

propagation of effects on global networks and inherent processes. It is evident that the effect of interdicting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could have nearly as great of an effect on the world economy as perhaps an attack itself, due to the disruption of global networks, such as on the maritime transportation system. In the Global Ripple Model, the primary networks of interest are those that depict international transactions of four global processes: *travel* (transfer of people), *transportation* (transfer of commodities), *finance* (transfer of money/credit), and *media* (transfer of data/knowledge via telecommunications).³ These various processes can be mapped to a small number of global hubs, related to key international cities, that are linked to subsidiary regional and local networks. It is envisioned that when the GISC reaches full operational capability at the end of this calendar year, the JIOC will continue supporting PTDT/GISC with an in-place liaison and virtual planning support through USSTRATCOM channels.

Next Generation Warfare

Lately, a lot of literature has debated the set of conditions which define the “global struggle against violent extremism”⁴ or more commonly referred to as the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The body of literature refers to the present war in such phrases as Fourth Generation Warfare, Small Wars, Irregular Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, and so on. My purpose here is not to classify the type of war or struggle in which we are presently engaged, but rather to define some of the realities of this generation of war, which arguably started in 1979 with the Iranian revolution, vice the popular belief that hostilities began in September 2001, or thereafter with the US-led allied operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The major point is that the globalization of economies, transportation, and telecommunications, and other global processes enabled adversaries to wage global war on the US and our allies. To quote Thomas Hammes: “Fourth-generation warfare uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.” Further he states, “It is an evolved form of [global] insurgency.”⁵

The recent change in terminology at the highest levels of government from GWOT to the *global struggle against violent extremism* is the beginning of a realization that this conflict cannot be won by military might alone—the extremists have learned to bypass the military. This is a strategic communications (SC) message indicating a change in our national strategy. The extremists are attacking vulnerabilities within the political, economic, and social sectors—utilizing global infrastructure to their advantage and to our disadvantage. In order to erect an active defense and to gain the advantage

in this continuing confrontation, we must use a network-based analysis approach to foreclose or divert adversary avenues of approach and attack.

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group

Many initiatives, like PTDT, were started shortly after the events of 9/11 with the goal of improving our capabilities against future terrorist attacks. Recognizing that combating terrorism requires capabilities beyond those of any single agency, General Tommy Franks, USA, Commander, CENTCOM, requested permission in October 2001...to establish an “interagency coordination cell.” Secretary Rumsfeld authorized a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and granted it the rare authority to coordinate directly with the necessary agencies. General Franks, in November 2001, approved a Joint Interagency Task Force—Counterterrorism (JIATF-CT). The task force was established quickly, but the interagency process inside Washington crept.⁶

Interagency coordination is not a new idea. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, was published on 9 October 1996, comprising nearly 400 pages of guidance in two volumes. However, this ten year old doctrine is sorely out-of-date and does not reflect the creation of the Department of Homeland Security or the

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reorganization of the intelligence community since 9/11. Volume II of the doctrine outlines various United States Government (USG) organizations, but is sorely lacking in detail in the description of *Capabilities and Core Competencies* of USG organizations and non-government organizations and private voluntary organizations.

In essence, the current doctrine is focused on “our Nation’s military power, particularly in ‘military operations other than war [MOOTW]’”⁷, and is not geared for day-to-day operations of the GWOT. Of note, JP 3-08 has been revised to reflect changes from the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and is pending approval and publication.⁸ Of course it is great that we have any guidance at all regarding interagency coordination.

The JIACG concept, attached to a joint task force, was tested in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Joint Staff’s assessment found that the JIACGs “integrated...U.S. Government objectives in each region, and created a forum for ...interagency operations planning and coordination.”⁹ Of course the main shortfall in this finding is the word ‘region’—the JIACG capabilities must be calibrated to engage in a global struggle and not merely established for regional conflicts. Prior to 2001, the interagency was assembled on temporary ad hoc basis, customized to the situation. A 2003 assessment of the JIACG voiced strong support for the concept by participating members. As noted by Colonel Matthew F. Bogdanos, who served on JIATF-CT: “integrating the elements of national power by leveraging each agency’s core competencies most

effectively requires *knowing which agency does what best*.¹⁰ Despite the great reviews, still little progress has been made to formalize the JIACG in Washington.

