations because of delayed and unpredictable effects. There is, however, some evidence which indicates that *front* commanders would be authorized to employ BW in circumstances in which Warsaw Pact forces were being compelled to withdraw, and that the means to do so could then be provided to them.

### *C. Availability of Biological Warfare Agents*

45. We believe that, through their own research and open US literature, the Soviets are well aware of the properties of a variety of BW agents, and they have the technical capability to develop, produce, and stockpile them in militarily significant quantities. We have, however, insufficient evidence on which to base an estimate of the types and quantities of BW agents which might be available to the Soviets for offensive use. The Soviets have done research on increasing agent virulence and maintaining high virulence for extended periods of time, retarding aerobiological decay, adapting agents to unusual vectors and testing the infectivity of causative agents of diseases not endemic to a particular geographic area. Studies on multiple combinations of bacterial, rickettsial, viral and toxoid vaccines, which have been conducted primarily by military scientists, have little relevance to Soviet public health requirements. Similarly, aerogenic studies have featured combinations of antigens that most likely would be found only in a BW environment, making some of these studies highly suspect of offensive agent research and development. In particular, there appears to be no other satisfactory explanation for Soviet work on the aerosolization of botulinum toxin.

Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas give a particularly extensive coverage of what the Soviet BW program held in their book *"The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History."*

### *D. Defense Against Biological Warfare*

46. The Soviet military establishment includes organizations charged with defense of troops against BW. The Chief Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has the prime responsibility for developing methods for defense of personnel and for numerous military and nonmilitary medical research centers which work on BW defense matters. In addition to medical service troops for BW defense, epidemiological services exist at all military levels to provide sanitation and disinfection facilities.

47. Soviet military forces are known to undergo training in BW defensive measures. Defense against BW has been included since 1956 in

Soviet civil defense efforts which are now under the control of the Ministry of Defense. Protective equipment is available and contingency plans have been made for mass immunization. There have been some joint civil-military BW defense exercises. These efforts, however, are not of a scale to indicate any meaningful BW civil defense posture.

48. At present the Soviets rely on conventional laboratory techniques for detection and identification of biological agents. There are no indications that Soviet military forces are equipped with automatic BW alarm systems, but a number of prototypes continue to be evaluated.

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## National Security Study Memorandum 59<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 28, 1969

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology  
The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents

The President has directed a study of U.S. policy, programs and operational concepts with regards to both chemical and biological warfare and agents.<sup>2</sup>

The study should examine present U.S. policy and programs on CBW, the main issues confronting that policy, and the range of possible

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. A copy was sent to General Wheeler.

<sup>2</sup> On April 30, Laird expressed his increasing concern to Henry Kissinger “about the structure of our chemical and biological warfare programs, our national policy relating to such programs, and our public posture vis-à-vis chemical and biological warfare activities.” Laird requested immediate NSC consideration of the matter. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research) Kissinger replied on May 9 that he shared Laird’s concerns. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. I) In a May 23 memorandum, Kissinger advised Nixon to authorize a NSSM on the matter. “In the light of the uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy and programs in this area, and in light of the increasing public concern and attention being given the subject,” Kissinger believed “that an overall study of present policy and possible alternatives is required.” (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–153, NSSM 59)

alternatives thereto. The analysis should delineate (1) the nature of the threat to the U.S. and its Allies and possible alternative approaches in meeting this threat; (2) the utility of and circumstances for possible employment of chemical and biological agents, both lethal and incapacitating; (3) the operational concepts relating to possible use, testing and stockpiling; (4) the research and development objectives; (5) the nature of and alternative approaches to the distinction between lethal and non-lethal chemical and biological agents, including a review of current applications of U.S. policy relating to non-lethal agents such as chemical riot control agents and chemical defoliants; and (6) the U.S. position on arms control, including the question of the ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The study should include consideration of the effects upon U.S. international posture in general and upon relationships with Allies in particular; of the relevant legal questions; of the various cost factors; and of the environmental control and public affairs aspects of U.S. policy.

The President has directed that the NSC Political-Military Group perform this study and that the addressees be included in the PMG for purposes of this study. The President has authorized the PMG to establish the necessary subgroups for special or technical aspects of this study.

The report of this Group should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by September 5, 1969.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

The famous NSSM 59 launched an extensive discussion into the deterrent value of CB weapons and their impact on U.S. national security policy that is unrivaled to date. As noted earlier, the reason for this review was largely political, not pragmatic. It was a combination of the use of riot control agents in Vietnam, the Dugway Proving Ground incident, the exposure of soldiers to nerve agent on Okinawa, and the United Nations' efforts to outlaw CB weapons use from future conflicts. While this discussion would inevitably lead to the unilateral U.S. disarmament of offensive biological weapons, the road to that decision is particularly fascinating. The following documents, and in particular the transcripts of the meetings, offer valuable insight into critical thinking on a national security policy issue of the day.

## SecDef Memorandum for Correspondents<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 9, 1969

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today issued the following statement in response to queries about the DoD position on the pending McIntyre amendment.

On assuming the office of Secretary of Defense in January, 1969, I became concerned with the management and control of our chemical warfare and biological research programs. I felt that improvements were needed in the management and control of these programs. That is why in April I requested and the President ordered a National Security Council study of these matters. This study is in progress.<sup>2</sup>

Pending the completion of the NSC study, I believe it is prudent that we act jointly with Congress and take actions, wherever possible, to improve the management and control of chemical warfare and biological research programs.

Members of my staff, principally Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engineering, have been working in recent days with Senator Thomas J. McIntyre of New Hampshire, and with other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on a revised amendment to the pending Defense Authorization Bill.

Sen. Thomas McIntyre (D-NH) was a former Army infantry officer who fought in the European theater during World War 2. He served in the Senate between 1962 and 1979. He was one of many congresspersons who had a sudden interest in the U.S. military's CB weapons following the Dugway Proving Ground incident.

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> See next document on NSSM 59.

The amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Act for FY 1970 became Section 409 of Public Law 91-121 (Nov 1969). It directed the Secretary of Defense to submit semi-annual reports on CB warfare RDT&E and procurement and, more importantly, stopped funding for any transportation or open-air testing of lethal CB warfare agents within the United States, subject to certain statements that such transportation or testing was vital to the interests of national security and that Congress was appropriately notified. It also stopped funding for the procurement of any delivery system specifically designed for CB warfare agents.

As a result of this specific act, all live agent testing outside of a controlled laboratory ceased and the idea of consolidating the U.S. chemical stockpile at one or a few military installations for purposes of destruction became impossible. It would also make the mission of developing and testing a modern binary chemical weapon in the late 1970s and early 1980s extremely difficult.

I am in agreement with the goals of the new amendment, which the Senate is scheduled to consider on Monday.

I believe this revised amendment will allow us to maintain our chemical warfare deterrent and our biological research program both of which are essential to national security.

This meant only legacy delivery systems could be used for deterrent purposes, essentially leading to the point where 1960s-era aerial bombs, spray tanks, artillery shells, and land mines provided the deterrent capability for the rest of the Cold War. This became a problem when the Army, Air Force, and Navy modernized their planes and artillery systems but did not consider compatibility issues with the CB weapons in the stockpile.

The history of the use of lethal chemical warfare agents has demonstrated on three notable occasions in this century that the only time military forces have used these weapons is when the opposing forces had no immediate capability to deter or to retaliate. This was true early in

World War I, later in Ethiopia and more recently in Yemen. Clearly, failure to maintain an effective chemical warfare deterrent would endanger national security.

Because it would not always be possible to determine the origin of attack by biological agents, the deterrent aspects of biological research are not as sharply defined. A continued biological research program, however, is vital on two other major counts.

First, we must strengthen our protective capabilities in such areas as vaccines and therapy.

Secondly, we must minimize the dangers of technological surprise.

It is important that the American people be informed of why we must continue to maintain our chemical deterrent, conduct biological research, and how we propose to improve the management and control of these programs.

Except, of course, the American public really couldn't understand these defense issues with the cacophony of negative press and books decrying the CB weapons program and pictures of Vietnam filling their televisions each night.

This document is identified as document 97 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## Minutes of Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 30, 1969, 2:25–3:55 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents (NSSM 59)<sup>2</sup>

### PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger	OEP Haakon Lindjord
State Richard F. Pedersen William I. Cargo Ronald Spiers Donald McHenry	USIA Henry Loomis ACDA Howard E. Furnas
Defense G. Warren Nutter	OST Vincent McRae
CIA Edward W. Proctor	NSC Staff Michael Guhin
JCS Rear Adm. Frank W. Vannoy Colonel James M. Bates	Col. Richard Kennedy Jeanne W. Davis

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Review Group Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. The minutes are also published in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972, Document 155*.

<sup>2</sup> Document 95.

## SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. The paper<sup>3</sup> is to be reworked by the IPMG to:
  - a. regroup the 11 issues into three categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides;
  - b. clarify the distinction between offensive and defensive R&D;
  - c. state the arguments for and against briefing the German Government on deployment of CW stocks in Germany;
  - d. include a specific policy issue on the UK draft convention on BW;
  - e. define an adequate CW retaliatory capability;
  - f. state the pros and cons for ratification of the Geneva Protocol<sup>4</sup> including the question of a reservation on tear gas;
  - g. raise the issue of a requirement for a Presidential decision to use tear gas in conflicts other than Vietnam.
2. The NSC meeting on CBW will be postponed from November 12 to November 19 in view of a conflict with the NPG meeting.<sup>5</sup>

Dr. Kissinger noted that the IPMG paper had been grouped into 11 issues. He would find it more useful, if the group agreed, to divide these into three basic categories: biological warfare, chemical warfare, and the question of the Geneva Protocol with respect to tear gas and herbicides. He suggested the discussion begin with *biological weapons* and identified the three choices: (1) retain full capability including lethal agents for deterrence and retaliation with an option for first use; (2) retain capability

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<sup>3</sup> The Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG), chaired by Spiers, submitted a 47-page draft response to NSSM 59 on October 15. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-40, Review Group Meeting, October 30, 1969) The revised paper is Document 99.

<sup>4</sup> By October 1969, 84 nations had become parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological agents. While the United States had signed the Geneva Protocol, the U.S. Senate had not ratified it.

<sup>5</sup> The meeting was held on Tuesday, November 18. See Document 103.

only for incapacitants; (3) retain only an R&D capability, for both offensive and defensive purposes or defense alone.

Mr. Pedersen asked if BW R&D could be broken down into offensive and defensive weapons.

Mr. Kissinger replied yes, saying defensive moves would include warning devices, immunization, etc., but with no capability to conduct biological warfare.

Mr. Spiers noted the military view that we would have to perform offensive R&D also.

Admiral Vannoy said we would have to have offensive weapons in order to test our defenses.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this meant there was no point in having defensive R&D only.

Admiral Vannoy agreed.

Dr. McRae noted that some aspects of R&D were specifically meant to strengthen our offensive capability, e.g., spray capabilities, weapons development, etc.

Mr. Nutter agreed but said it was hard to draw a line.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we could distinguish between offensive and defensive R&D.

Mr. Proctor said we would not prepare for mass production in R&D for defense.

Dr. McRae stated that, generally speaking, defensive R&D could be distinguished by leaving out engineering development.

Mr. Kissinger commented that an operational R&D program for defense would include enough work on offensive to give meaning to the defensive aspect.

Dr. McRae said offensive R&D would include an engineering component which would enable quick production.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the issues were correctly stated, and if the JCS favors full capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied yes.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the paper adequately stated the JCS views.

Admiral Vannoy said they had circulated proposed changes to the paper to give a better balance to the pros and cons.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> On October 17, Wheeler sent a memorandum to Laird with an appendix detailing the

Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone else opposed the JCS view.

Mr. Spiers noted that State had not taken a formal position since the Secretary had not considered the issue. However, State will recommend that he oppose JCS views.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the Secretary would of course express his views at the NSC meeting. He asked if the paper represented a fair statement.

Mr. Pedersen commented that some of the proposed JCS changes would cause trouble for State.

Mr. Kissinger summarized the arguments against a lethal BW capability in terms of its ineffectiveness for retaliatory purposes (e.g., delays in detecting attack, delivering a counterattack and in counterattack taking effect), and that it was not needed in the light of nuclear and other weapons. He asked about possible Soviet clandestine use.

Mr. Proctor replied that we have no information on Soviet plans.

He noted that our information was at best ambiguous.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we get intelligence information in this area.

Mr. Proctor replied we have information on exercises in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact countries on CW but none on BW.

Mr. Kissinger noted that a Czech chemist had told him a major effort was underway but that he was not sure whether this was CW or BW.

Mr. Loomis noted that the best use of BW would be clandestine and that such use would not appear to demand field exercises.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were not an incubation period and why field exercises would be useful if the weapons were not immediately effective. He thought the major use of BW would be on centers of population over a period of time.

Dr. McRae pointed out that the military would probably not elect BW weapons because of their limited effectiveness except in rare circumstances. He cited the incubation period and the uncertain human response.

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Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommended chemical and biological warfare policy. The JCS was against declaring a no-first-use policy and advocated vigorous R&D programs to maintain chemical and biological agents with both offensive and defensive capabilities. The JCS also wanted to maintain some overseas stocks of chemical weapons. Notes on the memorandum indicate that both Laird and Packard saw it. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 4, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

Mr. Kissinger asked if it was not easier to produce BW as an effective weapon than certain other alternatives.

Admiral Vannoy agreed, saying that it would be highly effective on a civilian population.

Mr. Kissinger asked if countries cannot achieve a BW capability before a nuclear capability. All agreed that this was true.

Mr. Loomis noted that experiments in this country indicated that BW would be extremely effective in any air-conditioned building.

Mr. Kissinger thought there would be very few occasions where we would use biological weapons first. If they were used against us, BW would not necessarily be the best response. He asked if, on moral grounds, we would not use BW first even if we could conceal it.

Mr. Spiers said he could see some circumstances for first use of BW, almost as a strategic weapon. In the circumstances, however, he thought we would also use nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would need BW if we used nuclear weapons.

This issue of “why use BW if you have nukes” is a popular but insufficient reason given for the U.S. government getting rid of biological weapons. The point was, if your enemy used BW against your forces, would you in turn automatically escalate to nuclear weapons, lacking the ability to retaliate in kind? First use of BW was a different issue, of course.

Admiral Vannoy replied that it would depend on the degree of destruction desired, giving Western Europe as an example.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could be sure that an epidemic in Western Europe would not spread to Eastern Europe.

Admiral Vannoy replied that the population could be prepared. He noted also the importance of developing a capability for flexible response. If a stringent nuclear arms control agreement were concluded we might face a strong Soviet BW capability not matched by the U.S.

Mr. Kissinger asked if General Wheeler would not make this point at the NSC meeting and Admiral Vannoy replied that the JCS Staff would so recommend.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the arguments for use of incapacitants and for an illustrative first-use scenario.

Admiral Vannoy cited an island situation, saying although we have BW incapacitants, we have no CW incapacitants. He cited a BW incapacitant which would, within two to four days, produce a high fever which would last a week or ten days. He noted we had no militarily significant quantities of lethal BW.

This is probably a reference to brucellosis organisms. Vannoy's comment was not to suggest the U.S. military didn't have anthrax, but that it had not stockpiled enough for a "Fulda Gap" scenario.

Mr. Kissinger asked if BW incapacitants might not kill people already weakened.

Admiral Vannoy acknowledged there would be a certain incidence of death, possibly among children, the elderly, and people with other illnesses, but this was not the primary purpose of the weapon.

Mr. Kissinger asked if everyone but the JCS rejects the island argument.

Mr. Spiers thought there was a consensus to retain R&D only with enough offensive R&D for defensive purposes.

Mr. Kissinger asked what the time lag was from R&D to production.

Mr. Spiers replied two to three years assuming we started from scratch.

Mr. Kissinger asked if R&D only implied no production facilities.

Mr. Spiers said yes, but that some facilities would be required to produce offensive BW for defensive purposes—testing, etc.

Admiral Vannoy noted that we now have a plant at Pine Bluff [Arkansas] spending approximately \$5 million a year producing BW for R&D purposes.

Mr. Kissinger saw two issues for the NSC to consider: (1) whether we should have both offensive and defensive R&D, or defensive only; and (2) whether we should or should not retain production facilities.

Mr. Pedersen asked if it would be necessary to build a plant from scratch or whether normal medical or pharmaceutical facilities could not produce BW.

Admiral Vannoy said it would not be possible to use commercial plants because of certain control and packaging requirements.

Mr. Pedersen asked if, in a state of war, adaptation of present commercial plants for BW purposes could not shorten the two to three-year period.

Admiral Vannoy agreed this might be possible. However, he thought an equally important problem would be development of a delivery and packaging system and that this would be as difficult as the production of the biological agents themselves.

Dr. McRae noted that we have little data with which to assess the effectiveness of BW even in an island situation. He thought the degree of incapacity was ambiguous.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the UK draft convention on BW<sup>7</sup> and asked if the only decision consistent with the convention would be R&D for defensive purposes only. Would it be consistent to pursue offensive R&D for defensive purposes?

Mr. Spiers replied no.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there are reasons for supporting the UK convention other than those of substance.

Mr. Spiers noted the verification issue, and also commented that the UK paper was not widely supported, mainly because it separated BW from CW.

Admiral Vannoy noted that we have zero capability of determining whether or not there is a production capability without on-site inspection.

Mr. Proctor agreed.

Mr. Kissinger noted that the JCS believes defensive R&D is impossible without doing enough offensive work to know what to defend against. In itself, this is inconsistent with the UK draft. Also, we could not tell whether a plant was being used for BW, even less whether for offensive or defensive purposes, without an obtrusive inspection. Would we be bothered by such inspection?

Mr. Spiers said there would be complications.

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<sup>7</sup> At the July 10 meeting of the ENDC in Geneva, the United Kingdom introduced a draft agreement to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological agents "in any circumstances." The proposed agreement also required the destruction of current stocks of biological weapons.

Mr. Kissinger asked that we categorize the arguments in light of the above discussion in a reshaped paper.

Dr. McRae thought we could eliminate the possibility of acceptance of the UK draft excepting the proposal on R&D.

Mr. Spiers noted the complications of trying to separate continued production from continued R&D. He noted, however, that the UK draft was not a high priority problem.

Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that we would have a problem with both the Soviet and UK drafts and that we will need a position.

Mr. Spiers thought our position on these issues would be affected by what we want in the way of arms control.

Mr. Pedersen asked if it were possible to pursue this along tactical lines.

(At 2:55 p.m. Mr. Loomis left the discussion.)

Mr. Cargo commented that the verification issue is less acute if we limit ourselves to R&D.

Mr. Pedersen agreed that if we undertake a unilateral limitation, we could then argue for the treaty for what we would get out of it.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should offer this as an argument in favor of the UK draft, if we are moving in that direction anyhow. He commented that others may not know that we have adopted such a position unilaterally.

Mr. Spiers thought that there were other arguments.

Mr. Kissinger noted the low priority of the BW program, commenting that high level interest sometimes brings with it higher priorities. He thought the low priority interest in BW was a form of tacit arms control.

Mr. Kissinger moved to the subject of *chemical weapons* and raised two issues: (1) are incapacitants covered by the no first-use policy on lethals; (2) do we want to maintain a capacity for retaliation (both lethal and incapacitant) or limit ourselves to R&D? He assumed no one was in favor of first-use of lethal CW.

Admiral Vannoy noted that the JCS position was qualified by the knowledge that we would have a retaliatory capability. If we had a retaliatory capability, we would, in fact, have a first-use capability.

Mr. Kissinger asked what the difference was between first use and retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied that we would need more to retaliate than to initiate, since we could assume some stocks would be destroyed by the enemy in an initial attack.

Mr. Kissinger assumed we would not be bothered by declaring a no first-use policy since we could always change our mind.

Mr. Nutter questioned the effect of a declaratory policy on our deterrent.

Mr. Kissinger asked if anyone believed we would undertake the first-use of CW.

Mr. Nutter noted that we had been careful not to make any such final statement on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger replied that we had, however, made a no first-use statement on CW. He asked if we would let Europe be overrun rather than use CW first.

Admiral Vannoy replied that at the present we would have no choice.

So here's an interesting position: the U.S. government would not authorize the first use of chemical weapons in the face of an overwhelming Soviet invasion of Europe, but it could authorize the first use of nuclear weapons. Where's the logic?

Mr. Spiers noted the difficulties involved in reversing present policy on no first-use CW.

Mr. Nutter noted that our statement is one of intention.

Mr. Kissinger asked if there were any significant pressure for altering the no first-use policy for lethal CW.

Admiral Vannoy said the JCS would fight to retain the capability. Mr. Kissinger asked if the no first-use policy applies to incapacitants. Mr. Spiers said we had never said whether this applies to incapacitants. He noted that the only Presidential statement (President Roosevelt in 1943) referred to "poisonous or noxious gases" and that we had not had a CW incapacitant at that time.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> On June 5, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated: "Authoritative reports are reaching this Government of the use by Japanese armed forces in various localities of China of poisonous or noxious gases. I desire to make it unmistakably clear that, if Japan

Admiral Vannoy replied that we did, in fact, have a CW incapacitant—49 tons of it—but that it was not very good and that we have had difficulty stabilizing it. In response to questions, he said that it became effective in the respiratory system in 1½ to 2 hours and lasted 3–5 days.

This was Agent BZ, of course. It was stored at Pine Bluff Arsenal until it was destroyed in 1988.

Dr. McRae described the effects of a CW incapacitant on the ability to coordinate bodily functions, giving illustrations.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this had been tested. Dr. McRae replied that it had.

Mr. Kissinger asked if this were an issue if we have no effective CW incapacitant.

Mr. Spiers thought that it was an issue—do we want to retain a CW incapacitant capability because of the production aspect?

Mr. Kissinger asked what we know about the other side.

Dr. McRae replied that we had heard rumors about a Chinese Communist CW incapacitant but they were only rumors.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would know about their CW capabilities when we know so little else about Communist China? He asked about possible use of a CW incapacitant—would we use it in an island situation?

Admiral Vannoy said yes, or wherever we want to acquire real estate without destroying it.

Dr. McRae thought it might possibly be useful if you could get an effective CW incapacitant—in fact, it would be more useful than BW because of its quick onset, predictable response, and the fact that it is not contagious.

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persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this Government as though taken against the United States, and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out. We shall be prepared to enforce complete retribution. Upon Japan will rest the responsibility.” (*Foreign Relations*, 1942, China, p. 67)

Mr. Kissinger asked if the arguments for and against CW incapacitants (pp. 26–27 of the IPMG paper) had been adequately stated?<sup>9</sup>

Dr. McRae thought there was an additional question: should you plan for the use of a CW incapacitant or merely plan to retain a capability.

Mr. Kissinger thought the first question could be added to the question of first-use and that the second should be phrased “should we retain a capability even though we have agreed on no first-use?” He asked if there were a consensus that we should retain a capability for retaliation.

Mr. Spiers commented that the State Department would support Secretary Laird’s recommendations on CW<sup>10</sup> including his recommendation that all stocks of mustard and phosgene gas should be destroyed or detoxified, and that production of other lethal CW agents should be discontinued until binary agents are fully developed. He thought they would recommend to the Secretary of State that once R&D on binary agents had been completed, we should request a Presidential decision whether or not to go into production.

Mr. Kissinger summarized Defense position as calling for an end to production of any more chemical weapons; detoxifying or destroying mustard and phosgene stocks, while maintaining other stocks (e.g., non-binary nerve gases); continuation of R&D on binary agents. State adds the issue of a Presidential decision on the production of binaries when development becomes possible.

Admiral Vannoy said that JCS wishes to maintain a retaliatory capability with lethal chemicals.

Mr. Spiers commented that State would not have raised the possibility of the destruction of existing stocks.

Mr. Kissinger noted the Defense Department debate on the definition of a lethal retaliatory capability. Secretary Laird has recommended some

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<sup>9</sup> See Section II E of Document 99.

<sup>10</sup> The Defense Department’s “Summary Report on Chemical Warfare Programs and Biological Research Programs,” October 8, recommended that “All stocks of mustard and phosgene gas should be destroyed or detoxified, and production of other lethal chemical agents should be discontinued until binary agents (suitable for safe handling) are fully developed. Meanwhile, the chemical warfare program should concentrate entirely on R&D of binary agents.” (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 4, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

detoxification or destruction, and the replacement of existing lethals by binary weapons which could be put into production later. The JCS judgment is that destruction of stocks and failure to produce more would leave us without a retaliatory capability. He thought this issue should be raised in the paper so that the President could address all CW and BW problems together.

Dr. McRae asked if our existing retaliatory capability is adequate. Admiral Vannoy replied that it is not.

Mr. Kissinger asked what would be considered an adequate retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy replied 8 tons per division per day. Mr. Kissinger asked for what objective?

Admiral Vannoy replied for the destruction of Warsaw Pact forces. Mr. Kissinger asked if JCS was, therefore, defining a retaliatory capability as nothing short of the capability to destroy Warsaw Pact forces totally by CW.

Admiral Vannoy added in conjunction with conventional weapons.

Mr. Cargo commented that we should be able to retaliate until the enemy stops using the weapon.

Admiral Vannoy said that the JCS have stated an additional requirement for deployment in Western Europe.

Mr. Spiers noted that the JCS say stocks are inadequate without saying what is adequate.

Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae what was meant by an inadequate retaliatory capability.

Dr. McRae noted that U.S. forces were concentrated in small areas in Europe such as air bases, they had no protective clothing, no decontamination equipment, no safe transportation between buildings and their aircraft, etc. An attack by lethal CW could take out our attack air forces. He mentioned that a retaliatory capability would involve more than stocks.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could distinguish between retaliation and deterrence—could we deprive an attack of its effectiveness? If we should retain a deterrent/retaliatory capability, we would need a definition of what is needed. He thought the principals might call for a study of precisely what is required for retaliation.

Mr. Lindjord asked how far away we are from development of binary agents.

Admiral Vannoy thought it would be 1974 or later.

Mr. Pedersen noted that the IPMG paper stated that the Soviets have larger stocks than we have.

Mr. Proctor noted the CIA revision of the paragraph on information about the Soviet CW program<sup>11</sup> which qualifies our ability to estimate the size of Soviet stocks.

Mr. Pedersen thought, however, that the net impression of the paper was that the Soviets have larger stocks.

Mr. Proctor agreed that the stocks in Warsaw Pact countries are larger than those of NATO countries, but said we did not know how much larger.

Dr. McRae thought this was not too relevant in determining policy.

Mr. Proctor agreed.

Admiral Vannoy thought it was relevant, however, if we were to have a retaliatory/deterrent capability.

Mr. Pedersen also thought it was relevant in the no first-use context—if the enemy is far ahead of us this is all the more reason for no first-use.

Mr. Kissinger said a sensible definition of a CW retaliatory capability would have to include some reference to nuclear weapons. He thought it inconceivable that we would rely on CW if we were attacked in Western Europe.

Mr. Proctor said that Soviet exercises clearly combined CW and nuclear elements with the ratio of CW to tactical nuclear weapons going down in recent years. He thought this could be attributed to the greater availability of tactical nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger asked if CIA had an estimate of Soviet capabilities? Mr. Proctor referred to an NIE of February 1969.<sup>12</sup> (This paper was later identified by the staff as having been partially overtaken by a re-examination within the intelligence community of the validity of the evidence on which it was based.)

Mr. Furnas said ACDA would place more emphasis on the development of binary agents—they would retain a lethal capability until

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<sup>11</sup>Not further identified and not found.

<sup>12</sup> NIE 11-11-69 is Document 94.

we see about the development of binaries and until we can see the future of arms control efforts.

Mr. Kissinger concluded that the CW issues were fairly clearly stated for NSC consideration, and moved to the next question of *stockpiles overseas*. He noted that, with the withdrawal of stocks from Okinawa, we maintain stocks only in Germany and asked why.

Admiral Vannoy replied that one needed the deterrent in close proximity to where one intended to use it.

Mr. Kissinger asked how we would deliver it.

Admiral Vannoy replied by tactical air, missiles or artillery. In response to a question, he said that our airlift capacity would be over-committed in the first 15 days of any difficulty.

Mr. Kissinger said that, if we had no stocks in Germany, we would be faced with the question of introducing chemical weapons into the country and that any such introduction would probably be too late to do any good.

Mr. Spiers commented that it would take 15 days to bring in even an initial supply, but would take 75 days to acquire the capacity for any sustained use.

Some estimates were that the Soviets planned to hit the French border within two weeks to overcome any NATO use of nuclear or chemical weapons, so 75 days was much too late to be starting a sustained operation of CW retaliation.

Mr. Kissinger said we could bring them in as a crisis approaches, but would then be susceptible to the charge that we had intensified the crisis by bringing them in. Why could we not bring such stocks in during a quiet period. Is domestic pressure an argument?

Mr. Spiers said we should tell the new German government that we have CW stockpiles in Germany, ask them if this is a problem for them, and, if so, bring it back.

Mr. Kissinger asked why go to the Germans?

Mr. Spiers thought we should ask them to focus on the question before it becomes a major issue.

Mr. Kissinger asked, if CW stocks are necessary in Germany, why raise it with the Germans?

Mr. Spiers thought we needed to explain to them the rationale, brief the new government on what is there and get their reaction.

Mr. Kissinger thought it would present Brandt<sup>13</sup> with a very tough question if we asked for approval. If we are willing to take these supplies out, well and good. If we are unwilling, we should look very carefully at the question of reopening the question with the Germans.

Mr. Spiers commented that, if it should become a major issue, he thought the State Department would argue that the stocks in Germany wouldn't be worth a major confrontation.

Mr. Kissinger said that if the Germans did not already know we had CW stocks in Germany, it would be all right to brief them. But they do know about these stocks and he saw no reason to reopen the question. He thought the German government was already overloaded with domestic issues. At least he thought the White House should have a crack at any decision in this area.

Mr. Spiers agreed, saying that the Secretary had not yet been consulted and may not agree with the recommendation for briefing the new German Government.

Mr. Kissinger thought this issue might be included in the paper. If we don't care about retaining the stocks in Germany, it is okay to raise the question. State should lay out the arguments for and against briefing the Germans and let the principals decide.

Mr. Spiers agreed to do so.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would take the weapons out of Germany if they asked us to or do we prefer to keep them in? If we choose to retain a retaliatory CW capability, he assumed we would want to keep them there. Is talking to the Germans the best way to keep them there?

Mr. Spiers thought it might be better to raise the question now than to run the risk that it might become a major issue and that we would then have to retreat under pressure.

Mr. Kissinger thought it unlikely that the Germans would make this a political issue. If not, why embarrass Brandt by asking him about it?

Mr. Nutter asked where we would put these stocks if we should remove them from Germany.

Portugal, Spain and the UK were suggested.

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<sup>13</sup> Willy Brandt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from October 22, 1969.

Mr. Pedersen asked whether there was a good argument for keeping stocks overseas if we were agreed on a no-first-use policy.

Mr. Nutter replied that NATO wants a retaliatory capability. Mr. Cargo asked if any of our allies has any CW capability.

The British government had abandoned its offensive CW capability in 1957. It is less clear whether France had a significant operational capability, but it is said to have produced nerve agents in the 1960s. Germany of course was prohibited from having chemical weapons. No other NATO country had an offensive CB warfare effort in the 1960s.

Mr. Spiers replied that there is some cooperative R&D for defensive purposes with the UK and the Germans.

Mr. Cargo asked if we could soak up anything from our allies to contribute to a retaliatory capability.

Admiral Vannoy thought we could get nothing useful from our NATO allies.

The Foreign Relations version of this transcript omitted the following discussion of the U.S. position regarding the Geneva Protocol and tear gas. It is a fascinating discussion that bears reading, if not just for the back and forth between the participants.

Mr. Kissinger moved to the question of the Geneva Protocol specifically as it relates to tear gas, and asked if we could adhere to the protocol if we decide on a first-use policy for tear gas.

Mr. Spiers noted that Defense lawyers say we can, while State Department lawyers say we can't. Ratification of the Geneva Protocol would mean that we could not use lethal agents. The State Department lawyers say that the Protocol also prohibits the use of incapacitants, but Defense says no. State's lawyers say we can only use tear gas for humanitarian purposes – i.e., where no lethal weapons are also employed. The non-legal side of State does not agree. They believe we could ratify

the Protocol with a net political advantage if we retained the right of unrestricted use of tear gas.

Mr. Kissinger asked if ratification of the Geneva Protocol would not force us into a declaratory policy. If we ratified without some statement, would not the use of incaps and probably tear gas be prohibited.

Mr. Spiers noted that some nations who had ratified the Protocol were using tear gas – specifically Australia and Thailand were using it in Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger saw two conclusions: either the Geneva Protocol doesn't mean anything or it doesn't apply to tear gas.

Mr. Pedersen noted again that was not the legal view.

Mr. Kissinger asked how that squared with the Australian and Thai position.

Mr. Spiers replied that it doesn't. The lawyers say we are bound by the principles and objectives of the Protocol and that the use of tear gas in Vietnam is illegal. The Administration should clarify this question. We could ratify the Protocol with a reservation on the humanitarian use of tear gas and tailor our policy in Vietnam accordingly.

Mr. Pedersen noted that our defense of the use of tear gas in the General Assembly discussion on Vietnam has been based on humanitarian use.

Admiral Vannoy asked if humanitarian use might not include saving the lives of U.S. soldiers.

Mr. Kissinger remarked that humanitarian considerations usually referred to the victim.

Mr. Spiers thought it distasteful to refer to humanitarian uses.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, saying it is hypocritical. He asked whether there were other issues concerning ratification of Protocol other than those relating to tear gas. He thought there were three issues: 1) should we ratify the Protocol? 2) if we ratified, should we reserve our position on incaps or tear gas? 3) if we ratified, should we not enter a reservation but simply assume the freedom to use tear gas.

(3: 20 p. m. Mr. Loomis returned to the meeting)

Mr. Spiers noted the legal arguments but said this has to be a political decision.

Mr. Kissinger thought we should ask the question with regard to tear gas and riot control agents, then ask if there are other reasons why we should not ratify the Protocol.

Mr. Loomis raised the specific question of their use in Vietnam.

Mr. Spiers said if we ratify the Protocol without a reservation, then we would be agreeing not to use it.

Mr. Loomis cited the Australian and Thai use in Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could have an internal reservation without going public. All agreed that we could not.

Mr. Pedersen asked if we would accept a restriction on tear gas for certain purposes or for all purposes.

Mr. Furnas asked if there were a military necessity for using it.

Mr. Kissinger thought this should be included under the pros and cons.

Mr. Cargo thought if we ratified the Protocol it would require some sort of reservation on first use.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the paper be redone to take these considerations into account.

Mr. Spiers recapped the issues to be added in a redo of the paper: 1) a clarification of the distinction between offensive and defensive R&D; 2) the arguments for and against briefing the German Government on deployment of CW stocks in Germany; 3) a specific policy issue on the UK draft convention on B W; and 4) a definition of an adequate CW retaliatory capability.

Dr. McRae asked if it would require a Presidential decision to use tear gas for conflicts other than Vietnam.

Admiral Vannoy said this was not included in the paper since President Johnson had specifically authorized the use of tear gas in Vietnam.

Mr. Spiers agreed that there was a question as to whether it would require authorization by a new administration for use of tear gas in situations other than Vietnam.

There was general discussion of the timing of an NSC meeting on this subject and it was agreed that November 19 was the earliest date on which a meeting could be scheduled.

This document is identified as document 99 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

**Paper by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in Response to NSSM 59<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 10, 1969

US POLICIES ON CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE  
AND AGENTS

[Omitted here are the first 22 pages of the paper comprising an Introduction and Part I, which contains background information on Soviet CBW capabilities, current United States policy, United States CBW capabilities, and international arms control initiatives.]

Part II: CW AND BW Policy Issues

Introduction

Before the nature, scope and direction of a coherent US policy for CW and BW can be decided upon, several underlying issues should be addressed and resolved. These issues fall into three categories.

The first two categories deal with CW and BW programs respectively, for policy will indeed be concerned with the objectives, scope and nature of future programs. The third category deals with a set of issues concerning the public and international posture of the US on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969. Top Secret. The NSC Secretariat sent the paper to NSC members for their consideration prior to the November 18 NSC meeting. The paper, according to the covering memorandum, had been revised following the NSC Review Group meeting on October 30. (Ibid.) See Document 97. The portions of the paper omitted here are published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972, Document 156. NSSM 59 is Document 95.

CW and BW issues. This involves legal issues, arms control policy, and US positions in international conferences and negotiations.

Before examining the various policy issues, over which there is disagreement, a few areas of agreement deserve mention.

*First*, there is need for a continuing US RDT&E program to improve defenses and guard against technological surprise. Indeed, there is a consensus that, regardless of decisions on the following issues, there should be more emphasis upon defensive measures and programs.

*Second*, the US should continue to work on, develop and improve controls and safety measures in all chemical and biological programs.

*Third*, a requirement exists for more definitive intelligence on other nations' CBW capabilities.

*Fourth*, Declaratory policy with respect to lethal chemicals and lethal biological agents is and should continue to be "no first use."

*Fifth*, no agents except RCA's and/or herbicides can be used except with Presidential approval.

Finally, to try to keep public opinion problems manageable, public affairs policy should be planned and implemented on an inter-agency basis in close integration with substantive policy.

### *I. BW Policy Issues<sup>2</sup>*

#### *A. Should the US maintain a lethal biological capability?*

##### *Pros:*

1. Maintenance of such a capability could contribute to deterring the use of such agents by others.

2. Without any production capability and delivery means for lethal agents, the United States would not be able to reconstitute such a capability within likely warning times.

3. Retains an option for the United States at very little additional cost as a hedge against possible technological surprise or as a strategic option.

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<sup>2</sup> Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. [Footnote in the original.]

*Cons:*

1. Control of the area of effect of known BW agents is uncertain.<sup>3</sup>
2. A lethal BW capability does not appear necessary to deter strategic use of lethal BW.
3. Limits our flexibility in supporting arms control arrangements.

B. *Should the US maintain a capability for use of incapacitating biologicals? (We now have two biological incapacitants in stock.)*

These incapacitants were probably *Brucellosis* bacteria and SEB toxin.

*Pros:*

1. From a military standpoint, incapacitating biologicals might be an effective method of preparing for an amphibious invasion, disrupting rear-echelon military operations, or of neutralizing pockets of enemy forces.
2. Biological incapacitants could provide in some circumstances a method of capturing particular targets or areas which might be more humane than conventional weapons.
3. Without a production facility in being at the present state of readiness, it would take approximately 2–3 years, starting from scratch, to produce biological agents in militarily significant quantities.
4. Maintains the only existing US incapacitant capability for those situations where incapacitation over a period of several days is desirable.

