I have laid out three priorities for the Air Force....They are taking care of people, balancing today's readiness with tomorrow's readiness, and ensuring we have the very best Air Force we possibly can have, at the best value for the taxpayer.
Safeguarding the global commons demands a code of conduct universally supported by a global community. By relinquishing control of the Internet directory “root zone file,” the United States demonstrated its commitment to cyberspace as a global common which cannot be owned or ruled by one.
The neomercantilist energy policies of China and Russia contribute to what is largely a competitive relationship among all three great powers in Central Asia. While neomercantilist policies do not negate the possibility of cooperation and the development of norms, rules, and institutions designed to promote collective action, they certainly erect formidable barriers.
A long-term display of Western resolve and deterrence using all instruments of power has the means to effectuate not only a return to the status quo ante, but to secure as well a change of perspective in Russia....it will not take 45 years to achieve that goal, since the Putin system already carries within it the seeds of its own destruction.
This article critiques current airpower strategy, by presenting how airpower theory and strategy emerged and concludes with an assessment of why and how airpower strategy must embrace contextual realities in the years ahead.
The notion underlying the responsive infrastructure concept—that latent nuclear capabilities can substitute for constituted weapons—is highly controversial. There are deep concerns about the effect of the model on strategic stability, particularly during breakdowns in relations between nuclear-armed adversaries.
Our critique of Shaping Air and Sea Power for the Asia-Pivot, published in SSQ, Summer 2013, focuses on the authors’ China analysis, threat analysis and implications, use of political and military theory, specific recommendations against the LRS-B and ASB, and their proposal to pursue an F/B-22-like capability.
Are Russian differences with the United States and its allies now so great that meaningful cooperation between Washington and Moscow is impossible? Or can Washington and Moscow successfully work together on issues of common concern despite their differences on others? And if Washington and Moscow cannot resolve their differences, can they at least contain them?