
Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and Challenges of the Information Battlefield

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Editorial Abstract: LTC Derik Crotts, a career Public Affairs Officer, advocates operationalizing Public Affairs, equating PA to operational fires and offers some unconventional approaches to focus personal soldier technology to support PA objectives.

“It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy’s forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies.”

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

As we prosecute the Global War on Terror, and as military experts postulate that the future involves more “clashes with civilizations” than outright war, it becomes imperative to develop more effective non-kinetic operational capabilities.¹ For many, the panacea lies in information operations (IO). In September 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signed the Information Operations Roadmap.² This roadmap is to make IO a military core competency on par with ground, air, sea, and special forces.³ Directed at the enemy decision-making apparatus, IO is designed to impact the enemy’s information and information system and protect our own.⁴ Most IO capabilities produce effects directed at impacting adversary actions. Only public affairs (PA) is specifically directed at the internal and external audiences and stakeholders who support our operations.

Maintaining public support and will is a critical component, in many cases the critical component, to successful military operations. Commanders can claim victory but it is the public who will determine if and when victory is

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achieved. PA is the only tool in the IO arsenal specifically focused and directed to maintain public support. As a supporting capability to IO, public affairs is designed to quickly and accurately create awareness and understanding of campaigns and operations.⁵ It links the public with the military and establishes the conditions that lead to operational success.⁶

In today’s operational environment, PA involves more than facilitating media pools or managing press briefings. PA

impacts operational planning and to be effective must consider relationships between media relations, command information, and community relations. Unfortunately, most commanders are consumed by the overwhelming and instantaneous impact of media relations. The operational impact of new media and command information concepts and capabilities have placed commanders in a reactive operational posture, struggling to counter perceptions and maintain public support, based on the fragmented operational snapshot provided by the media. Today’s informational environment has transformed public affairs into an operational function commanders have failed to effectively synchronize. Unless operational commanders fully incorporate all PA capabilities into operations, develop procedures to harness information technology within their commands, and establish habitual



Military broadcasters possess the capability to deploy and produce their products in any combat setting.

relationships with the media, they will not maintain the public will necessary to sustain and win on today's battlefield.

Public Affairs Impact on Operational Planning Factors

By employing asymmetrical warfare techniques, our adversaries no longer require large armies or unlimited resources to be successful. How a commander assesses and applies information is critical to the successful synchronization of space, time, and force.⁷ How and when PA is used to impact or influence these factors becomes a decision point for the commander.

One decision centers on managing the blurred distance between home and the battlefield. With the public now capable of monitoring operations, in many cases as they occur, commanders are finding it difficult to stay ahead of the "rumor" mill. While Vietnam was the beginning of televised war, today's technology allows anxious families to remain constantly immersed in images of live combat and in contact with their loved ones, adding stress on soldiers by "miring them in domestic problems that distract from the mission."⁸

Some commanders are turning to public affairs to help mitigate new stresses

and strains caused by this interactive battlespace. When the 173rd Airborne Brigade deployed into Kirkuk, Iraq they took two American Forces Network broadcasters.⁹ Equipped with video phones, INMARSATs, and cell phones, they provided daily radio and television news and information stories to families and friends located in Europe and the U.S. This reduced the need for constant communication home by soldiers and enabled the commander to provide an unfiltered message to his audience. This employment of public affairs assets was emulated by

"The speed of information flow, combined with global reach, means many issues and situations "go public" well before enough information is available for proper assessment."

3rd COSCOM and 1st Armored Division (AD) when they deployed to Iraq.¹⁰

More critical than creation of an interactive battlespace is the immediacy of how information now flows. Commanders and public affairs officers (PAO) no longer have the luxury of operating passively. The speed of information flow, combined with global reach, means many issues and situations "go public" well before enough information

is available for proper assessment. As one PAO who worked on the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse case put it:

"[We] realized quickly that the only way we could keep pace with the situation was to go public right away with everything we had. We had only to consider SECRET reports and copies of the damning photographs floating around the Internet to tell us that we were already hopelessly behind the power curve. Everyone I knew recommended that the Army publish all the photos and reports we had or else every time another was unofficially released, we'd go through the same painful process... the issue of control of information (in the traditional or pre-information age, sense) needs to be re-defined at least. The simple fact is the ability to "control information" is gone forever."¹¹

In an information centered environment, public affairs must be actively employed to reduce the impact of the information flow of the operation. The instantaneous nature of information dissemination means both the commander and his adversary can modify actions and



PFC Jonathon Bell, AFN broadcaster, sets up an INMARSAT dish near Tikrit, Iraq, in preparation for sending video product back to AFN South headquarters in Vicenza, Italy.