*Cons:*

1. Biological incapacitants have a questionable deterrent or retaliatory value.
2. First-use of incapacitating biologicals would be construed by most nations, including most US Allies, to be contrary to international law and the Geneva Protocol.
3. An enemy may perceive no clear-cut distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents under wartime conditions.

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<sup>3</sup> Although BW agents do require large safety zones, their controllability under other than a strategic attack is possible, based on results of testing to date. [Footnote in the original.]

*C. Should the US maintain only an RDT&E program?*

There are really two sub-issues here: (1) should the U.S. restrict its program to RDT&E for defensive purposes only or (2) should the U.S. conduct both offensive and defensive RDT&E? While it is agreed that even RDT&E for defensive purposes only would require some offensive R&D, it is also agreed that there is a distinction between the two issues. A defensive purposes only R&D program would emphasize basic and exploratory research on all aspects of BW, warning devices, medical treatment and prophylaxis. RDT&E for offensive purposes would emphasize work on mass production and weaponization and would include standardization of new weapons and agents. If a decision were made to continue an RDT&E program for defensive purposes only, it would be necessary to review the necessity for retaining existing production facilities.

*(1) —in the offensive and defensive areas?*

*Pros:*

1. Minimizes risks of technological surprise.
2. Provides knowledge and capability for physical and medical defensive measures.
3. Retains a relatively short lead time for response to new threats (depending on level of RDT&E effort).

*Cons:*

1. Could be construed as preparation to use biological agents in war.
2. Would degrade US capability for response in kind.
3. Would reduce US response options.

*(2) —in the defensive area only? (Maintenance of a defensive RDT&E program inherently requires some offensive RDT&E effort.)*

*Pros:*

1. Would provide some knowledge, although less than with the preceding option.
2. Would result in a more economical program.
3. Could not be construed as preparation for use in war.

*Cons:*

1. Would, as compared with (1) above, further degrade US capability to employ biological agents.

2. Could require disposal of certain material and facilities and loss of expertise.

3. Would increase the hazard of technological surprise.

[Omitted here is Part II, Section D, which deals with the question of whether the United States should support the draft convention prohibiting biological warfare introduced by July 10 by the United Kingdom at the ENDC in Geneva.]

## *II. CW Policy Issues<sup>4</sup>*

*A. Should the US maintain a capability to retaliate with lethal chemical agents? (There is no consensus on what constitutes adequate retaliatory capability.)*

### *Pros:*

1. The principal argument in favor of the development and stockpiling of lethal chemical agents is that such a capability is needed to deter possible use against US or allied forces by others in war.

2. Reliance on nuclear weapons as the sole deterrent against CW would deny to the decision-maker the lethal chemical option in retaliation, in the event US or allied forces were subject to a CW attack. Depending on the military capabilities of the enemy, an expanded conventional response could be inadequate and a nuclear response could prove too escalatory.

3. A response in kind would force an enemy to operate under the same cumbersome operational constraints (protective clothing, movement limitation and limited logistics) which would be imposed on our forces.

4. If the US were unilaterally to eliminate its lethal CW capability, this would remove a major bargaining lever for obtaining sound and effective arms control measures.

### *Cons:*

1. The principal argument against the development and stockpiling of a lethal chemical capability is that other military means, including a

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<sup>4</sup> Relevant legal arguments are discussed in Section III E. [Footnote in the original.]

whole range of nuclear weapons, are sufficient to deter the use of lethal chemicals.

2. The deterrent threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons against a CW attack could be more credible if the US were to eliminate its CW capability.

*B. Should the US destroy or detoxify its stockpiles of mustard [gas]? (All stocks of phosgene have been disposed of.)*

*Pros:*

1. Mustard is an obsolete World War I type gas which has considerably less military utility than modern nerve agents.

2. An announcement that we planned to dispose of these stocks would help to demonstrate US interest in controlling lethal chemical munitions and thus might have some political value.

*Cons:*

Would remove about 40% of existing lethal chemical artillery capability which although not as desirable as nerve agents do have a proven casualty producing capability. For these reasons, destruction is not appropriate until binary agents are available.

*C. Should the US continue to maintain stockpiles of Chemical munitions overseas (1) in Europe, and (2) in the Pacific? (European stockpile is only in Germany)*

*Pros:*

1. Stockpiles in close proximity to where they may be used are necessary for deterrence and for a timely and adequate response. Current stocks in Europe represent only 8–10 days of combat usage and in Asia about 15 days.

2. Not to continue to maintain chemical munitions overseas would impose a delay of at least 14 days for initial response and up to 75–90 days for sustained operations.

3. If stockpiles are not established during peacetime, it might be provocative to attempt to reinforce chemical stocks quickly in a crisis.

*Cons:*

1. Present stocks do not provide a significant operational capability; the expansion of overseas stocks necessary to create such a capability could involve increased political problems for the US.

2. Even maintaining present stockpiles of lethal chemical agents on foreign territory could become a source of political friction with the host country.

*D. Should the US consult with the FRG concerning the US CW stockpile in Germany?*

*Pro:*

Early discussion would help to remove a possible irritant in relations before it developed into a major issue.

*Con:*

If the US decides to retain these stocks, raising the issue could unnecessarily jeopardize this objective and place the FRG in an awkward position.

*E. Should the US preserve a first-use option for incapacitating chemicals?<sup>5</sup>*

*Pros:*

1. Successful development of an effective incapacitating agent could provide a capability to gain a military advantage, but with fewer casualties than is possible through the use of conventional, lethal chemical, or nuclear weapons.

2. Because they are non-lethal it may be possible to make these agents acceptable in world public opinion as being more humane than conventional or nuclear weapons.

3. Eliminating a first-use option without compensating political or military gains may unnecessarily deprive the US of a means of engaging in armed conflicts with resultant fewer casualties than in conventional war.

*Cons:*

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<sup>5</sup> The US currently does not have an effective operational incapacitating chemical capability. [Footnote in the original.]

1. First-use of incapacitating chemicals would probably be construed by most nations, including some US allies, to contravene international law and the Geneva Protocol and to be contrary to past expressions of US policy.<sup>6</sup>

2. First-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemical or biological warfare (if the enemy force had the capability) since the enemy might well not acknowledge any distinction between incapacitating and lethal agents.

3. First-use of incapacitating chemicals could lead to a loosening of international constraints on CW and BW, make effective arms control measures more difficult and probably bring the US considerable international and domestic criticism.

F. *Should the US maintain an option for unrestricted use of RCA's in warfare, and continue practicing this option in Vietnam?* (The discussion below excludes peacetime use by US forces for crowd control and base security which is not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol or international law generally.)

*Pros:*

1. In many military situations, use of RCA can contribute to military effectiveness; reduce US, civilian and enemy casualties and fatalities; decrease the destruction of civilian housing and public facilities; increase the possibilities of the capture of PWs; and impede enemy avenues of approach.

*Cons:*

1. The use of tear gases in combat situations could blur the "no first-use" doctrine and ultimately contribute to a lowering of barriers against use and proliferation of CW capabilities in general.

2. Use of tear gases in Vietnam as an adjunct to lethal weapons may be construed by some to be contrary to past US official statements on use of tear gases in Vietnam.

3. The use of tear gases in war (even if limited to humanitarian purposes) has been considered by many nations to be contrary to

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<sup>6</sup> DOD does not believe such would contravene international law. [Footnote in the original.]

customary international law and by most to be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol.

G. If the US maintains an option for the use of tear gas in war, should it be limited to “humanitarian purposes”?<sup>7</sup>

*Pros:*

1. Would permit the US to ratify the Geneva Protocol with a public interpretation that would create a minimum of international opposition.

2. Wartime use would be allowed in much the same way as riot control agents are used in time of peace, allowing for broader use than most restrictive interpretations of the Geneva Protocol would permit.

3. Maintaining this option would help us to explain our use of tear gas in Vietnam as consistent with our interpretation of the Geneva Protocol.

*Cons:*

1. If accepted, the military might well have to be restricted to use of tear gas in wartime to crowd control and base security which would deprive the military commander of the most useful military applications of tear gas.

2. Implementation of this principle would cast doubt on the legality of our present use of tear gas in Vietnam.

3. “Humanitarian purposes” is a term difficult to define conclusively and field commanders and others would be constantly beset by doubts about particular proposals to use tear gas, especially if its use would save the lives of their own troops, perhaps at the possible expense of the lives of the enemy.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> “Humanitarian purposes” has never been clearly defined. By way of illustration, however, the use of tear gas in Vietnam would be authorized where civilians and enemy forces were thought to be intermingled and the purpose of using tear gas was to save civilian lives. Tear gas would not be authorized where the primary purpose was to deny enemy troops cover or concealment and make conventional weapons such as artillery or airstrikes more effective. OSD/JCS believe that no “humanitarian purpose” doctrine on the use of weapons exists. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>8</sup> ACDA believes that workable rules of engagement could be issued which, at a minimum, prohibited use of RCA’s in conjunction with conventional weapons such as artillery or air strikes to facilitate killing of enemy troops. OSD/JCS disagrees. [Footnote in the original.]

H. *Should the US retain a policy permitting first-use of chemical herbicides?* (There is agreement that use of herbicides as a defoliant is not contrary to international law and is less likely to have international repercussions than use against crops. Thus the main issue centers on anti-crop use. Some believe that further research is required at least on possible long-term ecological effects of herbicides, and on such effects on human embryos as has led to the recent reaffirmation and extension of the policy banning the use of Agent 2, 4, 5 T in populated areas of CONUS and in Vietnam.)

*Pros:*

1. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to clear the sides of roads, canals and river and around encampments, thereby reducing the possibility of enemy ambush and concealment, and providing more protection to US and SVN forces.
2. Herbicides have been used effectively in Vietnam to destroy crops, thereby making it more difficult for the enemy to secure food supplies.

*Cons:*

1. The use of herbicides in an anti-crop role blurs a “no first-use” doctrine.
2. If the US continues to take the position that these agents are excluded from a “no first-use” policy, it could make international control of CW more difficult.
3. It is difficult to determine that crops are solely for the consumption of the armed forces which is the sole target sanctioned by international law.

I. *Should the use in war of all chemical and biological agents, including tear gas (riot control agents) and/or herbicides, require Presidential authorization?*

*Pro:*

The political implications of the unrestricted use of tear gas and/or herbicides in war could be of such magnitude that it would be unwise to have them introduced without Presidential authority.

*Cons:*

1. These non-lethal weapons should not be singled out of the US arsenal for special authorization.
2. This type decision should be pre-delegated in order for adequate planning and logistics support, if RCA is to be used.

This document is identified as document 102 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

**Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 17, 1969

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on CBW, November 18

The NSC meeting is intended to consider the basis U.S. policy issues relating to Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW).

The objective of the meeting is to establish a policy framework for future CBW programs which will be consistent with both national security and arms control objectives. Because the subject of CBW is highly complex, it will be possible during the meeting to address only the key issues. Your decisions on these issues, however, will provide the policy direction for the groups of sub-issues.

There is consensus on a number of policy aspects of CBW. All agree that there is need for:

- Continuing research and development, with emphasis on defense.
- Refinement of controls and safety measures.
- Better intelligence on other nations' CBW capabilities.
- Doctrinal reliance on a "no first-use" policy for lethal chemical and biological weapons.
- A closely coordinated public affairs policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969. Top Secret.

Attached and tabbed are:

—*Your talking points*, which will introduce the subject and structure the discussion. Briefings are called for by Mr. Helms and General Wheeler. I would propose to lead the discussion centering about the key issues. When I complete my outline of the issues, I suggest that you call on appropriate participants at the meeting for their views. Your talking points proceed in this way.<sup>2</sup>

—An “*Issues for Decision*” paper which includes my recommendation on each of the issues.

You need to read only your talking points and the “*Issues for Decision*” paper. Additional background material is enclosed in a separate background book.<sup>3</sup>

Briefly summarized, the topics for discussion are:

*1. Policy on Biological Weapons*

*Specific Issues for Decision*

a. Should we retain a capability for combat use of lethal or incapacitating biological weapons? If not, what should be the extent of research and development on biological weapons?

b. Can we or should we support the UK Draft Convention which would prohibit development, production and use of biological weapons?

*2. Policy on Chemical Weapons*

*Specific Issues for Decision*

a. Should we retain a capability for use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons or should we confine our chemical programs to research and development?

b. If we wish to retain a lethal chemical capability should we maintain stockpiles overseas?

c. If we wish to retain an incapacitating chemical capability should the “no first-use” policy apply to them as well as to lethal chemicals?

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<sup>2</sup> Nixon’s talking points, prepared by the NSC Staff, are attached but not printed

<sup>3</sup> In addition to the President’s talking points and “*Issues for Decision*,” the enclosed additional background materials included such documents as NIE 11–11–69, NSSM 59, and the final version of the IPMG’s response to that NSSM dated November 10. See Documents 94, 95, and 99.

3. *Policy on Tear Gas and our Position Toward the Geneva Protocol*

*Specific Issues for Decision*

- a. Do we wish to continue unrestricted use of tear gas in Vietnam and to keep this option open for the future?
- b. Do we wish to ratify the Geneva Protocol which bans first use of chemical and biological weapons?
- c. If so, are we willing to include incapacitating agents and tear gas within the strictures of the protocol or can we interpret the protocol to exclude them?

4. *Policy on Authorization for Use of Tear Gas and Herbicides*

*Specific Issues for Decision*

- a. Should Presidential authorization be required for the use of tear gas and herbicides outside of Vietnam as it is for all other chemical and biological weapons?
- b. If not, to what level should the authority be delegated?

**Tab**

ISSUES FOR DECISION

There are four principal policy issues for decision. Each major issue subsumes an additional number of specific questions.

Policy on Biological Warfare (BW)

There are two questions to be decided.

A. *What should be the nature and scope of U.S. policy on biological warfare?* There are four options:

1. Retain a Full Capability Including Both Lethal and Incapacitating Biological Weapons.
2. Retain a Capability for Incapacitating Weapons Only.
3. Research and Development Program Only, *but* for both Offensive and Defensive Purposes.
4. Research and Development Program for Defensive Purposes Only and to Protect against Technological surprise.

—Some argue that we should retain a full BW capability because (1) a *lethal BW* capability helps deter BW attack and gives us another

strategic option; (2) because it would take considerable time to reconstitute stockpiles and delivery means; and (3) because *biological incapacitants*—the only effective incapacitating capability we maintain—could be useful in military operations such as amphibious invasion.

—Others argue that we should maintain a research and development program only because (1) our nuclear deterrent serves to deter strategic use of lethal BW; (2) the control and effectiveness of BW weapons are uncertain as are the deterrent or retaliatory value of incapacitants; (3) though they could possibly be useful in a “first-use” situation, such use could risk escalation and would be considered by most nations to be contrary to the international law; and (4) a research and development program would protect against technological surprise.

All agencies, except the Joint Chiefs, support Option 4.

*Recommendation:* That you approve Option 4, (research and development for defensive purposes) to include only enough offensive research and development to protect against technological surprise.

*B. Should the U.S. support the U.K. Draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Warfare?* There are three options:

1. Defer any decision.
2. Associate *in principle* only.
3. Do not support.

—If our BW policy is to concentrate on research and development for defensive purposes (Option 4) we can support the Convention. Under any other policy we would have to oppose it or seek major modifications. The Convention provides for no on-site verification, but relies on procedures for investigation of treaty violations by agencies under UN auspices. Also, its relation to other CBW arms control proposals is unclear. No one argues that we should agree to the Convention as it stands.

—Some argue that we should associate in principle (1) to evidence our willingness to consider limitations on biological warfare, particularly if we maintain a research and development program only, and (2) because

we could gain political benefits without tying our hands until questions such as scope of the Convention and suitable verification procedures were resolved.

—Others contend that there is no urgency to consider the Convention and that any association with it might weaken our opposition to unverifiable provisions in other arms control proposals.

*Recommendation:* That you approve Option 2 (Association in Principle) subject to the satisfactory resolution of such questions as verification procedures and the relation of the U.K. Draft Convention to other arms control measures.

## II. Chemical Warfare (CW) Policy Issues

There are three basic issues.

*A. Should we maintain a lethal chemical capability and if so where and at what level should we maintain stocks?* There are two options:

1. Maintain lethal chemical stockpiles for deterrence or retaliation:
  - a. In the U.S. only.
  - b. In the U.S. and overseas.
2. Rely on Research and Development only.

—Some argue that we need lethal chemicals (1) to deter chemical attack, and (2) as a retaliatory option between a conventional response (which might be inadequate) and escalation to nuclear response. They also argue (1) that unilateral elimination of this capability would give up a valuable bargaining counter in arms control discussions and, (2) that so long as we maintain our declaratory policy of “no-first-use” the international political costs of retaining the capability are not excessive. They contend that stocks should be maintained overseas (particularly in Germany) to assure the capability for timely response and because, were they to be removed, attempts to replace them in a crisis could be both difficult and provocative. The JCS also believe that existing stocks of mustard gas should be retained until improved agents are developed because they represent a large portion of existing casualty producing chemical stocks.

—Others argue that (1) our tactical nuclear capability makes lethal chemicals unnecessary as a deterrent, and (2) that existence of the chemical capability may encourage chemical attack because the threshold of response appears lower to the enemy. They believe that an offensive and

defensive research and development program would guard against technological surprise and the improvement of defensive measures could lessen the likelihood of chemical attack because of inevitable enemy uncertainty about the true extent of our CW capabilities. They contend that, in any event, we should not retain stocks overseas because

(1) existing stocks are too small for an adequate response and to increase them would cause political problems with our allies; (2) needed chemical support to theaters of operation can be provided from the United States quickly; and (3) continued presence of these stocks, particularly in Germany, could become a source of friction. They argue further that mustard gas is far less effective than our other chemical weapons and that its destruction would yield political benefit. The Secretary of Defense favors destruction of mustard gas.

*Recommendation:* That you approve retention of a lethal chemical capability and retention of the stocks in Germany (Option 1-b). That you also approve the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to destroy or detoxify the stocks of mustard gas, but in a phased manner to assure an adequate capability while the development of safer weapons is in progress.

*B. Should the U.S. "no first-use" policy on lethal chemicals apply also to incapacitating chemicals?* Two options:

1. Affirm that the U.S. policy of "no first-use" applies also to incapacitants.

2. Exclude incapacitants from a "no first-use" policy.

—All agencies support our declaratory policy of "no first-use" for lethal chemicals but there are differing views as to whether it should apply to incapacitants. The incapacitant we now have is not an operationally effective agent because of its uncertain effects, but research is continuing with some promise of development.

—The proponents of including incapacitants in the policy argue that (1) their deterrent or retaliatory value is questionable, and their principal utility would be in a "first-use" situation against an unprotected enemy; and (2) that most nations would see such use contrary to the Geneva Protocol, international law and past expressions of U.S. policy. They argue also that first-use could lead to escalation to lethal chemicals, and loosen international constraints on chemical warfare.

—The opponents argue that an effective agent, if developed, could give military advantage in a variety of situations with fewer casualties and might be accepted internationally as more “humane” than other weapons.

—The JCS position is uncertain but they probably favor retaining a “first-use” option. The Secretary of Defense may, and all other agencies will, support including incapacitants in our no “first-use” policy.

*Recommendation:* That you approve a “no first-use” policy for incapacitants with the understanding that this does not preclude continued research and development toward an effective agent.

[Omitted here are Sections III and IV, which discuss the use of tear gas and/or herbicides in Vietnam and the Geneva Protocol. On agreements to control the development and use of chemical and biological weapons, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972.]

This document is identified as document 103 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## Minutes of National Security Council Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 18, 1969

Minutes of NSC Meeting on Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare

### PARTICIPANTS

The President [Richard Nixon]  
Vice President [Spiro] Agnew  
Secretary of State [William] Rogers  
Secretary of Defense [Melvin] Laird  
Attorney General [John] Mitchell  
General Earle Wheeler, Chairman, JCS  
Director of Intelligence [Richard] Helms  
U.S. Representative to the U.N. [Charles] Yost  
Assistant to the President [Henry] Kissinger  
Under Secretary of State [Elliot] Richardson  
Lee DuBridge, Science Advisor to the President  
Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA  
Ronald J. Spiers, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department  
of State  
William Watts, NSC  
Michael Guhin, NSC

RN—This is a difficult and unpleasant subject about which we have little real knowledge.

Helms—(Director Helms briefing is attached.)<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-109, NSC Meetings Minutes, 1969. Top Secret. The meeting was held from 3:44 to 5:27 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>2</sup> According to a talking paper prepared one day in advance of the NSC meeting, Helms

RN—I hope we know more about ours than about theirs.

Wheeler—At the end of World War II, we captured a great deal in the way of German shells and stockpiles.

There is an apocryphal story that the Germans planned to use (chemical warfare) against the Normandy landing. It is apocryphal because the German General Staff ignored orders.

The main use to us of Chemical Warfare is as a deterrent. I am inclined to think that the Soviets' capability is greater than ours, since ours is so small. They can resupply quickly by land to Europe or Asia.

They do show plans to use them. They have experimented with decontaminants.

If the enemy used chemical warfare and the U.S. lacked defenses, the advantage would accrue to the enemy.

Historically, the use of chemicals has never been initiated against a nation which had them. The Italians used them against Somalia, and the Egyptians used them in Yemen.

If we had no retaliatory equipment, we would have to be prepared all the way along the front. If both had such equipment then neither would have the advantage.

I therefore conclude that we should have a modest deterrent capability. Chemical warfare has many uses:

- Attrition
- in actions smaller than nuclear exchanges
- to give credibility
- for long-lasting effect

We must deploy our stocks forward; we can't move them rapidly in time of crisis.

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planned to begin his briefing by announcing, "Our knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions regarding biological and chemical warfare is very limited." Moreover, he acknowledged "a considerable controversy at present in the intelligence community over the size of the Soviet stockpile of chemical warfare weapons." The intelligence community did know a bit more about two things: Soviet defenses, which were "active," and Soviet doctrine, which regarded chemical and biological weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" to be used in retaliation within the context of general nuclear warfare. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-25, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969)

There are chemical incapacitants which we don't have in large enough quantity. They have five too many.

With regard to our biological warfare program, its major value is deterrence. If this fails, then we have a modest ability to retaliate. Our stockpiles are in terms of pounds, not tons.

We don't know what the Soviets have, but they are interested.

If the enemy uses BW, we must take a massive conventional or nuclear response. A nuclear response means the risk of nuclear escalation. The psychological impact would be high. Our BW program is the only free-world program. Eighty percent of our program is RDT&E. It costs \$7 million a year for agents and delivery systems.

Our facility at Pine Bluff can go into production in 30 days. If it were closed, it would take two to three years to reactivate.

The JCS believes that, on balance, it has a low cost, that it would be a catastrophe if we can't respond, and there is a difficulty in verifying enemy capabilities. Therefore, the JCS believes that we must retain our present stockpile and the options of production if needed.

With regard to riot control agents, these are primarily tear gas. They reduce casualties. They assist in withdrawal and breaking off contact. They can reduce the fire aimed at helicopters. They can be used to deny the enemy avenues of approach.

Herbicides improve vertical and horizontal visibility and help reduce ambushes.

Kissinger—(Presented the issues and options as contained in his talking points in attached NSC book.)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> According to Kissinger's undated talking points, he was advised to assert that the following was required: "Continuing research and development, with emphasis on defense, refinement of controls and safety measures, better intelligence on other nation's CBW capabilities, continuation of our declaratory 'no first-use' policy for lethal chemical and biological weapons," and "a tightly controlled public affairs policy." Kissinger was also advised to focus the NSC's attention on four basic issues for decision: policy on biological warfare, chemical warfare, the use of tear gas and herbicides, and ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. For biological weapons, the issue was retaining "full capability including lethal agents," "capability for incapacitating agents only," or "only R&D capability for both offense and defense or for defense along." For chemical weapons, the two basic policy issues were: 1) "Should we maintain a lethal chemical capability for retaliation or deterrence, and, if so, what should we do about our stockpiles in the U.S. and overseas?" 2) "Should we preserve a 'first-use' option for incapacitating

RN—Charlie (Yost), any comment?

Yost—The only action to go to the UN on the subject has been the Canadian procedural item which refers the subject back to Geneva.<sup>4</sup> There is general concern at the UN with CBW and seabeds. If we can present a generally cooperative position, then there is no immediate problem. We can go with the Canadian resolution.

Farley—We need to decide the security requirements first. It is difficult to devise an inspection scheme. We would welcome limiting our own efforts to R&D. We would then be willing to look at the UK initiative.<sup>5</sup> But we must look at verification, inspection and complaints procedures, and the question of aid to countries who claimed they were attacked.

DuBridges—There is great public interest in this subject. What is the military use? The value of a BW retaliatory capability is not clear. There is slow incubation, perhaps two weeks, and then 2 weeks to retaliate. We don't know how it spreads and we are unsure about possible epidemics.

The military retaliatory value of BW is not great. I would think it was better to go to chemical warfare than nuclear. We could be in a better situation.

The whole issue is not clear from the scientific side.

RN—The UK proposal would allow R&D for defensive purposes?

Farley—It is hard to be sure.

Rogers—The language is flexible. It could be done.

Wheeler—We don't feel as strongly about BW as about CW. We would like to see a minimal RDT&E program pointed to defense, guarding against offensive actions by the enemy.

Kissinger—On incapacitants, what we have is lethal to anyone without two nurses.

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chemicals?" (Ibid.)

<sup>4</sup> The Canadian Delegation to the United Nations submitted a draft resolution on August 26 calling for strict observance by all member states of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 7, Document 97.

It would be unlikely that we would use lethal chemical weapons in a strategic attack. Nuclear weapons would be more cost-effective. We should therefore use chemical weapons for tactical purposes.

The tear gas question concerns ratification of the Geneva Protocol. It would ban the first use of CW and BW. It is not clear about tear gas and herbicides.

Rogers—Australia has ratified without making an interpretive statement.

Wasn't the Protocol withdrawn in 1948? Would we have to resubmit it? There is Congressional pressure to resubmit it, and we could say we comply.

Yost—In 1966, the Administration called for support of the Protocol.

Kissinger—If we ratify, we must fill in the gap about the first use of incapacitants. It would be another unverifiable arms control agreement.

Rogers—It we exclude tear gas, we wouldn't have really changed our position.

Laird—This was a good study.<sup>6</sup> We should go beyond it. I must defend these programs.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Laird was referring to the NSSM 59 response, Document 99. At 7 p.m. on November 17, Laird told Kissinger: "the public affairs part of these discussions had been completely overlooked in the paper. He [Laird] said biological research is something that can be supported but biological warfare cannot be supported by anyone." Kissinger and Laird discussed the issue again at 11:55 a.m. on November 18: "Laird said the thing about it is that this paper deals with some important issues down the line—it doesn't address the basic question—what kind of weapons, strategic, or [word omitted in transcript] that have conversion capability. Laird didn't think biological warfare is a strategic weapon." Kissinger agreed, stating his view "that we should keep R&D for" defensive purposes. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

<sup>7</sup> According to Laird's talking points, Laird was advised to make numerous recommendations that, while the United States should forego offensive biological weapons, it must conduct a biological RDT&E program only for defensive purposes, retain the capability to retaliate with chemical weapons, and keep its European stockpiles of chemical munitions. (Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Weapons and Biological Research) Laird explained his supporting rationale for such forward deployments during a meeting with his staff on July 28. "The quantities overseas are very small," he said. "When we compare these quantities to the Soviet capability, it is

We are falling into a bad trap. CW and BW should not be put together. People who are against biological warfare also go against chemical warfare. But the latter is necessary for deterrence. These are two entirely different subjects. We need to clarify what CW and BW really mean.

BW does not have a deterrent quality.

We need a strategy for CW. We need a simple and understandable policy statement on it. We need a legislative and public relations game plan. This paper doesn't do that.

I believe we should renounce biological warfare, but go forward with an immunization program and research. There are communicable disease programs in Atlanta and under HEW. The scientists there can do good work.

From the standpoint of deterrence, the deterrent program is good.

We are on the verge of losing our CW capability. In the transport of phosgene gas, we do one percent and private industry does 99 percent.

RN—It is not a good paper.

Laird—Two points are particularly important: CW and BW should be separated, and a public relations and legislative game plan is not set forth.

Mitchell—There should be no prohibition of tear gas. This would be hard on our law enforcement. We need tear gas. And it makes your sinuses clearer.

Laird—It helps with the reduction of casualties in Vietnam. And not only necessarily in preparation for attack. It gets the enemy out so you can see who they are.

DuBridge—I agree with General Wheeler and Secretary Laird. CW has a deterrent effect. There is the danger of transportation. This can be lessened with binary weapons.

Laird—We are close to this.

RN—It is important to distinguish these. Also, you should move some programs to HEW and still get all the information you need. That relaxes the scientists.

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frightening.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-76-0028, June-August, 1969)

Rogers—There is not really much disagreement.<sup>8</sup> We need decisions, and we can work out a scenario. We should not delay.

Laird—We shouldn't leak this around town.

RN—The public relations aspect is very important.

Kissinger—You should reflect for a day. We can then issue an NSDM and work out the public relations and game plan.

RN—We could take a forthcoming position.

Yost—And ratify the Geneva Protocol.

RN—Does this bother you?

Rogers—We should do it with no reservation.

RN—We should approve it without reservation, but make a statement of understanding. We need tear gas and will use it.

Kissinger—We can show this in the NSDM.

RN—We should clear this with Sato.<sup>9</sup>

We have mixed CW and BW together and should get them separated.

Richardson—There is no significant international pressure for getting rid of CW stockpiles. The Protocol applied to its use.

Farley—It will go to Geneva, and then you can get it passed back to me.

RN—We can fuzz up the language. We should develop a simple statement within 48 hours. Then I want a positive public statement.<sup>10</sup> It

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<sup>8</sup> In a November 17 memorandum to Rogers and Richardson, Spiers urged them to support Laird's positions on biological and chemical weapons, including the maintenance of biological and chemical research and testing programs "for defensive purposes and to safeguard against technological surprise." Spiers also recommended that Rogers and Richardson "take the position that the US should *not* maintain an option for first-use of incapacitating chemicals." (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-NSC Meeting Files, 1969-1970: Lot 71 D 175, Box 6, NSC Meeting, November 18, 1969)

<sup>9</sup> Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan, held meetings with Nixon in Washington from November 19 to 21.

<sup>10</sup> Nixon released a statement on Tuesday, November 25, announcing his decisions on chemical and biological warfare. The United States, he stated, reaffirmed its renunciation of the first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical weapons and renounced the use of "all methods of biological warfare." Nixon announced that he had directed the Department of Defense to make plans for the disposal of existing stocks of U.S. biological weapons and that the United States henceforth would "confine its biological research to defense measures such as immunization and safety measures." Finally, he stated that his

should emphasize that this is an example of the right leadership, but which has the national security in mind.

Wheeler—The last time this was before a National Security defense panel was during President Eisenhower's Administration.

Rogers—We shouldn't do this while Sato is here.

Laird—That is no problem.

RN—I want a well thought-out statement. It should be released Sunday for the Monday papers, Bill.

DuBridge—It should say we will destroy dangerous chemicals and are moving to binaries.

Laird—We would need three years to burn them.

RN—Bryce Harlow thinks it is imperative to brief the legislature on Okinawa. Phil Farley and Henry Kissinger did this on SALT. We should do it on Okinawa.

Rogers—Yes. Alex Johnson and Henry should do it at first, and then you should come in.

RN—We must brief the Armed Services Committee. They will be against it.<sup>11</sup>

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administration would submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for ratification. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 968–969)

<sup>11</sup> Nixon hosted a breakfast meeting in the White House on November 25 for select members of Congress during which he, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Moorer, and Kissinger explained the administration's decisions on chemical and biological weapons. (National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of the Chairman, General Wheeler, 337, Meetings with President, April 1968–May 1970) After the meeting Nixon spoke to the press about his decisions. (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 969–970)

This is just a fascinating discussion of CB warfare policy at the very highest levels of office. Of particular interest, the president's intent was to support the retention and modernization of chemical weapons for deterrence purposes, while eliminating the BW program. Unfortunately, while SecDef Laird understood the importance of separating the discussions on chemical weapons from those on biological weapons, Congress and others failed to do so. As a result, progress on chemical weapons modernization was severely challenged.

This document is identified as document 104 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## National Security Decision Memorandum 35<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 25, 1969

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness  
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/  
Biological Research Program

Following consideration by the National Security Council, the President has decided that:

1. The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reference henceforth should be to the two categories separately—The Chemical Warfare Program and The Biological Research Program.

2. With respect to Chemical Warfare:

a. The objective of the U.S. program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons is reaffirmed.

c. This renunciation is hereby applied to incapacitating chemical weapons as well.

d. This renunciation does not apply to the use of riot control agents or herbicides. A special NSDM on authorization for their use will be issued.<sup>2</sup>

e. The Administration will submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925, "Protocol for the Prohibition of the use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. An appropriate interpretive statement will be prepared by the Department of State in coordination with the Department of Defense to the effect that the United States does not consider that the Protocol prohibits the use of chemical herbicides or riot control agents, widely used domestically, in war. The statement will be unilateral in form and will not be a formal reservation.

f. Existing overseas stockpiles of chemical weapons can be maintained except in Okinawa without additional consultation. If the matter is raised by the FRG, we will agree to consultations about the future of stockpiles located in Germany.

g. The Secretary of Defense, in cooperation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop and improve controls and safety measures in all Chemical Warfare programs.

h. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain surveillance of the Chemical Warfare capabilities of other states.

i. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Chemical Warfare programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.

3. With respect to Bacteriological/Biological programs:

a. The United States will renounce the use of lethal methods of bacteriological/biological warfare.

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<sup>2</sup> NSDM 78, "Authorization for Use of Riot Control Agents and Chemical Herbicides in War," issued August 11, 1970, required Presidential approval for the use of riot control agents and herbicides in war. Not printed.

b. The United States will similarly renounce the use of all other methods of bacteriological/biological warfare (for example, incapacitating agents).

c. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes (immunization, safety measures, et cetera). This does not preclude research into those offensive aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to determine what defensive measures are required.

d. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations about the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological/biological weapons.

e. The United States shall associate itself with the principles and objectives of the Draft Convention Prohibiting the Use of Biological Methods of Warfare presented by the United Kingdom at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on 26 August 1969. Recommendation as to association with specific provisions of the Draft Convention should be prepared by the Secretary of State and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in coordination with other interested agencies, for the President's consideration.

f. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, shall continue to develop controls and safety measures in all bacteriological/biological programs.

g. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall continue to maintain surveillance of the bacteriological/biological warfare capabilities of other states.

h. The Under Secretaries Committee shall conduct an annual review of United States Bacteriological/Biological Research Programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

**Richard Nixon, Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs<sup>1</sup>**

November 25, 1969

Soon after taking office I directed a comprehensive study of our chemical and biological defense policies and programs. There had been no such review in over 15 years. As a result, objectives and policies in this field were unclear and programs lacked definition and direction.

Under the auspices of the National Security Council, the Departments of State and Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of Science and Technology, the intelligence community, and other agencies worked closely together on this study for over 6 months. These Government efforts were aided by contributions from the scientific community through the President's Science Advisory Committee.

This study has now been completed and its findings carefully considered by the National Security Council. I am now reporting the decisions taken on the basis of this review.

**CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM**

As to our chemical warfare program, the United States:

- Reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons.
- Extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals. Consonant with these decisions, the administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the first use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare." The United States has long supported the principles and objectives of this Protocol. We take this step toward formal ratification to reinforce our continuing advocacy of international constraints on the use of these weapons.

**BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM**

Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. I have therefore decided that:

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<sup>1</sup> Available at <http://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/90920.pdf>.

- The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare.
- The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures.
- The Department of Defense has been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.

In the spirit of these decisions, the United States associates itself with the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom Draft Convention which would ban the use of biological methods of warfare. We will seek, however, to clarify specific provisions of the draft to assure that necessary safeguards are included.

Neither our association with the Convention nor the limiting of our program to research will leave us vulnerable to surprise by an enemy who does not observe these rational restraints. Our intelligence community will continue to watch carefully the nature and extent of the biological programs of others.

These important decisions, which have been announced today, have been taken as an initiative toward peace. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men.

**Memorandum from Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 9, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare and Biological Research – Terminology

I notice that current documents of various U.S. Government Agencies continue to refer to CBW, i.e., chemical and biological warfare. Such terminology, I believe, is seriously misleading and should be stricken from our lexicon.

The misleading aspects inherent in the term, CBW, are twofold:

- The first reason is that the term does not describe even remotely the United States program in the chemical or the biological areas. Our programs are best described as chemical warfare and biological research. The programs are so widely different in terms of (a) the strategic concept, (b) the deterrent value, (c) the tactical aspects of retaliation, and (d) the potential positive humanitarian dividends that they should be referred to separately. We do have a retaliatory chemical warfare capability, which we hope will have a deterrent capability on prospective users of chemical agents. We do not have a biological warfare capability, nor do we plan to have one. We will maintain, for defensive purposes, a biological research program.
- The second reason for reacting against the CBW terminology is that it connotes a generic interrelationship between the chemical and biological fields when, in fact, no such relationship exists. History has shown the possibility of chemical warfare. It is possible, furthermore, to conceive of biological warfare -- though, again, the United States does not have the capability and proposes

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

now to produce no capability to wage biological warfare. It is virtually impossible, however, to conceive of the circumstances in which chemical warfare and biological warfare, in a simultaneous or joint way, would be planned for and implemented.

While terminology may seem to be a minor point in some cases, this is one instance in which precise terminology is important. I would hope that in referring to the United States program the term chemical warfare and biological research would be used. I would also hope that in referring to other nations' programs, or to the general field of activity, chemical warfare and biological activities of whatever nature would be differentiated and treated separately. To do otherwise will continue to confuse the American public, our allies, our potential adversaries, and even those in our own government responsible for defense programs.

(signed)

**Melvin R. Laird**

This document is identified as document 115 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## National Security Study Memorandum 85<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 31, 1969

TO

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Office of Science and Technology  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins

As a follow-up to National Security Study Memorandum 59,<sup>2</sup> and in light of the decisions set forth in National Security Decision Memorandum 35,<sup>3</sup> the President has directed a study of all aspects of United States policy and programs with respect to toxins.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs, Nos. 43–103. Secret. Copies were sent to Helms and Wheeler.

<sup>2</sup> Document 95.

<sup>3</sup> Document 104.

