Philippine Information Operations During The Hukbalahap Counterinsurgency Campaign

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**Editorial Abstract:** Lt Col Bridgewater examines Philippine counterinsurgency operations in light of contemporary IO doctrine. He discussing how the Philippine government employed IO core capabilities to defeat the Hukbalahap insurgents, and how this experience might benefit current Coalition counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.

**Introduction**

The Philippine counterinsurgency operation from 1946-1956 is a fascinating small war worthy of examination today. This experience pitted the newly-minted Philippine government against the Hukbalahap—a well-organized and well-entrenched insurgent group that boasted years of success fighting other guerrilla forces, as well as Japanese invaders during World War II.

From 1946 to 1950 the Philippine government was in a desperate predicament, rapidly losing control of its country to the Hukbalahap. In fact, after the first years of the rebellion, the campaign was going so well for the insurgents that they publicly boasted they would replace the Philippine government with their own regime by 1952. Instead, by 1953, the insurgent movement was virtually crushed—a monumental turn of events. This dramatic swing from near defeat to total victory provides compelling lessons for future counterinsurgency operations.

This approach examines the Philippine government’s actions through the “lens” of today’s information operations (IO) doctrine. Analyzing specific aspects of the counterinsurgency campaign from the perspective of IO provides lessons that directly relate to current military theory and can be applied to current and future counterinsurgency operations.

In this paper, the researcher included only those activities he understood to “fit neatly” into the definition of IO. This enables the IO professional to determine if he can apply those capabilities in future warfare.

**The Hukbalahap**

The initial movement known as the Hukbalahap, later referred to as “Huk,” began in the 1930s as a political movement in Central Luzon. It gained legitimacy among the populace in Central Luzon during World War II when the Japanese invaded the Philippines. While many guerilla groups organized in response to the invasion, the Huks benefited from political sophistication and organization other groups did not have—enabling it to easily recruit, indoctrinate, and equip scores of volunteers.

Huk leaders knew they would attract more support by professing to be against the Japanese. The word Hukbalahap is an abbreviation of “Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon,” which means the People’s Anti-Japanese Army. Despite its revolutionary goals, the movement’s very name belied its emphasis on ousting the Japanese rather than instituting a Communist government. Many Huk members never realized the Huk’s Communist goals. In fact, “great care was taken...not to inject ideology into the anti-Japanese struggle so as not to...”
antagonize the non-communist elements in the Huk ranks.”

**Huk Rebellion**

When the Philippines gained national independence on July 4, 1946, the issue of agrarian unrest was still a primary concern. The Hucks capitalized on this popular grievance for their own advantage. They established a three-phase plan to overthrow and replace the government. The first phase, scheduled to take place from 1946-1949, was to expand its popular support. The second phase, from 1949-1951, was an offensive whereby the masses gained would join the Huk military organization in revolutionary revolt. The final stage was the government takeover.

According to Philippine intelligence in 1946, the Huk force numbered about 15,000 fighters armed with a variety of weaponry, including rifles (mostly Enfield and Springfield), pistols, machineguns (primarily 30 caliber), and mortars. Procuring weapons would plague the Huks, who were never able to match the firepower of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The Huk’s most important asset was support of the population. Peasants were desperate for social relief, and there were about 250,000 active Huk sympathizers. In areas where the Huk governed, peasants believed that there was actually a shift in power where they were in control—not the fleeing landlords. Villagers not only gave food and supplies to the Huks, but also provided information regarding the location, strength, and movement of government troops. Intelligence was vital to Huk success, and spies were eager to provide information. As Luis Taruc stated, “Without the support of the people...a guerrilla movement cannot survive.”

**Counterinsurgency Operations, 1946-1950**

In 1946 the newly-minted government inherited daunting challenges and was not prepared to deal with the Huk rebellion. Unavailability of agricultural land was the primary problem. While economic trade with the world improved, the fledgling government was unable to leverage this wealth and alleviate problems facing its population. Furthermore, there was catastrophic devastation throughout the islands as a result of World War II.

Considering these issues, the Philippines government underestimated the Huk threat. The government first minimized the Huk issue. In his 1947 State of the Nation Address, President Roxas declared there was “complete peace and order throughout the Philippines, except in a few limited areas in Central Luzon.” However, in his speech the following year he stated that “lawlessness...prevailed in practically every province.” Many government officials commuted daily from Manila to their Central Luzon offices for fear the Huks would kill them at night, while some simply abandoned their posts. While the U.S. did not provide military forces or fulfill Philippine requests for napalm and helicopters, it did provide military advisors who greatly influenced operations. Therefore, the campaign was almost entirely a Philippine-only struggle.