SGT Aaron Talley, AFN broadcaster, communicates via INMARSAT from Kirkuk, Iraq, to AFN South headquarters in Vicenza, Italy.

decisions in real-time.¹² While the fluid nature of the information may prevent it from being controlled, it can be managed through coordinated and synchronized releases designed to shape the information battlefield.

Prior to going into Iraq the 1st Armored Division commander provided hundreds of portable transistor radios to his troops.¹³ This action served two operational purposes. It helped to maintain morale by providing an “escape” from the realities and stresses of war. But, more importantly, by using his deployed public affairs broadcasters, the commander could broadcast local command information over the radio to ensure information filtered down to the troops. While PA will not physically reduce the impact of space, or increase the size of the force, PA operations have a direct impact on time. They allow the commander to shape the battlefield by managing the effects of information flow.

Public Affairs As An Operational Function

While recognizing PA impact on operational planning factors, some

commanders and planners still see the value of PA being somewhere between PSYOP and civil affairs (CA). Since information flow is central to PA, many commanders see it as an integral capability in support of IO, but not as an outright function. They feel synchronization and flexibility of IO occurs only when public affairs, PSYOP, and civil affairs operations are combined.¹⁴ Their objective is to create a strategic communications capability at the operational level.¹⁵ In reality this alignment only results in diluting the PA message.¹⁶ Some senior military leaders fear IO places more responsibility on PSYOP information dissemination at the expense of PA credibility.¹⁷ Doctrinally public affairs are, and must remain, part of the IO planning cell. The PA objectives of providing truthful, timely and accurate information are constant. These objectives must be met for every operation, regardless of type or duration and, as a result, must be planned as a separate function.¹⁸

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One problem with the IO Roadmap is treatment of PA as a supporting or related capability of IO.¹⁹ In today’s operational environment, PA is always required. Operations may occur and be successful without the need for PSYOP, civil affairs, or computer network operations. Like the operational functions of logistics, command and control (C2), intelligence, and force protection, public affairs must be organized and controlled in every operation. Instead of combining PA with information operations, it should be equated to operational fires.

Like operational fires, PA is a capability that must be sequenced and synchronized with every operational function in order for the commander to be successful. Army Doctrine points to the fact that public understanding is critical to operational success:

Soldiers, participants and the public must understand objectives, motives and the nature scope and duration of friendly actions. The relevant audiences important to the commander are not limited to soldiers and the American public, but are also international as well as local to the operation.²⁰

Here lies the biggest difference between public affairs, PSYOP, and civil affairs. The PA objective is to ensure factual information is presented and understood. The goal is to maintain or garner support of our operations and motives through a free flow and exchange of information.²¹ When these objectives are intertwined with deception, propaganda, or misinformation the lines of truth are blurred.²² Ultimately we create a gap in our information capability that our enemy can/will exploit.

Though most joint commanders may not see PA as an operational function, they do recognize the importance of public affairs and the role it plays in shaping and influencing operations. Of particular concern to commanders is how PA controls, or interfaces with, the media. Many commanders feel the news cycle and news outlets are a resource that can be influenced and controlled. It is for this reason that many have lumped PA and PSYOP together in the perception management arena.

Advocates of these programs (strategic influence) said that the advent of a 24-hour news cycle and the powerful influence of Arabic satellite television made it essential that U.S. military commanders and civilian officials made the control of information a key part of their battle plans. Information is part of the battlefield in a way that it’s never been before. We’d be foolish not to try to use it to our advantage.²³

Unfortunately, some have drawn a very rigid nexus between PA and PSYOP control and use of information.²⁴ What appears to be occurring is a blending of the public affairs role to inform and the PSYOP role to influence behavior. In fact, while PSYOP previously focused only on the enemy's population and C2 mechanism, it now includes friendly and neutral nations,²⁵ clearly crossing into PA responsibilities and audiences. Even though PA and PSYOP messages may be coordinated and similar, their audiences and objectives are vastly different. Public affairs focuses on control in order to inform and educate friendly troops and allies based on facts and knowledge gained through insight, investigation, or study while PSYOP campaigns and messages are designed to discourage or dissuade the enemy.

A dilemma occurs because both often use the same mechanism, the media, as their main source of communication. Even when messages are synchronized the potential for confusion and misunderstanding is inevitable.

While PA and PSYOP principles may be conflicting, to some leaders, effects are all that matter. This view is supported by Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, former deputy director of plans for CJTF Iraq.