<sup>4</sup> In a December 18 memorandum, Guhin informed Kissinger that “the real issue” requiring further study was as follows: “The question of the extent of the U.S. toxin program should” be decided on the basis of the toxins’ “relative utility as chemical weapons and whether or not their stockpiling contributes to national security.” Such a determination also involved the United States’ stance toward international agreements regarding chemical and biological weapons. According to Guhin, “The current toxin program is not large and there is now no production other than for R&D.” A note on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it on December 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 310, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare, Vol. 1)

The review should consist of a presentation of current and alternative United States policies and programs with respect to toxins and the pros and cons of each. It should include discussion of research and development programs and objectives, production methods, current capabilities, the military utility of toxins, and the effects upon the United States international position.

The President has directed that the NSC Interdepartmental Political-Military Group (IPMG) perform this study and that the addressees be included in the IPMG for purposes of this study.

The report of the IPMG should be forwarded to the NSC Review Group by January 16, 1970.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

This document is identified as document 122 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## Minutes of Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 29, 1970, 2:37–4 p.m.

### SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85)<sup>2</sup>

### PARTICIPATION

Chairman–Henry Kissinger	OEP Haakon Lindjord
State	
Richard F. Pedersen	USIA
William I. Cargo	Frank Shakespeare
Capt. George Birdt	
Donald McHenry	ACDA Howard Furnas
Defense	
G. Warren Nutter	OST Dr. Vincent McRae
CIA	
R. Jack Smith	NSC Staff Michael Guhin
JCS	Winston Lord
RAdm Frank W. Vannoy	Jeanne W. Davis

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group Minutes, Originals, 1970. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Document 115.

## SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

The Review Group agreed to:

1. reverse the two sentences of Option 2 and rephrase both Options 1 and 2 more permissively so as to reverse the right of production and stockpiling,<sup>3</sup>
2. draft public justifications<sup>4</sup> for each option and clear with USIA,
3. ask OST to determine how many toxic bullets are produced commercially, the method of production and if any controls are exercised on their production or sale.

(JCS and ACDA circulated proposed changes and additions to the paper at the table prior to the meeting.)

Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of a toxin.

Capt. Birdt referred to recent reports by the UN Secretary General and the World Health Organization which defined a toxin as a chemical, with the only difference between toxins and other chemical agents being that the former are also manufactured by living organisms. It is generally chemical in effect but biological in method of production.

Mr. Kissinger asked how it differs from nerve gas.

Mr. Cargo replied that nerve gas is not produced by living organisms.

Dr. McRae added that nerve gas changes the function of the organs.

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<sup>3</sup> All such references are to a 22-page paper, January 21, entitled "U.S. Policy on Toxins," prepared by the IPMG in response to NSSM 85. The IPMG paper listed three policy options. Option I was to "carry out offensive and defensive research and development programs and produce and stockpile toxins and associated delivery systems." Option II was defined as follows: "For those toxins which can be synthesized chemically, carry out a program of full research and development, production and stockpiling. For those toxins which require bacteriological intermediates for production, carry out a defensive research and development program only." Finally, Option III was to "carry out a research and development program for defensive purposes only and to protect against technological surprise." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-42, Review Group Meeting, January 29, 1970) The IPMG's January 30 paper, revised following the Review Group meeting, is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972, Document 177.

<sup>4</sup> The White House Press Secretary issued a press release on February 14 announcing the administration's policy on toxins. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970)

Mr. Kissinger asked for a definition of disease.

Dr. McRae defined disease as the introduction of foreign matter into the body.

Mr. Kissinger asked if nerve gas or mustard gas did not constitute foreign matter. He asked if the considerations were how the material was produced or the nature of its effect.

Capt. Birdt noted that nerve gas affected only the respiratory system [*sic*] and caused almost instant death, whereas a botulinus toxin would cause death in a matter of hours.

Dr. McRae agreed that the difference could be characterized by the different methods of production or by their effects. He said biological agents reproduce themselves while chemical agents do not. Therefore, toxins are chemical although certain of their characteristics resemble biological agents; for example, the body develops antibodies to toxins. He thought the basic distinction was whether or not the agent replicates; if it does not, it should be treated as a chemical.

It is amazing that a member of the Office of Science and Technology could not describe a disease as compared to a toxin or chemical agent. More amazing, given the topic of the meeting, is that the NSC staff is having this discussion and can't explain the difference.

Mr. Kissinger asked if he were right in saying that the present form of toxins are biologically produced but that their effect is more analogous to chemical agents.

Dr. McRae agreed that this was true of the toxins that we can now produce in *quantity*.

Mr. Kissinger asked if a toxin were produced chemically, would it not be difficult to distinguish between it and a chemical weapon.

Dr. McRae and Capt. Birdt agreed.

Mr. Kissinger asked for the difference between full R&D and defensive R&D in toxins.

Admiral Vannoy replied that full R&D would give us the capacity to experiment with a weapons system intended for retaliatory use; defensive R&D would not.

Mr. Kissinger asked what you could do under full R&D that you could not do under a defensive R&D program.

Admiral Vannoy said that under full R&D you could develop a toxin of a type you would propose to use. He also said full R&D could consider delivery systems and production techniques, and would vary in the amount of material produced.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we should announce a defensive R&D program, would the other side be able to tell that we are not doing full R&D?

Admiral Vannoy replied that they would not know without fairly full inspection.

Dr. McRae agreed that it would be difficult for the other side to see the distinction.

Mr. Kissinger asked, therefore, what we would accomplish by announcing a defensive R&D program. He recalled that defensive R&D in biological agents involved work on methods of immunization, etc.

Dr. McRae said that under a defensive R&D program we would not be developing delivery systems specifically for bacteriological agents or for toxins; for example, we would not have spray tanks. This, he thought, might be visible to the other side. He agreed that defensive R&D would permit all R&D short of actual engineering development—the same as the Presidential decision on bacteriological or biological agents.<sup>5</sup>

Mr. Kissinger asked what had been the practical effect of the Presidential decisions on biological weapons—were we closing down the Pine Bluff installation?

Admiral Vannoy replied that a decision had not yet been reached on Pine Bluff because that plant produced other things, such as riot control agents.

Dr. McRae said Defense and OST were examining the future of Pine Bluff. He said Pine Bluff has both chemical and biological programs and he saw no reason to maintain the biological programs. He said at Fort Detrick the research program has been reduced by approximately one-third, with a personnel cut of approximately 15 percent. He thought these were visible effects of the President's decision

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<sup>5</sup> NSDM 35, Document 104.

and that planned additional moves would make the effect even more visible.

In 1971, Pine Bluff's offensive biological weapons plant was turned over to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to create a National Center for Toxicological Research.

Mr. Kissinger asked what toxins were good for.

Admiral Vannoy replied that with regard to military utility, toxins are an intermediate weapon between biological and chemical weapons. They are better than chemical weapons in *some* ways but not as effective in other ways as biological weapons. You could cover a larger area with a smaller amount of a toxin than with other chemicals. On the negative side, however, toxins were not persistent.

Dr. McRae added toxins were not as stable as chemicals, and, because they deteriorate in sunlight, would require a heavier dose for an effect of similar duration.

Mr. Kissinger asked what we would use toxins for. He recalled that in a discussion of biological weapons it had been agreed that they were useful for offensive purposes but less useful for retaliation because of the time lag.<sup>6</sup>

Dr. McRae suggested that we separate the discussion into lethal and incapacitating toxins. He said we had one lethal toxin at present—botulinum—which he considered a poor military weapon. There is an effective toxoid which can be used to immunize troops which increases the amount required by  $10^5$ .

Admiral Vannoy agreed that Dr. McRae's comments on botulinum but thought this was not the only lethal toxin on the horizon. He thought there were others possibly with greater potential, such as shellfish poison.

Dr. McRae agreed that we do not expect to get an effective toxoid for shellfish poison and that it was more dangerous than botulinum. It can also probably be produced in significant quantities only

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 97.

synthetically. He thought, however, that masks still provide reasonably good protection.

With regard to chemical incapacitants, he considered they were of limited military utility since a mask can provide reasonably good protection. He cited their effects (high fever, faulty coordination, etc.) and compared them to food poisoning except that they were taken into the body through the nostrils. They take several hours to become effective and their effects last from six to thirty hours depending on the individual and the size of the dose.

Mr. Kissinger asked, since it was agreed that bacteriological weapons were primarily for offense, if toxins could be useful for retaliation.

Capt. Birdt commented that their incubation period was from one to six hours.

Dr. McRae added that, since masks provide good protection against toxins, they would be good primarily for first use.

Mr. Kissinger said that since we have renounced the first use of chemical weapons,<sup>7</sup> we would therefore not use toxins first. We must assume that if the other side uses toxins first, they would have masks; therefore, toxins would not be the most effective retaliatory weapon against toxins.

Dr. McRae agreed.

Admiral Vannoy commented that in the event of leakage a mask would not be as effective against toxins as against some other chemical agents, because the amount of toxin required to be dangerous is less than the amount of a chemical agent.

Mr. Kissinger commented, however, that some chemical weapons can be absorbed through the skin and that therefore masks would have no effect.

Admiral Vannoy replied that anyone using chemical weapons would be wearing decontamination suits.

Dr. McRae agreed that mask leakage would be more serious with toxins than with other chemical agents, adding that it was difficult to operate with masks on for long periods of time. He thought if a military

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 10, Document 103.

commander faced a choice of retaliating with percutaneous agents or toxins he would use the former.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it would take a smaller dose of toxins than of nerve gas.

Dr. McRae thought toxins would be better than some nerve gas but would not be better than VX for retaliation. He thought a combination of nerve gas and toxins could be best because defending troops would have to be particularly careful of mask leakage and would have to wear bulky decontamination suits.

Mr. Kissinger commented that in the earlier discussion we had covered both chemical and biological agents as first use weapons and as retaliatory weapons. We had decided, with JCS endorsement, that biologicals would not be good as strategic weapons and that nuclear weapons would be preferable. We had agreed that chemical weapons were primarily for battlefield use. He asked if the same were true of toxins. Were they largely a battlefield weapon?

Admiral Vannoy agreed that they were.

Mr. Kissinger asked if, as a battlefield weapon, they would be used essentially in retaliation.

Mr. Smith asked if they could be used against civilian populations as an adjunct to an attack.

Dr. McRae agreed that this would be possible, saying that shellfish poison would be better than nerve gas. However, we do not know how to produce shellfish poison in mass quantities and would have to be able to produce it chemically.

Mr. Kissinger asked why we would use a toxin if we were going to produce it chemically.

Dr. McRae said a chemically produced toxin would be identical in its chemical structure to that produced by the shellfish. He cited synthetic penicillin which differs from bacteriologically grown penicillin only in the way it is made. He thought shellfish poison would be a more strategic weapon than nerve gas because a larger area could be covered with a similar dose.

Admiral Vannoy said that we know little about toxins. We had paid very slight attention to toxins when we were working on biological weapons. Because we knew so little, he thought it would not be in our interests to preclude our examination of various systems for possible

future employment. He thought toxins may prove to be the best thing we have.

Mr. Kissinger repeated his understanding that while toxins also exist in nature, in fact, they act like chemicals.

Mr. Furnas added that toxins create a disease which is not transmissible.

Wow. Again, how can these guys not understand that toxins do not create disease?

Dr. McRae said scientists see the only difference between chemical and biological agents to be that biological agents reproduce themselves and chemical agents do not. While some toxins can reproduce themselves, you can get the same human response to a synthesized toxin although it might require twice as much. He said work was now being done in a laboratory in West Berlin on a synthetic toxin which could not be distinguished from a natural product—its chemical structure and the human response to it were exactly the same. He cited alcohol as a toxin because it is a poison, originally produced by a bacteriological process but now easily synthesized. The natural and synthetic products were exactly the same.

Mr. Pedersen asked if the effects of a toxin on the human body were not more analogous to the effects of a biological weapon than a chemical weapon.

Mr. Furnas agreed with the exception that these effects were not transmissible.

Dr. McRae agreed that this was true in bacteriological toxins.

Mr. Kissinger then moved to a discussion of the three options. He asked if anyone saw any other options.

All agreed that they did not.

Mr. Kissinger characterized our present program as including both offensive and defensive R&D: offensive R&D involving the production of agents and including the work on delivery systems with defensive R&D primarily devoted to immunization programs, plus an option to produce and stockpile weapons. We are not now doing this but, under Option I, would not be precluded from it by a Presidential decision.

Admiral Vannoy commented that we have no production facilities for producing in quantity. He said under Option I we would not renounce production but would not necessarily opt for it.

Mr. Pedersen thought this option should be defined more clearly since he had understood that it would automatically include the production and stockpiling of toxins.

Admiral Vannoy replied that in practice we had no capability for production and stockpiling of toxins.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was true now but need not be true in the future.

Mr. Cargo cited the modest size of the stockpile indicated on Page 4 of the basic paper.<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Kissinger noted the 15 lbs of lethal toxins, but said he did not know how potent this would be.

Admiral Vannoy said these stocks were maintained basically for research purposes.

Mr. Kissinger asked about the “toxic bullets”.

Admiral Vannoy replied that those we have are old, are being removed from our stockpile and not being replaced. He noted that such bullets are produced and sold commercially for various uses—e.g., for use in zoos, fired from sporting rifles to kill a dangerous animal. In response to a question from Mr. Kissinger, he said these bullets are produced in civilian life, both in lethal and incapacitating forms.

This was the M2 Separable Bullet, a 7.62mm rifle cartridge with a hollow metal bullet that could be filled with botulinum toxin. Upon impact, the agent would be released into the air.

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<sup>8</sup> Page 4 of the January 21 IPMG paper stated that the United States possessed less than 15 pounds of bulk lethal toxins and 100 pounds of incapacitating toxins. These stockpiles were for R&D purposes only and “would provide only a token military capability.” Three toxins—botulinum, shellfish poison, and staphylococcal enterotoxin— were considered to have potential military use. The paper also mentioned that the United States’ stockpile of “poison bullets” was obsolete and scheduled for destruction.

Mr. Kissinger asked Dr. McRae to find out how many of these bullets are produced commercially and how, and if any controls are exercised either on their production or sale.

Dr. McRae commented that a botulinum toxin was produced commercially because it was necessary to produce the toxin before you could produce the toxoid.

Admiral Vannoy raised the problem of verification and control of such production.

Mr. Kissinger said that if there were substantial civilian production of toxins for whatever purpose, foregoing the military production would not be as significant—nor would it be as convincing to the other side.

He asked if we stay with Option 1 do we not in effect nullify the President's decision on biological weapons. How could we answer expected arguments?

Mr. Furnas commented that it was very hard to distinguish between the effect of toxins and of biological agents except that the former are not communicable.

Dr. McRae said we were not producing toxins—a chemical—by biological process, would we not also be building up our biological capability—getting into biological production by the back door. If the President announced that he is using biological laboratories to produce toxins what would be the effect on his decision on biological agents?

Mr. Shakespeare thought it would mitigate the entire effect of the President's statement.

Mr. Pedersen remarked that this then throws you into Option 2.

Mr. Kissinger said that under Option 2 we would not renounce toxins but we would renounce biological production and biological R&D except for defense; we would apply to bacteriological toxins the same criteria as to other biological weapons and would apply to chemically produced toxins the same criteria as to other chemical weapons. In other words, we would make a decision not on the effect of the weapons, but on their origin. The effect of such a decision would not necessarily eliminate toxins but would make the President's earlier decision on biological weapons stand up. Such a decision would be consistent with the earlier biological decision and would not differentiate between different kinds of chemical weapons, i.e., toxins and other chemical weapons.

Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 2 we would retain the right to produce and stockpile synthetic toxins.

Mr. Kissinger added, however, that we have no present intention to do so.

Mr. Shakespeare referred to CON-6 of Option 2 and the vast PR problems that would be created by this option.<sup>9</sup>

Mr. Kissinger said his problem with Option 3 was that if we eliminated toxins, we would have to go through every weapon in our chemical arsenal to be sure that it does not also occur in a natural form. He asked if the President could not say that we could continue with chemical toxins if they were considered useful (but would not necessarily do so) and could reaffirm our renunciation of the first use of any chemical weapon.

Mr. Pedersen noted that under Option 3, since the only present method of producing toxins is biological, we would be left automatically with only a research program.

Mr. Nutter noted that the biological method might not be the only method of production in the future.

Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we could say that if chemical methods of production were developed, we could consider the resulting toxins the same as chemical weapons.

Dr. McRae noted that this would permit researchers to produce for R&D purposes but not to stockpile.

Mr. Shakespeare asked once chemical methods of production were developed, what would prevent people from producing by bacteriological methods and saying they were producing by chemical methods.

Mr. Kissinger thought we could close the bacteriological production facilities.

Dr. McRae thought the toxins we would want to produce chemically would be different than those we would want to produce biologically. He said that while Option 2 would permit the elimination of large

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<sup>9</sup> According to the January 21 IPMG paper, one argument against adopting Option II was that it “could continue the contentions over the existence of possible loopholes in the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare by creating questions as to the significance of differences based solely on the method of manufacture of toxins.”

bacteriological weapon production facilities, factories producing toxins could produce biological weapons.

Mr. Pedersen thought we might revise Option 2 to say that we reserved the right to produce chemically produced toxins.

Mr. Kissinger thought it would be hard to convince anyone that we were not chemically producing toxins if we have a chemical weapons production capability.

Mr. Shakespeare asked how this related to our problems with the Geneva Protocol and the UK Draft Convention.<sup>10</sup> He asked if we would have to oppose the UK.

Mr. Pedersen replied that the British statement in New York would preclude all bacteriological agents for military use. It would bar production of chemical toxins by bacteriological means but would not prevent production by chemical means.

Mr. Furnas said the UK was opposed to toxins but he did not know how they would react to toxins produced by chemical methods. He thought this distinction might stand up legally and ethically but would be hard to defend from an international and a PR point of view.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we would have to say anything about production and stockpiling. Could we just say we are stopping toxin programs? He thought the danger in Option 3 was that it might re-open the entire chemical warfare question. He said he was not convinced of the utility of toxins on military grounds. He noted that when the military had considered various chemical warfare programs it had focused on other forms of weapons, not on toxins, and it had deployed other chemical weapons overseas. He said although he was not impressed with the arguments on military utility, he did not like to preclude all work on toxins.

Mr. Pedersen commented that although toxins are chemical, they are biological in the public mind.

Mr. Kissinger thought we would be accused of having made a grandstand play on biological weapons, and of now producing something biologically. He noted the President has renounced biological warfare and has retained only defensive R&D with enough offensive R&D to

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<sup>10</sup> See footnotes 4 and 7, Document 97.

determine the threat and to test our defenses. Why could we not renounce any weapon which was biologically produced—including toxins? For PR purposes we could make it clear that we have no chemical production capability. If we should acquire a chemical production capability, we would face the PR problem at that time. By this time we might be considering chemical weapons in the context of arms control discussions at which time we could again renounce first use of chemical weapons.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if, under Option 2, we would proceed with a crash program to synthesize toxins.

Mr. Cargo thought that any Presidential decision could require that any production of synthetic toxins would require specific Presidential authorization.

Admiral Vannoy replied to Mr. Shakespeare's question that, for budgetary reasons alone, there would be no crash program to develop synthetic production methods. He said this was not that high on the priority list.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the three options be revised to indicate that under Option 1 we would not necessarily be producing or stockpiling but would be reserving the right to do so, and to include statements of justification for Options 2 or 3 from a PR point of view.

Mr. Pedersen noted with regard to the international aspects of Options 2 and 3 that there was at present a strong drive to eliminate the production and stockpiling of both bacteriological and chemical weapons. When the focus shifts to toxins, everyone will want to ban them also.

Mr. Kissinger said we could certainly agree to consider banning toxins in an international framework but need not ban them unilaterally. He thought no options would be withdrawn from possible arms control negotiations.

Mr. Furnas thought this raised the problem of verification and questioned whether we would be willing to go into an international agreement without adequate verification and inspection.

Mr. Cargo thought that whatever was done would not preclude looking at the decision in the international environment.

Mr. Kissinger thought this was true in the entire range of issues. Mr. Smith asked if we might break Option 2 into two parts.

Mr. Kissinger thought that under Option 2 we would reaffirm our renunciation of bacteriological warfare; we would renounce production and research in bacteriologically produced weapons, except for defensive purposes; and we would permit R&D on chemical weapons even if the chemical also exists in nature. We would leave the questions of stockpile and production for later decision.

Mr. Smith asked if the first part of Option 2 was not in fact a part of the chemical decision.

Mr. Kissinger thought that the first sentence of Option 2 was stated too positively—it should be rephrased permissively so as to reserve the right of production and stockpiling. He also thought the two sentences of the option should be reversed.

Mr. Cargo suggested that the same thing be done in Option 1.

Mr. Kissinger asked that the public justification for each option be drafted and shown to Mr. Shakespeare.

Mr. Nutter thought this should also include comments on the form in which any announcement should be made.

Mr. Kissinger noted the grave security problems on this item and the need to limit distribution of documents to prevent such things as the recent *New York Times* story.<sup>11</sup>

Mr. Cargo asked if, under Option 3, we limited R&D to defense only, what in fact would we be omitting which could be included under offensive R&D. Would we be precluded from R&D on a chemically produced toxin?

Mr. Kissinger thought we would be giving up the options of production and stockpiling.

Mr. Cargo asked if we would be doing R&D on both bacteriological and chemically produced toxins.

Mr. Kissinger asked why bother with chemically produced toxins if we were interested in defensive R&D only.

Mr. Nutter commented that they might be cheaper.

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<sup>11</sup> The *New York Times* reported on January 25 that Nixon had received an interagency paper that presented to him three options for retention of toxins in the U.S. chemical-bacteriological arsenal. The article also contained details of agency differences on the issue and of the discussions in the Review Group.

Dr. McRae noted that if, under Option 3, we were denied the right to produce and stockpile by a Presidential decision, the R&D people would probably not try to synthesize toxins since there would be no possibility of their production, stockpiling or use.

Mr. Cargo asked if we would not need agents for R&D purposes.

Dr. McRae agreed there would have to be some production but it would not be necessary to synthesize.

Mr. Cargo asked if there could not be possible variants between synthetic and naturally produced agents.

Dr. McRae agreed there theoretically could be variants but that naturally produced toxins would be close enough. He thought the nature of our R&D might be different under Option 3 and the military services might order their priorities somewhat differently.

In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (1970), SecDef Laird stated that there was no disagreement between the Department of State, Department of Defense, or President's Scientific Advisor that toxins were properly in the field of chemical warfare and not biological warfare. He claimed that this was also the position taken by the United Nations concerning chemical and biological warfare.

This document is identified as document 126 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

**Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon<sup>12</sup>**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy on Toxins (NSSM 85)<sup>13</sup>

The NSC Review Group has completed its study of U.S. Policy on Toxins (Tab—Basic Paper).<sup>14</sup> To assist you in your consideration of the issues, I have enclosed a brief background paper.<sup>15</sup>

The study was initiated because of the ambiguity regarding whether toxins were classified as chemical or biological and, therefore, where they

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<sup>12</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Richard Kennedy of the NSC Staff forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger under a February 10 covering memorandum for Kissinger's review.

<sup>13</sup> Document 115.

<sup>14</sup> On January 30, the IPMG submitted the 27-page study, revised by the Review Group during its January 29 meeting (see Document 122). Part I of the study consisted of background discussion regarding toxins. Part II dealt with policy issues and program options, which Kissinger summarized for the President in this memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-168, NSSM 85) The study is published in *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972, Document 177.

<sup>15</sup> Enclosed in Nixon's briefing materials was an undated background paper, entitled "Policy on Toxins," prepared by the NSC Staff. The 4-page paper summarized the methods of producing toxins, current U.S. capabilities, the military uses of toxins, and related political and arms control issues. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970)

were meant to fall under your announced policies for biological research and chemical warfare. This ambiguity flows essentially from the fact that while toxins are chemicals (non-living matter which does not reproduce itself), they currently are produced by biological processes from living organisms. Though their production by chemical synthesis is technically possible, none of military interest has yet been so produced. Moreover, if used, the effects of some toxins would be similar to those of biological agents in the sense that some toxins cause what is commonly described as disease. Toxins, however, do not cause contagious disease which is transmissible from man to man, and are therefore non-epidemic.

There are three options:

*OPTION I: Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Produced by Either Biological Processes or Chemical Synthesis.* (Implicit in the acceptance of this option is an offensive, as well as defensive, research and development program for toxins, produced by either method, and for related delivery systems/weapons.)

—This option would retain (1) a capability to achieve significant logistic advantage or large area coverage in either a lethal or incapacitating role, (2) maximum flexibility to develop a variety of toxins which may have military utility, (3) the most promising current potential to achieve an incapacitating capability (staphylococcal enterotoxin—produced by biological processes), and possibly (4) a bargaining lever for future arms control discussions.

—But this policy could be used as basis for charging the U.S. with preparation for biological warfare. Production of toxins by biological processes would cast doubt on the significance and credibility of the U.S. renunciation of biological warfare and cause domestic political problems associated with production, storage, transportation and testing. Moreover, any use of toxins could be used as justification by others for employing biological agents against U.S. forces. Also, our interpretation of the U.K. Draft Convention on biological warfare would differ from that of the U.K. itself if we take the position that the production of toxins by bacteriological/biological processes is permitted, and Senate ratification proceedings on the Geneva Protocol would be more complicated.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> See footnotes 4 and 7, Document 97. The administration was preparing to submit the

*OPTION II: Renounce the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Toxins Which are Produced by Biological Processes. Reserve the Option to Develop, Stockpile and Use in Retaliation Only Those Toxins Produced by Chemical Synthesis.* (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are: (1) a defensive research and development program only for biologically-produced toxins; and (2) offensive, as well as defensive, research and development programs for the development of chemically-synthesized toxins and related delivery system/weapons.)

—This option would leave open the development of a toxin capability by chemical synthesis thereby retaining the advantages of flexibility and relative logistics simplicity of *Option 1* if synthesis is accomplished. Moreover, it (1) would not require modification of the U.K. Draft Convention and (2) would remove a basis for claiming that we were acting inconsistently with the November 25th announcement on biological programs.<sup>17</sup>

—*But*, it would tend to limit future capabilities to lethal toxins more amenable to synthesis than is the only known incapacitating toxin. It also would deny toxins to the U.S. for at least 3–5 years while chemical production methods are developed. Since the end product is identical regardless of production method, it also might be seen as a loophole in the renunciation of a biological warfare program based solely on the method of manufacture. It might complicate future arms control measures and verification (a country could produce toxins biologically and claim they were chemically synthesized).

*OPTION III: Renounce the Use, and Hence the Development and Stockpiling, of Weapons Systems Using Toxins Produced Either by Chemical Synthesis or Biological Processes.* (Implicit in the acceptance of this option are only defensive research and development programs for all toxins with the purposes of assuring adequate defensive measures and of protecting against technological surprise.)

—This option would provide necessary defensive measures and protect against technological surprise. It also would (1) eliminate

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1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate for ratification, which President Nixon did on August 19. Documentation is published in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972.

<sup>17</sup> See footnote 10, Document 103.

questions as to the significance and credibility of the U.S. policy on biological methods of warfare and research, (2) put us in the best position to ratify the Geneva Protocol with the type of reservation most closely corresponding to our policy on chemical warfare and biological research, (3) enable us to accept the U.K. position on the U.K. Draft Convention, and (4) be received favorably in public discussion avoiding any appearance of loopholes in U.S. policy on biological research;

—*But*, it would foreclose development of a weapons system which may have military utility and could place us at a disadvantage if other countries had toxin programs without similar restrictions. Moreover, it could expose us to a challenge as to why we are willing to unilaterally renounce one class of chemical agents but not others. Unilateral renunciation of this class of chemicals could weaken our case for insisting on adequate verification of arms control agreements involving chemicals.

Agency positions and comments on the Review Group paper are enclosed and tabbed.<sup>18</sup> Under Secretary of State Richardson and Ambassador Smith both favor Option III on the grounds that (1) the need for a retaliatory toxin capability in addition to current and planned chemical capabilities is highly questionable and (2) the international and domestic political costs of retaining the option to retaliate with toxins will be high. Both believe that preserving an option to retaliate with toxins (*Option I or Option II*) would (1) detract from the favorable impact of your November 25th announcement on U.S. chemical warfare and biological research policy, (2) make more difficult the winning of international support for the U.K. Draft Convention, and (3) complicate efforts to gain Senate ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Both also believe that there is some risk that indication of U.S. interests in toxins could stimulate further interest in them by other countries. Ambassador Smith does not believe that renunciation of chemically

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<sup>18</sup> Several agencies submitted recommendations for future U.S. policy with respect to toxins, including the Department of State, ACDA, OST, and USIA. The recommendations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-168, NSSM 85; and *ibid.*, Box H-26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970. Moorer, in an undated memorandum to Laird, recommended Option I. Packard recommended Option II in a memorandum to Kissinger, February 12. (Both in Ford Library, Laird Papers, Box 3, Chemical Warfare and Biological Research)

synthesized toxins would affect our ability to insist on treating biological methods of warfare separately from chemical warfare in arms control negotiations or impair our ability to insist on verification requirements we deem necessary.

Dr. DuBridge favors Option II. He believes that it implements your announced policy on biological research. At the same time he notes that it would permit development of additional capabilities through chemical synthesis of toxins, and avoid introducing ambiguities into what was and was not allowable in the chemical field.

Mr. Shakespeare prefers Option III on the ground that it would be the clearest follow-through of your November 25th announcement and thus be most acceptable to the public at home and abroad.

I recommend that you approve Option II renouncing biologically produced toxins and confining U.S. programs involving them to research and development for defensive purposes only but reserving the option to produce chemically synthesized toxins. In so doing your renunciation of biological means of warfare will be reinforced and ambiguities in our position which could arise from biological production processes for toxins will be eliminated. We can continue to support the principles of the U.K. Draft Convention as you announced on November 25th. Though we will be questioned in the Geneva Protocol ratification proceedings, our position on chemically synthesized toxins will be the same as that for all chemical weapons and the reservations we will take need not be modified further. I believe it important to reserve the option for chemically synthesized toxins for two reasons. The field is new and we do not know where research will take us. I am not convinced that toxins will have significant military utility. But until we know what the potential is, we should not unilaterally foreclose development of what may be a useful weapon system. Moreover, toxins are chemicals however they are produced. If we unilaterally forego the research and possible future production of chemically synthesized toxins we increase the risk that our entire retaliatory chemical program will come under attack. If we are willing to renounce one chemical weapon produced by chemical means, the argument will run, why should we not renounce all chemical weapons. I do not believe that we should run this risk.

I have enclosed a draft NSDM<sup>19</sup> and draft public statement<sup>20</sup> which give effect to a policy based upon Option II of the Review Group paper which I recommend you approve.

*Draft NSDM*

Approve<sup>21</sup>

Disapprove

See Me

*Draft Public Statement*

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

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<sup>19</sup> Printed as approved as Document 128.

<sup>20</sup> The White House Press Secretary issued this press release on February 14 announcing the administration's policy on toxins. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-26, NSC Meeting, February 11, 1970) For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972, Document 189.

<sup>21</sup> The President initialed his approval of the NSDM and the draft statement. Written in an unknown hand above Nixon's initials is "Option III," suggesting that the President actually approved that option, the renunciation of the use, development, and stockpiling of toxins produced either by biological processes or chemical synthesis.

This document is identified as document 94 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969-1972*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v34/pdf/frus1969-76v34.pdf>.

## National Security Decision Memorandum 44<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 20, 1970

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness  
The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT

United States Policy on Toxins

Following a review of United States military programs for toxins,<sup>2</sup> the President has decided that:

1. The United States will renounce the production for operational purposes, stockpiling and use in retaliation of toxins produced either by bacteriological or biological processes or by chemical synthesis.
2. The United States military program for toxins will be confined to research and development for defensive purposes only.
3. The Secretary of Defense will submit recommendations concerning the disposal of existing stocks of toxin weapons and/or agents. These recommendations should accompany the recommendations pursuant

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, NSDMs, Nos. 1-50. Secret. A copy was sent to Wheeler.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 122.

to National Security Decision Memorandum 35<sup>3</sup> regarding the disposal of bacteriological/biological weapons.

4. The Under Secretaries Committee's annual review of United States chemical warfare programs and public information policy, as directed by National Security Decision Memorandum 35, will include review of United States military toxins programs.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

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<sup>3</sup> Document 104.

**Memorandum for the President<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 22, 1970

SUBJECT: Policy Regarding Use of Herbicides in South Vietnam

I want to report to you on the continuing actions we are taking, at your direction, to reduce the use of herbicides in Vietnam and to advise you that new steps will be taken so that there will be strict conformance in Vietnam with policies governing the use of herbicides in the United States.

The present ban on the use of the herbicide known as "ORANGE" remains in effect.

Additionally, Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams have advised that they are initiating a program which will permit an orderly, yet rapid phase-out of the use of other herbicides while preserving the option to reinstitute this program, if necessary, to assure the protection of American lives. During the phase-out, the use of herbicides in Vietnam will be restricted to remote, unpopulated areas or around firebases and US installations in a manner currently authorized in CONUS.

In short, any herbicides used in Vietnam henceforth will be used only under conditions which would apply in the United States.

As a result of new orders to the field, herbicide use in Vietnam will be such that the stresses and risks involved are no greater than those sustained by the United States population and the United States environment in normal peacetime activities.

I recognize, of course, that there could be some temporary risks to our forces as a result of these decisions. Should the military situation change as a result of an increase in the enemy level of activity, we would need, of course, to reassess this policy in order to assure the protection of

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

American lives, particularly as we withdraw thousands of additional US military personnel from South Vietnam in accordance with your program.

(signed)  
**Melvin R. Laird**

**Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 19, 1971

Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Bill:

I am unable to concur in the proposed memorandum for the President which you sent to me on February 2, 1971, calling for the President to decide to phase out immediately all herbicide operations in Vietnam. The main reasons for my non-concurrence are stated in the attached memorandum for the President.

In view of our position that the use of herbicides in Vietnam is not prohibited under the Geneva Protocol, I do not believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the Senate as a whole would be influenced in favor of ratification by our immediate termination of the herbicide program. Indeed, herbicides have been used to satisfy urgent and legitimate military objectives in Vietnam in accordance with our current national policy which was formulated with full awareness of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.

The Protocol, operating as a "no-first-use" agreement, is little more than an attempt to prevent any belligerent from resorting to the use of the prohibited weapons in warfare. Therefore, I believe that the President's decision to submit the Protocol to the Senate was primarily dictated by his expectation that ratification would be a useful and constructive step for proceeding with negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. These talks might lead to the effective

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

controls, that the Protocol lacks, over chemical and biological agents (including herbicides).

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should, of course, be kept advised of our herbicide policy--and in particular, that it satisfies our military objectives within the provisions of the Protocol. We have terminated the use of herbicides for crop destruction since this was no longer necessary to meet those objectives. They should further be advised that efforts at controlling such agents as herbicides or riot control agents (RCAs) should proceed in the form of effective arms control agreements at the conference of the CCD.

Sincerely,  
(signed)  
**Melvin R. Laird**

**Memorandum for Assistant to the President For National Security Affairs<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1972

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare Study--NSSM 157

In response to your 13 August memorandum, I have read with care the recent CW study coordinated by ACDA, which brought forth all the different options available to us in proposing a U.S. initiative at the CCD negotiations currently underway in Geneva. I am pleased to see that the study presents a comprehensive range of options, several of which can be useful in moving beyond our present CW negotiating position.

As I explained in my 12 July letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of State, my decision is in favor of option 2 which proposes a production ban on all lethal agents, including binaries, and no limitation on present stockpiles. As I see this option, it is a realistic proposal that has a good chance for acceptance at Geneva. At the same time, the proposal would not now nor in the near future affect present U.S. capabilities.

To permit formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, I have requested their comments to be submitted by 1000 hours, 16 August. On receipt, I will forward the Chairman's memorandum to you. It appears that the JCS position will favor option 1. This option would allow binary production, modernization and improvement of CW stockpiles, and a continued R&D program, all considered important to JCS. However, it offers very little that could help effect realistic CW restraints.

In the event that there is no production, JCS appear to be concerned primarily over the deterioration of the stockpile and the R&D program. I too, am concerned about these matters but I believe that they can be taken care of in a treaty that has a provision for review after five or ten years as well as another provision that could serve as an escape clause. Technical

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

measures can be undertaken within DOD to prolong the shelf life of chemical agents, protect our present stockpile, and modify plans for phasing out certain delivery systems employed at present. Control measures could insure a continuing R&D production.

Let me say in closing that prompt action is essential in order to table something at the CCD by early September before the possibility vanishes of doing anything meaningful in chemical warfare this year.

Signed  
**Melvin R. Laird**

Attachment: (1)  
Copy of SecDef letter,  
I-35640/72, dtd 12 Jul  
1972, to SecState, Tab A

**TAB A:**

Washington, July 12, 1972

Honorable William P. Rogers  
Secretary of State  
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Bill:

As you know, we have maintained a continuing review within the Department of Defense of U.S. programs and policies regarding chemical weapons, as well as the present capabilities and potential of other countries in this field. I have, as a result of that review, now concluded that it would be in the security interests of the United States to achieve broad international acceptance of an arms control treaty focusing on the prohibition of the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes.

The following are the central considerations that have led me to this view:

- An agreement such as I propose, which would permit us to retain our existing CW stockpiles, would not in any major way affect present U.S. capabilities.
- Existing fiscal constraints and attitudes in this country make it unrealistic for us to plan any substantial expansion of our CW program. These constraints and attitudes are likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
- An international agreement prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes would place similar constraints on other countries. It would also help limit the proliferation of significant chemical weapons capabilities.

I am concerned that, in the absence of a U.S. initiative, international discussion of prohibitions on chemical weapons will generate increasing pressures for far more comprehensive prohibitions -- extending to stockpiles and research -- than would be in the U.S. interest. Early United States support for an agreement prohibiting the production and transfer of lethal chemicals would, I believe, satisfy legitimate demands for concrete chemical arms control steps, while deflecting pressures for broader, harmful proposals.

Therefore, it seems to me to be in the U.S. interest to put forward as soon as possible a concrete proposal establishing a basis for negotiating a sound arms control step that would enhance the security of the United States. I believe that such an initiative, like the other important decisions regarding chemical and biological weapons taken by this Administration, would be welcome both at home and abroad.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the views that I have set forth above.