In defense of the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs), many have established JIACGs within their commands to coordinate with outside agencies. The remaining limitation is that the National Security Council (NSC), currently by default the only body with the authority to issue guidance, has not published JIACG doctrine and thus far the Deputies Committee has only issued nonbinding guidance. Since the JIACG is essentially a ‘coequal group’, there is the continuing issue of ‘lead agency’ status. Michael Donley, who served the NSC from 1984-89, has suggested a solution: “This approach has for DoD a strong analogy in the unified command system...[the lead agency] is responsible for assigned missions.”¹¹ On a positive note, the National Defense University (NDU) was charged in October 2003 to develop a course of instruction designed to enable each COCOM’s JIACG to accomplish its mission of facilitating interagency coordination at the operational level. The Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review (ITEA) program, conducted under the auspices of the NSC and sponsored by NDU initiated that training in March 2004.¹² Also, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has taken on the mission to standardize JIACG activities and to evaluate the collaborative information environment (CIE) that links COCOM staffs with the broader interagency community. JFCOM is preparing a JIACG fielding solution for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense review.

Elements of National Power—Capabilities and Core Competencies

While coordination between the COCOM staff and the JIACG (primarily via liaisons) at the operational level is a positive step, much more needs to be accomplished to fully mobilize the DIME-LE capabilities in the global struggle against violent extremism. Hopefully, ongoing JIACG training and JFCOM proposals will close more of the gap, in the near term. However, as cited, this is a global engagement, requiring use of all National resources, and may rely less upon fully fielded military forces in the future. Light, coordinated, and interdependent mobile forces, which Secretary Rumsfeld has long been urging, more likely will be utilized along the lines of the US Marine Corps Distributed Operations Concept.¹³ In fact, the military excels in planning and knowing exactly what capabilities can and should be brought to bear in various given situations. This military planning expertise must be lent to interagency personnel coordinating their efforts with those of DOD. Further, in order to employ non-DoD capabilities, there must be a better accounting of capabilities than those present within JP 3-08.


There is a template for employing the elements of national power. The military element categorizes capabilities via various documents and programs. For example, a Joint Mission Essential Task (JMET) is logged in a Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) which is essentially a menu of capabilities (mission-

derived tasks with associated conditions and standards, i.e., the tools) that may be selected by a joint force commander (JFC) to accomplish the assigned mission. These tasks are often used by COCOMs to build Master Scenario Event List (MSEL) inputs to identify key tasks to practice during military exercises. Utilizing other tools, often exercised, such as a Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL), the military identifies types of units and equipment to be deployed in sequence as scheduled to support operations plans of COCOMs. DOD can utilize this data for execution of deliberate (pre-planned) operations or for crisis operations with the ability to modify deployments as required. However, in this struggle, there is a need to employ the military element judiciously or in concert with other elements of national power.

Joseph Nye describes *Soft Power* as the ability to attract and persuade, which are inherent IO capabilities. Whereas hard power—the ability to coerce—grows out of a country’s military or economic might, soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.¹⁴ The USG is very good at deploying and employing the military element of power and has had a certain degree of success at employing economic power internationally. Currently, the US is experiencing diminishing success in the employment of diplomatic/political power, and if you evaluate informational power against negative international media reports concerning the GWOT, we are losing that former advantage of global prestige won during the Cold War. The wielding of these capabilities together form the crux of national strategic communications capability, but this is another area requiring NSC-level attention, since SC at the national level is both undermanned and under-coordinated at present.¹⁵ Our LE capabilities within the boundaries of the US are nearly unparalleled in any other nation. However, the 9/11 Commission exposed vulnerabilities of our LE agencies to communicate and coordinate effectively with other USG agencies.

...which agency does what best...?