“Are we trying to inform? Yes. Do we offer perspective? Yes. Do we offer military judgment? Yes. Must we tell the truth to stay credible? Yes. Is there a battlefield value in deceiving the enemy? Yes. Do we intentionally deceive the American people? No. There is a gray area. Tactical and operational deception are proper and legal on the battlefield...in a worldwide media environment how do you prevent that deception from spilling out from the battlefield

and inadvertently deceiving the American people?”²⁶

As commanders struggle to manage perceptions they are attempting to gain unity of effort by synchronizing all information functions. The problem is not the use of deception or propaganda, but the use of PA assets to facilitate those efforts. For example, instead of using assigned AFN broadcasters to gather and report information to families and audiences in Italy and the U.S as originally intended, the 173rd Airborne Brigade used these assets to run the United States Information Agency (USIA) radio station in Kirkuk.²⁷ This action resulted in little command information filtering back to counter



AFN civilian journalist deployed to support operations. Shooting stand-up for AFN News.

wrong or limited information being presented by mainstream media. While tactically this use of assets seems logical, operationally and strategically it had major implications on broadcast and PA support to other units.²⁸

The solution to this information management dilemma rests with the bedrock of public affairs - truth and honesty. To be effective, all IO campaigns must be grounded in truth.²⁹ By integrating PA with PSYOP and using the same delivery means, the media, we muddy the information waters. In essence we lose control of the information source because the credibility of the information is placed in question.

If the goal of information operations is not to convey the truth, or provide the public access to information, then the use of PA assets is not appropriate.³⁰ By incorporating PA as an operations function we ensure clear/consistent operational messages. More importantly, commanders establish an effective framework to manage challenges of the information battlespace.

Coping With New Public Affairs Challenges

How information is obtained and disseminated has long been the sole responsibility of public affairs officers. While still true, advances in technology now require more direct input, influence, and management by operational commanders. Examples include the development and institution of media embeds, military blogs, and digital cameras on the battlefield. More than any other PA challenge, these new information exchange capabilities have the most significant impact on operational commanders.

As the 3rd Infantry Division advanced on Baghdad, the world sat captivated by live images being transmitted from atop an armored vehicle by NBC News reporter David Bloom. Since the American Revolution the U.S. military has dealt with media on the

battlefield and their accounts of troop exploits.³¹ Yet, not until Operation Iraqi Freedom had the military provided such an unfettered access to information. The media embed program, as it became known, was a product of years of frustration and consternation between military leaders and the media.³² One of the biggest concerns and challenges facing commanders centered on operational security (OPSEC). Commanders were concerned that, as in Somalia where the media met Navy Seals as they came ashore, if the media were given too much information the ability to gain the initiative through surprise would be hampered. Knowing the enemy

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was watching the same live news feeds being sent by Bloom, and other embeds, commanders had to make critical decisions concerning the information conveyed. There is little evidence OPSEC was comprised by embeds, but there were some close calls. For example, the world knew exactly where and when the rescue of U.S. Army PFC Jessica Lynch was occurring because of television news reporting.³³

This example points to the need for commanders to plan for the effects of media coverage of their operations. Whether a reporter is embedded or not is irrelevant. The ability of a commander to control or manage embeds actually reduces OPSEC vulnerabilities. It is the free lance reporter, or the “man on the street,” capable of transmitting instantaneous images of on-going operations, who poses the biggest threat. Media will be present during every operation and while we can not regulate how or what the coverage is going to be, like the weather, we can plan for its impact.³⁴

Commanders must incorporate into their planning cycle development of habitual relationships with the media. The old Army adage “train as you fight” is more than apropos. How commanders incorporate national, international, affiliated and unaffiliated media into operations has become a critical planning factor. No longer is “dealing with the media” simply a PAO role and responsibility. It is a factor influencing the operation and impacting the objective, pushing PA into a function that must be coordinated and synchronized to gain maximum battlefield effect. While a news report may not make an operation successful, it can cause it to fail.

The impact of the Abu Ghraib images clearly shows how information can negatively affect operations. The

tool used to transmit these images, the Internet, has emerged as one of the most significant information management challenges for commanders and PAOs. Soldiers have always written letters home. However, their ability to instantly send messages or post their exploits for the world to see is a new phenomenon. Not only do commanders have to plan for embedded media, now they must account for the “entrenched” media - the service member. In many cases, it is individual service members who now set the agenda for national debate and establish conditions for effective information exchange.