In view of ACDA's experience with the discussions of chemical weapons control now under way at Geneva, and the various ideas and proposals which have already been suggested, I think it would be best for ACDA to take the lead in following up the ideas I have put forward. Specifically, I am proposing to Gerry Smith that ACDA develop for the President's consideration an arms control proposal focusing on the prohibition of the

production and transfer of lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. I trust that you will agree with this course of action. The Department of Defense, of course, wishes to work closely with the Department of State and ACDA on this matter at all stages, as we did in working out U.S. proposals for the Biological Weapons Convention and the Seabeds Treaty.

Sincerely,  
(signed)  
**Melvin R. Laird**

**Memorandum for the Secretary Of Defense (JSCM-37-72)<sup>1</sup>**

August 16, 1972

Subject: Response to NSSM 157 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-351-72, dated 28 July 1972, subject: "Chemical Warfare Policy (U)," which forwarded the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a US draft treaty on chemical warfare (CW).

b. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), I-26439/72, dated 14 August 1972, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the response to NSSM 157 and, particularly, the options therein.

2. (S) As requested in reference 1b, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the study and recognize it as a reasonably balanced presentation of the major available alternatives, their relative merits, and other relevant considerations.

3. (S) In assessing the proposed negotiating alternatives, certain factors have a major bearing on the selection of a proper option.

a. There is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons. Even onsite inspections (OSI) cannot provide effective verification regarding CW activities. Therefore, in the absence of any effective means of insuring that other nations would comply with CW prohibitions, it is imperative that the United States maintain an effective CW retaliatory capability in order to provide an effective CW deterrent and to preclude being placed at a significant disadvantage should CW hostilities occur.

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

b. In terms of negotiating goals, the United States should seek an agreement that would limit the USSR to a retaliatory capability in CW.

c. A production ban, which is a significant factor in several proposals in the study, would effectively eliminate the capability to maintain a viable retaliatory CW capability. Reliance on chemical stocks of the vintage and composition of the current US stockpile to provide a continuing deterrent is unacceptable due to the uncertainties concerning their remaining shelf life/employment life. The modernization of the current stockpile with binary type weapons, the most efficient and cost effective of the feasible courses of action, is essential to a credible retaliatory/deterrent CW capability.

d. While no truly effective and acceptable means of verifying a stockpile limit or a production ban exist, the principle of OSI should be advocated by the United States. An obligation to accept inspection of certain declared facilities would appear to have some merit in the international arena.

e. A unilateral statement by the United States regarding a substantial reduction of US stockpiles independent of, or coupled with, any other option is not in the US security interest. The same applies to a unilateral declaration of a moratorium on production. Such measures would result in immediate limitations on US CW capabilities without similar restraints on other nations. They would probably remain as permanent constraints even if international agreement on such measures never materializes.

4. (TS) Based on the above considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a treaty limiting stockpiles to retaliatory levels and prohibiting the transfer of lethal agents for weapons purposes would not adversely affect the national security. This combination of proposals more nearly reflects the approach of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to a new US CW treaty initiative forwarded in reference 1a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can support a proposal for a retaliatory/deterrent stockpile limit at approximately the current US level, with provision for modernization (binary production), accompanied, at least in initial negotiations, by a limited OSI requirement at military production centers by an international team.

5. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you support these views and forward them to the National Security Council.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
(signed)  
**T. H. Moorer**  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1973

Dr. Vincent V. McRae  
Office of Science and Technology  
Room 4202  
New Executive Office Building  
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Dr. McRae:

The OJCS submission of 12 January has been revised to reflect the majority of your comments of 18 January.

The revised version does not make any adjustment to reflect your comments concerning [not declassified]. To modify filled munitions would be prohibitive in cost for the value accrued. A preferable solution would be to fill munitions with GB or VX for the following reasons:

- a. [not declassified]
- b. [not declassified]
- c. [not declassified]

[not declassified] Such a procedure would be practical for the bulk agent but not for the agent already filled into munitions.

- d. GB and VX are much more effective than mustard.

As is indicated, the summary paragraph has been revised to include factual statistics in the event a decision is made to retain the 105 mm howitzer shells. I do not consider that this statement is misleading since

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<sup>1</sup> Available at [http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

we are simply stating facts and not attempting to express an opinion as to whether or not the projected stocks represent a "substantial quantity of high quality stocks." This judgment involves a number of considerations, among them, as you point out, whether or not a production ban is in effect and whether or not the binary munitions replace the mustard capability.

Colonel C. G. Olentine will attend the 10:30 AM meeting on 23 January. He will be prepared to make detailed comments on the draft memorandum for Dr. Kissinger and the draft report of the ad hoc OST panel.

Mr. Sanjuan has reviewed this memo and concurs.

(signed)  
**J.H. Doyle, Jr.**  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief, International Negotiations Div., J-5

Atch  
A/S

**Attachment**

IMPACT OF OBSOLESCENCE ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE

Revised as of 22 January 1973

1. The life expectancy of the chemical weapons stockpile is controlled more by the obsolescence of weapon systems than by deterioration of the agent itself. Within current plans and directives, the following degradations of the stockpile will occur:

- a. Bulk mustard (38.6% of the total stockpile). Deputy Secretary of Defense directed disposal of all bulk mustard with the exception of 4800 tons which is to be retained pending procurement of binary munitions. Mustard is less effective than the nerve agents, on a weight

per unit area required for casualty production basis, and has a high freezing point (@ 54°F) and is relatively ineffective at lower temperatures.

b. Mustard in artillery shells (12% of the total stockpile). Both the 105mm howitzer and the 4.2 inch mortar are obsolescent (only airmobile, airborne and marine divisions retain the 105mm howitzer capability). 60% of the agent fill is in these calibers. The limitations of bulk mustard agent are applicable to the remainder.

c. GB in bulk (19% of the total stockpile). About 2.9% of the bulk GB requires redistillation to be useful in filling aluminum casings (could be used in present form in steel casings). Remainder is serviceable for all purposes.

d. GB in artillery shells (6.2% of the total stockpile) Based on the obsolescence of the 105mm howitzer and the fact that a number of the 155mm howitzer shells are defective and cannot be used (only airmobile, airborne, and marine divisions retain the 105mm howitzer capability) 54% of the agent fill will be of limited, if any, use.

e. GB in rockets and warheads (6.4% of the total stockpile). All of the agent is filled in the obsolescent HONEST JOHN and the M55 rocket system. The vast majority of the agent is in the M55 system. There are many operational difficulties with this system which is obsolescent. Thus, none of this agent will be deliverable in the 1980s. Additionally, the M55 has an aluminum warhead, some of which will deteriorate with time because of the interaction caused by the impure agent used to fill some of them.

f. GB in aerial bombs (4% of the total stockpile). All of this agent should be useable for an indefinite period of time.

g. VX in bulk (5.4% of the total stockpile). This agent is serviceable and should be useable for an indefinite period of time.

h. VX in artillery shells (3.1% of the total stockpile). Except for a small quantity filled into defective rounds (about 2%), this agent should be useful for an indefinite period of time.

i. VX in rockets (1.6% of the total stockpile). This entire quantity is filled in the M55 system discussed above. None of this agent will be deliverable in the 1980s.

j. VX in land mines (1.7% of the total stockpile). All are serviceable. However, under a retaliation only policy, there is no employment concept for these weapons.

k. VX in spray tanks (2.0% of the total stockpile). These spray tanks have a projected storage life of only five years, which expires in 1973 or 1974. It is not known at this time whether the storage life can, or will, be extended. (N.B. These tanks are not refillable.)

2. In summary, of the total quantity of agent-filled munitions in the stockpile (about 37% of the total stockpile) less than 401 of it (14% of the total stockpile) will be immediately useable during the 1980s.

3. If the decision were made to retain the 105mm howitzer rounds (for use by airborne, airmobile, and marine divisions) then the summary figures in paragraph 2 would be:

"of the total quantity of agent-filled munitions in the stockpile (about 37% of the total stockpile), approximately 54% of it (20% of the total stockpile) will be immediately useable during the 1980s."



## CHAPTER 6

### **Ford Administration (1973-1976)**

The Ford administration generally continued the Nixon administration's agenda when it came to the U.S. CB weapons program, while increasing efforts in nonproliferation addressing nuclear technology and weapons programs. This continuation in itself is not surprising, despite the significant turnover within the administration (see following section). The U.S. military moved its chemical weapons stored at Okinawa to Johnston Atoll, where hundreds of drums of Agent Orange sat, ready for demilitarization. All of the U.S. biological agents stored at military bases were destroyed by the end of 1973, with the exception of those used at Fort Detrick for defensive research and development. The arms control community wanted to regain its forward momentum, while the defense community wanted to retain its deterrent capability. During this time, we see the Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol ratified, as well as continued efforts by DoD to obtain approval from the White House and Congress to start a production plant for binary chemical weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal. India's atomic test in 1974 led to the recognition that Pakistan would try to develop its own nuclear weapons.

If modernization of chemical weapons was blocked by the Congress, the U.S. military had to understand what its current chemical weapons stockpile could provide in terms of offensive capability. Studies were needed to clarify the operational impact of these weapon systems, if used by modern delivery systems under combat conditions. While negotiations were ongoing in Geneva for a new arms control agreement for chemical weapons, talks were slow in progressing toward a final solution. This led to some very interesting discussions regarding the future of U.S. chemical weapons modernization (in particular, see SecState Kissinger's remarks in the meeting on January 25, 1975 and SecDef Rumsfeld's efforts to champion the Army's funding for binary chemical weapons production).

However, Congress was not convinced to authorize funds for building a new production facility for binary chemical weapons.

Following the Arab-Israeli War, the administration had to address revelations that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact had heavily invested into developing CB defense capabilities for its military units. Other nations, including China, Egypt, Syria, North Korea, Yugoslavia, and Iraq were known to be initiating offensive CB weapons programs. Lacking a verification protocol, the U.S. government needed to retain a credible deterrent capability. In response to the appearance of growing threats from countries with CB weapons programs, in 1976, Secretary of the Army Martin Hoffman reversed the decision to disestablish the Army's Chemical Corps. The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of foreign policy discussions during the Ford administration.

### **The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Nixon's resignation in August 1974 brought Gerald R. Ford to the presidency. Ford inherited Nixon's second-term foreign policy team, which had undergone considerable turmoil in previous months. Kissinger had succeeded Rogers as Secretary of State on September 21, 1973, and served as both Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. Elliott L. Richardson had succeeded Laird as Secretary of Defense in January 1973, and then moved to become the Attorney General in late May. James R. Schlesinger served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for six months at the outset of the administration, replacing Helms; he then replaced Richardson as the Secretary of Defense. William E. Colby followed Schlesinger as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. General George S. Brown replaced Moorer as the CJCS in July 1974.

Ford emphasized continuity in foreign policy, continuing Nixon's policy of détente with the Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), reaching broad agreement on the SALT II framework in Vladivostok in November 1974. Along that same line, he continued to develop U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China, conducting a

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<sup>1</sup> Original text from Office of the Historian, US Department of State, "1969-1976: The Presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford," available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976>.

summit in Beijing in December 1975. He also worked with Kissinger in securing the Helsinki Accords, which were signed in August 1975, and a second Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, which was signed in September 1975. The first months of his presidency saw the invasion and conquest of South Vietnam by North Vietnam in March–April 1975, followed quickly by the *Mayaguez* incident.

Dissatisfied with the performance of his foreign policy team, Ford reshaped it on November 3, 1975. On that day he named Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft his National Security Advisor, with Kissinger continuing in his responsibilities as Secretary of State, and Donald R. Rumsfeld replacing James Schlesinger as the Secretary of Defense. Colby was removed as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, replaced by George H.W. Bush.

During the last year of Ford's presidency, Senator Henry Jackson led critics of détente who viewed it as an amoral foreign policy. That criticism fueled a significant challenge to his presidential candidacy from Ronald Reagan. In response, Ford slowed the momentum both toward an arms control agreement, and toward an agreement in the protracted negotiations on the Panama Canal. Ford was defeated by Jimmy Carter in the 1976 election and left office on January 20, 1977.

**Memorandum for Director, Politico-Military Affairs Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1973

Subject: U.S. Position on Chemical Weapons Limitation – NSSM 157 (U)

(S) We have reviewed the State Initiative on chemical weapons limitations. Our concern is that we not leave ourselves vulnerable to a chemical attack. The Soviets have been modernizing their forces to a degree that their chemical capability exceeds ours both offensively and defensively. Anything we might do to further the gap, such as a declaratory statement or a chemical treaty that would freeze this imbalance - places the United States at a disadvantage. From a military viewpoint, this would be unacceptable.

(S) We are particularly concerned if actions that we take reduce or eliminate our capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack. Such action would withdraw an important option for the President and could require him to face a choice of using nuclear weapons in response to a chemical attack or not responding.

Not to point out the obvious, but this letter demonstrates the strategic deterrent role of chemical weapons, despite the fact that the United States had nuclear weapons. Having the option to retaliate with chemical weapons slowed the rate of nuclear escalation between the two superpowers.

(S) While treaties are desirable, adequate verification provisions must be included to insure we are not placed in an unfavorable position. The verification problems of a chemical weapons treaty have not yet been resolved.

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<sup>1</sup>[http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation\\_and\\_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf](http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/NuclearChemicalBiologicalMatters/188.pdf).

(S) For these reasons we would have trouble supporting your initiative particularly when we have an opportunity to make a quantum jump forward in modernizing our chemical weapons with binary munitions. DOD (OSD and JCS) supports option 1 of NSSM 157.

(C) Obviously we would favor any course of action that would show a willingness to negotiate and we would be willing to work closely with you on future proposals or initiatives in this area.

(signed)  
**Robert C. Hill**

This document is identified as document 33 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

## **National Security Study Memorandum 192<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 7, 1974

TO

The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons Policy

The President has noted the NSSM 157 reports<sup>2</sup> and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee's second annual review of U.S. chemical warfare and biological research programs<sup>3</sup>—which considered, *inter alia*, the need for further examination of U.S. CW posture options following a decision on NSSM 157.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, NSSMs Nos. 104–206. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. Kissinger forwarded the NSSM to Nixon under an undated covering memorandum with the recommendation that he approve its issuance. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-192, Study Memoranda, NSSM 157 [1 of 4])

<sup>2</sup> NSSM 157, “Review of U.S. Position on Chemical Weapons Prohibitions,” July 28, 1972, and the study, August 12, submitted in response to it are Documents 263 and 264 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. E-2, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972*.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

However, prior to deciding what, if any, CW limitations are in the interests of the United States, the President has directed a study of United States deterrent/retaliatory posture options for chemical weapons.

Drawing upon past reports as appropriate, including those noted above, this study should comprise (1) an updated summary of the threat and of the rationale for chemical weapons; (2) an updated review of the U.S. and allied chemical warfare capability and programs, and existing and potential constraints on these programs; and (3) full analysis, with advantages and disadvantages, of such CW posture options as the following:

—Improved offensive and defensive CW capability, with particular emphasis on planned and prospective binary capabilities and forward deployment.

—Reliance on the existing CW capability, including consideration of what actions might be required to avoid significant deterioration of this capability over time.

—Reliance on a more limited CW retaliatory option with some improved defensive measures.

—Reliance on improved defensive measures only (recognizing that this calls into question the retaliatory aspect of the present deterrent/retaliatory policy).

The study should also note the relationship of the above considerations and options to the arms control alternatives set forth in the NSSM 157 report.

The President has directed that this study be performed by an NSC Ad Hoc Group, comprising representatives of the addressees and chaired by a representative of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be submitted for consideration of the Senior Review Group by March 29, 1974.

**Henry A. Kissinger**

This document is identified as document 39 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>

**Paper Prepared by the National Security Study Memorandum 192 Ad Hoc Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

RESPONSE TO NSSM 192<sup>2</sup>  
UNITED STATES CHEMICAL WEAPONS POSTURE

*A. Rationale for Chemical Weapons*

The US has a no-first-use policy for lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons.

The purposes of maintaining a chemical weapons capability are to deter the wartime use of chemical weapons by an adversary against US forces and, if this deterrence fails, to enable US forces to retaliate with chemical weapons.<sup>3</sup>

Nuclear weapons may or may not be as credible a deterrent to chemical warfare as a capability to retaliate in kind. At any rate, a CW

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-202, Study Memorandums, NSSM 192. Top Secret. Guhin, the Ad Hoc Group's chairman, forwarded the paper under a covering memorandum, June 6, to the other members of the group, drawn from the Department, OSD, CIA, and ACDA. Davis forwarded the paper for review to Schlesinger, Sisco, Ikle, Colby, and Moorer under a covering memorandum, June 11.

<sup>2</sup> Document 33.

<sup>3</sup> In the absence of a comparative analysis of all alternatives, the State and ACDA representatives do not believe the need for retaliation in kind has been demonstrated. The State representative believes that an adversary may also be discouraged from initiating use of chemical weapons by an effective CW defensive capability combined with US conventional and nuclear capabilities. [Footnote in the original.]

retaliatory and defensive capability can limit any expectation by an adversary that a significant military advantage might be achieved through initiation of chemical warfare in a conventional conflict. It is generally concluded that a perceived US capability for fullest possible retaliation in kind to any use of CW, including defensive measures and equipment, had an important deterrent effect against the possible use of chemical weapons by Germany in World War II.

There is no real CW threat to CONUS. The primary concern today is possible use by the Soviet Union against US and Allied forces as the Soviets are considered to be well equipped for CW,<sup>4</sup> whereas US and Allied forces are not. The major area of concern is in Europe. Agreed NATO strategy calls for the possession of the capability to employ effectively lethal CW agents in retaliation on a limited scale.

During the late 1940s and through the 1950s, there were concerns that Soviet bombers would use chemical weapons against U.S. cities in the event of total war, but as ICBMs became the main strategic weapon system, that concern faded. Thus, while chemical weapons could be used as strategic weapons, they were considered more useful at the tactical/operational levels.

The Soviets could initiate use of chemical weapons in a conventional war against the US and its allies, despite an international legal obligation not to do so, although Soviet writings and doctrine on CW indicate that they usually consider that any use of chemical weapons would take place in a nuclear warfare environment.<sup>5</sup> The US military doctrine considers chemical weapons of limited usefulness in terms of affecting the overall

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<sup>4</sup> The State and ACDA representatives do not believe available evidence indicates that the Soviets are well equipped offensively in the CW field. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>5</sup> The DOD and CIA representatives note that two sources have indicated that Soviet use of CW would not necessarily be restricted to a nuclear warfare environment. [Footnote in the original.]

military situation in a nuclear warfare environment although their tactical utility would remain.<sup>6</sup>

The US rationale for maintaining a chemical weapons capability is to neutralize any tactical advantage gained by an adversary from the use of CW. If an adversary were to initiate use of CW in war, he could gain a significant tactical net advantage against the defender depending upon the latter's defensive capabilities and retaliatory reactions. The extent of any overall military advantage would depend upon the timing extent of the adversary's use of CW. There may be no overall advantage in a nuclear warfare environment.

Even if the best protective equipment currently available were used by the defender, he would still suffer a serious net disadvantage in casualties and tactical mobility since his forces would be encumbered by the necessary protective equipment. The military disadvantage imposed by the use of CW could not be redressed without either effective CW retaliation, thereby imposing similar severe operational constraints on the attacker, or effective retaliation with tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup> (Presumably, however, an initiator of CW would be well prepared in a higher protective posture, at least in the first stages, to operate in a toxic environment.)

A capability to respond effectively in kind with CW would provide the President a similar weapon retaliation option to attempt to redress the situation imposed by an adversary's use of CW at an intermediate, non-nuclear level.<sup>8</sup> This CW retaliatory option may not, however, eliminate a need eventually to move to tactical use of nuclear weapons to redress the overall conflict situation. In addition, as noted in the later sections, there are currently chemical materiel shortages, insufficient prepositioning of

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<sup>6</sup> The ACDA representative believes that in the event nuclear weapons were used, they would so completely dominate the battlefield situation and possibilities for war termination that use or non-use of chemical weapons would not affect the outcome. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>7</sup> Based on analysis to date, the State and ACDA representatives are not convinced of the validity of the military judgments expressed in this paragraph. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>8</sup> The DOD and CIA representatives believe that an adequate CW capability would make the need to resort to tactical nuclear weapons less likely in the event CW was initiated against US forces, and that abandonment of a CW capability could possibly lower the nuclear threshold. [Footnote in the original.]

chemical munitions, and marginal defensive postures on the part of the US and its Allies generally. Unless these shortages and deficiencies were corrected by Allies as well as by the US, there may well be no effective response other than to employ tactical nuclear weapons to redress losses and gain the initiative should an enemy initiate large-scale chemical operations.<sup>9</sup>

[Omitted here is Section B, entitled “Threat Assessment and Other Foreign Capabilities.” For a summary of this section, see the attachment to Document 51.]

### *C. US Capabilities and Possible Improvements*

The overall capability of the US must be measured in terms of both the defensive capability of US forces to operate in a toxic environment and the offensive capability to conduct retaliatory operations. Although these capabilities are clearly interrelated, they are discussed separately below and, in any event, the major defensive deficiencies need to be addressed in large part irrespective of the offensive posture. Allied CW capabilities, although clearly related to the overall US posture, are addressed separately.

#### *Defensive Capability*

The current capability of all US forces to operate in a chemical or toxic environment<sup>10</sup> has been improving but is still generally inadequate and marginal at best. US forces are today ill-prepared to survive or launch chemical attacks or to continue operations in a chemically contaminated environment.

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<sup>9</sup> The ACDA representative believes that if US and Allied CW defensive capabilities were improved, an increased response with conventional weapons would be sufficient to redress the military situation. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>10</sup> A toxic environment may be chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR). With the exception of detection, alarms, and medical countermeasures, defensive measures against a biological attack are generally common to those for chemical attack. Although there are measures or items which are unique to a radiologically-contaminated environment, there are important areas noted below where improvements in chemical defense would equally improve the defensive capability of US forces in a biological or radiological environment. Similarly, an inadequate capability in these specific areas means an inadequacy of US forces to operate in any toxic environment. [Footnote in the original.]

Protective masks are adequate in both quality and quantity for most US forces. However, masks need to be developed for crew members of high performance aircraft and other specialized applications. Some manual detection and very few collectively protected vehicles, vans, and shelters (where personnel can operate without wearing individual protective equipment) are available. Protective clothing liners are available for less than half of all US Army forces. They are available for all Army forces stationed in Europe, but this type clothing needs to be complemented by an outer-garment for front line units. Medical materiel is generally adequate for the treatment of CW casualties except that an effective therapy for soman [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has not yet been developed.

There are deficiencies in most other types of defensive equipment either because quantities procured to date are insufficient or because the items have not yet completed development. The primary deficiencies are in the following areas:

—Automatic CW point detectors/alarms are being procured, but will not be available in adequate quantities until FY 80; and area scanning CW detectors/alarms are being developed.

—Inadequate stocks of protective clothing for all US forces.

—Protected shelters for command, medical, and logistics support in any toxic environment and protective equipment for specialized vans and vehicles are in inadequate supply.

—Decontamination equipment for operations in any toxic environment is in limited supply. Improved decontaminating techniques are being developed, but decontaminants, especially for aircraft and ships, require further technological advances.

A lack of other more specialized defensive equipment collectively contributes to the general inadequacy of the current US defensive posture against CW.

The M8 automatic chemical agent alarm was fielded in the 1960s, but was not very reliable. The M8A1 alarm used a different technology and was fielded in the mid-1980s. The U.S. Army was purchasing British protective suits for their forces in Europe, given a lack of investment in U.S. R&D projects. For the most part, collective protection was not designed into vehicles and shelters, and DS-2 decontaminant did work, but had significant shortcomings.

However, one of the fundamental deficiencies is the lack of emphasis, despite recent improvements, given to training of forces for operations in a toxic environment. Inadequately trained forces cannot take full advantage of either the defensive or offensive capabilities available to them.

The chemical (and directly related biological and radiological) defensive RDT&E budget from FY 69 through FY 74 has averaged \$14.6 million annually. The budget for procurement of defensive items has averaged \$14 million over the same time period. Funding at this level has not provided an adequate defensive posture.

#### *Improving Defensive Capabilities*

*Projected Adequate Posture.*<sup>11</sup> Development of certain items generally within the current state-of-the-art, procurement of the major items which are in insufficient supply today, and improvements in training could provide US forces with an adequate defensive posture. Relatively few qualitative deficiencies need to be overcome to achieve the improvements necessary to this posture. Its achievement is dependent primarily on the acquisition of adequate quantities of equipment (mainly detectors/alarms, protective shelters, and protective clothing) already standardized or in the latter stages of development and on improved training. Based on current service projections, an overall adequate defensive posture (as now conceived) could not be attained until sometime in the mid 1980's, although specific improvements will be attained prior to that time. DOD estimates that to achieve this posture for US forces would

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<sup>11</sup> As used here, "adequate" means that US forces will be able to defend themselves, but there will be a significant degradation (about 20%) in the performance capability of individuals and units. [Footnote in the original.]

require expenditures in the range of \$560–\$720 million spread out over the next 8 years.

*Substantially Improved Posture.*<sup>12</sup> Acquisition of larger quantities of already standard defensive equipment plus the solution to a greater number of qualitative deficiencies in current defensive equipment would provide a substantially improved defensive posture wherein the average degradation in individual and unit performance capability could be significantly less than 20%. In addition to the improvements outlined in the above section, achievement of this posture would require qualitative and quantitative improvements in detection equipment, air crew protection, a greater variety and increased numbers of protected shelters and vehicles, and a more extensive decontamination capability.<sup>13</sup> However, solutions to some of the qualitative problems (for example, developing improved decontaminants for aircraft and ships) are not yet in sight. DOD estimates that costs for achieving this posture for US forces might range from \$1.25 billion upwards spread out over 10–12 years, but further definition would be required to estimate actual costs and to conduct cost-benefit analysis.

*Sophisticated Defensive Posture.* A very sophisticated defensive posture would be one where forces could not only defend against chemical attack, but also operate in a toxic environment for extended periods with little or no degradation of performance. Significant qualitative improvements would have to be achieved through research and development in most defensive equipment, but most particularly in individual protective equipment which, if it were relatively comfortable and caused no significant impairment of normal activity, might reduce requirements for shelters and decontamination equipment. Some such qualitative improvements are believed to be technically feasible; it is not known if others will be. DOD estimates that costs to achieve this posture for US forces might range from \$3 billion upwards spread out over 15

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<sup>12</sup> Such a defensive posture is conceived to exist somewhere between what is currently foreseen as adequate and an idealized defensive system, but cannot be further defined at this time. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>13</sup> The ACDA representative believes that basic research on vaccination against nerve agents has been encouraging and that, if vaccination proves feasible, it could significantly improve the US and Allied defensive posture in the mid-1980s. [Footnote in the original.]

years, but even more definition would be required to estimate actual costs than in the preceding posture.

### *Offensive Capability*

US policy, established by NSDM 35<sup>14</sup> of November 1969, calls for the maintenance of a deterrent/retaliatory CW posture. The JCS military objective, in the event US forces were subjected to CW attack, is a CW capability to conduct the operations required at all levels in a conventional chemical warfare environment until hostilities and/or the use of CW are terminated. Estimated requirements of the commanders-in-chief are based on the 90-day standard stockage objective for conventional equipment for war in Europe and the 180-day capability standard for other theaters.<sup>15</sup> These requirements are being evaluated by the JCS.

Such requirements have never been integrated into an overall national requirement. Moreover, what the US CW posture should be has never been defined at higher levels.

Basing requirements on the 90-day and 180-day stockage standard may be open to question given (1) the indications that the Soviets usually consider that any use of CW would take place in a nuclear warfare environment;<sup>16</sup> (2) US and Allied emphasis on conventional and nuclear capabilities; (3) the very limited capability of US Allies to defend against CW; and (4) the absence of Allied offensive CW capabilities.

*Current Stockpile.* Excluding those agents/munitions scheduled for disposal or considered excess, the current national stockpile consists of approximately 22,400 agent tons, including 14,000 tons of nerve agent GB and VX and 8,400 tons of mustard in bulk and filled munitions as indicated by the table below.

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<sup>14</sup> NSDM 35, "US Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/ Biological Research Program," November 25, 1969, is Document 104, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972.

<sup>15</sup> The estimated munitions requirements are still greater for Europe because of the greater number of US divisions earmarked for deployment there. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>16</sup> The DOD and CIA representatives note that two sources have indicated that Soviet use of CW would not necessarily be restricted to a nuclear warfare environment. [Footnote in the original.]

*CURRENT STOCKPILE (in Agent Tons)*

<u>Agent</u>	<u>Ground Munitions</u>	<u>Air Munitions</u>	<u>Bulk</u>	<u>Total</u>
GB	3,843	1,230	4,400	9,473
VX	2,145	680	1,800	4,625
Mustard	3,534	—	4,800	8,334
Total	9,522	1,910	11,000	22,432

The stockpile is deployed as follows: 92% is stored in CONUS; 6% on Johnston Island in the Pacific; and 2% in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

*Durability of CW Stocks.* CW agents generally have a very extended (decades) and perhaps indefinite storage life, whether stored in suitable munitions or in bulk containers. The toxicity of the CW agents themselves is not known to be significantly degraded during storage.

Experience during the recent disposal of lethal chemical agents has indicated, however, a possible physical deterioration of GB and bulk mustard agents. Their toxicity still appears unchanged, but some of these agents might have to be further purified prior to loading into munitions, with a resultant 5–10% loss of volume of any amount that requires purification.

Most CW filled munitions are considered to have a storage life of at least 20 years. An exception is a USAF VX-filled spray tank which had a designed storage life of only five years. The munition reached that age in 1973 and after inspection, the storage life was extended another five years. Similar extensions in the future cannot be assumed.

This was the TMU-28 spray tank, which held more than 1300 pounds of nerve agent.
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The useful life of the CW munitions is generally controlled more by possible phase-out of delivery systems than by deterioration of the agents or munitions. The 4.2 inch mortar (1,390 tons of mustard, about half of which is considered a requirement in the Pacific theater) and the single-purpose M-91 rocket launcher (2,600 tons of nerve agent in M55 rockets

for the European theater) may be phased out by the Army in the 1980's. When and if these actions were taken, they would reduce the employable munitions inventory from 11,400 to 7,400 agent tons. The storage life of the spray tank mentioned above might expire within the same time frame, and thereby reduce the current munition inventory by 680 agent tons. The 105 mm howitzer (1,540 agent tons, half of which is mustard) is presently used only by US airborne and air mobile units and some US allies. The agents themselves can be recovered from unserviceable or phased-out munitions, but the process entails a loss of 2–10% of the agents involved.

The remaining filled munitions are not expected to have any problems of obsolescence or deterioration at least through the 1980's and perhaps much longer.

*Employment Capability.* Various illustrative examples on employment capabilities with the current stockpile are given below. These illustrations are based upon JCS estimated average military requirements of 8 agent tons per US division per day in Europe.<sup>17</sup>

These illustrations also focus on the area of the primary perceived threat—the Soviet threat to NATO—and include illustrative limited support levels for US Allies since it is unlikely that any of them (except possibly France) could independently acquire any meaningful capability during a period of strategic warning of impending hostilities.

Prepositioned stocks in Europe could provide combat support with nerve agent artillery shells for only 4-7 US divisions for about a week or for 3 days for 13-15 divisions if appropriately distributed. No air munitions are prepositioned in Europe.

Present chemical munitions could begin arriving in the field from CONUS by air in 7-10 days from their storage depots. This time could be shortened to about 5-7 days if sufficient priority and airlift allocation were assigned. To provide adequate stocks on a continuing basis for 15 US divisions, would require approximately 25% of the current Air Force strategic airlift capability (but a significantly lesser percentage of the potential national strategic airlift capability). The first CW supplies from CONUS to Europe by surface transport would require approximately 60

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<sup>17</sup> The State and ACDA representatives note that an analytical base for this estimated military requirement has not been presented. [Footnote in the original.]

days. Adequate quantities could be provided thereafter on a continuing basis with one shipload every three days.<sup>18</sup>

If all currently employable munitions in the national stockpile were provided and distributed appropriately in Europe, they would provide full support for 13-15 divisions in that theater for about 30 days but only marginal support for 90 days since there is only 45 days of one type (GB) of 155 mm artillery and about 30 days of filled air munitions. (The residual capability of the refillable spray tanks would provide only limited air support.)

If 13-15 US divisions were to utilize estimated requirements for 30 days, the remaining US stocks of employable munitions (not including bulk) could provide some support in ground munitions for about 30 Allied divisions for this same period, but at best only extremely limited support in ground munitions for 90 days. Any support to Allies would require either greater demands on US resupply capabilities or the provision of less than the estimated daily requirements for US forces. The days of support in Europe provided by the currently employable munitions would be reduced if munitions earmarked for US forces in that theater were to be phased-out by the Army or become unserviceable, or if any support earmarked for Europe were diverted to other theaters (for example, the Pacific).

If the US were capable of filling existing bulk agent into the necessary munitions on a timely basis (which it is not at present, see improvements section below), the estimated employment capabilities mentioned above would be almost doubled although some deficiencies in nerve agent munitions could still exist.

*Deficiencies in US CW Offensive Capability.*<sup>19</sup> Strictly in terms of total tonnage, but not in terms of its overall composition, the current CW stockpile of 22,400 agent tons exceeds the 18,000 to 20,000 agent tons

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<sup>18</sup> The State and ACDA representatives note that under current planning the US could field 9 divisions in Europe within 20 days of the mobilization decision and that the 15 division figure would not be attained before 70–80 days after mobilization. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>19</sup> The State and ACDA representatives note that the deficiencies discussed in this section are derived from previously stated requirements for which no analytical base had been presented. They believe that the possibility of trade-offs between munitions stocks and improved defensive capabilities should be considered. [Footnote in the original.]

which the JCS previously estimated to be required for an adequate CW deterrent/retaliatory capability for all US forces. However, given the estimated military requirement of at least a 90-day full support capability for 13-15+ US divisions in Europe and 10-12+ US divisions in other theaters, there are two broad deficiencies in our current stockpile capability.

—The composition of the existing stockpile is considered unsatisfactory in several respects. Specifically, (1) more air munitions and more of one type of artillery shell (155 mm GB) would be required to increase the present 30-day full support capability for 13–15 US divisions in Europe to a 90-day capability; (2) a far greater number of the above and of almost all other munitions would be required to provide a 180-day full support capability for US divisions in other theaters; (3) about 31% of the filled munitions capability and 40% of the bulk stocks consist of mustard agent which is less effective than nerve agent;<sup>20</sup> and (4) the bulk nerve agent is not useable until loaded into munitions and this could not be accomplished today on a timely basis in the event of chemical warfare. (The number of available filled munitions would be reduced if the Army were to phase-out some delivery systems in the 1980's or if some munitions became unserviceable.)

—We have very limited forward deployment. It is doubtful that the prepositioned stocks (440 agent tons) in the FRG could support local tactical operations for 4-7 divisions for as much as a week, and no air munitions (which are necessary for adequate support) are prepositioned. Moreover, there are stocks *at only one site*. Even in an emergency and assuming sufficient priority, it would take at least 5-7 days before stocks could begin to arrive from CONUS. Finally, there are no prepositioned stocks for other theaters, although 6% of the stockpile is located on Johnston Island in the Pacific.

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<sup>20</sup> Since mustard solidifies at 57°F, it is quite effective in tropical climates (e.g., the Pacific theater) but of limited usefulness in temperate areas (e.g., Europe). However, it has a proven casualty-producing capability under any circumstances. In warmer climes, it has a relatively persistent vapor threat which can force troops into prolonged wearing of protective clothing. Given a favorable climate (a tropical area or summertime in Europe), mustard could be used as a substitute in some of the roles where persistent nerve agent VX is considered more effective. [Footnote in the original.]

Limited forward deployment is considered a deficiency because it could well mean delay in responding to an adversary's use of CW in war. If stocks were moved during strategic warning time or any time prior to the use of CW, then limited forward deployment in peacetime is not a major deficiency. If not moved, however, then CW retaliation with other than the limited prepositioned stocks would be delayed until shipments could begin arriving from CONUS. To do this quickly would require 25% of the Air Force's strategic airlift capability (although a significantly lesser percentage of the national airlift capability).

*Possible Improvements Using Existing Agent Stockpile*

Very significant improvements in the US CW offensive capability could be made without further production of CW agents. Actions which could be taken to improve the CW stockpile substantially include:

—Using existing bulk agent to fill additional munitions, prior to any impending hostilities. This would entail manufacture of munition hardware, reactivation and expansion of the filling lines for VX at Newport, Indiana, and establishment of filling lines at Tooele, Utah—where most of the other bulk stocks are stored. There would be no need to ship agent to filling lines during peacetime, but there might be a problem regarding storage of filled munitions rather than bulk agent at Newport. DOD roughly estimates costs for filling existing bulk stocks at Newport (VX) and Tooele (GB and VX) in the range of \$200 million to \$400 million spread out over several years. These cost estimates do not include inflation factors or operation and maintenance.

—In addition to the improvements in the above section, the impact of any phasing-out of munitions could be further reduced substantially by recovering the agent during demilitarization to fill new munitions rather than disposing of it. Such a course could also require reactivation or construction of munition filling facilities and acquisition of munition hardware as noted above. Costs of recovering the agent are insignificant in relation to the overall disposal costs.

—Establishing a capability to produce complete CW munitions within 30–45 days using bulk agent stocks could reduce the amount of CW munitions required in any existing stockpile. This would require (1) establishing a stockpile of fuses and other long lead-time hardware items sufficient to allow filling operations to proceed until newly produced items

become available, and (2) maintaining munition filling facilities in a high state of readiness (including periodic production/ filling test runs and an adequate work force at least on call). DOD roughly estimated costs (not including inflation factors) for accomplishing this warm base capability range from \$850 million to \$1 billion spread out over 5 years.<sup>21</sup>

Reconfiguration of existing stocks could essentially eliminate the impact of potential degradation of the existing stockpile by the phasing-out of delivery systems in the 1980's. (This is time sensitive however, since phasing-out munition types would mean a degradation of the existing stockpile unless or until a substitute capability were made available.)

In addition, the US could achieve a 90-day full support capability for 13-15 US divisions in Europe by reconfiguring almost all of the existing agent tons of bulk nerve agent stocks into munitions. Reconfiguration of the remaining bulk stocks or agent recovered through demilitarization could *in principle* provide enough munitions for the JCS estimated adequate capability, but 57-66% of the support for theaters other than Europe would consist of useful but less effective mustard agent. Reconfiguration of present stocks would neither enable the US to replace its less effective mustard agent with nerve agent, nor provide a means of attempting to increase forward deployment. Total reconfiguration would probably mean some transportation of agents and/or munitions.