The DIME-LE capabilities of the USG are formidable, but require synchronization and deconfliction, just like the various capabilities of Information Operations (IO) require. The JIOC mission is to plan, integrate, and synchronize comprehensive IO in support of JFCs’ and national level objectives. When intelligence and open-source information provide indications and warning, through and resources of the GISC and the PTDT program, USG lead agencies must rapidly plan for action and subsequent effects (collateral and cascading effects). Previous planning by DOD and DHS, and other national/international entities should mitigate the effects of terrorist attack trajectories on global structures. However, even with pre-planning and prior knowledge (possibly gained via interagency response exercises), the USG should have the ability to wield the appropriate the elements of national power through the interagency (e.g. Department of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, etc) at the best juncture in time and space.



The goal is to align USG capabilities (or those of partners and allies) against terrorist vulnerabilities (their functions and capabilities) to minimize impact on global processes. DoD's well-defined planning process can be augmented by a *Capabilities Compendium* listing specific characteristics and employment requirements of the other DIME-LE elements. Joint interagency planners must have the tool-set from which to choose in order to integrate the best-suited USG capabilities into a coordinated CT response, a foreclosure of the attack trajectory, or an exploitation plan to be enacted against the extremists. A national power *Capabilities Compendium* is essentially an enhanced UJTL, expanded to include all capabilities of national power, to form a complete "playbook" of options to employ. Such a compendium, can be used to determine the best capability, or mix of capabilities, to pass along as planning guidance to the lead USG agency, which may or may not be DOD.

The mission of JIOC J511 is to "develop IO Initiatives... for COCOMs and USG agencies in support of the long-term planning efforts of the GWOT...IO activities include traditional and non-traditional operations research and analysis...and planning support to strategic communications." Further, this effort is accomplished by "...develop[ing] future concepts for planning...and directly support[ing] advanced planning efforts of the PTDT and ongoing establishment of the GISC."¹⁶ The development of a prototype model to portray global processes and display subsequent ripple effects on networks due to disruptions generated by terrorist aims or employment of WMD is J511's current task from USSTRATCOM. To enhance JIACG and COCOM collaboration and planning, the concept of a *Capabilities Compendium* needs to be formalized, in order to effectively wield appropriate DIME-LE elements in the global struggle against violent extremism. Currently, this is the J511 focus, to answer the question posed by Col Rayfield and other commanders: "How can we fight smarter?"

Endnotes

¹ Lt Col Darryl R. Williams, USAF, Program Manager, PTDT, USSTRATCOM J242; JIOC briefing 6 Jan 2005

² Henry J. Cordes, Omaha World-Herald, *Omaha Gets Terror War Think Tank*, 10 Apr 2005

³ Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, The New York Times; *Washington recasts terror war as 'struggle'*; July 27 2005

⁴ Joseph S. Nye, author & University [Harvard] Distinguished Service Professor, various works and other sources of research by Major [sel] Ken Stoni, JIOC J511 Advanced Concepts & Applications

⁵ Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone*; 2004

⁶ Matthew F. Bogdanos, *Joint Interagency Cooperation: The first Step*, Joint Force Quarterly; Issue 37

⁷ General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, preface, JP 3-08; 1996

⁸ https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/draft_pubs/jp3_08v1.pdf & https://ca.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/draft_pubs/jp3_08v2.pdf

⁹ Matthew F. Bogdanos, *Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step*, Joint Force Quarterly; Issue 37

¹⁰ Interagency News, *ITEA Progress Report: JIACG Educational Program Scheduled for February 2005*, Vol 5 #10; Jan 2005

¹¹ Michael Donley, *Rethinking the Interagency System Part 2*, H&AI Occasional Paper #05-02; May 2005

¹² Fact Sheet, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)—A Prototyping Effort, JFCOM; Jan 2005

¹³ *A Concept for Distributed Operations*, USMC; 25 April 2005

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*; 2004

¹⁵ Jeff Jones, Director, Strategic Communications and Information, NSC, speaking at Fiesta Crow, San Antonio; 2005

¹⁶ Joint Information Operations Center, J511 IO Initiatives Branch, *Mission and Intent*; 2005