In instances like Abu Ghraib, the images taken and distributed by soldiers severely undermined the credibility and effectiveness of U.S. operations. It is not that photos were taken, or even released,



it is how and when they were released that had the most significant impact. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld put it:

“We’re functioning with peacetime constraints, with legal requirements, in a wartime situation in the Information Age, where people are running around with digital cameras and taking these unbelievable photographs and then passing them off, against the law, to the media, to our surprise.”³⁵

Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement provides two points of concern - “passing them off, against the law” and “to our surprise.” It is for reasons like release of Abu Ghraib images, that commanders have developed elaborate control measures for their Internet warriors. Some commanders have restricted soldiers from carrying cell phones or digital cameras on deployments.³⁶ But, in the long run service members will find a way to speak their mind. To address the “passing them off, against the law” concern, education becomes the key to success. Simply making sure service members understand legal requirements will prevent the “against the law” concern. Operationally, the “passing them off” issue should never be a concern. If service members can obtain proof of wrong doing they should always “pass it” to the appropriate authorities. What they need to understand is how, when, and where the use of cameras are appropriate.

As for “surprise,” leaders should never let this happen. With proper planning the “surprise” scenario is avoidable. Digital photos, video cell phones, and web pages are all part of the “Information Age.” Soldiers and the public have become accustomed to a free flow and rapid exchange of information. Many of today’s leaders were born before the Information Age and have adapted to it - some more easily than others. Our privates, airmen, petty officers, corporals, and sergeants were born, live and naturally function in the Information Age. Use of information tools and their communication capabilities are second nature to them. While leaders could control the information flow from their units by implementing a World War II version of censorship, today’s public would not tolerate this infringement on free speech.³⁷

Instead of developing measures to prevent or limit troop information

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exchange, commanders must find ways to harness its capabilities. New information capabilities offer commanders the opportunity to gain valuable insight into operations. Each service member becomes a sort of quasi combat cameraman offering a first hand perspective of the facts. If incorporated into overall operations, insights gleaned from “unofficial” photos and after action reports (blogs) can eliminate or prevent inefficiencies or inadequacies. Some have discovered that “soldier blogs” offer a venue to tell the “Paul Harvey” version of an operation. Many see this “new era of news gathering” as a way to “fact check” the media, with soldiers providing first hand, factual, and unfiltered account of what is happening in the war.³⁸

Operational challenges facing commanders deal more with mission security than the actual conveying of information. With no specific guidance to control/limit blogs or Internet use, each command has taken a different approach to managing this information exchange function.³⁹ The result is a failure to capitalize on what potentially could be one of our greatest informational assets – the service member with his digital camera and his website.

Meeting the Challenge

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Mr. Larry Di Rita, sums up the challenges facing joint commanders.

“Communication is becoming a capability that combatant commanders have to factor in to the kinds of operations they are doing. Our job is to put out information to the public that is accurate and to put it out as quickly as we can.”⁴⁰

Ensuring the accurate and timely flow of information to influence and maintain public support is the role of public affairs. Until commanders

“To mitigate or nullify the effects of the propaganda, the IO staff must determine the appropriate countermeasures, as well as anticipate the effects of those countermeasures and the opponent’s response.”

recognize that media relations/facilitation is but one aspect of public affairs, we will continue to have a conflict between public affairs and IO. Unless PA is seen as an operational function with all of its capabilities exploited to the fullest, commanders will never achieve a fully integrated and synchronized operation. The non-kinetic impacts or effects of public affairs are clear. Yet, its full capabilities are rarely understood. To assist commanders in their effects-based IO, the following recommendations are offered.

Recognize the full capability of public affairs activities before we deploy troops. Some military leaders feel information superiority was lost when the media departed Baghdad and that due to a lack of PAOs “good news” stories stopped being told.⁴¹ While it is unrealistic to think PA assets could produce anywhere near the volume of 6000 stories a week filed by nearly 800 embedded reporters, it does not mean when the reporters depart, commanders lose the information advantage.⁴² While

embeds offer the best method to reach the widest audience, they are not the only method. Just as every unit has some means to acquire fire support, every unit should plan and use public affairs throughout their operation. Using PA broadcast teams to acquire and distribute news and information stories via Armed Forces Radio and

Television Service (AFRTS) is but one means to ensure distribution of the “good news.” With the Pentagon Channel, managed by AFRTS and the Defense Media Center, now reaching more than 200 cable distribution outlets and available on DISH Network secondary service, DOD has

the ability to reach more than 2 million plus viewers.⁴³ With the exception of the stove piped efforts by Armed Forces Network (AFN) Europe to embed military reporters into units, AFRTS assets were not even considered until nearly six months into operations in Iraq.⁴⁴ Even then the focus was simply distribution of AFRTS services to soldiers in Iraq and not acquisition and distribution of news and information back to CONUS.