#### *Improvements Using Binary CW Munitions*

Binary munitions would contain two relatively safe, separate chemical components which combine to form the standard lethal nerve agents GB or VX while the munition is en route to target. There are DOD plans to correct the major deficiencies in the composition of the current stockpile by acquisition of binary munitions. Binaries could eventually replace all existing CW munitions and bulk agents stocks. Binaries are not planned to represent a net increase in the total CW stockpile level.

The binary program is concentrating first on artillery rounds and then projects development of aurally delivered bombs. Present programmed

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<sup>21</sup> A warm base capability alone could extend the days of support for CW but a capability to begin providing adequate support from bulk agent stocks within 90 days after a decision to fill and load would involve very high costs. [Footnote in the original.]

production is limited to artillery munitions for which production is scheduled to begin in 1976 or 1977. DOD estimated total remaining costs—including RDT&E, procurement, and production base support for these artillery shells are about \$180 million. Development of air munitions will require 4-5 years before production could begin. Procurement of artillery and aerial delivered munitions in the sufficient quantities and agent types outlined below would correct the present estimated deficiencies in the agent and munition composition of the stockpile.<sup>22</sup>

Based on JCS's previous estimate that 18,000-20,000 agent tons in filled munitions would be required to provide full support for all US forces (25-27 divisions), the following actions would be necessary to correct the deficiencies in the composition of the current stockpile.

—Construction of at least two production, filling, and loading facilities, and manufacture of hardware. (Funds have been requested for establishing one production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. One component for each agent and munition hardware will be procured from industry by contract.)

—Production and stockpiling of the binary equivalent of 9,000-11,000 nerve agent tons in filled munitions. (The binary equivalent for this amount of nerve agent would be 11,250-13,750 agent tons.) However, the production and stockpiling of the binary equivalent of 6,500 agent tons in filled munitions (or 8,125 binary agent tons), combined with existing munitions earmarked for Europe, would provide a 90-day full support capability for 13-15 US divisions in that theater if the Army does not phase-out existing CW rockets.

—Very limited open-air testing (beginning in the 1975-76 time frame) may prove necessary prior to procurement of munitions. However, an extensive simulation program is being conducted which is designed to reduce/eliminate the requirement for open-air testing.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Since the Army Materiel Command has not yet provided technical information on the effectiveness of binaries requested by ACDA, the ACDA representative reserves judgment on whether or not binary munitions would be as effective as their non-binary counterparts [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>23</sup> The stimulant program to date has resolved most of the technical questions regarding the artillery shells raised by as OST technical experts panel in a 1973 report submitted as part of NSSM 157. However, the potential and significant problem of “flashing” (very rapid burning and consequent destruction of the binary agent) has not yet been resolved.

DOD estimated costs for the currently projected binary program (about 7,600 binary agent tons in ground and air munitions) are \$333 million spread out over the next 5+ years. To attain what the JCS estimates is needed to acquire an adequate capability overall would require about an additional 3,650–6,150 binary agent tons. These costs do not include either operation and maintenance of facilities or any inflation factors, or demilitarization costs.<sup>24</sup>

#### *Peacetime Forward Deployment*

From a military standpoint, it would be highly desirable to achieve a fully adequate retaliatory capability. To achieve this would require an increase in peacetime forward deployment regardless of what actions are or are not taken to correct some or all of the deficiencies in the composition of the stockpile.

Forward deployment and some dispersal of 840-1,200 agent tons in filled munitions would be needed to provide full support for 15 US divisions for 7-10 days (that is, until the first supplies from CONUS could arrive by air). (Only 440 agent tons are now prepositioned.) From the military point of view, forward deployed stocks would preferably be on the order of 7,500 agent tons in filled munitions to provide full support for 15 US divisions until surface shipments could arrive from CONUS.

Increasing peacetime forward deployment with existing CW munitions is not considered possible under present circumstances. Binaries would provide a means to shorten the time for rapid deployment by a couple days and/or to seek increased peacetime forward deployment because of their safety advantages in storage and transport. As noted in a

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In the opinion of the OST panel, final standardization of munitions may at any rate necessitate open-air testing with lethal agents. Any DOD proposal to conduct such testing would be forwarded for Presidential approval. [Footnote in the original. The OST forwarded its report on CW stockpile stability and the binary program, summarized above, to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 29, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-66, Meeting Files, 1969–1974, Senior Review Group Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73)]

<sup>24</sup> Costs for the above binary program and for previously discussed improvements using the existing stockpile do not include substantial demilitarization costs which would be incurred under both courses of action, although initially (10 years) they would be higher under the binary option. [Footnote in the original.]

later section, however, political factors in western Europe would make it very difficult to obtain approval for increased peacetime forward deployment and dispersal.

Binaries would also offer an option of forward deploying the complete munition minus one relatively light component which could be easily shipped to Europe or other theaters, although some additional complete munitions would still need to be forward deployed for JCS estimated fully adequate support.

[Omitted here are Section D, "European Allies' Capabilities," and Section E, "Non-Military Constraints on Present Capability."]

#### *F. Posture Alternatives*

There are three basic alternatives relative to the US CW posture. As noted below, each posture alternative has different implications for the arms control options considered in the NSSM 157 report.<sup>25</sup> The NSSM 157 options included (1) limiting CW stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels; (2) banning production of CW agents; and (3) banning production and stockpiles of CW agents and munitions. These limitations could be embodied in a treaty proposal, a unilateral declaration of policy, or parallel US and USSR declarations of policy (that is, in effect, a bilateral moratorium).

The basic US CW posture alternatives are:

##### *Alternative 1. Acquisition of Binary Chemical Weapons.*

Full plans for the binary program have not been completed. Current DOD projections include the acquisition of about 7,600 nerve agent tons in ground and air munitions. DOD estimates the total cost at \$333 million over 5 or more years. This estimate does not include any inflation factor, operation and maintenance costs, or demilitarization costs for an equivalent portion of the existing stockpile.

The currently projected level of binary acquisition, combined with the existing filled munitions, would *not* achieve what the JCS previously estimated for an adequate deterrent/ retaliatory capability for all US forces. Based on estimated military requirements, the projected stocks with acquisition of binaries would provide full support in ground

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<sup>25</sup> See footnote 2, Document 33.

munitions for about 23 US divisions for 90 days—but only about 60 days full support in air munitions for 13-15 US divisions.

DOD's estimated adequate CW defensive posture for this alternative would encompass improvements in the quantity and quality of defensive equipment and improved training at DOD's currently projected levels of \$560 million to \$720 million over 8 years. A substantially improved defensive posture above the currently projected level would be militarily desirable, and would mainly involve higher quantitative and qualitative improvements in equipment.

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative would be compatible with only Option 1 of the NSSM 157 study (limiting stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels), whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral declaration of policy, or bilateral US/USSR moratorium.

#### *Advantages*

—Binary acquisition at the currently projected level (coupled with an improved defensive posture) would provide a significantly improved CW retaliatory capability for US forces, thus enhancing the non-nuclear option in the event an adversary initiated use of CW in war,<sup>26</sup> and correcting a major portion of the deficiencies in the composition of the existing stockpile.

—Acquisition of a significant binary capability may provide a better deterrent against use of CW in a future conventional conflict.

—Binaries would involve essentially no potential safety hazards in their peacetime manufacture, storage, handling, and transportation; and would therefore probably not be subject to the same federal legal restrictions on peacetime storage and movement in CONUS as are the current stocks.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> However, unless US Allies (particularly NATO) were to improve their defensive and undertake the development of some offensive CW capabilities (or unless the US increased its CW stocks substantially for Allied forces), (1) the concept of CW providing an intermediate option between nuclear and conventional warfare would hold true only for US forces; and (2) tactical nuclear weapons may still be the only effective response to redress the military situation should the Soviets initiate CW operations. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>27</sup> The safety and rapid deployment advantages would not apply to the major portion of the existing CW munition stockpile which will remain part of the US capability for the foreseeable future. [Footnote in the original.]

—Binaries would facilitate rapid deployment in war or crises.<sup>28</sup>

—If the Navy were to carry binary chemical weapons routinely in peacetime, this could reduce dependence on forward deployment in Europe. (Navy policy is not to carry existing chemical stocks in peacetime.)

—Binaries would provide the only possibility for increasing peacetime forward deployment in Europe and, if desired and accomplished by the US, this would greatly reduce problems of CW munitions resupply in a conflict. (However, it would be politically difficult to achieve increased peacetime forward deployment, and this could not be achieved without incurring substantial political opposition in Allied governments and publics.)

—Binary acquisition at higher levels than currently projected would enable the US to acquire what the JCS has estimated as a fully adequate CW stockpile and, if the US were able to accomplish increased peacetime forward deployment, a fully adequate CW posture.

#### *Disadvantages*

—Acquisition of binary chemical weapons in peacetime would undoubtedly be controversial in Congress. (Any CW budget increases would be highly visible politically. Binary dollar costs would be low in comparison to other DOD programs. But the binary program, not to mention defensive improvements, would require sustaining substantial budget increases over the current funding level for several years. If binaries were inadequately funded by Congress, the US could incur much of the disadvantages below without achieving a significant military advantage.)

—Limited open-air testing may prove necessary prior to procurement, and this would certainly be controversial in the US.

Open-air testing would remain controversial, so the Army attempted to use chemical simulants to prove the effectiveness of the munitions in development. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the GAO had issues with that approach, preferring live tests to simulants.

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<sup>28</sup> Footnote 27 above is again herein referenced.

—Binary acquisition would be perceived internationally and domestically as contrary to our declared interest in further CW arms control, and the US would be criticized by the Soviets and others at the CCD and the UNGA for “refueling a CW arms race.”

—This might spur further Soviet programs in the CW area, an area where they are not subject to similar political restraints, and the adequacy of the proposed improvements could be called into question by a significant augmentation in the Soviet capability.

—The deterrent effect of a significantly improved US CW capability might be reduced if the Soviets viewed it as signaling a US intention or threat to initiate use of CW in wartime.<sup>29</sup>

—This might lead to further proliferation of CW capabilities.<sup>30</sup>

*Alternative 2. Reliance on Existing CW Offensive Capability.*

This alternative would rely on the existing CW-filled munitions capability and not entail production of any CW agents (binary or non-binary). It does not rule out filling munitions from existing bulk agent stocks to compensate for any phasing-out of delivery systems in the 1980's. To maintain the existing capability might require some filling actions as early as the late 1970's or early 1980's. This alternative does not contemplate significantly improving the US CW retaliatory capability by reconfiguring most existing bulk agent stocks in munitions.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The DOD representative questions this conclusion in the absence of supporting analysis. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>30</sup> The JCS representative believes that binaries would not necessarily lead to any proliferation of CW capabilities. The ACDA representative believes that unless proliferation of CW capabilities is controlled, the possibility that third countries may initiate CW against US Allies may become a more serious concern in the long-term than the threat of use in Europe. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>31</sup> The State and ACDA representatives note that the option to improve the existing CW capability by reconfiguration of bulk stocks would be left open, even if an agent production ban were desired and successfully negotiated. If filling facilities were later established to compensate for potential phaseout of some munitions, a gradual but substantial improvement of the overall capability could be undertaken with comparatively little additional dollar costs. This could provide, for example, almost a 90-day full support capability for 15 US divisions in Europe.

The State and ACDA representatives believe this course for significantly improving the US CW capability would be less controversial and provocative internationally and less

The current filled munitions could provide full support for 13-15 US divisions in Europe for about 30 days. The then remaining ground munitions could either provide marginal support for the next 60 days for 13-15 US divisions, or be used in other theaters, or be used to support about 30 allied divisions for the initial 30 days.

This option envisions maintenance of an adequate CW R&D program in all phases and does not rule out continuing R&D on binary munitions.

As with the preceding alternative, DOD estimates that improvements in training and CW defensive equipment would be required at least at the currently projected level. However, in contrast to the preceding alternative, it would be even more desirable militarily to achieve the substantially improved defensive posture discussed previously, which would entail more CW defensive dollar costs than DOD's currently projected level.<sup>32</sup>

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative would be most compatible with Option 2 (prohibiting further production of CW agents) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral US declaration of policy, or parallel US and USSR declarations of policy (i.e., a bilateral moratorium).<sup>33</sup> As long as the manufacture of munitions and the filling of these munitions with existing bulk agent stocks were not prohibited, the US would retain the right to compensate for any diminution of its existing capability through possible phase-out of delivery systems in the 1980's.

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expensive than acquisition of binaries, as it could be presented as a continuation of the current program. This could be particularly the case if the US were to negotiate an agent production ban.

The DOD representative believes such action would be equally if not more controversial, particularly domestically. DOD notes that this would not enable the US to replace the less effective mustard agent (earmarked for non-European theaters) with nerve agent. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>32</sup> The JCS representative believes that it would be necessary to achieve the substantially improved defensive posture under this alternative. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>33</sup> The State representative believes that if the US decided to seek a prohibition on producing CW agents, the advanced state of binary R&D would place the US in a strong bargaining position. [Footnote in the original.]

### *Advantages*

—The US would retain its existing CW capability (although limited) to deter the use of CW against US forces and, if deterrence fails, to retaliate in kind.

—This would be a less controversial and provocative posture, domestically and internationally, than any other alternative at least up until the time that any filling were undertaken to compensate for phase-out of some delivery systems.

—This would be consistent with our declared commitment to seek effective measures to control CW, could provide more flexibility for arms control negotiations than the other alternatives if a ban on production of CW agents were desired.

—This would be less likely than the preceding alternative to encourage the Soviets to increase their CW capability or to encourage any further proliferation of CW capabilities.

—This would cost somewhat less than the preceding alternative, even if filling actions were undertaken later (much less if they were not), and substantially less than the following alternative.

### *Disadvantages*

—This would not enable the US to attain what the JCS estimates to be an adequate deterrent/retaliatory CW capability because the previously discussed deficiencies in the composition and, secondarily, in the deployment of the stockpile would remain.

—To maintain the existing filled munitions capability would require some reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks into munitions sometime after 1978, and this would undoubtedly be controversial, in Congress and US public opinion, and involve highly visible budget increases.

—Potential safety hazards associated in the public mind with peacetime storage and transportation of existing lethal chemical weapons would not be alleviated. (No need for peacetime transportation of agents or munitions is foreseen for at least 5 years. Significant local pressures to destroy stocks at certain storage sites is considered unlikely in the foreseeable future although this could occur as manifested by the experience with the stocks at Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver.)

*Alternative 3. Reliance Only on Conventional and Nuclear Forces and Improved CW Defensive Capability, with No Ready CW Stockpile.*

This alternative envisions within 10-15 years reliance only on US conventional and nuclear capabilities, combined with an improved CW defensive posture, to provide deterrence against the wartime use of CW by an adversary and for retaliation in the event such deterrence fails. If CW were used on a significant scale against US forces, retaliation with tactical nuclear and conventional weapons could redress the overall military disadvantage imposed by the adversary's use of CW.

The existing filled munitions capability would, however, remain for the first 5-8 years. This would envision as a minimum the attainment of the improvements in the defensive posture at DOD's currently projected levels before any substantial disposal of the munitions stockpile were made, other than that resulting from some munitions possibly becoming unserviceable. By the time disposal is completed, it would be highly desirable militarily to have achieved the substantially improved and more expensive defensive posture discussed previously. It would be even more desirable militarily to have achieved the sophisticated defensive posture, if technologically possible, which would allow forces to operate in a toxic environment for extended periods with little degradation of performance.

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative coincides with Option 3 (prohibiting both stockpiles and production of CW agents and munitions) of the NSSM 157 study, whether embodied in a treaty proposal, unilateral US declaration of policy, or bilateral US/USSR moratorium.

*Advantages*

—This would be welcomed internationally and domestically by some as a US initiative to restrain CW.

—This would avoid the political costs of binary acquisition under Alternative 1 or any possible reconfiguration of existing bulk stocks under Alternative 2.

—This would provide an opportunity (if desired) to place political and legal constraints on Soviet CW stockpiling and production through CW arms control, although such constraints could not be reliably verified.

—A sophisticated defensive posture, if attainable, would greatly reduce but not necessarily eliminate the overall advantages an adversary could gain through initiating the use of CW in a conventional conflict.

*Disadvantages*

—The absence of any significant ready CW retaliatory capability could be more likely to tempt the Soviets to initiate use of CW in a conventional war, although they would still have to consider the likelihood of a tactical nuclear response by the US or its Allies.

—If chemical weapons were used by the Soviets against US and Allied forces on a significant or large scale in a conventional war, there would be no military option to respond in kind and, therefore, it would probably be necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the military situation.<sup>34</sup>

—There would be strong controversy in Congress and, to a lesser degree, with some Allies for the above reasons and because we would not be able to determine what the Soviets are doing in this area.

—This would entail higher dollar costs over the next 10-15 years than Alternative 2 and somewhat higher dollar costs than Alternative 1 (but possibly lower costs thereafter).

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<sup>34</sup> However, as noted previously, unless the existing CW offensive and defensive deficiencies were corrected by the US and its Allies, tactical nuclear weapons may at any rate provide the only effective response to redress the military situation should the Soviets initiate chemical operations in war. The ACDA representative believes that if US and Allied forces had achieved a substantially improved CW defensive posture, a response with conventional weapons would be sufficient to redress the military situation. Moreover, the ACDA representative believes that any increased reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, whether explicit or implicit, would be undesirable from the arms control point of view and that this disadvantage would seem to outweigh the arms control benefits of this alternative. The ACDA representative believes, however, that there is a variant of Alternative 3 which should be considered. This variant would place reliance only on conventional forces and an improved CW defensive posture. It would not explicitly introduce the question of tactical nuclear weapons use, but at the same time recognizes that any large-scale war in Europe would pose for the aggressor a risk of nuclear escalation in any event—whether or not he introduced the use of chemical weapons. [Footnote in the original.]

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**Memorandum from David D. Elliott of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1975

SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons

An SRG meeting on this subject is scheduled for January 27, 1975. The issues are:

—Should we improve our chemical weapons (CW) offensive capability by producing and stockpiling new binary chemical weapons (NSSM 192)?

—Should we seek some international agreement on CW restraints (even though none could be reliably verified), and what are our options for such restraints (discussed in the 1972–73 NSSM 157 and follow-on reports)?<sup>2</sup>

—What joint initiatives are we prepared to consider with the USSR on limiting the most lethal CW agents (in light of the 1974 Summit statement on this subject)?<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 14, Senior Review Group Meeting, 1/27/75—CW Policy (NSSM 192) (2). Top Secret. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 33.

<sup>3</sup> In the Joint Communiqué signed by Nixon and Brezhnev at the conclusion of the Moscow Summit, June 27–July 3, 1974, both the United States and the Soviet Union “reaffirmed their interest in an effective international agreement which would exclude from the arsenals of states such dangerous instruments of mass destruction as chemical weapons.” As such, both sides “agreed to consider a joint initiative” in the CCD to

Your purpose at the SRG is (1) to confirm agency views on the binary questions; (2) to agree that based on the binary decision the President can decide on which international CW limitations, if any, should be sought; and (3) to direct that an ad hoc interagency group prepare options for a position, encompassing these decisions and any verification objectives, for a meeting with the Soviets.

As a result of the interagency review, all agencies except the JCS believe we should *not* now pursue production and stockpiling of binary chemical weapons at this time. However, as noted below, *OSD* wishes to keep open the option for future binary production, whereas *State* and *ACDA* believe this option has little real utility and would preclude any meaningful international agreement banning lethal CW production—an agreement which would be in our interest. *The JCS* recommended a decision favoring acquisition of binaries and oppose any arms control measures which would prohibit this. (My analytical summary, agency positions, and the interagency report are at marked tabs.)<sup>4</sup>

Also as a result of the interagency review, *all agencies agree* that our CW *defensive* posture needs to be improved regardless of the decision on our offensive posture.

#### *The Binary Decision*

Binary CW weapons would consist of two relatively safe, separate chemical components which would combine to form the standard lethal nerve agents while the munition is en route to target. Their storage and transportation would involve no special safety hazards, and they could provide a significantly improved CW offensive and deterrent capability *if* they alleviated political constraints on storage, transport, and peacetime forward deployment.

The binary issue has come to a head as Army development has reached the stage for a production decision on artillery shells. The issue was somewhat defused since Defense's FY 75 budget request for \$5.8 million to establish a binary production facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, was knocked out on the floor of the House (by a vote of 218 to

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conclude "an international Convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare." (Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, p. 571)

<sup>4</sup> Elliott's analytical summary, August 31, 1974, is attached, but not printed.

186) after being favorably reported out of committee. The Senate agreed to the deletion. We need a decision on binaries, however, to provide guidance for Defense's FY 76 budget and to help determine the more immediate question of what our position should be regarding options on CW limitations.

#### *CW Rationale and Utility*

We are committed by the Geneva Protocol not to use CW except in retaliation (see marked tab).<sup>5</sup> We maintain a lethal CW capability as a deterrent against and a response-in-kind to wartime use of CW by an adversary.

There is no CW threat to CONUS. Our primary concern today is the Soviet threat against US and Allied forces in Europe. We do not know the size or location of Soviet stocks or production facilities. We do know that their and some of their Allies' chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) defensive measures and, therefore, their ability to operate in *any* toxic environment exceed our's [sic] or NATO's. (The very substantial Soviet capability is detailed in the NSSM 192 study, pp. 4-10.)<sup>6</sup>

If the Soviets were to initiate use of CW on a significant scale in a conventional conflict, US/NATO forces would suffer a serious net disadvantage. This disadvantage could be redressed if (1) we had adequate CW defenses (equipment and training), *and* (2) retaliated effectively *either* with CW (to attempt to impose similar severe operational constraints attendant to warfare in a toxic environment) *or* with tactical nuclear weapons. The CW capability may not eliminate a need to move to tactical use of nuclear weapons to redress the conflict situation, but it would allow

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<sup>5</sup> The Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of lethal and incapacitating chemical and bacteriological weapons was not in force in the United States until some 50 years after its completion on June 17, 1925. The Protocol, first submitted to the Senate in 1926 and again in 1970, received the Senate's advice and consent for ratification on December 16, 1974. President Ford signed the Protocol's ratifying instrument on January 22, 1975, but issued a statement of reservation: "Although it is our position that the Protocol does not cover riot control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce their use in war as a matter of national policy, except in a certain, very, very limited number of defense situation where lives can be saved." Ford signed Executive Order 11850 detailing that policy on April 8, after which time the Protocol entered into force in the United States. (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, pp. 72-75)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 39.

us to make that determination on its own merits—if existing CW defensive and offensive deficiencies were corrected by *both* our Allies and us.

### *US Capability and Programs*

US policy (NSDM 35 of November 1969)<sup>7</sup> calls for a deterrent/retaliatory CW posture. What the US CW posture should be has never been defined any further.

All our currently employable CW munitions (not including bulk agent) could provide full CW air and ground support for 13-15 US divisions in Europe for 30 days, plus some CW ground munitions support for about 30 allied divisions. We have more than sufficient tons of CW agents (bulk and in munitions) for about 25+ US divisions for 90 days.

Nonetheless, our actual CW offensive capability is limited and thereby considered inadequate from the military viewpoint mainly because (1) our CW defensive posture is inadequate; (2) about a third of the filled munitions capability consists of mustard agent, which is considerably less effective than nerve agent; (3) about half the stockpile (in bulk agent) could not be loaded into munitions today on a timely basis; (4) our limited forward deployed stocks (at one site in Germany) could at best support local tactical operations for 4–7 divisions for a week; and (5) no air munitions are prepositioned.

In addition, except for France's meager stocks, no NATO state has any CW and their CW defenses are no better than ours.

The stocks that we do have are quite durable. Agents in bulk stocks will remain unchanged virtually indefinitely. Almost all our useable filled ground munitions and bombs are not expected to have any significant problems of deterioration or obsolescence through the 1980's, though our filled spray tank capability could well become unserviceable sometime after 1978 and the military could prefer to phase-out some delivery systems.

### *CW Posture Alternatives*

There are three basic posture alternatives. Each alternative envisages improvements in our CW defensive posture. As noted below, each

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 14, Document 39.

alternative has different implications for the arms control options considered in the NSSM 157 and follow-on reports.

*Alternative 1. Acquisition of Binary Chemical Weapons.* Current military projections would include the acquisition of about 7,600 nerve agent tons in binary ground and air munitions, at a DOD estimated cost of \$333 million over 5 or more years (not including any inflation factor, operation and maintenance, or substantial demilitarization costs for an equivalent portion of the existing stockpile). This, plus existing filled munitions, would still not meet estimated military requirements for *all* US forces.

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative would be compatible with Option 1 of the NSSM 157 study (limiting stocks to agreed or declared retaliatory levels and banning international transfer of CW), as supported by the JCS and OSD.

*Advantages.* Binaries would (1) provide a significantly improved CW retaliatory capability for US forces if coupled with an improved defensive posture and might provide a better CW deterrent; (2) facilitate rapid deployment in war or crises;<sup>8</sup> and (3) probably not be subject to the same political/legal constraints on peacetime storage and transport as are current stocks since binaries would involve essentially no special safety hazards.

*Disadvantages.* Acquisition of binaries (1) would at best be very controversial in Congress and indications are that Congress may well not support substantial CW budget increase;<sup>9</sup> (2) might require limited open-air testing (otherwise we would be stocking up with a weapon not fully tested) which would also be very controversial; (3) if not accepted as a genuine effort to deter CW use, it would be criticized internationally and domestically as contrary to our declared interest in CW arms control; (4) might spur further Soviet programs in CW to counter our improvements; and (5) might lead to further proliferation of CW capabilities.

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<sup>8</sup> Binaries would also provide whatever possibility there might be for increased peacetime forward deployment in Europe, but this would not be achieved without incurring strong political opposition in Allied governments and publics. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>9</sup> The DOD FY 75 budget request of \$5.8 million to establish a binary production facility was just knocked out on the floor of the House and the deletion was sustained in the Senate. Binary dollar costs, not to mention defensive improvements, would require sustaining far more substantial budget increases over the current funding level for several years. [Footnote in the original.]

[The JCS support this choice. They believe that binaries are needed to provide a significant improvement in our CW offensive capability and thereby provide a credible and adequate CW deterrent. OSD wants to keep the binary option open for possible future production.]<sup>10</sup>

*Alternate 2. Reliance on Existing CW Offensive Capability.* This would not entail new production of any CW agents (binary or non-binary). But it would not rule out filling munitions from existing bulk agent stocks to compensate for any phasing-out or deterioration of delivery systems in the late 1970's or 1980's. It also envisions maintenance of an adequate CW R&D program and would not rule out continuing R&D on binaries.

*Arms Control Interface.* This would be most compatible with Option 2 (prohibiting further production and international transfer of CW agents) of the NSSM 157 study, as supported by State and ACDA.

*Advantages.* This would (1) retain the existing CW deterrent/retaliatory capability (although limited); (2) be the least controversial and provocative posture, domestically and internationally; (3) be consistent with our declared interest in CW arms control and provide the most flexibility for arms control *if* a production *ban* were desired; and (4) be less likely to encourage either an increase in the Soviet CW capability or proliferation of CW capabilities.

*Disadvantages.* Our current CW deterrent/retaliatory capability is admittedly limited and considered inadequate from the military standpoint. In addition, our existing CW munitions capability (not bulk) could begin to diminish sometime after 1978 (and perhaps significantly diminish sometime later if delivery systems are phased out or become unserviceable)—unless we acquire binaries or fill munitions from existing bulk stocks (which would also be controversial).

[State and ACDA strongly support this choice<sup>11</sup> and believe we should seek a CW production ban *inter alia* to forestall proliferation of CW

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<sup>10</sup> On August 21, Clements sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of the OSD's and the JCS's views. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330-77-0063, 040, NSC, 1974)

<sup>11</sup> On July 24, Springsteen sent Scowcroft a memorandum informing him of the Department's position. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S-I Files: Lot 80D212, NSSM 192) On July 10, Ikle sent Kissinger a memorandum informing him of ACDA's position. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-202, Study Memoranda, NSSM 192)

capabilities. *OSD* supports reliance on existing CW stocks for now (largely because a “US only” CW capability without Allied CW capabilities and/or cooperation is inadequate with or without binaries) *but* *OSD* wishes to continue binary R&D and to keep options open for future binary production.]

*Alternative 3. Reliance Only on Conventional and Nuclear Forces and much Improved CW Defensive Capability, with No Ready CW Stockpile.* This envisions destruction of existing CW stocks within 10–15 years, with a Soviet commitment to do the same. The existing filled munitions capability would remain for the first 5–8 years.

*Arms Control Interface.* This alternative coincides with Option 3 (prohibiting stockpiles, production, and international transfer of CW agents and munitions) of the NSSM 157 study, which ACDA and State believe should be our ultimate objective.

*Advantages.* This would (1) be welcomed internationally and domestically by some; (2) avoid the political and financial costs of binary acquisition; (3) provide an opportunity to place some political and legal constraints on Soviet CW stockpiling and production through CW arms control; and (4) call for a much improved defensive posture which could reduce the overall advantages an adversary could gain through initiating the use of CW in a conventional conflict.

*Disadvantages.* This could be very controversial in Congress and with some Allies since we would not be able to determine what the Soviets are doing in this area. This absence of a ready US CW capability might tempt the Soviets to maintain a secret stockpile with a view to providing CW to states in a non-NATO conflict or to initiating use of CW in a conventional war. If they did the latter, it would probably be necessary for us to use tactical nuclear weapons to redress the military situation.<sup>12</sup>

[ACDA believes that this should be our ultimate objective and would not necessarily lower the nuclear threshold.]

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<sup>12</sup> These arguments are weakened, however, by the facts that (1) the Soviets would have to consider the likelihood of a tactical nuclear response by US/NATO forces in a major conflict whether or not the Warsaw Pact used CW; and (2) a tactical nuclear response may at any rate be the only way to redress the military situation caused by Soviet use of CW unless existing CW offensive and defensive deficiencies are corrected by the US and its Allies. [Footnote in the original.]

*Our View.* It is unlikely we can attain a significant binary capability given congressional constraints (which reflect public attitudes toward CW) and budget priorities. Even if we could, binary acquisition would certainly be controversial here and abroad, appear contrary to our declared interest in CW restraints, might confront us with the issue of some open-air testing, and provide no real leeway for arms control negotiations (thereby showing our Summit declaration to be empty).

Moreover, as OSD has noted, a “US only” CW offensive capability, with or without binaries, is not an adequate CW posture against the Warsaw Pact. The CW option is a thin one indeed *unless* (1) we and our Allies improve CW defenses (which is likely to some degree but is not a priority endeavor), *and* (2) *either* we and our Allies improve CW offensive capabilities significantly (which our Allies are not likely to do and we are probably not able to do politically) *or* we stockpile sufficient CW for ourselves and our Allies (which would be more controversial here and even less likely to receive congressional support).

Destruction of our stocks (combined with much better CW defenses) and a ban on both production and stockpiles would probably be in our interest *were reliable verification possible*. But it is not and retention of our significant (even if limited) CW capability provides some relatively inexpensive insurance as a hedge. Moreover, a decision now to destroy existing stocks would also be controversial in Congress and with some Allies.

Given the above, we recommend that the decision be *against* binary production but for retaining a CW capability as a hedge.

#### INTERNATIONAL CW LIMITATIONS

CW limitations have been the major subject at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) for three years. The Soviets have privately and publicly pressed hard for US action on CW negotiations. We have maintained, in speeches and CCD working papers, that we are committed to seeking limitations but important problems of reasonable verification need to be resolved before negotiations.

The 1974 US/USSR Moscow and Vladivostok summit communiques<sup>13</sup> indicates agreement to consider a joint initiative in the CCD dealing with international restraints on the most lethal means of chemical warfare. The Soviets wish to begin consultations soon and have informally given us a draft convention. Their draft proposal (which has been seen by some in State and ACDA but no one in DOD) gives us serious problems mainly because it envisages the destruction of existing lethal CW stocks (see marked tab).<sup>14</sup>

A 1973 SRG on the NSSM 157 study<sup>15</sup> considered our options for international CW limitations, but no action resulted since the basic question of whether or not we want to produce binaries needed to be answered. Since the binary issue is now ready for decision, we should, at the same time, be able to obtain a decision on acceptable international restraints. [NB. *An affirmative binary decision would necessarily reduce our options for international restraints to only the one of agreed stockpile size, considered below as Option 1. A postponement of the binary decision (the OSD proposal) would not foreclose any international agreement option, but would give us no basis for reaching any actual agreement other than Option 1.* A postponed binary decision conceivably might be used as a bargaining chip in any US–USSR CW negotiations.]

The basic question (studied in response to NSSM 157) is whether we should continue to oppose negotiations on chemical weapons limitations because any limitations would not be reliably verifiable, or should we seek some form of international agreement. Another unverifiable treaty is undesirable in principle. But our CW programs are in fact already severely constrained by congressional and public attitudes and by budget priorities. They are likely to remain so. Thus, it may be preferable to try to place constraints on the Soviets and others.

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<sup>13</sup> The Joint Communiqué, November 24, signed by Ford and Brezhnev following their meeting at Vladivostok noted that the United States and the Soviet Union had established “initial contacts” regarding “the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to continue an active search for mutually acceptable solutions” to this matter. (Public Papers: Ford, 1974, pp. 658–662)

<sup>14</sup> The Soviet draft convention, summarized above, is attached, but not printed.

<sup>15</sup> The record of the March 5, 1973 SRG meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1973–1976, Vol. E–14, Part 2, Arms Control, 1973–1976.

### *Treaty Options*

Interagency consideration resulted in unanimous agreement that treaty limitations on R&D and defensive measures would be unacceptable. There are, therefore, three basic treaty proposals we might make on CW limitations. (Each includes a prohibition on CW proliferation and transfer to other nations and recognizes that reliable verification of any of the limitations is not possible.)

#### *Option 1. Limit Stocks to Agreed Retaliatory Levels.*

*Advantages.* This would (1) allow binary production and stockpiling to replace existing stocks and provide a better retaliatory capability, particularly if binaries eased political constraints on movement and deployment in Europe; and (2) involve little if any military risk to us, even if the Soviets did not comply, if we obtained an adequate stockpile.

*Disadvantages.* This would (1) be preserving an option for modernization and deployment which we may not be able to exercise given congressional and budget constraints here and attitudes toward CW stocks in Europe, while possibly stimulating more Soviet CW activity; (2) be criticized here and abroad as only justifying further CW production and, therefore, probably fail to ease pressures for broader constraints; (3) open us to criticism (e.g., by Germany) that we are discriminating since we could both stockpile and produce while asking non-chemical weapons States to forego both; (4) be the least likely treaty option to achieve international agreement; and (5) make it even more difficult to determine any non-compliance compared to the other options.

[The JCS and OSD support this option. They note that our forward deployed capability is very limited and that the percentage of our agents in filled munitions is unsatisfactory. They believe we should replace at least some of our existing stocks with binaries to provide a much more credible CW retaliatory capability.]

#### *Option 2. Prohibit the Production of CW Agents.*

(In negotiating a production ban we would have to decide if we should reserve a right to manufacture and fill CW munitions to replace existing munitions as needed or whether we should also ban these activities but limit a treaty to 10 or 12 years.)

*Advantages.* This would (1) place international treaty constraints on the Soviets in an area where our programs are already most constrained by Congress and budget priorities; (2) retain our existing retaliatory capability as a hedge against our inability to monitor compliance; (3) help channel pressures away from more comprehensive limitations; (4) avoid the political costs of binary production; and (5) make negotiation of a non-proliferation clause easier.

*Disadvantages.* This (1) would prohibit our producing and stockpiling binary agents to provide a better retaliatory capability; and (2) might still be criticized as discriminatory since we would retain stocks and the right to manufacture and fill CW munitions with existing agents while asking non-chemical weapons States not to acquire either.

[State and ACDA support this option.]

*Option 3. Prohibit Both Stockpiles and Production of CW Agents and Munitions.*

*Advantages.* This would (1) place maximum legal and political constraints on CW, an area where the Soviets have an advantage over us; (2) appeal to the many countries which favor a comprehensive ban; and (3) provide the most chance of discovering any non-compliance.

*Disadvantages.* This would phase out our option to respond in kind if the Soviets failed to comply and used CW in a conventional war.

[ACDA sees merit in this option in the long-term since (1) our nuclear and conventional capabilities provide adequate deterrence against or responsive CW attack; and (2) we should try to place the greatest constraints on the Soviets since it is unlikely we or NATO will develop a real CW retaliatory capability.]

*Non-Treaty Options*

As a follow-up to the NSSM 157 SRG, the working group considered non-treaty options for CW restraints, entailing unilateral US declaration, parallel US-USSR declarations, or parallel declarations by a number of countries including the US and USSR (see marked tab).<sup>16</sup> All agencies, however, recommend the treaty approach since it is more binding and

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<sup>16</sup> Not found attached.

more likely to curb proliferation. State and ACDA support a US declaration renouncing CW production, as we seek a treaty.

*Elliott's View.* An unverifiable treaty is not desirable. But our own CW programs are already very much constrained by congressional and public attitudes and budget priorities and are likely to remain so. Thus, it seems preferable to try to place some restraints on the Soviets, even if they are not reliably verifiable.

We are being pressed internationally to make some treaty proposal, and the 1972<sup>17</sup> and 1974 Moscow Joint Communique indicates we will work toward agreement on CW restraints.

A ban on both stocks and production (Option 3) would be in our interest if reliable verification were possible. But it is not; and retention of retaliatory capability provides some insurance and is not destabilizing.

If we do forego binary production, a US declaration renouncing any further CW production would probably get us some political mileage in the CCD. However, if we find a production ban treaty difficult to negotiate (e.g., because the Soviets press for destruction of stocks) we might be unilaterally restrained for years, or have to take the visible step of withdrawing our declaration.

I therefore recommend seeking a treaty to prohibit the production of CW agents and the proliferation and transfer to other nations of CW agents and munitions. We would not include a prohibition on manufacture and filling of munitions in our proposal, thereby allowing us to maintain a filled munitions capability indefinitely. However, we may have to reconsider our position on munitions manufacture and filling later if this proved to be a barrier to reaching international agreement. We should also be prepared to continue international discussions directed at the verification problem, with a view to possibly finding acceptable conditions for a ban on stockpiles, as unlikely as this may be.