**Constabulary and the Population**

Relations between the population and government forces were dismal. When the Japanese were expelled in 1945, the government hurriedly reorganized the Constabulary to ensure security throughout the archipelagos, often admitting people to its ranks such as Japanese collaborators and bandits. These troops often took food and supplies from people without compensation.

In addition, the Constabulary employed tactics that alienated the population. For example, in attempts to gather intelligence, troops adopted a tactic known as zona. This practice involved sealing-off a village to interrogate villagers and prevent them from supporting the Huk. This practice enraged villagers since the Japanese used this tactic to conduct interrogations, torture, and executions. This served to strengthen the villagers’ loyalties to the Huk. As a U.S. military advisor stated, the Constabulary “treated the people worse than the Hucks did.”

**Philippine Operations, 1950-1953**

On August 28, 1949, Huk forces attacked a convoy, killing Mrs. Aurora Quezon, wife of the late President Manuel Quezon. The Huks seriously miscalculated the effects of their attack—Mrs. Quezon was one of the best-loved ladies in the Philippines, and popular support for the Huks began to erode. This catastrophic event jolted the government to take stronger action, and President Quirino appointed Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense in late 1949. Within 15 months of his appointment, Magsaysay stopped the Huk offensive and removed the Huks’ popular support.

**Magsaysay’s New Strategy**

Assisted by U.S. military advisors, Magsaysay developed a new strategy for the armed forces. Initially favoring large-scale, conventional sweeps, he quickly reconsidered after reviewing the results of previous operations. Since the Huk had sent assassins to kill the new Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay lived with (then) Lt Col Edward Lansdale, a U.S. Air Force officer and military advisor in the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG). While
they were roommates, Lansdale listened to Magsaysay’s problems and helped identify key issues that needed to be addressed. He helped prioritize issues, suggest solutions, and let Magsaysay select the course of action he wanted to take. While other JUSMAG staff only ventured between the JUSMAG compound and AFP Headquarters, Lansdale accompanied Magsaysay on early morning field visits—pointing out operational shortcomings to Magsaysay’s untrained eye.

Lansdale’s discussions led to practices such as the government’s Economic Development Corps—a highly successful civil affairs program—as well as military deception tactics. In addition, JUSMAG codified basic counter-guerilla military operations in a manual for the Philippine government. In this way, U.S. advisors helped craft the unconventional tactics central to Magsaysay’s strategy—one that can be considered today as a counterinsurgency IO campaign.

The tactics Magsaysay proposed were unconventional, designed specifically to gain popular support and eliminate the Huks. In 1962, Colonel Valeriano noted, “Probably no campaign in Philippine history has seen such extensive use of unconventional operations as that against the Huks, especially after 1950.”

Philippine Counterinsurgency and Information Operations

The AFP changed its motto to reflect Magsaysay’s new counterinsurgency strategy. The old motto “Find ‘Em, Fight ‘Em, Finish ‘Em” was modified to begin with the phrase “Fool ‘Em” to reflect the importance of affecting the enemy’s information system. In his book on counterguerrilla operations based on lessons learned from the Huk campaign, Colonel Valeriano stressed this point by stating, “first in importance, and first in difficulty, is fooling the guerrilla enemy, misleading, eluding, or blinding his information and observation screens. Undoubtedly, one can see the emphasis on performing what is known today as “Information Operations.”

There are several IO capabilities at work throughout Magsaysay’s counterinsurgency plans. Military professionals today can easily characterize Magsaysay’s plan as including a comprehensive and successful IO campaign to defeat the Huk insurgency. In 1984 the U.S. Senate noted that the strategy devised by Magsaysay in 1950 “laid the foundation for U.S. counterinsurgency strategy to this day.” Therefore, it is useful to examine the specific elements of this “IO campaign” to see how it helped defeat the insurgents.

Military Deception (MILDEC)

Military deception focuses on presenting information to the enemy that causes him to behave as you desire. The AFP incorporated military deception in their operations to defeat Huk insurgents. Using deception techniques, government forces achieved greater success than had previously been achieved in operations that did not employ military deception. As emphasized in doctrine today, deceptive techniques were designed to affect the information available to the Huks, leading them to act in a manner benefiting the AFP.

Posing as Enemy Forces

The AFP became adept at posing as Huk insurgents. Highly risky infiltration operations were conducted to penetrate enemy strongholds, learn more about the adversary’s behavior, attack specific units, and confuse the Huks. The strict restrictions placed on joining an infiltration team posing as Huk soldiers was so rigorous that it is better defined as a “Special Information Operations,” and an example is provided in the SIO section of this paper.

Some of these deceptive operations were wildly successful while others were not, since there was no formalized process between AFP units for establishing and training these infiltration teams. However, taken in aggregate, posing as the enemy certainly served to confuse the Huks. What was the affect on Huk behavior? Certainly, the Huks began to distrust other Huk units for fear that they were actually AFP troops. For example, after the use of AFP forces disguised as Huk soldiers became so prevalent, two Huk units fought against each other—each one being convinced that the other unit was actually AFP forces in disguise.