Use technology as an information multiplier not a hindrance to OPSEC. Soldiers possessing digital cameras or operating blogs should be organized, not disbanded or restricted. These soldiers should be viewed as a new version of combat camera. They should be encouraged to take photos and develop their blog sites. However, procedures must be developed to ensure these tools are maximized. Security at the source has long been the mantra of the intelligence community. With detailed procedures of what is allowed for public release and



AFN broadcaster uses laptop editing system to produce final product for distribution throughout the AFN Network and the Pentagon Channel.

what must be cleared, commanders could easily allow the soldiers freedom of expression while at the same time prevent violations of OPSEC. Additionally, the popularity of soldier blogs shows that this mechanism offers one of our best opportunities to tell the “whole story” to the public.⁴⁵ Soldiers have long been our best credentials. We should not stifle the initiative nor diminish the impact these creative warriors possess.

Build relationships and alignments with media before conflicts occur. If PA is incorporated as an operational function commanders will expect media presence as a normal part of daily operations. Embedded media accompanying units during live fire exercises, training center rotations, or normal operations and intelligence briefs at bases build the relationships needed to continue the good news long after major combat subsides. While you can not expect the Washington Post, New York Times, CNN, or Fox News to cover every event, they must never be discounted. The media is eager to cover our operations, and want more opportunities to train with us and learn more about how we operate.⁴⁶

Finally, as a function, PA must become synchronized internally. The development of the Joint Public Affairs Operations Center is a good first step.⁴⁷ Next, we need to incorporate this element at each Combatant Command. Then, we need to combine all service public affairs at the DOD level. Soldiers represented all branches of the military as the person of the year for 2004 on the cover of Time.⁴⁸ While we still need to manage individual service issues, as a function and as a whole, the world sees us as one entity. When there is a Navy Tail Hook scandal, an Army drill sergeant abuse case, an Air Force Academy sexual assault, or a Marine hazing, the world sees one organization - the military. Our PA operations must begin to function more like a public relations firm. We can have different management teams but we all must collaborate for the good of the company.

We must reorganize and redistribute AFRTS and combat camera assets. When Major General Mark W. Clark

established the Blue Danube Network in 1945, what became today’s American Forces Network South, he stated he did not want just another AFN.⁴⁹ He saw the need for a tool that would provide more than radio entertainment. Today, each Service has its own robust information acquisition and distribution systems. The Air Force News Service, Navy Media Center, Army Broadcasting Service, Soldiers Radio and Television, and combat camera all acquire and produce video, audio, and photo products. With this immense broadcast capability, the military is capable of supplementing, or even competing with, mainstream media coverage. By combing assets under a single command and assigning broadcast teams (three people) to each Brigade Combat Team, Carrier Strike Group, Marine Expeditionary Force, and Air Wing, the operational commander would possess organic capability to communicate globally via radio, television, or the Internet.

Conclusion

It is clear that today’s information environment has created a new operational function that commanders must understand and synchronize in order to maintain public will and operational tempo necessary to sustain and win on today’s battlefield. Public affairs are a function that has long been a part of every military action. It impacts perceptions and public opinion to the point that every operational planning factor is influenced by it in some way. PA provides commanders with a non-kinetic fire capability that, if and when synchronized and coordinated with other battlefield functions, can produce substantial positive operational effects. While the effects produced by PA may not win a battle, evidence is clear they can cause a loss of public support and change perceptions to a point that operational objectives are altered or not achieved.

Commanders are faced with many challenges on today’s asymmetric battlefield. No longer will operations be carried out without media coverage.

Access to and speed of information transmission capabilities by the media, service members, and adversaries’ means commanders must plan for and synchronize the effects of public affairs. They must develop procedures to incorporate the capabilities of their service members and the media. Commanders must recognize that PA operations involve more than facilitating media pools or managing press briefings. To achieve a fully integrated effects-based information program, commanders must consider the relationships among all PA functions and how they support other operational functions.

What the public thinks and perceives about operations is as important as influencing the adversary through deception or propaganda. By increasing and combining PA functions, a synchronized capability can be established that provides a broader operational perspective and effectively counters the fragmented operational snapshot provided by the media. In order to maintain information superiority and meet the information challenges, commanders must begin to consider and manage public affairs as an operational function not just another IO capability.

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