*Sonnenfeldt's View.* My view is more or less along the lines of that expressed by Bill Hyland, although not quite as strongly held. This view reflects concern over committing ourselves to an unverifiable treaty which forecloses future CW production. There are future situations, such as a greatly increased Soviet defensive CW capability which might only be

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<sup>17</sup> For the text of the U.S.-Soviet joint communique issued on May 29, 1972, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 635-642.

countered by a greater offensive CW capability on our part, where further US production would be highly desirable. Therefore, a reasonable strategy would be to unilaterally declare a production moratorium (or a bilateral moratorium if the Soviets are interested), followed by an approach to the Soviets on the basis of treaty Option 1 (agreed stockpile levels). We might have to fall back to Option 2 (a production ban), but this could be considered on its own merits after we have had the benefit of some bilateral negotiations.

#### NEXT STEPS

Your aim at this SRG meeting is to ensure that the issues are fully drawn and agency views expressed, such that the President can address the questions of binary acquisition, acceptable international CW limitations, and a US renunciatory declaration.

Based on his decisions, an ad hoc interagency group will:

1. Review detailed verification questions to provide a more substantial basis for considering whether or not on-site inspections and detailed information exchanges are worth pursuing in their own right (regardless of their “negotiability” for now) and could allow us to look at the implications for verifying open-air testing. (This can build on the verification analysis in the NSSM 157 study and the verification follow-on at the marked tab.)<sup>18</sup>

2. To review the Soviet draft treaty.

3. To prepare and submit to you a US position for meeting with the Soviets to consider a joint initiative in the CCD.

Granger, Lodal, and Clift concur.

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<sup>18</sup> Not found attached. Farley forwarded the NSSM 157 Ad Hoc Working Group’s follow-up verification study to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 26, 1973. The Working Group found “no new developments which would affect the general consideration stated in the NSSM 157 study that there is no dependable way to verify compliance with most prohibitions or limitations on chemical weapons.” As a means to enhance verification, however, the Group recommended the establishment of committees of CW experts to monitor compliance within their own countries and to exchange relevant data with committees representing other signatory countries. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-192, Study Memorandums, NSSM 157 [2 of 4])

This document is identified as document 51 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

## **Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 27, 1975, 10:50–11:25 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons Policy (NSSM 192)

### PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

*CIA*

Lt. Gen. Vernon Walters

[*name not declassified*]

*State*

Robert Ingersoll

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

William Hyland

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Thomas Davies

*Defense*

William Clements

Robert Ellsworth

Dr. James P. Wade

*NSC Staff*

LTG Brent Scowcroft

Dr. David Elliott

James Barnum

*JCS*

Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, National Security Council, Box TS 71, Committees and Panels, Senior Review Group, Aug. 1973–Oct. 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

## SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—the Working Group would prepare a paper showing the arguments for and against producing binary chemical weapons on a best-case basis. The paper would also include a deployment scheme and the costs of deployment and production of binaries.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm sorry I'm late. Do we need—have a briefing?

General Walters: I have one if you want. It's short. (Began to brief from the attached.)

Secretary Kissinger: Did you say the Soviets have an antidote for nerve gas?

General Walters: Yes, they do.

Secretary Kissinger: How do they use it? What form is it in, pills?

[*name not declassified*]: No, it's injected by a syringe.

General Walters: (Continued to brief.)

Secretary Kissinger: Who's this you're talking about?

General Walters: Iraq. Iraq wants to develop an offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability. They have purchased and installed a nerve agent production plant which may give them an agent capability by this Spring. They want it to use against the Kurds. (Finished his briefing.)

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, we have two issues before us. The first is what should U.S. policy be regarding the production of chemical weapons. The second is whether we should support some type of international agreement on the limitation of chemical weapons at Geneva. In respect to the first issue, we have three options as I understand it. The first is whether we should acquire binary chemical weapons. The second is whether we should rely instead on our existing CW offensive capability, and the third is, in effect, doing away with our capability and relying instead on conventional and nuclear forces. We don't really have the first option because of congressional opposition, isn't that right?

Mr. Clements: Well, I don't know, Henry. Senator Stennis has indicated to me that he would help us if the President supports the acquisition of binary weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think such a thing would ever get through Congress?

Mr. Clements: I really don't know, Henry. I personally am not in favor of going to binaries. I'm just passing on what Stennis told me.

Dr. Ikle: It would be a big fight.

Secretary Kissinger: Can anybody make a good case for producing binaries?

General Pauly: The Joint Chiefs would prefer to produce binary weapons. We believe we are at the stage now where our stockpiles need to be improved in quality. Binaries would do this for us. They are safer, for one thing. Also, they would give us the ability to deploy further forward.

Secretary Kissinger: Why would they be easier to deploy further forward?

General Pauly: Well, for one thing, they are safer. They are easier to handle and you can move them around easier. Only two percent of our stockpile is now deployed overseas—in Germany.

Secretary Kissinger: Do we have any in the Pacific?

General Pauly: Yes, six percent of our stockpile is on Johnson Island.

Mr. Clements: It's a problem of getting them from Colorado to Germany.

Perhaps Mr. Clements meant Utah (Tooele) rather than Colorado (Pueblo), since nearly half of the state-side chemical weapons were at Tooele.

Dr. Ikle: Isn't the real question one of how widely they are deployed in Germany? The problem is the quantity there.

General Pauly: That's true.

Secretary Kissinger: Then, as I understand it, our chemical weapons are currently deployed at only one base in Germany, and I would presume the Soviets know where that base is, am I right?

General Pauly: Yes. I think we can be pretty sure they know where they are stored.

Secretary Kissinger: And, if war breaks out we can be fairly sure that one of the first things they will do is knock out that base.

General Pauly: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Are there any plans—do we have any plans for CW deployment in the event of war?

General Pauly: I'm not sure, but there would be a distribution problem . . .

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would not be unreasonable to assume that the probability of the U.S. being able to retaliate in the event the Soviets use CW would be very slight.

General Pauly: Yes, that's right.

Secretary Kissinger: So we end up with a weapon we really can't use because we can't get it to where it needs to be used. Could we see (get a paper on) what difficulties we would encounter if we decide to go with the binaries? Could we see what kind of deployments you would have to make? I think that what we have now does not give the President a fair chance to make a decision. We ought to look at the whole deployment thing—and make it on a best-case basis.

Mr. Clements: I'm against producing binaries.

DepSecDef Clements may have been against binaries, but the Army leadership and the JCS was not. Clement's future boss, Donald Rumsfeld, also supported the Army's desire for modern chemical weapons.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I want to bring all of the alternatives to his (the President's) attention, and I think that we ought to make a better case for producing binaries. I don't think we have it here.

Mr. Clements: Okay, we can do it.

Secretary Kissinger: I see that one of our new options is to maintain our present CW stockpiles. Do you support that?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

Mr. Clements: So that we can retain some appearance of being able to retaliate.

Secretary Kissinger: What do we have, two percent of our stockpile in Germany and six percent at Johnson Island, and nowhere else? There is nothing that prevents us from moving it, is there?

Dr. Ikle: No, you can move it to an area of conflict, if you need to.

Secretary Kissinger: The point is, if there is a conflict in say, Korea, can you move it there if you have to? I would like to see a rational deployment plan for getting the stuff out of Johnson Island. Where's the rest of it?

Mr. Clements: The rest—ninety percent or so—is in Colorado and Utah.

Actually only 51.5% of the U.S. chemical stockpile was in Colorado and Utah.

Dr. Ikle: One of the problems is that it costs an awful lot to get rid of. It's cheaper to store than to destroy.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not in favor of getting rid of what we already have. What bothers me is that we don't have adequate studies that would show how we would get the stuff from Colorado to the place where it might be needed. It seems to me that we are in a *de facto* anti-CW position. How does one go about using chemical weapons? Can you move it by air?

Dr. Ikle: Yes, air is probably the best method.

Secretary Kissinger: What kind of aircraft, drones?

Mr. Davies: No, you use airplanes for safety reasons and because of the public image of moving them by other means.

The USG used airplanes so that the State governors wouldn't try to block rail shipments of chemical weapons across state lines in response to public perceptions. Rail transport of chemical weapons happened routinely prior to the 1968 Dugway Proving Ground incident. Transport by air wasn't safer but it could be done.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but how do you move it from Colorado and Utah to some foreseeable war zone? Do you use C-150s?

Mr. Clements: Yes, that would probably be the aircraft you would use.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we take a look at how we would move the stuff in the event it would be needed?

General Pauly: Yes, we can. One of the imponderables, however, is how its movement would fit into other air priorities at the time of conflict. My estimate would be that you could get it to the area in four to five days.

Secretary Kissinger: Four to five days? I think it would be a reasonable assumption that any enemy that would use chemical warfare had crossed over the threshold, don't you? I mean, that's pretty extreme. It was not used in Vietnam.

General Walters: We have a study here that shows that 25 percent of your air capability . . .

Dr. Ikle: The real question is what is an adequate CW capability.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't see—I have no strong views on this question, but what I am trying to do is identify just what the President is going to have to decide. We have no real retaliatory capability in the Pacific. We do have some retaliatory capability in Germany. But what if the Soviets attack our stockpiles? The rest of it is in the U.S. and how many days would it take to get there? Ninety-two percent of our stockpiles are so positioned that unless there is an immediate high-point in a war we wouldn't get it there in time.

General Pauly: That's right. But, you might have information that they are moving the stuff up. Then you would make a conscious decision to deploy.

Secretary Kissinger: It's hard to imagine that you would have a build-up period. Suppose the Soviets double their forces. Could you double your CW reserves in time? You wouldn't move them until after you're hit, would you?

General Pauly: That's right. But, if you have information that they are moving their weapons up, you might want to begin to move yours.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all of you are against binaries except the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Is that right?

Mr. Clements: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Is there any law against it being rationally deployed? It seems to me to make no sense to keep ninety-two percent of the stuff where it can't be used.

Dr. Ikle: Domestic opposition to moving it around would be very strong.

Mr. Clements: Yes, but we're not going to deploy it domestically.

Dr. Ikle: But you still have to move it within the country.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, could we see what a rational deployment would look like? Where is all this stuff kept?

Mr. Clements: Our biggest stockpile is in Denver, right at the end of the runway (Denver International Airport).

Secretary Kissinger: Do they (Denverites) know it's there?

Mr. Clements: Oh yes, and they are worried about it. You know, that stuff is not easy to handle.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. I'm just trying to move this thing to the President for decision and I want to be sure he has all the rationale for his decision.

Dr. Ikle: We are all agreed that further deployment is politically impossible.

Secretary Kissinger: We now have the ability to wage chemical warfare, but it is deployed in such a way that it is not useable. I don't understand that. How do you get it out of Johnson Island? Do you see any area that would be able to get these weapons in four to five days?

General Pauly: No, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: Then it would take four to five days before it would have any effect. What kind of weapon is it? Does it make you sick?

Dr. Ikle: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It just seems to me that our chemical weapons capability is irrelevant to the situation.

And Mr. Kissinger is right: it didn't make sense to keep most of it state-side when the deterrent capability was desired for European and Pacific theaters of operation, but no one wanted to deal with the politics of the situation.

Mr. Ingersoll: Not unless you have an inadequate defensive capability.

Mr. Clements: That's true, and an adequate defensive capability is a whole new story.

Secretary Kissinger: Can anybody make a case against stockpiling an anti-CW capability?

Dr. Ikle: No, but ours is very weak, and Congress has to support it—with money.

General Pauly: There is no real opposition on the Hill to storing a defensive capability. But, the problem is time. It would take until the early 1980s before we could build up an adequate defensive capability.

And in fact, it was around the mid-1980s when the Army's chemical companies and adequate quantities of defensive equipment were fielded.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, do we have a Working Group?

Dr. Elliott: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Can the Working Group do a paper ... I don't think we need a separate NSC on this. We'll just tack it on the end of one in the near future. We need a paper that defines the issues so the President can make his decision. Am I correct that nobody here favors the destruction of our current stocks and that nobody but the Joint

Chiefs of Staff favor production of binaries? Do it (the paper) on a best-case basis, and also include arguments against producing binaries.

Mr. Clements: Do you want the costs included as well?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, include the costs.

Dr. Ikle: Is it fair to say that we would reduce our stockpiles if it doesn't cost too much?

Secretary Kissinger: What are our agents? What do we use?

Mr. Clements: Nerve gas.

Secretary Kissinger: Why nerve gas? How do we store it?

Dr. Ikle: In tanks. It's cheaper to store it that way.

General Pauly: You have a two-pronged problem with storing the stuff: one, it loses its potency after a certain period of time, and two, it becomes contaminated from the tanks—a chemical reaction.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that leads to the next set of issues—what do we want to propose at Geneva? As I understand it, the Joint Chiefs' position is that they want to maintain current stockpiles at our present level as a retaliatory deterrent. Another option is a ban on all current production.

Dr. Ikle: A production ban on agents only.

Secretary Kissinger: The third option is to prohibit both stockpiles and production. My problem is that all of these alternatives are totally unverifiable. If we go for an agreement, it's unverifiable. We can't get a handle on their production, can we?

General Walters: [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Secretary Kissinger: [*1 line not declassified*]

[*name not declassified*]: [*2 lines not declassified*]

Dr. Ikle: That would be one advantage of an agreement—you may stop them from producing it.

Secretary Kissinger: For whom? The Eastern European countries?

Dr. Ikle: No, Iran and Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: That's the whole issue here. We can get an agreement, but we can't verify it. What good does that do? Iran and Egypt could have it and we wouldn't even know. I don't even know where to look for it, do you?

General Walters: I believe we could find it.

Dr. Ikle: One thing you could do is soften an agreement—make it a ten year deal with the stipulation that the whole issue could be reopened.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the President just can't make a decision based on what we have here. All these options are unverifiable. How would you handle the refilling problem if we chose Option II?<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Ellsworth: That's the problem, we'd have to build a new plant.

Secretary Kissinger: Would you refill the old equipment or the new?

Dr. Ikle: The old stuff.

Secretary Kissinger: What, with a new batch of the old stuff, or a new batch of the new stuff?

Dr. Ikle: No, the old stuff.

Secretary Kissinger: Are we going to run out of it?

Dr. Ikle: Not for a long time. We have quite a bit now.

Dr. Elliott: OST has just completed a study which shows that the gas stored in bulk has an indefinite lifetime, but that it tends to deteriorate in the filled.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The second alternative outlined in the NSSM 192 study called for the United States to rely on its existing CW offensive capability. See Document 39.

<sup>3</sup> The study, summarized herein, was not found.

Secretary Kissinger: I might as well get an education here. What is bulk? Does that mean tanks? Where is it stored? What is filled?

Dr. Elliott: Bulk means tanks. That's where it is stored—in tanks. Filled means in weapons, like artillery shells.

“Bulk” means ton-containers, from which munitions could be filled.

Dr. Ikle: The problem is that the casings of artillery shells deteriorate over a period of time.

General Pauly: We're finding that some of our weapons, particularly the filled variety, lose their purity over a period of time.

Secretary Kissinger: What does it do to the casings?

General Pauly: I'm not sure. It has something to do with aging.

Secretary Kissinger: Would I offend anybody too much if I said that the level of analysis in this group is not on the level of the SALT people? Well, let's get this stuff together.

And Kissinger's final word basically summed up the state of ignorance about chemical weapons and the challenge of developing sound chemical warfare policy in the 1970s and 1980s.

## **Attachment**

### **Briefing Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, January 23, 1975

#### **BRIEFING FOR NSSM-192: CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY**

The Intelligence Community's contribution to NSSM-192 was in the form of CW threat assessments for the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact Countries (WPC); Middle East (Egypt, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Iraq); Peoples Republic of China; Republic of China (Taiwan); and

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<sup>4</sup> Top Secret.

NATO, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] A summary of these assessments follows:

*USSR/WPC*

The Soviet Union/WPC CW program continues to provide them with a capability, superior to that of NATO, to operate for a limited time in a toxic environment whether created by the enemy or their own forces. [*2 lines not declassified*] Chemical munitions include a wide variety of air and ground delivery systems. The Soviets possess the technological capability and materiel required to produce any of the known toxic CW weapons. [*2½ lines not declassified*] CBR defense equipment is far more widely distributed in the Soviet Union/WPC forces than in NATO/US forces. The continued training of Soviet/WPC forces with CBR equipment further enhances their capability to operate in the severe environment that we expect CBR conditions to impose on the battlefield.

*Middle East*

*Egypt*

Continuing reports over the past few years lead us to believe that Egypt possesses an offensive CW capability without Soviet participation.

Defensively, Egypt is equipped with a wide variety of modern Soviet CBR defense equipment of good quality. Soviet CBR training and doctrine were incorporated into Egyptian training, and recent evidence continues to reaffirm the Egyptian interest in CBR defense training. Good equipment, coupled with effective training, give Egypt a good capability to operate in a toxic environment.

[*place not declassified*]

[*1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified*]

*Iraq*

According to recent reports, Iraq desires to develop an offensive CW capability for use against the Kurds. The Iraqis have purchased and installed a nerve agent production plant which may give them an agent capability by this spring without Soviet aid.

*Peoples Republic of China*

The PRC continues to show interest in defense CW aspects in training exercises of their infantry and armor forces.

*Republic of China*

The ROC has a high priority program to develop an offensive and defensive CW capability but is in an early stage in both areas.

*NATO- [place not declassified]*

Any NATO capability in CW is dependent on the US. [*1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified*]

This document is identified as document 121 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

**Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 15, 1976

SUBJECT

Chemical Weapons (CW)

The Department of Army included in its FY 1978 request for appropriations funding in the amount of \$15.3 million to support a stand-by binary CW production facility. These funds would provide \$2.0 million for modernization of an existing facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal and some \$13.3 million to purchase production-related equipment. This would be a long-range program requiring two years before the facility would be ready to produce. These funds have since been deleted at the White House.

Over the years, U.S. ability to deter Soviet use of CW through the threat of retaliation in kind has steadily decreased. At the same time, intelligence reveals that the Soviets have continued to emphasize operations on a chemical battlefield. While their intentions concerning the first use of CW are not entirely clear, the fact that they are able to launch a chemical attack against NATO in depth presents a serious threat to Allied forces. U.S. forces require a credible CW retaliatory capability in order to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330-79-0049, 370.64, CBR, (June-Dec.) 1976. Confidential. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, McAuliffe forwarded it to Rumsfeld under his own December 15 memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. A handwritten memorandum, December 15, addressed to Rumsfeld from Holcomb was found attached. It reads: "Brent [Scowcroft] wants an SRG meeting on this subject . . . tentatively scheduled for 12/16 in the afternoon. Hence the urgency." (Ellipsis in the original.) McAuliffe's and Holcomb's memoranda are *ibid*. The meeting was held on December 29.

deter the Soviets from using chemicals and possibly lowering the nuclear threshold as a result.

The Department of Defense is fully supportive of the principles behind the ongoing arms control negotiations in the area of CW. However, we are aware that there has been little positive movement toward achieving an effective agreement. In our view, a primary reason for Soviet intractability is the fact that they see no real advantage in giving up their superior capability. Thus, DOD sees two significant advantages accruing from the appropriation of funds for the long lead-time binary production items requested by the Army: (1) The appropriations would preserve our options concerning future modernization of the U.S. CW stockpile and (2) it would provide a strong, but by no means provocative, signal to the Soviets that the U.S. is prepared to rebuild its CW capability if an effective arms control agreement cannot be reached.

In this regard, DOD has prepared the attached position paper which outlines the essential elements of an agreement we consider would meet our security needs.<sup>2</sup> It is provided for interagency consideration. The DOD is prepared to couple our request for FY 1978 funds for binary items to a DOD commitment to negotiate an acceptable agreement along these lines.

I urge that the Army's request for these items be restored in the FY 1978 budget.

**Donald Rumsfeld**

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<sup>2</sup> The undated paper entitled "Proposed Chemical Weapons Arms Limitation" is attached, but not printed.

This document is identified as document 126 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

**Background Paper Prepared by the National Security Council  
Chemical Weapons Working Group<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

**BACKGROUND PAPER FOR THE SRG ON 29 DECEMBER, 1976,  
ON ACQUISITION OF A BINARY CW MUNITION FACILITY**

*Issue*

Should the Administration approve the DOD recommendation, enclosure 1,<sup>2</sup> that the Army request for establishment of a binary production facility as outlined below be restored in the FY 1978 budget?

*Specifics of the Army Request*

The Army request for \$15.3 million provides for establishment of a government-owned and operated facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, to produce initially binary chemical (GB nerve agent) artillery projectiles. This project will provide for the rehabilitation of an existing building and the purchase and installation of equipment necessary for:

—The manufacture of one of the two binary chemical components (the other to be obtained commercially).

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 18, Senior Review Group Meeting, 12/29/76—Chemical Munitions (NSSM 192) (1). Secret. All brackets are in the original. No drafting information appears on the paper, but Elliott's December 28 memorandum to Hyland (Document 127) indicates that it was drafted by the group. Davis forwarded the paper to Ingersoll, Clements, Lynn, Ikle, General Brown, and Bush under a covering memorandum, December 23, for review prior to the SRG meeting scheduled for December 29. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Document 121, Rumsfeld's December 15 memorandum to Scowcroft, is attached.

—Filling and sealing the manufactured chemical component into a canister.

—Loading, assembling and packing the projectile by inserting the filled canister and explosive charge into the projectile and placing a fibre-board spacer in place of the second chemical component which is to be stored separately.

The request does not presume a commitment to produce binary munitions. Approximately two years would be required to prepare the facility for production.

#### *Present U.S. Policy*

The U.S. has a no first-use obligation for lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons by virtue of being a party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>3</sup> Current U.S. chemical warfare policy stems from NSDM 35, dated 25 November 1969. This NSDM states, in part, that “the objective of the U.S. [chemical warfare] program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence falls.”<sup>4</sup> The DOD maintains a stockpile of chemical weapons for the purpose of implementing this policy.

The United States is firmly committed to the objective of complete and effective prohibition of all chemical weapons. This commitment has been reiterated on many occasions by the President and other senior officials.

Under Article IX of the Biological Weapons Convention,<sup>5</sup> the United States has an obligation “to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures” for the prohibition of chemical weapons. To this end, the United States has

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 50.

<sup>4</sup> NSDM 35 is printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972*, Document 165.

<sup>5</sup> The international Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was signed on April 10, 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate on March 26, 1975. On December 26, 1975, the United States declared that it had destroyed all of its biological weapons. (Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and James M. Smith (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2005), pp. 32–33)

entered into both multilateral and bilateral U.S.–U.S.S.R. discussions of possible limitations.

*Pending Policy Issues*

The National Security Council has had under study two broad issues in the area of chemical warfare policy. NSSM 157<sup>6</sup> addressed possible treaty alternatives for achieving restraints on the possession of chemical weapons, and NSSM 192<sup>7</sup> examined alternatives for the U.S. chemical warfare posture, mainly aimed at the question of whether or not to proceed with the acquisition of binary CW munitions.

Two Senior Review Group meetings<sup>8</sup> were held to consider the alternatives developed in these two NSSM studies, but no consensus emerged on the closely-linked issues of the military need for modernization of the U.S. CW stockpile and acceptable CW treaty restraints where the verification of compliance is incomplete. Rather than moving these issues to the President for resolution and decision, it was decided to wait the outcome of an internal DOD reassessment of its position on binary acquisition and acceptable arms control approaches. This reassessment has recently been concluded, and the results are reflected in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum at enclosure 1. That memorandum proposes:

- FY 78 funding of a standby binary production facility.
- Deferral for a reasonable time of binary production, pending the outcome of international negotiations on CW restraints.
- A specific approach for international CW restraints.

The first of these is the subject of the present SRG. The third would be the basis for another SRG in the near future, possibly leading to a consensus on a U.S. treaty proposal in our bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union as well as in the CCD.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 33.

<sup>7</sup> See Documents 39 and 51.

<sup>8</sup> For the March 5, 1973 SRG meeting, see footnote 15, Document 50. The record of the January 27, 1975 SRG meeting is Document 51.

### *Military Considerations*

The Defense Department's evaluation indicates that a serious asymmetry exists between the chemical warfare capabilities of the US/NATO and USSR/Warsaw Pact forces, and this imbalance poses a significant threat to NATO.

—Available intelligence reveals that the chemical warfare posture of the USSR far outranks that of any other nation and that they are actively engaged in maintaining their superior capabilities. Warsaw Pact forces are well equipped to operate in a toxic environment, particularly one of their own choosing and training for CW operations receives high priority. The Soviets are known to have a variety of chemical munitions in significant quantity and recent evidence indicates that some chemical weapons are deployed at forward air bases. Soviet forces include over 200 chemical units and about 100,000 dedicated CBR personnel. They have conducted some 18 open air tests of chemical weapons during the past two years.

—In contrast U.S. and other NATO forces are deficient in both defensive and retaliatory (offensive) capabilities, particularly the latter. Some members of the Alliance possess the ability to conduct operations for a limited time on a chemical battlefield, others patently do not. With the exception of a limited French stockpile, only the U.S. has any chemical munitions in Europe and these are in short supply and consist only of artillery ammunition. Further, U.S. stocks in theater are all located in one supply facility and vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike. Resupply to the theater is a tenuous proposition. Early warning of impending need would be required to mount an effective resupply mission without seriously crippling other logistic operations. Even given the ability to move efficiently the CW presently in CONUS, deficiencies in the retaliatory stockpile would still remain, e.g., limited variety, volume, and appropriate type of munitions. A status of the current U.S. CW retaliatory stockpile is shown in enclosure 2.<sup>9</sup>

Although Soviet intentions concerning the first use of CW munitions are not clear, the fact that they are able to attack NATO targets in depth with CW presents a risk which causes serious concern. Currently, the funding priority for chemical warfare is devoted to improving our CW

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<sup>9</sup> A DOD paper, "DOD CW Stockpile Data," is enclosed, but not printed.

protective posture (see enclosure 3).<sup>10</sup> This is consistent with expressed Congressional desires.

The proponents of the Army's FY 78 request take the position that these improvements in U.S. CW defensive posture are not sufficient to offset the growing obsolescence and possible deterioration in the effectiveness of our current CW stockpile. If the U.S. is to have a credible deterrent consistent with our present national policy, it must demonstrate both a capability to protect itself against CW attack and to retaliate in kind. At the very least we must be prepared to modernize our retaliatory capability by constructing a binary munition facility. The request for funds to purchase long lead-time items required for a binary CW production facility does not presume a decision to produce, but it is necessary to our maintaining a credible CW deterrence since it would protect our options regarding possible modernization of the retaliatory stockpile. As indicated above, the proposed program requires two years to complete. Thus, even if funds are provided to begin the program in FY 1978, it will be 1979-80 before production could begin. Continued delay in starting the program will further aggravate an already serious readiness deficiency.

Those opposing the Army's proposal to construct a binary production facility argue that it is unnecessary, at least at this time. The military CW situation is a relatively stable one. Whatever deficiencies are thought to exist in the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile—for example, virtually no deployment in Europe and a small fraction of total agent in a readily deliverable form—have been present for many years. This situation was considered sufficiently tolerable that no request for the binary facility was included in the budget request last year. A lack of urgency is also indicated by the fact that the Army's testing program on possible lethality deterioration in filled munitions is scheduled to take four years. Since this information would be an important factor in deciding to produce binaries, the commitment to a production facility now would appear to be premature. Meanwhile, the overall military situation seems to be improving since major improvements are already under way in CW defense readiness, which provides an important deterrent to chemical attack.

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<sup>10</sup> A DOD paper, "U.S. Protective Capabilities," is enclosed, but not printed.

The opponents also question whether the threat of retaliation in kind is the most effective or credible deterrent to a chemical attack. Approval of the production facility is not necessary to keep open the option of improving the U.S. CW stockpile until that basic issue is resolved. The option will continue to exist.

It should be noted that modernization of the CW stockpile could also be accomplished by filling new munitions from present bulk stocks of nerve agent. This method has severe shortcomings, however, when compared to the binary concept. Binaries provide significant advantages in manufacturing, storage, surveillance, transportation, and eventual disposal of chemical munitions. Thus, they not only serve to satisfy environmental concerns, but also allow flexibility in deployment. It is estimated that the time necessary to ready a facility for production and the over-all costs involved in the manufacture of sufficient munitions to satisfy stockpile deficiencies are roughly the same regardless of the method use.

#### *Arms Control Considerations*

##### *Review of Negotiations*

As noted above, the United States is engaged in bilateral U.S.-Soviet as well as multilateral discussions of possible chemical weapons limitations.

Since the U.S. has not yet reached a decision on the basic CW policy issues, U.S. participation in these discussions has been limited to examination of alternative approaches to CW arms control. The U.S. has not yet taken a definitive position on what would constitute an acceptable agreement.

Present U.S.-Soviet discussions of CW restraints stem from the July 1974 Summit in Moscow. In the communique, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. "agreed to consider a joint initiative in the conference of the Committee on Disarmament with respect to the conclusion . . . of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare."<sup>11</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Soviets presented a draft treaty which is deficient in that it limits only the most toxic chemicals and lacks effective verification measures. The U.S. did not respond to the Soviet draft before the Vladivostok summit in November 1974. (Although no definitive

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<sup>11</sup> See footnote 3, Document 50.

response has been provided, the U.S. forwarded request for clarification on April 29, 1975.) That November 1974 meeting's final statement "noted that in accordance with previous agreements, initial contacts were established between representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on . . . measures dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare."<sup>12</sup>

On a number of occasions since the Vladivostok summit, the Soviets proposed that bilateral consultations begin, but the U.S. did not accept until mid-1976. The first round of consultations was held in Geneva, in late August 1976. This session dealt with a variety of technical issues related to CW limitations, particularly in the areas of scope and verification. It was agreed that the consultations had been useful and that they would be continued at a time to be determined.

Since the August 1976 consultations, there has been no further substantive discussion of CW restraints with the Soviets. The Soviets submitted a memorandum to the UNGA suggesting that they may be willing to discuss provisions for limited forms of on-site inspection. This appears to some to be a reflection of a basic Soviet decision on on-site inspection made in connection with negotiation of the PNE Treaty.<sup>13</sup> However, until further talks are held it will be difficult to judge how significant these statements actually are.

The multilateral discussions, which take place at the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), began in earnest in 1972. The United States has participated actively in the CCD's discussions, which have focused on the study of technical issues related to scope and verification of various types of limitations. Draft conventions to prohibit chemical weapons have been proposed by the U.S.S.R., Japan, and the UK.

During the summer 1976 session of the CCD, discussions of CW issues were more active and constructive than previously. We believe that

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<sup>12</sup> For the joint communique' issued at the close of the Vladivostok Summit, November 23-24, 1974, see footnote 13, Document 50.

<sup>13</sup> The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 28, 1976. The treaty, which did not enter into force until 1990, allows PNEs within certain prescribed limits. It also requires prior notification of explosions and on-site inspections. (Historical Dictionary of Arms Control and Disarmament, p. 169)

these discussions are likely to remain at least as active during the spring 1977 session and that they will focus on the proposal presented by the British in August 1976 for a phased prohibition of chemical weapons. Among other members of the CCD, including our Allies, there is a general expectation, in fact, that the CCD's discussion of CW limitations will intensify during 1977.

*The Arms Control Impact of Proceeding with a U.S. Binary CW Facility*

Proponents of the Army's request believe that early approval is necessary in order to provide a strong, but by no means provocative, signal to the Soviets of U.S. resolve to counter their CW superiority and thus provide a realistic basis for arms control negotiations. U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions concerning a CW limitation have been under way for several years, although formal discussion has only taken place recently. The Soviets have consistently maintained that on-site verification of CW limitation is unacceptable. Recent Soviet statements on this matter do not indicate any significant change in their position. Soviet offers to "consider" on-site inspection have been limited to agent destruction only and, even here, they have been purposely vague concerning their intent. As the situation stands now, the prospect for an effective agreement appears dim. The Soviets cannot help but be aware of their advantages in CW and there is no reason to expect them to give them up. If we seriously expect the Soviets to negotiate away their warfighting capability, we may first have to convince them that we are willing to improve our stockpile should arms control efforts fail.

Those opposing the Army's request believe that:

—Given the attitudes in Congress and among some of our NATO Allies, it is unrealistic to expect that the U.S. can remedy whatever offensive CW deficiencies exist in NATO. German opposition to increased peacetime forward deployment of CW is a critical factor, and one that is not based on environmental and safety concerns, and hence one that will not be overcome by U.S. production of the safer binary munitions. Our most promising strategy in attempting to moderate the Warsaw Pact CW capabilities is to seek treaty restraints on CW, even though the restraints may not be fully verifiable. Thus to the extent that the

Army's request would be perceived, both in the U.S. and abroad, as contrary to the U.S. commitment to attempt to achieve further limitations, it could work against our interest.

—Progress has been made recently, during a period in which the U.S. exercised restraint on the question of preparations for the production of binary chemical weapons. For example, U.S. views on the need to find solutions to verification issues have won increased support. At the same time the U.S.S.R. appears to be approaching the remaining problems involved in negotiation of effective CW restraints in a more serious and flexible manner than previously. A decision to construct a binary facility at this time might well send the wrong signal to the Soviet government, leading them to conclude that the U.S. is not serious about seeking CW limitations.

—A budget request for the binary chemical weapon production facility should not be viewed as a way to facilitate negotiations by increasing pressure on the U.S.S.R. Failure to reach agreement on CW limitations so far cannot be attributed to Soviet intransigence, since the U.S. has not yet presented a proposal. In fact, the U.S. representative at the August 1976 bilateral consultations reported that the Soviets appeared to be prepared to go farther once the U.S. put forward a concrete proposal.

—U.S. commitment to a binary CW facility may tend to encourage CW proliferation. It may well be taken by some smaller countries to indicate renewed importance for chemical weapons, leading them to consider acquiring CW stockpiles of their own.

#### *Congressional Considerations*

In the FY 1975 budget, \$5.8 million was requested to procure the long lead time equipment items necessary to develop a production loading, assembling, and packaging (LAP) facility for the 155mm artillery projectile at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. After considerable debate in the Congress, this budget item was deleted by a vote of 214–186 on the House floor.

In the FY 1976 budget \$8.8 million for the same equipment was again requested, and Congress again deleted this request, because, in part, of concern over arms control implications. In recommending deletion, the House Appropriations Committee expressed its hope that genuine progress could be made during 1976 at the Conference of the Committee on

Disarmament on a realistic and workable treaty to ban all means of chemical warfare, but noted that:

“If no real progress is made in negotiations at the time we are to consider the FY 1977 Defense budget, the Committee may have to reappraise its position on the overall matter.”

The only additional FY 1976 budgetary request related to production was \$562,000 in Military Construction Authorization (MCA) for alterations to an existing facility to contain this (LAP) equipment. The House of Representatives deleted this MCA project on July 28, 1975.

Also in 1975 in response to a Congressional inquiry, the White House clarified its position on budget requests for binary chemical munitions: On July 17, Mr. Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, wrote Representative Melvin Price and Senator John Stennis:<sup>14</sup>

“... The President would recommend approval of the R and D funds for binary chemical munitions and the modification of the building at Pine Bluff, Arkansas. With the approval of the foregoing items, the other budgetary request for this program for procurement production could be deferred to a later point in time.”

It was the sense of both the Senate and House Appropriation Committees that priority of effort should be given to improving U.S. CW defenses. Further, the House conferees agreed to provide statutory language prohibiting the production of lethal binary chemical munitions unless the President certifies that it would be in the national interest. This was codified in Section 818, Public Law 94-106, October 6, 1975, as follows:

“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds authorized by this or any other Act shall be used for the purpose of production of lethal binary chemical munitions unless the President certifies to Congress that the production of such munitions is essential to the national interest to do so and submits a full report to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as far in advance of the production of such munitions as possible.

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<sup>14</sup> Friedersdorf’s letter to Charles Melvin Price (D-Illinois) and Stennis was not found.

“(b) For the purpose of this section the terms ‘lethal binary chemical munitions’ means (1) any toxic chemical (solid, liquid, or gas) which, through its chemical properties, is intended to be used to produce injury or death to human beings, and (2) any unique device, instrument, apparatus, or contrivance, including any components or accessories thereof, intended to be used to disperse or otherwise disseminate any such toxic chemical.”

(Note: Although the above law is concerned specifically with production and, therefore, does not apply to the proposed FY 78 Army request, DOD believes that a practical consideration of past Congressional concerns dictates that the White House endorse that request in some manner if approval is to be obtained. If the President approves the inclusion of the binary production facility in the FY 78 budget, he would indicate to Congress that while pursuing vigorously international treaty restraints on CW, it would serve our national security purposes to have such a standby facility.)

It would be up to President Ronald Reagan to present Congress with a statement in 1985 that the production of binary chemical weapons was necessary for national security reasons.

This document is identified as document 127 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

**Memorandum from David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 28, 1976

SUBJECT

SRG on Wednesday, December 29, 1976, at 3:00 p.m.

An SRG has been scheduled for Wednesday, December 29, 1976, at 3:00 p.m. to consider a DOD proposal to restore \$15.3 million in the FY 78 budget for the purpose of establishing a facility in which binary chemical munitions can be produced. This proposal, according to DOD, is not intended to imply a decision to produce binaries, or to prejudge that future decision, but rather is to reduce the time between a possible affirmative decision to produce binaries and the actual production, by acquiring the pacing item—the production facility—in advance. DOD has also proposed the elements of an approach to international restraints on CW, and links the establishment of the binary production facility with the tabling of a U.S. position on restraints.

The President decided against including the binary production facility in the FY 78 budget. DOD was prepared to reclama that decision as part of its overall budget appeal. Brent [Scowcroft] advised Rumsfeld that inasmuch as the binary issue was still under active interagency consideration within the NSC process, it would be appropriate for the SRG to address the production facility question rather than handling it strictly as a budget matter. Rumsfeld accepted this recommendation and followed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 18, Senior Review Group Meeting, 12/29/76—Chemical Munitions (1). Secret.

up with a memorandum to Brent outlining the DOD proposal for the binary facility and also describing a new DOD position for our international discussions on CW arms control (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

DOD believes it is [a] prudent military step to have a standby binary chemical weapons production facility, and that our action to acquire such a facility may also be useful in overcoming Soviet reluctance to negotiate a CW treaty having acceptable verification provisions.

The staff positions at State and ACDA are that the need for a binary production facility at this time has not been demonstrated; that it has been our inability to formulate our own position on CW treaty limitations which has impeded meaningful U.S.–USSR negotiations, and not Soviet recalcitrance; and that the signal implied in proceeding now with a binary production facility may be destructive to our bilateral and multilateral (CCD) discussions on possible CW restraints.

The CW working group prepared a background paper for the SRG (Tab B),<sup>3</sup> which was circulated to the members on December 23. Because of the shortness of time, official agency views—other than DOD’s as expressed in their memorandum to Scowcroft—were not obtained in advance of the SRG.