Confusing and Luring the Enemy

Perhaps the most creative IO tactic used simply involved “luring” or “confusing” the Huks. Methods ranged from highly-coordinated to very simple deception techniques. In each case, AFP action was taken purposely to cause the enemy to respond in a specific manner.

During the daytime AFP units would depart an area, which caused the Huks to believe they had ended their operations there. Observing this, the Huks would believe the area was safe and return to it. In reality, though, AFP operations had not ended and government forces returned to the same area under the cover of darkness to surprise their Huk adversaries. The results of the AFP’s military deception strategy were excellent. After years of successful operations, Huk foraging tactics were severely curtailed and they were forced to demand more support from already poor Central Luzon peasants, often offended their sympathizers by using harsh tactics. Intra-unit suspicions were aroused, and they were under constant lookout for government forces—increasing their operational tempo and degrading their readiness posture. The AFP learned that deceit, in any form, proved to be a particularly effective method of combat for Philippine forces.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

For the first three years of the Huk campaign there was virtually a one-way PSYOP war—that of the Huk extolling their virtues and deriding the government. However, in 1950, the AFP’s use of PSYOP gave it a considerable advantage over their guerrilla adversary. While
the Huks waged PSYOP toward the population, the AFP waged a PSYOP campaign, referred to as the “psy-war,” toward both the people and their adversaries.

**PSYOP Strategy**

Magsaysay’s overall message was a simple one: the government would provide “All-out Force or All-out Friendship.” Magsaysay developed a strategic PSYOP plan that addressed several target groups that included the dissidents (both “die-hard” communists, Huk soldiers, and misguided peasants), the neutral population, and even the AFP itself. Note that, while the researcher can delineate between messages specifically for the Huk soldier, the AFP needed to communicate these messages to the Huk, his sympathizers, his civilian opponents, and the neutral population, since he was unable to distinguish between Huks and the population at large.

**Institutionalizing “Psy-War”**

Magsaysay was convinced that the AFP itself was the best method to prosecute what he called the “psy-war”—not only toward Huk soldiers, but to the populace as well. To that end, he took dramatic steps to ensure the PSYOP campaign was strongly ingrained throughout the AFP’s combat units. To institutionalize his vision, Magsaysay reorganized the AFP. He provided the strategic leadership for the psy-war. At the operational level, he established a Public Affairs Office (PAO) to oversee 8-10 man tactical-level psy-war teams. These teams were integrated into each combat company and included equipment for typing, public address, video, and copy making. Personnel with valuable skills were included, such as typists, artists, draftsmen, and technicians. In this manner, the AFP was organized in a manner that enabled commanders at the tactical level to prosecute the psy-war using local discretion and creativity.

**Special Information Operations (SIO)**

In 1948 the Huk movement in Southern Luzon gained momentum and attempted to connect with Huk forces in the north—presenting an opportunity for AFP forces. The AFP developed a highly-secretive team, referred to as “Force X,” to infiltrate the Huk organization in south Luzon. Information was vital to the team’s success. Thus, after being selectively screened for entry into Force X, members underwent a four-week training program designed to enable them to infiltrate the Huk. Ex-Huk soldiers taught team members Huk speech, songs, customs and mannerisms. Force X also recruited and incorporated AFP soldiers who were recently wounded in action and still recovering from their injuries. Members carried items found on dead Huk soldiers, to include communist propaganda, weapons, pictures of loved ones, and indoctrination materials.

PSYOP lent credibility to Force X and provided an introduction into Huk forces. On April 14, 1948, fake battle took place between Force X and two Philippine Constabulary companies in a southern province—the battle was widely reported. Huk units wanted to know more about their “brethren Huk force,” and Force X infiltrated two Huk squadrons who accepted their cover stories. More Huk units joined this group, including Huk from Central Luzon. After six days, when the members of Force X noticed that the real Huks acted coolly toward them, they coordinated an attack that dismantled the Huk squadrons in an instant.

This example not only indicates the massive effects of SIO, but it also displays how various aspects of IO must be integrated to ensure success. Certainly intelligence played a central role in Force X’s success, as did MILDEC, PSYOP, and OPSEC. A failure in any of these IO capabilities could have sabotaged the impact of this particular SIO.

