psy of terr
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page reviewed/updated 15 Dec 2011
Definitions ___return to top
Federal resources ___return to top
- from AFDD 3-13 Information Operations, formerly called AFDD 2-5
- Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary’s decision cycle, which aligns with the commander’s objectives. The military capabilities of influence operations are psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, counterpropaganda operations and public affairs (PA) operations. Public affairs, while a component of influence operations, is predicated on its ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences.
These activities of influence operations allow the commander to prepare and shape the operational battlespace by conveying selected information and indicators to target audiences, shaping the perceptions of decision-makers, securing critical friendly information, defending against sabotage, protecting against espionage, gathering intelligence, and communicating selected information about military activities to the global audience.
- from a Comprehensive Assessment of Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis (HFA) Methodologies - Statement of Work
- Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 7/3 defines HFA as, “The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision-making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals and groups at any level in any state or organization.”
Joint Resources ___return to top
Army Resources ___return to top
- see also DoD intelligence resources
- see also gov/mil cultural awareness resources, at the Regional and Cultural Studies Resources site
- see also media as an instrument of war - especially the transcript of the 17 Feb 06 speech by Sec Rumsfeld pointing out how good the terrorists have gotten at using the media
- Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Pilot Effort: Focus on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (local copy), by DoD Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) Office, Fall 2011
- Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) publications
- National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) publications
- JP 3-13.4, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception - formerly JP 3-58
- DoD Instruction 5160.70, "Management of DoD Language and Regional Proficiency Capabilities"
- DoD Directive 1315.17, Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs
- Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC)
- Joint Threat Anticipation Center (JTAC)
- In September 2004, DTRA supported the establishment of the Joint Threat Anticipation Center (JTAC), operated collaboratively by the Center for International Studies (CIS) at the University of Chicago and the Center for Complex Adaptive Agent Systems Simulation (CAS2) at Argonne National Laboratory. The JTAC threat anticipation program has four objectives:
- Expand and champion the art and science of anticipating threats
- Establish a recognized “center for excellence” at the University of Chicago for threat anticipation, drawing on the expertise of the social sciences and related disciplines
- Develop a repository at Argonne National Laboratory for models, publications, and institutional memory of threat anticipation
- Assist the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) with Threat Anticipation Program (TAP) activities and contacts that facilitate federal interagency participation
- Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) - with social scientists and engineers to develop models and methodologies
- Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
- The Joint IED Defeat Organization leads the U.S. counter-IED effort. We are attacking the network, defeating the device and training the force to eliminate IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.
- Only one in five IEDs causes casualties, while a significant percentage are found and rendered safe.
- We will continue to counter the enemy's tactics and anticipate his next move.
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Human Factors Analysis Center (HFAC)
- Human Language Technology Center of Excellence
- The Johns Hopkins University has been awarded a long-term, multimillion dollar contract to establish and operate a Human Language Technology Center of Excellence near Johns Hopkins' Homewood campus in Baltimore. The center's research will focus on advanced technology for automatically analyzing a wide range of speech, text and document image data in multiple languages.
- The Human Language Technology Center of Excellence is the result of a competitive solicitation from the U.S. Department of Defense. The contract, signed earlier this year, envisions a minimum of $48.4 million in funding through 2015.
- "This will be the nation's premier language technology center, and it's likely to stimulate further expansion both at Johns Hopkins and at the University of Maryland in this important research field."
- from a Human Factors Full-Spectrum Project - Statement of Work, for DIA and USSTRATCOM
- The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Human Factors Analysis Center (HFAC) is performing an initial, short-term program designed to fill the existing analytic gap between the analysis of key national leaders and the analysis of key systems operators. USSTRATCOM has CoCom requirements for increased fidelity on individuals and small groups as it moves forward into the realm of IO influence campaigns and Time Sensitive Targeting (TSP).
- from a Comprehensive Assessment of Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis Methodologies - Statement of Work
- Additionally, the information that supports IO HF analysis can be derived largely from open sources. Open source information exploitation has been identified as severely deficient by various sources, including Commissions on Intelligence Reform, the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act, and the Defense Open Source Council. Development of a repeatable exploitation model in support of IO activities using open source can have immediate and far-reaching positive implications both to IO and other areas of Intelligence Community (IC) interest.
- No Leader Is Ever Off Stage: Behavioral Analysis of Leadership (local copy), by Connors, in Joint Force Quarterly, 4th quarter 2006
- With a better understanding of the behavior of foreign leaders, we can strengthen our ability to influence them and their decisions. Assessing these figures accurately—indeed, analyzing human
motivation rationally—is a tough business. But predicting the behavior of often reclusive and complex individuals who possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an essential task of modern government.