*Purpose of the SRG Meeting*

In addition to State, Defense, ACDA, CIA, and the JCS, the SRG will include OMB since the issue involves an FY 78 budget item. The purposes of the SRG are:

—To see if DOD wants to press for Presidential approval of a binary production facility in the face of the likely opposition from State, ACDA, and OMB, and in view of the awkwardness of obtaining Congressional support for a controversial proposal from an outgoing Administration.

—To give Robinson and Ikle an opportunity to express their views (which at least as far as Ikle is concerned, may not be as doctrinaire as the staff views).

—To see if there is any acceptable compromise (though none is apparent).

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<sup>2</sup> Rumsfeld’s December 15 memorandum to Scowcroft (Document 121) is attached.

<sup>3</sup> The paper (Document 126) is attached.

—To decide how to move the question to the President for resolution in time for inclusion in the budget. A somewhat expanded version of the paper at Tab B, plus agency views, could be forwarded to the President jointly by OMB and NSC during the week January 3–7. Rumsfeld, however, may want to have an NSC meeting to address the question.

### *Brief Background*

The U.S. manufactured and stockpiled nerve agent munitions and bulk nerve agent to fill future munitions. This manufacturing ended in 1968. Since then, our offensive CW capability has gradually degraded as certain munitions became obsolescent and some chemical deterioration occurred inside filled munitions (extent of this deterioration is being assessed by the Army, but the results will not be fully known until 1980). Our munition filling facilities have not been maintained, and it would be expensive, time consuming, and objectionable to many in Congress to rebuild these facilities to permit replacement of obsolescent and deteriorated stocks. Public concern over the safety of chemical weapons has led to restriction that nearly preclude transporting these munitions unless a war crisis exists. Our prepositioned forward deployment of chemical weapons for NATO is limited to one German site. The Germans have not been willing to increase deployment, mainly for domestic political reasons.

The Army has developed another form of nerve agent chemical munition, the binary. Two non-lethal substances, maintained separately inside the munition, are mixed to form nerve agent only as the munition is in flight to the target. The Army wants to produce these new munitions to replace the older ones that are the wrong type for newer weapons, to replace those suffering agent deterioration, to overcome transportation restriction, and possibly to overcome German resistance to further deployment. Also, the Army hopes that a modernized CW offensive capability would be a greater deterrent to Soviet introduction of CW in a conventional European war.

For several years, the Army has requested funds to build a facility to produce binaries. Each year Congress has knocked the funds out because some Congressmen are not convinced (1) that the military need has been sufficiently demonstrated and (2) that the possibility of arms control initiatives have [sic] been adequately explored. Congressional language in

the FY 76 DOD authorization made it clear that the President would have to certify a strong national interest exists before there would be any chance of obtaining Congressional approval for binary production. (Stennis made the same point privately.)

DOD wants to make another effort as part of the FY 78 budget to establish a standby binary production facility to permit production to proceed immediately if a decision were made in two years that our offensive CW capability must be modernized. (DOD already has underway a major program to upgrade our defensive CW posture.) To overcome Congressional objections, DOD would propose that the President certify the need for a production decision and also commit the U.S. to vigorous international negotiations on CW restraints.

Over the past several years, the U.S. has had desultory discussions in the CCD, and even more limited talks with the Soviets, about possible treaty restraints on the possession and production of CW (first use of CW is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol). Attempts to define internally our position on acceptable CW restraints (NSSM 157, 192, and short follow-on papers) have faltered over the problem of verification, and the perception that the Soviets would not accept on-site inspection on challenge. Recently, however, the Soviets have given some indication that they may be prepared to accept some on-site inspection—such as verification of the destruction of declared stocks. This factor, plus DOD's new proposal for a possible treaty regime, opens the possibility for more productive CW talks than before. In DOD's view, construction of a binary production facility could pressure the Soviets to be forthcoming in CW negotiations, and would also permit us to proceed with the necessary modernization of our CW capability if the talks fail.

The contrary views, as developed in the NSSM studies, hold that:

—Real upgrading of NATO's offensive CW capability is a remote possibility, given our Allies' lack of that capability and no discernible inclination to acquire such, and German objection to greater forward deployment in the regions where chemical munitions would be needed quickly to retaliate against Soviet use.

—Retaliation in kind to a CW attack is unlikely to be effective. Tactical nuclear weapons would probably be required to redress the military advantage the Soviets would obtain by introducing CW.

—Our best hope to neutralize the Soviet CW offensive capability is to improve greatly NATO's CW defensive capacity, and to achieve the maximum possible CW treaty restraints. Soviet cheating on any CW treaty cannot be ruled out, but given their political concern over being exposed, any illegal retention of chemical weapons or production facilities would give them a capability that would be considerably reduced and constrained in comparison to the situation today.

—It is doubtful that proceeding with a binary production facility will help in our negotiations, and could, in fact, send the wrong signal. The obstacle to negotiations has been the lack of our own position.

[Omitted here is a list of the tabs containing Scowcroft's briefing materials.]

This document is identified as document 128 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

## **Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 29, 1976, 3:07–4:03 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Binary Weapons Chemical Facility

### PARTICIPANTS

*Chairman*

William G. Hyland

*State*

Charles Robinson

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

*Defense*

Col. Don Mahlberg

Dr. James P. Wade

*JCS*

Gen. George S. Brown

*CIA*

Enno Knocke

Carl Weber

*OMB*

Don Ogilvie

Robert Howard

*ACDA*

Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Thomas D. Davies

*NSC*

William G. Hyland

Dr. David Elliott

Michael Hornblow

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 307, National Security Council, Committees and Panels, Senior Review Group, Nov. 1976–Jan. 1977. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

Hyland:<sup>2</sup> The problem as I understand it is that the DOD proposal for \$15 million in the budget for a binary CW production facility was turned down. Don Rumsfeld reclaimed and it was agreed to have this meeting. I think we all know the DOD position. My question is: What is the relationship between the budget proposal and DOD's draft CW treaty. What happens if you don't get the funds?

Wade: We are trying to move to improve our CW posture. This is now more important and has a higher priority because we have taken no action in the last couple of years. The binary facility is a long-lead item and an important element in our CW posture.

Hyland: But how do you handle Congress. Is this just a bargaining chip?

Wade: If we brief Congress frankly about what we know regarding the Russian CW program, I think we could get Congressional support.

Hyland: You wish to begin modernization and start preparing to produce binaries in two years, and at the same time we would begin to negotiate. We would also continue R&D in the CW area.

Wade: The possibility of an acceptable international agreement limiting CW is not high.

Brown: We are trying to keep the binary option open.

Hyland: Suppose we put the money in the budget. Then maybe Congress would say to hell with it. What does that do to our leverage at the negotiating table?

Wade: The two should be linked. Frank discussions with Congress would help bring them around. We can't maintain a balance in Europe using only our mechanized forces. We have to increase the pressure against Soviet use of CW. We have been stalemated for the last couple of years and the problem needs to be faced up to.

Ikle: We don't have a U.S. negotiating position on CW. In a year's time we could probably get an agreement, but without verification.

Hyland: The U.S. could not accept an agreement without verification.

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<sup>2</sup> The copy of the minutes located in the Kissinger Papers (see footnote 1 above) is missing the first page. This portion of the published conversation is based upon a transcription, prepared by the editor, of a draft version of the minutes found in the Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 24, Meeting Minutes—Senior Review Group, November–December 1976.

Robinson: There is some give on the Soviets' part in that area.<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Ikle: Even if we started to produce binaries, it is doubtful that it would give us much leverage in verification negotiations. There would not be much leverage coming out of a small production facility. The leverage would have to result from political factors. The problem is that we have been sitting on the fence for so long. I don't think we should go ahead at this time with a production facility. It does not require all that much lead time.

Dr. Wade: This is a long lead item which requires two years.

Dr. Ikle: But in a real emergency, it might not take that long.

Mr. Robinson: I am comparing the \$15.8 million under question vs. the \$8.8 million in the FY 76 budget for ordering long delivery items.

Are we talking about two different things?

Dr. Wade: \$2 million is for rehabilitation and \$13 million is for equipment.

Mr. Robinson: So that figure includes the equipment and the installation.

Dr. Wade: It could be a significant half step forward and might be useful in the negotiations. I cannot say definitely what effect it might have.

Dr. Ikle: If there were an impasse, it might help.

Mr. Davies: But we have never made a negotiating proposal.

Mr. Hyland: What is in the Soviet draft treaty, a total ban?

Mr. Davies: Yes, eventually.

Gen. Brown: It is for new production: They won't destroy the facilities they have.

Dr. Ikle: It presents us with massive verification problems. We can, though, observe the destruction of facilities. Once the negotiations start, there may be some give on the Soviet side.

Mr. Robinson: I have some technical questions. One question is about the efficiency of the binary artillery shell vis-a-vis the present one.

Dr. Wade: There is no degradation. They are the same.

Mr. Davies: There is slight degradation on a per pound basis.

Gen. Brown: You don't get something for nothing.

Col. Mahlberg: It is not militarily significant.

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<sup>3</sup> The remainder of the minutes is in the Kissinger Papers.

Mr. Robinson: My second question is that effective use of CW requires lots of shells concentrated in one area. Given the limitation on tubes, wouldn't you have to cut back on some conventional artillery support?

Dr. Wade: It depends on your objectives. There are different scenarios.

Mr. Davies: We are short of artillery today.

Gen. Brown: Haig is more concerned now about a CW attack than a conventional attack.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Are binaries the answer?

Gen. Brown: They would be [of] some use. We have none today.

Mr. Hyland: Why is our proposed response an offensive one? Why not have a substantial increase in our defensive capabilities?

Dr. Wade: If we go into a completely defensive posture that gives the Soviets the option to attack at a time and place of their choosing.

Gen. Brown: We are only talking about \$15 million.

Mr. Hyland: But there is the possibility of much larger expenses in the future. Don't the Soviets have an active program of protective measures?

Gen. Brown: Yes, at present they could fight in an environment they create.

Dr. Wade: Both sides would be affected and would have to wear masks.

Mr. Davies: Both sides would be slowed down.

Mr. Hyland: Don't we have some capability in West Germany?

Dr. Ikle: Yes, but it is all in one place. In case of a war you could ship more over if there were time. Binaries would give you some advantage.

Gen. Brown: We can easily sit here and quick-talk ourselves out of this decision.

Dr. Ikle: I was explaining your side of the story and saying that one of the reasons for going to binaries is that it would be easier to ship.

Gen. Brown: I misunderstood you.

Mr. Robinson: My understanding is that if a decision is made to go ahead that in ten years the cost would add up to \$1 billion. A long lead time of two years is required. The State Department feeling generally is that we haven't really explored the possibility of an agreement with the Soviets. We have not made a counter offer. If we fail in an effort to get the

Congress to spend the \$15 million, it would weaken our bargaining position. Then there is the problem of West Germany. They would not be impressed by our assurances on safety. For the Germans there are more important psychological and political concerns. We would have a problem in determining what we could store in a forward position. State feels we should not go ahead at the present time.

Dr. Ikle: The German position is fundamental. Perhaps we should see if we can get the Germans to agree to store binaries.

Dr. Wade: We are talking about FY 78 money.

Mr. Hyland: Congress has turned it down the last two years. The two main problems are how to get it in the budget and how to get it through Congress.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We need to make some sort of answer to the Russians. It has been a year and a half.

Mr. Hyland: I am worried about a full blown proposal being killed in Congress. Many of the people up there say let's try first to negotiate. We should have talks with the Russians about verification. These could be technical talks about how to verify without saying to them what we propose. We could tell Congress that on the basis of these technical talks we plan to develop a negotiating position next fall.

Dr. Wade: It might be a viable way to start. Congress might accept it.

Mr. Hyland: We could put it in the budget and tell Congress that we are going ahead to have serious talks with the Russians.

Dr. Ikle: We should have a larger reexamination of our position in light of verification problems. The present stockpile in the Soviet Union is a key problem. We could probably agree to cut down on new production and verify that. We can verify the visible things but there is no way to verify the stockpiles. There is some disingenuousness in our position.

Mr. Robinson: (to Mr. Hyland) Your compromise seems palatable to me personally but I don't know about the Department. If you could give me a draft of your proposal I could take it back so that we could reconsider our position. Basically we are opposed to the \$15 million expenditure. However your suggestion might cause us to reconsider.

Mr. Hyland: My proposal is that we would put the \$15 million in the budget. Simultaneously we would propose to the Russians and also inform Congress that we are prepared to hold technical talks with the Russians on verification and the limitation of chemical weapons and on the basis of

these talks we could make a proposal. We would use that decision with Congress and go along on a parallel track. If the arms control discussions succeed then the binaries are irrelevant. If they don't work then we will have to face up to a major threat.

Mr. Ogilvie: You are talking about a bargaining chip?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It's keeping your options open.

Gen. Brown: The Hill might react that way—that it is a bargaining chip—but we should stand behind it.

Mr. Ogilvie: Look. It is a long time before FY '78 starts. Not until September 1977. No commitment could be made for at least a year. We have the option of telling the Soviets of our intentions and to start negotiating with them now. We would so advise Congress. We could use this as a bargaining chip with the Soviets and see if we can or cannot get an agreement.

Dr. Ikle: That is illusory. You could not get an agreement in that time providing for verification.

Mr. Ogilvie: There is a year to find out.

Dr. Ikle: There are two ways of having an agreement. One would be without verification. The second would be a partial agreement limiting new production.

Mr. Ogilvie: I have real worries about the Hill. If the Hill says no for a fourth time then we have lost a lot of leverage.

Dr. Ikle: The USSR would be willing to sign an agreement without verification. Maybe after one or two years there could be some progress on the verification issue.

Mr. Ogilvie: With regard to the budget there is a technical problem. Even if we acted today it would be extremely difficult to get the numbers changed. We could do it today or possibly as late as Monday. The budget is in page proof now and we expect to lock it in final very shortly. In order to get a change in the budget we would have to go to the President and we would need a memo for the President. This would be very difficult in such a short time. The other option is to keep the budget as is and have the President submit a supplemental.

Mr. Hyland: Would there have to be a Presidential determination that it is in the national interest?

Dr. Wade: Only for actual binary production.

Mr. Ogilvie: There are legal differences of interpretation. It would be interpreted as a production decision and would require a Presidential determination.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It is not a production decision, it is just a decision to keep our options open.

Mr. Ogilvie: That would not reflect the intent of Congress. They would view this as a production decision requiring a determination.

Gen. Brown: Well if the President approves the \$15 million, there should not be any problem in getting a determination.

Mr. Hyland: So there is no consensus in this group.

Mr. Robinson: Right. We would like to reserve our vote until we can review the paper to the President outlining the alternatives.

Dr. Ikle: Our view is that it should not be put in the budget. Although the \$15 million is a small amount it would be a red flag and cause a great deal of commotion on the Hill and among the public. It is already flagged as an important issue in the Defense Posture statement. A new negotiating position is not for us to develop but for the new Administration. We should become more honest in our position.

Gen. Brown: What could really be done in negotiations?

Dr. Ikle: We could have an agreement in a year without verification provisions and some progress toward verifying stockpile destruction.

Dr. Wade: But as long as our posture is zero the possibility of an accord is zero.

Gen. Brown: Why would the Russians want to negotiate?

Dr. Ikle: We still have our old stock.

Gen. Brown: We could get a telegram out to Vail<sup>4</sup> tonight.

Mr. Hyland: All we could say is that we had a meeting and there was no agreement.

Dr. Ikle: There should be some explanation in it as to why we have not made a counter proposal in Geneva. The reason is verification problems.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: If the President were to advocate this, he could say that we have been unable to make a responsible statement on the subject because of verification problems, and, secondly, he could mention the

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<sup>4</sup> Ford vacationed in Vail, Colorado from December 19 to January 2, 1977. (Ibid., Staff Secretary's Office, President's Daily Diary)

cumulative effect of Soviet forces in the area. The other possibility is that we need to use more imagination to see if there is some way to negotiate. There is nothing lost by waiting another year to update the facility and resolve our problems with our Allies. We could make one more major effort.

Mr. Ogilvie: That is up to the next Administration.

Mr. Hyland: If it is not in the budget then it is not an issue.

Mr. Ogilvie: If it is not in then we have until September to ask for a supplement.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: In the memo to the President it should be pointed out that if we put the money in and Congress then takes it out, we lose leverage.

Mr. Hyland: The variable is to what extent the Russians will let us inspect. If they agree to inspection it is a new ball game. We should explore that and see how they feel about it. We could make a proposal that both sides destroy X tons and no more. Something like that could be verified.

And in fact, something like this happened in 1989 between the United States and USSR under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction Agreement Text.

Mr. Davies: Is the remainder of military consequence?

Mr. Robinson: \$15.3 does not bother me. I am concerned with the rationale. What can be achieved is the important thing.

Gen. Brown: What if you assume that Congress will go along with having the \$15 million. Would that give you leverage?

Dr. Ikle: It might give you some leverage.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We would lose leverage if it squeaks by Congress. The opposition would then become more vociferous. There could be an outcry and controversy and Congress might then reverse itself.

Dr. Wade: The timing of the presentation is important. We could advise Congress we are starting technical talks but that we would not spend money for a year.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That would get you leverage but it is risky.

Dr. Ikle: If this scenario leads you to residual stocks, then it is better to have these stocks in binaries.

Gen. Brown: Your worry about Congress might be true. But on the other hand there is growing concern in the country regarding the fundamental imbalance of power between us and the Russians. I have just been going through our posture statement. It is depressing. It is awful. I think we are going to start getting a reaction in this country. In the next year the new team, the general public and Congress will all be educated.

Dr. Ikle: First we should have a position on negotiations. In light of that perhaps a production facility would be in order.

Mr. Hyland: You are still opposed to the \$15 million now?

Dr. Ikle: Yes, it is putting things in reverse order.

Mr. Ogilvie: If you take this to the President it is important that Jack Marsh have some input. He was involved originally when the President expressed his concern about the public reaction. This is more than a meeting of the SRG. It is a budget decision that Marsh was originally involved with.

Mr. Hyland: There is no agreement to recommend that the budget be reversed. That split should be reported to the President. DOD through Don Rumsfeld has the right to reclama. I will report to Brent Scowcroft that there was no agreement. It was 2 vs. 2. DOD will reclama through Lynn.

This document is identified as document 130 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973-1976*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1969-76v35/pdf/frus1969-76v35.pdf>.

**Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) and the President's Assistant for Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 3, 1977

SUBJECT

Binary Chemical Weapons Production Facility

Secretary Rumsfeld has appealed<sup>2</sup> your decision to deny funding of \$15 million in the FY 1978 Defense budget to establish and equip a facility to produce binary chemical artillery projectiles. This facility would be a first step toward a possible modernization of chemical munitions at a total cost of about \$1 billion.

In your review of this issue, the following arguments were pointed out in favor of the Defense request:

—U.S. offensive chemical warfare capability is poor relative to the Soviet's and is slowly deteriorating. We have no present ability to replace obsolescent chemical munitions.

—Binary munitions are safer to manufacture, transport and store than current munitions.

—Existing stocks of chemical munitions will need eventual replacement if we are to maintain an offensive capability.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Ford Library, President's Handwriting File, Box 30, Subject File, National Security—Chemical Warfare. Secret. Sent for action. A memorandum, January 3, from Connor to Ford was found attached that reads: "OMB and NSC would very much like your decision on this matter by early tomorrow morning in order for it to be reflected in the Budget."

<sup>2</sup> See Document 121.

The following considerations argued against approval of the facility:

—There is no urgency for production of binaries. Some chemical munitions are already forward deployed in Europe.

—Though Defense believes that a modernized CW capability would be a greater deterrent against Soviet employment of chemical weapons, more emphasis on our defensive capability may be sufficient response to the Soviet CW threat.

—Strong Congressional opposition exists to production of binaries (funds were denied by Congressional action on the FY 1975 budget; the FY 1976 Defense Authorization Bill forbids production of binaries unless explicitly authorized by the President).

—Approval of the facility may be premature until arms control initiatives can be better explored.

Secretary Rumsfeld has appealed your decision on the grounds that funding of the facility would:

1. Preserve our options concerning future modernization of the stockpile.

2. Provide a strong, but not provocative signal to the Soviets that we are prepared to rebuild our chemical warfare capability if an effective arms control agreement cannot be reached.

3. Reverse the growing imbalance in U.S.–USSR offensive CW capabilities, while continued inaction would result in increased risk to NATO and possibly lower the nuclear threshold in Europe.

Because the possible production of binary offensive weapons raises fundamental policy matters, the question of the Defense appeal was considered at a meeting of the NSC Senior Review Group.<sup>3</sup> No consensus was reached at this meeting.

Defense reaffirmed the need to provide an option for binary production. Funding of the facility would not presume a commitment to produce binary munitions. Approximately two years would be required to prepare the facility for production. Defense believes that the following rationale could be used in presenting this matter to Congress: (1) The U.S. has not yet presented a CW arms control proposal because we have not been able to solve the verification problem and (2) the cumulative effect of

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 128.

the Soviet CW effort is such that we have determined it necessary to take action now to preserve our options and are requesting the minimum amount needed to do this.

ACDA does not favor funding the binary weapons facility in the 1978 budget and argues that initiation of a program to produce binaries is premature, prior to a decision on the U.S. negotiating position on chemical weapons limitations. It engenders unnecessary controversy domestically and internationally without significant gains in national security. This would detract from the President's broader and more important message on his defense budget.

State sees no urgency in the construction of this facility and argues that we should first proceed with a response to the Soviet proposal for a CW treaty in an effort to determine the possibility of a CW agreement. State points out that while a visible step toward modernizing our offensive chemical capabilities might possibly provide some negotiating leverage, possible Congressional denial of the request could leave us in a weakened negotiating position. Insofar as the case for binaries assumes increased peacetime forward deployment, it should be noted that we have not yet determined whether the FRG would oppose further deployment of additional chemical weapons, including binary weapons, on their territory. Current information suggests that such additional deployments would be opposed.

*Recommendation*

That you reaffirm your decision to deny 1978 funding of the binary facility. (State, ACDA and OMB recommend)<sup>4</sup>

Alternatively, that you

—Allocate \$15 million within current totals for the binary facility in the FY 1978 defense budget. (NSC recommends)

—Include \$15 million for the binary facility in the FY 1978 defense budget. (Defense and Jack Marsh recommend)

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<sup>4</sup> Ford initialed his approval.

While the proposed binary chemical weapons production facility would start with the 155mm artillery shell, it would also grow to include an 8-in and MRLS rocket version. The Air Force and Navy both initiated binary chemical agent aerial bombs, but neither got out of R&D before the binary program was cancelled in 1991.



## CHAPTER 7

### **Carter Administration (1977-1980)**

There were not many significant events relating to CB weapons policy during this time frame. With the Biological Weapons Convention in place and the U.S. chemical weapons modernization effort being stalled in Congress, there was not much to discuss at the senior policy level other than the progress of arms control efforts between the United States and Soviet Union. One of the more colorful news stories was the issue of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov being assassinated in London in 1978 by a ricin pellet, allegedly by the Soviet KGB and Bulgarian secret police. The Carter administration did focus on continuing arms control talks with the Soviet Union, but without much success. One can see the early outlines of the Chemical Weapons Convention in the 1977-1978 Presidential Review Memorandums. The 1979 Sverdlovsk incident (accidental release of inhalation anthrax) pretty much killed any momentum on cooperative talks on CB arms control. Although the Soviet Union's ambassadors denied that Sverdlovsk was a biological weapons production plant at the time, President Yeltsin admitted in 1992 that it was in fact an accidental release of inhalation anthrax from a production plant.

The following is a section from the *Foreign Relations* series on the climate of arms control discussions during the Carter administration. While it is titled as discussing counterproliferation, it should be noted that the topics are much more oriented toward non-proliferation activities.

#### **Counterproliferation during the Carter Administration<sup>1</sup>**

During his run for the presidency in 1976, former Governor Jimmy Carter made the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arms a key part of his foreign policy platform. Carter, in a

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<sup>1</sup>Original text from the Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Counter-Proliferation during the Carter Administration," *Foreign Relations of the United States*, available at <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/non-proliferation>.

departure from former Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, also tried to link his arms control ideas to his emphasis on human rights. After his January 1977 inauguration, Carter immediately began to pursue his counter-proliferation objectives. He also announced that he would link arms control to the human rights records of U.S. allies, in particular in Latin America.

Carter focused on five areas: anti-satellite (ASAT) space systems; chemical and biological weapons (CBW); a comprehensive nuclear testing ban (CTB), even if such tests were used for “peaceful” purposes; the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by Latin American nations; and the global reduction of conventional arms sales/transfers. The Carter administration’s main negotiating partner in the first three areas was the Soviet Union. Carter’s negotiating partners in the last two areas were the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Soviet Union, and the Latin American allies.

It became quickly apparent that the two superpowers fundamentally diverged on two key points. First was the issue of verification, which also hampered the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations that were occurring simultaneously. Like Nixon and Ford, Carter wanted each side to have the ability to perform on-site inspections (OSIs) and employ National Technical Means (NTM) such as photo reconnaissance flights to verify compliance with agreements. The Soviets, however, rejected both means of verification in the ASAT, CTB, and CBW negotiations.

The second area of disagreement involved definitions of weapons systems. The Soviets demanded that the space shuttle, currently being developed by the United States, be subject to an ASAT treaty. Carter, however, categorically rejected this demand. The ASAT negotiations ended after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979.

Chemical weapons negotiations bogged down over whether pesticides and other defoliants would be subjected to an arms control agreement, and the Soviet Union and the United States could not agree whether or not binary chemical weapons (those weapons requiring a chemical reaction to activate the toxin) would be included in a potential treaty. These roadblocks had also been a problem during the Nixon and Ford years.

Biological weapons did not become an issue until the spring of 1980, when the United States learned that an outbreak of pulmonary anthrax had killed hundreds, possibly thousands, in Sverdlovsk, the site of a suspected

Soviet biological weapons factory. The factory had ostensibly been closed after former President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention that banned the use and production of biological weapons. This apparent violation of the Convention, coming shortly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Carter's decision to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics, further poisoned U.S.-Soviet relations, and the CBW talks languished.

The CTB discussions were the most intense and long-lasting arms control discussions of the Carter years. These negotiations also bogged down over whether Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) should be included in an agreement. Carter wanted a comprehensive ban, but the Soviets wanted the ability to perform PNEs, especially to divert the course of a river in Siberia to the desert areas of Central Asia. Like the ASAT and CBW negotiations, the CTB talks were threatened after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Sverdlovsk incident. When the United States began detecting signs in the summer of 1980 that the Soviets had resumed high-yield testing that violated the 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Carter abandoned the negotiations.

Talks over nuclear non-proliferation in Latin America also began as soon as Carter took office. Carter had publicly criticized the 1975 sale of a nuclear reactor by the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil because he worried that the Brazilians would be able to produce weapons-grade uranium. If Brazil developed nuclear weapons, it would violate the 1968 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had created a Latin American nuclear-free zone. Brazil had signed, but not ratified, the Treaty. Only three days into his presidency, Carter learned from the U.S. Department of State that Brazilian-American and German-American relations would be severely jeopardized if he continued to criticize the sale. Meanwhile, Argentina, Brazil's principal regional rival, refused to ratify the Treaty and began the process of purchasing a nuclear reactor of its own. The Carter administration asked the Mexican Government, which had provided the impetus for the signing of the Treaty, to convince Brazil, Argentina, and also Cuba, to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. Washington's and Mexico City's efforts failed, and when Carter left office in 1981 the status quo remained.

As noted above, Carter wanted to link his arms control initiatives to human rights, particularly in the area of conventional arms sales.

However, Carter found that his human rights rhetoric collided with U.S. security interests. If the United States wished to counterbalance Soviet power, then it could not easily stop selling or transferring conventional arms to its Latin American (and Asian) allies even if their commitment to human rights was suspect. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union increased its arms sales, especially to the developing world. Ultimately, Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, successfully convinced Carter that the rise of Cuban and Soviet activity in Central and South America, along with instability in East Asia, meant that the United States must support its anti-communist allies with conventional weapons, despite their human rights records. By the time Carter left office, U.S. conventional arms sales had actually increased.

This document is identified as document 21 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>.

## Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *United States*

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. Paul Warnke  
Assistant Secretary  
Arthur Hartman  
Mr. William Hyland  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Slocombe  
Mr. William D. Krimer,  
Interpreter

#### *USSR*

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Deputy Chairman of the Council  
of Ministers L.V. Smirnov  
Deputy Foreign Minister  
Georgiy Korniyenko  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. O. Sokolov  
Mr. V.F. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[The first section of this memorandum discusses various foreign policy issues, to include Berlin, Cyprus, nuclear non-first use, anti-satellite capabilities, civil defense, and other issues.]

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### *CHEMICAL WEAPONS*

*Gromyko* said that he would like to instruct his representatives in Geneva to suggest that the CCD [Conference of the Committee on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on April 12; reviewed by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place at the Kremlin.

Disarmament] start drafting the text of an agreement on chemical weapons, provided the United States agreed of course. In the process of drafting, some problems might simply disappear. So far the CCD had indulged in philosophical discussions. This is all he had to say on the subject. (He remarked that this was the briefest statement he had ever made on any issue.)

*The Secretary* agreed that some progress had been made through discussions between technical people in this area. We were ready and willing to join with the Soviet Union in this initiative. We would see if working on the text of an agreement might not change our respective stand on issues on which we had different views, although our goals were the same.

*Gromyko* said we should instruct our representatives to get to work.

...

The challenge with constructing an arms control discussion on chemical weapons was that, unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons had been produced and stockpiled for decades in significant quantities. The question of verifiable prohibitions on production, stockpiling, and transfer of existing weapons centered on how the United States and Soviet Union would allow on-site inspections and other confidence building measures to go forward.

**Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-27**

May 19, 1977

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee undertake a review of the US chemical warfare (CW) posture with a view toward developing CW arms limitation options.

The review shall include:

1. An assessment of the nature and trends of the CW threat, to be prepared by the Intelligence Community.
2. A definition of alternative military strategies for deterring CW, and limiting its effect if deterrence fails. Each strategy description shall include an evaluation of:
  - supporting force postures and programs, including costs.
  - associated military risks
  - US and allied technological capabilities, and military and social constraints
  - impact on US allies
  - effect of use on military operation including incentives for first use of chemicals
3. An evaluation of arms limitation options. Analysis shall include consideration of:
  - net effect on US security, including impact on US Allies

- contribution to US-Soviet relations and to other foreign policy interests
- verification and compliance requirements
- possibilities for successful negotiation

The review shall be completed by June 1 and shall not exceed 25 pages.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

We don't have any records on this review or the final recommendations of this Special Coordination Committee.

**Presidential Directive/NSC-15**

June 16, 1977

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Chemical Warfare

The President has directed that a United States delegation under the direction of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency should immediately initiate bilateral consultations with the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, to be followed by negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of a comprehensive treaty to ban chemical warfare.

Talks with the Soviet Union should seek to reach agreement on a joint US-USSR initiative to be presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament along the following lines:

- Definitions of important terms would be incorporated in the agreement.
- To the extent possible, low-risk, more easily verified actions would be undertaken at the earliest possible stage.
- Production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of chemical warfare (CW) agents and munitions would be prohibited.
- Development of CW agents or munitions would be prohibited, but development of means of protection against chemical attack would be permitted.
- Existing stocks of CW agents and munitions would be destroyed over a period of at least eight years according to an agreed schedule. All CW stocks would be declared at a time a State became a Party. As an alternative to destruction, dual-purpose agents could be diverted to

peaceful purposes, subject to appropriate controls. Precursors would be treated in the same manner as agents.

- All facilities designed or used for production of single-purpose chemicals would be declared and immediately closed down. However, under appropriate controls such a facility could be used for agent/munition destruction operations. All declared facilities would be destroyed or dismantled within two years after stockpile destruction had been completed. Establishment of new production facilities would be prohibited.
- The disposition of declared facilities and the destruction of declared stocks would require on-site verification under independent, international auspices.
- The agreement would contain agreed procedures for the carrying out of an investigation by representatives of a Consultative Committee of treaty parties in the event that suspicious activities were reported.
- The following types of chemicals would be subject to the provisions of the agreement: lethal and other highly toxic chemicals, incapacitating chemicals, and precursors.
- The principal criterion for application of the provisions of the agreement to specific chemicals would be whether the specific activities in question are justified for peaceful purposes (“purpose criterion”). To assist in the applying the purpose criterion, two supplementary toxicity criteria would be adopted.
- Transfer of CW agents or munitions to others would be prohibited, as would any other effort to help others obtain CW agents or munitions.
- Provisions would be included for confidence-building purpose.
- Any State Party would have the right to withdraw if it decided that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the agreement, had jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. Appropriate notice would be required.
- All States would be eligible to become Parties.

The President has also directed that US chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement. This decision will be reviewed,

beginning with the start of the FY 1980 budget cycle, on the basis of the progress made in arms limitation talks.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

Of interest, many if not all of these points would remain in the Chemical Weapons Convention 15 years later—it just took a while to get the major powers to agree to the script.

**Presidential Directive/NSC-28**

January 25, 1978

TO:           The Vice President  
              The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense  
              The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
              The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
              The Director of Central Intelligence  
              The Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy  
              The Director, Federal Preparedness Agency

SUBJECT:   United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and  
              Bacteriological/Biological Research Program

Following consideration by the National Security Council, the President has decided that:

1. The term Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) will no longer be used. The reference should be to the two categories separately – The Chemical Warfare Program and The Biological Research Program.
2. With respect to Chemical Warfare:
  - a. The primary United States objective will be to negotiate a comprehensive treaty to ban chemical weapons. U.S. policy on these negotiations is contained in PD-15. The objective of the U.S. Chemical Warfare Program will be to deter the use of chemical weapons by other nations and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence fails.
  - b. The renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons in accordance with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is reaffirmed.
  - c. This renunciation is also applied to incapacitating chemical weapons.
  - d. This renunciation does not apply to the use of riot control agents or herbicides. Executive Order 11850 provides guidance on authorized uses.

- e. [This portion has not been declassified]
  - f. The Secretary of Defense shall continue to develop and improve controls and safety measures in all chemical warfare programs.
  - g. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain surveillance of the chemical warfare capabilities of other states.
  - h. An Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the NSC shall conduct a periodic review of United States chemical warfare programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.
3. With respect to Biological Research:
- a. The United States renounced the use of all methods of bacteriological/biological and toxin warfare in accordance with the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention.
  - b. The United States has destroyed all stockpiles of bacteriological/biological and toxin materials and associated weapons systems.
  - c. The United States bacteriological/biological programs will be consistent with the provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention.
  - d. The Secretary of Defense shall continue to develop controls and safety measures in all defensive biological research programs.
  - e. The Director of Central Intelligence shall continue to maintain surveillance of the bacteriological/biological warfare capabilities of other states.
  - f. An Ad Hoc Committee chaired by the NSC shall conduct a periodic review of United States biological research programs and public information policy, and will make recommendations to the President.

NSDM 35 is hereby rescinded.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

Not significantly different than the Nixon/Ford administration's point of view, except to point out that by 1977, all of the U.S. offensive BW agents had been destroyed. At least, there were far fewer BW agents by weight than what was in the existing CW stockpile.

**Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-37**

June 16, 1978

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO: The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Chemical Weapons

The President has directed that the Special Coordination Committee undertake a review of the United States chemical weapons (CW) posture incorporating information acquired over the past year and covering the following:

1. An updated on the CW threat, U.S. protective posture and U.S. retaliatory capability.
2. An assessment of the current bilateral negotiations with the USSR aimed at the preparation of a joint CW initiative for presentation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) including:
  - Key elements on which some degree of agreement has been reached with the USSR.
  - Key elements on which agreement has not been reached, and possible approaches for resolution.
  - Prospects for agreement on a joint initiative consistent with the current U.S. negotiating instructions.
  - Consideration of extent of implementation on past decrease regarding U.S. CW stocks.
3. In light of the assessment per Paragraph 2, a review of the PD-15 decision "that U.S. chemical warfare forces be maintained without force improvement" including a discussion of possible steps to modernize or restructure the U.S. CW posture.

The review should be completed by July 14, 1978.

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

Another Special Coordination Committee? Again, no insights into what they discussed.

This document is identified as document 203 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>

## Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev  
Topics: SALT III and other arms control issues

### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
The President  
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance  
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
General David Jones  
Mr. Hamilton Jordan  
General G. Seignious  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. Joseph Powell  
Mr. David Aaron  
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

*U.S.S.R.*  
President L.I. Brezhnev  
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Marshal D.F. Ustinov  
Mr. K.U. Chernenko  
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; approved by Aaron. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Marshal N.V. Ogarkov  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov  
Mr. L.M. Zamyatin  
Mr. V.G. Komplektov  
Mr. A.M. Vavilov  
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The *President* said he was grateful that a successfully completed SALT II agreement would be signed tomorrow. For the first time, this agreement places ceilings on nuclear arms and provides for reductions of certain nuclear arms. However, it is obvious that SALT II does not go far enough. It still permits a massive buildup in nuclear arms and a buildup in warheads, and we are concerned about the future and very eager to make progress today in deciding ways to explore how we can have a meaningful SALT III agreement. As President Brezhnev would know, under SALT II both nations are permitted to develop and deploy more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. This is a waste of national resources, but each nation is inclined to match the potential nuclear strength of the other. In addition to great numbers, technological advances, which are almost inevitable, can be very destabilizing in the future. With cruise missiles, new types of submarines with missiles, our own MX missile, improved accuracy of warheads, air defense systems, civil defense commitments and the very large ICBMs, like the SS-18, all these advances can be very destabilizing in the future. So, under SALT II, the nuclear arms race will continue, but the United States is ready to stop the arms race. The President was sure that Brezhnev understood the military and technical aspects of this problem. He would now like to outline briefly some steps they might explore together as they approached the SALT III negotiations.

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Turning to other disarmament issues, *Brezhnev* first wanted to remind the President that the Soviet Union was firmly in favor of disarmament and in favor of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union considered this to be a correct way of proceeding and was prepared at any time to begin practical discussions of this matter. Unfortunately, the United States

and its NATO allies had not manifested such willingness to date. Well, the Soviet side would have to wait until the appropriate situation matured. But in the meanwhile, as he saw it, it might well be possible to reach agreement on such partial measures as prohibition of radiological weapons and prohibition of chemical weapons, mutual renunciation of the manufacture of neutron weapons and some other actions to reduce the scope of military competition between our countries and in the world at large. Here, again, he would ask Gromyko to review the general state of affairs.