**Assessing Philippine IO Strategy**

The Philippine government made excellent use of IO to help defeat the Huks. With the assistance of U.S. advisors, the government employed deception to interdict and disrupt Huk logistics and degrade enemy readiness. Well-orchestrated PSYOP achieved what military conflict failed to do—appealing for Huk fighters to surrender while wooing the general population. The PSYOP campaign was supported by the civil affairs activities that leveraged AFP and government resources to assist the public. This reversed destructive practices of government troops and employed them as an essential resource to befriend disenfranchised peasants. Information gleaned from former Huk rebels proved vital to infiltration teams who not only destroyed Huk units but also learned their practices and hiding places. Across the board, IO tactics significantly influenced enemy information systems to facilitate the government’s success. The Huk
rebellion shows that IO provides forces with the unconventional tactics necessary to defeat insurgents.

Lessons For Today

A striking similarity between the Philippine situation in 1946-1950 and Iraq today is the introduction of a fledgling government and an entrenched opposition. An important lesson from the Huk rebellion is that success centers around attracting and sustaining public support. Attacking insurgents simply as a “military problem” alone only served to expand the insurgent’s influence in the Philippines. Leaders understood that the best way to gain popular support was through an effective IO campaign—not through military firepower alone.

Today, U.S. forces find themselves in a similar environment as the AFP did years ago—fighting insurgents without being able to easily distinguish them from the population at large. Attracting public support while influencing the enemy is crucial in this environment. Like the AFP, U.S. forces must employ PSYOP techniques to convey “ethical and religious messages” that may cause insurgents to abandon safehouses or avoid locations. PSYOP offering amnesty or fair treatment in exchange for surrender or information must also be liberally employed.

Indigenous IO Strategy

The IO campaign during the Huk rebellion was an indigenous campaign. The U.S., although crucial to the campaign's success, served only in an advisory role. The Huks were skilled at vilifying the Americans as occupiers and evil capitalists. The fact that the local populace in Luzon could identify positively with their own officials was vital to the use of IO and removed the Huk’s ability to incite anger toward “American colonialists,” as it had done in the 1930s.

U.S. military forces are currently employing IO tactics in Iraq—not an indigenous Iraqi force. Therefore, the U.S. must work just as hard with the new Iraqi government to devise an IO strategy that will win popular support and defeat insurgents. Today, U.S. forces must prepare the future battlespace by establishing a military advisory group that can help develop an Iraqi IO strategy against the insurgents. The U.S. must identify the insurgent’s key centers of gravity and prepare IO tactics to attack these centers of gravity. It must also determine what issues are important to the public and develop IO tactics to address these issues as well. Therefore, once an Iraqi government is in place, it can center its counterinsurgency campaign around unconventional IO methods. In addition, when Iraqi forces begin employing IO tactics themselves, this will remove the insurgent’s ability to attribute these tactics to the U.S. IO tactics performed by a credible Iraqi force will likely have greater public appeal than similar tactics employed by U.S. troops. In addition, using Iraqi forces also allows more IO options such as using indigenous personnel to infiltrate insurgent groups, much like the AFP’s “Force X” teams. Therefore, it is prudent to prepare now to help the new Iraqi government execute a coherent IO strategy.

Military’s Expanded Role

In Iraq today, the military must continue to foster the perception that it is able to assist the population. However, in addition to civil affairs performed by U.S. troops, the coalition must leverage the newly-organized Iraqi Army to fill civil affairs roles as well. Iraqi forces, guided by U.S. advisors, must also build schools, establish hospitals, and assist the local populace. This practice will not only engender greater popular support for Iraqi forces, but it will also set an important precedent of civic support and assistance within the fledgling Iraqi Army.

One “high-return” civil duty the military can perform is to enforce free and fair national elections. The Philippine elections of 1951 presented an excellent opportunity that greatly improved the AFP’s image and instilled trust in the electoral process. Since the 1949 Philippine elections were violent and dishonest, somewhat like the sham Iraqi election in 2002, and insurgents boasted that the 1951 elections would only further prove the government’s dishonesty. To reassure the public, AFP protected voting booths and quelled dishonest activity—in one case imprisoning a town’s entire police force for allowing the assassination of a candidate whom it disapproved. The peaceful and honest election of 1951 convinced many peasants that open elections were a sound alternative to organized revolt.

Conclusion

Any assertion that one aspect of a counterinsurgency campaign is solely responsible for defeating insurgents neglects the impact other activities contributed to the final outcome. Thus, asserting that the IO strategy was the “key to success” would be fallacious. What can be stated with certainty, however, is that the Philippine IO campaign was overwhelmingly successful in achieving its goal to help defeat the insurgents. Considering that, prior to introducing a comprehensive IO strategy, the Philippine government was losing the campaign against the Huks in 1949 and the dramatic way the AFP defeated the insurgents after incorporating capabilities of IO, there is a clear indication that the IO campaign was central to the government’s victory. In the end, the Huk rebellion was crushed largely due to an effective IO campaign. Certainly, current and future counterinsurgency operations must take into account the asymmetric effect an IO campaign can have to influence enemy behavior, gain popular support, and defeat insurgents.