- Information Operations, STRATCOM, and Public Affairs (local copy), by Keeton and McCann, in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005
- Transforming Military Diplomacy (local copy), by Shea, in Joint Force Quarterly, July 2005
- "Pentagon Funds Diplomacy Effort Contracts Aim to Improve Foreign Opinion of United States," by Merle, Washington Post, 11 June 2005
- The Pentagon awarded three contracts this week, potentially worth up to $300 million over five years, to companies it hopes will inject more creativity into its psychological operations efforts to improve foreign public opinion about the United States, particularly the military.
- "We would like to be able to use cutting-edge types of media," said Col. James A. Treadwell, director of the Joint Psychological Operations Support Element, a part of Tampa-based U.S. Special Operations Command. "If you want to influence someone, you have to touch their emotions."
- He said SYColeman Inc. of Arlington, Lincoln Group of the District, and Science Applications International Corp. will help develop ideas and prototypes for radio and television spots, documentaries, or even text messages, pop-up ads on the Internet, podcasting, billboards or novelty items.
- "What's changing is the realization that in this so-called war on terrorism, this is not a force multiplier; this might be the thing that wins the whole thing for you," said Dan Kuehl, a specialist in information warfare at the National Defense University. "This gets to the importance of the war of ideas. There are a billion-plus Muslims that are undecided. How do we move them over to being more supportive of us? If we can do that, we can make progress and improve security."
Navy & Marine Resources ___return to top
- see also Army intelligence resources
- see also gov/mil cultural awareness resources, at the Center for Regional and Cultural Studies
- FM 3-61.1, Public Affairs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
- FM 46-1, Public Affairs Operations
- FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception as posted by FAS
- 1st Information Operations Command (Land), "chief agent for integrating IO into Army operations"
- US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) - Civil Affairs Overview
- 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) - 4th POG
- The Research and Analysis Division of the 4th POG(A), is the only source of finished PSYOP analytical intelligence products that are tailored to the needs of the entire PSYOP community, the geographic combatant commanders, and the intelligence community. [from JP 3-53]
- U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
- Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
- Behavioral Sciences & Leadership at USMA
- How to Win Friends and Influence People: Planning Perception Management at the Division and Corps Level (local copy), by Briand, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2004
- Strategic Influence Operations - the Information Connection (local copy), by Ward, US Army War College, 2003
- The Evolution of Strategic Influence (local copy), by Gough, strategic research project for US Army War College, 2003
- "This paper will examine the evolution of how the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense have organized to conduct strategic influence as an instrument of national power, from the Psychological Warfare Division of World War II, through the Psychological Strategy Board and Operations Coordinating Board of the early Cold War, through the Vietnam years to today. Are they organized effectively today to meet the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century?"
Air Force resources ___return to top
- see also Air Force intelligence resources
- see also gov/mil cultural awareness resources, at the Air University Culture & Language Center
- AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations
- Air University Culture & Language Center
- Behavioral Influences Analysis Center (BIAC), Air University
- From the Mind to the Feet: Assessing the Perception-to-Intent-to-Action Dynamic, ed.s Kuznar, Asorino-Courtois, and Canna: Air University Press, Feb 2011 (4.2 Mb)
- National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC)
- Behavioral Influences Analysis Division
- Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership, U.S. Air Force Academy
- Getting Inside the Enemy’s Head: The Case for Counteranalysis in Iraqi Counterinsurgency Operations, by Gyves, in Air & Space Power Chronicles, Mar 2006
- Emergent Capability: Influence Operations and the Strategic Airman, by Copelin and Provoncha, in Air & Space Power Journal, Winter 2005
- Influence Operations: Integrated PSYOP Planning, by Szeredy, in Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2005
- Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic Cultures, from USAF Counterproliferation Center
- Factors in Military Decision-Making: Communication and Cross-Cultural Analysis, by Turner and Mowlana, in Air University Review, Mar-Apr 1971
- Henry Kissinger has said that “a threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a ‘genuine’ threat interpreted as a bluff.” Since this type of gamesmanship in the nuclear age can be catastrophic, communication and cross-cultural analysis should be major factors in the military decision-making process.
- What is considered normal in one society may be considered abnormal in another. While this makes any overall theory of human nature unreliable, generalizations about national character do have a heuristic role in interpreting and predicting the behavior of a people. An understanding of an enemy nation’s behavior, even if it is probabilistic in nature but based on sound analysis, can, in the long run, be more important to the strategic planner than technological superiority.