*Gromyko* noted that the Soviet Union was engaged in negotiations with the United States on some other partial disarmament questions, apart from mutual force reductions. The radiological weapons negotiations were scheduled to begin literally three days after conclusion of the current meeting. In general, at these negotiations, the situation was encouraging. There were a few minor remaining differences which could probably be eliminated quickly. He hoped that this would be so and that both sides would make a major effort to achieve the goal of bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion. What was contemplated in this area was the signing of an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

I do not understand the Soviet Union's fixation on radiological weapons, unless they were inferring the possibility of directed energy weapons. Certainly the United States was not investing any R&D into radiological dispersal devices. It may have been a desire to limit any research and development into a new means of warfare, rather than to limit existing weapons or concepts. To my knowledge, this didn't go anywhere.

Turning to neutron weapons, *Gromyko* noted that the Soviet Union had tabled a proposal at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, proposing that these weapons be prohibited and that both our nations be a party to such an agreement. The Soviet Union had stated its views on this matter more than once and, in particular, this had been emphasized repeatedly by President Brezhnev. The Soviet Union believed that the manufacture and deployment of weapons of this kind would be a major negative step that would adversely affect relations between our two

countries and the international atmosphere as a whole. He would therefore express the hope that President Carter personally and the United States approach this matter seriously and that an agreement be reached which would serve the interests of improving relations between us and the interests of detente and peace.

Turning to chemical weapons and the possibility of reaching agreement to prohibit such weapons, *Gromyko* noted that the negotiations on this question are proceeding badly and in an unsatisfactory way. It would evidently be difficult to go into detail at this meeting, but he wanted to make two points in this connection. First, we had major differences between our views on questions relating to verification in this connection and, secondly, for an agreement on chemical weapons to be effective, it was important that all major powers, and certainly the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, join in such an agreement. What kind of an agreement would that be without the participation of China? Could one really agree to a situation in which the Chinese alone would have a free hand to manufacture chemical weapons? These were the major points to which he wanted to draw the President's attention.

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[Conversation goes on to discuss other arms control issues]

This document is identified as document 267 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>.

**Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and the U.S. Mission at Geneva<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1980, 0509Z

68654. Geneva for Ambassador [Charles] Flowerree<sup>2</sup> only. Subject: Sverdlovsk BW Incident.

1. (Secret-entire text).

2. Summary and action requested. There is disturbing evidence pointing to the release of lethal biological agent as the cause of numerous deaths in Sverdlovsk, USSR, in April–May 1979. The intelligence community's present conclusions and report have been sent to you septel.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador Watson is instructed to raise this matter with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko as soon as possible. Ambassador Flowerree should inform Ambassador Issraelyan<sup>4</sup> of the demarche promptly after it is made in Moscow. End summary.

3. We are deeply concerned about the incident in Sverdlovsk in April 1979 and its implications. We wish to make a serious effort to discuss this issue bilaterally in accordance with Article V of the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention.<sup>5</sup> Speed is essential in view of the end of the BW

<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P990025–0588. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mark Palmer (PM/DCA) and Martin McLean (EUR/SOV); cleared by Aaron, Robert Martin (INR/PMT), Bremont, Shulman, Earle, Peter Wilson (S/P), Walter Slocombe (DUSD/PP), J. Taylor (S/S–O), John Pustay (JSC), R. McCrory (CIA), Kahan, and Barry; approved by Christopher.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Flowerree, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 68653 to Moscow and Geneva, March 15, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0592.

<sup>4</sup> Victor Issraelyan, Soviet Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

<sup>5</sup> The Biological Weapons Convention, which was signed in April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975, prohibits the development and stockpiling of biological weapons

Convention Review Conference on March 21, and our desire to give the Soviets as much time as possible to give us a considered response. It is in both our interests to have at least a preliminary response before the end of the Review Conference, since we will have to state at the conference that we have raised a compliance issue.

4. Ambassador Watson should personally make the following points as soon as possible to Korniyenko or, should he be unavailable, to another official on the First Deputy Minister or Deputy Minister level. Points should be provided in the form of a non-paper as well.

A.—The United States and the Soviet Union have a continuing interest in sustaining our mutual efforts to control the arms race.

B.—I have been instructed to raise a matter which potentially has extremely serious implications for the future of arms control negotiations between our countries and more specific bearing on the Biological Weapons Convention.

C.—Although no public announcement was made by Soviet authorities, for some time we have been aware of reports of an extraordinary outbreak of disease which was apparently pulmonary anthrax, which caused numerous deaths in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, and which resulted in the establishment of a quarantine.

D.—We have now received further information which indicates that this extraordinary outbreak appears to have been caused by the release of a quantity of anthrax agent exceeding that justified for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes and that it originated at a military facility in Sverdlovsk.

E.—Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention provides that the parties shall consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems which may arise. In accordance with that Article, the US Government is asking that the Soviet Government consult and cooperate with it and provide information to explain this outbreak of disease in Sverdlovsk in April 1979.

F.—We want to deal with this matter in the same serious way in which we have consulted on a number of questions involving compliance

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that are intended for harmful use. Article V states that parties will work together in solving any problems pertaining to biological weapons that arise as a result of the convention.

with arms control agreements in recent years. Because of the implications regarding compliance with the Convention itself and for other arms control negotiations, we are raising this matter directly with you and asking for prompt and full consultations. A simple denial in response to this present US approach will not advance the situation and will not serve our mutual interests.

G.—Since we are now in the process of consulting with you on a compliance related question, we will make a statement before the Review Conference concludes indicating that we are pursuing consultations in accordance with Article V. Any response you can make to our request for consultation and cooperation under Article V before the end of the Review Conference will be taken into account in determining the character of the statement we will make.

H.—Obviously, under these circumstance we would not be prepared to approve language in the final document of the Review Conference which states that no questions have arisen relating to compliance.

5. Embassy Moscow should inform Ambassador Flowerree immediately after Ambassador [Thomas] Watson sees [Georgy] Korniyenko. Ambassador Flowerree should then inform Ambassador Issraelyan of the demarche, and repeat points made in para 4 above.

6. For Geneva: We will provide additional guidance on RevCon and consultations with allies.

**[Cyrus] Vance**

This document is identified as document 269 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>.

### **Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 17, 1980, 1031Z

4225. Department repeat Geneva for Ambassador [Charles] Flowerree. Subj: Demarche on Sverdlovsk BW Issue. Refs: (A) Moscow 4211, (B) State 70023, (C) State 68654.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S-entire text.)

2. I made the demarche on the Sverdlovsk incident this morning to First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, reading and leaving with him as a non-paper the talking points from Ref C as amended by Ref B. In supplemental remarks I made the additional point that a simple denial would not advance the situation or serve our mutual interests.

3. Korniyenko responded to my presentation by stating that the Soviets would of course study the statement I had made, but that he would like to make a few immediate points. First of all, he said, in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),<sup>3</sup> as with all international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party, the Soviet Union strictly complies with all requirements of the agreement. Secondly, in a number of instances US Government agencies have been compelled to admit publicly and officially that charges which have appeared from time to time in the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0580. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Reference telegrams 4211 from Moscow, March 17, and 70023 to Moscow, March 16, both of which addressed the Sverdlovsk biological weapon incident, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0584 and P880025-0585. For telegram 68654 to Moscow and Geneva, March 15, see Document 267.

<sup>3</sup> Article I of the BWC states that each party commits never to produce, stockpile or retain biological weapons, the intent of which is to cause harm.

US press about the alleged nonobservance by the Soviet Union of this or that agreement were unjustified.

4. In the present case, Korniyenko continued, he could not but wonder why we were raising the matter and what the purpose of our statement was. He noted that Soviet, US, and British specialists, as representatives of the BWC depositories, had jointly worked on a report for submission to the BWC Review Conference and that no such questions had arisen during the preparation of the report. Now, all of a sudden, the US side was raising expressions of concern, asking for urgent consultations, and stating that it would inform the Review Conference that it had done so.

5. Korniyenko then characterized the information I had provided about the incident itself as vague. He did not know, he said, on what it was based and added that it was not unheard of for there to be no basis for such allegations. Even assuming, Korniyenko went on, that some kind of illness did occur in the Sverdlovsk area, what relationship did this have to the BWC? He asked me to imagine how we would react if the Soviets today or tomorrow were to make such representation to us, expressing concern about the "Legionnaires' disease," obliging us to enter into consultations under the BWC, and trying to bring that matter into the work of the BWC Review Conference.

6. In commenting on Korniyenko's remarks, I stated that the US representation was occasioned by an interagency study of all available evidence of the unexplained incident in Sverdlovsk, some of it received fairly recently, and that what we were seeking was an explanation of the incident. As for his reference to the vagueness of the information, I told him that I thought it was spelled out rather clearly in the non-paper I had left with him but that if he could characterize what was not clear to him I would try to elaborate. Noting that the parties to the BWC are not permitted to have biological warfare stocks, I told him that if there was a sensible explanation for what had occurred in Sverdlovsk I hoped it could be provided to us quickly so it could be taken into consideration in the report we were required to make [garble].

7. Answering his question on how we would react if challenged about the Legionnaires' disease, I said I thought I had a pretty good idea of what our procedure would be. We would in all likelihood invite the Soviets to send scientists to discuss the matter with our scientists and to visit the

Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta to go over the records of what our investigation had shown thus far.

8. Korniyenko said he had nothing to add and would merely repeat that the Soviets would study our statement and provide a response. He stressed that he did not know whether anything had happened in Sverdlovsk or not and that it would require looking into and checking. But he was still struck by the fact that our experts had worked together for several months and that no such matter had been raised. Our raising of the question at this point could only give rise to feelings of apprehension on the Soviet side as to our good faith in doing so—particularly in view of the fact that the Soviets would do nothing which would violate the Convention.

**Watson**

This document is identified as document 270 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>.

### **Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 20, 1980, 1054Z

4496. Subj: Soviet Reply to Demarche on Sverdlovsk BW Incident.  
Refs: (A) Moscow 4225, (B) State 68654.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S-entire text.)

2. In replying to our demarche on the Sverdlovsk incident, the Foreign Ministry confirmed that an outbreak of anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk in March/April 1979 but said this was due to natural causes, denied that it had anything to do with the Biological Weapons Convention and charged that the raising of the issue by the United States creates the impression that someone is trying to cast a shadow on the efficacy of the Biological Weapons Convention. The reply was given to the Acting DCM in the form of an oral statement this morning (March 20) by Viktor Komplektov, Chief of the Foreign Ministry USA Department. Because Komplektov insisted that the appointment take place before 12 noon, we imagine the Soviets may be planning shortly to release the text of the statement to the press.

3. Following is the Embassy's informal translation of the oral statement, a copy of which was given us as a non-paper.

Begin text:

In connection with the representation of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow of 17 March 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is instructed to state the following.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 3/20-31/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent with a request that the Department repeat to Geneva. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 267 and 269.

The Soviet side firmly rejects the efforts of the Government of the USA to place in doubt the conscientious fulfillment by the Soviet Union of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. With regard to this Convention, just as with other international agreements in which the Soviet Union participates, the Soviet side strictly fulfills all provisions of the documents under which it has accepted the relevant obligations.

In accordance with the legislation and practice of the Soviet Union, the observance of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, ratified by order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate state institutes of the USSR. In a statement made by the representative of the USSR in the committee on disarmament on 24 June 1975, it was pointed out that the Soviet Union does not have any of the bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery indicated in Article 1 of the Convention.<sup>3</sup>

As for the incident referred to by the American side which occurred in April 1979 in the area of Sverdlovsk, there did in fact occur in this area in March–April 1979 an ordinary outbreak, arising from natural causes, of anthrax among animals and cases of illness of people from the intestinal form of this infection, connected with the use as food of the meat of cattle which was sold without observance of the rules established for veterinary supervision. Appropriate warnings in connection with this were given in the press. No quarantine of any kind was established.

That it occurred, however, has no relationship to the question of observance by the Soviet Union of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, and therefore there is absolutely no basis for putting forward the question which has been raised by the American side.

The impression is automatically created that someone would like under a clearly invented pretext to cast a shadow on the efficacy of the

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<sup>3</sup> Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention outlines the prohibitions detailed in the BWC. While specific substances are not banned, their purposes can be if they would prove to be harmful. Biological weapons that are prophylactic, protective, or peaceful are permitted by the BWC.

Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons—one of the most important agreements in the arms control area—and to do this at the very moment when the Review Conference on the operation of this Convention is taking place in Geneva.<sup>4</sup> Such actions by the Government of the US are clearly not dictated by concern for the strengthening of valid international agreements on disarmament. On the contrary, they are only capable of weakening these agreements, of complicating the situation, of hampering the efforts of states in the matter of limiting the arms race. The Soviet side condemns such actions as directly contradicting the interests of preserving and strengthening peace. End text.

4. A/DCM stated that the Embassy would transmit the Soviet Union's response immediately to Washington. He took note of the fact that the response contained some information on the incident in Sverdlovsk, but added that it was not possible to accept the allegations as to the motives of the US in raising this matter. Given the growing evidence on the incident, it clearly had to be raised in order to be dealt with before the BWC Review Conference meeting in Geneva ended. He emphasized that it was not the intent of the USA to “cast a shadow” over the BW Convention or any other disarmament treaty.

5. In seeing A/DCM to the door, Komplektov commented that, only 24 hours after the Ambassador had met with first Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko on March 17,5 everything he had said at that meeting had appeared in the press and that this happens “every time”. That circumstance, he said, only served to bear out the validity of the views expressed in the final paragraph of his statement.

**Watson**

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<sup>4</sup> The First Review of the Biological Weapons Convention met March 3–21.

This document is identified as document 290 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>.

## Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 10, 1980

### SUBJECT

BW: The Sverdlovsk Incident

### PARTICIPANTS

*US*  
The Acting Secretary  
PM—Reginald Bartholomew  
S/MS—Marshall Shulman

*USSR*  
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Toward the end of a discussion on TNF,<sup>2</sup> the *Acting Secretary* mentioned that he had one other matter to raise. This concerned the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk last spring. The *Acting Secretary* said that we felt that we hadn't been able to engage the Soviet Government on this matter to the extent its seriousness warranted. He noted that Ambassador Earle would meet with Dobrynin to discuss this issue in some detail.

*Dobrynin* responded by questioning what it was the US wanted, since this was not clear. He noted that the Soviets have already given us an explanation of this incident.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 42, INT Documents: #4200s: 7/80. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bartholomew. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "M[arshall] B[remer], Next step? ZB."

<sup>2</sup> The July 10 memorandum of conversation covering TNF is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear: TNF: 1-10/80.

The *Acting Secretary* again stressed the seriousness we attach to engaging in bilateral consultations so we could satisfy ourselves on this issue, and not permit this question to undermine the BW Convention or damage prospects for arms control generally.

*Dobrynin* reiterated that they have given us what they have on this matter, and that the Soviets have not seen anything from us that would contradict their explanation. He said that our goal should be preserving the Convention and prospects for arms control. *Dobrynin* again stressed that what they have heard was based on hearsay, and that if we have anything else more to say in terms of evidence or proof would we please tell them.

The *Acting Secretary* replied by stressing that Ambassador Earle will provide information that will underline the seriousness of our concerns.

Due to the press of vacation plans, *Dobrynin* suggested that Ambassador Earle see Vasev instead and give him a paper, which *Dobrynin* would then make certain is dealt with in Moscow. *Dobrynin* stressed that he needed to take something back with him.

The *Acting Secretary* repeated that this was a serious political matter, that Ambassador Earle had important things to say about this question, and that *Dobrynin* should definitely try to see Earle before returning to Moscow.

*Dobrynin* said that he understood the seriousness of this issue, but suggested that it reflected domestic American election-year politics. But he asked whether we really had something to say. If so, this would be good. But he did not want to discuss just anything on this issue in a general fashion. People in Moscow are critical of the way in which this issue has been the subject of rumor, hearsay, and press reports.

The *Acting Secretary* said that this issue would be every bit as serious to the USG if we were now in the first year of this Administration instead of the fourth year. He suggested the possibility that the issue might be addressed by distinguished scientists from each country.

*Dobrynin* repeated again that up to now there has been no proof, and there have been indirect discussions in the scientific community which have caused a chain reaction. There has not been a single additional fact but only hearsay.

The *Acting Secretary* concluded this portion of the conversation by urging *Dobrynin* to see Ambassador Earle on the BW question.

## **Attachment**

### **Paper<sup>3</sup>**

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In March 1980 at the Five-Year Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States Government reported that it had initiated consultations with the Soviet Union as the result of information which raised questions concerning the compliance of the Soviet Union with the Biological Weapons Convention. We indicated that we were proceeding in these consultations in a cooperative spirit and in accordance with the specific provisions of the Convention; we further indicated our hopes that the Soviet Union would also proceed in the same manner. At that time, anticipating that the bilateral consultations would take some time, the USG promised to make a full report on the results of those consultations to the Parties at a later appropriate date. This paper constitutes that promised report. (S)

The basic obligation of the BWC, set forth in Article I, provides that parties undertake “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protection or other peaceful purposes.” The Convention also provides, in Article V, that Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate with one another “in solving any problems which may arise” relating to the application of the provisions of the Convention. (S)

Early in 1980, the United States Government became aware of an event which apparently happened in the city of Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union during the spring of 1979. Information concerning this event raised questions regarding the compliance of the Soviet Union with the obligations it had undertaken in Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention. On the basis of the evidence then available, it was decided that the matter would be raised with Soviet authorities pursuant to Article V of the treaty. The timing of the request for information from the Soviets

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<sup>3</sup> Secret.

was complicated by the fact that, purely by coincidence, the long-planned Five-Year Review Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention had convened in Geneva and was in session at that time. (S)

The USG raised the matter in Moscow on March 17<sup>4</sup> and informed the participants in the Geneva Conference of that action. The USG further promised to report the results of consultations with the Soviet Government to the parties to the BWC. In responding to the USG demarche, the Soviets acknowledged that a number of deaths had occurred due to an anthrax epidemic in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, but asserted that it was the intestinal form of anthrax resulting from contaminated meat. The USG again raised the issue with the Soviets on March 28 and proposed expert consultations as called for in Article V. The Soviet Government repeated its earlier explanation and denied the request for consultations. Most recently, in June, the USG reiterated its concerns to the Soviets and re-emphasized its interest in pursuing expert consultations as provided in Article V. The Soviet Government has again repeated its simple denial and refused its request for consultations to resolve the issue. (S)

The concerns which originally led the USG to raise this issue with the Soviet Government are as follows:

There is located in the south of Sverdlovsk a military facility which is subordinate to the section within the Soviet Ministry of Defense which is responsible for biological and chemical warfare. This facility is contained within a heavily secured perimeter and operates in secrecy. It includes structures, including animal pens, which suggest that it is engaged in research and/or production activities involving biological effects on living organisms. Other physical characteristics of the facility include structures suitable for storage of explosives. The facility was built before 1972 (i.e., before the signature of the Biological Weapons Convention), and it remains in active use up to the present time. (S)

According to reliable reports, during the first weeks of April 1979, at least 40 persons died in Sverdlovsk after experiencing pulmonary and other symptoms normally associated with inhalation anthrax. Many additional cases were reported in the following weeks, and a large hospital in Sverdlovsk became devoted exclusively to the treatment of anthrax cases—under military control and strict secrecy. (S)

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 269.

Anthrax is an animal disease caused by a bacterial organism which may infect humans who are exposed to it. There are three forms of anthrax, which are distinguished by the manner in which the spores enter the body. *Cutaneous* anthrax, the most common form, is caused when spores enter through a cut in the skin of a person handling contaminated animals or animal products. *Intestinal* anthrax results from the consumption of contaminated meat. *Inhalation* anthrax is caused by airborne spores entering the lungs. (Spores in animal hair or hides can become airborne in industrial processing of contaminated material.) Cutaneous anthrax is readily diagnosed, easily treated, and not usually fatal when treated. (Untreated cases result in death about 20% of the time.) The intestinal variety, however, often results in death. Inhalation anthrax is almost always fatal. Anthrax organisms which are ingested or inhaled are transported within the body to lymph glands (in the abdomen and in the chest, respectively) where they multiply and produce a toxin which spreads through the body and is difficult to arrest. These forms of anthrax are more difficult to diagnose, but are readily identified and distinguished from each other in clinical diagnosis. A principal difference between intestinal and inhalation anthrax which assists in clinical diagnosis is that the former type is usually characterized by abdominal distress and the latter by respiratory distress. Both varieties produce cyanosis, general toxemia, and death within about a week of exposure. (S)

The initial victims of the Sverdlovsk outbreak resided or worked in the immediate vicinity of the military facility described above. Many reports indicate the widespread belief in Sverdlovsk that the outbreak of anthrax was indeed caused by an accident at that military facility. The reported locations of the initial victims, near the facility, suggest that the disease could have reached them by an airborne cloud emanating from the facility. Meteorological data for the most likely dates of such an occurrence are consistent with this possibility. (S) Official Soviet explanations of the outbreak as initiated by anthrax-infected cattle are not credible because of the large number of victims and the contrary clinical reports indicating symptoms of inhalation anthrax rather than intestinal anthrax. Furthermore, decontamination measures taken by Soviet authorities, including the spraying of buildings and terrain with disinfectants, were more consistent with a response to an airborne infection than with a response to the presence of contaminated meat. A

quarantine of the affected region of Sverdlovsk was established and transportation out of the city was controlled. (S)

The information which gave rise to the USG's concerns has come from a variety of sources, including extremely sensitive technical and human intelligence information. The USG will not jeopardize these sources and methods of intelligence collection. Consequently the USG cannot elaborate further on its understanding of the events in Sverdlovsk or on the origins of its information. (S)

Although this evidence is less than conclusive, the USG believes that it raises questions serious enough to warrant pursuit of the issue under Article V of the Convention. Despite three formal overtures from the USG, the Soviet Government has declined to cooperate and consult as provided in Article V. The US Government regrets that its concerns have not been allayed. (S)

The USG has attached great importance to seeking a resolution of this issue which would enhance confidence in the BWC, in contrast to one which could result in complications for future cooperation among nations in the vital sphere of arms control. The furtherance of the arms control process has been a common objective of fundamental importance to both the US and the USSR. It is hoped that the Soviet Government will respond to this report in a manner satisfactory to the other parties to the BWC so that the viability of the Convention, and the broader process of arms control so vitally important to the security of all the nations of the world will be enhanced. (S)

This document is identified as document 297 of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Vol VI, Soviet Union*, <http://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v06/pdf/frus1977-80v06.pdf>

**Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, August 11, 1980, 1545Z

12712. Subj: Demarche on Sverdlovsk Incident. Ref: State 209746.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S-entire text.)

2. On August 11 Charge raised Sverdlovsk incident with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, presenting oral statement as provided in reftel. (Demarches on MBFR and Iran reported septels.)<sup>3</sup>

3. Korniyenko's response followed familiar lines. He said the Soviet side could agree that the "fuss" being made over the outbreak of anthrax could damage future joint efforts at controlling the arms race, but asserted that the fuss, including the public distribution of information with vague accusations that the USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention, had been organized by the American side over an imaginary incident. The whole affair was thus the responsibility of the U.S.

4. Korniyenko said that the Soviet position on what had occurred at Sverdlovsk had been expressed many times. Unfortunately, he said, outbreaks of anthrax do occur almost every year in the Sverdlovsk region; last year's outbreak was reported in the local press, which prescribed precautionary measures for the population to prevent infection from

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 8/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 209746 to Moscow, outlined Garrison's talking points for his meeting with Korniyenko regarding the Sverdlovsk incident. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025-0412)

<sup>3</sup> The demarche on MBFR was not found. The demarche on Iran, telegram 12360 to Moscow, August 5, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800374-0420.

contaminated animals. But the anthrax outbreaks which occur in Sverdlovsk have no relation to the Biological Weapons Convention. Ambassador Dobrynin had already explained this, Korniyenko added.

5. Korniyenko said the U.S. request for consultations under Article V of the BW Convention aroused suspicion on the Soviet side. After all, either side could always dream up pretexts for invoking the Convention. Why the U.S. was doing so at the present time, Korniyenko said, was not hard to guess: it was the result of an irresponsible attitude on the U.S. side toward international agreements. Korniyenko went on to note that the BW Convention was the first agreement that had fully banned not only the use of a type of mass destruction weapon, but also its possession. The sides should be striving to protect the Convention, he said, but instead the U.S. was discrediting it by raising Sverdlovsk. This understandably caused indignation on the Soviet side. He wondered how the U.S. would have reacted if the Soviet Union had invoked the BW Convention and demanded information on the outbreak of Legionnaire's disease in the U.S.

6. Continuing, Korniyenko noted that the U.S. had proposed consultations of the sort conducted under SALT. But in SALT, he said, there was a special commission for discussing questions which might arise (implying, without saying it, that there is no such body under the BW Convention). Moreover, the U.S. underlined its desire for confidentiality, yet at the same time was spreading information around the world about the USSR's suspected violation of the BW Convention. The two sides began to discuss the issue, yet immediately the American side began to spread stories that it was not convinced by the USSR's statements.

7. Summing up, Korniyenko said that, from the Soviet perspective, it was clear that the U.S. had chosen to create a fuss over Sverdlovsk as yet another way of increasing tensions and another attempt to damage US-Soviet relations.

8. In response, Charge said he would attempt once more, briefly, to clarify the U.S. position, since Korniyenko's remarks indicated continued serious misunderstanding of the U.S. position. It was precisely the great concern that was bound to arise and did arise in the U.S., in Congress and elsewhere, when the reports became known about the event in Sverdlovsk, that made it essential for the sides, if they wished to "protect" the BW Convention, to deal with the questions that had arisen concerning

Sverdlovsk. Charge stressed that U.S. had not accused the Soviet Union of a violation. The U.S. was simply asking for information pursuant to Article V of the BW Convention, and felt the best way to exchange information would be through bilateral meetings of experts. The U.S. cannot accept the explanations provided thus far by the Soviet side, because the information available to us points to inhalation anthrax rather than a form of the disease transmitted by contaminated meat. If the Soviet Union, as Korniyenko suggested, raised Legionnaire's disease with the U.S., the U.S. would have invited Soviet experts to consult with U.S. disease control specialists.

9. Korniyenko replied that there would not have arisen any public concern if the U.S. Government had not taken the initiative after the first of the year to activate the issue in the press and in Congress. After all, the subject was not unknown prior to the first of the year; the local newspapers in Sverdlovsk had published warnings to the population at the time. It seemed to Moscow that the American authorities had decided in January to worsen the atmosphere between the U.S. and USSR by using the Sverdlovsk incident. Charge said this was definitely not the U.S. objective, regardless of how the chronology of events may appear. While it is regrettable that the Sverdlovsk question had leaked to the press before it was resolved through confidential bilateral discussions, this simply illustrates that problems of this nature must be dealt with forthrightly and cannot be swept under the rug, because it is a fact of life that information on matters of such great import will sooner or later become public in the U.S.

10. Department repeat to Geneva and elsewhere as desired.

**Garrison**

## CHAPTER 8

# Conclusions

This book is not meant as a stand-alone compendium of how the U.S. government viewed its chemical and biological weapons as part of its strategic deterrent against the Soviet Union. One must put these documents into context with the foreign policy and national security discussions that took place within each administration to fully appreciate the import placed on these weapons. This book is intended to extract and focus on those specific government discussions and written records on the place of chemical and biological weapons within the scope of national security, in the hopes that further research might be conducted to discuss this important issue.

It has been said by many contemporary voices that chemical weapons do not deserve to be called “weapons of mass destruction,” given the smaller scale of casualties that might result from the battlefield use of chemical weapons. Others tout biological weapons as equivalent to nuclear weapons, seemingly missing the point that biological weapons also do not cause “mass destruction” on the order of nuclear weapons. There has been an unconscious loss of understanding as to the development and intended use of chemical and biological weapons and why they were considered “weapons of mass destruction” along with nuclear weapons. What should be clear in the readings of this book is that CB weapons were considered distinct but “special” in the deliberations of the highest government officials when it came to national security issues. The fact that the Soviet Union had a credible capability to employ CB weapons against the United States was of considerable concern to the national leadership.

Without going too much into the academic discussions, it is illustrative to observe that the U.S. presidential administrations and executive agencies did not often use the term “weapons of mass

destruction.” For arms control discussions, it was beneficial to discuss proposals on reducing, and eventually eliminating, CB weapons along with other contemporary discussions on nuclear arms control. It was not anyone’s perception that these weapon systems were equivalent in level of destruction; rather, it was the understanding that they were all strategic weapon systems with potential indiscriminate and mass casualty effects on unprotected civilian population centers and therefore required special consideration. By one set of reasoning, if a singular focus on nuclear weapons disarmament resulted in nation-states switching over to CB weapons, then the diplomats had missed an opportunity to reduce the impact of future wars on noncombatants.

Given that understanding, one can see in the readings that U.S. officials did in fact discuss CB weapons as a separate issue, but in concert with other discussions on nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union’s expected employment of CB weapons (and later, the People’s Republic of China’s WMD program) would have had a significant impact on U.S. forces and U.S. security interests. As a result, the U.S. military’s ability to employ CB weapons in response was an important aspect of strategic deterrence. Given public events in the late 1960s that called into question the safety and security of the U.S. offensive CB weapons program, the U.S. government had to come to grips with whether it would continue to promote deterrence through “in-kind” response.

Today’s multipolar international community is more complex than the Cold War environment, and there is no comparison between the former Soviet Union’s (or United States’) offensive CB weapons programs and the rest of the world’s CB weapons-armed nations. However, the stark realism of dealing with the Soviet Union and the pragmatic solutions developed should not be disregarded, and there are “lessons learned” that can be applied to today’s global WMD community. Given this perspective of U.S. policy on CB weapons during the Cold War, one might arrive at the following conclusions:

1. The term “WMD” was appropriate during the Cold War, given the size of the U.S. and Soviet NBC weapons arsenals and potential for war between the two superpowers, but was not a term frequently used in high-level, deliberate discussions on U.S. policy and strategy. Policymakers were careful to distinguish topics relating to CB weapons from nuclear weapons (both tactical and strategic). At the same time, they were not

averse to discussing CB weapons and nuclear weapons within the same memorandums and meetings. That clarity has been lost in today's discussions, with general policy statements about "WMD" challenges leading to poorly developed policy approaches, rather than focused discussions on the use of specific weapon systems within very different security scenarios. Today's adversaries do not have "WMD" capabilities on the scale of the Cold War, but certainly the technical aspects of NBC weapons, CBR hazards, and natural disease outbreaks offer unique challenges to U.S. security concerns. It may be that this term needs to be retired in order to develop appropriately focused policy approaches to future operating environments.

2. U.S. policy and strategy focused on the Soviet Union's war plans and objectives, one aspect of which included the possible use of WMD during a military confrontation. There was no fixation on WMD in and of themselves, separate from the potential actions of the Soviet Union's military. Policymakers were not so concerned about Egypt, Iraq, or China getting and using CB weapons as much as they were about the Soviet Union's intentions and capabilities to use said weapons against the United States. There were no clear indications of concern about terrorists using WMD within the United States, although certainly others outside of the government worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s. Today's fixation on WMD as the center of national security discussions has resulted in strategy and policy that is more broadly applicable toward generic actors, but simultaneously has falsely elevated the concern over WMD possessors (both nation-states and sub-state groups) as being equivalent to the former Soviet Union's capability. We need to change the discussion from the general threat of WMD to the intentions and capabilities of those actors involved to better develop informed risk-management approaches.

3. As the use of military force is intended to address political ends, so the U.S. employment of CB weapons was guided by political direction. Each administration had to develop the political rationale for the use of CB weapons, along with other guidance as to the use of military force. In the 1950s, it was logical to consider first use of CB weapons for operational benefit, along with the "total war" model that World War II had established and the concern that war with the Soviet Union was a real possibility. This evolved in the 1960s and 1970s into developing the U.S.

offensive CB warfare program to support a deterrent-only (no first use) policy. At the same time, the U.S. military was informing political leaders that there were not enough munitions to support an effective deterrent during expected military operations against the Soviet Union. Because of the rising interest in arms control and disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, this uneasy balance between offensive capacity and disarmament resulted in an unclear political commitment and thus potential vulnerability of U.S. forces during the mid-to-late Cold War. The poor defensive capability of U.S. forces in 1991 and 2003 (as assessed by the GAO) suggests that the policy-operational discussions on reducing vulnerabilities to WMD-armed adversaries have not substantially improved from the Cold War days.

4. In the meeting transcripts, one can see a lack of understanding of basic weapons effects: what is a chemical agent, what is a biological agent, what is the difference between a toxin and a pathogen. Henry Kissinger, accustomed to more informed senior-level debates on nuclear weapons (and author of a prominent international relations book on nuclear weapons use), called out the National Security Council staff in 1975 for their inability to answer basic questions about CB weapons and address their implications to military operations and national security. This problem still exists today, with many military and civilian government officials unable to articulate the differences in mitigating threats from industrial chemicals and chemical warfare agents, natural disease outbreaks and biological terrorist incidents, “dirty bombs” and improvised nuclear devices. Our ability to predict and understand the quantitative effects of unconventional weapons on military operations remains limited, and instead there is a fixation on large-scale “Black Swan” events rather than on cost/benefit analyses of relevant military scenarios. This phenomenon also affects contemporary discussions on the value and use of nuclear weapons within U.S. security interests.

5. Bilateral arms control discussions between the United States and Soviet Union were tied to the potential effect on military operations. Both hawks and doves had an interest in reducing the Soviet Union’s capability to use unconventional weapons, either to reduce the potential impact of future wars between the superpowers, or to gain an advantage over the Soviet Union by reducing its arsenal while minimizing reductions in the U.S. arsenal. Today, the desire to eliminate unconventional weapons

appears to be driven more by simple beliefs that these weapons are “bad” and ridding the planet of them is, in and of itself, a good enough rationale to support U.S. national security concerns. However, this is not a universal view in a multi-polar international security community. Bilateral discussions. Bilateral discussions between the United States and Russia are still important confidence measures, but it is unclear as to whether there is any focus on the potential military aspects of arms control decisions. Further details of internal discussions within the Carter and Reagan administrations would be insightful as to this process.

6. During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, there was increasing disagreement between the State Department/ACDA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the utility of CB weapons and the need to support international arms control negotiations. During the Cold War, this friction was more easily explained: the U.S. military was loathe to give up weapon systems that it thought the Soviet military would still have the option to employ, while the arms control community thought they could eliminate an entire class of weapons from consideration of future wars. The military supported the development and stockpile of CB weapons as a strategic deterrent, meaning that it required a credible military capability that could, if called upon, use these weapons in the execution of military operations at any time. The United States enjoyed conventional and nuclear superiority for a good part of the Cold War, but at the same time, saw the value in controlling the escalation to nuclear warfare through the option of employing CB weapons. Today, we still see similar discussions on the future use and utility of nuclear weapons in a multi-polar international community. The friction between arms control and the military communities continues today, requiring that the military leadership remain engaged in the development and implementation of deterrence policy.

7. Words are important. The Nixon/Ford/Carter administrations stressed the use of specific terminology following the decision to unilaterally dismantle the U.S. biological warfare program but retain the chemical warfare program. Because of the increasing political direction to develop and implement global agreements on banning these weapons, it was important to make U.S. policy clear in the international forum as well as to military operators. There was a U.S. chemical warfare program that would continue the modernization and procurement of chemical weapons, and a U.S. biological defense program that would continue research and

development of biological warfare agents to better design protection for U.S. forces. Today, the lack of agreement within DoD and the interagency as to what a WMD is and is not confuses the issues. The threat of NBC weapons used on the battlefield is very different than the terrorist use of CBR hazards, which is different than the threat of natural disease outbreaks. All of these have been called “WMD,” yet the three situations require very different policy approaches. As a result, we have a lexicon challenge that limits our ability to develop needed capabilities against expected unconventional weapons use.

8. In the Nixon/Ford administrations, the issue of modernizing chemical weapons teetered between the administration’s desire to maintain a credible deterrent and the political debate within Congress as to whether chemical weapons could be safely developed. On the one hand, the issue of deterrence “in kind” was still considered a viable military option; on the other hand, fears stoked by the 1968 Dugway Proving Ground incident remained fresh in the memories of congresspersons. The Reagan administration was ultimately successful in making the argument and getting the funding approved, but those internal discussions have not yet been revealed. The struggle to maintain aging chemical munitions for a credible deterrent while the next generation system was developed and produced parallels the current debate within the nuclear enterprise. If the United States intends to have a credible deterrent, modernization needs to be a part of that discussion. But as these transcripts and memorandums show, the discussions are not easily resolved, even at the highest levels.

9. These documents emphasize the need for active engagement of senior military leadership on unconventional weapons issues. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army in particular, advocated to retain chemical and biological weapons within the U.S. military’s stockpile. Given the known unconventional weapons capabilities of the Soviet Union and the possibility that it would use these weapons, there was a required vulnerability that had to be addressed. When these strategic weapons are discussed at the highest levels of government, there can be many more civilian agencies with different points of view than the military. As such, if the military is only going to have one or two representatives in the room when a decision is made, those representatives need to be well-informed and prepared to discuss why nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons are needed to achieve military objectives. This is doubly true for the military’s

desired use of weapons that may have chemical components but are not toxic munitions, such as riot control agents and incendiaries. While, at the end of the day, all military actions are guided by political direction, it behooves the military to understand and explain the need for these weapon systems to inform policymakers of the impact of their decisions.

10. Finally, during the Cold War there was a need for better strategic communication with Congress and the public regarding WMD and weapons that are not WMD. This remains as a requirement today. During the Vietnam conflict in particular, public concern regarding the use of riot control agents sparked a debate as to the role and use of chemical weapons within U.S. military doctrine. The public has a right to understand what the government is doing with regards to military capabilities, since they are paying for them. At the same time, there are critical groups who did not support the development or stockpiling of unconventional weapons. These issues remain relevant today as the U.S. government continues to modernize its nuclear weapons and conventional capabilities to defend against nation-states with WMD programs, and develops other options (to include law enforcement and intelligence collection) for reducing the threat of CBRN terrorism. To successfully legitimize and implement these programs, the U.S. government (and especially the U.S. military) must ensure that the public and international community understand what it is doing and why it is concerned with actors developing WMD capabilities. More importantly, the government must avoid inflating the threat, given the very low probability that a true “mass destruction” incident will occur. There will always be other defense priorities that will be considered as higher than WMD issues. It is not a question of when, but if WMD are employed against the United States, and it does in fact depend on what one is calling a WMD and who is presumed to be seeking that capability.

As more documents are released in the *Foreign Relations* series and other open government sources, this document will be updated to provide interested researchers and students with as much information about the U.S. government’s policies and decisions on CB weapons as possible.

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